

Towards a formal foundation of trading in financial markets

Suneel Sarswat

Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, India

suneel.sarswat@gmail.com

Abhishek Kr Singh

Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, India

abhishek.uor@gmail.com

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a formal framework for analyzing trades in financial markets. An exchange in financial markets is a venue where multiple buyers and sellers participate to trade. Today all big exchanges use computer algorithms to match these buy and sell requests. The mechanism used by these algorithms to match multiple buyers with multiple sellers simultaneously is known as double sided auction mechanism. An exchange which uses these algorithms must abide by certain regulatory guidelines. For example, market regulators enforce that a matching produced by exchanges should be fair, uniform and individually rational. To verify these properties of trades we formally define these notions in a theorem prover. In this formal setting, we prove some useful results on matchings in double sided auctions. Finally, we use this framework to verify properties of two important classes of double sided auction mechanisms. All the definitions and results present in this paper are completely formalized in the Coq proof assistant without adding any axiom to it.

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1 Introduction

Trading is a principal component of all modern economies. Over the century more and more complex instruments are being introduced to trade in the financial markets. All big stock exchanges use computer algorithms to match buy requests (demands) with sell requests (supplies) of traders. Computer algorithms are also used by traders to place orders in the markets.¹ With the arrival of computer assisted trading, the volume and liquidity in the markets have increased drastically. As a result of this the markets have become more complex.

Softwares which enable this whole process are extremely complex and have to meet high efficiency criterion because of the massive data on which they operate in real time. Furthermore, to increase the confidence of traders in the market, the market regulators set stringent safety and fairness guidelines for these softwares. Traditional way of developing these software extensively rely on testing them on large data sets. Although testing is helpful in identifying bugs, it cannot guarantee the absence of bugs in these software. Even small bugs in these softwares can have catastrophic effect on the overall economy of the markets. An adversary can exploit these bugs to his benefit outpacing other genuine traders in the market. These events are certainly undesirable in any healthy economy.

¹ This is known as algorithmic trading.



In the recent past there have been various instances [1, 2, 3] of violation of the trading rules by the stock exchanges. For example, in [1], regulator noted that "NYSE Arca failed to execute a certain type of limit order under specified market conditions despite having a rule in effect that stated that NYSE Arca would execute such orders". At a fundamental level this is an example where a program does not meet its specification. Here the program is matching algorithm used by the exchange and the regulatory guidelines are broad specifications for the program. Note that in most of the cases these guidelines stated by regulators are not a complete specification for these softwares. Moreover, there is no formal guarantee that these guidelines are consistent with each other. These are some serious software related issues which can adversely affect the safety and integrity of the markets.

Recent advances in formal methods from computer science can be put to good use in ensuring a safe and fair financial markets. During the last few decades formal method tools have been increasingly successful in proving the correctness of large software and hardware systems [7, 5]. While Model checking tools have been used for the verification of hardware, the use of Interactive theorem provers have been quite successful in the verification of large softwares [10, 9]. A formal verification of financial algorithms using these tools can be helpful in the rigorous analysis of market behaviour at large. The matching algorithms used by the venues (exchanges) are at the core of the broad spectrum of algorithms used in financial markets. A formal verification of these algorithms will provide a formal foundation on which the verification of the other financial algorithms can be based.

1.1 An overview of trading at exchange

An exchange is an organized financial market. There are various types of exchanges for example stock exchange, commodity exchange, foreign exchange etc. The job of an exchange is to facilitate trading between buyers and sellers for the products which are registered at the exchange. A potential trader (buyer or seller) places orders in the markets for a certain product. These orders are matched by the stock exchange to execute trades. Most stock exchanges hold trading into two main sessions; pre-market (or auction session), continuous market (or regular trading session).

The pre-market session reduces uncertainty and volatility for the regular sessions of trading by discovering the opening price of the product. During the pre-market session an exchange collects all the buy requests (bids) and sell requests (asks) for a fixed duration. At the end of this duration the exchange matches these buy and sell requests at a single price using a matching algorithm. In the continuous market session the incoming buyers and sellers are continuously matched against each other on a priority basis. An incoming bid (ask) is immediately matched against the existing asks (bids). If the bid (ask) is not matchable, it is placed in a priority queue. A trader can place multiple quantity to trade during both the sessions. However, for the analysis of the markets it is helpful to assume a bid or an ask is an order to buy or sell a single unit of the item. A multiple quantity order can always be treated as a bunch of orders each with single quantity. Note that at any moment in both the sessions there are possibly multiple bids as well as multiple asks present to be matched against each other. A mechanism that allows multiple buyers and sellers to trade simultaneously is called double sided auction [6].

