
Stage 2


We are given the zip file containing lots of the encrypted files, and the binary that encrypts the files itself.

Initial analysis of the binary indicates that it has been packed by UPX, so we can go ahead and unpack it.



```
kali@kali:~/Downloads/tisc2$ upx -d anorocware
                      Ultimate Packer for eXecutables
                         Copyright (C) 1996 - 2020
UPX 3.96
               Markus Oberhumer, Laszlo Molnar & John Reiser Jan 23rd 2020
       File size
                         Ratio
                                    Format
                                                Name
                         ____
  7406375 <- 3993332
                        53.92%
                                  linux/amd64
                                                anorocware
Unpacked 1 file.
kali@kali:~/Downloads/tisc2$
```

Opening the file up in Cutter, we can see a lot of functions, and realised they used Golang for the program itself. So I filtered the program to only display the main functions on the left side, and looked around at the graph view, and from there, we can see Base64 decode and PEM, which was what we were looking for!



We can now copy the instruction address of call encoding/base64. (*Encoding). DecodeString in the Disassembly view, so that we can set a breakpoint there in gdb to see what arguments would be passed into the DecodeString function itself.

```
mov qword [var_8h], rcx
0x0066216b
0x00662170
                mov qword [var_10h], rdx
                mov rax, qword [var_28h]
0x0066217a
0x0066217f
                mov rcx, qword [var_20h]
0x00662184
               mov rdx, qword [var_18h]
                cmp qword [var_30h], 0
0x00662189
0x0066218f
               jne 0x66262c
0x00662195
               mov qword [rsp], rdx
0x00662199
               mov qword [var_8h], rcx
0x0066219e
                mov qword [var_10h], rax
                call en
                                            sym.encoding_pem.Decode
               mov rax, qword [var_18h]
0x006621a8
0x006621ad
               mov rcx, gword [rax + 0x28]
               mov rdx, qword [rax + 0x20]
0x006621b1
0x006621b5
                mov rax. aword [rax + 0x18]
```

We start gdb (I installed pwndbg extension here) and we set the breakpoint at 0×00662175 . We run the program, and pwndbg displays a ton of useful information, like in the RCX address, where it seems to be storing some string.

```
kali@kali:~/Downloads/tisc2/dockerize$ gdb anorocware
GNU gdb (Debian 9.2-1) 9.2
Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc

...

pwndbg> b *0x00662175
Breakpoint 1 at 0x662175: file /home/hjf98/Documents/CSPC2020Dev/goware/main.go,
line 246.
pwndbg> r
Starting program: /home/kali/Downloads/tisc2/dockerize/anorocware
[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1".
```

```
Thread 1 "anorocware" hit Breakpoint 1, 0x000000000662175 in main.main () at
/home/hjf98/Documents/CSPC2020Dev/goware/main.go:246
       /home/hjf98/Documents/CSPC2020Dev/goware/main.go: No such file or
directory.
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
        -----[ REGISTERS
 RAX 0xc000182000 ← 0x4847464544434241 ('ABCDEFGH')
RBX 0x7c4
 RCX 0xc00038b000 ← 0x4331534c7430534c ('LS0tLS1C')
 RDX 0x7c4
 RDI 0x64
RSI 0x6fd9d7 (string.*+76319) ← 0x4633574c76375b4e ('N[7vLW3F')
            ----[ DISASM
 ► 0x662175 <main.main+2085> call encoding/base64.(*Encoding).DecodeString
<encoding/base64.(*Encoding).DecodeString>
       rdi: 0x64
       rsi: 0x6fd9d7 (string.*+76319) <- 0x4633574c76375b4e ('N[7vLW3F')
       rdx: 0x7c4
       rcx: 0xc00038b000 ← 0x4331534c7430534c ('LS0tLS1C')
                —[ STACK
00:0000 rsp 0xc0001bfc08 → 0xc000182000 ← 0x4847464544434241 ('ABCDEFGH')
01:0008
             0xc0001bfc10 → 0xc00038b000 ← 0x4331534c7430534c ('LS0tLS1C')
02:0010
             0xc0001bfc18 ← 0x7c4
             0xc0001bfc20 <- 0x64 /* 'd' */
03:0018
04:0020
             0xc0001bfc28 - ▶ 0xc00038b000 <- 0x4331534c7430534c ('LS0tLS1C')
             0xc0001bfc30 ← 0x7c4
05:0028
             0xc0001bfc38 ∢- 0x0
06:0030
...↓
            ----- BACKTRACE
 ▶ f 0
                662175 main.main+2085
  f 1
                43692a runtime.main+506
  f 2
                463061 runtime.goexit+1
  f 3
                     0
```

