

Schumpeterian Competition in a Lucas Economy

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Abstract

the effect of competition on innovation and its macro/finance consequences (AE) theoretically examines competition distorts optimal innovation policies and impacts asset pricing dynamics (Referee) We model a market penetration game where agents compete for claims to a consumption stream. We characterize how creative destruction affects risk, wealth, and prices. Competition not only imposes excessive disruption risk on existing assets and higher technological uncertainty, it also increases the duration of the consumption stream (the weighted-average maturity of wealth). Because of hedging motives, a complementarity between wealth duration and technological uncertainty decreases systematic risk. If competition is sufficiently intense, a negative risk premium may arise. The model generates price paths consistent with boom-bust patterns and transient episodes of negative expected excess returns. We discuss the implications of competition for income inequality.

Keywords: Schumpeterian Competition; Experimentation; Creative Destruction; Return Predictability; Income Inequality.

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1 Introduction

We characterize the effect of Schumpeterian competition on the aggregate consumption stream in a standard Lucas endowment economy. When paradigm shifts occur, agents fight for market share, which is a claim to both current and future cash flows, and includes real options such as the option to expand, flexibility, and synergies. We investigate the consequences that this type of market penetration has for the structure of the consumption stream and for risk in the economy.

Surely, aggregate consumption changes when innovation arises and agents compete for monopoly rents. The relationship between creative destruction and rent-seeking has been studied in a variety of contexts (e.g., [Reinganum, 1983](#); [Aghion and Howitt, 1992](#); [Baye and Hoppe, 2003](#)).¹ Though, it still remains unclear whether creative destruction is socially beneficial (e.g., [Witt, 1996](#); [Aghion, Akcigit, Bergeaud, Blundell, and Hémous, 2015](#); [Komlos, 2014](#)), and whether it worsens income inequality (e.g., [Jones and Kim, 2018](#)).

But, risk is also an important consideration during a paradigm shift. The expected value and variance of future consumption may change because the fate of existing assets becomes uncertain. Some assets face disruption risk, while others enjoy new growth options and complementarities. Beyond the technological uncertainty associated with innovation, creative destruction involves spillovers and irreversible changes in systematic risk ([Pastor and Veronesi, 2009](#)).

We study a Tullock contest ([Tullock, 1980](#)) in which agents make simultaneous choices about how much to experiment with a new technology. Agents compete for market share, which is a proportion of an aggregate consumption stream that endogenously results from innovation ([Hirshleifer, 1989](#)). In the model, however, creative destruction by the agents has two effects on the aggregate consumption stream: it changes the growth rate of consumption—hopefully for the better—and it amplifies the magnitude of its diffusion. The former characterizes technological uncertainty and the latter captures disruption risk.

We solve for a first-best benchmark. The socially optimal amount of experimentation results from the classic tradeoff between maximizing the expected value of future

¹See [Kamien and Schwartz \(1975\)](#) for an excellent survey of the literature, and [Kamien and Schwartz \(1982\)](#) and [Nelson and Winter \(2009\)](#) for textbook treatments. See also [Swan \(1970\)](#), [Loury \(1979\)](#), [Futia \(1980\)](#), [Fudenberg and Tirole \(1984\)](#), [Reinganum \(1985\)](#), [D’Aspremont and Jacquemin \(1988\)](#), [Reinganum \(1989\)](#), [Klepper \(1996\)](#), [Witt \(1996\)](#), [Chung \(1996\)](#), [Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt \(2005\)](#), [Carree and Thurik \(2005\)](#), [Boldrin and Levine \(2008\)](#), [Aghion and Griffith \(2008\)](#), [Komlos \(2014\)](#), [Bam-poky, Prieger, Blanco, and Liu \(2016\)](#), [Acemoglu and Restrepo \(2020\)](#), [Akcigit, Grigsby, and Nicholas \(2017\)](#), and [Jones and Kim \(2018\)](#).

consumption and minimizing its future volatility. Naturally, experimentation is higher with less technological uncertainty, a higher expected benefit, lower risk aversion, and less spillover to existing assets through disruption risk.

Rent-seeking competition fundamentally alter this tradeoff and catalyze inefficient investments. When agents fight for a slice of the pie, aggregate experimentation is higher than the social optimum and grows monotonically with competition. But, the agents do not internalize their effect on risk. As such, even though excessive experimentation allows for faster learning about the new technology, it amplifies the impact of technological uncertainty and causes more disruption of existing assets.

I have updated the introduction starting from this paragraph until the end

Disruption risk permanently increases both the equilibrium stock market volatility and the risk premium, and competition amplifies this. However, technological uncertainty has a negative and dynamic effect on volatility and the risk premium. This arises in general equilibrium because of an increased negative hedging demand from investors, who insulate themselves against the adverse effect of technological uncertainty.

From the model, we learn that experimentation affects systematic risk by changing the term structure of consumption. The *wealth duration*, which measures the weighted average maturity of the price of a claim to aggregate consumption, describes the risks that investors bear based on the timing of consumption from the dividend stream. Experimentation tends to increase wealth duration, and this amplifies the effect of technological uncertainty and increases investors' hedging motives. This complementarity may even cause the risk premium to be negative. But this effect is transient: as learning progresses and technological uncertainty drops, both systematic risk and the risk premium rise, which is a result of persistent disruption risk.

Higher rent seeking and more competition make the existence of a negative risk premium more likely; this does not arise in the social optimum. To explore the empirical implications of this, we discretize our continuous-time setup, perform simulations of the model at quarterly frequencies, and run predictive regressions. We show that high competition causes the price-dividend ratio to negatively predict future returns. Competition not only lowers predicted expected excess returns, but it may be associated with negative expected excess returns if it is sufficiently intense. Simulating our model, we show that the price-dividend ratio rises with experimentation, but declines sharply as learning occurs. This pattern is consistent with the empirical characterization of booms and busts in Hoberg and Phillips (2020) and the theoretical implications of DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2007).

In extensions of the model, we consider the additional effects of obsolescence, tech-

nological diversification, heterogeneous agents, and recursive preferences. Obsolescence exemplifies an important characteristic of technological innovation, in which new technologies render previous ones obsolete (Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Our analysis suggests that intense competition for technologies that are under stronger threat of becoming obsolete may exacerbate the over-experimentation result obtained in our baseline setup. We also consider the effect of technological diversification (Koren and Tenreyro, 2013). When the introduction of the new technology raises the degree of diversification (thus lowering volatility), agents’ incentive to experiment increase, which amplifies our results.

We further assume the existence of passive agents in our model who do not compete for market share, but are the residual claimants of the consumption stream. We show that the welfare of passive agents decreases monotonically with competition: not only does over-experimentation give less of the pie to residual claimants, but it also causes the value of the consumption stream to decrease. As such, our model implies that creative destruction may worsen income inequality, and that this is more severe with higher competition (e.g., Jones and Kim, 2018). Finally, an extension to a setting with recursive preferences reveals that learning by doing endogenously creates long-run risk in the spirit of Bansal and Yaron (2004). This connects our study with a growing literature initiated by Kung and Schmid (2015) and Kung (2015), who provide equilibrium foundations of long-run risk through innovation and R&D.

Our paper is closest to Pastor and Veronesi (2009). In their model, learning about the new technology takes place with an infinitesimally small consumption stream, so the new technology does not perturb the rest of the economy. Once the new technology becomes sufficiently promising, there is an instantaneous transition in which the new consumption stream displaces the status quo. Prices rise and then fall as risk changes from idiosyncratic to systematic. Our work complements theirs. First, we consider that learning by doing (Arrow, 1962) does disrupt the status quo and there is an observer effect. Second, because of our game-theoretic framework, we can consider the effect of competition on risk, wealth, and prices. Third, both technological uncertainty and systematic risk evolve continuously, so that we can evaluate their effects dynamically. Last, because we model game-theoretic claims to a consumption stream, we can show how the term structure of those claims changes and affects volatility and risk premia.

In a related paper, DeMarzo et al. (2007) develop a model of relative wealth concerns where risky technologies attract excessive investment that can be largely unprofitable, which they argue is consistent with a real investment bubble. In our setting with Schumpeterian competition, excess investment arises in a rent-seeking contest (Tullock, 1980;

Hirshleifer, 1989). Our approach extends the analysis in DeMarzo et al. (2007). First, we establish a novel link between excessive real investment and asset price bubbles. As over-investment magnifies technological uncertainty, it leads to price paths consistent with boom-bust patterns and transient episodes of negative expected excess returns. Second, our model shows how excessive investment may worsen wealth inequality and expose agents who do not actively invest in the new technology to excessive risks.