In double sided auctions, an auctioneer (e.g. exchanges) collects buy and sell requests over a period of time. Each potential trader places the orders with a limit price: below which a seller will not sell and above which a buyer will not buy. The exchange at the end of this time period matches these orders based on their limit prices. This entire process is completed using a double sided auction matching algorithm. Designing algorithms for double sided

90 auctions is a well studied topic [11, 14, 12].

91 A major emphasis of many of these studies have been to either maximize the number
 92 of matches or maximize the profit of the auctioneer. In the auction theory literature the
 93 profit of an auctioneer is defined as the difference between the limit prices of matched bid-ask
 94 pair. However, most exchanges today earn their profit by charging a transaction cost per
 95 trade to the traders. Therefore, maximizing the number of matches increases the profit of
 96 the exchange as well as the liquidity in the markets. There are other important properties
 97 besides the number of matches which are considered while evaluating the effectiveness of a
 98 matching algorithm. However, it is known that no single algorithm can possess all of these
 99 properties simultaneously [14, 11].

100 1.2 Our contribution

101 In this work we formally define various notions from auction theory relevant for the analysis
 102 of trades in financial markets. We define notions like bids, asks and matching in the Coq
 103 proof assistant. The dependent types of Coq turns out to be very useful in giving concise
 104 representation to these notions, which is also close to their natural definitions. After preparing
 105 the basic infrastructure, we define important properties of matching in a double sided auction.
 106 These properties reflect various regulatory guidelines for trading. Furthermore, we prove
 107 some results on the existence of various combinations of these properties. These results can
 108 also be interpreted as consistency proofs for various subsets of regulatory guidelines. We
 109 prove all these results in the constructive setting of the Coq proof assistant without adding
 110 any axiom to it. These proofs are completed using computable functions which computes
 111 the actual instances (certificate). We also use computable functions to represent various
 112 predicates on the lists. Finally we use this setting to verify properties of two important
 113 classes of matching algorithms; dynamic price and uniform price algorithms.

114 In Section 2 we formally define the theory of double sided auctions. In Section 3 we define
 115 and prove some important properties of matching algorithms in double sided auctions. In
 116 particular we present a dynamic price matching algorithm which produces a maximum as well
 117 as a fair matching. In Section 3.3 we describe a uniform price matching algorithm used for
 118 price discovery in financial markets. Moreover, we prove that it produces a matching which
 119 is maximal among all possible uniform matchings. We summarize the work in Section 5 with
 120 an overview of related work in Section 4. The Coq formalization for this paper is available at
 121 [4].

122 2 Modeling double sided auctions

123 An auction is a competitive event, where goods and services are sold to the most competitive
 124 participants. The priority among participating traders is decided by various attributes of
 125 the bids and asks (e.g. price, time etc). This priority can be finally represented by ordering
 126 them in a sequence. Sequences are best represented using the list data structure in the Coq
 127 standard library [].

128 2.1 Bid, Ask and limit price

129 In any double sided auction multiple buyers and sellers place their orders to buy or sell a
 130 unit of underlying product. The auctioneer matches these buy-sell requests based on their
 131 *limit prices*. While the limit price for a buy order (i.e. *bid*) is the price above which the
 132 buyer doesn't want to buy one quantity of the item, the limit price of a sell order (i.e. *ask*)

133 is the price below which the seller doesn't want to sell one quantity of the item. If a trader
 134 wishes to buy or sell multiple units, he can create multiple bids or asks with different *ids*.

