The Cryptographic Layer of Biometric Authentication

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February 21, 2025

Abstract

In this project, we focus on the cryptographic layer which is added on the top of biometric authentication for privacy reasons. We first formalize a biometric authentication scheme and propose security models for two security properties of interest: *unforgeability* and *indistinguishability*. Unforgeability refers to an adversary's ability to impersonate a user, while indistinguishability evaluates the server's knowledge of users' biometrics, related to privacy preservation. Subsequently, we analyze two existing instantiations of biometric authentication built on two cryptographic primitives: function-hiding inner product functional encryption and relational hash. Our results demonstrate conditions under which these schemes achieve security within our security model, and we propose a simple way to strengthen the system based on functional encryption by adding a digital signature in the cryptographic layer.

1 Introduction

Biometric authentication offers an error-tolerant approach to user verification. Despite its convenience, unlike traditional authentication methods, servers have to verify users' identities by comparing the similarity of enrolled and probed data instead of their equivalence. An authentication method based on comparing hashes of two templates thus fails. Additionally, unlike a user-defined password, biometrics reveal sensitive personal information and cannot be changed, raising significant privacy concerns. Furthermore, the inherent nature of biometrics data can introduce a false positive rate that is not negligible. These issues make designing a biometric authentication scheme and analyzing its security challenging and highlight the importance of a rigorous study in this domain.

Previous Work Previous works have demonstrated several potential cryptographic primitives that can be utilized to instantiate a biometric authentication scheme, such

as function-hiding inner product functional encryption (fh-IPFE) [Kim+16; Lee+18; Che+21; Cac+22; EM23], homomorphic encryption [JP09; Yas+13; PM21], fuzzy extractor [Boy04; Li+17], oblivious transfer [BCP12], relational hash [MR14], etc. Some of them provide non-interactive protocols in the sense that only the clients transmit enrollment and probe messages to the server before the server decides the authentication results. On the other hand, an interactive protocol allows the server to send hints or challenges to the clients during the authentication process.

Explanation   [A brief explanation of this work]

Contribution   In this project, we present the following contributions:

- We provide a new general framework for analyzing a non-interactive biometric authentication scheme. Our framework formalizes a biometric authentication scheme by splitting it into two layers: the biometric layer and the cryptographic layer. The biometric layer accounts for collecting biometric data from users, comparing the closeness of enrolled and probed biometric templates, and deciding the authentication result. The cryptographic layer, on the other hand, is to protect users' privacy and strengthen the security of the scheme.

- We list two security games to model two security notions that we consider relevant to a biometric authentication scheme: the unforgeability (UF) game and the indistinguishability (IND) game. The UF game models an adversary's ability to impersonate the user by offering a (possibly invalid) probe message that can result in a successful authentication, which is similar to the unforgeability notion in [MR14] and the malicious adversary in [EM23]. However, we consider several options for the adversary to add more flexibility to our security model.

  The IND game evaluates the server's knowledge of users' biometrics, where we model the adversary's ability to recognize the biometrics. Previous works [MR14; Lee+18; Che+21; EM23] consider a similar security notion by considering an adversary who has enrollment and probe messages. Compared to them, our model also provides the adversary with oracles to users' biometric templates to take biometric distributions into consideration and increase practicality.

- We analyze the UF and IND security of existing instantiations of biometric authentication schemes from previous works. Our results demonstrate necessary and sufficient conditions and provide transformations for these instantiations to achieve our desired security.

Structure of the Project   In Section 2, we formally define a biometric authentication scheme, including the biometric layer and cryptographic layer. In Section 3, we introduce the unforgeability (UF) game and the indistinguishability (IND) game. In Section 4 and 5, we recall two instantiations using function-hiding inner-product functional encryption and relational hash, repsectively, and provide analyses of the UF and IND security of them.

Notation   In this project, we assume

- λ is the security parameter.

- $[m]$ denotes the set of integers $\{1, 2, \cdots, m\}$.

- $\mathbb{Z}_q$ is the finite field modulo a prime number q.

- A function $f(n)$ is called *negligible* iff for any integer c, $f(n) < \frac{1}{n^c}$ for all sufficiently large n. We write it as $f(n) = \mathsf{negl}$, and we may also use negl to represent an arbitrary negligible function.

- poly is the class of polynomial funcions. We may also use poly to represent an arbitrary polynomial function.

- We write sampling a value r from a distribution $\mathcal{D}$ as $r \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{D}$. If S is a finite set, then $r \leftarrow_\$ S$ means sampling r uniformly from S.

- The distribution $\mathcal{D}^t$ denotes t identical and independent distributions of $\mathcal{D}$.

- A PPT algorithm denotes a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. Unless otherwise specified, all algorithms run in PPT.

2   Formalization

2.1   Biometric Authentication Scheme

In this section, we formally define a biometric authentication scheme. For this, we first define how we simulate biometric distributions of users.

Assume the existence of a family $\mathbb{B}$ of biometric distributions that are efficiently samplable. We have the following interfaces for all algorithms to interact with $\mathbb{B}$.

- $\mathsf{BioSamp}()$: Generate a random distribution $\mathcal{B}$ of $\mathbb{B}$. By this we mean providing either parameters of an efficiently samplable distribution or a PPT algorithm as the sampler. For simplicity, we write $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathsf{BioSamp}()$ as $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}$.

- $\mathsf{BioDelete}(\mathcal{B})$: Delete $\mathcal{B}$ from $\mathbb{B}$. Consequently, no further access to $\mathsf{BioSamp}$ can derive $\mathcal{B}$. For simplicity, we write $\mathsf{BioDelete}(\mathcal{B})$ as $\mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$.

- $\mathsf{TempSamp}(\mathcal{B})$: Let $\mathcal{B}$ be a biometric distribution in $\mathbb{B}$. This algorithm samples a biometric template from $\mathcal{B}$. For simplicity, we write $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{TempSamp}(\mathcal{B})$ as $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{B}$.

Definition 1 (Biometric Authentication Scheme)**.** A *biomtric authentication shceme* Π associated with a family $\mathbb{B}$ of biometric distributions is composed of the following algorithms.

- $\mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \to \mathbf{b}$: Given an oracle $\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}$, which samples biometric data from a distribution $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$, it outputs a biometric template $\mathbf{b}$ for enrollment.

- getProbe$^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \to \mathbf{b}'$: Given an oracle $\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}$, which samples biometric data from a distribution $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$, it outputs a biometric template $\mathbf{b}'$ for probe.

- BioCompare$(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}') \to s$: Given two biometric templates $\mathbf{b}$ and $\mathbf{b}'$, it outputs a score s.

- Verify$(s) \to r \in \{0, 1\}$: It is a deterministic algorithm that reads the comparison score s and determines whether this is a successful authentication ($r = 1$) or not ($r = 0$).

We also call these algorithms the *biometric layer* of Π. We will add a *cryptographic layer* on top of it in Section 2.2

Given an authentication scheme Π, we can consider its true positive rate and false positive rate.

Definition 2 (True Positive Rate). For a biometric distribution $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$ and $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow$ getEnroll$^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$, define the *true positive rate* TP.

$$\mathsf{TP}(\mathcal{B}, \mathbf{b}) := \Pr[\mathbf{b}' \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \quad : \mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}')) = 1]$$

$$\mathsf{TP}(\mathcal{B}) := \Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \\ \mathbf{b}' \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \end{bmatrix} : \mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}')) = 1 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()}[\mathsf{TP}(\mathcal{B}, \mathbf{b})]$$

$$\mathsf{TP} := \Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B} \\ \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \quad : \mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}')) = 1 \\ \mathbf{b}' \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \end{bmatrix}$$
$$= \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}}[\mathsf{TP}(\mathcal{B})]$$

Definition 3 (False Positive Rate). For a biometric distribution $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}, \tilde{\mathbb{B}} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$ and $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow$ getEnroll$^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$, define the *false positive rate* FP.

$$\mathsf{FP}(\mathbf{b}) := \Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{B}' \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B} \\ \mathbf{b}' \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}'}}() \end{bmatrix} : \mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}')) = 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathsf{FP}(\mathcal{B}) := \Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{B}' \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B} \\ \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}() \\ \mathbf{b}' \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}'}}() \end{bmatrix} : \mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}')) = 1 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()}[\mathsf{FP}(\mathbf{b})]$$

$$\mathsf{FP} := \Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}, \mathcal{B}' \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B} \\ \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}() \\ \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}'}}() \end{bmatrix} : \mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}')) = 1 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$= \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}}[\mathsf{FP}(\mathcal{B})]$$

Ideally, we hope TP to be 1, and $\mathsf{FP}(\mathcal{B})$ to be negligible for any $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$. However, due to the inherent nature of biometrics, there might be a nonzero false negative rate $1 - \mathsf{TP} > 0$ and a $\mathsf{FP}(\mathcal{B})$ that is not negligible. Our security model and analysis also take these possibilities into consideration.

2.2   Cryptographic Layer

In this work, we add a cryptographic layer on top of Π to protect privacy of users. The cryptographic layer includes the following algorithms.

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda) \to \mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{csk}$: It outputs the enrollment secret key esk, probe secret key psk, and compare secret key csk.

- $\mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b}) \to \mathbf{c_x}$: On input a biometric template $\mathbf{b}$, it encodes it into a vector $\mathbf{x}$ and outputs the enrollment message $\mathbf{c_x}$.

- $\mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}') \to \mathbf{c_y}$: On input a biometric template $\mathbf{b}'$, it encodes it into a vector $\mathbf{y}$ and outputs the probe message $\mathbf{c_y}$.

- $\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}) \to s$: It compares the enrollment message $\mathbf{c_x}$ and probe message $\mathbf{c_y}$ and outputs a score s.

Correctness: An authentication scheme Π is *correct* if for any biometric distributions $\mathcal{B}$ and $\mathcal{B}'$, let $\mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{csk} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$, $\mathbf{b}' \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}'}}()$, $\mathbf{c_x} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b})$, $\mathbf{c_y} \leftarrow \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$. Then

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}) = \mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}')\right] = 1 - \mathsf{negl}.$$

In a real-world biometric system, these algorithms may be run by different parties such as a biometric scanner, a user's secure hardware, a trusted authority that issues keys, and the server.

We provide two instantiations of a biometric authentication scheme with the cryptographic layer in Sections 4.1 and 5.1.

3 Security Games

In this section, we discuss two security notions of a biometric authentication scheme: *unforgeability* and *indistinguishability*.

3.1 Unforgeability

To describe the unforgeability of an authentication scheme, we model the ability of an adversary who tries to impersonate a user. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is given auxiliary information option that depends on our threat model and tries to find a valid probe message $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$. The whole game $\mathsf{UF}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathsf{option}}$ is defined in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1 $\mathsf{UF}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathsf{option}}(\mathcal{A})$

1: $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$
2: $\mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{csk} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
3: $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$
4: $\mathbf{c_x} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b})$
5: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{option})$
6: **if** $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ is equal to any output of $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ **then**
7:     **return** 0
8: **end if**
9: $s \leftarrow \mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$
10: **return** $\mathsf{Verify}(s)$

The auxiliary information option can be nothing or include $\mathbf{c_x}, \mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{csk}$ or the following oracles:

- $\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}$: It outputs a biometric sample $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{B}$. This oracle and psk should not be given at the same time; otherwise, there exists a trivial attack with a winning rate TP by returning $\mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}())$.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}(\mathsf{esk}, \cdot)$: On input $\mathbf{b}'$, it outputs the enrollment message $\mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b}')$.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}(\mathsf{psk}, \cdot)$: On input $\mathbf{b}'$, it outputs the probe message $\mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$. If this oracle is given, we require the adversary to return a $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ that is not equal to any previous answer of $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{log}}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \cdot)$: On input $\mathbf{b}'$, it first computes $\mathbf{c_z} \leftarrow \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$ and outputs $\mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_z}))$.