Our study builds on the seminal contribution of Tullock (1980) and a number of papers that have explored various aspects of rent-seeking competitions.² We contribute to this literature by considering a game in which the aggregate prize changes non-linearly with effort. This is a key aspect of our analysis, whose outcome is that agents over-experiment despite the fact that the aggregate prize decreases, because their incentives are mainly focused on their own share of the prize. Furthermore, because we place the Tullock contest into a general equilibrium asset pricing setting with heterogeneous agents, we can consider the effect of competition on systematic risk, social welfare, and wealth inequality.

Our model relates to stochastic variants of Schumpeterian growth models (Barlevy, 2007; Kung, 2015; Kung and Schmid, 2015), which provide microfoundations for the way innovation impacts economic growth its fluctuations. Our reduced-form model builds on these microfoundations and analyzes the effect of competition and technological uncertainty on risk and asset prices. The dynamics of the model provide a new perspective on how competition may drive secular trends relating to innovation and risk premia. Recent studies have attributed slumping investment and innovation (Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2018) and rising risk premia in equity markets (Corhay, Kung, and Schmid, 2020) to declining competition, an observation that aligns well with the predictions of our model. Finally, through its effect on duration and risk, experimentation changes the term structure of equity claims and implies lower returns for long-duration assets, consistent with a recent literature that studies the risk premia of equity claims with different maturities (Lettau and Wachter, 2007, 2011; Weber, 2018; Van Binsbergen, 2020; Gonçalves, 2021).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 poses the model, characterizes learning and socially optimal experimentation, and contrasts the equilibrium behavior of competitive agents to the social optimum. Section 3 characterizes the risks of Schumpeterian competition and its implications for asset prices and return predictability. Section 4 discusses various extensions of the model. Section 5 concludes. All proofs and additional calculations are in the Appendix.

²See, among many others, D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988); Hirshleifer (1989); Alexeev and Leitzel (1996); Chung (1996); Baye and Hoppe (2003); Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011).

2 Experimentation and Competition

The continuous-time model of this section builds on a pure exchange economy (Lucas, 1978) whose growth is disrupted by the advent of a new technology. We study agents' decision to deploy the new technology and reap the associated rewards. For expositional purposes, we keep the model as simple as possible. We discuss the model's assumptions in Section 4, where we analyze several extensions and alternative specifications.

Consider an economy defined over a continuous-time finite horizon $[0, T]$. In the status quo, the aggregate output in the economy follows the dynamic process

$$\frac{d\delta_t^S}{\delta_t^S} = \bar{f}dt + \sigma dW_t, \quad (1)$$

where \bar{f} and σ are known constants and W_t is a one-dimensional standard Brownian motion. For now, we assume that the economy is populated by one representative agent. Later, we study an economy with multiple agents who compete for shares of the aggregate consumption stream. We also discuss the finite horizon assumption in Section 4.1, where we consider an extension of the model to the infinite horizon case.

The agent has isoelastic preferences over lifetime consumption,

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \frac{c_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} dt \right], \quad (2)$$

where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ is the time discount parameter, and $\mathbb{E}_0[\cdot]$ denotes the expectation under the filtration of the agent, to be defined below.

At time $t = 0$, the agent has the opportunity to allocate resources $X \geq 0$ to an *experimental asset*. This new asset is sufficiently important to affect the entire economy and to change aggregate consumption. The asset employs a new technology that has never been implemented on a large scale before. Its output follows the dynamic process

$$\frac{d\delta_t^E}{\delta_t^E} = \left(g - \frac{k^2\sigma^2}{2}X \right) dt + k\sigma dW_t. \quad (3)$$

The parameter g in the drift of the process (3) is unknown at time $t = 0$ (all the other parameters are known). We refer to the uncertainty about g as *technological uncertainty*. The drift of δ_t^E increases in g and decreases linearly with X ; that is, the expected output growth of the experimental asset has decreasing returns to scale, an assumption that will simplify our theoretical analysis, and that is likely to dampen our main results. Finally,

the parameter $k > 0$ controls the output volatility of the new technology.

The new technology experiences the same shock as the status quo, dW_t . We make this assumption for simplicity of exposition. In Section 4.2, we allow δ_t^E to be driven by an additional shock, uncorrelated to dW_t , which provides technological diversification benefits (Koren and Tenreyro, 2013) and amplifies our results.

The agent commits to an experimentation level X that remains constant thereafter. As such, the agent chooses how far to open Pandora’s box and lives with the consequences. Allocating resources to the new asset has an opportunity cost: if $X > 0$, the consumption stream that results from the old asset grows at a slower pace:

$$\frac{d\delta_t^S}{\delta_t^S} = \left(\bar{f} - \frac{c}{2}X^2 \right) dt + \sigma dW_t. \quad (4)$$

where $c > 0$. One can think of this cost as a displacement cost arising from transferring resources away from the existing asset (Kogan, Papanikolaou, and Stoffman, 2020). This opportunity cost specification is both mathematically convenient and economically relevant: as argued by Lucas (1987) and Barlevy (2004), reducing the growth rate of consumption entails large welfare costs.

If $X = 0$, the economy remains in the status quo and only δ_t^S is consumed. When $X > 0$, the experimental asset produces a new consumer good. Thus, the agent’s decision to allocate resources to a new asset and create a new consumer good embodies Schumpeter’s “*fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion*” (1942, p. 83): it yields a new variety in the aggregate consumption basket, which we define as

$$\delta_t \equiv \delta_t^S (\delta_t^E)^X. \quad (5)$$

This implies the following process for the *aggregate consumption* δ_t :

$$\frac{d\delta_t}{\delta_t} = \left(\bar{f} + \beta X - \frac{c}{2}X^2 \right) dt + \sigma(1 + kX)dW_t, \quad (6)$$

where the parameter β is defined as

$$\beta \equiv g + \frac{1}{2}(2 - k)k\sigma^2. \quad (7)$$

In the new economy, the agent consumes a composite of the status-quo and experimental goods. Replacing the aggregate consumption (5) in (2) yields a Cobb-Douglas/isoelastic

specification commonly encountered in the international economics and finance literature³, where X is interpreted as a taste parameter. A similar interpretation can be made here. Referring to the aggregate consumption basket δ_t as the numéraire and normalizing its price to unity, optimal intratemporal choice implies that $X/(1 + X)$ is the agent's expenditure share on the experimental good (see Appendix A.1).

Investment in the new technology simultaneously affects the drift and diffusion coefficients of aggregate consumption growth. In the new drift coefficient, which becomes $(\bar{f} + \beta X - cX^2/2)$, the parameter $\beta \in \mathbb{R}$ is unknown and encompasses both that innovation can fuel growth when $\beta > cX/2$ and also be destructive when $\beta < cX/2$. Our new economy is thus one in which growth is endogenous and driven by technological change (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Garleanu, Panageas, and Yu, 2012; Kung and Schmid, 2015; Kung, 2015). Importantly, in our model the true value of β is unknown. Thus, the agent does not exclude the possibility that the technology may have negative aggregate effects (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020).

Investment in the new technology changes the diffusion coefficient to $\sigma(1 + kX)$. This captures the *disruption risk* that the new asset imposes on the economy. Unlike in Pastor and Veronesi (2009), here the new technology is sufficiently developed so that its adoption contributes to aggregate fluctuations. The literature recognizes that innovation creates systematic risk (Gârleanu, Kogan, and Panageas, 2012; Kung and Schmid, 2015). Our focus will be on the effect of competition on the risks created by innovation.

To summarize, while the new technology may allow the economy to grow faster, it also makes the output more volatile. Stochastic variants of Schumpeterian growth models (e.g., Barlevy, 2007; Kung, 2015; Kung and Schmid, 2015) provide microfoundations for the way innovation impacts the drift and diffusion components of the aggregate output. Our model captures these effects in reduced form and focuses on the tradeoff between faster expected growth and more systematic risk. The agent maximizes the welfare gains of faster growth, net of the welfare losses induced by larger aggregate fluctuations, a tradeoff that has also been discussed in Barlevy (2004, 2007). We emphasize, however, that our model features an additional source of risk that is not apparent from (6). This source of risk is the technological uncertainty about the true value of β . Understanding how technological uncertainty affects the tradeoff requires characterizing agent's learning.

