Created on 2021-09-30 12:10:33 PM

Threat Model Name:

Owner: Reviewer: Contributors: Description: Assumptions:

External Dependencies:

Threat Model Summary:

Not Started42Not Applicable0Needs Investigation0Mitigation Implemented0Total42Total Migrated0

Diagram: Diagram 1




Diagram 1 Diagram Summary:

Not Started42Not Applicable0Needs Investigation0Mitigation Implemented0Total42Total Migrated0

Interaction: Request

1. An adversary can reverse engineer and tamper binaries [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Tampering

Description: An adversary can use various tools, reverse engineer binaries and abuse them by tampering

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Obfuscate generated binaries before distributing to end users. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end"

Mitigation(s): //aka.ms/tmtdata#binaries-end

SDL Phase: Design

2. An adversary may spoof Mobile Client and gain access to Web Application [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: If proper authentication is not in place, an adversary can spoof a source process or external entity and gain unauthorized access to

the Web Application

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Consider using a standard authentication mechanism to authenticate to Web Application. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtauthn#standard-authn-web-app">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#standard-authn-web-app

SDL Phase: Design

3. An adversary can create a fake website and launch phishing attacks [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: Phishing is attempted to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card details (and sometimes, indirectly,

money), often for malicious reasons, by masquerading as a Web Server which is a trustworthy entity in electronic communication

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Verify X.509 certificates used to authenticate SSL, TLS, and DTLS connections. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-

Mitigation(s): ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-ssltls Ensure that authenticated ASP.NET pages incorporate UI Redressing or clickjacking

defences. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtconfigmgmt#ui-defenses Validate all redirects within the application are closed or done safely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#

/tmtinputval#redirect-safe

SDL Phase: Implementation

4. An adversary can steal sensitive data like user credentials [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: Attackers can exploit weaknesses in system to steal user credentials. Downstream and upstream components are often accessed by

using credentials stored in configuration stores. Attackers may steal the upstream or downstream component credentials. Attackers may steal credentials if, Credentials are stored and sent in clear text, Weak input validation coupled with dynamic sql queries, Password

retrieval mechanism are poor,

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Explicitly disable the autocomplete HTML attribute in sensitive forms and inputs. Refer: a href="https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtdata#autocomplete-input">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#autocomplete-input Perform input validation and filtering on all string

type Model properties. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#typemodel Validate all redirects within the application are closed or done safely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#redirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#redirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#step-up-adaptive-authn">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#step-up-adaptive-authn Implement forgot password functionalities securely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pwo

href="https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pword-fxn">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pword-fxn Ensure that password and account policy are implemented. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy Implement input validation on all string type parameters accepted by Controller methods. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms

/tmtinputval #string-method ">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval #string-method

SDL Phase: Implementation

5. An adversary can spoof the target web application due to insecure TLS certificate configuration [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: Ensure that TLS certificate parameters are configured with correct values

Justification: < no mitigation provided>

Possible Verify X.509 certificates used to authenticate SSL, TLS, and DTLS connections. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-

Mitigation(s): ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-ssltls

SDL Phase: Implementation

6. Attacker can deny the malicious act and remove the attack foot prints leading to repudiation issues [State: Not Started] [Priority: Medium]

Category: Repudiation

Description: Proper logging of all security events and user actions builds traceability in a system and denies any possible repudiation issues. In the

absence of proper auditing and logging controls, it would become impossible to implement any accountability in a system

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Ensure that auditing and logging is enforced on the application. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtauditlog#auditing Ensure that log rotation and separation are in place. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#auditing

rotation">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-rotation Ensure that Audit and Log Files have Restricted Access. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-restricted-access Ensure that User Management Events are Logged. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management

management

SDL Phase: Implementation

7. An adversary can gain access to sensitive information through error messages [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary can gain access to sensitive data such as the following, through verbose error messages - Server names - Connection

strings - Usernames - Passwords - SQL procedures - Details of dynamic SQL failures - Stack trace and lines of code - Variables stored in memory - Drive and folder locations - Application install points - Host configuration settings - Other internal application

details

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Do not expose security details in error messages. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtxmgmt#messages Implement Default error handling page. Refer: https://aka.ms

