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Conflict Management and Peace Science published online 30 December 2013
DOI: 10.1177/0738894213508691

Article

cmps

Conflict Management and Peace Science
0(0) 1–26

DOI: 10.1177/0738894213508691
cmp.sagepub.com
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Victory without peace: Conquest, insurgency, and war termination

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Abstract

The decisive defeat of an enemy in conventional war—conquest—frequently brings about peace on the victor's terms; in some cases, however, conquest does not end the violence, but instead marks a transition to guerrilla war. What determines whether conquest results in war termination? While traditional theories of insurgency would predict that peace depends on appealing to the hearts and minds of the defeated population, I argue that conquerors in conventional wars cannot expect to win over the defeated population, and hence that avoiding post-conquest resistance requires quick and often brutal responses to initial opposition to deter potential challengers. I test this argument both statistically and through two sets of short paired case studies.

Keywords

Brute force, conquest, guerrilla war, hearts and minds, insurgency, victory, war termination

In international politics, force is the ultimate arbiter of disputes, and decisive military victory is the surest way to achieve one's political aims. When the Allies steamrolled into Berlin in 1945, there was no doubt that both World War II in Europe and Nazi Germany's plans for European domination were at an end. Yet, as American misadventures in Iraq have demonstrated, even a decisive victory in conventional war does not guarantee peace if the opponent responds with a sustained guerrilla campaign.

Why does insurgent resistance emerge following some decisive military victories in conventional war but not others? This question is significant for several reasons. Most obviously, whether resistance emerges following conquest in conventional war has obvious policy implications, especially given American conventional superiority, but also for other disputes around the world. To cite two examples, what would happen in the event of the decisive military defeat of the North Korean government, or in the event of a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan? Indeed, a good understanding of when resistance is likely after conquest should influence leaders' decisions about whether to fight in the first place, whether to accept compromise settlements prior to a final military victory, and when it may be worthwhile to

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encourage resistance among friendly conquered populations, as for example the British did in France during World War II. From an academic perspective, whether resistance emerges following conquest in conventional war is an important but understudied question, with implications for our understanding of important historical cases. The transition from conventional interstate wars to local insurgencies also points to the widely recognized but little-studied connections between interstate and civil wars.[1] Moreover, the recognition that resistance can continue after the collapse of the conventional armies has important implications for the bargaining theory of war, which has uniformly treated conventional collapse as a game-ending move that allows the conqueror to impose its preferred political settlement.[2]

While few studies have addressed this question directly, our conventional understanding of counterinsurgency suggests that the answer would hinge on the ability of the conqueror to win the hearts and minds of the conquered population. American strategy in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq has focused on winning over the target population through public works and the protection of the civilian population. Indeed, scholars and policy-makers both are quite clear that each application of brute force risks creating more insurgents than are killed.[3] Along these lines, Bush administration figures predicted prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 that benevolent American intentions and popular hostility to Saddam Hussein would result in the Iraqi public welcoming the invading forces. In this article, I argue by contrast that, while the conventional wisdom may be correct about the relative merits of brute force and a hearts and minds strategy in an ongoing counterinsurgency campaign, whether or not significant resistance develops after conventional conquest depends not on the conqueror's ability to appeal to hearts and minds but on the feasibility of successful insurgency. In brief, I argue that in the context of conventional conquest it is almost inevitable that at least some elements within the defeated population will be opposed to the political consequences of defeat, and that strategies that rely on goodwill among the defeated population create space for potential insurgents to carry out the critical task of organizing a resistance force. From this perspective, a number of plausible indicators of conqueror goodwill, such as limited political aims, democratic government or the removal of a despotic leader, will not guarantee an end to fighting, whereas factors such as a large occupying army, the removal of obvious resistance leaders, the willingness of the conqueror to respond disproportionately to violence, or terrain that limits opportunities for successful insurgency will be more likely to produce peace.

I test these predictions both with statistical analysis of cases of military conquest since 1815 and through two sets of paired case studies. The statistical results are quite consistent with these findings, suggesting that conquerors who are willing and able to respond quickly and lethally to violence will be less likely to face significant resistance. Confidence in the statistical results is necessarily limited, however, by the relatively small number of cases of conquest (fewer than 60 in primary analyses) in the post-Napoleonic period, which reduces the precision of individual estimates and presents obstacles to the use of multivariate tests. The case studies—of the German experience in France and Yugoslavia during World War II and the conquest of South Vietnam and of Cambodia by the North Vietnamese—thus allow me to evaluate the general plausibility of competing perspectives based on hearts and minds and on the ease of resistance, as well as to better assess the validity of specific hypotheses in individual cases. The results again indicate that appealing to the public does less to guarantee peace after conventional conquest than does convincing a defeated population, however hostile, that further resistance will be fruitless.

The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. I first expand upon the central question, clarifying what I mean by both decisive military victory (conquest) in war and subsequent resistance, and surveying the relevant empirical record over the post-Napoleonic period. I then review the relevant literature, highlighting key insights but also noting their limitations for the question of when military conquest produces peace. Building on available insights, I derive a set of testable hypotheses about the circumstances in which resistance is likely to continue following conquest. The next section presents quantitative tests of those hypotheses. I then turn to the case studies, discussing in each case why significant resistance either did or did not emerge and connecting these developments to my theoretical predictions. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my findings for American foreign policy and the study of insurgency more generally.

Military conquest and guerrilla resistance

I define "military conquest" as the forced operational collapse of the conventional military forces on one side of the war, such that it can no longer maintain conventional resistance. Conquest typically entails the collapse of an established military front, which allows the victor to penetrate anywhere in the territory of the defeated state, and thus undermines efforts at establishing a new front. At its core, conquest brings about the possibility of involuntary war termination from the perspective of the political leader on the losing side: when Soviet troops entered Berlin in May 1945, Hitler had to recognize that his ability to impose continued resistance had reached an end.[4] By removing the ability of leaders to compel a continuation of the war, conquest thus opens up the possibility of war termination on quite favorable terms for the conqueror.

That holds, however, only so long as individual soldiers and civilians on the defeated side do not coordinate to mount further resistance. While almost every conqueror encounters some degree of opposition, in most cases no organized resistance force capable of challenging the conqueror's hold on power ever emerges. In cases like the limited and largely peaceful French opposition to Nazi occupation in 1940, the Russian reoccupation of Hungary in 1956, and the North Vietnamese defeat of South Vietnam in 1975, conquest ended all serious fighting. The sustained violent resistance following the conquest of Iraq in 2003 is not an isolated case, however. Military victors from France in Mexico in the 1860s to Vietnam in Cambodia in the 1970s have on occasion found that glorious triumphs bring only a new period of fighting, less intense but often far more frustrating. Indeed, this possibility appears to be a persistent feature of international politics: thus, for example, it took William the Conqueror five years and a highly destructive campaign in northern England to put down the resistance that followed the Norman Conquest of 1066 (Rex, 2004). Moreover, even when such resistance does not occur, leaders must worry about it, as with American generals' fear that Nazi hardliners would respond to the occupation of Germany by waging a guerrilla war from the mountains in the South (Fritz, 2004: 9–10).

Most wars end prior to military conquest.[5] As I discuss below, a comprehensive search of conventional wars between countries identifies a total of 55 cases of conquest since the Napoleonic period. Of these, 23, or about 40%, were followed by sufficiently severe violent resistance in the months following conquest to challenge the conqueror's hold over the conquered territory. In those cases in which conquest occurs, it thus typically ends the war. When resistance does occur, however, it is usually quite extended, lasting on average over

four years; in roughly half of cases the conqueror is forced into substantial concessions to escape the violence.

