

Biometrics Authentication: Formalization and Instantiation

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This report formalizes the biometric authentication scheme, including its structure, usage, and security analysis with a security game model.

1 Preliminaries

In this report, we assume

- λ is the security parameter.
- $[m]$ denotes the set of integers $\{1, 2, \dots, m\}$.
- \mathbb{Z}_q is the finite field modulo a prime number q .
- A function $f(n)$ is called *negligible* iff for any integer c , $f(n) < \frac{1}{n^c}$ for all sufficiently large n . We write it as $f(n) = \text{negl}$, and we may also use negl to represent an arbitrary negligible function.
- poly is the class of polynomial functions. We may also use poly to represent an arbitrary polynomial function.
- We write sampling a value r from a distribution \mathcal{D} as $r \leftarrow^* \mathcal{D}$. If S is a finite set, then $r \leftarrow^* S$ means sampling r uniformly from S .
- The distribution \mathcal{D}^t denotes t identical and independent distributions of \mathcal{D} .
- A PPT algorithm denotes a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. Unless otherwise specified, all algorithms run in PPT.

We introduce three types of inner product functional encryption schemes: function hiding functional encryption, two-input functional encryption, and two-client functional encryption. We will instantiate our biometric authentication scheme using these primitives.

Definition 1 (Function Hiding Inner Product Functional Encryption). A *function hiding inner product functional encryption* (fh-IPFE) scheme FE for a field \mathbb{F} and input length k is composed of PPT algorithms FE.Setup, FE.KeyGen, FE.Enc, and FE.Dec:

- $\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{msk}, \text{pp}$: It outputs the public parameter pp and the master secret key msk .
- $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{x}) \rightarrow f_{\mathbf{x}}$: It generates the functional decryption key $f_{\mathbf{x}}$ for an input vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}^k$.
- $\text{FE.Enc}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{y}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$: It encrypts the input vector $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^k$ to the ciphertext $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$.
- $\text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, f_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}) \rightarrow z$: It outputs a value $z \in \mathbb{F}$.

Correctness: The fh-IPFE scheme FE is *correct* if $\forall(\text{msk}, \text{pp}) \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^k$, we have

$$\text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{x}), \text{FE.Enc}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{y})) = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}^T \in \mathbb{F}.$$

Instantiation using an fh-IPFE scheme is given in Section 2.3.

Definition 2 (Two-Input Inner Product Functional Encryption (adapted from [PP22])). A *two-input inner product functional encryption* (2i-IPFE) scheme FE for a field \mathbb{F} and input length k is composed of PPT algorithms FE.Setup , FE.KeyGen , FE.Enc , and FE.Dec :

- $\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{sk}, \text{ek}_1, \text{ek}_2$: It outputs a secret key sk and two encryption keys ek_1, ek_2 .
- $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{sk}, \mathbf{A}) \rightarrow \text{dk}_{\mathbf{A}}$: It generates the functional decryption key $\text{dk}_{\mathbf{A}}$ for a diagonal matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times k}$,
- $\text{FE.Enc}(\text{ek}_i, \mathbf{x}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$: Given an encryption key, either ek_1 or ek_2 , it encrypts the input vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}^k$ to the ciphertext $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$.
- $\text{FE.Dec}(\text{dk}_{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}) \rightarrow z$: It outputs a value $z \in \mathbb{F}$.

Correctness: The 2i-IPFE scheme FE is *correct* if $\forall(\text{sk}, \text{ek}_1, \text{ek}_2) \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times k}$, and $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^k$, we have

$$\text{FE.Dec}(\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{sk}, \mathbf{A}), \text{FE.Enc}(\text{ek}_1, \mathbf{x}), \text{FE.Enc}(\text{ek}_2, \mathbf{y})) = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{A}\mathbf{y}^T \in \mathbb{F}.$$

Instantiation using a 2i-IPFE is given in Section 2.4.

Definition 3 (Two-Client Inner Product Functional Encryption (adapted from [PP22])). A *two-client inner product functional encryption* (2c-IPFE) scheme FE for a field \mathbb{F} and input length k is composed of PPT algorithms FE.Setup , FE.KeyGen , FE.Enc , and FE.Dec :

- $\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{sk}, \text{ek}_1, \text{ek}_2$: It outputs a secret key sk and two encryption keys ek_1, ek_2 .
- $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{sk}, \mathbf{A}) \rightarrow \text{dk}_{\mathbf{A}}$: It generates the functional decryption key $\text{dk}_{\mathbf{A}}$ for a diagonal matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times k}$,

- $\text{FE.Enc}(\ell, \text{ek}_i, \mathbf{x}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_x$: Given a label ℓ and an encryption key, either ek_1 or ek_2 , it encrypts the input vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}^k$ to the ciphertext \mathbf{c}_x .
- $\text{FE.Dec}(\text{dk}_A, \mathbf{c}_x, \mathbf{c}_y) \rightarrow z$: It outputs a value $z \in \mathbb{F}$.

Correctness: The 2c-IPFE scheme FE is *correct* if $\forall(\text{sk}, \text{ek}_1, \text{ek}_2) \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda), \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times k}$, label ℓ , and $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^k$, we have

$$\text{FE.Dec}(\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{sk}, \mathbf{A}), \text{FE.Enc}(\ell, \text{ek}_1, \mathbf{x}), \text{FE.Enc}(\ell, \text{ek}_2, \mathbf{y})) = \mathbf{x} \mathbf{A} \mathbf{y}^T \in \mathbb{F}.$$

Instantiation using a 2c-IPFE is given in Section 2.5.

We also consider an instantiation using a relational hash scheme.