/tmtxmgmt#default Set Deployment Method to Retail in IIS. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#deployment Exceptions should fail safely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#fail">https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#fail">https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#fail">https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#fail ASP.NET applications must disable tracing and debugging prior to deployment. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtconfigmgmt#trace-deploy Implement controls to prevent username enumeration. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#controls-username-enum

enum

SDL Phase: Implementation

8. An adversary can gain sensitive data from mobile device [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: If application saves sensitive PII or HBI data on phone SD card or local storage, then it ay get stolen.

Justification: < no mitigation provided>

Possible Encrypt sensitive or PII data written to phones local storage. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtdata#pii-phones

SDL Phase: Implementation

9. An adversary can gain access to sensitive data by sniffing traffic from Mobile client [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary can gain access to sensitive data by sniffing traffic from Mobile client

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Implement Certificate Pinning. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#cert-pinning

Mitigation(s): pinning

SDL Phase:

Implementation

10. An adversary may gain access to sensitive data from log files [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary may gain access to sensitive data from log files

Justification: < no mitigation provided>

Possible Ensure that the application does not log sensitive user data. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data

/tmtauditlog#log-restricted-access">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-restricted-access

SDL Phase: Implementation

11. An adversary can reverse weakly encrypted or hashed content [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary can reverse weakly encrypted or hashed content

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Do not expose security details in error messages. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtxmgmt#messages Implement Default error handling page. Refer: https://aka.ms

/tmtxmgmt#default Set Deployment Method to Retail in IIS. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#deployment Use only approved symmetric block ciphers and key lengths. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#cipher-length Use approved block cipher modes and initialization vectors for symmetric ciphers. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#vector-ciphers Use approved asymmetric algorithms, key lengths, and padding. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#padding">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#padding Use approved random number generators. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen Do not use symmetric stream ciphers. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#stream-ciphers Use approved MAC/HMAC/keyed hash algorithms. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#hash-functions Verify X.509

//aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-ssltls

SDL Phase: Implementation

12. An adversary may jail break into a mobile device and gain elevated privileges [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Elevation of Privileges

Description: An adversary may jail break into a mobile device and gain elevated privileges

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Implement implicit jailbreak or rooting detection. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtauthz#rooting-detection

SDL Phase: Design

13. An adversary can gain access to sensitive data by performing SQL injection through Web App [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Tampering

Description: SQL injection is an attack in which malicious code is inserted into strings that are later passed to an instance of SQL Server for parsing

and execution. The primary form of SQL injection consists of direct insertion of code into user-input variables that are concatenated with SQL commands and executed. A less direct attack injects malicious code into strings that are destined for storage in a table or as metadata. When the stored strings are subsequently concatenated into a dynamic SQL command, the malicious code is executed.

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Ensure that type-safe parameters are used in Web Application for data access. Refer: a href="https://aka.ms">https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtinputval#typesafe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#typesafe

SDL Phase: Implementation

14. An adversary can gain access to sensitive data stored in Web App's config files [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Tampering

Description: An adversary can gain access to the config files. and if sensitive data is stored in it, it would be compromised.

<no mitigation provided>

Justification: Possible

Encrypt sections of Web App's configuration files that contain sensitive data. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtdata#encrypt-


Mitigation(s):

data">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#encrypt-data

SDL Phase:

Implementation

Interaction: Request



15. An adversary can gain unauthorized access to Azure SQL database due to weak account policy [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Elevation of Privileges Category:

Description: Due to poorly configured account policies, adversary can launch brute force attacks on Azure SQL Database for customer

information

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible When possible use Azure Active Directory Authentication for connecting to SQL Database. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmt-

th10a">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10a Ensure that least-privileged accounts are used to connect to Database server. Refer: <a Mitigation(s):

href="https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b and https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b">https://aka.ms/tmt-th10b

th10c

SDL Phase: Implementation

16. An adversary can gain unauthorized access to Azure SQL DB instances due to weak network security configuration. [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Elevation of Privileges Category:

Description: An adversary can gain unauthorized access to Azure SQL DB instances due to weak network security configuration.