Theory: Two perspectives on conquest and resistance

The central question then is what determines whether resistance continues after conquest.[6] Existing work provides surprisingly little insight into this question. Edelstein's (2008) work on military occupations covers similar ground, but as the discussion below demonstrates, a shared external threat—the key variable for him in predicting successful occupation—is rare in the aftermath of conventional conquest, and thus cannot explain most cases of post-conquest peace. Liberman's (1996) investigation of whether conquest can be profitable for the conqueror highlights several of the variables that I discuss below, but he focuses primarily on economic benefits and does not discuss cases in which conquerors encountered significant violent resistance. Similarly, studies of state-building after war, including after military conquest (e.g. Dobbins et al., 2003), typically focus primarily on cases in which violence did not resume and do not address in depth the question of why violence recurs in some cases rather than others. The large literature on insurgency has been more interested in the course, termination and outcome of insurgencies than in their initiation, focusing on questions such as how rebels recruit in the face of collective action problems or when counterinsurgents win, and even those studies that explore the onset of insurgency do not do so in the particular context of conquest in conventional war.[7] A few recent studies examine the determinants of violence after foreign-imposed regime change, but combine cases in which regime change was preceded by war with ones in which it was not (Enterline and Greig, 2008; Peic and Reiter, 2011). There is also a large historical literature on several prominent cases, although these studies typically are not framed in comparative terms and often take for granted the presence or (especially) absence of continued resistance after conquest.

Absent a strong literature on when guerrilla resistance emerges following conventional conquest, work on how one goes about *winning* a counterinsurgency campaign provides a useful starting point. The conventional wisdom in both policy circles and the academic literature is that victory in counterinsurgency hinges on winning over the "hearts and minds" of the local population; a purely coercive strategy that focuses on killing insurgents and cowing their supporters by contrast is expected to alienate the local population and thus prove counterproductive.[8] From this perspective, a natural expectation is that conquerors who are well positioned to win the hearts and minds of defeated populations will be less likely to encounter significant resistance.

I argue, however, that this natural expectation is incorrect. To understand why, it helps to start with the underlying logic of the hearts and minds approach to counterinsurgency. Unable or unwilling to mount serious conventional resistance, insurgents cede territory to their opponent and then selectively target weak points in the occupying army, while melting away into the general population or into the countryside whenever the opponent brings significant force to bear. Unable in turn to goad the insurgents into a direct clash, the counterinsurgents are thus left to hunt for them among the general population, on whom the insurgents rely for supplies and intelligence. The hearts and minds strategy thus focuses on winning over the civilian population and thereby gaining the intelligence necessary to track down the insurgents while cutting off their access to supplies. Central tactics in a counterinsurgent war are thus political, including providing public goods, developing an attractive

political vision for the country and discrediting the insurgent group. From this perspective, conquerors whose policies are expected to serve the interests of the local population more than a likely alternative government should be less likely to face significant resistance. This logic certainly lay behind American strategy in Iraq, where it was assumed that the Iraqi public would welcome occupation, and also plausibly explains the absence of resistance in cases like the Tanzanian overthrow of the genocidal and aggressive Idi Amin (Decalo, 1989).

The hearts and minds strategy was developed in response to colonial and communist insurgent challenges to the existing order, where by virtue of being the status quo the existing order had some degree of plausible legitimacy. Conquerors in conventional war, by contrast, have upset the status quo, and have done so as the enemies of the defeated state. The existence of a conventional war inevitably implies the existence of significant political differences with at least some elements of the defeated population, and the punishment imposed on the defeated population is more likely to alienate it than to win it over to the conqueror (Pape, 1996). As a result, even the most benignly intentioned conqueror will have difficulty winning the hearts and minds of its opponent. Consistent with this argument, both Enterline and Greig (2008) and Peic and Reiter (2011) find that foreign-imposed regime change is more likely to result in violence when it is preceded by interstate war. To cite a more specific example, although the Japanese recognized that Americans did not intend to seize territory from Japan, when asked how they had felt about Americans during the war, a plurality of respondents spoke in terms of hatred; they did not resist the occupation only because they recognized that further violence would be futile (Pape, 1996: 25–26). Moreover, given that conquest almost always results in leadership change and typically in more fundamental regime change in the defeated state, it also produces political losers who have particular reason to oppose the conqueror.

Conquerors do not, however, need to win over hearts and minds to avoid violent resistance. In the immediate aftermath of conquest, the insurgency is not yet established, and the conqueror needs only to ensure that it does not form. Quick retaliation after initial acts of resistance, even if it does not catch the perpetrators, may convince the defeated population not to back them. Thus, for example, after the conquest of Poland in World War II, the German army tracked down potential insurgents and imposed collective punishment on the population, thereby convincing the Poles not to act on their obvious hostility to the German presence (Mazower, 2008: 471). Indeed, as the case studies below demonstrate, collective punishment in response to initial attacks on occupying forces can turn the population *against* the guerrillas, who are seen as prolonging the public's suffering to no useful end. Even a conqueror less predisposed to collective punishment can avoid resistance if it can capitalize on its obvious military superiority to convince potential insurgents that further resistance would be futile, for example because the conqueror is sufficiently resolved on the issues at stake to indefinitely maintain a large occupying force that can respond quickly to any initial signs of resistance. Thus, while winning the affection of the entire population in competition with a local alternative may be impossible, convincing the population that it is not in its interest to back that alternative is feasible, and conquerors who are better positioned to do so should be less likely to face resistance.

We thus have two competing perspectives on what kind of conqueror would be less likely to face post-conquest resistance.[9] If avoiding resistance depends on appealing to the defeated population's hearts and minds, then the conqueror least likely to face significant resistance would be a trustworthy government with limited territorial and political aims that had not

already alienated the local population and that could make a strong case that its policies would advance that population's interests. By contrast, if resistance arises primarily where it is seen as both feasible and likely to work, then conquerors will be less likely to face resistance when they are willing and able to respond quickly to initial acts of violence and when the environment is less favorable to guerrilla tactics. Each of these perspectives generates a number of specific hypotheses about the likely correlates of post-conquest resistance. While space constraints prevent a full discussion of the logic of different hypotheses, I argue that those listed are salient in both popular and scholarly discourse and amenable to general tests.

Hypotheses from hearts and minds

Most obviously, a hearts and minds perspective would lead us to expect that conquerors will be more likely to face post-conquest resistance the more that their aims clash with the preferences of the defeated population. Thus, conquerors who intend to alienate territory from the conquered state or to extinguish that state's independence will inevitably anger the local population, potentially spurring it into resistance. Conquerors should also benefit to the extent that they can claim to be rescuing the defeated population from a repressive government, as with the aforementioned overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda, whereas conquerors who disrupt more popularly elected governments should be more likely to face resistance. Alternately, following Edelstein (2008), the presence of a common external threat to both the conqueror and the conquered state, as with the Soviet threat to West Germany and its occupiers after World War II, should help the conqueror to make a more credible case that its presence will be mutually beneficial.

Hypothesis 1: Conquerors with more limited territorial or political aims will be less likely to experience significant guerrilla resistance.

Hypothesis 2: The more repressive the conquered government, the less likely the conqueror will be to encounter significant guerrilla resistance.

Hypothesis 3: Significant guerrilla resistance will be less likely when the conqueror and the defeated country face a common threat.

Limited aims and benign intentions are worthless, however, if the conquered population believes the conqueror to be hiding more expansive "true" intentions. Because intentions are unknowable and because underestimating hostility can be extremely costly, absent strong and credible signals of benign intent, observers typically will assume that the powerful are hostile and will not believe professions to the contrary (Jervis, 1978). Thus, despite the Bush administration's intention to withdraw quickly from Iraq after the 2003 invasion, many Iraqis suspected that the Americans intended to return Iraq to colonial status (Pirnie and O'Connell, 2008: 62). From this perspective, even the best intentions may not be sufficient to win over hearts and minds on the defeated side absent some way of credibly conveying those intentions.

