Masking Floating-Point Number Multiplication and Addition of Falcon

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Introduction

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- In theory, these algorithms can base their security on problems that are considered still hard given the advantage of quantum computing.
- In practice, the implementations of these algorithms can suffer side-channel attacks.

Side-channel Attacks on FALCON



Figure: A graphical overview of FALCON.Sign.

	Attack	Countermeasure
Pre-image Vector Computation	[KA21; Gue+22]	
Gaussian Sampler over Lattices	[Gue+22; Zha+23]	[Gue+22; Zha+23]

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

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Our Contribution: The first masking scheme on the the pre-image vector computation as a countermeasure against current attacks.

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- For a proposition P, $[\![P]\!] = 1$ if and only if P is true and 0 if otherwise.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Introduction to FALCON

KeyGen

Sign(m)

Verify(m, **s**)

Introduction to Falcon

KeyGen

Secret Key: Short polynomials $f, g, F, G \in \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^N + 1)$ such that $fG - gF = q$ and

$$\mathbf{B} = \left[\begin{array}{c|c} g & -f \\ \hline G & -F \end{array}\right]$$

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Check

1. $\mathbf{s}$ is short
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Table of Contents

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The pre-image vector computation includes polynomial multiplications

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To speed up, the pre-image vector computation is performed after the Fourier transform:

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$$\frac{1}{q}\left[\begin{array}{c|c} \mathrm{FFT}(c) \odot \mathrm{FFT}(-F) & \mathrm{FFT}(c) \odot \mathrm{FFT}(f) \end{array}\right]$$

Therefore, the pre-image vector computation is essentially coefficient-wise complex number multiplications.

Floating-Point Number

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Figure: A 64-bit Floating-Point Number

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An FPN is composed of sign bit s, exponent e, and mantissa $\tilde{m}$

Figure: A 64-bit Floating-Point Number

The value is $(-1)^s \cdot 2^{e-1023} \cdot \underbrace{(1 + \tilde{m} \cdot 2^{-52})}_{\times 2^{52} = m}$

Floating-Point Number Arithmetic

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Table of Contents

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In each run, all x_i's are freshly randomized.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

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- B2A: $(y_i)_{1 \le i \le n} \mapsto (x_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$ such that $\bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} y_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i$

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- Right-shifting a secret value by another secret value
  - Given $(x_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$ and $(c_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$, right-shifting $(x_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$ by $(c_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$

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  - Given $(x_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$ and $(c_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$, right-shifting $(x_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$ by $(c_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$
- Normalizing a secret value to $[2^{63}, 2^{64})$
  - Given $(x_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$, left-shifting $(x_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$ until its 64th bit is set

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We design novel gadgets for these three operations, including

- SecNonzero: securely checking whether a secret value is nonzero
- SecFprUrsh: securely right-shifting a secret value by another secret value
- SecFprNorm64: securely normalizing a secret value to $[2^{63}, 2^{64})$

In addition, we make several improvements to reduce the costs.

Table of Contents

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We need a gadget that, given shares (x_i), outputs one-bit shares (b_i) such that

$$\left[\!\!\left[\bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} x_i \neq 0 \right]\!\!\right] = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} b_i \quad \text{or} \quad \left[\!\!\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \neq 0 \right]\!\!\right] = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} b_i$$

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For Boolean shares, our method is by OR-ing all the bits.

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Then we need a gadget for secure OR operations, which can be constructed by applying the De Morgan's law and a SecAnd gadget [ISW03; Bar+16].

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For arithmetic shares, instead of applying an n-shared A2B, we consider that

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i = 0 \iff \sum_{i=1}^{\frac{n}{2}} x_i \oplus \sum_{i=\frac{n}{2}+1}^{n} (-x_i) = 0$$

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In this way, we replace one n-shared A2B with two $n/2$-shared A2Bs.