135 We can express bids as well asks using records containing two fields.

```
136 Record Bid: Type := Mk_bid { bp:> nat;    idb: nat }.
137 Record Ask: Type := Mk_ask { sp:> nat;    ida: nat }.
```

138 For a bid b , $(bp\ b)$ is the limit price and $(idb\ b)$ is its unique identifier. Similarly for an
 139 ask a , $(sp\ a)$ is the limit price and $(ida\ a)$ is the unique identifier of a . Note that the limit
 140 prices are natural numbers because it can be represented as multiples of monetary unit. Also
 141 note the use of coercion symbol $:>$ in the first field of *Bid*. It declares bp as an implicit
 142 function which is applied to any term of type *Bid* appearing in a context where a natural
 143 number is expected. Hence from now on we can simply use b instead of $(bp\ b)$ to express the
 144 limit price of b . Similarly we can use a for the limit price of an ask a .


145 Since equality for both the fields of *Bid* as well as *Ask* is decidable (i.e. $\text{nat} : \text{eqType}$),
 146 the equality on *Bid* as well as *Ask* can also be proved decidable. This is achieved by declaring
 147 two canonical instances bid_eqType and ask_eqType which connect *Bid* and *Ask* to the
 148 eqType .

149 2.2 Matching in Double Sided Auctions

150 All the buy and sell requests can be assumed to be present in a list B and list A respectively.
 151 At the time of auction, the auctioneer matches bids in B against asks in A . We say a bid-ask
 152 pair (b, a) is *matchable* if $b \geq a$ (i.e. $bp\ b \geq sp\ a$). Furthermore, the auctioneer assigns a trade
 153 price to each matched bid-ask pair. This process results in a matching M , which consists of
 154 all the matched bid-ask pairs together with their trade prices. We define matching as a list
 155 whose entries are of type fill_type .

```
156 Record fill_type: Type:= Mk_fill {bid_of: Bid; ask_of: Ask; tp: nat}
```

157 In a matching M , a bid or an ask appears at most once. Note that there might be some
 158 bids in B which are not matched to any ask in M . Similarly there might be some asks in A
 159 which are not matched to any bid in M . The list of bids present in M is denoted as B_M and
 160 the list of asks present in M is denoted as A_M . For example, Fig. 1 shows a matching M
 161 between list of bids B and list of asks A . Note that the bid with limit price 37 is not present
 162 in B_M since it is not matched to any ask in M .




■ **Figure 1** Bids in B and asks in A are represented using right and left brackets respectively along with their limit prices. Every matched bid-ask pair in M is shown using brackets of same colors. Bids with limit prices 37, 83 and 120 are not matched to any ask in the matching M .

More precisely, for a given list of bids B and list of asks A , M is a matching iff, (1) All the bid-ask pairs in M are matchable, (2) B_M is duplicate-free, (3) A_M is duplicate-free, (4) $B_M \subseteq B$, and (5) $A_M \subseteq A$.

► **Definition 1.** $\text{matching_in } B \ A \ M := \text{All_matchable } M \wedge \text{NoDup } B_M \wedge \text{NoDup } A_M \wedge B_M \subseteq B \wedge A_M \subseteq A$.

The term $\text{NoDup } B_M$ in the above definition indicates that each bid is a request to trade one unit of item and the items are indivisible. We use the expression $B_M \subseteq B$ to denote the term $(\text{Subset } B_M \ B)$. It expresses the fact that each element in the list B_M is also present in the list B . While the predicates NoDup and Subset are sufficient to express the notion of a matching, we need more definitions to describe the properties of matching in double sided auctions. In Fig 2 we describe three binary relations on lists namely **sublist**, **included** and **perm** which are useful in stating some intermediate lemmas leading to important results on matching. For example, consider the following lemma which states that the property of being a matching is invariant over permutation.

► **Lemma 2.** $\text{match_inv: } \text{perm } M \ M' \rightarrow \text{perm } B \ B' \rightarrow \text{perm } A \ A' \rightarrow \text{matching_in } B \ A \ M \rightarrow \text{matching_in } B' \ A' \ M'$.



■ **Figure 2** The dotted lines between the entries of lists confirm the presence of these entries in both the lists. (a) If L_1 is **sublist** of L_2 then every entry of L_1 is also present in L_2 and they appear in the same succession. (b) A list L_1 is **included** in L_2 if every entry in L_1 is also present in L_2 . (c) Two lists L_1 and L_2 are permutation of each other if each entry has same number of occurrences in both L_1 and L_2 .