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Restrict access to Azure SQL Database instances by configuring server-level and database-level firewall rules to permit connections Possible Mitigation(s):

from selected networks (e.g. a virtual network or a custom set of IP addresses) where possible. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmt-

th143">https://aka.ms/tmt-th143

SDL Phase: Implementation

17. An adversary can read confidential data due to weak connection string configuration [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary can read confidential data due to weak connection string configuration.

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Clients connecting to an Azure SQL Database instance using a connection string should ensure encrypt=true and

Mitigation(s): trustservercertificate=false are set. This configuration ensures that connections are encrypted only if there is a verifiable server

certificate (otherwise the connection attempt fails). This helps protect against Man-In-The-Middle attacks. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmt-th144

SDL Phase: Implementation

18. An adversary having access to the storage container (e.g. physical access to the storage media) may be able to read sensitive data [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

An adversary having access to the storage container (e.g. physical access to the storage media) may be able to read sensitive data. Description:

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Enable Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) on Azure SQL Database instances to have data encrypted at rest. Refer: <a hr

Mitigation(s): href="https://aka.ms/tmt-th145a">https://aka.ms/tmt-th145a. Use the Always Encrypted feature to allow client applications to

encrypt sensitive data before it is sent to the Azure SQL Database. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmt

th145b

SDL Phase: Implementation

19. A compromised identity may permit more privileges than intended to an adversary due to weak permission and role assignments [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Elevation of Privileges

Description: A compromised identity may permit more privileges than intended to an adversary due to weak permission and role assignments.

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible It is recommended to review permission and role assignments to ensure the users are granted the least privileges necessary. Refer:

Mitigation(s): https://aka.ms/tmt-th146

SDL Phase: Implementation

20. An adversary can deny actions performed on Azure SQL Database for customer information due to a lack of auditing [State: Not Started] [Priority: Medium]

Category: Repudiation

Description: An adversary can deny actions performed on Azure SQL Database for customer information due to a lack of auditing.

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Enable auditing on Azure SQL Database instances to track and log database events. After configuring and customizing the audited Mitigation(s): events, enable threat detection to receive alerts on anomalous database activities indicating potential security threats. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmt-th147

SDL Phase: Design

21. An adversary can gain long term, persistent access to an Azure SQL DB instance through the compromise of local user account password(s) [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Elevation of Privileges

Description: An adversary can gain long term, persistent access to an Azure SQL DB instance through the compromise of local user account

password(s).

Justification: < no mitigation provided>

Possible It is recommended to rotate user account passwords (e.g. those used in connection strings) regularly, in accordance with your

Mitigation(s): organization's policies. Store secrets in a secret storage solution (e.g. Azure Key Vault).

SDL Phase: Implementation

22. An adversary may abuse weak Azure SQL Database for customer information configuration [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Elevation of Privileges

Description: An adversary may abuse weak Azure SQL Database for customer information configuration.

Justification: <no mitigation provided>


Possible Enable SQL Vulnerability Assessment to gain visibility into the security posture of your Azure SQL Database instances. Acting on the Mitigation(s): assessment results help reduce attack surface and enhance your database security. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmt-th14

assessinent results help reduce attack surface and enhance your database security. Neter: Nather – https://aka.ms/timetin43/2/1ttp

//aka.ms/tmt-th149

SDL Phase: Implementation

Interaction: Response



23. An adversary can reverse weakly encrypted or hashed content [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary can reverse weakly encrypted or hashed content

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Do not expose security details in error messages. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtxmgmt#messages Implement Default error handling page. Refer: https://aka.ms