- $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enroll}}(\cdot)$: On input esk', it first samples $\mathbf{b}' \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$ and outputs $\mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}', \mathbf{b}')$. This oracle is only useful when option does not include $\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}$.

- $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Probe}}(\cdot)$: On input psk', it first samples $\mathbf{b}' \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$ and outputs $\mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}', \mathbf{b}')$. This oracle is only useful when option does not include $\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}$, and this oracle and psk should not be given at the same time; otherwise, there exists a trivial attack with a winning rate TP by returning $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Probe}}(\mathsf{psk})$.

The requirement that the adversary should return a $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ that is not equal to any previous answer of $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ is to prevent a trivial attack that leverages TP or FP when it is not negligible. If option includes $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$ and either psk or $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$, the adversary can enjoy a winning rate TP. Therefore, we rule out the case that option includes both psk and $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$, and we forbid the adversary to return what $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ returns. If option has only psk or $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$, the UF adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in Algorithm 2 can still enjoy a winning rate FP, if we place no restriction on the adversary's answer. Therefore, we only consider psk in option when FP is negligible, and we restrict the adversary's answer when $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ is given.

Algorithm 2 $\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{psk})$ (or $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}}$)

1: $\mathcal{B}' \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}$
2: $\mathbf{b}' \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}'}}()$
3: $\mathbf{c_y} \leftarrow \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$ $\triangleright$ or $\mathbf{c_y} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}(\mathbf{b}')$
4: **return** $\mathbf{c_y}$

We define the advantage of an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in the $\mathsf{UF}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathsf{option}}$ game of a scheme Π associated with a family $\mathbb{B}$ of distributions as

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{UF}}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathcal{A},\mathsf{option}} := \Pr[\mathsf{UF}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathsf{option}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1]$$

An authentication scheme Π associated with a family $\mathbb{B}$ of distributions is called *option-unforgeable* (option-UF) if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{UF}}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathcal{A},\mathsf{option}} = \mathsf{negl}.$$

For the rest of this work, if the scheme Π, the family $\mathbb{B}$ of distributions, and the auxiliary information option are clear from context, we omit the subscript and write the game as $\mathsf{UF}(\mathcal{A})$. This abbreviation also holds for all other games.

UF Security with Digital Signature   We note that we can achieve UF security by a similar approach in [EM23] with a digital signature scheme. Given any authentication scheme Π and an sEUF-CMA digital signature scheme $\mathsf{Sig} = (\mathsf{Sig.KeyGen}, \mathsf{Sig.Sign}, \mathsf{Sig.Verify})$, consider the following scheme Π'.

- $\mathsf{Setup}'(1^\lambda)$: Run $(\mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{csk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and $(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{Sig}}, \mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{Sig}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Sig.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$. Output $\mathsf{esk}' \leftarrow \mathsf{esk}$, $\mathsf{psk}' \leftarrow (\mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{Sig}})$, $\mathsf{csk}' \leftarrow \mathsf{csk}$.

- $\mathsf{Probe}'(\mathsf{psk}', \mathbf{b}')$: Run $\mathbf{c_y} \leftarrow \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$ and $\sigma \leftarrow \mathsf{Sig.Sign}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{Sig}}, \mathbf{c_y})$. Output $\mathbf{c_y}' \leftarrow (\mathbf{c_y}, \sigma)$.

- $\mathsf{Compare}'(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}')$: If $\mathsf{Sig.Verify}(\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{Sig}}, \mathbf{c_y}, \sigma) = 1$, output $\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y})$; otherwise, output $\bot$.

An $\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}$ adversary has to forge a signature σ to win the game, so the scheme is option-UF for any option that does not include psk.

Theorem 1. *Let* $\mathsf{option} = \{\mathbf{c_x}, \mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{csk}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}\}$. *For any authentication scheme* Π, Π' *is* option-UF.

3.2 Indistinguishability

In the game of indistinguishability, we model the ability of an authentication server who tries to identify the user, which describes the privacy leakage of the scheme. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is given oracles to two biometric distributions $\mathcal{B}^{(0)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ and option that depends on our threat model. It tries to guess from either $\mathcal{B}^{(0)}$ or $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ the enrollment or probe messages are generated. The whole game $\mathsf{IND}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathsf{option}}$ is defined in Algorithm 3.

Algorithm 3 $\mathsf{IND}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathsf{option}}(\mathcal{A})$

1: $b \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}$
2: $\mathcal{B}^{(0)} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}^{(0)}$
3: $\mathcal{B}^{(1)} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}^{(1)}$
4: $\mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{csk} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
5: $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(b)}}}()$
6: $\mathbf{c_x} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b})$
7: $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}}(\mathsf{option})$
8: **return** $1_{\tilde{b}=b}$

The auxiliary information option can be nothing or include $\mathbf{c_x}, \mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{csk}$ or the following oracles:

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbf{c_y}}$: It first samples a biometric sample $\mathbf{b}' \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{B}^{(b)}}()$ and outputs $\mathbf{c_y} \leftarrow \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}(\mathsf{esk}, \cdot)$: On input $\mathbf{b}'$, it outputs the enrollment message $\mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b}')$.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}(\mathsf{psk}, \cdot)$: On input $\mathbf{b}'$, it outputs the probe message $\mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{CompVrfy}}(\mathsf{csk}, \cdot, \cdot)$: On input $\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{c}'$, it first computes $s \leftarrow \mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{c}')$ and outputs $\mathsf{Verify}(s)$.

We define the advantage of an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in the $\mathsf{IND}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathsf{option}}$ game of a scheme Π associated with a family of distributions $\mathbb{B}$ as

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{IND}}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathcal{A},\mathsf{option}} := \left| \Pr[\mathsf{IND}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathsf{option}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right|.$$

An authentication scheme Π associated with a family $\mathbb{B}$ of distributions is called *option-indistinguishable* (option-IND) if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{IND}}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathcal{A},\mathsf{option}} = \mathsf{negl}.$$

Necessity of IND Security   Consider the following authentication scheme for any biometric layer. Let $\mathsf{esk} = \mathsf{psk} = \mathsf{csk}$ be empty strings and

$$\mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b}) \to \mathbf{b}, \quad \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}') \to \mathbf{b}'$$
$$\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}') = \mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}')$$

By the transformation using an sEUF-CMA digital signature scheme we introduced in Section 3.1, we can obtain an authentication scheme Π' that is option-UF for any option that does not include psk. However, the enrollment and probe messages leak biometric vectors $\mathbf{b}$ and $\mathbf{b}'$ and compromise privacy. Obviously, this scheme is not option-IND for an option that includes either $\mathbf{c_x}$ or $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbf{c_y}}$, and we use this example emphasize the necessity of the game of indistinguishability.

IND Security for a Particular Biometric Layer   Let $\mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}(), \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$ be such that

$$\mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \to \mathbf{b}^*_\mathcal{B} \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Enroll}} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \to \mathbf{b}^*_\mathcal{B} \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$$

where $\mathbf{b}^*_\mathcal{B} \in \{0,1\}^k$ is a fixed vector only dependent on $\mathcal{B}$, and $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}, \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}} \subseteq \{0,1\}^k$ are some *error distributions* independent of $\mathcal{B}$. Let $\mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}') \to 1_{\mathsf{HD}(\mathbf{b},\mathbf{b}')\leq\tau}$. Then

$$\mathsf{TP} = \Pr[\mathsf{HW}(\mathbf{b}^*_\mathcal{B} \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Enroll}} \oplus \mathbf{b}^*_\mathcal{B} \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}}) \leq \tau] = \Pr[\mathsf{HW}(\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Enroll}} \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}}) \leq \tau]$$

We note that previous works such as [Boy04; MR14] model biometric template vectors in a similar way.

Now, for this biometric layer, we can construct a simple but IND secure authentication scheme Π with the following cryptographic layer.

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: Sample $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}^k$. Output $\mathsf{esk} = \mathsf{psk} \leftarrow \mathbf{r}$, $\mathsf{csk} \leftarrow \epsilon$.

- $\mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b})$: Output $\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{r}$.

- $\mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$: Output $\mathbf{b}' \oplus \mathbf{r}$.

- $\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y})$: If $\mathsf{HD}(\mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}) \leq \tau$, return 1; otherwise, return 0.

The correctness of Π holds by

$$\mathsf{HD}(\mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}) = \mathsf{HW}(\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{r} \oplus \mathbf{b}' \oplus \mathbf{r}) = \mathsf{HW}(\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{b}') = \mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}').$$

Theorem 2. *Let option $= \{\mathbf{c_x}, csk, \mathcal{O}_{\mathbf{c_y}}\}$. The authentication scheme Π is option-IND.*

Proof. Let $\mathbf{b}^*_0$ and $\mathbf{b}^*_1$ be the fixed vectors of $\mathcal{B}^{(0)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ in the IND game, respectively. Given any adversary, assume that the number of its queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbf{c_y}}$ is bounded by t. For any $\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{v}^{(1)}, \cdots, \mathbf{v}^{(t)}$,

$\Pr[\mathbf{c_x} = \mathbf{v}, \ \mathbf{c_y}^{(1)} = \mathbf{v}^{(1)}, \ \cdots, \ \mathbf{c_y}^{(t)} = \mathbf{v}^{(t)} \mid b = 0, \ \mathbf{b}^*_0, \ \mathbf{b}^*_1]$

$= \Pr[\mathbf{b}^*_0 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Enroll}} \oplus \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{v}, \ \mathbf{b}^*_0 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}} \oplus \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{v}^{(1)}, \ \cdots, \ \mathbf{b}^*_0 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}} \oplus \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{v}^{(t)} \mid \mathbf{b}^*_0, \ \mathbf{b}^*_1]$

$= \Pr[\mathbf{r} = \mathbf{v} \oplus \mathbf{b}^*_0 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Enroll}} = \mathbf{v}^{(1)} \oplus \mathbf{b}^*_0 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}} = \cdots = \mathbf{v}^{(t)} \oplus \mathbf{b}^*_0 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}} \mid \mathbf{b}^*_0, \ \mathbf{b}^*_1]$

$= \Pr[\mathbf{r} = \mathbf{v} \oplus \mathbf{b}^*_1 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Enroll}} = \mathbf{v}^{(1)} \oplus \mathbf{b}^*_1 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}} = \cdots = \mathbf{v}^{(t)} \oplus \mathbf{b}^*_1 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}} \mid \mathbf{b}^*_0, \ \mathbf{b}^*_1]$

$= \Pr[\mathbf{b}^*_1 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Enroll}} \oplus \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{v}, \ \mathbf{b}^*_1 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}} \oplus \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{v}^{(1)}, \ \cdots, \ \mathbf{b}^*_1 \oplus \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}} \oplus \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{v}^{(t)} \mid \mathbf{b}^*_0, \ \mathbf{b}^*_1]$

$= \Pr[\mathbf{c_x} = \mathbf{v}, \ \mathbf{c_y}^{(1)} = \mathbf{v}^{(1)}, \ \cdots, \ \mathbf{c_y}^{(t)} = \mathbf{v}^{(t)} \mid b = 1, \ \mathbf{b}^*_0, \ \mathbf{b}^*_1]$

Hence, the adversary cannot distinguish between $\mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}^{(1)}, \cdots, \mathbf{c_y}^{(t)}$ generated from $\mathcal{B}^{(0)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$.