Note that the notion of permutation for lists is analogous to the equality in multisets. More precisely we have following lemmas specifying the **perm** relation.

► **Lemma 3.** $\text{perm_intro: } (\forall a, \text{count } a \ l = \text{count } a \ s) \rightarrow \text{perm } l \ s$.

► **Lemma 4.** $\text{perm_elim: } \text{perm } l \ s \rightarrow (\forall a, \text{count } a \ l = \text{count } a \ s)$.

The term $(\text{count } a \ l)$ in Lemma 3 represents the number of occurrences of element a in the list l . In proving various properties of a matching M we very often base our arguments solely on the information present in B_M , A_M and P_M . Therefore it is useful to have lemmas establishing the interaction of B_M , A_M and P_M with above mentioned relations on lists.

► **Lemma 5.** $\text{included_M_imp_included_bids: included } M \ M' \rightarrow \text{included } B_M \ B_{M'}$.

► **Lemma 6.** $\text{included_M_imp_included_asks: included } M \ M' \rightarrow \text{included } A_M \ A_{M'}$.

The notion of included in above lemmas is similar to subset relation on multisets. We have following lemmas specifying the exact behaviour of **included** relation.

192 ► **Lemma 7.** *included_intro:* $(\forall a, \text{count } a \ l \leq \text{count } a \ s) \rightarrow \text{included } l \ s$.

193 ► **Lemma 8.** *included_elim:* $\text{included } l \ s \rightarrow (\forall a, \text{count } a \ l \leq \text{count } a \ s)$.

194 In this work we come across various processes whose input and output are lists. We need
 195 the **sublist** relation, which is similar to the subsequence relation, to properly specify the
 196 behaviour of these processes.


197 ► **Lemma 9.** *sublist_intro1* $(a:T): \text{sublist } l \ s \rightarrow \text{sublist } l \ (a::s)$.

198 ► **Lemma 10.** *sublist_elim3a* $(a \ e:T): \text{sublist } (a::l)(e::s) \rightarrow \text{sublist } l \ s$.

199 Note the recursive nature of **sublist** as evident in Lemma 10. It makes inductive
 200 reasoning easier for the statements which contain **sublist** in the antecedent. However, this
 201 is not true for the other relations (i.e. **included** and **perm**).

202 3 Analysis of Double sided auctions

203 In this work we do not consider analysis of profit for the auctioneer. Therefore the buyer
 204 of a matched bid-ask pair pays the same amount which the seller receives. This price for a
 205 matched bid-ask pair is called the trade price for that pair. Since the limit price for a buyer
 206 is the price above which she doesn't want to buy, the trade price for this buyer is expected
 207 to be below its limit price. Similarly the trade price for the seller is expected to be above its
 208 limit price. Therefore in any matching it is desired that the trade price of a bid-ask pair
 209 lies between their limit prices. A matching which has this property is called an *individual*
 210 *rational (IR)* matching. Note that any matching can be converted to an IR matching without
 211 altering its bid-ask pair (See Fig 3).




■ **Figure 3** The colored dots represent the trade prices at which the corresponding matched bid-ask pairs are traded. While the matching M_2 is not IR since some dots lie outside the corresponding matched bid ask-pair. The matching M_1 is IR because trade prices for every matched bid-ask pair lie inside the interval. Note that the matching M_1 and M_2 contains exactly the same bid-ask pairs.

212 The number of matched bid-ask pairs produced by a matching algorithm is crucial in
 213 the design of a double sided auction mechanism. Increasing the number of matched bid-ask
 214 pairs increases liquidity in the market. Therefore, producing a maximum matching is an
 215 important aspect of double sided auction mechanism design. For a given list of bids B and
 216 list of asks A we say a matching M is a maximum matching if no other matching M' on the
 217 same B and A contains more matched bid-ask pairs than M .

218 ► **Definition 11.** $Is_MM \ M \ B \ A := (\text{matching_in } B \ A \ M) \wedge (\forall M', \text{matching_in } B \ A \ M' \rightarrow |M'| \leq |M|)$.