The question then is which conquerors will be able to credibly signal benign intentions. While debate remains, a large literature now predicts that democratic countries are better able to signal intentions—for example because opposition parties have incentives to reveal lies by the government and because the leader is able to stake her political future on following through on her commitments—than are autocrats (Fearon, 1994; Schultz, 2001).[10] From

this perspective, we would expect more democratic conquerors to be less likely to face guerrilla resistance. Likewise, claims of benign intentions are harder to make the greater the suffering that conquerors have imposed on the defeated side—when the conventional war has killed a substantial portion of the defeated population, it will be difficult for the conqueror to credibly claim to have that population's interests at heart. Finally, building on the observation of an innate human tendency to divide the world into an in-group and an out-group and to favor in-group members (Tajfel, 1981), and following arguments that cultural and religious difference provides an obvious basis for delineation in politics (Huntington, 1996), we might expect that greater cultural or religious differences between conqueror and conquered populations might be associated with an increased probability of resistance.[11]

Hypothesis 4: More democratic conquerors will be less likely to encounter guerrilla resistance following conquest.

Hypothesis 5: Significant guerrilla resistance following conquest in conventional war is more likely when the costs of the pre-conquest war are high.

Hypothesis 6: Significant guerrilla resistance following conquest will be less likely when the conqueror and the defeated population are culturally or linguistically similar.

Finally, there may be features of the conquered population that affect the degree to which the conqueror can expect to face significant hostility. From a historical perspective, the emergence of nationalism of the past few centuries is associated with an increased reluctance to be governed by outsiders, which might lead one to expect greater resistance in societies characterized by a stronger nationalist sentiment.[12] From a different perspective, Petersen (2002) argues that dominant groups within society who find their status challenged will be particularly likely to resort to violence. Sunni resistance in Iraq, which was triggered in part by anger at the perceived relegation of the traditionally dominant Sunni population to a subsidiary status, provides an obvious example. From this perspective, we would expect that the presence of a threatened social hierarchy on the defeated side would be associated with an increased probability of resistance.[13]

Hypothesis 7: Resistance following conquest in conventional war will be more likely when the conquered population has developed a strong national identity.

Hypothesis 8: Resistance following conquest in conventional war will be more likely when conquest threatens to alter the social hierarchy of the conquered state.

Hypotheses related to the (f)utility of resistance

If, by contrast, there almost always exists at least a portion of the population that is willing to contemplate continued fighting, resistance will be most likely where conditions are favorable for insurgency. Thus, difficult terrain, which provides insurgents with natural hiding places that counterinsurgents find difficult to control (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), will make guerrilla resistance more attractive following conquest. Resistance will also be more attractive when the occupying force is small and thinly stretched: such forces will provide attractive targets for potential insurgents and, more importantly, will be unable to completely control territory or to respond quickly and effectively to provocation.[14] Thus, for example, many observers have argued that the relatively small occupying force in Iraq in 2003 provided space for the Iraqi insurgency to develop, in contrast for example to the extraordinarily dense

occupation of Germany after World War II (Dobbins et al., 2003: esp. xvi–xvii; Ricks, 2006: 117–123). Similarly, occupying powers will be better able to respond quickly and effectively to early signs of resistance if they are operating in their own geographic neighborhood than if the conquered state is on the other side of the globe.

Hypothesis 9: Guerrilla resistance following conquest will be more likely in the presence of difficult terrain.

Hypothesis 10: The larger the size of the conquering and occupying army, the less likely it will be to encounter significant guerrilla resistance.

Hypothesis 11: Guerrilla resistance will be more likely when the distance between the conquering and conquered states is greater.

Even if the conqueror leaves an opening for resistance, however, it will be possible only if potential insurgents can overcome serious obstacles to collective action.[15] A central challenge for insurgents is to coordinate activities, especially given the disruption that accompanies conquest in conventional war: joining a small and unproven group will be both riskier and less likely to produce tangible benefits than would be coordinating resistance in a larger and better-run organization. Potential insurgents thus benefit from the presence of a leader from the pre-conquest state, who both serves as a focal point for resistance (overcoming coordination problems) and is more likely to have the skills necessary to conduct resistance effectively.[16] Thus, for example, in the War of the Triple Alliance Paraguay lost most of its remaining army in the capture of Humaitá and the fall of Asunción, but because Francisco Solano López remained at large, he was able to rally the Paraguayans around him to build a new force that continued the resistance.

Economic modernization poses another obstacle to guerrilla resistance. As Liberman (1996: 25–28) points out, modernization hinders resistance to a conqueror because the infrastructure of modern states facilitates rapid reaction to resistance, while city-dwelling citizens are less versed in violence, easier to monitor, and more vulnerable to threats to withhold food.[17] From this perspective, wealthier and more urban defeated populations will have greater difficulty organizing serious resistance.

Hypothesis 12: Resistance will be more likely when the pre-war political leader remains at large in the conquered country.

Hypothesis 13: More urban, economically developed societies will be less likely to undertake significant violent resistance after conquest.

The previous hypotheses all speak to the military feasibility of mounting resistance. Given the imbalance of capabilities between insurgents and occupying forces, however, most successful insurgencies ultimately attain their goals not through a purely military victory but by convincing the counterinsurgent to make significant political concessions.[18] By this standard, conquerors who are believed to be less resolved—more willing to make political concessions to avoid the costs of fighting—should be more likely to face significant post-conquest resistance. The conqueror's regime type in turn provides a potential indicator of resolve: given that democratic leaders are responsible to publics that presumably dislike paying the costs of war, opponents of democracies may reasonably conjecture that guerrilla resistance will be unusually likely to work (Wrede Braden, 2007). As importantly, laudable ethical scruples

imply that democracies generally will be less willing to resort to the kind of disproportionate or generalized retaliation for initial offenses that may convince the local population to turn its back on the incipient insurgency before it is able to establish itself.

Hypothesis 14: Guerrilla resistance following conquest in conventional war will be more likely when the conquering power is more democratic.

Data

The unit of observation for the dataset is the individual case of conquest. Conquest is coded as occurring at a point at which conventional resistance no longer is possible for the losing side, generally because the invaders have overrun the country or because the army has suffered a decisive defeat that led it to capitulate, go into exile or dissolve. Thus, examples of recent cases that are coded as ending in conquest include the North Vietnamese conquest of South Vietnam and, later, of Cambodia, the Iraqi conquest of Kuwait, and the American conquest of Iraq.

Coding cases of conquest requires that I first identify a list of conflicts in which conquest might have occurred. In doing so, I work from the Correlates of War (COW) list of interstate and extrastate wars, which includes conflicts between two states or between a state and a state-like entity that does not meet COW's restrictive requirements to be considered a state.[19] To be included, a conflict must involve two states that controlled territory prior to the start of the war (a requirement that excludes, for example, the many wars of decolonization, as the colony did not control the territory at the start of the war), and it must involve a conventional phase (thereby excluding cases like the Viet Cong resistance in the Vietnam War, which began as a guerrilla conflict). This coding identifies 55 clear cases of conquest. The list of conflicts corresponds fairly closely to Gleditsch's (2004) expanded list of interstate wars—nine cases, identified by consulting Lyall and Wilson's (2009) list of historical insurgencies, involve conquered polities, such as Dahomey or East Timor, that did not meet Gleditsch's requirements for inclusion, but that did claim state control over a defined territory. Excluding these cases from the analysis does not change the results.[20]

The next question is whether conquest is followed by significant guerrilla resistance. Given the dislocation associated with major military defeat, there is always at least a minimal level of violence following conquest; the question is whether that violence reaches a level sufficient to seriously imperil the conqueror's ability to impose its chosen political outcome. Thus, for example, in the context of World War II, the French resistance, although at times irritating, never endangered the German hold on France, meaning that France is coded as not experiencing guerrilla resistance. By contrast, partisan forces in Yugoslavia did pose a serious threat to the occupying Germans and Italians and their puppet Croatian state, thus justifying a coding of resistance. For there to be post-conflict resistance that challenges the conqueror's control, it must be the case that resistance occur within a reasonable timespan and that it be sufficiently serious. Specifically, I require that post-conquest resistance emerge within six months, and that subsequent fighting produce at least 1000 battle deaths (a conventional threshold for war).[21] Overall, of the 55 cases of conquest in the primary dataset, 23 experienced significant post-conflict resistance.[22] By itself, this observation implies that conquest in conventional war was sufficient to bring peace in the majority of cases, providing justification for thinking of it as a distinct type of war termination.