$\square$

4 Security Analysis: fh-IPFE-based Instantiation

Definition 4 (Function-Hiding Inner Product Functional Encryption (adapted from [Kim+16]))**.** A *function-hiding inner product functional encryption* (fh-IPFE) scheme FE for a field $\mathbb{F}$ and input length k is composed of PPT algorithms FE.Setup, FE.KeyGen, FE.Enc, and FE.Dec:

- FE.Setup$(1^\lambda) \to$ msk, pp: It outputs the public parameter pp and the master secret key msk.

- FE.KeyGen(msk, pp, $\mathbf{x}$) $\to f_{\mathbf{x}}$: It generates the functional decryption key $f_{\mathbf{x}}$ for an input vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}^k$.

- FE.Enc(msk, pp, $\mathbf{y}$) $\to \mathbf{c_y}$: It encrypts the input vector $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^k$ to the ciphertext $\mathbf{c_y}$.

- FE.Dec(pp, $f_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c_y}$) $\to z$: It outputs a value $z \in \mathbb{F}$ or an error symbol $\perp$.

Correctness   An fh-IPFE scheme FE is *correct* if $\forall(\text{msk}, \text{pp}) \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^k$, we have

$$\text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{x}), \text{FE.Enc}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{y})) = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}^T \in \mathbb{F}.$$

4.1   Instantiation with an fh-IPFE Scheme

Let FE = (FE.Setup, FE.KeyGen, FE.Enc, FE.Dec) be an fh-IPFE scheme. Following [EM23], we can instantiate a biometric authentication scheme using FE with the distance metric the Euclidean distance. Let getEnroll$^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ and getProbe$^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ both output vectors in $\{0, 1, \cdots, m\}^k$ for all biometric distributions $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$. For a pre-defined real number $\tau \geq 0$, define

$$\text{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}') \to \|\mathbf{b} - \mathbf{b}'\|^2 \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Verify}(s) \to \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \sqrt{s} \leq \tau \\ 0 & \text{if } \sqrt{s} > \tau \end{cases}.$$

Now, let the associated field of FE be $\mathbb{Z}_q$, where q is a prime number larger than the maximum possible Euclidean distance $m^2 \cdot k$. The scheme is instantiated as follows.

- Setup(1^λ): It calls FE.Setup$(1^\lambda) \to$ msk, pp and outputs esk $\leftarrow$ (msk, pp), psk $\leftarrow$ (msk, pp) and csk $\leftarrow$ pp.

- Enroll(esk, $\mathbf{b}$): On input a template vector $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_k)$, the algorithm first encodes it as $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_{k+2}) = (b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_k, 1, \|\mathbf{b}\|^2)$. Next, it calls FE.KeyGen(msk, pp, $\mathbf{x}$) $\to f_{\mathbf{x}}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c_x} \leftarrow f_{\mathbf{x}}$.

- Probe(psk, $\mathbf{b}'$): On input a template vector $\mathbf{b}' = (b'_1, b'_2, \cdots, b'_k)$, the algorithm first encodes it as $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, y_2, \cdots, y_{k+2}) = (-2b'_1, -2b'_2, \cdots, -2b'_k, \|\mathbf{b}'\|^2, 1)$. Next, it calls FE.Enc(msk, pp, $\mathbf{y}$) $\to \mathbf{c_y}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c_y}$.

- $\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y})$: It calls $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}) \to s$ and outputs the value s.

By the correctness of the functional encryption scheme FE, we have

$$s = \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}) = \mathbf{xy}^T = \sum_{i=1}^{k} -2b_i b_i' + \|\mathbf{b}\|^2 + \|\mathbf{b}'\|^2 = \|\mathbf{b} - \mathbf{b}'\|^2.$$

which is equal to $\mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}')$. Therefore, if two templates $\mathbf{b}$ and $\mathbf{b}'$ are close enough such that $\|\mathbf{b} - \mathbf{b}'\| \leq \tau$, the scheme results in $r = 1$, a successful authentication.

Instantiated with an fh-IPFE scheme in this way, the comparison secret key csk is public, and the enrollment secret key esk and probe secret key psk are the same. Anyone with access to the enrollment message $\mathbf{c_x}$ and either esk or psk can probe any (invalidly encoded) $\mathbf{y}' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k+2}$ and find $\mathbf{xy}'^T$ to get partial or full information about the biometric template $\mathbf{b}$. Even if the adversary has no esk or psk, if it can sample ciphertexts $\mathbf{c_y}$ corresponding to some unknown random vectors $\mathbf{y}$, and if the field size q is not large enough, it can also find a forged $\mathbf{c_{y^*}}$ such that $\mathbf{xy}^{*T} \leq \tau$ with a good probability to impersonate the user by sampling many times offline.

Let Π be an authentication scheme instantiated by an fh-IPFE scheme FE for a field $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{Z}_q$. In the following, we discuss the UF and IND security of Π in this section. For this, we first define two security notions of FE[1].

4.2   fh-IND Security of FE

Given an fh-IPFE scheme FE, we define the fh-IND game [Kim+16] in Algorithm 4.

Algorithm 4 $\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}_{\mathsf{FE}}(\mathcal{A})$

1: $b \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}$
2: $\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$
3: $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathsf{pp})$
4: **return** $1_{\tilde{b}=b}$

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\cdot, \cdot)$: On input pair $(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}^{(1)})$, where $\mathbf{x}^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}^{(1)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^k \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$, it outputs $\mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{x}^{(b)})$.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}(\cdot, \cdot)$: On input pair $(\mathbf{y}^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(1)})$, where $\mathbf{y}^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(1)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^k \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$, it outputs $\mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{y}^{(b)})$.

To avoid trivial attacks, we consider *admissible adversaries*.

Definition 5 (Admissible Adversary). Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary in an fh-IND game, and let $(\mathbf{x}_1^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}_1^{(1)}), \cdots, (\mathbf{x}_{Q_K}^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}_{Q_K}^{(1)})$ be its queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}$ and $(\mathbf{y}_1^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}_1^{(1)}), \cdots, (\mathbf{y}_{Q_E}^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}_{Q_E}^{(1)})$ be its queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$. We say $\mathcal{A}$ is *admissible* if $\forall i \in [Q_K], \forall j \in [Q_E]$,

$$\mathbf{x}_i^{(0)} \mathbf{y}_j^{(0)T} = \mathbf{x}_i^{(1)} \mathbf{y}_j^{(1)T}$$

---

[1] In security definition, the vectors lie in $\mathbb{Z}_q^k$, but we consider $\mathbb{Z}_q^{k+2}$ when discussing the instantiation Π.

Definition 6 (fh-IND Security)**.** An fh-IPFE scheme FE is called fh-IND secure if for any admissible adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in the fh-IND game in Algorithm 4 is

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}} := \left| \Pr[\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}_{\mathsf{FE}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| = \mathsf{negl}.$$

We note that fh-IND security is a standard notion for an fh-IPFE, and constructions in [DDM15; TAO16; Kim+16] are proven fh-IND. However, fh-IND security may not be sufficient for the UF security of the instantiation in Section 4.1.

Theorem 3. *An instantiation Π using the construction in [Kim+16] is not* option-*UF for any* option*.*

We recall the construction in [Kim+16] in Appendix A.

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a UF game adversary that returns $(K_1, K_2) = (1, (1, \cdots, 1))$. Then, in the decryption,

$$D_1 = e(g_1, g_2)^0 = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad D_2 = e(g_1, g_2)^0 = 1$$

As $D_1^0 = D_2$, the decryption returns 0 and let the adversary win the game with probability 1.

$\square$

4.3 RUF Security of FE

We also define the $\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}}$ game in Algorithm 5.

Algorithm 5 $\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathcal{A})$

1: $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}^k$
2: $\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$
3: $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{r})$
4: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c})$
5: **if** $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ is equal to any output of $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}$ **then**
6:     **return** 0
7: **end if**
8: $s \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$
9: **return** $1_{s \neq \perp}$

The oracle $\mathcal{O}$ can be nothing or include the following options based on the threat model.

- $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\cdot)$: On input $\mathbf{x}'$, it outputs $\mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{x}')$.

- $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}(\cdot)$: On input $\mathbf{y}'$, it outputs $\mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{y}')$. The adversary is required to return $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ that is not equal to any output of this oracle.

Definition 7 (RUF Security). An fh-IPFE scheme FE is called $\mathcal{O}$-RUF secure if for any adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in the $\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}}_{\mathsf{FE}}$ game in Algorithm 5 is

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{RUF},\mathcal{O}}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{A}} := \Pr[\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}}_{\mathsf{FE}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] = \mathsf{negl}.$$

We say FE is RUF secure if it is $\{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}\}$-RUF secure.

4.3.1 Achievability of RUF Security

We note that RUF security is a new security notion of fh-IPFE but can be achieved with a digital signature scheme. Let $\mathsf{Sig} = (\mathsf{Sig.KeyGen}, \mathsf{Sig.Sign}, \mathsf{Sig.Verify})$ be an sEUF-CMA signature scheme. By adding Sig, an fh-IPFE scheme FE can be upgraded to an RUF scheme FE'.

- $\mathsf{FE}'.\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: Run $\mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \to (\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp})$ and $\mathsf{Sig.KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \to (\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{Sig}}, \mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{Sig}})$. Output $\mathsf{msk}' = (\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{Sig}})$ and $\mathsf{pp}' = (\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{Sig}})$.

- $\mathsf{FE}'.\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}', \mathbf{x})$: Run $\mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathbf{x}) \to f_{\mathbf{x}}$ and output $f_{\mathbf{x}}$.

- $\mathsf{FE}'.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{msk}', \mathbf{y})$: Run $\mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathbf{y}) \to \mathbf{c_y}$ and sign $\mathbf{c_y}$ by $\mathsf{Sig.Sign}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{Sig}}, \mathbf{c_y}) \to \sigma$. Output $\mathbf{c_y}' = (\mathbf{c_y}, \sigma)$.

- $\mathsf{FE}'.\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{pp}', f_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c_y}')$: Output the decryption $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, f_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c_y})$ if the verification $\mathsf{Sig.Verify}(\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{Sig}}, \mathbf{c_y}, \sigma) = 1$. Otherwise, output $\bot$.