³See Helpman and Razin (1978, p. 101), Cole and Obstfeld (1991, p. 7), Zapatero (1995, p. 790), Pavlova and Rigobon (2007, p. 1144). For analytical convenience, the sum of the exponents in (5) is $1 + X$ rather than being normalized to unity. Our results are preserved if we specify instead $\delta_t \equiv (\delta_t^S)^{1-X}(\delta_t^E)^X$. However, this alternative would impose the constraint $X \leq 1$ and would further insert a non linearity in (6) arising from the cost $cX^2/2$ that experimentation imposes on the existing asset in (4).

Learning In this economy learning occurs *by doing*: the agent can evaluate the benefits of the new technology only if it is deployed in the real economy and $X > 0$.⁴ This implies that the agent learns via a *field experiment*, rather than through an isolated, laboratory experiment. What we have in mind is that a controlled laboratory setting where economic agents learn about a new technology by implementing it at an infinitesimally small scale (Pastor and Veronesi, 2009) is not sufficient to assess the efficacy of innovation (e.g., a vaccine; ride-sharing technology).

The agent learns by observing the history of aggregate consumption (6).⁵ We define the information filtration of the agent as $\{\mathcal{F}_t^\delta\}$, where $\mathcal{F}_t^\delta = \sigma(\delta_u : u \leq t)$. The agent has initial beliefs

$$\beta \sim N(\widehat{\beta}_0, \nu_0), \quad (8)$$

where $\widehat{\beta}_0 > 0$, so that the agent initially believes that investing in the experimental asset is a good idea. The parameter ν_0 captures *technological uncertainty*. The agent's learning from observing δ_t implies that both $\widehat{\beta}$ and ν evolve dynamically over time.

Proposition 1 *This partially observed economy is equivalent to a perfectly observed economy with aggregate consumption process*

$$\frac{d\delta_t}{\delta_t} = \left(\bar{f} + \widehat{\beta}_t X - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \right) dt + \sigma(1 + kX) d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (9)$$

where

$$d\widehat{\beta}_t = \frac{X\nu_t}{\sigma(1 + kX)} d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (10)$$

$$\frac{d\nu_t}{dt} = -\frac{X^2\nu_t^2}{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}, \quad (11)$$

and

$$d\widehat{W}_t \equiv \frac{1}{\sigma(1 + kX)} \left[\frac{d\delta_t}{\delta_t} - \left(\bar{f} + \widehat{\beta}_t X - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \right) dt \right] = dW_t + \frac{X(\beta - \widehat{\beta}_t)}{\sigma(1 + kX)} dt. \quad (12)$$

⁴This is distinct from what is typically modeled in the literature with incomplete information where agents update their beliefs for free or pay a financial cost to obtain information (for surveys of this literature, see Ziegler, 2003; Veldkamp, 2011, and the references therein). Instead, here the agent acquires knowledge through effort (Arrow, 1962; Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman, 1977; Rob, 1991; Johnson, 2007) and the cost of learning is its observer effect: it disturbs the process of aggregate consumption by inserting uncertainty about its drift and by increasing the magnitude of its diffusion.

⁵An alternative would be to allow the agent to learn by observing (3) directly. We show in Appendix A.11.1 that this does not qualitatively affect our results. See the discussion in Section 4.2.

\widehat{W}_t is a standard Brownian motion with respect to the agent's filtration $\{\mathcal{F}_t^\delta\}$. The shock $d\widehat{W}_t$ can be interpreted as the “surprise” change in aggregate consumption.

Proposition 1 is an application of the Kalman-Bucy filter (Theorem 12.1, p. 22, [Liptser and Shiryaev, 2001](#)).⁶ According to (10), the agent revises the estimate $\widehat{\beta}$ in the direction of the consumption surprises she observes ([Brennan, 1998](#)). The expression in (11) and the initial value ν_0 implies a deterministic, decreasing path for the Bayesian (technological) uncertainty ν_t :

$$\nu_t = \left(\frac{1}{\nu_0} + \frac{X^2}{\sigma^2(1+kX)^2}t \right)^{-1}. \quad (13)$$

Technological uncertainty starts at ν_0 , but decays to zero as t goes to infinity. One benefit of experimentation is that the agent learns about the new technology and lowers Bayesian uncertainty. However, when $k > 0$, experimentation also has a negative effect on learning. Although the *speed of learning*—the term multiplying time t in (13)—increases with experimentation, it is always lower than $1/(k^2\sigma^2)$. Thus, the agent cannot perfectly learn β in any finite time.

2.1 Socially Optimal Experimentation

The agent's choice of X affects her expected lifetime utility of consumption conditional on information at time 0. We denote the agent's expected lifetime utility at time 0, as defined in (2), by $\mathcal{U}_0(\delta_0, \widehat{\beta}_0, \nu_0, X)$. For notational convenience, we will suppress the dependence of \mathcal{U}_0 on the variables δ_0 , $\widehat{\beta}_0$, and ν_0 . The agent trades a riskless asset in zero net supply and a risky asset claim to the aggregate consumption (dividend) stream δ_t . The risky asset is in positive supply of one share. Proposition 2 characterizes $\mathcal{U}_0(X)$ together with the equilibrium price-dividend ratio in this economy, $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$.

Proposition 2 *Define the function $\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0)$ as follows:*

$$\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0) \equiv (1 - \gamma) \left(\bar{f} + X\widehat{\beta}_0 - \gamma \frac{\sigma^2(1+kX)^2}{2} - \frac{c}{2}X^2 \right) - \rho. \quad (14)$$

(a) *For any $X \geq 0$, the representative agent's lifetime expected utility is*

$$\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \frac{\delta_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} dt \right] = \frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \int_0^T \exp \left[\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0)t + \frac{(\gamma-1)^2 X^2 \nu_0}{2} t^2 \right] dt. \quad (15)$$

⁶The seminal applications of the Kalman-Bucy filter in continuous-time finance are [Detemple \(1986\)](#), [Dothan and Feldman \(1986\)](#), and [Gennotte \(1986\)](#).

(b) The stochastic discount factor in this economy is $\xi_t \equiv e^{-\rho t}(\delta_t/\delta_0)^{-\gamma}$, with $\xi_0 = 1$. Thus, the equilibrium price-dividend ratio equals

$$\mathcal{P}_0(X) = \frac{1}{\delta_0} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^T \xi_t \delta_t dt \right] = \int_0^T \exp \left[\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0)t + \frac{(\gamma-1)^2}{2} X^2 \nu_0 t^2 \right] dt. \quad (16)$$

Part (a) of Proposition 2 requires computing the expectation $\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t^{1-\gamma}]$. We compute this expectation in Appendix A.3 using the theory of affine processes (Duffie, Filipović, and Schachermayer, 2003). The stochastic discount factor in part (b) of Proposition 2 follows from standard results in asset pricing (Duffie, 2010). Proposition 2 then shows that both $\mathcal{U}_0(X)$ and $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$ depend on the level of experimentation, and we also notice that $\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \mathcal{P}_0(X)$. The following Corollary guarantees the existence and uniqueness of an optimal level of experimentation when $\gamma > 1$.

Corollary 2.1 *If $\gamma > 1$, the expected lifetime utility $\mathcal{U}_0(X)$ is strictly concave in X .*

Corollary 2.1 implies that the first order condition with respect to X is necessary and sufficient for maximizing lifetime utility. This is guaranteed when $\gamma > 1$, an assumption that we maintain throughout. We discuss the case $\gamma < 1$ in Appendix A.14 and we consider an extension to recursive preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989) in Section 4.4.

Before solving for the optimal level of X , we define two important quantities that enter into the experimentation tradeoff, *wealth duration* and *wealth convexity*.