Many of the explanatory variables come from existing datasets. Regime type data comes from the standard Polity IV dataset, which provides coverage over the entire temporal period examined here. I use regime type from the year in which conquest occurred; using the democracy score from the year the conflict started makes no difference for results. For rough terrain, the primary measure is Fearon and Laitin's (2003) data on the percentage of a conquered country's territory that is mountainous.[23] The variable to capture cultural clashes comes from Henderson and Tucker's (2001) operationalization of Huntington's (1996) categorization of civilizations. Cultural clashes are coded whenever the conqueror and vanquished come from different civilizations.[24] War duration, one proxy for pre-war suffering, is the time from the beginning of fighting to the date on which conquest occurred. For the presence of a common threat, I adopt Edelstein's (2008) codings for cases found in his dataset, while coding other cases myself. I code defeated populations as having a national identity in all cases in Latin America and Europe, after 1900 in Asia, and after 1945 in Africa, except that cases such as Piedmont's conquest of the Two Sicilies or the North Vietnamese conquest of South Vietnam in which the conqueror comes from the same nation as the conquered country are coded 0.[25] For hypothesis 13, I need measures of urbanization and of economic development. For the former, I divide the country's urban population by its total population, using data from COW's National Military Capabilities dataset. For the latter, I use Maddison's (2003) data on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.[26] Finally, to capture the distance between countries, I rely on intercapital distance, logged to correct for skew.

Other variables used here were coded on the basis of standard encyclopedias of war, notably Clodfelter (2007), and secondary sources. Coding rationales for these variables, along with lists of the secondary sources used for coding, are contained in Appendix A of the Supplementary Materials.[27] The conqueror's territorial aims are captured by a trichotomous variable, with cases in which the conqueror makes no claim receiving a score of 0, those in which the conqueror makes a claim for some but not all territory receiving a 1, and cases in which the conqueror intends to completely incorporate the conquered country receiving a 2. To capture the conqueror's political aims, I code a separate variable that is equal to 0 when the invading country makes no claim on the opposing government, 1 when they aim for regime change, and 2 when they aim for annexation. Codings for war aims are based on stated intent at the time of conquest rather than final outcomes—for example, Britain is coded as making no territorial demands in its conquest of Egypt, despite the subsequent decision to turn the country into a de facto colony. Data on the size of conquering army and the number of battle deaths prior to conquest come primarily from Clodfelter (2007). In some cases, Clodfelter reports only casualty levels; on these occasions, coded deaths are estimated as one-third of casualties.[28] The size of the occupying army, again relying on data from Clodfelter, is measured at the time of conquest, which is the time at which the potential guerrillas are contemplating organizing themselves.[29] Finally, the dataset includes a variable to capture whether the pre-conquest political leader of the country, who forms the most natural leader for any guerrilla resistance, remained free to operate in the country.[30] Leaders who are dead, imprisoned, or in exile are coded as not present.

Statistical results

Statistical analysis provides a useful way of identifying and summarizing broad trends across a wide range of cases. There are, however, limits to statistical methods in this context, given

the limited number of cases of conquest and the large number of hypotheses. In particular, the standard probit or logit analysis conducted for bivariate dependent variables often produces separation, especially in the context of small datasets and when using largely categorical explanatory variables, as is the case here (Zorn, 2005). Perfect solutions to problems with separation do not exist, although a number of options have been proposed. For this paper, I use two approaches. First, I present results from probit regressions of each independent variable without controls, thereby avoiding problems with separation. Second, for multivariate analysis I make use of a linear probability model, which avoids problems with separation but introduces the possibility of non-meaningful predicted probabilities outside the [0,1] range. Neither of these methods is immune to criticism, but together they allow me to summarize what can be inferred from the data while also acknowledging its limitations. To limit concerns about the impact of particular coding decisions on my findings, I conducted a wide range of robustness checks for all analyses presented below, including introducing marginal conquest cases in several different ways, removing all cases in which conquest occurred after less than a month of conventional fighting, introducing a control for cases in which conquest occurred in the context of an ongoing war (as with the German conquest of France in World War II) and recoding Poland in World War II as experiencing resistance. Findings were remarkably robust to these changes; I mention exceptions in the discussion of the results below. In all regressions, I cluster standard errors on wars to account for cases in which multiple countries were conquered in the context of a single war.

Results of these sorts of analyses are most easily understood not through tables but with graphs. Figures 1 and 2 summarize results for the hearts and minds and feasibility of resistance hypotheses, respectively, in every case for a probit regression without controls. For each variable, the graph includes the point estimate and 95% confidence interval. Point estimates to the right of the central line at 0 imply that increases in the variable of interest are associated with an increase in the probability of resistance; point estimates to the left imply a decrease. If the line representing the confidence interval crosses the line at 0, the variable is not statistically significant at the conventional $p < 0.05$ level. To facilitate comparison, all non-dichotomous variables were standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. After standardization, a larger point estimate (further from zero) implies a greater substantive effect. To take a representative example, the first variable in Figure 1 shows the results for the analysis using the conqueror's territorial war aims. The point estimate here is close to zero, while confidence intervals stretch well on either side of zero. This result suggests that there is no clear relationship between the size of the conqueror's territorial war aims and the probability of post-conquest resistance.

Indeed, the hearts and minds hypotheses are generally unsupported in the data.[31] Larger war aims—either territorial or political—have no clear relationship with the probability of post-conquest resistance. Similarly, a longer or deadlier war prior to conquest—which the grievance perspective leads us to expect will be associated with greater hostility towards the conqueror—typically does a poor job of predicting resistance.[32] Any expectation that conquest of more representative governments would produce resistance (or alternately that liberation of oppressed populations would be associated with peace) is likewise unsupported by the data. Nor is the presence of a common threat associated with a statistically significant reduction in the probability of resistance.[33] The spread of nationalism likewise does not seem to have increased the probability of post-conquest resistance. The conqueror's government also does not have the effect predicted by the hearts and minds perspective. Although



Figure 1. Results for hearts and minds variables.



Figure 2. Results for ease of resistance/brute force variables.

Table 1. Difference and distance as predictors of post-conflict resistance (probit analysis)

	Huntington		Religion		Language	
Cultural difference	1.21**	0.72	1.46**	0.59	1.07**	0.25
	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.46)	(0.36)	(0.43)
log(Distance)		1.11**		1.03**		1.16**
		(0.25)		(0.20)		(0.23)
Constant	−0.82*	−8.77**	−0.70**	−8.04**	−0.59*	−8.87**
	(0.36)	(1.81)	(0.24)	(1.44)	(0.24)	(1.62)
Observations	55	55	55	55	55	55

Standard errors clustered by war. *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$.

statistically significant, the effect is in the opposite direction from that predicted, with more democratic conquerors significantly more likely to experience resistance.[34]

Cultural difference constitutes the one exception to this trend. Regressions using both Huntington's classification of civilizations and a variety of alternative measures of cultural difference consistently reveal that culturally dissimilar conquerors are more likely to encounter resistance than are culturally similar conquerors. Closer examination raises doubts about even this finding, however. Hypothesis 11 predicts that increased distance between conqueror and conquered state should be associated with an increased probability of resistance, as the conqueror will have greater difficulty reacting quickly to events on another continent than they will to events next door. Measures of cultural similarity are unsurprisingly highly correlated with measures of distance, raising the possibility that cultural variables may simply be proxying for distance. Indeed, Table 1 suggests that this is precisely what is happening. Three different measures of cultural difference—Huntington's classification, religious difference, and linguistic difference—are consistently associated with a significant increase in the probability of resistance in the absence of controls, but introducing a control for distance into the cultural difference regression consistently results in the difference variable losing both substantive and statistical significance, while distance is a strong predictor of resistance.[35]