Definition 4 (Relational Hash (adapted from [MR14])). Let R_λ be a relation over sets X_λ, Y_λ , and Z_λ . A *relational hash* scheme RH for R_λ consists of PPT algorithms RH.KeyGen , RH.HASH_1 , RH.HASH_2 , and RH.Verify :

- $\text{RH.KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{pk}$: It outputs a public hash key pk .
- $\text{RH.Hash}_1(\text{pk}, \mathbf{x}) \rightarrow \mathbf{h}_x$: Given a hash key pk and $\mathbf{x} \in X_\lambda$, it outputs a hash \mathbf{h}_x .
- $\text{RH.Hash}_2(\text{pk}, \mathbf{y}) \rightarrow \mathbf{h}_y$: Given a hash key pk and $\mathbf{y} \in Y_\lambda$, it outputs a hash \mathbf{h}_y .
- $\text{RH.Verify}(\text{pk}, \mathbf{h}_x, \mathbf{h}_y) \rightarrow r \in \{0, 1\}$: Given a hash key pk , two hashes \mathbf{h}_x and \mathbf{h}_y , and $\mathbf{z} \in Z_\lambda$, it verifies whether the relation among \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} and \mathbf{z} holds.

Correctness: The relational hash scheme RH is *correct* if $\forall \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} \in X_\lambda \times Y_\lambda \times Z_\lambda$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{cases} \text{pk} \leftarrow \text{RH.KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \\ \mathbf{h}_x \leftarrow \text{RH.Hash}_1(\text{pk}, \mathbf{x}) \\ \mathbf{h}_y \leftarrow \text{RH.Hash}_2(\text{pk}, \mathbf{y}) \end{cases} : \text{RH.Verify}(\text{pk}, \mathbf{h}_x, \mathbf{h}_y, \mathbf{z}) = R(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \right] = 1 - \text{negl}.$$

Instantiation using a relational hash is given in Section 2.6.

2 Formalization

In general, an authentication scheme Π associated with a family of biometric distributions \mathbb{B} is composed of the following algorithms.

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{esk}, \text{psk}, \text{csk}$: It outputs the enrollment secret key esk , probe secret key psk , and compare secret key csk .
- $\text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_B}() \rightarrow \mathbf{x}$: Given an oracle \mathcal{O}_B , which samples biometric data from the distribution $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$, it encodes biometric samples as \mathbf{x} , the input format for enrollment.
- $\text{Enroll}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{x}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_x$: It outputs the enrollment message \mathbf{c}_x from \mathbf{x} .

- $\text{encodeProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}() \rightarrow \mathbf{y}$: Given an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$, which samples biometric data from the distribution $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$, it encodes biometric samples as \mathbf{y} , the input format for probe.
- $\text{Probe}(\text{psk}, \mathbf{y}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$: It outputs the probe message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$ from \mathbf{y} .
- $\text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}) \rightarrow s$: It compares the enrollment message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ and probe message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$ and outputs a score s .
- $\text{Verify}(s) \rightarrow r \in \{0, 1\}$: It is a deterministic algorithm that reads the comparison score s and determines whether this is a successful authentication ($r = 1$) or not ($r = 0$).

We discuss two usage models that employs the authentication scheme Π .

2.1 Usage Model – Device-of-User

In the model described in Figure 1 (an overview), Figure 2 (on enrollment), and Figure 3 (on authentication), users authenticate themselves to a server through their own devices and biometric scanners that are shared among different users. A key distribution service distributes keys for them. In practice, this model applies to the situation when the users access an online service run by the server.

- **User**: The user who enrolls its biometric data and authenticates itself to the server. We assume the user's biometric distribution is $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$.
- **Scanner**: A machine to extract the user's biometric data by querying the oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$.
- **Device**: A device belonging to the user. In practice, it can be a desktop or a mobile phone. It processes the **Enroll** and **Probe** functions for **User** with keys esk and psk . It queries $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$ for biometric data through the **Scanner**.
- **KDS**: A key distribution service. It runs **Setup** to generate keys and distribute them to **Device** and **Server**.
- **Server**: The server responsible for authenticating the user. It stores the comparison key csk and the user's enrollment message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$. On authentication, it compares the probe message with the registered enrollment message and returns the result.

The Device-of-User model, when instantiated by an fh-IPFE scheme (Section 2.3), is analogous to the use case presented in [EM23]. In their model, a user possesses a personal device, such as a smartphone or laptop, and a secure hardware device that runs an initial setup and stores all the keys, which corresponds to our KDS. On enrollment and authentication, the user inputs biometric templates onto the device, which corresponds to our **Scanner**. Subsequently, the device transmits the template to the secure hardware for the enrollment or probing processes, which are equivalent to our **Device**. In addition, they incorporate a two-factor authentication mechanism. The secure hardware also executes a digital signature scheme and sign the probe message on authentication.




Figure 1: An Overview of the Device-of-User Usage Model




Figure 2: Device-of-User Usage Model on Enrollment




Figure 3: Device-of-User Usage Model on Authentication

2.2 Usage Model – Device-of-Domain

In the model described in Figure 4 (an overview), Figure 5 (on enrollment), and Figure 6 (on authentication), users first enroll themselves at an enrollment station and then authenticate themselves to a server through devices that belong to a domain. A key distribution service distributes enrollment keys to the enrollment station, probe keys to the domain, and comparison keys to the server. In practice, a domain can be a department in an organization, and this model applies to the situation when a user wants to access a public service of a department, such as a restricted area or instruments.

- **User:** The user who enrolls its biometric data at an enrollment station and authenticates itself to the server. We assume the user's biometric distribution is $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$.
- **Domain:** A domain that owns several devices, all of which share one enrollment key esk , one probe key psk and one comparison key csk . Only the probe key is stored at each device of a domain. The enrollment key is stored at the enrollment station, and the comparison key is stored at the server. In practice, a domain can be a department, and users enroll and authenticate themselves before accessing a restricted service of this department.
- **Scanner:** A machine to extract the user's biometric data by querying the oracle \mathcal{O}_B .
- **Station:** An enrollment station responsible for collecting the user's biometric data to enroll them for a domain on the server.
- **Device:** A device belonging to a domain. In practice, it can be a device checking identities for a restricted area or an instrument. It owns a probe key psk and processes the Probe function for enrolled users of this domain.




Figure 4: An overview of the Device-of-Domain Usage Model

- **KDS:** A key distribution service. It runs **Setup** to generate keys and distribute them to **Station**, **Domain**, and **Server**.
- **Server:** The server responsible for authenticating the user. It stores the comparison key csk for each domain and the user's enrollment message c_x . On authentication, it compares the probe message with the registered enrollment message and returns the result.