Table of Contents

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Given 64-bit shares (x_i) and 6-bit shares (c_i), we need to derive shares (z_i) such that

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- Right-shifting and right-rotating by a value c only differ by the most c significant bits.
- Right-rotating x by a value c is equal to right-rotating x by $c \bmod 64$.

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$$m' := m \gg c \oplus (m \gg c) \gg 1 \oplus \cdots \oplus (m \gg c) \gg 63 = (\underbrace{0 \cdots 0}_{c \text{ bits}} 11 \cdots 1)_2$$

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Some high bits are redundant, so we use an index $m = (1 \ll 63)$ to indicate the first meaningful bit of the result. Consider

$$m \gg c = (\underbrace{0 \cdots 0}_{c \text{ bits}} 10 \cdots 0)_2$$

$$m' := m \gg c \oplus (m \gg c) \gg 1 \oplus \cdots \oplus (m \gg c) \gg 63 = (\underbrace{0 \cdots 0}_{c \text{ bits}} 11 \cdots 1)_2$$

By an AND operation with m', we can clear useless bits.

Table of Contents

SecFprNorm64

Given 64-bit shares (x_i) and 16-bit shares (e_i), we need to derive shares (x_i') and (e_i') such that

$$\bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} x_i' = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} x_i \ll c \text{ and } \sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i' = (\sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i) - c$$

where c is the smallest integer such that $\bigoplus_{i=1}^{n} x_i \ll c \in [2^{63}, 2^{64})$

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We repeatedly check whether $(x_i^{(64)})$ is 0 or not, then conditionally shift it by 1 bit, and then decrease (e_i) by $[\![(x_i^{(64)}) = 0]\!]$.

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We repeatedly check whether $(x_i^{(64)})$ is 0 or not, then conditionally shift it by 1 bit, and then decrease (e_i) by $[\![(x_i^{(64)}) = 0]\!]$.

To improve efficiency, we sequentially check $x^{[64:64-2^j]} = 0$ for $j = 5, 4, \cdots, 0$.

Wrapping-up

Utilizing SecNonzero, SecFprUrsh, and SecFprNorm64, we design the following gadgets:

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We leave the details of the implementations and several tricks for improvements in our paper.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Theoretical Security – Probing Model

For a positive integer t,

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Theoretical Security – Probing Model

For a positive integer t,

- The t-probing model [ISW03] assumes that an adversary is able to peek any t intermediate values in the algorithm.
- To be secure in t-probing model, the number of shares $n \geq t + 1$, and any share cannot be combined with each other.
- It can be complicated to prove t-probing security for a large composition of gadgets. We apply the concept of non-interference.

Non-Interference Security

t-Non-Interference (t-NI) Security (from [Bar+16])

A gadget is t-Non-Interference (t-NI) secure if every set of t intermediate values can be simulated by no more than t shares of each of its inputs.

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t-Strong Non-Interference (t-SNI) Security (from [Bar+16])

A gadget is t-Strong-Non-Interference (t-SNI) secure if for every set of t_I internal intermediate values and t_O of its output shares with $t_I + t_O \leq t$, they can be simulated by no more than t_I shares of each of its inputs.

Non-Interference Security

- For $t = n - 1$, if a gadget is t-NI or t-SNI secure, and if any $n - 1$ input shares are uniformly and independently distributed, then it is t-probing secure.

Non-Interference Security

- For $t = n - 1$, if a gadget is t-NI or t-SNI secure, and if any $n - 1$ input shares are uniformly and independently distributed, then it is t-probing secure.
- All the gadgets in our paper are proven either t-NI or t-SNI secure.

Gadget	**Security**	**Gadget**	**Security**
SecOr	t-SNI	SecNonzero	t-SNI
SecFprUrsh	t-SNI	SecFprNorm64	t-NI
SecFPR	t-SNI	SecFprMul	t-SNI
SecFprAdd	t-SNI		

Table: List of gadgets in our work with $n = t + 1$ shares

Practical Security – Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA)

In TVLA, one records two sets of power or electromagnetic traces where

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By convention, we consider the leakage significant if the t-value exceeds ± 4.5.