Taken together, then, initial analysis suggests that none of the hearts and minds variables are robustly correlated with post-conflict guerrilla war. The story is quite different, however, when we turn to variables related to the ease with which resistance can be organized and the conqueror's willingness and ability to resort to brute force. Figure 2 graphs point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the variables of interest, standardized where appropriate. In every case, the effect of the variable is in the predicted direction and statistically significant. Resistance proves to be more likely in the presence of rough terrain, which should facilitate insurgency. Similarly, larger occupying armies, either in absolute terms or adjusted by the size of the conquered country, are substantially less likely to encounter significant resistance, consistent with the argument that small occupying forces will have difficulty maintaining order, allowing the defeated population to believe that resistance may succeed. The resistance-encouraging effects of distance have already been discussed, and are borne out in bivariate analysis. The modernization hypotheses are similarly supported: more urban and more economically developed populations, who are easier to monitor and who are less likely to have the experience with weaponry necessary for effective insurgency, are less likely to resist violently. By contrast, when the pre-conquest political leader—who should help

Table 2. Multivariate linear probability regressions

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Cultural clash	0.45*	0.23	
	(0.18)	(0.16)	
Territorial war aims	0.019	0.069	
	(0.084)	(0.074)	
log(Pre-conquest deaths)	−0.011	−0.036	
	(0.024)	(0.021)	
Conqueror's Polity score	0.030*	0.0097	−0.022
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Loser's Polity score	0.0028	0.000032	
	(0.010)	(0.0096)	
National identity	−0.087	−0.043	
	(0.15)	(0.11)	
Common threat	0.015	0.11	
	(0.58)	(0.49)	
log(Intercapital distance)		0.27**	0.24**
		(0.064)	(0.063)
Terrain			0.52†
			(0.27)
Occupying force density			−0.025
			(0.037)
Per capita GDP			−0.038
			(0.043)
Coordinating leader			0.44*
			(0.15)
Constant	0.45†	−1.35*	−1.62**
	(0.24)	(0.49)	(0.48)
Observations	36	36	35

Standard errors clustered by war. †$p < 0.1$, *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$.

potential insurgents overcome coordination problems and provide them with experienced leadership under difficult circumstances—is at large in the conquered country, significant post-conquest resistance is far more likely. Finally, the finding that more democratic conquerors are more likely to face post-conquest violent resistance is consistent with the expectation that scruples about physical retaliation and a perception that they are casualty-averse will lead democratic conquerors to be more likely to face significant resistance.

There are limits to the strength of the conclusions that we should draw from these results, of course. Absent control variables, we cannot rule out the possibility of omitted variable bias. As was noted above, however, inclusion of multiple control variables in the probit analysis produces overfitting and problems with separation; these problems are exacerbated by the presence of missing data for many covariates. One possible alternative is to resort to a linear probability model, which avoids problems with separation and which some methodologists advocate as frequently preferable to probit or logit. Table 2 presents representative results from linear probability models with multiple variables.[36] Model 1 includes the hearts and minds variables, omitting the variable for the conqueror's political aims, which is highly collinear with the territorial aims variable. Once again, cultural difference is the only variable that performs as expected; all others are statistically insignificant, except for the

conqueror's regime type, which has the opposite sign from that predicted. Nor is cultural difference robust. Model 2 replicates model 1 while adding a control for the distance between the conqueror and the defeated state. Once again, controlling for distance results in the cultural difference variable becoming statistically insignificant, while greater distance is strongly associated with an increased probability of post-conquest resistance.

Model 3 introduces the variables testing the utility of resistance hypotheses. Increased distance, the presence of a coordinating leader and rough terrain remain in the predicted direction and significant (terrain only at the $p < 0.1$ level), while the density of the occupying army and per capita GDP are in the predicted direction but no longer significant. The one notable change is that the conqueror's regime type now has the opposite sign, although it is statistically insignificant. As the Statistical Appendix details more fully, the statistical significance of variables in this model can depend on modeling choices, although variables that are statistically significant in model 3 are significant or near significance in most other models. Given the limited N, these results are quite strong, although they suggest that we should be cautious drawing strong conclusions about conqueror regime type.[37]

While the historical rarity of conquest places limits on the confidence that we should place in any single finding, the general message from the quantitative analysis is that the conqueror's ability to appeal to the hearts and minds of the defeated public plays a relatively small role in determining whether significant post-conquest resistance emerges. Instead, these results suggest that the primary determinant of whether such resistance emerges is the ease with which the conquered population expects that it will be able to carry out successful resistance.

Case studies

The quantitative analysis thus suggests that winning the affection of a defeated population is less important for avoiding significant guerrilla resistance than is the ability to demonstrate the futility and costliness of further resistance. That said, the strength of the quantitative tests is limited by the relatively small sample size, and a critic might argue that the focus on willingness and ability to appeal to hearts and minds or to use brute force, rather than the actual strategy of occupation, leaves open the possibility that countries are behaving "against type", introducing bias into the results. Short case studies can illustrate mechanisms in action and can examine specific strategy choices. I thus present two sets of paired case studies. The paired case approach allows me to make comparative static predictions (predicting that resistance is more likely in one case than in another), which, given that variables within a given perspective often will have crosscutting effects, should be more convincing than point predictions (predicting that a specific case should experience either resistance or its absence). The case studies are the German conquests of France and Yugoslavia in World War II and (North) Vietnam's conquests of South Vietnam and of Cambodia. By examining cases in which a single country conquers two others in a short period, I hold many relevant factors constant while retaining variation in the dependent variable. A hearts and minds perspective predicts that post-conquest resistance would be roughly equally likely in France and Yugoslavia, and would be more likely in South Vietnam than in Cambodia. A perspective based on the feasibility of resistance by contrast correctly predicts that resistance would be more likely in Yugoslavia than in France and in Cambodia than in South Vietnam.

Nazi Germany in World War II

Hitler's Germany provides the quintessential example of the rapacious conqueror, repeatedly overrunning neighbors while showing little respect for international law or human rights. Despite this record, however, the Germans faced little if any serious resistance in most of the conquered countries. Thus, while some resistance continued in the overseas French colonies, in occupied France, especially in the first few years of occupation, resistance was largely limited to protests, the publication of underground newspapers, and other forms of non-violent opposition; although acts of sabotage and direct violent attacks increased over time, they never constituted a serious challenge to German control.[38] Yugoslavia constitutes the most obvious counterexample: after an overwhelming conventional victory in the spring of 1941, the Germans quickly encountered violent resistance, especially by Tito's Partisans, that they were never able to put down.

A hearts and minds perspective would predict that the Germans would face resistance in both cases. In France, while their ultimate aims were unclear, they adopted policies that signaled an intention to incorporate roughly a third of the country into Germany, while leaving the rest governed by a puppet regime that was in no position to resist further advances (Paxton, 1972: 55–56). Yugoslavia they partitioned, dividing territory among themselves, the Italians, and the brutal Croat Ustaše, which massacred purported racial enemies, while making no assurances about any future Yugoslav state (Johnson, 1962: ch. 6). Moreover, in every place they occupied, the Germans were quick and brutal in responding to resistance, often resorting to collective punishment; recognizing that they were unlikely to be loved, the Germans sought only to ensure that distaste did not turn to violence (e.g. Heaton, 2001: 93; Mazower, 2008: ch. 15). It is thus unsurprising that even those occupied populations that were initially greeted the Germans as liberators quickly turned antagonistic.