Figure 5: Device-of-Domain Usage Model on Enrollment




Figure 6: Device-of-Domain Usage Model on Authentication

2.3 Instantiation with an fh-IPFE Scheme

Let $\text{FE} = (\text{FE.Setup}, \text{FE.KeyGen}, \text{FE.Enc}, \text{FE.Dec})$ be an fh-IPFE scheme we defined in Definition 1. Following [EM23], we can instantiate a biometric authentication scheme using FE with the distance metric the Euclidean distance. Let the biometric distribution $\mathcal{B} \subseteq [m]^k$, and let the associated field of FE be \mathbb{Z}_q where q is a prime number larger than the maximum possible Euclidean distance $m^2 \cdot k$. The scheme is instantiated as follows.

- **Setup(1^λ)**: It calls $\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{msk}, \text{pp}$ and outputs $\text{esk} \leftarrow (\text{msk}, \text{pp})$, $\text{psk} \leftarrow (\text{msk}, \text{pp})$ and $\text{csk} \leftarrow \text{pp}$.
- **encodeEnroll $^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}$** (\cdot): For a template vector $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k)$ sampled from $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$, the function encodes it as $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{k+2}) = (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k, 1, \|\mathbf{b}\|^2)$.
- **Enroll(esk, \mathbf{x})**: It calls $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{x}) \rightarrow f_{\mathbf{x}}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow f_{\mathbf{x}}$.
- **encodeProbe $^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}$** (\cdot): For a template vector $\mathbf{b}' = (b'_1, b'_2, \dots, b'_k)$ sampled from $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$, the function encodes it as $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{k+2}) = (-2b'_1, -2b'_2, \dots, -2b'_k, \|\mathbf{b}'\|^2, 1)$.
- **Probe(psk, \mathbf{y})**: It calls $\text{FE.Enc}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{y}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$.
- **Compare($\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$)**: It calls $\text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}) \rightarrow s$ and outputs the value s .
- **Verify(s)**: If $\sqrt{s} < \tau$, a pre-defined threshold for comparing the closeness of two templates, then it outputs $r = 1$; otherwise, it outputs $r = 0$.

By the correctness of the functional encryption scheme FE, we have

$$s = \text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}) = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}^T = \sum_{i=1}^k -2b_i b'_i + \|\mathbf{b}\|^2 + \|\mathbf{b}'\|^2 = \|\mathbf{b} - \mathbf{b}'\|^2.$$

which is the square of the Euclidean distance between two templates \mathbf{b} and \mathbf{b}' . Therefore, if two templates \mathbf{b} and \mathbf{b}' are close enough such that $\|\mathbf{b} - \mathbf{b}'\| < \tau$, the scheme results in $r = 1$, a successful authentication.

Instantiated with an fh-IPFE scheme in this way, the comparison secret key csk is public, and the enrollment secret key esk and probe secret key psk are the same. Anyone with access to the enrollment message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ and either one of esk , psk , or a probe oracle $\text{Probe}(\text{psk}, \cdot)$ can probe some $\mathbf{y}' \in \mathbf{F}^{k+2}$ and find $\mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}'^T$ to get partial or full information about \mathbf{x} . Even if the adversary can only sample random ciphertexts $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$ without knowing \mathbf{y} , if the field size q is not large enough, one can find a forged $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}^*}$ such that $\mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}^{*T} < \tau$ to impersonate the user by sampling many times offline.

Therefore, **Server** must store $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ securely, to avoid such an attack from an adversary who can access the probe oracle; **Device** must protect its probe function, to avoid such an attack from a malicious **Server**.

In the Device-of-Domain model, we assume the probe oracle is public, just as everyone can try accessing a public service. A malicious **Station** or **Server**, who has the enrollment message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$, can utilize this attack to retrieve information about **User**.

2.4 Instantiation with a 2i-IPFE Scheme

Let $\text{FE} = (\text{FE.Setup}, \text{FE.KeyGen}, \text{FE.Enc}, \text{FE.Dec})$ be a 2i-IPFE scheme we defined in Definition 2. Following the scheme in Section 2.3, we can instantiate a biometric authentication scheme using FE.

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: It calls $\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{sk}, \text{ek}_1, \text{ek}_2$, $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{sk}, \mathbf{I}_{k+2}) \rightarrow \text{dk}_{\mathbf{I}}$, where \mathbf{I}_{k+2} is an identity matrix of size $(k+2) \times (k+2)$. It outputs $\text{esk} \leftarrow \text{ek}_1$, $\text{psk} \leftarrow \text{ek}_2$, and $\text{csk} \leftarrow \text{dk}_{\mathbf{I}}$
- $\text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$, $\text{encodeProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$: The same as the scheme in 2.3.
- $\text{Enroll}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{x})$: It calls $\text{FE.Enc}(\text{ek}_1, \mathbf{x}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$.
- $\text{Probe}(\text{psk}, \mathbf{y})$: It calls $\text{FE.Enc}(\text{ek}_2, \mathbf{y}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$.
- $\text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}})$: It calls $\text{FE.Dec}(\text{dk}_{\mathbf{I}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}) \rightarrow s$ and outputs the value s .
- $\text{Verify}(s)$: If $\sqrt{s} < \tau$, a pre-defined threshold for comparing the closeness of two templates, then it outputs $r = 1$; otherwise, it outputs $r = 0$.

By the correctness of the functional encryption scheme FE, we have

$$s = \text{FE.Dec}(\text{dk}_{\mathbf{I}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}) = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{I}_{k+2}\mathbf{y}^T = \mathbf{x}\mathbf{y}^T = \|\mathbf{b} - \mathbf{b}'\|^2.$$

just as the scheme in Section 2.3

Unlike the previous scheme, instantiated with a 2i-IPFE scheme in this way, the comparison secret key csk is now secret, and the enrollment secret key esk and probe secret key psk are distinct. Without csk , one cannot compare an enrollment message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ and a probe message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$. We can also transmit $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ in a public channel and store it in a public storage, under necessary security requirements of the 2i-IPFE scheme, such as indistinguishability of $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$.