220 In certain situations, to produce a maximum matching, different bid-ask pairs must be
 221 assigned different trade prices (Fig 4). However, different prices for the same product in
 222 the same market simultaneously leads to dissatisfaction amongst some of the traders. A
 223 mechanism which clears all the matched bid-ask pairs at same trade price is called a *uniform*
 224 *matching*. It is also known as *perceived-fairness*.



■ **Figure 4** In this case the only individually rational matching of size two it is not uniform.

3.1 Fairness

A bid with higher limit price is more competitive compared to bids with lower limit prices. Similarly an ask with lower limit price is more competitive compared to asks with higher limit prices. In a competitive market more competitive traders are prioritised for matching. A matching which prioritises more competitive traders is called a *fair* matching.

► **Definition 12.** $fair_on_bids\ M\ B := \forall\ b\ b',\ In\ b\ B \wedge In\ b'\ B \rightarrow b > b' \rightarrow In\ b'\ B_M \rightarrow In\ b\ B_M.$

► **Definition 13.** $fair_on_asks\ M\ A := \forall\ s\ s',\ In\ s\ A \wedge In\ s'\ A \rightarrow s < s' \rightarrow In\ s'\ A_M \rightarrow In\ s\ A_M.$

► **Definition 14.** $Is_fair\ M\ B\ A := fair_on_asks\ M\ A \wedge fair_on_bids\ M\ B.$

Here, the predicate $fair_on_bids\ M\ B$ states that the matching M is fair for the list of buyers B . Similarly, the predicate $fair_on_asks\ M\ A$ states that the matching M is fair for the list of sellers A . A matching which is fair on bids as well as ask is expressed using the predicate $Is_fair\ M\ B\ A$.

Unlike the uniform matching, a fair matching can always be achieved without compromising the size of matching. We can accomplish this by converting any matching into a fair matching without changing its size. For example, consider the following function `make_FOB`.

```

242 Fixpoint Make_FOB (M:list fill_type) (B: list Bid):=
243   match (M,B) with
244   | (nil,_) => nil
245   | (m::M',nil) => nil
246   | (m::M',b::B') => (Mk_fill b (ask_of m) (tp m))::(Make_FOB M' B')
247 end.
```


The function `make_FOB` produces a $fair_on_bids$ matching from a given matching M and a list of bids B , both sorted in decreasing order of bid prices (See Fig 5). Note that `make_FOB` doesn't change any of the ask in M and due to the recursive nature of `make_FOB` on B , a bid is not repeated in the process of replacement. Hence the new B_M is duplicate-free. Once we get a fair matching on bids, we use similar function `make_FOA` to produce a fair matching.

More precisely, for the function `make_FOB` and `make_FOA` we have the following lemmas proving it fair on bids and fair on asks respectively.

► **Lemma 15.** $mfob_fair_on_bid\ M\ B: (Sorted\ M) \rightarrow (Sorted\ B) \rightarrow sublist\ P_{B_M}\ P_B \rightarrow fair_on_bids\ (Make_FOB\ M\ B)\ B.$

► **Lemma 16.** $mfob_fair_on_ask\ M\ A: (Sorted\ M) \rightarrow (Sorted\ A) \rightarrow sublist\ P_{A_M}\ P_A \rightarrow fair_on_asks\ (Make_FOA\ M\ A)\ A.$

► **Theorem 17.** $exists_fair_matching\ (Nb: NoDup\ B)(Na: NoDup\ A): matching_in\ B\ A\ M \rightarrow (\exists\ M', matching_in\ B\ A\ M' \wedge Is_fair\ M'\ B\ A \wedge |M| = |M'|).$




■ **Figure 5** The dotted lines in this figure represent matched bid-ask pairs in matching M_1 , M_2 and M_3 . In the first step function `make_FOB` operates on M_1 recursively. At each step it picks the top bid-ask pair, say (b, a) in M_1 and replaces the bid b with a most competitive bid available in B . The result of this process is a `fair_on_bids` matching M_2 . In a similar way the function `make_FOA` changes M_2 into a fair on ask matching M_3 .

262 Proof of Theorem 17 depends on Lemma 16 and Lemma 15. Furthermore, Lemma 16
263 and Lemma 15 can be proved using induction on the size of M .