To understand the absence of significant resistance in France, we have to recognize that most French citizens believed the war irredeemably lost and saw further resistance as futile (e.g. Bell, 1974: 56). This is not to say that the potential for resistance was not present—in the months after conquest, proto-insurgent groups emerged in several places throughout the occupied zone and Vichy France (Jackson, 2001: 286–287). Efforts to build a more general resistance force were stymied by the absence of a focal leader—Paul Reynaud, the prime minister during the conventional war, was in German custody, while the collaboration of other potential candidates like General Maxime Weygand and World War I hero Philippe Pétain convinced most officers not to rebel (Christofferson and Christofferson, 2006: 162)—and by the division of the country into multiple zones with significant variation in the nature and significance of the German presence, which presented potential resistance groups with varying concerns and thus complicated efforts to coordinate on a single strategy (Christofferson and Christofferson, 2006: 152; Jackson, 2001: 246). Especially in the months after conquest, the occupied zones were overrun by German soldiers, who could respond quickly to any potential threats. Severe retaliation against even non-violent acts of defiance, such as the execution of nine men and the deportation of many others in response to a strike by coal miners (Christofferson and Christofferson, 2006: 152), combined with collective punishment in response to acts of violence to cow potential guerrillas and ensure that the population on whom they would have to rely would oppose resistance (Gildea, 2003). In this environment, the population was split between those who actively accommodated themselves to what they saw as the new regime and those who still hoped that the British might pull off a miracle; neither group, however, saw anything to be gained by further fighting.

Several key differences are apparent in the Yugoslav case. First, the manpower requirements of Operation Barbarossa—the invasion of the Soviet Union launched two months after the conquest of the Balkans—meant that the German occupying force was comparatively overstretched, creating a space in which initial resistance by Josip Broz Tito's communist partisans and the Serbian-nationalist Chetniks could emerge. Brutal retaliation nonetheless convinced Draža Mihailović, the leader of the Chetniks and the recognized representative of the Yugoslav state in exile, to call off active resistance until such time as Allied troops entered Yugoslavia, and to put pressure on Tito to do likewise (Johnson, 1962: 163–164; Tomasevich, 1975: 145–146). The partisans, however, were able "to evacuate to the relative safety of the mountainous terrain", where overstretched German forces were unable to oppose them effectively (Gumz, 1998: 42; Heaton, 2001: 90, 99; Milazzo, 1975: 1–10). While the initial stages of resistance were nonetheless still a desperate period for Tito's forces, these differences made resistance sustainable in a way that it was not elsewhere in Europe.

Communist conquests in Southeast Asia

Most historical conquests have involved Western great powers overrunning smaller states. Vietnamese military successes in the 1970s, highlighted by the decisive end to the Vietnam War in 1975 and the conquest of Cambodia in 1979, thus provide an interesting set of comparison cases. In the former case, the conventional invasion of South Vietnam, which culminated in the collapse of the South's military forces and the capture of Saigon, brought a clear end to decades of fighting. In Cambodia, by contrast, the rapid destruction of Khmer Rouge conventional forces was followed by a decade-long insurgency that ended only when the Vietnamese agreed to withdraw. As with the German cases, a close examination reveals that these differences are better accounted for by variation in the ease of resistance than by variation in the popularity of the conquering forces.

Consider first the conquest of South Vietnam. Although North Vietnamese propaganda portrayed the South as oppressed by the capitalist West and almost uniformly yearning for unification under communism, in practice most South Vietnamese preferred that their country remain independent, and soldiers, government officials and those who had cooperated with the Americans had good reason to fear North Vietnamese retaliation (Goodman, 1978).[39] While the fall of Saigon did not bring about the retaliatory bloodbath than many South Vietnamese feared, the occupying forces quickly started to force residents to leave Saigon, implemented economic reforms that impoverished the middle and upper classes (Lang, 2006), and, most notably, incarcerated most people who had fought or worked for the South Vietnamese government in "reeducation" camps. The mass exodus that accompanied the American withdrawal was perhaps the clearest signal that many South Vietnamese were hostile to the North's presence.

That hostility, however, was never going to translate into significant resistance; indeed, accounts of the end of the war uniformly accept that the fall of Saigon necessarily marked an end to the violence. As such, historical sources do not explicitly discuss why no resistance occurred. That said, the most plausible explanation is that the South Vietnamese recognized that further resistance would be futile. By the end of the war, almost the whole of the North Vietnamese military—21 of a total of 24 divisions—was in South Vietnam (Dawson, 1977: 326). Moreover, the long guerrilla war in the South meant that the occupying army had connections to local allies who would provide intelligence on any nascent counteroccupation

guerrilla force. In this context, the people who would form the core of any resistance group either fled the country—as almost all of the South's political leadership did in the final days—or consented to incarceration in reeducation camps, where they languished for several years.

In Cambodia, by contrast, the Vietnamese had an ideal opponent from a hearts and minds perspective. After seizing power, the communist Khmer Rouge government launched repeated unprovoked raids against its neighbors while killing some two million of its own citizens. The Vietnamese could thus credibly claim to be responding to aggression and to be rescuing the Cambodian people from a genocidal government. That the Vietnamese made no territorial demands and sought to hand over control to a new Cambodian government as quickly as possible provided further reason for optimism. Even many non-communists welcomed the Vietnamese arrival and were willing to work with the new government (Becker, 1998: 435; Kiernan, 1996: 453–455).

That the Vietnamese encountered serious and sustained guerrilla resistance is thus a consequence of several factors that made mounting such resistance unusually easy for a minority, primarily within the Khmer Rouge, who were less enthusiastic about the new government. The Vietnamese limited the size of their military commitment in Cambodia, both to increase the plausibility of the claim that the Cambodian government was independent and because of the threat from China, which launched a serious invasion of Vietnam in February 1979 in response to the Vietnamese invasion. The Vietnamese military strategy involved sidestepping the Cambodian defensive positions along the border; conquest was thus achieved quickly and at low cost, but without forcing the capitulation of much of the Cambodian army, which despite tremendous losses broke up into smaller units and withdrew toward the border with Thailand (Becker, 1998: 432; Morris, 1999: 220–221). Likewise, the Vietnamese failed to capture the Khmer Rouge leaders, who were thus able to serve a focal role in assembling initial resistance to the Vietnamese occupation.[40] Most importantly, the Pol Pot government benefited from direct support from China and Thailand, which discussed how to support guerrilla resistance in the days after the fall of Phnom Penh; the guerrillas benefited especially from the opportunity to operate out of enclaves in Thai territory (Quinn-Judge, 2006: 213–215). Thus, despite a relatively favorable environment from a hearts and minds perspective, the Vietnamese found themselves fighting an extended and ultimately unwinnable guerrilla war.

Summary of the case study findings

Events in the case studies both accord with and extend the findings from the statistical analysis. In both sets of paired case studies, the conqueror's willingness and ability to coerce the defeated population better explained whether post-conquest resistance emerged than did the conqueror's ability to appeal to that population's hearts and minds. Nazi Germany made little effort to appeal to the local population, yet it faced little resistance in France (and most other conquered states in Europe), while encountering more resistance in Yugoslavia only because its forces were overstretched given the invasion of the Soviet Union, and Tito's partisans were able to escape into the mountains when necessary. North Vietnam's conquest of the South decisively ended the Vietnam War, with further resistance unthinkable given the density of the North's occupation and the flight or incarceration of the entire natural leadership and much of the likely membership of a resistance force; in Cambodia, by contrast, a lighter occupation, the continued presence of the Khmer Rouge leadership and the

availability of extra-territorial enclaves from which to mount resistance outweighed the far more favorable environment from a hearts and minds perspective.

Several additional specific findings are worth highlighting. First, brutality clearly worked in avoiding resistance: in France, willingness to resort to collective punishment cowed the defeated population into submission.[41] Even in Yugoslavia, where serious resistance did emerge, German brutality convinced the leader of the Chetniks to call off attacks and generated significant hostility toward the Partisans, complicating their efforts to organize a general uprising.

Second, thus far I have not discussed hypothesis 8, which predicts from a hearts and minds perspective that resistance will be more likely when conquest disrupts an existing social hierarchy. Statistical tests could not evaluate this hypothesis, but prominent examples such as the role of the displaced Sunni leadership in mobilizing Iraqi resistance in 2003 appear consistent with its predictions. Yet in other cases, threats to the social hierarchy provided an incentive not for resistance but for collaboration. In France, a key motivation for many collaborators was the belief that further fighting would ultimately only aid the communists, an enemy many saw as worse than Nazi Germany (Christofferson and Christofferson, 2006: 161; Jackson, 2001: 288).

