Intrusion Detection using Parzen-Windows on Provenance Graph Statistics

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Abstract

Provenance is data that describes how a digital artifact came to be in its current state. We hypothesize that intrusions on a system leave behind anomalies in the lineage of digital artifacts. We present an intrusion detection approach to find these anomalies by analyzing centrality metrics on provenance graphs. We use a Parzen-Window approach (TODO CITE) on various provenance graph centrality metrics (TODO CITE) to determine probability density estimates of normal behavior, and we use these density estimates to determine if an intrusion occurred. We used this approach to analyze *user-to-remote* (u2r) intrusions and *remote-to-local* (r2l) intrusions (TODO: include r2l?) from the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection data sets (TODO CITE) and achieved up to *TODO true positive rate for intrusions* accuracy in detecting intrusions with only *TODO false positive rate for intrusions* accuracy. We also present future work to extend our intrusion model to an online intrusion detection system.

1 Introduction

For as long as systems have existed, there have been malicious users that attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in systems to gain unintended privileged access. As a result, system designers and administrators place a large effort in securing systems and preventing intrusions. However, intrusions inevitably occur because of bugs or flaws within the system, and as a result, system administrators want to have some automatic way of detecting these intrusions.

Intrusions often leave behind digital artifacts, e.g., unusual output or log files, a process executed with an unusual arguments or environment, unusual system call activity by a process. In addition to unusual digital artifacts, we hypothesize that intrusions also intrusions leave behind abnormalities in the *provenance* of these digital artifacts, the lineage of how these digital artifacts were created.

Provenance is data that describes how digital artifacts came to be in their current state. Provenance data is typically structured as a directed acyclic graph with typed nodes and typed edges. Nodes typically include processes and files, and edges are directed from nodes to their dependencies. For example, process nodes have edges directed towards input file nodes and to the parent process's node, and file nodes have edges directed towards previous versions of the file and to the nodes of the processes that modified the file.

Existing intrusion detection systems (IDS) use provenance data only to a limited extent. ??? person analyzes basic statistics on provenance graphs (e.g., number of nodes, number of edges, ... TODO) in order to facilitate easier manual intrusion detection by a human (CITE WORK). Their work, however, does not present a way of using provenance graph to automatically determine intrusions. Other systems use provenance data to determine the scope of an intrusion. For example, Backtracker (CITE WORK) uses provenance graphs to build causality graphs of intrusions: once the system has determined an intrusion has occurred, the system follow the causality graph backwards determine the original source of the attack, and then it follow the causality graph forwards to determine all the objects tainted by the attack. However, the authors do not present a way of using provenance data to automatically detect intrusions.

¿¿¿ INSERT PROVENANCE GRAPH SMALL EXAMPLE HERE SHOWING DATA FLOW

In this paper, we present an approach to use provenance data to automatically detect intrusions. Intrusion detection can be framed as a *novelty detection* problem, in which one attempts to decide whether an unknown test pattern is produced by an underlying distribution corresponding to a training set of nor-

mal patterns (CITE WORK). However, ???authors note that in the case of intrusion detection, novel or abnormal patterns are typically difficult to obtain, and as a result, they present a *Parzen-Window* approach for non-parametric density estimation. Using this technique, they obtain a high degree of success in identifying various intrusion types (CITE WORK). Because obtaining abnormal patterns is difficult, we borrow their Parzen-Window approach to build models of normal behavior using various provenance graph statistics and graph centrality metrics, and we evaluate the success of this technique on *user-to-local* (u2l) intrusions (intrusions that provide unauthorized access to local superuser (root) privileges), and *remote-to-local* (r2l) intrusions (intrusions that provide unauthorized access from a remote machine).

The main contributions of this paper are the following:

1. Discuss which provenance graph statistics we chose to use, how we chose them, and why we chose them.

2. Analyze the Parzen-Window technique on a real intrusion detection data set and evaluate its performance.

3. Discuss the limitations of the approach and present future work to transform the technique into an online intrusion detection system.

2 Related Work

2.1 Existing IDSs

inspiration - novelty detection problem with intrusion detection - somayaji use sequences of system calls - system calls and BSM data can be used to build provenance graphs; we believe that provenance graphs provide more information than somayaji and can help detect intrusions with better results

use provenance to automatically detect intrusions - existing machine learning techniques on KDD data set: use features of an intrusion (number of data) - but not actually using graph structure - parzen window–allow us to build a profile of normal with lack of abnormal examples

2.2 Provenance Graph Features

how we choose features to look at - basic statistics for manual detection - graph centrality and clustering can help us identify the different kinds of tasks running - use these metrics for kernel estimation and

2.3 Types of Intrusions

we limit our work to these intrusions - explain various kinds - why just user 2 local

3 Design and Implementation

3.1 Selecting Metrics

talk about PASS and SPADE here.

put that table here

4 Evaluation

4.1 Experimental Setup

4.2 Results

4.3 Discussion

5 Conclusion

6 Limitations & Future Work

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