/tmtxmgmt#default Set Deployment Method to Retail in IIS. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#deployment Use only approved symmetric block ciphers and key lengths. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#cipher-length Use approved block cipher modes and initialization vectors for symmetric ciphers. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#vector-ciphers Use approved asymmetric algorithms, key lengths, and padding. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#padding">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#padding Use approved random number generators. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen Use approved MAC/HMAC/keyed hash algorithms. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#nac-hash Use only approved cryptographic hash functions. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#hash-functions Verify X.509 certificates used to authenticate SSL, TLS, and DTLS connections. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtccommsec#x509-

//aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-ssltls

SDL Phase: Implementation

24. An adversary may gain access to sensitive data from log files [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary may gain access to sensitive data from log files

Justification: < no mitigation provided>

Possible Ensure that the application does not log sensitive user data. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data

/tmtauditlog#log-restricted-access">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-restricted-access

SDL Phase: Implementation

25. An adversary can gain access to sensitive information through error messages [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary can gain access to sensitive data such as the following, through verbose error messages - Server names - Connection

strings - Usernames - Passwords - SQL procedures - Details of dynamic SQL failures - Stack trace and lines of code - Variables stored in memory - Drive and folder locations - Application install points - Host configuration settings - Other internal application

details

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Do not expose security details in error messages. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtxmgmt#messages Implement Default error handling page. Refer: https://aka.ms

/tmtxmgmt#default Set Deployment Method to Retail in IIS. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#deployment Exceptions should fail safely. Refer: https://aka.ms/t

enum

SDL Phase: Implementation

26. Attacker can deny the malicious act and remove the attack foot prints leading to repudiation issues [State: Not Started] [Priority: Medium]

Category: Repudiation

Description: Proper logging of all security events and user actions builds traceability in a system and denies any possible repudiation issues. In the

absence of proper auditing and logging controls, it would become impossible to implement any accountability in a system

Justification: < no mitigation provided>

Possible Ensure that auditing and logging is enforced on the application. Refer: https://aka.ms

rotation">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-rotation Ensure that Audit and Log Files have Restricted Access. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-restricted-access Ensure that User Management Events are Logged. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management

management

SDL Phase: Implementation

27. An adversary can spoof the target web application due to insecure TLS certificate configuration [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: Ensure that TLS certificate parameters are configured with correct values

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Verify X.509 certificates used to authenticate SSL, TLS, and DTLS connections. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-

Mitigation(s): ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-ssltls

SDL Phase: Implementation

28. An adversary can steal sensitive data like user credentials [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: Attackers can exploit weaknesses in system to steal user credentials. Downstream and upstream components are often accessed by

using credentials stored in configuration stores. Attackers may steal the upstream or downstream component credentials. Attackers may steal credentials if, Credentials are stored and sent in clear text, Weak input validation coupled with dynamic sql queries, Password

retrieval mechanism are poor,

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Explicitly disable the autocomplete HTML attribute in sensitive forms and inputs. Refer: a href="https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtdata#autocomplete-input">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#autocomplete-input Perform input validation and filtering on all string

type Model properties. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#typemodel Validate all redirects within the application are closed or done safely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#redirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#redirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#step-up-adaptive-authn">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#step-up-adaptive-authn Implement forgot password functionalities securely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pword-fxn">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pword-fxn">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pword-fxn">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pword-fxn">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pword-fxn">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pword-fxn">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pword-fxn Ensure that password and account policy are implemented. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy

policy Implement input validation on all string type parameters accepted by Controller methods. Refer: a href="https://aka.ms

/tmtinputval#string-method">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#string-method

SDL Phase: Implementation

29. An adversary can create a fake website and launch phishing attacks [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: Phishing is attempted to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card details (and sometimes, indirectly,

money), often for malicious reasons, by masquerading as a Web Server which is a trustworthy entity in electronic communication

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Verify X.509 certificates used to authenticate SSL, TLS, and DTLS connections. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-