Conclusions

When decisive victories in conventional war produce peace on favorable terms for the conqueror, and when by contrast they simply mark a transition to an extended and costly guerrilla conflict, is an important question from the perspective of both policy and scholarship. Our conventional understanding of insurgency suggests that conquerors best positioned to appeal to the hearts and minds of the defeated population will be most likely to avoid serious resistance. In this paper, I argue that this expectation is unfounded: it is effectively impossible for conquerors to avoid alienating at least some of the defeated society, and thus conquerors fare better when they are able to convince potential guerrillas that successful resistance is impossible. Statistical analysis of cases of conquest over the past two centuries found that more benign or trustworthy conquerors were no less likely to encounter resistance than were more rapacious powers; instead, resistance was more likely to arise when obvious leaders were available, the occupying force was overstretched and far from home, the terrain favored insurgency, and the conqueror was potentially unresolved and unwilling to resort to mass reprisals in response to violence. Two sets of paired case studies reinforce this conclusion. Nazi Germany was ill-positioned to appeal to hearts and minds but nonetheless generally avoided resistance in conquered countries, with the Yugoslav exception a consequence of favorable terrain and a smaller occupying force. An overwhelming North Vietnamese presence in South Vietnam made resistance unthinkable, even for those who detested Hanoi, but in Cambodia saving the population from a genocidal regime could not save a smaller occupying force confronting an enemy whose leadership remained intact from mounting a sustained guerrilla campaign.

What are the implications of these findings for our understanding of insurgency in general? From one perspective, they are quite limited: even with the decline in communist insurgencies against capitalist states, most insurgencies arise in contexts other than the aftermath of conquest in conventional war. Moreover, this study should not be understood to imply that a brute force strategy will be more effective than a hearts and minds approach once an

insurgency is established. That said, these findings provide a potential answer to a persistent puzzle: given the conventional wisdom that brute force tactics are counterproductive in counterinsurgency, why do so many counterinsurgents resort to them (Kalyvas, 2003)? This study suggests that at least part of the explanation may be that brute force, while ill-suited to defeating insurgencies, is more effective at preventing them from emerging. Governments may thus resort to brute force initially, and have difficulty shifting quickly to a different policy in those cases in which it fails.

These findings are particularly sobering for American foreign policy. The USA benefits from several critical advantages in international politics, most notably a reservoir of goodwill—arising from attractive political ideals, economic vitality and a history of relatively benign foreign policy—and a military that enjoys a tremendous technological advantage over any conceivable rival. The findings here, however, suggest that these advantages in fact position the USA to be unusually likely to encounter post-conquest violent resistance. If the consequences of conquest inevitably alienate at least some sector of the defeated population sufficiently for it to contemplate guerrilla resistance, then American soft power and benign intentions may simply engender misplaced optimism. At the same time, American technological advantages have permitted the USA to transition to a relatively small all-volunteer army without scaling back its international commitments, with the result that the USA is ill-positioned to generate the kind of overwhelming occupation force that tends to deter post-conquest resistance. Meanwhile, American political institutions prevent the kinds of brutal and widespread retaliation used by more autocratic conquerors to cow potential insurgents; these same institutions are also connected to the belief in American casualty aversion, which provides potential insurgents with a plausible theory of victory even in the face of overwhelming military superiority. From this perspective, the resistance that the USA encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq was not simply the consequence of poor planning or bad luck, but instead followed from core characteristics of the American political and military systems.

Acknowledgments

I thank Chris Chiego, Erik Gartzke, Avery Goldstein, Stephen Long, Sean Lynn-Jones, Jessica Stanton and anonymous reviewers for useful comments and conversations. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Midwest Political Science Association and Peace Science annual conferences. Data, including a document explaining coding decisions for new variables, and a Stata .do file replicating analysis are available on the Dataverse network at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/weisiger.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1. On this connection, see Cunningham and Lemke (2013).
2. Formal game-theoretic models of war almost invariably allow for fighting to end either through settlement or through conquest (e.g. Powell, 2004a; Slantchev, 2003b; Wagner, 2000): the possibility of conquest is what introduces military power into the models, which otherwise would turn war into a simple battle of wills, as in Slantchev (2003a; the sole prominent exception to the above

generalization). Conquest invariably ends the game, however; allowing for subsequent guerrilla resistance would have important implications for predictions about willingness to negotiate prior to conquest.

3. See for example Galula (1964) and Valentino et al. (2004).
4. Domestic political developments can also remove a leader's ability to force the continuation of an ongoing war, most notably by removing the leader from power (Croco, 2011); in this case, however, whoever replaces the prior leader retains a choice about whether or not to settle the ongoing war. In conquest, by contrast, there is no political leader who has a direct choice about whether to continue fighting.
5. To say that war ends prior to conquest is not, of course, to say that the possibility of conquest is irrelevant. In many cases, as with the Russo-Finnish War or the Persian Gulf War, it is precisely the imminent prospect of conquest that induces one side to lower its demands, thereby facilitating settlement.
6. A separate but related question is when resistance occurs in enemy-occupied zones in the context of an ongoing conventional war, as with Soviet partisan resistance behind German lines during World War II. Darden (2012) provides a useful recent example of work on this topic.
7. Recent high-profile studies of insurgency include Wood (2003), Humphreys and Weinstein (2008), Lyall and Wilson (2009) and Lyall (2009). A central challenge in studying the origins of insurgency is identifying a comparison set of cases in which insurgency was possible but did not occur. Fearon and Laitin equate civil wars with insurgencies; this study clearly echoes their conclusion that the emergence of insurgency is better explained by opportunity than by grievance.
8. In reality, of course, strategy choices exist along a spectrum between pure brute force and pure hearts and minds, with the conventional wisdom holding that options on the brute force side of the spectrum are likely to be counterproductive. For the conventional wisdom, see for example Galula (1964) and the US *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (United States Department of the Army, 2007). The conventional wisdom is not, however, universal. Lyall (2009) finds that indiscriminate bombing by the Russians in Chechnya was at least tactically useful in reducing subsequent insurgent attacks, while Dixon (2009) argues that the British in Malaya, in the classic case of successful counterinsurgency, were far more coercive toward the local population than a standard hearts and minds strategy would dictate.
9. The general summary in this paragraph and the hypotheses below are couched in terms of the conqueror's ability and willingness to use brute force against the local population, rather than the strategy choice to actually do so. While a focus on the actual strategy choice would arguably be more appropriate, devising reliable coding rules to identify the conqueror's strategy across cases is difficult: in many cases, the necessary information on internal discussions is unavailable, while coding based on observable behavior will be misleading if limited initial brutality deters subsequent challenges, while initial lenience that allows resistance to emerge is followed by some amounts of brutal retaliation once the resistance is established. The case studies are better able to assess strategy, however, especially in comparative terms.
10. Recent work has criticized key elements of this argument, however. See Snyder and Borghard (2011) and Sechser and Downes (2012).
11. Empirical studies have found relatively little historical support for clash of civilizations arguments (e.g. Henderson and Tucker, 2001), but these studies have focused on the behavior of elites. For ordinary soldiers and civilians, cultural difference serves as an obvious out-group marker that may encourage attributions of hostile intentions to the conqueror, thereby facilitating coordination into a general insurgency.
12. For the relationship between nationalism and war, see for example Van Evera (1994).
13. I am unable to test this hypothesis statistically because of data limitations, but several of the case studies shed light on its plausibility.
14. Quinlivan (1995–1996) provides a useful discussion of force ratio requirements for peace operations, and Dobbins et al. (2003) discuss the significance of force size in state-building.