For long traces, we refer to [Din+17] to alter this threshold to avoid false positives.

TVLA results of floating-point number multiplication (FprMul, SecFprMul)



Figure: 1,000 traces, unmasked



Figure: 10,000 traces, 2-shared



Figure: 100,000 traces, 3-shared

TVLA results of floating-point number addition (FprAdd, SecFprAdd)



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

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

Figure: 100,000 traces, 3-shared

Table of Contents

Performance Evaluation on ARM Cortex-M4

Gadget	Cycle		
	Unmasked	2 Shares	3 Shares
FprMul/SecFprMul	308	7134 (23×)	36388 (118×)
FprAdd/SecFprAdd	487	17154 (35×)	48291 (99×)

Table: Performance evaluation of SecFprMul and SecFprAdd

Performance Evaluation on ARM Cortex-M4

	Gadget	Cycle	
		2 Shares	3 Shares
SecFprMul	**Total**	**7134**	**36388**
	128-bit A2B [Sch+19]	1619 (23%)	19253 (53%)
	SecFPR	3362 (47%)	10813 (30%)
SecFprAdd	**Total**	**17154**	**48291**
	64-bit SecAdd [Bar+18]	6990 (41%)	16956 (35%)
	SecFPR	3362 (20%)	10813 (22%)

Table: Performance evaluation of each component in SecFprMul and SecFprAdd.

Table of Contents

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In this paper,

- We present the first masking scheme for floating-point number multiplication and addition to protect the pre-image vector computation.
- We design novel gadgets SecNonzero, SecFprUrsh, and SecFprNorm64.
- All our gadgets are proven t-NI or t-SNI secure.
- The TVLA result shows no leakage in the 2-shared version in 10,000 traces, and no leakage in the 3-shared version in 100,000 traces.

Conclusion

In this paper,

- We present the first masking scheme for floating-point number multiplication and addition to protect the pre-image vector computation.
- We design novel gadgets SecNonzero, SecFprUrsh, and SecFprNorm64.
- All our gadgets are proven t-NI or t-SNI secure.
- The TVLA result shows no leakage in the 2-shared version in 10,000 traces, and no leakage in the 3-shared version in 100,000 traces.
- Our countermeasure when compared to the unmasked reference implementation is slow. Improved designs of SecAdd and A2B can reduce the costs.

Thank You

Any question?

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Table of Contents

Floating-Point Number Packing and Rounding

FPR

Input: Sign bit s, exponent e, and 55-bit mantissa z
Output: FPN x packed by s, e, z

1: $e \leftarrow e + 1076$
2: $b \leftarrow [\![e < 0]\!]$
3: $z \leftarrow z \wedge (b - 1)$
4: $b \leftarrow [\![z \neq 0]\!]$
5: $e \leftarrow e \wedge (-b)$
6: $x \leftarrow ((s \ll 63) \vee (z \gg 2)) + e \ll 52$
7: $f \leftarrow \texttt{0XC8} \gg z^{[3:1]}$
8: $x \leftarrow x + f^{(1)}$ {increment if $z^{[3:1]}$ is 011,110 or 111}
9: **return** x

SecFPR: Secure FPR

SecFPR

Input: 1-bit Boolean shares $(s_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$
Input: 16-bit arithmetic shares $(e_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$
Input: 55-bit Boolean shares $(z_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$
Output: Boolean shares $(x_i)_{1 \le i \le n}$