In the Device-of-Domain model, the indistinguishability of $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ is against an adversary who has a probe oracle $\text{Probe}(\text{psk}, \cdot)$. If **Server** is malicious, then it can use csk to distinguish $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ enrolled by different samples. Therefore, we must limit the adversary's ability. For example, we can require the adversary to distinguish biometric vectors sampled from distributions in a pre-defined pool, and the adversary can only probe vectors randomly sampled from a distribution in the pool. We can also limit the rate of the probe oracle.

2.5 Instantiation with a 2c-IPFE Scheme

Note that if labels remain constant, a 2c-IPFE scheme is reduced to a 2i-IPFE scheme. Therefore, we can consider utilizing the label to represent each domain in the Device-of-Domain model. Let $\text{FE} = (\text{FE.Setup}, \text{FE.KeyGen}, \text{FE.Enc}, \text{FE.Dec})$ be a 2c-IPFE scheme we defined in Definition 3. Following the scheme in Section 2.4, we can instantiate a biometric authentication scheme using FE.

- **Setup**(1^λ): It calls $\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{sk}, \text{ek}_1, \text{ek}_2$, $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{sk}, \mathbf{I}_{k+2}) \rightarrow \text{dk}_{\mathbf{I}}$, where \mathbf{I}_{k+2} is an identity matrix of size $(k+2) \times (k+2)$. For keys used for Domain ℓ , it outputs $\text{esk} \leftarrow (\ell, \text{ek}_1)$, $\text{psk} \leftarrow (\ell, \text{ek}_2)$, and $\text{csk} \leftarrow \text{dk}_{\mathbf{I}}$.

Note that when the previous 2i-IPFE-based scheme in Section 2.4 is applied to a Device-of-Domain model, we assume that **Setup** is run once for each domain to generate different esk , psk , csk . In the scheme in this section, however, **Setup** is run only once for all the domains, and each domain shares the same csk and the same esk , psk except different labels.

- $\text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$, $\text{encodeProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$: The same as the scheme in 2.4.
- **Enroll**(esk, \mathbf{x}): It calls $\text{FE.Enc}(\ell, \text{ek}_1, \mathbf{x}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$.
- **Probe**(psk, \mathbf{y}): It calls $\text{FE.Enc}(\ell, \text{ek}_2, \mathbf{y}) \rightarrow \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$.
- **Compare**($\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$): It calls $\text{FE.Dec}(\text{dk}_{\mathbf{I}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}) \rightarrow s$ and outputs the value s .
- **Verify**(s): If $\sqrt{s} < \tau$, a pre-defined threshold for comparing the closeness of two templates, then it outputs $r = 1$; otherwise, it outputs $r = 0$.

By the correctness of the functional encryption scheme FE, if the labels of $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ and $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}$ are the same (they are of the same domain), we have

$$s = \text{FE.Dec}(\text{dk}_{\mathbf{I}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}}) = \mathbf{x} \mathbf{I}_{k+2} \mathbf{y}^T = \|\mathbf{b} - \mathbf{b}'\|^2.$$

just as the scheme in Section 2.4

When the Device-of-Domain model is instantiated with a 2c-IPFE scheme in this way, the enrollment secret key esk and probe secret key psk are now shared among all the devices, regardless of their domains. Therefore, to let a malicious or broken Domain not threaten other honest ones, one needs to make sure given esk or psk , $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ still does not leak information about \mathbf{x} . This is different from the scheme in Section 2.4, where we only need security against an adversary who has a probe oracle $\text{Probe}(\text{psk}, \cdot)$.

If Server and Domain are both malicious, then the adversary can use csk to distinguish $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ and even recover \mathbf{x} . Therefore, we assume at most one party of them can be malicious at the same time. Note that this is the same as the 2i-IPFE-based scheme, where only one of Server and Domain can be malicious.

2.6 Instantiation with a Relational Hash Scheme

Let $\text{RH} = (\text{RH.KeyGen}, \text{RH.Hash}_1, \text{RH.Hash}_2, \text{RH.Verify})$ be a relational hash scheme we defined in Definition 4 for the relation R of Hamming distance proximity parametrized by a constant τ .

$$R = \{(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \mid \text{HD}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \leq \tau, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \in \{0, 1\}^k\}$$

Note that here we ignore the third parameter Z . Following [EM23] and [MR14], we can instantiate a biometric authentication scheme using RH. Let the biometric distribution $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \{0, 1\}^k$.

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: It calls $\text{RH.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{pk}$ and outputs $\text{esk} \leftarrow \text{pk}$, $\text{psk} \leftarrow \text{pk}$, and $\text{csk} \leftarrow \text{pk}$.
- $\text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$: For a template vector \mathbf{b} sampled from $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$, it directly outputs $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathbf{b}$.
- $\text{Enroll}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{x})$: It calls $\text{RH.Hash}_1(\text{pk}, \mathbf{x}) \rightarrow \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{x}}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{x}}$.
- $\text{encodeProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$: For a template vector \mathbf{b}' sampled from $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$, it directly outputs $\mathbf{y} \leftarrow \mathbf{b}'$.
- $\text{Probe}(\text{psk}, \mathbf{y})$: It calls $\text{RH.Hash}_2(\text{pk}, \mathbf{y}) \rightarrow \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{y}}$ and outputs $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}} \leftarrow \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{y}}$.
- $\text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{y}})$: It calls $\text{RH.Verify}(\text{pk}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{y}}) \rightarrow s$ and outputs the value s .
- $\text{Verify}(s)$: It directly returns $r \leftarrow s$.

By the correctness of the relational hash scheme RH , we have (except for a negligible probability),

$$r = 1 \Leftrightarrow (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}') \in R \Leftrightarrow \text{HD}(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{b}') \leq \tau$$

3 Security Games

From now on, we consider a family of biometric distributions \mathbb{B} . Removing a person \mathcal{B} from \mathbb{B} is written as $\mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$. We presume that \mathbb{B} has an excessively large size for an adversary to enumerate. To model the knowledge about the biometric distributions, we offer an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{samp}}(\cdot)$ to all adversaries in this section.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{samp}}(\cdot)$: On input an index i ,
 - If i was not queried before, it first samples a biometric distribution $\mathcal{B}_i \in \mathbb{B}$ and then outputs a biometric sample $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_i$.
 - If i has been queried before, it outputs a biometric sample $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_i$.