Definition 1 *The wealth duration and wealth convexity, $\mathcal{D}_0(X)$ and $\mathcal{C}_0(X)$, are defined respectively as the weighted average maturity and the weighted average squared maturity of the price of a claim to aggregate consumption:*

$$\mathcal{D}_0(X) = \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_0(X)} \int_0^T t \exp \left[\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0)t + \frac{(\gamma-1)^2}{2} X^2 \nu_0 t^2 \right] dt, \quad (17)$$

$$\mathcal{C}_0(X) = \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_0(X)} \int_0^T t^2 \exp \left[\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0)t + \frac{(\gamma-1)^2}{2} X^2 \nu_0 t^2 \right] dt. \quad (18)$$

The denominators in (17)-(18) dictate the weights that are used to compute the weighted averages. The *wealth duration* \mathcal{D}_0 measures the sensitivity of aggregate wealth to changes in expected growth. The longer the wealth duration, the greater the impact of experimentation on the agent's wealth. The *wealth convexity* \mathcal{C}_0 measures the sensitivity of wealth to changes in uncertainty about expected growth. The higher the wealth convexity, the greater the impact of the uncertainty generated by experimentation on wealth.

Thus, \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{C}_0 characterize the effect of experimentation on the term structure of future consumption. Both \mathcal{D}_0 and \mathcal{C}_0 are strictly positive quantities.

The first-order condition with respect to X , $0 = \partial \mathcal{U}_0(X)/\partial X$, implies

$$0 = \int_0^T \left(\frac{\partial \kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0)}{\partial X} t + (\gamma - 1)^2 X \nu_0 t^2 \right) \exp \left[\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0) t + \frac{(\gamma - 1)^2 X^2 \nu_0}{2} t^2 \right] dt. \quad (19)$$

Dividing by $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$ allows us to interpret the first-order condition using Definition 1:

$$0 = \frac{\partial \kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0)}{\partial X} \mathcal{D}_0(X) + (\gamma - 1)^2 X \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X). \quad (20)$$

This equation determines the socially optimal level of experimentation.

Proposition 3 *At time $t = 0$, the representative agent chooses a socially optimal level of experimentation that solves the following implicit equation*

$$X^* = \begin{cases} \frac{(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X^*)}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X^*) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X^*)}, & \text{if } \frac{\hat{\beta}_0}{k \sigma} > \gamma \sigma \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (21)$$

The first-best level of experimentation is strictly positive when the condition $\frac{\hat{\beta}_0}{k \sigma} > \gamma \sigma$ is satisfied. The left-hand side of this condition measures the expected growth ($\hat{\beta}_0$) per unit of risk ($k \sigma$) and can be interpreted as the *creativity ratio* of the new technology (Komlos, 2014). The right-hand side measures the Sharpe ratio in the status quo economy (1).⁷ The optimal decision to experiment at all involves comparing these two quantities.

The optimal level of experimentation in (21) resembles a mean-variance portfolio.⁸ A more favorable belief about the promise of the new technology (higher $\hat{\beta}_0$) increases experimentation, whereas more disruption or a higher cost of transferring resources (higher k or c) decrease experimentation. Experimentation has a stronger impact when the wealth duration is longer. When $(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2)$ is positive, the agent's incentive to experiment increases further with the wealth duration.

The effect of technological uncertainty on the optimal level of experimentation depends on risk aversion. When $\gamma > 1$, uncertainty about the new technology dampens experimentation, to a greater extent when the wealth convexity is higher. The damp-

⁷The status quo economy (1) is a classic Lucas tree economy (Lucas, 1978), in which the Sharpe ratio is the product of risk aversion with the instantaneous volatility of consumption.

⁸In Appendix A.6, we show that the agent's optimal choice is indeed consistent with a classic mean-variance tradeoff (Markowitz, 1952).

ening effect of uncertainty can be understood by writing the tradeoff resulting from the first-order condition (20) as follows:

$$\underbrace{\widehat{\beta}_0 \mathcal{D}_0(X^*) + X^* \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X^*)}_{\text{marginal benefit}} = \underbrace{cX^* \mathcal{D}_0(X^*) + \gamma k \sigma^2 (1 + kX^*) \mathcal{D}_0(X^*) + \gamma X^* \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X^*)}_{\text{marginal cost}}. \quad (22)$$

The technological uncertainty ν_0 affects the tradeoff on both sides of (22). On the left-hand side, uncertainty increases the expected value of future consumption. This is similar to the positive effect of risk on the value of real options with convex payoffs. But on the right-hand side, uncertainty increases the future variance of consumption. If the agent is sufficiently risk averse, the marginal cost of higher uncertainty exceeds its benefit. With power utility this condition is met when $\gamma > 1$.⁹

One caveat is that both the wealth duration and convexity are themselves functions of X^* . In Section 3, we further characterize this and show that wealth duration increases in experimentation. Nevertheless, the overall message from Proposition 3 is that a risk-averse agent prefers technologies that have more potential (higher $\widehat{\beta}_0$), dislikes more disruptive technologies (higher k) and, if sufficiently risk averse, dislikes the uncertainty that new technologies introduce into the economy (higher ν_0).

2.2 Experimentation Under Competition

Now that we have characterized the socially optimal level of experimentation, we proceed to describe how competition causes the level of aggregate experimentation to deviate from the social optimum. We depart from the previous setup by assuming that the economy consists of $n \geq 1$ agents. All agents derive utility from consumption as in (2), with the same coefficient of risk aversion. Together they compete to consume the aggregate consumption basket δ_t .

This section assumes that all agents can actively participate in experimenting with the new technology. In reality, some agents are passive and merely benefit from the discovery of new technologies without actively investing in them. We consider this distinction between active and passive agents in Section 4.3, where we show how our results are amplified when active agents compete for the value of the rents produced exclusively by the new technology δ_t^E .

⁹More precisely, for any time-additive utility function that is increasing and concave in current consumption, uncertainty about consumption growth will decrease expected utility whenever the second derivative of the utility with respect to the natural logarithm of consumption is negative. In the case of power utility, this condition is satisfied when $\gamma > 1$. See Ziegler (2003, p. 52).

We model each agent's share of aggregate consumption, θ_i , with a symmetric, logit Tullock contest success function (Tullock, 1980). Here, θ_i represents the proportion of the prize won based on each individual experimentation level x_i (Hirshleifer, 1989). Our modeling choice is motivated by Baye and Hoppe (2003), who show that rent-seeking competitions, patent-race games, and innovation tournaments are often strategically equivalent to a Tullock contest, and by the fact that Tullock contest functions are commonly used to characterize R&D races (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Chung, 1996).

We define

$$\theta_i = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{n} & \text{if } x_j = 0 \text{ for all } j \in 1, \dots, n. \\ \frac{x_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n x_j} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (23)$$

Agents' experimentation choices are perfectly observable and all agents have the same information filtration $\{\mathcal{F}_t^\delta\}$. Any agent i 's lifetime expected utility, \mathcal{U}_0^i , can be written as

$$\mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \frac{(\theta_i \delta_t)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} dt \right] = \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0 \left(\sum_{j=1}^n x_j \right), \quad (24)$$

where $\mathcal{U}_0(\cdot)$ is the function defined and characterized in Proposition 2.

Effort by the agents in our Tullock contest affects the aggregate value of the rents available from the consumption stream. When agents experiment, they not only fight for consumption share, they affect the technological uncertainty and disruption risk that everyone faces. Prior work has considered rent-seeking with spillovers like this where the size of the pie in contests increases with effort (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Chung, 1996) or shrinks (Alexeev and Leitzel, 1996). Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011) generalize this to consider linear combinations of effort complementarities in duopoly contests. Thus, our work contributes in two ways to this literature: by considering a non-linear combination and extending the analysis beyond a duopoly.

After learning (which is identical across agents and continues to hold as in Proposition 1), the aggregate consumption stream that evolves based on the total level of experimentation, $X_n \equiv \sum_{j=1}^n x_j$, is

$$\frac{d\delta_t}{\delta_t} = \left(\bar{f} + \hat{\beta}_t X_n - \frac{c}{2} X_n^2 \right) dt + \sigma(1 + kX_n) d\widehat{W}_t. \quad (25)$$

This is the counterpart of Equation (9) in the representative agent version of the model, with the aggregate level of experimentation X_n replacing X .