1: $e_1 \leftarrow e_1 + 1076$
2: $(e_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{A2B}((e_i))$
3: $(b_i) \leftarrow (-e_i^{(16)})$
4: $(z_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAnd}((z_i), (\neg b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n))$
5: $(e_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAnd}((e_i), (-z_i^{(55)}))$
6: $(e_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAdd}((e_i), (z_i^{(55)}))$
7: $(e_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Refresh}((e_i))$
8: $(s_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Refresh}((s_i))$
9: $(x_i) \leftarrow ((s_i^{(1)} \ll 63) \vee (e_i^{[11:1]} \ll 52) \vee (z_i^{[54:3]})$
10: $(f_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecOr}(\mathsf{Refresh}(z_i^{(1)}), (z_i^{(3)}))$
11: $(f_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAnd}((f_i), (z_i^{(2)}))$
12: $(x_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAdd}((x_i), (f_i))$
13: **return** (x_i)

Floating-Point Number Multiplication

FprMul

Input: FPN $x = (sx, ex, mx)$
Input: FPN $y = (sy, ey, my)$
Output: FPN product of x and y

1: $s \leftarrow sx \oplus sy$
2: $e \leftarrow ex + ey - 2100$
3: $z \leftarrow mx \times my$
4: $b \leftarrow [\![z^{[50:1]} \neq 0]\!]$
5: $z \leftarrow z^{[106:51]} \vee b$
6: $z' \leftarrow (z \gg 1) \vee z^{(1)}$
7: $w \leftarrow z^{(106)}$
8: $z \leftarrow z \oplus (z \oplus z') \wedge (-w)$
9: $e \leftarrow e + w$
10: $bx \leftarrow [\![ex \neq 0]\!]$, $by \leftarrow [\![ey \neq 0]\!]$
11: $b \leftarrow bx \wedge by$
12: $z \leftarrow z \wedge (-b)$
13: **return** $\mathsf{FPR}(s, e, z)$

SecFprMul: Secure FprMul

SecFprMul

Input: Shares $(sx_i)_{1\le i\le n}, (ex_i)_{1\le i\le n}, (mx_i)_{1\le i\le n}$
Input: Shares $(sy_i)_{1\le i\le n}, (ey_i)_{1\le i\le n}, (my_i)_{1\le i\le n}$
Output: Boolean shares for the FPN product.

1: $(s_i) \leftarrow (sx_i \oplus sy_i)$
2: $(e_i) \leftarrow (ex_1 + ey_1 - 2100, ex_2 + ey_2, \cdots)$
3: $(p_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecMult}((mx_i), (my_i))$
4: $(p_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{A2B}((p_i))$
5: $(b_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecNonzero}((p_i^{[51:1]}))$
6: $(z_i) \leftarrow (p_i^{[105:51]})$
7: $(z_i') \leftarrow (p_i^{[105:51]} \oplus p_i^{[106:52]})$
8: $(w_i) \leftarrow (p_i^{(106)})$
9: $(z_i') \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAnd}((z_i'), \mathsf{Refresh}((-w_i)))$
10: $(z_i) \leftarrow (z_i' \oplus z_i)$
11: $(z_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecOr}((z_i), (b_i))$
12: $(w_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{B2A}_{\mathsf{Bit}}((w_i))$
13: $(e_i) \leftarrow (e_i + w_i)$
14: $(bx_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecNonzero}((ex_i))$
15: $(by_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecNonzero}((ey_i))$
16: $(d_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAnd}((bx_i), (by_i))$
17: $(z_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAnd}((z_i), (-d_i^{(1)}))$
18: **return** $\mathsf{SecFPR}((s_i), (e_i), (z_i))$

