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## ABBREVIATIONS

AFPs	Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones
AHV	Acción Humanista Verde (Green Humanist Action)
AMA	Amarillos (Yellows)
AMP	Amplitud (Amplitude)
AN	Acción Nacional (National Action)
ANI	Alianza Nacional de los Independientes (National Alliance of Independents)
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
CH1	Chile Primero (Chile First)
CEP	Centro de Estudios Públicos
CIU	Ciudadanos (Citizens)
COM	Comunes (Commons)
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CS	Convergencia Social (Social Convergence)
DC	Democracia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party)
DEMO	Demócratas (Democrats)
DR	Democracia Regional (Regional Democracy)
DRP	Democracia Regional Patagónica (Patagonian Regional Democracy)
ECO	Ecologistas (Ecologists)
ENP	Effective Number of Parties
Evópoli	Evolución Política (Political Evolution)
FA	Frente Amplio (Broad Front)
FDN	Fuerza del Norte (Force of the North)
FECH	Federación de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile
FEUC	Federación de Estudiantes de la Pontificia Universidad Católica

FP	Frente Popular (Popular Front)
FREP	Frente Regional y Popular (Popular and Regional Front)
FRNV	Fuerza Regional Norte Verde (Northern Green Regional Force)
FRV	Frente Regional Verde (Green Regional Front)
FRVS	Federación Regionalista Verde Social (Social Green Regionalist Federation)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IC	Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAPREs	Instituciones de Salud Previsional
LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Poll
LOCE	Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Enseñanza
LV	Los Verdes (The Greens)
MAPU	Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (Popular Unitary Action Movement)
MAS	Movimiento Amplio Social (Broad Social Movement)
MIRA	Movimiento Independiente Regionalista Agrario y Social (Independent Agrarian and Regionalist Social Movement)
MIR	Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement)
NAP	Nueva Alternativa Popular (New Popular Alternative)
NT	Nuevo Tiempo (New Time)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAIS	Partido Amplio de Izquierda Socialista (Country)
PAVP	Partido Alianza Verde Popular (Popular Green Alliance Party)
PCC	Partido Conservador Cristiano (Christian Conservative Party)
PC	Partido Comunista de Chile (Communist Party of Chile)
PEC	Partido Ecologista (Ecologist Party)
PEV	Partido Ecologista Verde (Green Ecologist Party)
PEVN	Partido Ecologista Verde del Norte (Green Ecologist Party of the North)
PH	Partido Humanista (Humanist Party)
PI	Partido Igualdad (Equality Party)
PL	Partido Liberal (Liberal Party)
PN	Partido Nacional (National Party)
PNC	Partido Nacional Ciudadano (Citizen National Party)
POD	Poder (Power)
PP	Partido Popular (People's Party)
PPD	Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy)
PRI	Partido Regionalista Independiente (Independent Regionalist Party)
PR	Partido Radical (Radical Party)

PRM	Partido Regionalista de Magallanes (Regionalist Party of Magallanes)
PRO	Partido Progresista (Progressive Party)
PRSD	Partido Radical Socialdemócrata (Social Democrat Radical Party)
PSC	Partido Social Cristiano (Social Christian Party)
PSD	Partido Socialdemócrata (Social Democratic Party)
PS	Partido Socialista (Socialist Party)
PSCH	Partido Socialista Chileno (Chilean Socialist Party)
PTR	Partido de Trabajadores Revolucionarios (Revolutionary Workers' Party)
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
SERVEL	Servicio Electoral de Chile
SQM	Sociedad Química y Minera de Chile
RD	Revolución Democrática (Democratic Revolution)
REP	Partido Republicano (Republican Party)
RN	Renovación Nacional (National Renewal)
SAY	Somos Aysén (We Are Aysén)
SUR	Partido del Sur (Southern Party)
TODOS	Todos (Everybody)
UCC	Unión de Centro Centro (Center-Center Union)
UDI	Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union)
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UP	Unidad Popular (Popular Unity)
URD	Unidos Resulta en Democracia (United Results in Democracy)
W	Wallmapuwen (Mapuche Nation)
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

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