Any Nash equilibrium involves an optimal choice of $x_i \geq 0$, taking into account the simultaneous choices of the other players. The first-order condition for agent i 's maximization problem is

$$0 = \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_n)}{\partial x_i} = \frac{(1 - \gamma)(X_n - x_i)}{x_i X_n} \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_n) + \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}, \quad (26)$$

which, after dividing by $\theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_n)$ and replacing $\mathcal{U}_0(X_n)$ by $\frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)$ in accordance with Proposition 2, yields

$$\frac{(\gamma - 1)(X_n - x_i)}{x_i X_n} = \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}. \quad (27)$$

Equation (27) can further be written as

$$\frac{X_n}{x_i} = 1 + \frac{X_n}{\gamma - 1} \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}, \quad \text{for all } i \in \{1, \dots, n\}. \quad (28)$$

By inspection, it is easy to appreciate that any candidate equilibrium in this setting must be symmetric. This is because the right-hand side of (28) is the same for all agents. Any agent i that changes her experimentation has the same marginal impact on X_n and therefore on the aggregate consumption stream in (25). It follows then that X_n/x_i is identical across agents.

Denote the symmetric equilibrium by (x^*, \dots, x^*) , where $x^* = X_n^*/n$. By substituting x^* for x_i in (27), the first-order condition can be rewritten as an equation in X_n^* :

$$\frac{(\gamma - 1)(n - 1)}{X_n^*} = \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n^*)}{\partial X_n^*}. \quad (29)$$

A key result that follows from Corollary 2.1 is that the equilibrium price-dividend ratio $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$ is log-convex in the aggregate level of experimentation X (see Appendix A.4).¹⁰ This result implies that the right-hand side of (29) strictly increases in X_n . Appendix A.4 further shows that $\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)/\partial X_n$ takes values from $(1 - \gamma)(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(0)$, which is finite, to ∞ . When $n \geq 2$, the left-hand side strictly decreases in X_n , taking values from ∞ to 0. Thus, any equilibrium that satisfies (29) is unique.

Proposition 4 *There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate*

¹⁰A function $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is *logarithmically convex* or *log-convex* if $f(x) > 0$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$ and $\ln f$ is convex (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, p. 104).

level of experimentation under competition among n agents solves the implicit equation

$$X_n^* = \frac{(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + \frac{n-1}{X_n^*}}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X_n^*)}, \quad (30)$$

and $x_i^* = X_n^*/n \forall i$. The quantity X_n^* is strictly increasing in n and $X_n^* > X^*$, $\forall n \geq 2$.

To provide an intuition for the result that $X_n^* > X^*$, write each agent's utility function:

$$\mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \left(\frac{x_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n x_j} \right)^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_n). \quad (31)$$

Let $x_j = X^*/n$ for all j , where X^* is the social optimum of Proposition 3. Starting at this social optimum in (31), a marginal change in x_i does not change $\mathcal{U}_0(X_n)$ by the envelope theorem (at the social optimum, $\partial \mathcal{U}_0(X)/\partial X = 0$). However, it does increase agent i 's consumption share because $x_i/\sum_{j=1}^n x_j$ is increasing in x_i . Therefore, every agent has an incentive to increase her own experimentation from the socially optimal level, so that the equilibrium generates an excessive amount of experimentation.

When $n = 1$, the agent consumes the entire aggregate output, so the incentive to increase her consumption share vanishes, and we recover the social optimum of Proposition 3. When $n \geq 2$, competition increases experimentation in the economy. As competition intensifies, the aggregate level of experimentation moves further away from the social optimum. To provide an intuition for the result that X_n^* increases with n , consider an economy with $n+1$ agents, $n \geq 2$, and start at the aggregate level X_n^* , with $x_j = X_n^*/(n+1)$ for all j . That is, assume that the $n+1$ agents in aggregate experiment at the same level as in an economy with n agents and write each agent's utility function as

$$\mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_{n+1}) = \left(\frac{x_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{n+1} x_j} \right)^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_{n+1}). \quad (32)$$

At $X_{n+1} = X_n^*$, a marginal change in x_i decreases $\mathcal{U}_0(X_{n+1})$ (see Appendix A.7), but increases the consumption share $x_i/\sum_{j=1}^{n+1} x_j$. In other words, increasing experimentation shrinks the total size of the pie, but increases agent i 's share of the pie. Appendix A.7 shows that this second force always dominates and therefore every agent has an incentive to increase her own experimentation from the level $X_n^*/(n+1)$, so that in equilibrium the aggregate level of experimentation increases in n .

The main result is that creative destruction and Schumpeterian competition decreases aggregate welfare from the social optimum. It can also be shown that competition can

promote inefficient technologies. Consider the case $\hat{\beta}_0/(k\sigma) < \gamma\sigma$ from Proposition 3. From the perspective of a welfare-maximizing agent, such a technology is inefficient and $X^* = 0$. But when $n \geq 2$ agents compete for consumption share, Proposition 4 implies $X_n^* > 0$. Thus, innovation accompanied by Schumpeterian competition can lead to over-investment in inefficient technologies.

Illustration We illustrate the effect of Schumpeterian competition on experimentation with a numerical example. The parameters that we choose for this example are economically plausible and will be the same for the rest of the paper. We fix the risk aversion to $\gamma = 2$, below the level of ten deemed reasonable by Mehra and Prescott (1985, p. 154).¹¹ We calibrate the long-term growth and the volatility of consumption in the status-quo economy to $\bar{f} = 0.03$ (Andrei and Hasler, 2015, Table 1) and $\sigma = 0.05$ (this parameter allows us to obtain reasonable levels for the risk premium in Section 3). The agents' initial beliefs about the new technology are set to $\hat{\beta}_0 = 0.03$ (the same value as \bar{f}) and $\nu_0 = 0.03^2$ (in line with the variance of expected growth of consumption, estimated at 0.029^2 in Andrei and Hasler, 2015). We fix the disruption parameter to $k = 3$ and the cost of transferring resources to $c = 0.02$. These values imply that at the social optimum ($X^* = 0.16$), the price-dividend ratio is $\mathcal{P}_0(X^*) = 17$, which is consistent with Robert Shiller's Cyclically Adjusted PE Ratio that averaged 16.91 from 1870 to 2021. Given this, the representative agent is willing to forgo 0.03% expected growth in the status-quo to experiment with the new technology, as shown in Eq. (4). Finally, we fix $T = 100$ and the subjective discount rate to $\rho = 0.03$. These values yield a duration $\mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*)$ between 17 years (for $n = 1$) and 65 years (for $n = 10$), consistent with numbers estimated by Van Binsbergen (2020). We further discuss the calibration and different specifications of the model in Section 4.

Panel (a) of Figure 1 depicts the solution of Eq. (29), where the solid line represents the right-hand side and the dashed (dotted) line represent the left-hand side for $n = 2$ ($n = 5$). The social optimum X^* is obtained when the solid line crosses the zero axis. The plot shows that when $n \geq 2$ the equilibrium generates excessive levels of experimentation. Panel (b) plots the aggregate level of experimentation X_n^* when the number of agents varies from 1 to 10. The line starts at the social optimum X^* and experimentation increases as competition rises in the market, further confirming the results of Proposition 4. As we show next, increased competition and the excessive level of experimentation that results

¹¹Friend and Blume (1975) estimate an average coefficient well in excess of one and perhaps in excess of two. Drezé (1981) finds values between 0.6 and 10 using an analysis of deductibles in insurance contracts.




Figure 1: **Equilibrium Experimentation with Competition.** Panel (a) depicts the solution of Eq. (29), where the solid line represents the right-hand side and the dashed (dotted) line represent the left-hand side for $n = 2$ ($n = 5$). The social optimum, X^* , is obtained when the solid line crosses the zero axis. Panel (b) depicts the aggregate level of experimentation as a function of the number of agents in the economy. The calibration used is: $\gamma = 2$, $\bar{f} = 0.03$, $\hat{\beta}_0 = 0.03$, $\nu_0 = 0.03^2$, $\sigma = 0.05$, $k = 3$, $\rho = 0.03$, $T = 100$, $c = 0.02$, and $\delta_0 = 1$.

expose the economy to excessive risks.

3 The Implications of Schumpeterian Competition

Both disruption risk ($k > 0$) and technological uncertainty ($\nu_0 > 0$) affect the path of the future volatility of consumption, $\{\text{Vol}_0[\delta_t]\}_{t=0}^T$. Figure 2 illustrates this for one maturity ($t = 30$). When competition increases experimentation in the economy, it magnifies the disturbance to the status quo, which is the hatched area in the plot. Experimentation also initially introduces technological uncertainty, which further magnifies risk and is captured by the gray area in the plot. So, experimentation creates macroeconomic risk through two channels and competition makes this worse.