Theorem 4. *For any fh-IPFE FE, FE$'$ is an RUF fh-IPFE.*

Proof. Given an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in the $\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}_{\mathsf{FE}'}$ game, consider the reduction adversary $\mathcal{R}$ in Algorithm 6 which plays the sEUF-CMA game of Sig. $\mathcal{R}$ is given a verification public key $\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{Sig}}$ and a signing oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Sig}}$ and returns a forged message-signature pair that is not equal to any previous answer of $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Sig}}$. To run $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{R}$ simulates each oracle in the following way.

- $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}')$: Return $\mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathbf{x})$.

- $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}(\mathbf{y}')$: Run $\mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathbf{y}) \to \mathbf{c_y}$ and call the signing oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Sign}}(\mathbf{c_y}) \to \sigma$. Output $\mathbf{c_y}' = (\mathbf{c_y}, \sigma)$.

Algorithm 6 $\mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Sign}}}(\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{Sig}})$

1: $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^k$
2: $\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$
3: $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{r})$
4: $\mathsf{pp}' \leftarrow (\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{Sig}})$
5: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathsf{pp}', \mathbf{c})$
6: Parse $(\mathbf{c_z}, \sigma') \leftarrow \tilde{\mathbf{z}}$
7: **return** $(\mathbf{c_z}, \sigma')$

$\mathcal{R}$ perfectly simulates a RUF game for $\mathcal{A}$, and if $\mathcal{A}$ wins the RUF game, $(\mathbf{c_z}, \sigma')$ is not equal to any previous answer of $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}$, and thereoere not equal to any previous message-signature pair $(\mathbf{c_y}, \sigma)$ given from the signing oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Sign}}$. Now, since Sig is sEUF-CMA,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] \leq \Pr[\mathsf{Sig.Verify}(\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{Sig}}, \mathbf{c_z}, \sigma') = 1] = \mathsf{negl}.$$

$\square$

4.4   UF Security of Π

We first consider option-UF security when option includes $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}$. Note that in this instantiation, csk is the public parameter pp of FE and assumed to be given to all adversaries.

Theorem 5. *Let* option $= \{\mathbf{c_x}, \mathsf{csk}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}\}$. *For any distribution family* $\mathbb{B}$, *if* FE *is fh-IND and* $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}$*-RUF, then* Π *is* option*-UF.*

Proof. Given an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in the $\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}$ game, consider the reduction adversary $\mathcal{R}$ in Algorithm 7 which plays the fh-IND game. $\mathcal{R}$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ and simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b}')$ by first encoding $\mathbf{b}' = (b'_1, \cdots, b'_k)$ into $\mathbf{x}' = (b'_1, \cdots, b'_k, 1, \|\mathbf{b}'\|^2)$ and calling $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}', \mathbf{x}')$ given in the fh-IND game. Note that since $\mathcal{R}$ never calls $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$, it is an admissible adversary.

Algorithm 7 $\mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathsf{pp})$

1: $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$
2: $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, \cdots, b_k) \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$
3: $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow (b_1, \cdots, b_k, 1, \|\mathbf{b}\|^2)$
4: $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}^{k+2}$
5: $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{r})$
6: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}}(\mathbf{c}, \mathsf{pp})$
7: $s \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$
8: **if** $\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1$ **then**
9:     **return** $\tilde{b} = 0$
10: **else**
11:     **return** $\tilde{b} \leftarrow_\$ \{0, 1\}$
12: **end if**

If the challenge bit $b = 0$, then $\mathcal{R}$ perfectly simulates a $\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}$ game for $\mathcal{A}$. Therefore, the probability that $\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1$ in Line 8 is $\Pr[\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1]$.

For the case when the challenge bit $b = 1$, consider an adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ in Algorithm 8 in the $\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}}$ game. $\mathcal{A}'$ runs Line 1 and 6 of $\mathcal{R}$ and simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b}')$ by first encoding $\mathbf{b}'$ into $\mathbf{x}'$ as before and calling $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}')$ given in the $\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}}$ game.

Now, if the challenge bit $b = 1$, then $\mathcal{R}$ perfectly simulates $\mathcal{A}'$ in the $\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}}$ game. The probability that $\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1$ in Line 8 is smaller than $\Pr[s \neq \perp] = \Pr[\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}}(\mathcal{A}') \to 1]$

Algorithm 8 $\mathcal{A}'^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c})$

1: $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$
2: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}}(\mathbf{c}, \mathsf{pp})$
3: **return** $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$

In conclusion,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}(\mathcal{R}) \to 1] = \Pr[b = 0] \cdot \left(\Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 0] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 0 \mid b = 0] \right)$$

$$+ \Pr[b = 1] \cdot \frac{1}{2} \cdot \Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 0 \mid b = 1]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} \left(\Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 0] - \Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 1] \right)$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} \left(\Pr[\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}}(\mathcal{A}') \to 1] \right)$$

Since both $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{R}}^{\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}} = \left| \Pr[\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}(\mathcal{R}) \to 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right|$ and $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{A}'}^{\mathsf{RUF},\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}} = \Pr[\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}}(\mathcal{A}') \to 1]$ are negligilbe,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] \leq 4 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{R}}^{\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}} + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{A}'}^{\mathsf{RUF},\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}} = \mathsf{negl}.$$

$\square$

For option that includes $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$, we first note that for any $d \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and any nonzero vector $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k+2}$, there exists a vector $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{k+2}$ such that $\mathbf{r}\mathbf{y}^T = d$.

Theorem 6. *Let* option $= \{\mathbf{c_x}, \mathsf{csk}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}\}$. *For any distribution family* $\mathbb{B}$, *if* FE *is fh-IND and* $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}$-*RUF, then* Π *is* option-*UF.*

Proof. Given an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in the $\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}$ game, consider the reduction adversary $\mathcal{R}$ in Algorithm 9 which plays the fh-IND game. $\mathcal{R}$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ and simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ in the following way.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$: On input $\mathbf{b}' = (b'_1, \cdots, b'_k)$, it first encodes it as $\mathbf{y}' = (-2b'_1, \cdots, -2b'_k, \|\mathbf{b}'\|^2, 1)$. Next, it computes $d \leftarrow \mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}'^T$ and finds a vector $\mathbf{y}''$ such that $\mathbf{r}\mathbf{y}''^T = d$. Finally, it calls $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}(\mathbf{y}', \mathbf{y}'')$, which is given by the fh-IND game, and returns the result.

Note that $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{r})$ is the only query of $\mathcal{R}$ to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}$, and for any query $(\mathbf{y}', \mathbf{y}'')$ to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$, it satisfies $\mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}'^T = \mathbf{r}\mathbf{y}''^T$. Hence, $\mathcal{R}$ is an admissible adversary.

If the challenge bit $b = 0$, then $\mathcal{R}$ perfectly simulates a $\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}$ game for $\mathcal{A}$. Therefore, the probability that $\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1$ in Line 11 is $\Pr[\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1]$.

For the case when the challenge bit $b = 1$, consider an adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ in Algorithm 10 in the $\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}}$ game. $\mathcal{A}'$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ and simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ in the following way.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$: It first encodes $\mathbf{b}'$ into $\mathbf{y}'$ as before. Next, it computes $d \leftarrow \mathbf{x}^{(*)}\mathbf{y}'^T$ and finds a vector $\mathbf{y}''$ such that $\mathbf{r}\mathbf{y}''^T = d$. Finally, it calls $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}(\mathbf{y}'')$, which is given by the $\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}$ game, and returns the result.

Algorithm 9 $\mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathsf{pp})$

1: $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$
2: $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, \cdots, b_k) \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$
3: $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow (b_1, \cdots, b_k, 1, \|\mathbf{b}\|^2)$
4: $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}^{k+2}$
5: $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{r})$
6: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}}(\mathbf{c}, \mathsf{pp})$
7: **if** $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ is equal to any output of $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ **then**
8:     **return** $\perp$
9: **end if**
10: $s \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$
11: **if** $\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1$ **then**
12:     **return** $\tilde{b} = 0$
13: **else**
14:     **return** $\tilde{b} \leftarrow_\$ \{0, 1\}$
15: **end if**

To make $\mathcal{R}$ simulate $\mathcal{A}'$ in the $\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}$ game, we still need to ensure two conditions.

- $\mathbf{r} \neq \mathbf{0}$. Otherwise, $\mathcal{A}'$ cannot simulate $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$.

- $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \neq \mathbf{c}^{(i)}$ for all i. The answers of $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ have already been checked in $\mathcal{R}$.

Let $\mathcal{A}'$ play a tweaked $\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}$ game which does not check that $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ is not equal to $\mathbf{c}^{(i)}$ for all i. That is, the game only checks whether $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ is not equal to any output of $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}$ called by $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ of $\mathcal{A}$. Let the returned value of this game be V. We have Equation 1 and 2. The former one is a relation between $\mathcal{R}$ playing fh-IND game when the challenge bit $b = 1$ and V, and the latter is a relation between $\mathcal{A}'$ playing a regular $\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}$ game and the tweaked one.

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 1 \wedge \mathbf{r} \neq \mathbf{0}] = \Pr[V = 1] \tag{1}$$

$$\Pr[\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathcal{A}') \to 1] = \Pr\left[V = 1 \mid \bigwedge_{i=1}^{k+2} \tilde{\mathbf{z}} \neq \mathbf{c}^{(i)}\right] \tag{2}$$

For Equation 1, consider that

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 1] &= \Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 1 \wedge \mathbf{r} \neq \mathbf{0}] \cdot \Pr[\mathbf{r} \neq \mathbf{0}] \\
&\quad + \Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 1 \wedge \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{0}] \cdot \Pr[\mathbf{r} = \mathbf{0}] \\
&\leq \Pr[V = 1] + \Pr[\mathbf{r} = \mathbf{0}] \\
&= \Pr[V = 1] + \frac{1}{q^{k+2}}
\end{aligned}$$

Algorithm 10 $\mathcal{A}'^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c})$

1: $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$
2: $\mathbf{b}^{(*)} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$
3: $\mathbf{x}^{(*)} \leftarrow (b_1^{(*)}, \cdots, b_k^{(*)}, 1, \|\mathbf{b}^{(*)}\|^2)$
4: Sample $k + 2$ linearly independent vectors $\{\mathbf{e}^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^{k+2}$.
5: **for** $i = 1$ to $k + 2$ **do**
6: $\quad \mathbf{c}^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}(\mathbf{e}^{(i)})$.
7: $\quad d_i \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{c}^{(i)})$.
8: **end for**
9: Find the vector $\mathbf{r}$ by solving the linear system $\{\mathbf{r}\mathbf{e}^{(i)T} = d_i\}_{i=1}^{k+2}$.
10: **if** $\mathbf{r} = \mathbf{0}$ **then**
11: $\quad$ **return** $\perp$
12: **end if**
13: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}}(\mathbf{c}, \mathsf{pp})$
14: **return** $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$