15. On collective action problems and insurgency, see for example Wood (2003) and Kalyvas and Kocher (2007).
16. For the concept of focal points and coordination, see Schelling (1960). The significance of leaders in guerrilla resistance is evident in the observation that counterinsurgents who successfully assassinate insurgent leaders appear to significantly improve their odds of defeating the insurgency and of doing so quickly (Johnston, 2012).
17. An alternative line of argument that follows the hearts and minds perspective holds that resistance will be particular likely in modern states, which are more nationalist (e.g. Kaysen, 1990). Hypothesis 7 on nationalism and resistance will capture this effect.
18. While insurgents who follow Mao's strategy of guerrilla war in theory might transition to conventional combat and win, few insurgent groups can manage the transition, let alone achieve a decisive victory once conventional warfare resumes.
19. To be coded as a state, a political entity must meet a variety of requirements, including having a minimum population and meeting certain standards of diplomatic recognition. For the period prior to 1920 (when the emergence of the League of Nations and later the UN provided an easier rubric for handling diplomatic recognition), COW requires that the country receive diplomatic missions from Britain and France. The colonial powers were unsurprisingly unlikely to extend high-level diplomatic recognition (and associated international legitimacy) to entities that they intended to colonize, meaning that many clear cases of conquest of countries that meet our standard understanding of international states would be omitted.
20. In the Appendix in the Supplementary Materials, I conduct robustness checks using a further 22 marginal cases of conquest. Nine of these cases involve countries like Belgium in World War I or Japan in World War II that suffered significant military setbacks that resulted in the occupation of most or all of their territory, but that either continued conventional resistance or had the ability to do so at the point that fighting stopped. A further 13 observations, identified by consulting Downes's (2013) list of incidences of foreign-imposed regime change, consist of cases in which fighting occurred but was so brief that the conflict does not meet conventional coding rules to be considered a war, as in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in the Prague Spring or the American invasion of Panama in 1989. Both these types of cases are omitted from the main analysis for reasons based on theory. In cases like Belgium in World War I, the option to continue resistance elsewhere probably reduced the incentive to engage in guerrilla resistance. In cases with little conventional fighting, the absence of significant fighting during the "conventional war" phase of the conflict implies that the conqueror is less likely to have definitively alienated the local population. It is, however, useful to retain these cases in the dataset to permit statistical robustness checks.
21. Both of these thresholds are admittedly somewhat arbitrary, but neither greatly affects the coding. In only one case—Poland in World War II—did significant rebellion emerge more than six months but less than five years after conquest; coding that case as experiencing resistance does not change the results. Likewise, cases without significant resistance typically have fewer than 100 deaths in post-conquest military incidents (although at times the victor executes larger numbers of people in non-military settings, as with King Ferdinand's retaliation against Spanish Liberals after the Franco-Spanish War or German repression in Poland and France during World War II), while those that experience resistance typically see far more than 1000 dead in fighting.
22. A list of the cases and codings and coding rationales for the dependent variable is available in the Appendix in the Supplementary Materials.
23. I also construct an alternative terrain measure that combines both the percentage of the country that is mountainous and the percentage that is forested, using the earliest available forest cover data from the World Conservation Monitoring Center.
24. For robustness purposes, I supplement the Huntington-based variable with others that capture religious or linguistic similarity. For religion, I code two variables, one that captures whether the most common religion in conquering and conquered states differs, and one that also codes cultural difference when the two countries adhere to different major sects of a single religion (as with

Western and Orthodox Christianity or Shi'a and Sunni Islam). For linguistic similarity, I code variables at three levels of possible similarity: if the primary language in the two states is the same, if the languages spoken in the two states come from the same language family (e.g. Germanic, Slavic, Sino-Tibetan), or if the two languages come from the same higher-order language group (e.g. Indo-European).

25. Anderson (1983) demonstrates that broad national identities, and the corresponding belief that the national group should govern itself, emerges first in Latin America, and were also present in Europe by the Napoleonic period. In areas with less well-defined national identities, by contrast, rule by outsiders was relatively normal and hence less likely to provoke opposition, although this situation changed over time as nationalism diffused to Asia and Africa (as can be seen, for example, in nationalist decolonization movements after World War II). The specific date choices in Asia and Africa make little difference for the variable, as only the conquest of Ethiopia lies close to the border, and results for the variable are consistent when recoding this case.
26. Maddison's data is reported according to current national boundaries, which occasionally generates problems for historical states that do not closely match current boundaries (e.g. the Two Sicilies or Saxony). He also provides only intermittent estimates for GDP per capita for most states in the nineteenth century. To limit missing data, I interpolate observations where possible in creating the variable used in the bivariate analysis. For multivariate analysis, where preserving observations is at a premium, I generate an alternative variable that uses interpolated estimates of regional GDP per capita for the appropriate region (e.g. Germany for Saxony, Latin America for Paraguay in 1870).
27. Supplementary Materials are available at: http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/weisiger
28. Historically, battle deaths have typically comprised between a quarter and a third of casualties—for example, using Clodfelter's (2007) figures, 28% of casualties in World War I and 33% of casualties in World War II died. As cases in which only casualty information is available typically involve less developed countries, and as modern medicine tends to reduce the proportion of wounded who die, I adopt a figure at the upper end of this range.
29. In most analyses below, I use the density of the occupying force, which is calculated by dividing force size by the area of the conquered country. Country size in turn comes from the *CIA World Factbook*, adjusted where necessary to account for territorial changes that occurred between the time of the war and the present.
30. Guerrilla leaders may, of course, arise from the military, as with Abd el-Kader in Algeria, or from society in general, as with Tito in Yugoslavia. Such leaders must overcome coordination problems associated with the presence of other equally plausible resistance leaders—initial resistance in both Algeria and Yugoslavia was divided among multiple groups with different political agendas—and, from a practical perspective, are in any event impossible to identify ex ante.
31. No good quantitative measure of status reversals is available, so I do not present a statistical test of hypothesis 8. The case studies later in the paper provide some leverage over this hypothesis, however.
32. This result holds for most robustness checks, although logged per capita deaths are associated with a statistically significant increase in the probability of resistance when including marginal cases drawn from incidents of foreign-imposed regime change.
33. Consistent with the rarity of common external threat in Edelstein's study, only three cases of conquest are coded as experiencing a common external threat: Italy and Germany in World War II, and Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance (given the common threat from Argentina, which ultimately facilitated the Brazilian occupation). On the Paraguayan case, see Warren (1978). Changing the coding for the Paraguay case would leave external threat a perfect predictor of non-resistance, but the hypothesis would still only account for two of the 31 cases of non-resistance.
34. The signaling logic behind the hearts and minds democracy hypothesis arguably implies that democracies should face less resistance only when their aims are limited, an interactive effect.

Further analysis, however, demonstrates that democratic conquerors have a higher predicted probability of experiencing resistance whatever their war aims.

35. Additional alternative measures of cultural difference discussed above produce effectively identical results, which I omit for reasons of space. This analysis uses the log of intercapital distance, to correct for skew in the data. Using an unlogged variable produces analogous results, however.
36. Bivariate results in the linear probability model are effectively identical to the probit results presented above.
37. Given missing data for different observations, a full model including all covariates would have 12 variables and only 29 observations. Given limited power, it is unsurprising that only one variable—the presence of a coordinating leader—consistently retains statistical significance, although signs are typically the same (per capita GDP occasionally has a different sign, and conqueror regime type also varies frequently) and many variables are significant under one model but not another.
38. Early studies of the French resistance seriously overstated its significance. See Jackson (2001: 1–9).
39. For a representative North Vietnamese account of the final stages of the war, see Van (1977).
40. Once the Khmer Rouge mounted a guerrilla war, additional guerrilla armies under Son Sann and Prince Sihanouk emerged, with the latter eventually emerging as the principal Cambodian insurgent force. At the critical initial stage, however, it was the Khmer Rouge resistance that created the space in which these other groups subsequently established themselves.
41. In the American Civil War, a conventional war that does not appear in the main dataset, the willingness of the Union to impose harsh punishments on Confederate civilians and soldiers contributed to the Confederate decision not to engage in guerrilla resistance after the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia (Feis, 2001).

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