Mitigation(s): ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-ssltls Ensure that authenticated ASP.NET pages incorporate UI Redressing or clickjacking

defences. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtconfigmgmt#ui-defenses Validate all redirects within the application are closed or done safely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#nedirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#nedirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#nedirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#nedirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#nedirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#nedirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#nedirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#nedirect-safe

/tmtinputval#redirect-safe

SDL Phase: Implementation

30. An adversary may spoof Azure SQL Database for customer information and gain access to Web Application [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: If proper authentication is not in place, an adversary can spoof a source process or external entity and gain unauthorized access to

the Web Application

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Consider using a standard authentication mechanism to authenticate to Web Application. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtauthn#standard-authn-web-app">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#standard-authn-web-app

SDL Phase: Design

31. An adversary can gain access to sensitive data by performing SQL injection through Web App [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Tampering

Description: SQL injection is an attack in which malicious code is inserted into strings that are later passed to an instance of SQL Server for parsing

and execution. The primary form of SQL injection consists of direct insertion of code into user-input variables that are concatenated with SQL commands and executed. A less direct attack injects malicious code into strings that are destined for storage in a table or as metadata. When the stored strings are subsequently concatenated into a dynamic SQL command, the malicious code is executed.

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Ensure that type-safe parameters are used in Web Application for data access. Refer: a href="https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtinputval#typesafe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#typesafe

SDL Phase: Implementation

32. An adversary can gain access to sensitive data stored in Web App's config files [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Tampering

Description: An adversary can gain access to the config files. and if sensitive data is stored in it, it would be compromised.


Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Encrypt sections of Web App's configuration files that contain sensitive data. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtdata#encrypt-

Mitigation(s): data">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#encrypt-data

SDL Phase: Implementation

Interaction: Response



33. An adversary can reverse weakly encrypted or hashed content [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary can reverse weakly encrypted or hashed content

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Do not expose security details in error messages. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtxmgmt#messages Implement Default error handling page. Refer: https://aka.ms

/tmtxmgmt#default Set Deployment Method to Retail in IIS. Refer: https: //aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#deployment Use only approved symmetric block ciphers and key lengths. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#cipher-length Use approved block cipher modes and initialization vectors for symmetric ciphers. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#vector-ciphers Use approved asymmetric algorithms, key lengths, and padding. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#padding Use approved random number generators. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#numgen Do not use symmetric stream ciphers. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#stream-

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ciphers">https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#stream-ciphers Use approved MAC/HMAC/keyed hash algorithms. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#mac-hash Use only approved cryptographic hash functions. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcrypto#hash-functions Verify X.509 certificates used to authenticate SSL, TLS, and DTLS connections. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-ssltls

SDL Phase: Implementation

34. An adversary may gain access to sensitive data from log files [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary may gain access to sensitive data from log files

Justification: < no mitigation provided>

Possible Ensure that the application does not log sensitive user data. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-sensitive-data

/tmtauditlog#log-restricted-access">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-restricted-access

SDL Phase: Implementation

35. An adversary can gain access to sensitive information through error messages [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Information Disclosure

Description: An adversary can gain access to sensitive data such as the following, through verbose error messages - Server names - Connection

strings - Usernames - Passwords - SQL procedures - Details of dynamic SQL failures - Stack trace and lines of code - Variables stored in memory - Drive and folder locations - Application install points - Host configuration settings - Other internal application

details

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Do not expose security details in error messages. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtxmgmt#messages Implement Default error handling page. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#default

/tmtxmgmt#default Set Deployment Method to Retail in IIS. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#deployment Exceptions should fail safely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtxmgmt#fail

enum

SDL Phase: Implementation

36. Attacker can deny the malicious act and remove the attack foot prints leading to repudiation issues [State: Not Started] [Priority: Medium]

Category: Repudiation

Description: Proper logging of all security events and user actions builds traceability in a system and denies any possible repudiation issues. In the

absence of proper auditing and logging controls, it would become impossible to implement any accountability in a system