For Equation 2, consider that

$$\Pr[\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathcal{A}') \to 1] = \Pr\left[V = 1 \mid \bigwedge_{i=1}^{k+2} \tilde{\mathbf{z}} \neq \mathbf{c}^{(i)}\right]$$

$$\geq \Pr[V = 1] - \Pr\left[\neg\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^{k+2} \tilde{\mathbf{z}} \neq \mathbf{c}^{(i)}\right)\right]$$

$$= \Pr[V = 1] - \Pr\left[\bigvee_{i=1}^{k+2} \tilde{\mathbf{z}} = \mathbf{c}^{(i)}\right]$$

$$\geq \Pr[V = 1] - \sum_{i=1}^{k+2} \Pr[\tilde{\mathbf{z}} = \mathbf{c}^{(i)}].$$

Note that each $\mathbf{c}^{(i)} = \mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{e}^{(i)})$ for some uniform nonzero vector $\mathbf{e}^{(i)}$. Also note that distinct vectors in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{k+2}$ will have different encryptions due to the correctness of FE. Therefore, $\Pr[\tilde{\mathbf{z}} = \mathbf{c}^{(i)}] \leq \frac{1}{q^{k+2}-1}$ and

$$\Pr[\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathcal{A}') \to 1] \geq \Pr[V = 1] - \frac{k+2}{q^{k+2} - 1}.$$

Combining both results from Equation 1 and 2, we derive

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 1] \leq \Pr[V = 1] + \frac{1}{q^{k+2}} \leq \Pr[\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathcal{A}') \to 1] + \frac{k+2}{q^{k+2} - 1} + \frac{1}{q^{k+2}}.$$

Finally, similar to the proof of Theorem 5, we derive

$$\Pr[\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}(\mathcal{R}) \to 1] = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}\left(\Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 0] - \Pr[\mathsf{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 1]\right)$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}\left(\Pr[\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathcal{A}') \to 1] - \frac{k+2}{q^{k+2} - 1} - \frac{1}{q^{k+2}}\right).$$

Since both $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{R}}^{\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}} = \left|\Pr[\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}(\mathcal{R}) \to 1] - \frac{1}{2}\right|$ and $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{A}'}^{\mathsf{RUF},\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}} = \Pr[\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathcal{A}') \to$
$1]$ are negligible,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] \leq 4 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{R}}^{\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}} + \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{A}'}^{\mathsf{RUF},\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}} + \frac{k+2}{q^{k+2}-1} + \frac{1}{q^{k+2}} = \mathsf{negl}.$$

$\square$

Unfortunately, for the instantiation in Section 4.1, we cannot achieve UF security when the adversary has psk, even if the false positive rate is negligible. The adversary can simply compute $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{0})$ and return $\mathbf{c}$. The same results also hold for option that includes esk since both psk and esk are equal to msk and allow the adversary to run $\mathsf{FE}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{v})$ for any vector $\mathbf{v}$. We state this result formally in the following theorem.

Theorem 7. *Let* option *include* esk *or* psk. *For any distribution family* $\mathbb{B}$ *and functional encryption* FE, Π *is not* option*-UF.*

4.5   IND Security of Π

For the IND security, we first consider the following definition and assumption on the biometric distribution family $\mathbb{B}$.

Definition 8. For an authentication scheme Π, a distribution $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$, and an integer t, define the distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}}(t)$ as

$$\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}}(t) = \left(\mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}^{(1)}), \mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}^{(2)}), \cdots, \mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}^{(t)})\right)$$

where $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ and $\mathbf{b}^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ for all $i \in [t]$.

Assumption 1. Let t be an integer. Assume that for any two distributions $\mathcal{B}^{(0)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ in the biometric distribution family $\mathbb{B}$, $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}(t)$ and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}(t)$ are the same.

Note that indistinguishability between $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}(t)$ and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}(t)$ is a necessary condition to achieve IND security because

$$\left(\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}^{(1)}), \cdots, \mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}^{(t)})\right) = \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(b)}}(t)$$

where b is the challenge bit.

Theorem 8. *For any distribution family* $\mathbb{B}$ *satisfying Assumption 1 and having a true positive rate* $\mathsf{TP} > \frac{1}{\mathsf{poly}}$, *if* FE *is fh-IND, then* Π *is IND.*

Proof. Given an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in the IND game, consider the reduction adversary $\mathcal{R}$ in Algorithm 11 which plays the fh-IND game by running $\mathcal{A}$.
Note that $(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}^{(1)})$ is the only query of $\mathcal{R}$ to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}$, and for any query $(\mathbf{y}^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(1)})$ to $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$, it satisfies $\mathbf{x}^{(0)}\mathbf{y}^{(0)^T} = \mathbf{x}^{(1)}\mathbf{y}^{(1)^T}$. Hence, $\mathcal{R}$ is an admissible adversary.

Algorithm 11 $\mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}},\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathsf{pp})$

1: $\mathcal{B}^{(0)} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}^{(0)}$
2: $\mathcal{B}^{(1)} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}^{(1)}$
3: $\mathbf{b}^{(0)} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}}(), \mathbf{x}^{(0)} \leftarrow (b_1^{(0)}, \cdots, b_k^{(0)}, 1, \|\mathbf{b}^{(0)}\|^2)$
4: $\mathbf{b}^{(1)} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}}(), \mathbf{x}^{(1)} \leftarrow (b_1^{(1)}, \cdots, b_k^{(1)}, 1, \|\mathbf{b}^{(1)}\|^2)$
5: $\mathbf{c_x} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}^{(1)})$
6: **for** $i = 1$ to t **do**
7: $\quad \mathbf{b'}^{(0)} \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}}()$
8: $\quad \mathbf{y}^{(0)} \leftarrow (-2b_1'^{(0)}, \cdots, -2b_k'^{(0)}, \|\mathbf{b'}^{(0)}\|^2, 1)$
9: $\quad$ **repeat**
10: $\quad\quad \mathbf{b'}^{(1)} \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}}()$
11: $\quad\quad \mathbf{y}^{(1)} \leftarrow (-2b_1'^{(1)}, \cdots, -2b_k'^{(1)}, \|\mathbf{b'}^{(1)}\|^2, 1)$
12: $\quad$ **until** $\mathbf{x}^{(0)}\mathbf{y}^{(0)^T} = \mathbf{x}^{(1)}\mathbf{y}^{(1)^T}$
13: $\quad \mathbf{c_y}^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}(\mathbf{y}^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(1)})$
14: **end for**
15: $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c_x}, \{\mathbf{c_y}^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^t)$
16: **return** $\tilde{b}$

The probability that Line 12 is satisfied is

$$\Pr[\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}(1) = \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}(1)] \geq \sum_{i=0}^{\tau} \Pr[\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}(1) = i]^2 \qquad \text{(Assumption 1)}$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{\tau+1} \cdot \left(\sum_{i=0}^{\tau} \Pr[\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}(1) = i] \right)^2$$

$$= \frac{1}{\tau+1} \cdot \left(\Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}}() \\ \mathbf{b'} \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}}() \end{bmatrix} : \|\mathbf{b} - \mathbf{b'}\| \leq \tau \right)^2$$

$$= \frac{\mathsf{TP}(\mathcal{B}^{(0)})^2}{\tau+1} = \frac{\mathsf{TP}^2}{\tau+1} \qquad \text{(Assumption 1)}$$

The expected number of repetitions is bounded above by $\frac{\tau+1}{\mathsf{TP}^2}$. Moreover, the probability that it is satisfied within T repetitions is at least

$$1 - (1 - \frac{\mathsf{TP}^2}{\tau+1})^T \geq 1 - e^{-T \cdot \frac{\mathsf{TP}^2}{\tau+1}}$$

We can reach a $1 - \mathsf{negl}.$ probability that the loop will end within T times by setting a polynomial-size T.

Now, we show that $\mathcal{R}$ perfectly simulate an IND game for $\mathcal{A}$. If the challenge bit b of the fh-IND game is 0, $\mathbf{c_x}$ and $\mathbf{c_y}^{(i)}$ for all $i \in [t]$ are generated from $\mathcal{B}^{(0)}$ and have the same distributions as the inputs for an adversary in IND game. If the challenge bit b is 1, we show that distributions of $\mathbf{c_x}, \{\mathbf{c_y}^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^t$ also follow the same distribution given Assumption 1.

Let $b' \in \{0,1\}$, define distributions

$$\mathbf{X}^{(b')} = \{\mathbf{b}^{(b')} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(b')}}}() : \mathbf{x}^{(b')} \leftarrow (b_1^{(b')}, \cdots, b_k^{(b')}, 1, \|\mathbf{b}^{(b')}\|^2)\}$$

$$\mathbf{Y}_i^{(b')} = \{\mathbf{b}^{(b')} \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(b')}}}() : \mathbf{y}^{(b')} \leftarrow (-2b_1^{(b')}, \cdots, -2b_k^{(b')}, \|\mathbf{b}^{(b')}\|^2, 1)\}$$

$$\{\mathbf{Y}_i^{(b')}\}_{i \in [t]} = (\mathbf{Y}_1^{(b')}, \cdots, \mathbf{Y}_t^{(b')}) \quad (t \text{ identical and independent distributions})$$

Let $\mathbf{Y}_i'$ be the distribution of $\mathbf{y}^{(1)}$ derived after the loop in Line 12 in the i-th iteration. For any $\{d_i\}_{i=1}^t, d_i > 0$,

$$\Pr\left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^t \mathbf{X}^{(0)}\mathbf{Y}_i^{(0)T} = d_i^2\right] = \Pr\left[\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}(t) = (d_1, \cdots, d_t)\right]$$

$$= \Pr\left[\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}(t) = (d_1, \cdots, d_t)\right] = \Pr\left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^t \mathbf{X}^{(1)}\mathbf{Y}_i^{(1)T} = d_i^2\right]$$

Hence, for any $\mathbf{x}$ and $\{\mathbf{y}_i\}_{i=1}^t$,

$$\Pr[\mathbf{X}^{(1)} = \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{Y}_1' = \mathbf{y}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{Y}_t' = \mathbf{y}_t]$$

$$= \sum_{d_1, \cdots, d_t} \left(\Pr\left[\mathbf{X}^{(1)} = \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{Y}_1^{(1)} = \mathbf{y}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{Y}_t^{(1)} = \mathbf{y}_t \mid \bigwedge_{i=1}^t \mathbf{X}^{(1)}\mathbf{Y}_i^{(1)T} = d_i^2\right] \right.$$

$$\left. \times \Pr\left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^t \mathbf{X}^{(0)}\mathbf{Y}_i^{(0)T} = d_i^2\right] \right)$$

$$= \sum_{d_1, \cdots, d_t} \left(\Pr\left[\mathbf{X}^{(1)} = \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{Y}_1^{(1)} = \mathbf{y}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{Y}_t^{(1)} = \mathbf{y}_t \mid \bigwedge_{i=1}^t \mathbf{X}^{(1)}\mathbf{Y}_i^{(1)T} = d_i^2\right] \right.$$

$$\left. \times \Pr\left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^t \mathbf{X}^{(1)}\mathbf{Y}_i^{(1)T} = d_i^2\right] \right)$$

$$= \Pr[\mathbf{X}^{(1)} = \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{Y}_1^{(1)} = \mathbf{y}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{Y}_t^{(1)} = \mathbf{y}_t]$$

which implies $\mathcal{R}$ also perfectly simulate an IND game for $\mathcal{A}$ when the challenge bit $b = 1$.