To explore how these two sources of risk affect systematic risk and risk premia, we rely on well-known results from the theory of dynamic portfolio choice (Merton, 1973; Brennan, 1998). Once experimentation begins, all agents face the same investment opportunity set. Agents trade a risky asset, which is a claim to the aggregate output stream δ_t , and a risk-




Figure 2: **Equilibrium Experimentation with Competition and its Effect on Macroeconomic Risk.** The figure depicts the increase in the volatility of future consumption, $\text{Vol}_0[\delta_t]$, for $t = 30$ years. The increase is due to disruption risk ($k > 0$, hatched area) and technological uncertainty ($\nu_0 > 0$, gray area).

free asset that is in zero net supply. At $t > 0$, the expected growth rate of the economy is time-varying based on $\hat{\beta}_t$. Because the investment opportunity set faced by agents is time-varying, their hedging needs and willingness to hold the risky asset evolve over time. Denoting by RP_t the equilibrium risk premium and by $\sigma_{P,t}$ the instantaneous diffusion of the risky asset (both RP_t and $\sigma_{P,t}$ will be determined once we impose market clearing), the next proposition characterizes agents' trading.

Proposition 5 *At $t > 0$, agents have homogeneous beliefs and invest the same proportion of their wealth in the risky asset,*

$$\phi_t = \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\text{RP}_t}{\sigma_{P,t}^2} + (1 - \gamma) \frac{(X_n^*)^2 \nu_t}{\sigma(1 + kX_n^*)\sigma_{P,t}} \mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*). \quad (33)$$

The first term in (33) is the myopic position that results from a classic risk-return tradeoff (Markowitz, 1952). The second is a hedging position, $\mathcal{H}_t(X_n^*, \nu_t)$, born of agents' desire to manage the uncertainty of future changes in expected growth (Merton, 1973). As time evolves, agents trade in order to hedge the technological uncertainty generated by experimentation. If $\gamma > 1$ and $\sigma_{P,t} > 0$, the hedging position $\mathcal{H}_t(X_n^*, \nu_t)$ is negative: agents dislike uncertainty and therefore *decrease* their demand for the risky asset. Consistent with the analysis in Brennan (1998), agents who are more risk-averse than log demand

less of the risky asset when they face uncertainty about its mean return.

Agents' hedging demand, which depends on ν_t , has consequences for the equilibrium volatility of stock returns and the risk premium. This can be understood by recognizing that the Sharpe ratio in this economy, $SR_t \equiv RP_t/\sigma_{P,t}$, equals $\gamma\sigma(1 + kX_n^*)$ and does not depend on ν_t (see Appendix A.8). Since market clearing requires zero-net supply for the risk-free asset and $\phi_t = 1$, Proposition 5 implies that the equilibrium volatility of stock returns¹² and the equilibrium risk premium solve

$$\sigma_{P,t} = \frac{\sigma(1 + kX_n^*)}{1 - \mathcal{H}_t(X_n^*, \nu_t)} \quad \text{and} \quad RP_t = \frac{\gamma\sigma^2(1 + kX_n^*)^2}{1 - \mathcal{H}_t(X_n^*, \nu_t)}. \quad (34)$$

Because $\mathcal{H}_t(X_n^*, \nu_t) < 0$ and investors use financial markets to mitigate undesirable risks, the equilibrium volatility of the risky asset is lower. The same hedging motive lowers the risk premium when there is more technological uncertainty. This may seem surprising at first because investors *dislike* uncertainty, and *ceteris paribus* should require a higher risk premium to hold the risky asset. But, once a general equilibrium perspective is considered, it follows directly. In any model with time-additive utility, investors choose a tangency and a hedge portfolio, the sum of which can be written as (Merton, 1973):

$$\text{Risky Asset Position}_t = \frac{1}{\text{Relative Risk Aversion}} \times \frac{1}{RP_t} \times SR_t^2 + \text{Hedging demand}_t. \quad (35)$$

Since in equilibrium the risky asset position must equal one, keeping the Sharpe ratio constant at $\gamma\sigma(1 + kX_n^*)$, a negative hedging demands must yield a lower risk premium.¹³

An alternative way to understand it is to impose market clearing $\phi_t = 1$ and write (33) under this form:

$$\frac{RP_t}{\sigma_{P,t}^2} = \gamma[1 - \mathcal{H}_t(X_n^*, \nu_t)] \quad (36)$$

When the agent is more risk-averse than log, the negative hedging demand leads to an increase in the risk premium per unit of variance. Keeping the Sharpe ratio constant, this leads to a decrease in the equilibrium risk premium.

The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium stock diffusion (i.e., the *systematic*

¹²The rigorous term is the *diffusion* of stock returns (the volatility is the absolute value of the diffusion), but here we discuss the case $\sigma_{P,t} > 0$ and thus refer to $\sigma_{P,t}$ as *volatility* for simplicity of exposition.

¹³The asset demand structure (35) is not specific to time-additive utility models. Recursive utility models (e.g. Epstein-Zin utility models) inherit the same structure (Duffie and Epstein, 1992, Equation (17), p. 422). The added feature of recursive utility is that the market price of risk *does* depend on the level of uncertainty about the growth rate. See Section 4.4 for a setting with Epstein-Zin utility.

risk) and the risk premium in this economy, based on primitives in the model and on the wealth duration at any time $t \in [0, T]$. According to Definition 1,

$$\mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*) = \frac{\int_t^T (s-t) \exp \left[\kappa(X_n^*, \hat{\beta}_t)(s-t) + \frac{(1-\gamma)^2}{2} (X_n^*)^2 \nu_t(s-t)^2 \right] ds}{\int_t^T \exp \left[\kappa(X_n^*, \hat{\beta}_t)(s-t) + \frac{(1-\gamma)^2}{2} (X_n^*)^2 \nu_t(s-t)^2 \right] ds}. \quad (37)$$

Proposition 6 *The equilibrium stock diffusion with experimentation is given by*

$$\sigma_{P,t} = \sigma(1 + kX_n^*) - (\gamma - 1) \frac{(X_n^*)^2 \nu_t}{\sigma(1 + kX_n^*)} \mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*), \quad (38)$$

and the equilibrium risk premium is

$$\text{RP}_t = \text{SR}_t \times \sigma_{P,t} = \gamma \sigma^2 (1 + kX_n^*)^2 - \gamma(\gamma - 1) (X_n^*)^2 \nu_t \mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*). \quad (39)$$

Because $k > 0$, Equation (38) shows that experimentation increases systematic risk by disturbing the economy and amplifying macroeconomic fluctuations. At the same time, investors' hedging in response to uncertainty dampens systematic risk, as discussed above and as can be seen in the last term in (38). Thus, the two types of risk imposed by creative destruction—disruption risk and technological uncertainty—have opposite effects on the systematic risk in financial markets. The balance between these two effects is affected by the level of experimentation.

The expression for the equity risk premium in (39) is also made up of two terms. Investors require a premium for holding the risky asset, but at the same time their hedging against technological uncertainty yields a negative (insurance) premium. The balance between these two forces is affected by the level of experimentation for two reasons. First, higher experimentation increases the uncertainty in the economy and the impact of hedging. Second, higher experimentation tends to increase the wealth duration $\mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*)$. This can be seen from (37), where the denominator dictates the weights that are used in the numerator to compute the weighted-average maturity. Technological uncertainty increases the long-maturity weights, amplifying the long-term impact of experimentation. More competition increases experimentation, which puts more weight on long-term payoffs and increases $\mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*)$. Figure 3 plots the wealth duration for different values of the number of agents. Wealth duration increases with the degree of competition.

Figure 4 illustrates the effect of experimentation on the risk premium for different levels of competition. The figure shows that the risk premium is hump-shaped in experimentation. The initial increase is driven by disruption risk, and the subsequent decrease




Figure 3: **Experimentation with Competition and its Effect on the Wealth Duration.** The line depicts the wealth duration as a function of the number of agents in the economy.

is driven by technological uncertainty. The effect of competition on the risk premium depends on the number of agents in the market. When n is low, the impact of disruption risk dominates and competition increases the risk premium. However, when n is large, the complementarity between duration and technological uncertainty creates a significant hedging demand and lowers the risk premium. When the number of agents is large and the last term in (38) leads to a negative stock diffusion, competition may lead to a negative risk premium: as the stock diffusion switches sign to negative, the risky asset becomes a good hedge against fluctuations in expected growth (Proposition 5) and the hedging demand $\mathcal{H}_t(X_n^*, \nu_t)$ turns positive, yielding a negative risk premium.