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Ensure that auditing and logging is enforced on the application. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtauditlog#auditing Ensure that log rotation and separation are in place. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-

rotation">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-rotation Ensure that Audit and Log Files have Restricted Access. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#log-restricted-access Ensure that User Management Events are Logged. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management">https://aka.ms/tmtauditlog#user-management

management

SDL Phase: Implementation

37. An adversary can spoof the target web application due to insecure TLS certificate configuration [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: Ensure that TLS certificate parameters are configured with correct values

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Verify X.509 certificates used to authenticate SSL, TLS, and DTLS connections. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-

Mitigation(s): ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-ssltls

SDL Phase: Implementation

38. An adversary can steal sensitive data like user credentials [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: Attackers can exploit weaknesses in system to steal user credentials. Downstream and upstream components are often accessed by

using credentials stored in configuration stores. Attackers may steal the upstream or downstream component credentials. Attackers may steal credentials if, Credentials are stored and sent in clear text, Weak input validation coupled with dynamic sql queries, Password

retrieval mechanism are poor,

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Explicitly disable the autocomplete HTML attribute in sensitive forms and inputs. Refer: a href="https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtdata#autocomplete-input">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#autocomplete-input Perform input validation and filtering on all string

type Model properties. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#typemodel Validate all redirects within the application are closed or done safely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#redirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#redirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#redirect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#step-up-adaptive-authn">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#step-up-adaptive-authn Implement forgot password functionalities securely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#forgot-pword-fxn Ensure that password and account policy are implemented. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#pword-account-policy

/tmtinputval#string-method">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#string-method

SDL Phase: Implementation

39. An adversary can create a fake website and launch phishing attacks [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: Phishing is attempted to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card details (and sometimes, indirectly,

money), often for malicious reasons, by masquerading as a Web Server which is a trustworthy entity in electronic communication

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Verify X.509 certificates used to authenticate SSL, TLS, and DTLS connections. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-

Mitigation(s): ssltls">https://aka.ms/tmtcommsec#x509-ssltls Ensure that authenticated ASPNET pages incorporate UI Redressing or clickjacking

defences. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtconfigmgmt#ui-defenses Validate all redirects within the application are closed or done safely. Refer: https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#ndorect-safe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#ndorect-safe

/tmtinputval#redirect-safe

SDL Phase: Implementation

40. An adversary may spoof Route determination server and gain access to Web Application [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Spoofing

Description: If proper authentication is not in place, an adversary can spoof a source process or external entity and gain unauthorized access to

the Web Application

Justification: < no mitigation provided>

Possible Consider using a standard authentication mechanism to authenticate to Web Application. Refer: https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtauthn#standard-authn-web-app">https://aka.ms/tmtauthn#standard-authn-web-app

SDL Phase: Design

41. An adversary can gain access to sensitive data by performing SQL injection through Web App [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Tampering

Description: SQL injection is an attack in which malicious code is inserted into strings that are later passed to an instance of SQL Server for parsing

and execution. The primary form of SQL injection consists of direct insertion of code into user-input variables that are concatenated with SQL commands and executed. A less direct attack injects malicious code into strings that are destined for storage in a table or as metadata. When the stored strings are subsequently concatenated into a dynamic SQL command, the malicious code is executed.

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Ensure that type-safe parameters are used in Web Application for data access. Refer: a href="https://aka.ms

Mitigation(s): /tmtinputval#typesafe">https://aka.ms/tmtinputval#typesafe

SDL Phase: Implementation

42. An adversary can gain access to sensitive data stored in Web App's config files [State: Not Started] [Priority: High]

Category: Tampering

Description: An adversary can gain access to the config files. and if sensitive data is stored in it, it would be compromised.

Justification: <no mitigation provided>

Possible Encrypt sections of Web App's configuration files that contain sensitive data. Refer: <a href="https://aka.ms/tmtdata#encrypt-

Mitigation(s): data">https://aka.ms/tmtdata#encrypt-data

SDL Phase: Implementation