264 3.2 Maximum Matching

265 The liquidity in any market is a measure of how quickly one can trade in the market without
266 much cost. One way to increase the liquidity is to maximize the number of matched bid-ask
267 pairs. In the previous section we have seen that any matching can be changed to a fair
268 matching without altering its size. Therefore, we can have a maximum matching without
269 compromising on the fairness of the matching. In this section we describe a matching which
270 is fair as well as maximal. For a given list of bid B and list of ask A , a maximum and fair
271 matching can be achieved in two steps. In the first step we apply function `produce_MM` which
272 produces a matching which is maximal and fair on bids. In the next step we apply `make_FOA`
273 to this maximum matching to produce a fair matching (See Fig 6).



■ **Figure 6** In the first step, the function `produce_MM` operates recursively on the list of bids B and list of asks A . At each iteration `produce_MM` selects a most competitive available bid and then pairs it with the largest matchable ask. The output of this function is fair on bids since it doesn't leave any bid from top. In the second step, the function `make_FOA` converts M_1 into fair matching M_2 .

```
274 Fixpoint produce_MM (B:list Bid) (A: list Ask): (list fill_type) :=
275   match (B, A) with
276   | (nil, _) => nil
277   | (b::B', nil) => nil
278   | (b::B', a::A') => match (a <= b) with
279     | true => ({|bid_of:= b; ask_of:= a; tp:=(bp b)|})::(produce_MM B' A')
```



```

280     |false => produce_MM B A'
281   end
282 end.

```

At each iteration `produce_MM` generates a matchable bid-ask pair (See Fig 6). Due to the recursive nature of function `produce_MM` on both B and A , it never pairs any bid with more than one asks. This ensures that the list of bids in matching (i.e. B_M) is duplicate-free. Note that `produce_MM` tries to match a bid until it finds a matchable ask. The function terminates when either all the bids are matched or it encounters a bid for which no matchable ask is available. Therefore, the function `produce_MM` produces a matching from a given lists of bids B and a list of asks A , both sorted in decreasing order by their limit prices. The following theorem states that the function `produce_MM` produces a maximum matching when both B and A are sorted in decreasing order by limit prices.

► **Theorem 18.** *`produce_MM_is_MM(Nb:NoDup B) (Na:NoDup A): Sorted B -> Sorted A -> Is_MM (produce_MM B A) B A.`*

Proof: We prove this result using induction on the size of list A .

■ Induction hypothesis (IH): $\forall A', |A'| < |A| \rightarrow \forall B, \text{Sorted } B \rightarrow \text{Sorted } A' \rightarrow \text{Is_MM}(\text{produce_MM } B \ A') \ B \ A'.$

Let M be an arbitrary matching on the list of bids B and list of asks A . Moreover, assume that b and a are the topmost bid and ask present in B and A respectively (i.e. $A = (a :: A')$ and $B = (b :: B')$). We prove $|M| \leq |\text{produce_MM } B \ A|$ in the following two cases.

■ **Case-1** ($b < a$): In this case the limit price of a is strictly more than the limit price of b . In this case the function `produce_MM` computes a matching on B and A' . Note that due to the induction hypotheses (i.e. IH) this is a maximum matching for B and A' . Since the limit price of ask a is more than the most competitive bid b in B it cannot be present in any matching of B and A . Therefore a maximum matching on B and A' is also a maximum matching on B and A . Hence we have $|M| \leq |\text{produce_MM } B \ A|$.


■ **Case-2** ($a \leq b$): In this case `produce_MM` produces a matching of size $m + 1$ where m is the size of matching `produce_MM B' A'`. We need to prove that $|M| \leq m + 1$. Note that due to induction hypothesis (i.e. IH) the matching `produce_MM B' A'` is a maximum matching on B' and A' . Hence no matching on B' and A' can have size bigger than m . Without loss of generality we can assume that M is also sorted in decreasing order of bid prices. Now we further split this case into the following five sub cases (see Fig 7).

■ **Case-2A** ($M = (b, a) :: M'$): In this case bid b is matched to ask a in the matching M (see Fig 7 (a)). Note that M' is a matching on B' and A' . Since $|M'| \leq m$ we have $|M| = |M'| + 1 \leq m + 1$.