We can then print out the RCX pointer contents, and we can see it stores a lot of text, and it looks like it is in base64 (full contents are at stage2/b64.txt).

```
pwndbg> x/16s $rcx
0xc00038b000:
"LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQVUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0KTUlJRU1EQU5CZ2txaGtpRz13MEJBUUVGQUFPQ0JBMEFNS
UlFQ0FLQ0JBRUFtOTliMnB2dHJWaVcrak4vM05GZgp3OGczNmRRUjZpSnIrY31SZStrOFhGenVIVU80TE4
zdGs3NnRGUzhEYmFDY11GaXVmOEdzdWdjUm1R"...
0xc00038b0c8:
"REVyUFpmCnFna3ZYWnB1ZmZmVGZqVEIramUvV2k0M2J3THF0dzBXNGNYb1BXMzN1R1ZhV1pYMG9MektDL
0F4Zzdrd010bUcKeG5uMzIxVEFqRVpnVGJMK09hTmtjSHpmUTdVendhRXA5VVB0VDhwR11vTkpIbFgzZmt
GcTJpVnk3N3VJNGdSSwpNZjh1alRma0lISGpR"...
0xc00038b708:
"bXk3Y1FzSF1YSUhVZ2tCWF16ZHkvdStOb2RLQWpoZFZwaUpiekluY3oKU2RvbFhpbmlLd05VTFc4VmpqU
zlLVFNSd2lkcWVPa2twTmVJcWlSbldUM1RUTUFNemI1ajBqRUdGN0wzRE9NUAo2UU1CQXc9PQotLS0tLUV
ORCBQVUJMSUMgS0VZLS0tLS0K"
0xc00038b7c5:
0xc00038b7c6:
0xc00038b7c7:
0xc00038b7c8:
                11 11
0xc00038b7c9:
0xc00038b7ca:
pwndbg>
```

Using an online base64 decoder (because I'm lazy) will yield a very nice public key!

----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----MIIEIDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCBA0AMIIECAKCBAEAm99b2pvtrViW+jN/3NFf w8g36dQR6iJr+cyRe+k8XFzuHUO4LN3tk76tFS8DbaCcYFiuf8GsugcRmQDErPZf qgkvXZpufffTfjTB+je/Wi43bwLqtw0W4cXoPW33uGVaWZX0oLzKC/Axg7kwItmG xnn321TAjEZgTbL+OaNkcHzfQ7UzwaEp9UPtT8pGYoNJHlX3fkFq2iVy77uI4gRK Mf8ujTfkIHHjQ7BEzgEgk8kqxGaSPlINQs65P4tvOpihqpwUVpAjPLNBTt9Hz1F/ fR+aDsJQRKZNMrWRLuMYi02Mx9cZBnwzL9KuFRvHe107BWayU9f0X0pg/zybEQOL ux+jmsUsTsQbjK9cB67Ma21D+XJHyKgKuP9u14mVCZgCBk9lybS1bxdvFDQPgkyc M3z9vuucCU1Eu2D0lhFmJ3FQfZkAY++XHUpiwui9NO3A9UG7amyXbOSclF2X9kRq OCwmqOtBRBEWISe5rdzc/ATOP3PqDjGwySXxWZDCH8rrgnzWpv2LriYQTnf2cE0G /iI8RwjYoGLWzeLVRr1hhZ8Y5s4R/sR497WenkRcpOLOkDVge7MusTOWh4eNi4go PldsiYTqTndA1wV67r09ujpp8VvpdLuo+4h+7p/pfpXMsx8dALom4sfkYcJHhObk xt5CpNCkVXh5tsGheFb7v85GiNFy17zualMda32BinPeEbFrqKwD2Z4R5QgQuB8u IwjqSTgNo9Uvvch61WCbj9e+80ugV4o7jHCd/56FkuvhCqiINdZDUU4ZB37hdelf eE9NbxDjKG8V7aCdwqJJDYGiz/3jmuCfB/k5FkoHSANgbLE0A5Smk3T8tuv8Sz+f v4rrPxmpn8X2Sm1Foz+U0BWzP+VLmpLnnyXkrOHyn8lJFbn/U5NWGRLn+ev2CSkw AI/TfHALqTvjqlGQxTTaY7Znkn5i+D1LztK8cpSZXdDVoRh+/vMIEiNuk8++/s6a HNd7wuFkY/Z8jjJ1jH/csF37mGYAUxp32nRk5wRp/c6eWZPM+zGibfEnmFW5yUEU YbX4hzzGr5Q6f/sysuzhaylWi3XCvIrH6LBjFNu3UJ0VIzcJN0kxaABaXY8JUDYX tXULipvUOqkttOqJSxOXWg72SWKLKv/QvfDRVXedUk066k7RL1okpbMnwYlfYg7J

mpZZR2CNNwbMkQm2TmrA/MZudvqtsX9PpkgJI+ZWjUwVtGRUTdDMxZWx4H3neJiy
8m8udk42RN0j3n0wVXsWt6Qmy7bQsHYXIHUgkBXYzdy/u+NodKAjhdVpiJbzIncz
SdolXiniKwNULW8VjjS9KTSRwidqeOkkpNeIqiRnWT3TTMAMzb5j0jEGF7L3DOMP
6QIBAw==
----END PUBLIC KEY-----

So we run the base64 file onto sha256sum.

kali@kali:~/Downloads/tisc2\$ sha256sum b64.txt
8eaf2d08d5715eec34be9ac4bf612e418e64da133ce8caba72b90faacd43ceee b64.txt

We take the hash, encapsulate it in TISC20{} and submit it to finish the stage!

TISC20{8eaf2d08d5715eec34be9ac4bf612e418e64da133ce8caba72b90faacd43ceee}