In conclusion,

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{R}}^{\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}} = \mathbf{Adv}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{IND}} = \mathsf{negl}.$$

which holds for all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ in the IND game. This implies the IND security of Π.

$\square$

5 Security Analysis: Relational Hash-based Instantiation

Definition 9 (Relational Hash (adapted from [MR14])). Let R be a relation over sets X, Y, and Z. A *relational hash* scheme RH for R consists of PPT algorithms RH.KeyGen, RH.HASH$_1$, RH.HASH$_2$, and RH.Verify:

- RH.KeyGen(1^λ) $\to$ pk: It outputs a public hash key pk.

- RH.Hash$_1$(pk, $\mathbf{x}$) $\to$ $\mathbf{h_x}$: Given a hash key pk and $\mathbf{x} \in X$, it outputs a hash $\mathbf{h_x}$.

- RH.Hash$_2$(pk, $\mathbf{y}$) $\to$ $\mathbf{h_y}$: Given a hash key pk and $\mathbf{y} \in Y$, it outputs a hash $\mathbf{h_y}$.

- RH.Verify(pk, $\mathbf{h_x}$, $\mathbf{h_y}$, $\mathbf{z}$) $\to r \in \{0,1\}$: Given a hash key pk, two hashes $\mathbf{h_x}$ and $\mathbf{h_y}$, and $\mathbf{z} \in Z$, it verifies whether the relation among $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}$ and $\mathbf{z}$ holds.

Correctness   A relational hash scheme RH is *correct* if $\forall \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} \in X \times Y \times Z$,

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathsf{pk} \leftarrow \mathsf{RH.KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \\ \mathbf{h_x} \leftarrow \mathsf{RH.Hash}_1(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{x}) : \mathsf{RH.Verify}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{h_x}, \mathbf{h_y}, \mathbf{z}) = R(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \\ \mathbf{h_y} \leftarrow \mathsf{RH.Hash}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{y}) \end{bmatrix} = 1 - \mathsf{negl}.$$

Note that Z_λ is an auxiliary input. When the relation R is over two sets $X \times Y$, we ignore Z and write RH.Verify(pk, $\mathbf{h_x}$, $\mathbf{h_y}$).

5.1   Instantiation with a Relational Hash Scheme

Let RH = (RH.KeyGen, RH.Hash$_1$, RH.Hash$_2$, RH.Verify) be a relational hash scheme for the relation R^τ of Hamming distance proximity parametrized by a constant τ.

$$R^\tau = \{(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \mid \mathsf{HD}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \leq \tau \wedge \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \{0,1\}^k\}$$

Note that here we ignore the third parameter Z. Let getEnroll$^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}$() and getProbe$^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}$() both output vectors in $\{0,1\}^k$ for all biometric distributions $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$, and let

$$\mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b'}) \to \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } (\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b'}) \in R^\tau \\ 0 & \text{if } (\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b'}) \notin R^\tau \end{cases} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathsf{Verify}(s) \to s.$$

Following [MR14], we can instantiate a biometric authentication scheme using RH. Let the biometric distribution $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \{0,1\}^k$.

- Setup(1^λ): It calls RH.KeyGen(1^λ) $\to$ pk and outputs esk $\leftarrow$ pk, psk $\leftarrow$ pk, and csk $\leftarrow$ pk.

- Enroll(esk, $\mathbf{b}$): Let $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathbf{b}$. It calls RH.Hash$_1$(pk, $\mathbf{x}$) $\to$ $\mathbf{h_x}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c_x} \leftarrow \mathbf{h_x}$.

- Probe(psk, $\mathbf{b'}$): Let $\mathbf{y} \leftarrow \mathbf{b}$. It calls RH.Hash$_2$(pk, $\mathbf{y}$) $\to$ $\mathbf{h_y}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c_y} \leftarrow \mathbf{h_y}$.

- Compare(csk, $\mathbf{c_x}$, $\mathbf{c_y}$): It calls RH.Verify(pk, $\mathbf{h_x}$, $\mathbf{h_y}$) $\to s$ and outputs the value s.

By the correctness of the relational hash scheme RH, we have (except for a negligible probability),

$$r = 1 \Leftrightarrow (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = (\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b'}) \in R^\tau \Leftrightarrow \mathsf{HD}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b'}) \leq \tau$$

The idea behing this construction is that users hold a personal device which runs Setup, Enroll, and Probe using templates coming from a biometric sensor. The message $\mathbf{c_x}$ along with the comparison key $\mathsf{csk} = \mathsf{pk}$, which is assumed to be public, are sent to a server in order to enroll the user, and $\mathbf{c_y}$ is sent on authentication.

Now, let Π be an authentication scheme instantiated by a relational hash scheme RH. For the UF and IND security of Π, we define the unforgeability [MR14] of RH.

Definition 10 (Unforgeability)**.** A relational hash scheme RH is called *unforgeable* for the distribution $\mathcal{X}$ if for any adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the following probability is negligible.

$$
\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{x} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{X} \\ \mathsf{pk} \leftarrow \mathsf{RH.KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \\ \mathbf{h_x} \leftarrow \mathsf{RH.Hash_1}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{x}) \\ \tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{h_x}) \end{array} : \mathsf{RH.Verify}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{h_x}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}}) = 1 \right] = \mathsf{negl}.
$$

5.2   UF Security of Π

We first consider option that includes $\mathbf{c_x}$.

Theorem 9. *Let* option $= \{\mathbf{c_x}, \mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{csk}\}$. *If RH is unforgeable for the distribution*

$$
\mathcal{X} = \{\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B} : \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \mid \mathbb{B}\},
$$

then Π is option*-UF.*

In [MR14], the authors construct an RH that is unforgeable for the uniform distribution over $\{0,1\}^k$, under the hardness of some computational problems. Note that we need to provide knowledge of $\mathbb{B}$ in the distribution $\mathcal{X}$.

Proof. Recall that the distribution of $\mathbf{c_x}$ in the UF game of the instantiation of Section 5.1 is

$$
\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B} \\ \mathsf{pk} \leftarrow \mathsf{RH.KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \quad : \mathbf{c_x} \leftarrow \mathsf{RH.Hash_1}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{x}) \\ \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \end{array} \right\}
$$

Also recall that $\mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})) = \mathsf{RH.Verify}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$. The option-UF security is thus guaranteed by the unforgeability of RH.

$\square$

Remark   As we mentioned in Section 3.1, an adversary with psk can enjoy a winning rate of the false positive rate FP of $\mathbb{B}$. Theorem 9 thus implies that if FP is not negligible, there does not exist an RH that is unforgeable for the distribution $\{\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B} : \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \mid \mathbb{B}\}$.

Note that since $\mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{psk}$, and csk are all public in this instantiation, it is meaningless to discuss $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$, or $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{log}}$. In addition, for option that includes $\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}$ or $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Probe}}$, as discussed in Section 3.1, we cannot achieve option-UF security since psk is public in this instantiation.

For option that includes $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enroll}}$, we notice that for the RH construction in [MR14], there exists an invalid pk' such that $\mathsf{RH.Hash_1}(\mathsf{pk}', \mathbf{x})$ directly leaks $\mathbf{x}$. By returning $\mathsf{RH.Hash_2}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{x})$, one can break the $\mathsf{UF}_{\mathsf{option}}$ game with probability 1.

5.3 IND Security of Π

For the IND security, we have a negative result for Π.

Theorem 10. *For any distribution family $\mathbb{B}$ that $\mathsf{TP} - \mathsf{FP} > \frac{1}{\mathsf{poly}}$, and for any relational hash scheme RH, Π is not IND for any $t \geq 0$.*

Proof. Consider the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in Algorithm 12. When the challenge bit $b = 0$, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ wins is TP. When the challenge bit $b = 1$, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ wins is $1 - \mathsf{FP}$. Now,

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{IND}}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}} = \left| \Pr[\mathsf{IND}_\Pi(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| = \left| \frac{1}{2}(\mathsf{TP} + 1 - \mathsf{FP}) - \frac{1}{2} \right| > \frac{1}{\mathsf{poly}}.$$

Algorithm 12 $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}}(\mathsf{csk} = \mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \{\mathbf{c_y}^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^{t})$

1: $\mathbf{y}^{(0)} = \mathbf{b}^{(0)} \leftarrow \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}}()$
2: $\mathbf{h_y}^{(0)} \leftarrow \mathsf{RH.Hash}_2(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{y}^{(0)})$
3: **if** $\mathsf{RH.Verify}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{h_y}^{(0)}) = 1$ **then**
4:     **return** 0
5: **else**
6:     **return** 1
7: **end if**

$\square$

We note that this insecurity result holds whenever psk is public. When esk is public, one can also use $\mathbf{c_y}^{(i)}$ to verify from which distribution the challenge ciphertexts are generated. We write this observation formally in the following theorem.

Theorem 11. *Given any distribution family $\mathbb{B}$ that $\mathsf{TP} - \mathsf{FP} > \frac{1}{\mathsf{poly}}$. If psk is public, Π is not IND for any $t \geq 0$. If esk is public, Π is not IND for any $t \geq 1$.*

5.3.1 IND Security for a Particular Biometric Layer

Recall that in Section 3.2, we introduce as an example a particular biometric layer:

$$\mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \to \mathbf{b}^* + \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Enroll}} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}() \to \mathbf{b}^* + \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$$

where $\mathbf{b}^* \in \{0, 1\}^k$ is a fixed vector only dependent on $\mathcal{B}$, and $\mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}, \mathcal{E}_{\mathsf{Probe}} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^k$ are some *error distributions* independent of $\mathcal{B}$. With the same relational hash RH in Section 5.1, we can instantiate another authentication scheme using RH.

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: It runs $\mathsf{RH.KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \to \mathsf{pk}$ and samples $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_\$ \{0, 1\}^k$. Then it outputs $\mathsf{esk} \leftarrow (\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{r})$, $(\mathsf{psk} \leftarrow \mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{r})$, and $\mathsf{csk} \leftarrow \mathsf{pk}$.

- $\mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}, \mathbf{b})$: Let $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathbf{b}$. It calls $\mathsf{RH.Hash}_1(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}) \to \mathbf{h_x}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c_x} \leftarrow \mathbf{h_x}$.

- $\mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}, \mathbf{b}')$: Let $\mathbf{y} \leftarrow \mathbf{b}$. It calls $\mathsf{RH.Hash_2}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{r}) \rightarrow \mathbf{h_y}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c_y} \leftarrow \mathbf{h_y}$.

- $\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y})$: It calls $\mathsf{RH.Verify}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathbf{h_x}, \mathbf{h_y}) \rightarrow s$ and outputs the value s.

Correctness holds because

$$\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y}) = 1 \Leftrightarrow \mathsf{HD}(\mathbf{x}+\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{y}+\mathbf{r}) \leq \tau \Leftrightarrow \mathsf{HD}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \leq \tau = \mathsf{BioCompare}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}').$$

With the same argument in Theorem 2, one can prove that this new scheme is now IND, albeit at the cost of requiring esk and psk to remain secret.

A   Construction in [Kim+16]

Let $\mathbb{G}_1$ and $\mathbb{G}_2$ be two groups of order a prime number q with generators g_1 and g_2, respectively. Let $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$ be a mapping to a target group $\mathbb{G}_T$ also of order q.

