

# Psychiatric Disorder: Lessons for the Division of Labor in Bio-Medicine

Or why there should be more jobs for  
philosophers

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# Introduction

## STIPULATION / ASSUMPTION OF THE DSM

- Psychiatry is an applied science of mental disorder
- Its aim is to discover the causes and nature of mental disorder and apply effective treatments


# Introduction

- In the 1960's there was a serious critique of psychiatry by gay rights activists in particular
- Anti-psychiatrists maintained there was little more to mental disorder than our judging certain people to violate certain kinds of (yet to be specified) social and / or moral norms.

# The Grounding Project

- In response theorists have attempted to show psychiatry to be grounded in the non-normative biological sciences (the naturalization or grounding project).

# The Grounding Project



# The Division of Labor

- William James hope of helping psychology better become a science by getting clearer on the division of labor between the metaphysical (philosophical) issues and the psychological (scientific) issues
- I similarly have a hope that I can help psychiatry become better regarded as a science by getting clearer on the division of labor between the conceptual and normative (philosophical) issues and the role of scientific discovery
- In particular I think that rather than being a poorer second cousin of the bio-medical sciences psychiatry has much to show us about the nature of bio-medicine more generally

# Some Intuitions

## INTUITIVE JUDGEMENT OF CASES

- Intuitions about paradigmatic symptoms
  - Delusion, hallucination, depression, mania
- Intuitions about paradigmatic conditions
  - Depression, bi-polar, schizophrenia

## THEORETICAL INTUITIONS

- There is something wrong with people who are mentally disordered

# Some Intuitions

## NORMATIVE INTUITIONS

- People who have a mental disorder would be better off if they didn't have a mental disorder (defeasible rights and duties for treatment)

## SCIENTIFIC INTUITIONS

- Science will tell us the nature of what is wrong with them
  - EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
    - Science has told us x



# Intuitions and the Division of Labor

## CONCEPTUAL INTUITIONS

Judgment of Cases  
Something is **Wrong**

## NORMATIVE INTUITIONS

They would be better  
off if what was **wrong**  
would be put right

## SCIENTIFIC INTUITIONS

Science will tell us  
what is **wrong** and the  
most effective way of  
fixing it

# A Two-Stage View


- P1) It is a-priori that mental disorder is the result of an inner **dysfunction** that results in **harm** to the individual and / or to society (our judgment of cases tracks this)
- P2) It is a-priori that science will discover the relevant process for fixing the functions and **dysfunctions**
- P3) Science has told us that functions and **dysfunctions** are fixed by evolution by natural selection
- C) Therefore mental disorders are evolutionary **dysfunctions** within the person that result in harm to the individual and / or to society

# The Grounding Project

Mental Disorder is a certain  
kind of Physical Disorder

Disorder =  
Dysfunction + Harm\*

Functions and  
Malfunctions =  
Physical  
Properties and  
Processes



# The Division of Labor

Judgment of Cases

Something is Wrong




NORMATIVE INTUITIONS

SCIENTIFIC INTUITIONS


Whether their behavior  
results in **harm** to the  
individual and / or  
society

Whether their  
behavior is caused  
by an inner  
**dysfunction**


# Science and Norms









# 1. Inner Dysfunction No Harm




## 2. Harm No Inner Dysfunction












# Attentional Control



# Levels of Serotonin



# Evolutionary Fitness



# From Difference to Dysfunction

- Our intuitions about whether a difference constitutes a dysfunction seems to vary according to whether we think their behavior results in harm (in some yet to be specified sense)
- Wakefield maintains that science has discovered that evolution by natural selection is the relevant process for fixing functions and dysfunctions
- It is unclear why

# Function

- Aristotelian (Megone)
  - Relative to the good of the kind
- Bio-Statistical (Boorse)
  - Relative to the statistical mean
- Evolutionary (Wakefield)
  - Relative to evolutionary fitness (survival and reproduction)
- Systemic (Murphy)
  - Relative to a previously specified output of a larger system

# Translating Function Talk

- ‘The function of the heart is to pump blood’
- *ARIST.f* - ‘pumping blood is the good for hearts’
- *STAT.f* - ‘pumping blood is what statistically average hearts do’
- *EVO.f* - ‘pumping blood is what past tokens did that resulted in presently existing tokens’
- *SYST.f* - ‘pumping blood is what hearts contribute to the circulatory system’

# Translating Function Talk

- They all share a common structure of providing some **standard** where we can read off functions and dysfunctions from how much or how little something approximates the standard
- Any of these (aside from the Aristotelian notion) seem perfectly respectable from the point of view of the grounding project
- Biology can make use of whichever it likes and we can translate 'function' talk into talk of purely causal properties and processes



# The Problem

- The problem comes when we appeal to these notions to justify intervening on the individual
- Why should any of these notions be relevant for whether or not we are justified in intervening on individuals who are harmed?

# From Difference to Dysfunction

- In practice we start with our intuition that a person is harmed by their behavior then look for a difference maker within them
- Once we have found it we label it a `dysfunction'
- To then appeal to `dysfunction' in answer to why we are justified in intervening on the individual is circular

# From Dysfunction to Prescription

- Other times in practice scientists discover a difference that they call a 'dysfunction' and advocate treatment for the condition
- There is a slippage in scientific usage between non-normative (scientifically respectable) notions of dysfunction and prescriptive or normative notions of dysfunction
- The relationship seems more intimate than the two-stage view would have led us to suppose

# Relationship Between Science and Norms

- Role for science in finding out the causes, the nature, and the most effective ways of altering the phenomena.
- This is in common to all the sciences (whether the explanandum are functions or dysfunctions or neither)
- Role for normative theory in finding out when the person would be better off for behavioral change or when the person should receive intervention


# Relationship Between Science and Norms

- We need to be careful of thinking that science discovers what is 'wrong' where 'wrong' features in our normative theorizing about 'better' or 'worse' or 'duties' and 'rights'

# Why Should Deviation from Any of These Justify Intervention?

- Aristotelian
  - the good of the kind
- Bio-Statistical
  - the statistical mean
- Evolutionary
  - evolutionary fitness (survival and reproduction)
- Systemic
  - a previously specified output of a larger system

# Relationship Between Science and Norms



# The Moral:

- We need to stop looking to science to tell us whether a person has a disorder or not
- The issue seems to depend on our normative notion of ‘harm’ for whether intervention on the individual is or is not justified
- Hardly surprising given that bio-medicine is an *applied* science





# Distinctions

**1. Distinction between the presence and absence of bio-medical disorder**

**2. The Distinction between mental and non-mental disorder**

**3. The Distinction between different types or kinds of mental disorder**

**4. Sub-Types**