In Table 1, we list a summary of the adversary in each game.

3.1 Unforgeability against Malicious Scanner (UF-MS)

In the game of Unforgeability against Malicious Scanner, we model the ability of a malicious **Scanner** in the Device-of-User model who has access to **Server**'s database of registered enrollments and tries to impersonate **User**. The adversary \mathcal{A} is given the enrollment message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ and oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q$, and it tries to find a valid probe message $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$. The whole game UF-MS is defined in Algorithm 1.

The given oracle is defined as follows:

- $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$: It outputs a biometric sample $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}$.

Games	Goals	Knowledge and Oracles	
		Device-of-User	Device-of-Domain
UF-MSC (Section 3.1)	Forge a probe	$\mathbf{c}_x, \mathcal{O}_B, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q$	$\mathbf{c}_x, \mathcal{O}_B, \mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q$
UF-MDV (Section 3.2)	Forge a probe	$\text{esk}, \text{psk}, \mathbf{c}_x, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q$	$\text{psk}, \mathbf{c}_x, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q$
UF-MDM (Section 3.3)	Forge a probe	-	$\mathbf{c}_x, \mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}, \mathcal{O}'_{\text{Probe}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q$
UF-MST (Section 3.4)	Forge a probe	-	$\text{esk}, \mathbf{c}_x, \mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}, \mathcal{O}'_{\text{Enroll}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q$
IND-MSV (Section 3.5)	Identify User	$\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_x, \{\mathbf{c}_y\}_{i=1}^t, \mathcal{O}_{B^{(0)}}, \mathcal{O}_{B^{(1)}}$	$\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_x, \{\mathbf{c}_y\}_{i=1}^t, \mathcal{O}_{B^{(0)}}, \mathcal{O}_{B^{(1)}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}^{\text{samp}}$

Table 1: Summary of Adversaries in Security Games

Algorithm 1 $\text{UF-MSC}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A})$

```

1:  $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$ 
2:  $\text{esk}, \text{psk}, \text{csk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ 
3:  $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_B}()$ 
4:  $\mathbf{c}_x \leftarrow \text{Enroll}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{x})$ 
5: In Device-of-User model:
6:    $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_B, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q}(\mathbf{c}_x)$ 
7: In Device-of-Domain model:
8:    $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_B, \mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q}(\mathbf{c}_x)$ 
9: if  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$  equals to any output of  $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}$  then
10:   return  $\perp$ 
11: end if
12:  $s \leftarrow \text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$ 
13: return  $\text{Verify}(s)$ 

```

- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q(\text{csk}, \cdot, \cdot)$: This is a resource-limited oracle. If it has been queried over q times in total, it aborts. Otherwise, on input $\tilde{\mathbf{c}}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_y$, it outputs $\text{Verify}(\text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_y))$.

To consider potential false positives of biometrics match, we consider the plain UF game in Algorithm 2, in which the adversary has only public information.

Algorithm 2 $\text{UF}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}')$

```

1:  $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$ 
2:  $\text{esk}, \text{psk}, \text{csk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ 
3:  $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ 
4:  $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow \text{Enroll}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{x})$ 
5: In Device-of-User model:
6:    $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}'^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q}()$ 
7: In Device-of-Domain model:
8:    $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}'^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q}()$ 
9:  $s \leftarrow \text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$ 
10: return  $\text{Verify}(s)$ 

```

Note that in Device-of-Domain model, a probe oracle is given to the adversary.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}(\text{psk}, \cdot)$: On input \mathbf{y}' , it outputs the probe message $\text{Probe}(\text{psk}, \mathbf{y}')$.

We define the advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} in the UF-MSC game of a scheme Π associated with a family of distributions \mathbb{B} as

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MSC}} := \Pr[\text{UF-MSC}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \sup_{\text{PPT } \mathcal{A}'} \Pr[\text{UF}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1].$$

An authentication scheme Π associated with a family of distributions \mathbb{B} is called *unforgeable against malicious scanner (UF-MSC)* if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MSC}} = \text{negl}.$$

Note that if csk is an empty or public string, then the scheme cannot achieve UF-MSC security when the false positive rate is not negligible, as the adversary can run the $\text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \cdot)$ over q times to boost the false positive rates. Also note that in the Device-of-Domain model, the probe oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}$ is assumed to be public, so the adversary is asked to return some $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$ that is not returned by the probe oracle.

For the rest of this report, if the scheme and the family distribution are clear from context, we omit the subscript and write the game as $\text{UF-MSC}(\mathcal{A})$. This abbreviation also holds for all other games.

3.2 Unforgeability against Malicious Device (UF-MDV)

In the game of Unforgeability against Malicious Device, we model the ability of a malicious **Device** who has access to **Server**'s database of registered enrollments and tries to impersonate **User**. The adversary \mathcal{A} is given the keys esk, psk (only psk in Device-of-Domain model), enrollment message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$, and oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q$ and tries to find a valid probe message $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$. The whole game UF-MDV is defined in Algorithm 3.

We define the advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} in the UF-MDV game of a scheme Π associated with a family of distributions \mathbb{B} as

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MDV}} := \Pr[\text{UF-MDV}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \sup_{\text{PPT } \mathcal{A}'} \Pr[\text{UF}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1].$$

Algorithm 3 UF-MDV_{Π,ℬ}(\mathcal{A})

```

1:  $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$ 
2:  $\text{esk}, \text{psk}, \text{csk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ 
3:  $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ 
4:  $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow \text{Enroll}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{x})$ 
5: In Device-of-User model:
6:    $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q}(\text{esk}, \text{psk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}})$ 
7: In Device-of-Domain model:
8:    $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q}(\text{psk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}})$ 
9:  $s \leftarrow \text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$ 
10: return  $\text{Verify}(s)$ 

```

An authentication scheme Π associated with a family of distributions \mathbb{B} is called *unforgeable against malicious device (UF-MDV)* if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MDV}} = \text{negl}.$$

3.3 Unforgeability against Malicious Domain (UF-MDM)

In the game of Unforgeability against Malicious Domain, we model the ability of a malicious **Domain** in the Device-of-Domain model who tries to access an honest **Domain** through a **User** who has enrolled in both of them. The adversary \mathcal{A} is given the enrollment message $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}$ of the honest **Domain** and oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}, \mathcal{O}'_{\text{Probe}}$, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q$, and it tries to find a valid probe message $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$. The whole game UF-MDM is defined in Algorithm 4.