Definition 11 (Bilinear asymmetric group [Kim+16]). A tuple $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q, e)$ is a *bilinear asymmetric group* if the following hold.

- Group operations in $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2,$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ and mapping e are efficiently computable.

- e is bilinear. That is, for $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, $e(g_1^x, g_2^y) = e(g_1, g_2)^{xy}$.

- e is non-degenerate. That is, $e(g_1, g_2) \neq 1$, the identity element of $\mathbb{G}_T$.

For a vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, v_2, \cdots, v_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and a group element g in group of order q, we write $g^{\mathbf{v}}$ to denote the vector of group elements $(g^{v_1}, g^{v_2}, \cdots, g^{v_n})$. Moreover, for $k \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, we write $(g^{\mathbf{v}})^k = g^{k \cdot \mathbf{v}}$ and $g^{\mathbf{v}} \cdot g^{\mathbf{w}} = g^{\mathbf{v}+\mathbf{w}}$. Finally, the pairing operation is extended to vectors.

$$e(g_1^{\mathbf{v}}, g_2^{\mathbf{w}}) = \prod_{i \in [n]} e(g_1^{v_i}, g_2^{w_i}) = e(g_1, g_2)^{\mathbf{v}\mathbf{w}^T}.$$

We now recall the fh-IPFE construction FE in [Kim+16].

- FE.Setup(1^λ): Sample an asymmetric bilinear group $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q, e)$ and choose generators $g_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2$. Sample $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{GL}_n(\mathbb{Z}_q)$ and find $\mathbf{B}^* = \det(\mathbf{B}) \cdot (\mathbf{B}^{-1})^T$. Finally, output the public parameter $\mathsf{pp} = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q, e)$ and the master secret key $\mathsf{msk} = (\mathsf{pp}, g_1, g_2, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{B}^*)$.

- FE.KeyGen($\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{x}$): Sample $\alpha \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_q$ and output

$$f_{\mathbf{x}} = (K_1, K_2) = \left(g_1^{\alpha \cdot \det(\mathbf{B})}, g_1^{\alpha \cdot \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{B}} \right)$$

- FE.Enc($\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{y}$): Sample $\beta \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_q$ and output

$$\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}} = (C_1, C_2) = \left(g_2^{\beta}, g_2^{\beta \cdot \mathbf{y} \cdot \mathbf{B}^*} \right)$$

- FE.Dec($\mathsf{pp}, f_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$) $\to z$: Parse $f_{\mathbf{x}} = (K_1, K_2)$ and $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}} = (C_1, C_2)$ and compute

$$D_1 = e(K_1, C_1) \quad \text{and} \quad D_2 = e(K_2, C_2)$$

  Solve the discrete logarithm to find z such that $D_1^z = D_2$ and output z. If it fails to find such z, output $\perp$.

Correctness We have

$$D_1 = e(K_1, C_1) = e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha \cdot \beta \cdot \det(\mathbf{B})}$$

and

$$D_2 = e(K_2, C_2) = e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha \cdot \beta \cdot \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{B} \cdot (\mathbf{B}^*)^T \cdot \mathbf{y}^T \cdot} = e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha \cdot \beta \cdot \det(\mathbf{B}) \cdot \mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}^T}.$$

Therefore, $(D_1)^{\mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}^T} = D_2$.

Remark   In this construction, q is exponential to λ to achieve security, and decryption relies on some priori knowledge of possible ranges of the inner product $\mathbf{xy}^T$. For example, for the instantiation in Section 4.1, one can enumerate $z \in \{0, 1, \cdots, \tau\}$ and return $\bot$ when no valid $z \leq \tau$ such that $D_1^z = D_2$ is found.

B γ-RUF Security of FE

Let $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{Z}_q$. We can extend the definition of the RUF security with an integer parameter γ.

Algorithm 13 $\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O},\gamma}(\mathcal{A})$

1: $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}^k$
2: $\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$
3: $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{r})$
4: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c})$
5: **if** $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ is equal to any output of $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}$ **then**
6:     **return** 0
7: **end if**
8: $s \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$
9: **return** $1_{s \leq \gamma}$

Here, the game runs $1_{s \leq \gamma}$ by first viewing the field element $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ as a positive integer in $\{0, 1, \cdots, q-1\}$ and comparing it with γ.

The oracle $\mathcal{O}$ can be nothing or include $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\cdot)$ and $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}(\cdot)$ based on the threat model as in Section 4.3.

Definition 12 (γ-RUF Security). An fh-IPFE scheme FE is called $\{\mathcal{O}, \gamma\}$-RUF secure if for any adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in the $\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O},\gamma}$ game in Algorithm 13 is

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{RUF},\mathcal{O},\gamma} := \Pr[\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O},\gamma}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] = \mathsf{negl}.$$

Note that if FE is $\mathcal{O}$-RUF secure, it is $\{\mathcal{O}, \gamma\}$-RUF secure for any integer γ.

With the extension with γ, we can rewrite our results in Section 4.

Theorem 12 (Theorem 5). *Let* $\mathsf{option} = \{\mathbf{c_x}, \mathsf{csk}, \mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}\}$. *For any distribution family* $\mathbb{B}$, *if* FE *is fh-IND and* $\{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \gamma\}$-*RUF for a* $\gamma \geq \tau^2$, *then* Π *is* option-*UF.*

Theorem 13 (Theorem 6). *Let* $\mathsf{option} = \{\mathbf{c_x}, \mathsf{csk}, \mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}\}$. *For any distribution family* $\mathbb{B}$, *if* FE *is fh-IND and* $\{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}, \gamma\}$-*RUF for a* $\gamma \geq \tau^2$, *then* Π *is* option-*UF.*

B.1 Achievability of γ-RUF Security

Assumption 2. Assume that $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{z})$ only returns when $\mathbf{z}$ corresponds to a *nonzero* vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^k$. More precisely, assume that for any $\mathbf{z}$, there can only be two possibilities.

- Either there exists a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^k \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$ such that for any $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}^k, \mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{x})$,

$$\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{z}) = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{v}^T.$$

- Or for any $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}^k$ and $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{x})$, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{z}) \to \bot$.

Note that this implies FE rejects zero vector $\mathbf{0}$ as the input of $\mathsf{FE.Enc}$.

Theorem 14. *Given Assumption 2. If FE is fh-IND, then FE is $\{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \gamma\}$-RUF for any $\gamma \leq (1 - \frac{1}{\mathsf{poly}}) \cdot \|\mathbb{F}\|$.*

Proof. Given an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ in the $\mathsf{RUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \gamma}$ game for a $\gamma \leq (1 - \frac{1}{P(\lambda)}) \cdot \|\mathbb{F}\|$, where $P(\lambda)$ is any polynomial. Let t be an integer, consider the reduction adversary $\mathcal{R}$ in Algorithm 14 which plays the fh-IND game. $\mathcal{R}$ simulates $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}')$ by $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}', \mathbf{x}')$. If there exists an $s_i \neq \bot$ in Line 7, by Assumption 2, let $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ correspond to a nonzero vector $\tilde{\mathbf{v}}$.

Algorithm 14 $\mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Enc}}}(\mathsf{pp})$

1: $\mathbf{r}^{(0)}, \mathbf{r}^{(1)} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}^k$
2: $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{r}^{(0)}, \mathbf{r}^{(1)})$
3: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c})$
4: **for** $i = 1$ to t **do**
5:    $\mathbf{r}_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}^k$
6:    $\mathbf{c}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{r}^{(0)}, \mathbf{r}_i)$
7:    $s_i \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}_i, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$
8: **end for**
9: **if** $\bigwedge_{i=1}^{t} s_i \leq \gamma$ **then**
10:    **return** $\tilde{b} = 0$
11: **else**
12:    **return** $\tilde{b} \leftarrow_\$ \{0, 1\}$
13: **end if**

If the challenge bit $b = 0$, then by Assumption 2, any $s_i \neq \bot$ in Line 7 implies all $s_i \neq \bot$ and $s_i = s_j$ for any i, j. Therefore, the probability that all $s_i \leq \gamma$ in Line 9 is

$$\Pr\left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^{t} s_i \leq \gamma \mid b = 0\right] = \Pr\left[s_1 \neq \bot \mid b = 0\right] \cdot \Pr\left[s_1 \leq \gamma \mid b = 0 \wedge s_1 \neq \bot\right]$$

$$= \Pr\left[s_1 \neq \bot \mid b = 0\right] \cdot \Pr\left[\mathbf{r}^{(0)}\tilde{\mathbf{v}}^T \leq \gamma \mid b = 0 \wedge s_1 \neq \bot\right]$$

$$= \Pr\left[s_1 \neq \bot \mid b = 0\right] \cdot \Pr\left[\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}}) \leq \gamma \mid b = 0 \wedge s_1 \neq \bot\right]$$

$$= \Pr\left[s_1 \neq \bot \mid b = 0\right] \cdot \Pr\left[\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \gamma}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1 \mid b = 0 \wedge s_1 \neq \bot\right]$$

$$= \Pr\left[\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}}, \gamma}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1\right]$$

If the challenge bit $b = 1$, for any $i \in [t]$,

$$\Pr[s_i \leq \gamma \mid b = 1] = \Pr[s_i \neq \bot \mid b = 1] \cdot \Pr[s_i \leq \gamma \mid b = 1 \wedge s_i \neq \bot]$$

$$= \Pr[s_i \neq \bot \mid b = 1] \cdot \Pr[\mathbf{r}_i\tilde{\mathbf{v}}^T \leq \gamma \mid b = 1 \wedge s \neq \bot]$$

Note that $\mathbf{r}_i$ is independent of $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ and thus independent of $\tilde{\mathbf{v}}$. Hence, $\Pr[\mathbf{r}_i\tilde{\mathbf{v}}^T \leq \gamma \mid b = 1 \wedge s_i \neq \bot] = \frac{\gamma}{\|\mathbb{F}\|}$ and

$$\Pr\left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^{t} s_i \leq \gamma \mid b = 1\right] = \Pr\left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^{t} s_i \neq \bot \mid b = 1\right] \cdot \left(\frac{\gamma}{\|\mathbb{F}\|}\right)^t \leq \left(\frac{\gamma}{\|\mathbb{F}\|}\right)^t$$

In conclusion,

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}(\mathcal{R}) \to 1] &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}\left(\Pr\left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^{t} s_i \leq \gamma \mid b = 0\right] - \Pr\left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^{t} s_i \leq \gamma \mid b = 1\right]\right) \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}\left(\Pr[\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}},\gamma}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] - \left(\frac{\gamma}{\|\mathbb{F}\|}\right)^t\right) \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}\left(\Pr[\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}},\gamma}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] - e^{-t\cdot(1-\frac{\gamma}{\|\mathbb{F}\|})}\right) \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}\left(\Pr[\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}},\gamma}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] - e^{-\frac{t}{P(\lambda)}}\right)
\end{aligned}$$

Take t be any integer larger than $P(\lambda)\cdot\lambda$. Since $\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{R}}^{\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}} = \left|\Pr[\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}(\mathcal{R}) \to 1] - \frac{1}{2}\right|$ and $e^{-t\cdot\frac{1}{P(\lambda)}} < e^{-\lambda}$ are negligible,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{KeyGen}},\gamma}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] \leq e^{-\frac{t}{P(\lambda)}} + 4 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathsf{FE},\mathcal{R}}^{\mathsf{fh\text{-}IND}} = \mathsf{negl}.$$

$\square$

C   Fixing the Proof of Theorem 6

In Theorem 6, we simulate the oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ in the adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ in Algorithm 10 in the $\mathsf{RUF}^{\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}}$ game by the following steps:

1. Sample $k + 2$ independent vectors $\mathbf{e}^{(1)}, \cdots, \mathbf{e}^{(k+2)}$.

2. For $i \in [k + 2]$, $\mathbf{c}^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}(\mathbf{e}^{(i)})$.

3. For $i \in [k + 2]$, $d_i \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{c}^{(i)})$, where $\mathbf{c}$ is $\mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{r})$.