■ **Case-2B** ($b \notin B_M \wedge a \notin A_M$): In this case neither bid b nor ask a is present in matching M (see Fig 7 (b)). Therefore M is a matching on B' and A' . Hence we have $|M| \leq m < m + 1$.

■ **Case-2C** ($(b, a') \in M \wedge (b', a) \in M$): In this case we have $(b, a') \in M$ and $(b', a) \in M$ where $a' \in A'$ and $b' \in B'$. We can obtain another matching M_1 of same size as M (see Fig 7 (c)) where $(b, a) \in M_1$ and $(b', a') \in M_1$. Note that all other entries of M_1 is same as M . Therefore we have $M_1 = (b, a) :: M'$ where M' is a matching on B' and A' . Since $|M'| \leq m$ we have $|M| = |M_1| \leq m + 1$.

■ **Case-2D**: ($(b, a') \in M \wedge a \notin A_M$): In this case we have $(b, a') \in M$ and $a \notin A_M$ where $a' \in A'$. We can obtain another matching M_1 of same size as M (see Fig 7 (d)) where $(b, a) \in M_1$. Therefore we have $M_1 = (b, a) :: M'$ where M' is a matching on B' and A' . Since $|M'| \leq m$ we have $|M| = |M_1| \leq m + 1$.



■ **Figure 7** This figure shows all the five sub cases of Case-2 (i.e. when $b \geq a$). The dotted line shows presence of the connected pair in matching M . Both the list of bids B and list of asks A are sorted in decreasing order of their limit prices. Moreover, we assume $B = b :: B'$ and $A = a :: A'$.

- **Case-2E:** $(b', a) \in M \wedge b \notin B_M$: In this case we have $(b', a) \in M$ and $b \notin B_M$ where $b' \in B'$. We can obtain another matching M_1 of same size as M (see Fig 7 (e)) where $(b, a) \in M_1$. Therefore we have $M_1 = (b, a) :: M'$ where M' is a matching on B' and A' . Since $|M'| \leq m$ we have $|M| = |M_1| \leq m + 1$.

Note that all the cases in the above proof correspond to predicates which can be expressed using only the membership predicate on lists. Since we have decidable equality on the elements of the lists all these predicates are also decidable. Hence, we can do case analysis on them without assuming any axiom. \square

Now that we proved the maximality property of `produce_MM` we can produce a fair as well as maximal matching by applying the functions `Make_FOA` and `Make_FOB` to the output of `produce_MM`. More precisely, for a given list of bids B and list of asks A , we have following result stating that there exists a matching which is both maximal and fair.

► **Theorem 19.** *exists_fair_maximum* (B : list Bid) (A : list Ask): $\exists M, (Is_fair\ M\ B\ A \wedge Is_MM\ M\ B\ A)$.

3.3 Matching in financial markets

An important aspects of the pre-market session is to discover a unique price (equilibrium price) at which maximum demand and supply can be matched. Most exchanges execute trade during this session at an equilibrium price. Consider the function `UM` which produces an individually rational matching which is fair and maximal among all uniform matchings.

```

346 Fixpoint produce_UM (B:list Bid) (A:list Ask) :=
347   match (B,A) with
348   | (nil, _) => nil
349   | (_, nil) => nil
350   | (b::B', a::A') => match (a <= b) with
351   | false => nil
352   | true  => ({|bid_of:= b; ask_of:= a; tp:=(bp b)|}):produce_UM B' A'
353   end
354 end.
```


```

355 Definition uniform_price B A := bp (bid_of (last (produce_UM B A))).
356 Definition UM B A:= replace_column (produce_UM B A) (uniform_price B A).

```


357 The function `produce_UM` produces bid-ask pairs, `uniform_price` computes the uniform
 358 price and finally `UM` produces a uniform matching. The function `produce_UM` is recursive
 359 and matches the largest available bid in B with the smallest available ask in A at each
 360 iteration (See Fig 8). This function terminates when the most competitive bid available
 361 in B is not matchable with any available ask in A . The following theorem states that the
 362 function `produce_UM` produces a maximal matching among all uniform matchings when the
 363 list of bids B is sorted in decreasing order by limit prices and the list of asks A is sorted in
 364 increasing order by limit price.

