

Security Hardening Plan and Implementation

1) Research Summary (Current Security Standards)

This hardening plan was based on primary guidance from OWASP, NIST, and framework docs.

Key protocols and coding practices used

1. Authentication and session management

- Use signed, time-bounded sessions.
- Use secure cookie attributes (`HttpOnly`, `SameSite`, `Secure` in TLS environments).
- Rotate sessions on login.

2. Credential handling

- Use adaptive password hashing (PBKDF2/Argon2/bcrypt), never plaintext.
- Add lockout/rate limiting on login flows.

3. CSRF protection

- Enforce anti-CSRF tokens for state-changing browser requests.
- Protect API state-change calls when cookie auth is used.

4. SSRF protection

- Restrict URL schemes and destination networks.
- Block localhost/private/reserved IP resolution.
- Restrict LinkedIn enrichment to explicit `linkedin.com` profile URLs when opt-in is enabled.

5. Security headers

- Add CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy.
- Add HSTS in secure deployments.

6. Access control

- Enforce server-side RBAC checks for every sensitive route/API.
- Avoid client-side-only authorization.

7. Auditability

- Log security-relevant actions (login, denied actions, enrichment attempts, exports, admin operations).

2) Sources

- OWASP ASVS project: <https://owasp.org/www-project-application-security-verification-standard/>
- OWASP Cheat Sheet Series (index): <https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/>
- OWASP Session Management Cheat Sheet:
https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html

- OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html
- OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html
- OWASP CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
- OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
- NIST SP 800-63B (Digital Identity Guidelines - Authentication): <https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html>
- FastAPI security docs: <https://fastapi.tiangolo.com/reference/security/>
- Starlette middleware docs: <https://www.starlette.io/middleware/>
- MDN HTTP security headers overview: <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP>

3) Security Hardening Plan

Phase A: Immediate controls (implemented)

- Replace plaintext organizer auth with hashed credentials in DB.
- Add signed, expiring auth session cookie.
- Add CSRF checks on all state-changing form routes.
- Add CSRF checks for state-changing API routes using cookie auth.
- Add RBAC for UI and API routes.
- Add login rate limiting and organizer lockout controls.
- Add SSRF guardrails for external enrichment endpoint.
- Add security headers middleware.
- Add audit logging for security-sensitive actions.

Phase B: Near-term controls (next)

- Add per-user and per-endpoint distributed rate limiting (Redis-backed).
- Add account recovery and mandatory credential rotation policies.
- Add breached-password blocklist checks.
- Add API token service for machine-to-machine usage (instead of session cookie for API clients).

Phase C: Production-grade controls (next)

- Migrate auth to enterprise IdP/SSO (OIDC/SAML) with MFA.
- Add centralized audit pipeline (SIEM).
- Add secret manager integration and key rotation.
- Add threat-detection and alerting (anomaly/risk-based events).

4) Implemented Controls in This App

Authentication and session hardening

- Added `AppUser` table for organizer and attendee credentials (hashed password).
- Password hashing uses PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with high iteration count.
- Sessions are signed and include expiration.
- Login sets signed auth cookie + CSRF cookie.
- Added startup guardrails that block insecure config in `APP_ENV=production`.

Files:

- `app/models.py` (`AppUser`)
- `app/services/security.py`
- `app/main.py`

RBAC

- Role map defined for `organizer` and `attendee`.
- Route and API permissions enforced server-side.
- Attendee scoped to their own record for protected operations.

Files:

- `app/main.py`

CSRF protection

- Hidden CSRF token added to form POST flows.
- Double-submit verification for browser forms.
- `X-CSRF-Token` enforcement for state-changing API routes.

Files:

- `app/services/security.py`
- `app/main.py`
- `app/templates/login.html`
- `app/templates/organizer.html`
- `app/templates/attendee.html`

Rate limiting and login logout

- In-memory IP-based rate limiter on login, attendee create, intros, feedback, and enrichment flows.
- Organizer account logout window after repeated failures.
- Added attendee account logout window after repeated failures.

Files:

- `app/services/security.py`

- `app/main.py`

SSRF protections

- Only `https` allowed.
- Hostname validation and resolution.
- Blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved/multicast targets.
- Redirect hops are validated and bounded.
- HTML response size is bounded to prevent memory abuse.
- LinkedIn enrichment allows only `linkedin.com` profile URLs (`/in/...`) and requires attendee opt-in.

Files:

- `app/services/external_enrichment.py`

Security headers and host/https controls

- Added CSP and baseline hardening headers.
- Optional `TrustedHostMiddleware` via `ALLOWED_HOSTS`.
- Optional `HTTPSRedirectMiddleware` via `FORCE_HTTPS`.

Files:

- `app/main.py`

Container/runtime hardening

- Added Docker image running as non-root user.
- Added container health checks via `/health`.
- Added deployment env template to enforce secure defaults in production.

Files:

- `Dockerfile`
- `docker-compose.yml`
- `.env.example`

Audit logging

- Added `AuditLog` table.
- Logs login outcomes, feedback writes, intro actions, attendee creation, enrichment attempts, and exports.
- Added organizer audit view.

Files:

- `app/models.py` (`AuditLog`)
- `app/services/audit.py`
- `app/main.py`

- `app/templates/organizer_audit.html`

5) Environment and Security Configuration

- `AUTH_SECRET`
- `COOKIE_SECURE`
- `FORCE_HTTPS`
- `ALLOWED_HOSTS`
- `ORGANIZER_EMAIL`
- `ORGANIZER_PASSWORD`
- `ATTENDEE_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD`
- `APP_ENV`
- `DATABASE_URL`
- `PASSWORD_ITERATIONS`
- `TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS`
- `LOCKOUT_SECONDS`

6) Validation Performed

- Existing tests still pass (6 passed).
- Verified:
 - unauthenticated API access is denied,
 - role restrictions are enforced,
 - CSRF-protected form requests fail without token,
 - API state changes require CSRF header,
 - security headers are present,
 - audit page is accessible to organizer role,
 - attendee login uses per-attendee passcode pattern (`attendee123-<id>`),
 - feedback tampering across attendee match scopes is blocked.

7) Residual Risk and Next Actions

Current hardening is strong for MVP/demo, but still not full enterprise production. Priority next actions:

1. Replace in-memory rate limiter with Redis/distributed limit service.
2. Add enterprise SSO + MFA and remove static attendee passcode model.
3. Add database migrations/versioning for security schema changes.
4. Add structured audit export to SIEM and alerting.
5. Add automated security test suite (DAST/SAST + dependency scanning).