4. Find the vector $\mathbf{r}$ by solving the linear system $\{\mathbf{r}\mathbf{e}^{(i)T} = d_i\}_{i=1}^{k+2}$.

5. On query $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Probe}}(\mathbf{b}')$, first encode $\mathbf{b}'$ into $\mathbf{y}'$ and find $d \leftarrow \mathbf{x}^*\mathbf{y}'^T$. Then find a vector $\mathbf{y}''$ such that $\mathbf{r}\mathbf{y}''^T = d$. Return $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}(\mathbf{y}'')$.

However, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}$ of constructions in [DDM15; TAO16; Kim+16] rely on some *prior knowledge* of the inner product. Their basic idea is to find d given g and g^d, where g is in a group of exponential size. Therefore, $\mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{c}^{(i)})$ will probably return $\perp$, representing that d is too large to find.

For this problem, I have three proposals:

1. Let the adversary choose $\mathbf{r}$.

2. Modify the RUF game.

3. Do nothing. Claim [DDM15; TAO16; Kim+16] are not ideal FE.

C.1   Solution I

Consider the SUF game.

Algorithm 15 $\mathsf{SUF}_{\mathsf{FE}}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2))$

1: $\mathbf{r}, \mathsf{st} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\lambda)$
2: **if $\mathbf{r} = \mathbf{0}$ then**
3:    **return** $\perp$
4: **end if**
5: $\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$
6: $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{r})$
7: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathsf{st}, \mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c})$
8: **if $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ is equal to any output of $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Enc}}$ then**
9:    **return** 0
10: **end if**
11: $s \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$
12: **return** $1_{s \neq \perp}$

$\mathbf{r} \neq \mathbf{0}$ is because for constructions [TAO16; Kim+16], there exists an algorithm $\mathsf{RandEnc}(\mathsf{pp})$ that can generate ciphertexts of random unknown vectors $\mathsf{FE.Enc}(\mathsf{msk}, r)$.

I call this security property *selective unforgeability (SUF)*. An SUF FE is RUF since the adversary $\mathcal{A}_1$ can choose $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}^k$. We can also add a signature scheme to an FE to make it SUF. Moreover, if we use SUF security, we do not need fh-IND security in our main results in 4.4. One can reduce option-UF of Π to SUF of FE in a simple and intuitive way.

Theorem 15. *Let* option $= \{\mathbf{c_x}, csk, \mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{O}_{Enroll}\}$*. For any distribution family* $\mathbb{B}$*, if either one of the following is satisfied:*

- *FE is both fh-IND and* $\mathcal{O}'_{KeyGen}$*-RUF (Theorem 5)*

- *FE is* $\mathcal{O}'_{KeyGen}$*-SUF*

then Π *is* option*-UF.*

Theorem 16. *Let* option $= \{\mathbf{c_x}, csk, \mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{O}_{Probe}\}$*. For any distribution family* $\mathbb{B}$*, if FE is* $\mathcal{O}'_{Enc}$*-SUF, then* Π *is* option*-UF.*

We can also leave both RUF and SUF security.

C.2   Solution II

Instead of sampling $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}^k$, one samples $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}^{k+2}$.

1. Pick $k+2$ random one-hot vectors $\mathbf{e}^{(i)} \leftarrow (0, \cdots, \overset{i\text{th}}{u_i}, \cdots, 0)$, where $u \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}$.

2. For $i \in [k+2]$, $\mathbf{c}^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}'_{Enc}(\mathbf{e}^{(i)})$.

3. For $i \in [k+2]$, $d_i \leftarrow \mathsf{FE.Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{c}^{(i)})$. Note that d_i can only be u_i or 0.

4. Find the vector $\mathbf{r} \in \{0,1\}^{k+2}$.

5. On query $\mathcal{O}_{Probe}(\mathbf{b}')$, first encode $\mathbf{b}'$ into $\mathbf{y}'$ and find $d \leftarrow \mathbf{x}^* \mathbf{y}'^T$. Then find a vector $\mathbf{y}''$ such that $\mathbf{r}\mathbf{y}''^T = d$. Return $\mathcal{O}'_{Enc}(\mathbf{y}'')$.

C.3   Solution III

We can say these fh-IPFE constructions [DDM15; TAO16; Kim+16] are not *ideal*. Their FE.Dec often aborts on unrestricted inputs. On the contrary, constructions like [Che+21] do not need discrete logarithm in FE.Dec. Unfortunately, it is not fh-IND secure.

D   Reusability

The work [Sim+12] discusses a security concept related to reusability. It is called *Trace users with different identities*. It is about when a user registers multiple records of its biometrics on the database. The server or compromised database should not be able to find that two records correspond to the same person.

Based on this concept, I design the following games. $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{Enroll}}$ and $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{Probe}}$ are two simulators that do not have access to $\mathbb{B}$.

Algorithm 16 $\mathsf{REU}_{\Pi,\mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A})$

1: $b \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}$
2: $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$
3: $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Reg}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{auth}}}(1^\lambda)$
4: **return** $1_{\tilde{b}=b}$

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{Reg}}$: It maintains a table $\mathcal{T}$ and a counter i initialized to 0 at the beginning. On query, it updates $i \leftarrow i + 1$, and behaves depending on b:

    - If $b = 0$: It generates key triplets $(\mathsf{esk}_i, \mathsf{psk}_i, \mathsf{csk}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, samples an enrollment template $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$, stores an entry psk_i in $\mathcal{T}[i]$, and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}_i} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}_i, \mathbf{b})$ and csk_i.

    - If $b = 1$: It generates key triplets $(\mathsf{esk}_i, \mathsf{psk}_i, \mathsf{csk}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, samples a biometric distribution $\mathcal{B}_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}$ and an enrollment template $\mathbf{b}_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}_i}}()$, stores an entry $(\mathsf{psk}_i, \mathcal{B}_i)$ in $\mathcal{T}[i]$, and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}_i} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}_i, \mathbf{b}_i)$ and csk_i.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{auth}}(i)$: This oracle has access to the table $\mathcal{T}$. On input i, it retrieves the entry $\mathcal{T}[i]$ and behaves depending on b:

    - If $b = 0$: Let $\mathsf{psk}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{T}[i]$. It samples a probe template $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}_i} \leftarrow \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}_i, \mathbf{b})$.

    - If $b = 1$: Let $(\mathsf{psk}_i, \mathcal{B}_i) \leftarrow \mathcal{T}[i]$. It samples a probe template $\mathbf{b}_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}_i}}()$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}_i} \leftarrow \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}_i, \mathbf{b}_i)$.

If any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ cannot recover the bit b; that is, if $\Pr[\mathsf{REU}(\mathcal{A}) \to 1] = \mathsf{negl}.$, then a real-world server cannot distinguish whether a list of enrollment records all corresponding to the same person or not.

To provide more power for the adversary, we can also consider the following oracles.

- $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Reg}}(\mathsf{esk}')$: This oracle maintains a table $\mathcal{T}$ and a counter i initialized to 0 at the beginning. If esk' has been queried before, it aborts. Otherwise, it updates $i \leftarrow i + 1$ and behaves depending on b:

    - If $b = 0$: It samples an enrollment template $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}', \mathbf{b})$.

  – If $b = 1$: It samples a biometric distribution $\mathcal{B}_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{B}$ and an enrollment template $\mathbf{b}_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{getEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}_i}}()$, stores $\mathcal{B}_i$ in $\mathcal{T}[i]$, and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}_i} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enroll}(\mathsf{esk}', \mathbf{b}_i)$.

- $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{auth}}(i, \mathsf{psk}')$: This oracle has access to the table $\mathcal{T}$ and behaves depending on b:

  – If $b = 0$: It samples a probe template $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_\mathcal{B}}()$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}', \mathbf{b})$.

  – If $b = 1$: Let $\mathcal{B}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{T}[i]$. It samples a probe template $\mathbf{b}_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{getProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}_i}}()$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}_i} \leftarrow \mathsf{Probe}(\mathsf{psk}', \mathbf{b}_i)$.

We forbid the adversary to query $\mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{Reg}}$ on the same esk' twice to avoid trivial attacks. Without this restriction, the adversary can generate honest key triplet $(\mathsf{esk}, \mathsf{psk}, \mathsf{csk})$, ask for two records $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}1}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}2}$ both corresponding to esk, and use $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}'_{\mathsf{auth}}(1, \mathsf{psk})$ and $s \leftarrow \mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}2}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}})$ to know the challenge bit b. If $b = 0$, $\mathsf{Verify}(s) \to 1$ with probability TP; otherwise, $\mathsf{Verify}(s) \to 1$ with probability FP.

E   Instantiation using Other Primitives

- Homomorphic encryption (HE) [JP09; Yas+13; PM21]:

  - [Yas+13]: The server owns the secret key for the HE. $\mathsf{Compare}(\mathsf{csk}, \mathbf{c_x}, \mathbf{c_y})$ is split into two phases:

    * With $\mathbf{c_x}$ and $\mathbf{c_y}$, homomorphically compute the encryption of $\mathsf{HW}(\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{b}')$.
    * Use csk, which is the secret key of the HE, to recover $\mathsf{HW}(\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{b}')$.

    If we want to hide the biometrics $\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}'$ from the server, two phases of $\mathsf{Compare}$ have to be run by two parties.

    * The first one only has $\mathbf{c_x}$ without csk.
    * The other one only has csk without $\mathbf{c_x}$.

  - [JP09; PM21]: The user owns the secret key for the HE. The server homomorphically computes the encryption of $\mathsf{HW}(\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{b}') + R$, where R is a random value, and sends it to the user. The user decrypts the value $\mathsf{HW}(\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{b}') + R$, sends it back to the server. The server recovers $\mathsf{HW}(\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{b}')$ by subtracting from R.

- Fuzzy extractor [Boy04; Li+17]: This requires either the enrollment phase passes a public string Q to the authentication phases, or the server sends Q to the user on authentication.

- Oblivious transfer [BCP12]: The server knows $\mathbf{b}$. Run k OT protocols, where k is the length of $\mathbf{b}$ and $\mathbf{b}'$. Finally after the protocol, the user will have R. The server will have $T = \mathsf{HW}(\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{b}') + R$. The user sends R to the server, and the server recovers $\mathsf{HW}(\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{b}')$.

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