Algorithm 4 UF-MDM_{Π,ℬ}(\mathcal{A})

```

1:  $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$ 
2:  $\text{esk}, \text{psk}, \text{csk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ 
3:  $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ 
4:  $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow \text{Enroll}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{x})$ 
5:  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}, \mathcal{O}'_{\text{Probe}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q}(\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}})$ 
6:  $s \leftarrow \text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{x}}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$ 
7: return  $\text{Verify}(s)$ 

```

The $\mathcal{O}'_{\text{Probe}}$ oracle is to model the ability that the malicious **Domain** can let **User** probe with a contrived key.

- $\mathcal{O}'_{\text{Probe}}(\cdot)$: On input psk' , it first samples $\mathbf{y}' \leftarrow \text{encodeProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ and outputs $\text{Probe}(\text{psk}', \mathbf{y}')$.

We define the advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} in the UF-MDM game of a scheme Π associated with a family of distributions \mathbb{B} as

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MDM}} := \Pr[\text{UF-MDM}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \sup_{\text{PPT } \mathcal{A}'} \Pr[\text{UF}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1].$$

An authentication scheme Π associated with a family of distributions \mathbb{B} is called *unforgeable against malicious domain (UF-MDM)* if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MDM}} = \text{negl}.$$

3.4 Unforgeability against Malicious Station (UF-MST)

In the game of Unforgeability against Malicious Station, we model the ability of a malicious **Station** in the Device-of-Domain model who tries to impersonate **User**. The adversary \mathcal{A} is given the enrollment key esk , enrollment message \mathbf{c}_x , and oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}$, $\mathcal{O}'_{\text{Enroll}}$, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q$, and it tries to find a valid probe message $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$. The whole game UF-MST is defined in Algorithm 5.

Algorithm 5 $\text{UF-MST}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A})$

```

1:  $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$ 
2:  $\text{esk}, \text{psk}, \text{csk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ 
3:  $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ 
4:  $\mathbf{c}_x \leftarrow \text{Enroll}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{x})$ 
5:  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}, \mathcal{O}'_{\text{Enroll}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{c}_x)$ 
6:  $s \leftarrow \text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$ 
7: return  $\text{Verify}(s)$ 
```

The $\mathcal{O}'_{\text{Enroll}}(\cdot)$ oracle is to model the ability that the malicious **Station** can let **User** enroll with a contrived key.

- $\mathcal{O}'_{\text{Enroll}}(\cdot)$: On input esk' , it first samples $\mathbf{x}' \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ and outputs $\text{Enroll}(\text{esk}', \mathbf{x}')$.

We define the advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} in the UF-MST game of a scheme Π associated with a family of distributions \mathbb{B} as

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MST}} := \Pr[\text{UF-MST}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \sup_{\text{PPT } \mathcal{A}'} \Pr[\text{UF}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1].$$

An authentication scheme Π associated with a family of distributions \mathbb{B} is called *unforgeable against malicious station (UF-MST)* if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MST}} = \text{negl}.$$

3.5 Indistinguishable against Malicious Server (IND-MSV)

In the game of Indistinguishable against Malicious Server, we model the ability of a malicious **Server** who tries to identify the user. The adversary \mathcal{A} is given oracles to two biometric distributions $\mathcal{B}^{(0)}, \mathcal{B}^{(1)}$, the comparison key csk , an enrollment message \mathbf{c}_x , and a list of t probe messages $\{\mathbf{c}_y^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^t$. It tries to guess from either $\mathcal{B}^{(0)}$ or $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ these messages are generated. The whole game is defined in Algorithm 6.

Note that in Device-of-Domain model, a probe oracle is given to the adversary.

Algorithm 6 $\text{IND-MSV}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A})$

```

1:  $b \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}$ 
2:  $\mathcal{B}^{(0)} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}^{(0)}$ 
3:  $\mathcal{B}^{(1)} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ 
4:  $\text{esk}, \text{psk}, \text{csk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ 
5:  $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(b)}}}()$ 
6:  $\mathbf{c}_x \leftarrow \text{Enroll}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{x})$ 
7: for  $i = 1$  to  $t$  do
8:    $\mathbf{y}^{(i)} \leftarrow \text{encodeProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(b)}}}()$ 
9:    $\mathbf{c}_y^{(i)} \leftarrow \text{Probe}(\text{psk}, \mathbf{y}^{(i)})$ 
10: end for
11: In Device-of-User Model:
12:    $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_x, \{\mathbf{c}_y^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^t)$ 
13: In Device-of-Domain Model:
14:    $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_x, \{\mathbf{c}_y^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^t)$ 
15: return  $1_{\tilde{b}=b}$ 

```

- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}^{\text{samp}}(\cdot)$: On input an index i , it first samples $\mathbf{y}' \leftarrow_{\$} \text{encodeProbe}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{samp}}(i)}$, which uses $\mathcal{O}_{\text{samp}}(i)$ to answer biometric queries, and outputs $\text{Probe}(\text{psk}, \mathbf{y}')$.

We provide $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}^{\text{samp}}(\cdot)$ instead of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Probe}}(\text{psk}, \cdot)$. This is to avoid the trivial attack where the adversary probes samples from the oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}$ and compare the results with \mathbf{c}_x .

We define the advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} in the IND-MSV game of a scheme Π associated with a family of distributions \mathbb{B} as

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{IND-MSV}} := \left| \Pr[\text{IND-MSV}_{\Pi}(\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}) \rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right|.$$

An authentication scheme Π associated with a family of distributions \mathbb{B} is called *indistinguishable against malicious server (IND-MSV)* if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{IND-MSV}} = \text{negl}.$$

4 Security Analysis

Given an fh-IPFE scheme FE, we define the IND game in algorithm 7.