A recent literature studies the risk premia of equity claims with different maturities and documents that long-duration assets earn lower returns than short-duration assets (Lettau and Wachter, 2007, 2011; Weber, 2018; Van Binsbergen, 2020; Gonçalves, 2021). Over the past century, long-duration dividend risk has received little to no compensation (Van Binsbergen, 2020). The negative impact of duration on the risk premium in our model (Eq. 39) is consistent with these findings and proposes that long-duration assets may be a good hedge against technological uncertainty. Moreover, the fact that in the model assets that are more exposed to technological uncertainty have longer duration corroborates with the view of growth firms as long-duration assets (Lettau and Wachter, 2007). Further, understanding the impact of Schumpeterian competition on the equity




Figure 4: **Experimentation and the Risk Premium.** This figure plots the effect of experimentation on the risk premium in the economy.

duration and the cross-section of returns may prove a fruitful avenue for future research.

3.1 Dynamic Implications

While the impact of disruption risk on the risk premium is permanent, the effect of technological uncertainty is time-varying, depending on the speed of learning and the amount of wealth duration. Thus, the risk premium is time-varying and depends on both ν_t and $\mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*)$. When a new technology is initially adopted, technological uncertainty and wealth duration are both high. Investors build hedging positions to manage risk, which decreases the risk premium. However, as learning takes place, both technological uncertainty and wealth duration decline, so that systematic risk rises over time. Figure 5 illustrates these patterns in an economy with $n = 5$ competitors.

These dynamic patterns have implications for the valuation of asset prices. The equilibrium price-dividend ratio at any time $t \in [0, T]$ follows from Proposition 2:

$$\mathcal{P}_t(X_n^*) = \int_t^T \exp \left[\kappa(X_n^*, \hat{\beta}_t)(s - t) + \frac{(1 - \gamma)^2}{2} (X_n^*)^2 \nu_t(s - t)^2 \right] ds. \quad (40)$$

The price-dividend ratio increases with the uncertainty about β . To see this, suppose that β were known (i.e., $\hat{\beta}_t = \beta$ and $\nu_t = 0$ for all t). Then, an application of Leibniz' integral rule would confirm that $\partial^2 \mathcal{P}_t(X_n^*) / \partial \beta^2 > 0$ and thus the price-dividend ratio is *convex* in β . Since β is in fact a random variable, Jensen's inequality implies that the




Figure 5: **Dynamic Patterns of Risk.** Panel (a) shows the evolution of ν_t after the time of technology adoption ($t = 0$), in an economy with $n = 5$ agents. Panel (b) shows the evolution of wealth duration (while keeping the maturity T constant, to avoid a mechanical effect arising from the reduction of maturity). Panel (c) depicts the dynamics of the risk premium over the same period of time.

price-dividend ratio under incomplete information ($\nu_t > 0$) must be greater than the one under complete information ($\nu_t = 0$). This is a general result and does not depend on the value of γ (e.g., [Pástor and Veronesi, 2003, 2006](#)).¹⁴

Our key observation is that Schumpeterian competition amplifies this over-valuation result. Panel (a) in Figure 6 depicts the price-dividend ratio as a function of aggregate experimentation (solid line). The dashed line depicts the price-dividend ratio while setting technological uncertainty to zero. The gap between the two lines, illustrated with the gray area, provides a measure of over-valuation due to technological uncertainty. We also plot the point that corresponds to the socially optimal level of experimentation. Schumpeterian

¹⁴Another intuitive way to obtain it is to start from the simplest Gordon growth model, $P = D/(r - g)$, in which the price P is convex in the growth rate g , hence uncertainty about g must inflate P .




Figure 6: **Booms and Busts in Asset Prices.** The solid line in panel (a) depicts the price-dividend ratio as a function of the level of aggregate experimentation in the economy. The dashed line depicts the price-dividend ratio with uncertainty set to $\nu_0 = 0$. The dot labeled “ $n = 5$ ” corresponds to the equilibrium aggregate level of experimentation in an economy with five agents. Panel (b) depicts average price paths over time starting from “ $n = 5$ ” and $\hat{\beta}_0 = \beta$ (solid and dotted lines) and from the social optimum (dashed line). The dotted line maintains the maturity of the asset constant at $T = 100$ years.

competition leads to over-experimentation, increasing the wealth duration and the gap between the two lines. The gap grows from being almost negligible at the social optimum to roughly 100% when five agents compete for consumption share.

The over-valuation of the asset caused by competition and technological uncertainty has consequences for the future dynamics of the price-dividend ratio. In panel (b), we compare the dynamics of the price-dividend ratio once the points “ $n = 5$ ” and the social optimum have been reached. We start from a prior $\hat{\beta}_0$ that is exactly equal to the true value of β , so that agents and investors are initially right, but still uncertain, about the expected growth of the new technology. As such, we are not imposing any behavioral bias on future price paths. This assumption ensures that simulations of the economy over time will result in an average $\hat{\beta}_t$ that is equal to the true value of β .¹⁵ Because the only remaining state variable that enters into the price-dividend ratio, ν_t , decreases deterministically over time, we can plot the average price-dividend ratio over time by

¹⁵This can be seen from Proposition 1. At time $t = 0$, $d\widehat{W}_0 = dW_t$ (because $\beta - \hat{\beta}_0 = 0$). Technically, at time $t = 0$ the filter $\hat{\beta}$ is a martingale. This ensures that the average of its future simulated values one step ahead, $\hat{\beta}_{0+dt}$, is exactly β . Then apply the same reasoning at time $t = 0 + dt$.

simply using (13) for the dynamics of ν_t , without resorting to simulations.

The solid line in panel (b) depicts the average path of the price-dividend ratio starting from a competitive equilibrium with five agents. The dashed line shows the average path of the price-dividend ratio starting from the social optimum. Because the remaining life of the asset diminishes, we also plot the dotted line, which isolates the effect of the decrease in uncertainty by holding the remaining asset life constant at $T = 100$ years.¹⁶ With competition ($n = 5$), asset prices have the tendency to decrease as uncertainty about the new technology resolves. The pace of the decline depends on the rate at which uncertainty about the new technology is resolved. Equation (13) shows that uncertainty decays faster with over-experimentation, which accelerates the decline. In contrast, after experimentation at the social optimum, the average asset price decrease due to resolution of uncertainty is negligible. Thus, markets characterized by intense Schumpeterian competition are prone to asset price over-valuation and to subsequent declines through learning and resolution of uncertainty.

These dynamics of risk and pricing suggest that competition impacts the time-series predictability of returns. Using a discretization of our continuous-time setup (Appendix A.9), we perform simulations of the model at a quarterly frequency for 100 years and run the following predictive regressions (Beeler and Campbell, 2012):

$$\sum_{k=1}^K (r_{t+k} - r_{f,t+k}) = a_K + b_K p d_t + \epsilon_{t+K}, \quad (41)$$

where the dependent variable is the K -period time-aggregated excess return, the independent variable is the log price-dividend ratio, and $K = \{4, 12, 20, 40\}$ quarters. We keep the remaining life of the asset constant at $T = 100$ years in order to eliminate effects arising from the diminishing time to maturity.

The results in Table 1 show that return predictability is positive for $n = 5$, but negative for $n = 20$. When $n = 20$, the last line of the table shows that investors expect negative excess returns: they are willing to hold the risky asset at a high price, for which they demand a negative risk premium. This generates negative return predictability. Since the price-dividend ratio in (40) is partially driven by movements in technological uncertainty, when agents over-experiment, uncertainty increases the price-dividend ratio, but after $t = 0$ the downward drift of uncertainty caused by learning (Figure 5) deflates the price-dividend ratio (Figure 6). Thus, high prices may indeed negatively predict future excess

¹⁶This adjustment is unnecessary in the social optimum, where the decrease in the price-dividend ratio is almost imperceptible with our calibration.