365 ► **Theorem 20.** *UM_is_maximal_Uniform* (B : list Bid) (A : list Ask): Sorted $B \rightarrow$
 366 Sorted $A \rightarrow \forall M$: list fill_type, Is_uniform $M \rightarrow |M| \leq |(UM\ B\ A)|$



■ **Figure 8** (a) The dotted lines indicate all the bid-ask pair produced by function `produce_UM`. In
 each iteration function `produce_UM` matches the largest available bid in B with the smallest available
 ask in A . (b) The dotted lines here indicate a maximum matching for the list of bids B and list of
 asks A . Note that in this case the matching produced by `UM` is not a maximum matching.

367 **Proof:** Let M be any arbitrary IR and uniform matching on the list of bids B and list
 368 of asks A where each matched bid-ask pair is traded at price t . We need to prove that $m \leq$
 369 $|(UM\ B\ A)|$ where m is the number of matched bid-ask pairs in the matching M . Observe
 370 that in any individually rational and uniform matching the number of bids above the trade
 371 price is same as the number of asks below the trade price (See Fig 9). Therefore, there are
 372 at least m bids above t and m asks below t in B and A respectively.



■ **Figure 9** Trade price p for the matching M is shown using a dot that lies between the ask with
 limit price 90 and bid with limit price 91. Note that since M is individually rational the number of
 matched asks below the trade price p is same as number of matched bids above the trade price p .

373 Since at each step the function `produce_UM` pairs the largest bid available in B with the
 374 smallest ask available in A it must produce at least m bid-ask pairs. Hence for the list of
 375 bids B and list of asks A the function `UM` produces a uniform matching which is of size at
 376 least m . \square

377 4 Related work

378 There are very few works towards formalizing financial markets. Passmore et al. in [13]
 379 highlights the significance, opportunities and challenges involved in formalizing financial
 380 markets. This work describes in great detail the whole spectrum of the financial algorithms
 381 to be verified for ensuring safe and fair markets. Matching algorithms used by exchanges are
 382 at the core of this whole spectrum. However, there are no work known to us which formalizes
 383 financial algorithms used by the exchanges.

384 On the other hand there are quite a few works [8] formalizing various concepts from
 385 auction theory. Most of these works focus on the Vickrey auction mechanism. In Vickrey
 386 auction, there is a single seller with different items and multiple buyers with valuations for
 387 every subsets of items. Each buyer places bids for combinations of the items. At the end
 388 of the bidding, the seller divides the items to buyers. The aim if the seller is to compute a
 389 partition of the items which maximizes his profit.

390 5 Conclusion

391 Trading activities in today's financial markets are mostly enabled using computer algorithms.
 392 These algorithms are extremely large and complex. Matching algorithms used by venues
 393 (exchanges) are at the core of this broad range of financial algorithms [13]. To ensure safety
 394 and integrity in the markets, the market regulators introduce guidelines specifying different
 395 features for these algorithms. Traditional methods of software development, which focus on
 396 testing, can't guarantee that these softwares meet the guidelines.

397 In this work we develop a formal framework to verify some important properties of the
 398 matching algorithms used by venues. These algorithms use double sided auction mechanism
 399 to match multiple buyers with multiple sellers during different sessions of trading. We
 400 use the dependent types of Coq proof assistant to concisely represent various notions from
 401 auction theory relevant for the verification of these algorithms. We formally verify two
 402 important classes of double sided auction mechanism (uniform price and dynamic price) in
 403 this framework.

404 In this work, we define each bid or ask as a request to trade a single unit of product and
 405 the product is indivisible. In the future this work can be extended to accommodate trades
 406 involving multiple units of an item by introducing proper functions to generate bids and
 407 asks from the buy and sell requests of multiple units. Another interesting direction of work
 408 is to extend this work for different type of orders (e.g. limit orders, market orders, stoploss
 409 orders, iceberg orders etc) in continuous markets. It would require maintaining a priority
 410 queue based on the various attributes of these orders. A formal verifications of trading at
 411 exchange will provide a formal foundation that can be used for rigorous analysis of other
 412 financial algorithms (e.g. order routing, clearing and settlements etc).

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