Algorithm 7 $\text{IND}_{\text{FE}}(\mathcal{A})$

```

1:  $b \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}$ 
2:  $\text{msk}, \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ 
3:  $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyGen}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{Enc}}}(\text{pp})$ 
4: return  $1_{\tilde{b}=b}$ 

```

- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyGen}}(\cdot, \cdot)$: On input pair $(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}^{(1)})$, it outputs $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{x}^{(b)})$.
- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Enc}}(\cdot, \cdot)$: On input pair $(\mathbf{y}^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(1)})$, it outputs $\text{FE.Enc}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{y}^{(b)})$.

To avoid trivial attacks, we consider *admissible adversaries*.

Definition 5 (Admissible Adversary). Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary in an IND game, and let $(\mathbf{x}_1^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}_1^{(1)}), \dots, (\mathbf{x}_{Q_K}^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}_{Q_K}^{(1)})$ be its queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyGen}}$ and $(\mathbf{y}_1^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}_1^{(1)}), \dots, (\mathbf{y}_{Q_E}^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}_{Q_E}^{(1)})$ be its queries to \mathcal{O}_{Enc} . We say \mathcal{A} is *admissible* if $\forall i \in [Q_K], \forall j \in [Q_E]$,

$$\mathbf{x}_i^{(0)T} \mathbf{y}_j^{(0)} = \mathbf{x}_i^{(1)T} \mathbf{y}_j^{(1)}$$

Definition 6 (IND Security). An fh-IPFE scheme FE is called IND secure if for any admissible adversary \mathcal{A} , the advantage of \mathcal{A} in the IND game in Algorithm 7 is

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{FE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{IND}} := \left| \Pr[\text{IND}_{\text{FE}}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| = \text{negl}.$$

4.1 IND Security and UF-MSc Security

Let Π be the authentication scheme instantiated by an fh-IPFE scheme FE as in Section 2.3. We see a relation between the IND security of FE and the UF-MSc security of Π . To show this, first we define a middle game for UF-MSc security in Algorithm 8.

Algorithm 8 $\text{UF-MSc}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}^*(\mathcal{A})$

- 1: $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B}, \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$
 - 2: $\text{esk}, \text{psk}, \text{csk} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
 - 3: $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$
 - 4: $\mathbf{c}_x \leftarrow \text{Enroll}(\text{esk}, \mathbf{x})$
 - 5: $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{auth}}^q(\mathbf{c}_x)$
 - 6: $s \leftarrow \text{Compare}(\text{csk}, \mathbf{c}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$
 - 7: **return** $\text{Verify}(s)$
-

Theorem 1. In the Device-of-User model, for any distribution family \mathbb{B} , if FE is IND secure, then $\forall \mathcal{A}$ in the UF-MSc game,

$$\Pr[\text{UF-MSc}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF-MSc}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1] = \text{negl}.$$

where \mathcal{A}^* is an adversary in the UF-MSc^* game which runs \mathcal{A} and simulates oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$ by $\mathcal{O}_{\text{samp}}(i^*)$ for some index i^* that is never queried by \mathcal{A} in $\mathcal{O}_{\text{samp}}(\cdot)$.

Proof. Given an adversary \mathcal{A} in the UF-MSc game, consider the reduction adversary \mathcal{R} in Algorithm 9 which plays the IND game. \mathcal{R} runs \mathcal{A} and simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}$ by $\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q(\text{csk}, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_y)$ by $\text{Verify}(\text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_y))$. Note that since \mathcal{R} never calls \mathcal{O}_{Enc} , it is an admissible adversary.

Algorithm 9 $\mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyGen}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{Enc}}}(\text{pp})$

```

1:  $\mathcal{B}^{(0)} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}^{(0)}$ 
2:  $\mathcal{B}^{(1)} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{B}, \quad \mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ 
3:  $\mathbf{x}^{(0)} \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}}()$ 
4:  $\mathbf{x}^{(1)} \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(1)}}}()$ 
5:  $\mathbf{c}_x \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}^{(1)})$ 
6:  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}^{(0)}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^g}(\mathbf{c}_x)$ 
7:  $s \leftarrow \text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{c}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$ 
8: if  $\text{Verify}(s) = 1$  then
9:   return  $\tilde{b} = 0$ 
10: else
11:   return  $\tilde{b} \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}$ 
12: end if

```

If the challenge bit $b = 0$, then \mathcal{R} perfectly simulates a UF-MSC game for \mathcal{A} . Therefore, the probability that $\text{Verify}(s) = 1$ in Line 8 is $\Pr[\text{UF-MSC}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1]$.

If the challenge bit $b = 1$, then $\mathcal{B}^{(1)}$ is never seen by \mathcal{A} , and since $\mathcal{B}^{(0)}$ has the same distribution as any $\mathcal{B}^* \in \mathbb{B}$ that has never been queried before in the view of \mathcal{A} . Therefore, the probability that $\text{Verify}(s) = 1$ in Line 8 is $\Pr[\text{UF-MSC}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1]$.

In conclusion,

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\text{IND}(\mathcal{R}) \rightarrow 1] &= \Pr[b = 0] \cdot \left(\Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 0] + \frac{1}{2} \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 0 \mid b = 0] \right) \\
&\quad + \Pr[b = 1] \cdot \frac{1}{2} \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 0 \mid b = 1] \\
&= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(\Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 0] + \frac{1}{2} (1 - \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 0]) \right) \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{4} \cdot (1 - \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 1]) \\
&= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} (\Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 0] - \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 1]) \\
&= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} (\Pr[\text{UF-MSC}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF-MSC}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1])
\end{aligned}$$

Since $\text{Adv}_{\text{FE}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND}} = |\Pr[\text{IND}(\mathcal{R}) \rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2}| = \text{negl}$,

$$\Pr[\text{UF-MSC}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF-MSC}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1] = 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{FE}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND}} = \text{negl}.$$

□

For the next theorem, we consider two assumptions for the fh-IPFE scheme FE.