Floating-Point Number Addition

FprAdd

Input: FPNs x and y
Output: FPN sum of x and y

1: $d \leftarrow x^{[63:1]} - y^{[63:1]}$
2: $cs \leftarrow d^{(64)} \vee ((1 - (-d)^{(64)}) \wedge x^{(64)})$
3: $m \leftarrow (x \oplus y) \wedge (-cs)$
4: $x \leftarrow x \oplus m, y \leftarrow y \oplus m$
5: Extract (sx, ex, mx) and (sy, ey, my) from x, y, respectively.
6: $mx \leftarrow mx \ll 3, my \leftarrow my \ll 3$
7: $ex \leftarrow ex - 1078, ey \leftarrow ey - 1078$
8: $c \leftarrow ex - ey$
9: $b \leftarrow [\![c < 60]\!]$
10: $my \leftarrow my \wedge (-b)$
11: $my \leftarrow (my \gg c) \vee [\![my^{[c:1]} \neq 0]\!]$
12: $s \leftarrow sx \oplus sy$
13: $z \leftarrow mx + (-1)^s my$
14: Normalize z, ex to make the 64th bit of z set
15: $z \leftarrow (z \gg 9) \vee [\![z^{[9:1]} \neq 0]\!]$
16: $ex \leftarrow ex + 9$
17: **return** FPR(sx, ex, z)

SecFprAdd: Secure FprAdd

SecFprAdd

Input: Boolean shares $(x_i)_{1\le i\le n}$
Input: Boolean shares $(y_i)_{1\le i\le n}$
Output: Boolean shares for the FPN sum

1: $(xm_i) \leftarrow (x_i^{[63:1]})$
2: $(ym_i) \leftarrow (\neg y_1^{[63:1]}, y_2^{[63:1]}, \cdots, y_n^{[63:1]})$
3: $(d_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAdd}((xm_i), (ym_i))$
4: $(b_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecNonzero}(\neg d_1, d_2, \cdots, d_n)$
5: $(b_i') \leftarrow \mathsf{SecNonzero}(\neg(d_1 \oplus (1 \ll 63)), d_2, \cdots, d_n)$
6: $(cs_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAnd}((\neg b_1, b_2, \cdots, b_n), (x_i^{(64)}))$
7: $(cs_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecOr}((cs_i), (d_i^{(64)} \oplus b_i \oplus b_i'))$
8: $(m_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAnd}((x_i \oplus y_i), (-cs_i))$
9: $(x_i) \leftarrow (x_i \oplus m_i),\ (y_i) \leftarrow (y_i \oplus m_i)$
10: Extract $(sx_i), (ex_i), (mx_i)$ and $(sy_i), (ey_i), (my_i)$ from (x_i) and (y_i), respectively.
11: $(mx_i) \leftarrow (mx_i \ll 3),\ (my_i) \leftarrow (my_i \ll 3)$
12: $(ex_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{B2A}((ex_i)),\ (ey_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{B2A}((ey_i))$
13: $ex_1 \leftarrow ex_1 - 1078,\ ey_1 \leftarrow ey_1 - 1078.$
14: $(c_i) \leftarrow (ex_i - ey_i)$
15: $(c_i') \leftarrow \mathsf{A2B}((c_1 - 60, c_2, \cdots, c_n))$
16: $(my_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAnd}((my_i), (-(c_i'^{(16)})))$
17: $(my_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecFprUrsh}((my_i), (c_i^{[6:1]}))$
18: $(my_i') \leftarrow (\neg my_1, my_2, \cdots, my_n)$
19: $(my_i') \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAdd}((my_i'), (1, 0, \cdots, 0))$
20: $(s_i) \leftarrow (-(sx_i \oplus sy_i))$
21: $(my_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Refresh}((my_i))$
22: $(my_i') \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAnd}((my_i \oplus my_i'), (s_i))$
23: $(my_i) \leftarrow (my_i \oplus my_i')$
24: $(z_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecAdd}((mx_i), (my_i))$
25: $(z_i), (ex_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecFprNorm64}((z_i), (ex_i))$
26: $(b_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{SecNonzero}((z_i^{[10:1]}))$
27: $(z_i) \leftarrow (z_i \gg 9)$
28: $(z_i^{(1)}) \leftarrow (b_i)$
29: $ex_1 \leftarrow ex_1 + 9$
30: **return** $\mathsf{SecFPR}(\mathsf{Refresh}((sx_i)), (ex_i), (z_i))$