Assumption 1. Assume that there exists a simulator \mathcal{S} such that given pp , the statistical distance between $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{r})$ and $\mathcal{S}(\text{pp})$, where $(\text{msk}, \text{pp}) \leftarrow$

$\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^{k+2}$, is bounded by δ . That is, let $(\text{msk}, \text{pp}) \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^{k+2}$,

$$\Delta((\text{pp}, \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{r})), (\text{pp}, \mathcal{S}(\text{pp}))) \leq \delta.$$

The distribution of $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{r})$ is taken over FE.Setup , FE.KeyGen , and \mathbf{r} .

Assumption 2. Assume that $\forall \mathbf{z}$ and $\forall \mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{B}$, functional decryption results of two invocations of $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{x})$ and \mathbf{z} are the same with a probability bounded below by $1 - \epsilon$. That is, let $(\text{msk}, \text{pp}) \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{x}), \mathbf{z}) \\ = \text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \text{pp}, \mathbf{x}), \mathbf{z}) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \epsilon$$

The probability is taken over FE.Setup and FE.KeyGen .

Theorem 2. Given Assumption 1 with a negligible δ and Assumption 2 with a negligible ϵ . In the Device-of-User model, for any distribution family \mathbb{B} , if FE is IND secure, then $\forall \mathcal{A}^*$ in the UF- MSC^* game,

$$\Pr[\text{UF-}\text{MSC}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1] = \text{negl}.$$

where \mathcal{A}' is an adversary in the UF game which runs \mathcal{A}^* and simulates \mathbf{c}_x by $\mathcal{S}(\text{pp})$ from Assumption 1.

Proof. Given an adversary \mathcal{A}^* in the UF- MSC^* game, consider the reduction adversary \mathcal{R} in Algorithm 10 which plays the IND game. \mathcal{R} runs \mathcal{A}^* and simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q(\text{csk}, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_y)$ by $\text{Verify}(\text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}_y))$. Note that since \mathcal{R} never calls \mathcal{O}_{Enc} , it is an admissible adversary.

Algorithm 10 $\mathcal{R}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyGen}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{Enc}}}(\text{pp})$

```

1:  $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B}$ ,  $\mathbb{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{B} \setminus \mathcal{B}$ 
2:  $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{encodeEnroll}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathcal{B}}}()$ 
3:  $\mathbf{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^{k+2}$ 
4:  $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{r})$ 
5:  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{*\mathcal{O}_{\text{auth}}^q}(\mathbf{c})$ 
6:  $\mathbf{c}_x \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyGen}}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x})$ 
7:  $s \leftarrow \text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{c}_x, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})$ 
8: if  $\text{Verify}(s) = 1$  then
9:   return  $\tilde{b} = 0$ 
10: else
11:   return  $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ 
12: end if
```

If the challenge bit $b = 0$, then \mathcal{R} perfectly simulates a UF- MSC^* game for \mathcal{A}^* . Therefore, the probability that $\text{Verify}(\text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})) = 1$ is $\Pr[\text{UF-}\text{MSC}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1]$. By Assumption 2, the probability that $\text{Verify}(s) = 1$ in Line 8 is at least

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[s = \text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})] \cdot \Pr[\text{Verify}(\text{FE.Dec}(\text{pp}, \mathbf{c}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}})) = 1] \\ & \geq (1 - \epsilon) \cdot \Pr[\text{UF-}\text{MSC}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1] \end{aligned}$$

If the challenge bit $b = 1$, then the statistical distance between \mathbf{c} in Line 4 and the output of \mathcal{S} from Assumption 1 is within δ . Therefore, the probability that $\text{Verify}(s) = 1$ in Line 8 is at most $\Pr[\text{UF}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1] + \delta$.

In conclusion,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{IND}(\mathcal{R}) \rightarrow 1] &= \Pr[b = 0] \cdot \left(\Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 0] + \frac{1}{2} \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 0 \mid b = 0] \right) \\ &\quad + \Pr[b = 1] \cdot \frac{1}{2} \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 0 \mid b = 1] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} (\Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 0] - \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1 \mid b = 1]) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} ((1 - \epsilon) \cdot \Pr[\text{UF-MS}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1] - \delta) \end{aligned}$$

Since $\text{Adv}_{\text{FE}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND}} = \left| \Pr[\text{IND}(\mathcal{R}) \rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| = \text{negl}$, $\epsilon = \text{negl}$, and $\delta = \text{negl}$,

$$\Pr[\text{UF-MS}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1] \leq 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{FE}, \mathcal{R}}^{\text{IND}} + \epsilon + \delta = \text{negl}.$$

□

Corollary 1. *Given Assumption 1 with a negligible δ and Assumption 2 with a negligible ϵ . In the Device-of-User model, for any distribution family \mathbb{B} , if FE is IND secure, then $\forall \mathcal{A}$ in the UF-MS game, there exists an adversary \mathcal{A}' such that*

$$\Pr[\text{UF-MS}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1] = \text{negl}.$$

As a result, $\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MS}} = \text{negl}$. The authentication scheme is UF-MS secure.

Proof. Given an adversary \mathcal{A} in the UF-MS game, from Theorem 1, we know there exists a reduction \mathcal{R}_1 and an adversary \mathcal{A}^* such that

$$\Pr[\text{UF-MS}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF-MS}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1] = 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{FE}, \mathcal{R}_1}^{\text{IND}}$$

With \mathcal{A}^* , from Theorem 2, we know there exists a reduction \mathcal{R}_2 and an adversary \mathcal{A}' such that

$$\Pr[\text{UF-MS}^*(\mathcal{A}^*) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1] \leq 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{FE}, \mathcal{R}_2}^{\text{IND}} + \epsilon + \delta.$$

Hence,

$$\Pr[\text{UF-MS}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1] \leq 4 \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\text{FE}, \mathcal{R}_1}^{\text{IND}} + \text{Adv}_{\text{FE}, \mathcal{R}_2}^{\text{IND}}) + \epsilon + \delta$$

Since FE is IND secure and both ϵ and δ are negligible,

$$\Pr[\text{UF-MS}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1] = \text{negl}.$$

In particular, since $\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MS}} \leq \Pr[\text{UF-MS}(\mathcal{A}) \rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\text{UF}(\mathcal{A}') \rightarrow 1]$,

$$\text{Adv}_{\Pi, \mathbb{B}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UF-MS}} = \text{negl}.$$

This holds for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , so Π is UF-MS secure.

□

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