Panel I: $n = 5$, $X_5^* = 0.917$ (medians of 10,000 simulations)

	4Q	12Q	20Q	40Q
Coefficient of Log (P/D)	0.043	0.128	0.207	0.411
t-stat	1.263	1.257	1.302	1.555
R-squared	0.010	0.030	0.051	0.109
Expected Excess Returns (annualized)	1.1%	1.3%	1.5%	1.9%

Panel II: $n = 20$, $X_{20}^* = 1.271$ (medians of 10,000 simulations)

	4Q	12Q	20Q	40Q
Coefficient of Log (P/D)	-0.033	-0.093	-0.144	-0.243
t-stat	-2.087	-2.315	-2.469	-2.614
R-squared	0.054	0.137	0.190	0.274
Expected Excess Returns (annualized)	-7.5%	-6.8%	-6.1%	-4.5%

Table 1: Return Predictability with the Price-Dividend Ratio (Simulations).

This table reports the predictability of excess stock returns with the log price-dividend ratio, estimated from (41). There are two panels, each one corresponding to a different value of n . Each panel reports medians from 10,000 simulations for the regression coefficients, t-stats computed with Newey and West (1987) standard errors with $2(K - 1)$ lags, and the R^2 coefficients. The panels show results for different horizons: 4, 12, 20, and 40 quarters. The last row of each panel computes the median annualized excess return between the initial date and the horizon indicated in each column.

returns, particularly when Schumpeterian competition is intense.

These dynamic implications seem to provide an economic interpretation of how changes in competition may drive secular trends relating to innovation and risk premia. In recent decades, there has been a secular decline in competition that accelerated in the early 2000s (e.g., Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely, 2019; De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger, 2020). Recent studies have attributed slumping investment and innovation (Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2018) and rising risk premia in equity markets (Corhay et al., 2020) to declining competition. Our model’s predictions appear to be consistent with these stylized facts: a decline in the number of competitors would indeed result in depressed investment in new technologies (Figure 1) and higher risk premia (Figure 4). The model can therefore provide an economic explanation for why declining competition leads to slumping innovation and a rising equity premium since the early 2000s.

4 Extensions and Discussion of Assumptions

Our baseline model relied on several simplifying assumptions, which served our purpose of isolating the main results implied by the model. In this section, we relax some of these assumptions and explore various extensions of the model.

4.1 Infinite Horizon and Obsolescence

An important feature of our model is that time is a state variable. As can be seen from (13), when agents experiment with the new technology, the technological uncertainty ν_t decays deterministically with time. This gradual resolution of uncertainty, arguably a common feature of many new technologies, generates our dynamic results in Section 3.1. But it comes with a caveat: it is a well-known observation that learning about a constant, as in Proposition 1, implies that the posterior belief $\hat{\beta}_t$ is a martingale and thus has infinite persistence (Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer, 2016). The immediate implication of this observation that all of the integrals in Proposition 2 would not converge when $T \rightarrow \infty$ (the terms that multiply t^2 in (15)-(16) are strictly positive). Thus, the main purpose of our finite horizon assumption is to keep the model stationary.

Our model can be extended to the infinite horizon case without losing the realistic feature of a gradual resolution of uncertainty. We propose here another staple feature of new technologies, namely, obsolescence. New technologies are constantly under threat of becoming obsolete (Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Accordingly, we assume that the unknown parameter β decays deterministically to zero:

$$d\beta_t = -\lambda\beta_t dt. \quad (42)$$

Suppose that the parameter $\lambda \geq 0$ is commonly known and represents the *rate of obsolescence* for the new technology. We recover the baseline model if $\lambda = 0$. Continue to assume that agents have a common initial prior,

$$\beta_0 \sim N(\hat{\beta}_0, \nu_0), \quad (43)$$

with $\hat{\beta}_0 > 0$. They learn about β as follows.

Proposition 7 *This partially observed economy is equivalent to a perfectly observed econ-*

omy with aggregate consumption process

$$\frac{d\delta_t}{\delta_t} = \left(\bar{f} + \widehat{\beta}_t X - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \right) dt + \sigma(1 + kX) d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (44)$$

where

$$d\widehat{\beta}_t = -\lambda \widehat{\beta}_t dt + \frac{X\nu_t}{\sigma(1 + kX)} d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (45)$$

$$\frac{d\nu_t}{dt} = -2\lambda\nu_t - \frac{X^2\nu_t^2}{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}, \quad (46)$$

and \widehat{W}_t is a standard Brownian motion with respect to the agents' filtration $\{\mathcal{F}_t^\delta\}$.

Equation (46) implies

$$\nu_t = \left(\frac{e^{2\lambda t}}{\nu_0} + \frac{X^2}{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2} \frac{e^{2\lambda t} - 1}{2\lambda} \right)^{-1}, \quad (47)$$

which carries the same interpretation as (13).

The following is the counterpart of Proposition 2 in the infinite horizon case.

Proposition 8 Define the function $\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0, t)$ as follows:

$$\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0, t) \equiv \left[(1 - \gamma) \left(\bar{f} - \frac{c}{2} X^2 - \gamma \frac{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}{2} \right) - \rho \right] t + (1 - \gamma) \widehat{\beta}_0 X \frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda}. \quad (48)$$

(a) For any $X \geq 0$, the representative agent's lifetime expected utility is

$$\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \int_0^\infty \exp \left[\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0, t) + \frac{(\gamma-1)^2}{2} X^2 \nu_0 \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 \right] dt. \quad (49)$$

(b) The equilibrium price-dividend ratio equals

$$\mathcal{P}_0(X) \equiv \int_0^\infty \exp \left[\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0, t) + \frac{(\gamma-1)^2}{2} X^2 \nu_0 \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 \right] dt. \quad (50)$$

When $\lambda > 0$, the last terms in (48)-(50) are bounded as $t \rightarrow \infty$. We can thus derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the expected lifetime utility $\mathcal{U}_0(X)$ and the price-dividend ratio $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$ to be finite (the *transversality condition*, see Appendix A.10):

$$(1 - \gamma) \left(\bar{f} - \frac{c}{2} X^2 - \gamma \frac{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}{2} \right) - \rho < 0. \quad (51)$$

Obsolescence keeps the infinite horizon model stationary, while at the same time preserves concavity of the value function, as in Corollary 2.1. We now write a modified version of Proposition 4.

Proposition 9 *There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate level of experimentation under competition satisfies (51) and solves*

$$X_n^* = \frac{\widehat{\beta}_0 \mathcal{D}_0^E(X_n^*) - \gamma k \sigma^2 \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + \frac{n-1}{X_n^*}}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0^E(X_n^*)}, \quad (52)$$

and $x_i^* = X_n^*/n \ \forall i$. The quantity X_n^* is strictly increasing in n and $X_n^* > X^*$, $\forall n \geq 2$.

The main difference with Proposition 4 is that the rate of obsolescence modifies the wealth duration and wealth convexity that pertain to the economic value generated by the new technology. Hence the new quantities $\mathcal{D}_0^E(X_n^*)$ and $\mathcal{C}_0^E(X_n^*)$ in (52) are distinct from $\mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*)$, and $\mathcal{C}_0(X_n^*)$, as we show in Appendix A.10. With this in mind, all of our previous results go through in the infinite horizon case.

Higher technological obsolescence impacts both $\mathcal{D}_0^E(X_n^*)$ and $\mathcal{C}_0^E(X_n^*)$. Depending on which effect dominates in (52), higher obsolescence may lead to stronger or weaker aggregate experimentation. Figure 7 depicts the aggregate experimentation X_n^* as a function of the number of agents in the economy. We augment our baseline calibration with $\lambda \in [0.01, 0.15]$, which implies depreciation rates between 1% and 14% and a half-life for β_t between 5 and 65 years.¹⁷ The plot has two lines, one for $\lambda = 0.01$ (low obsolescence) and one for $\lambda = 0.15$ (high obsolescence). With our calibration, high obsolescence generates weaker experimentation when competition is low but stronger experimentation when competition is high. While we have not been able to prove the generality of this result, the illustration suggests that intense competition for technologies that are under stronger threat of becoming obsolete may exacerbate the over-experimentation result obtained in our baseline setup.

4.2 Technological Diversification

In the baseline setup, we assumed that the new technology experiences the same shock as the status quo, dW_t . But an important feature of endogenous growth models is *technological diversification* (Koren and Tenreyro, 2013): as new varieties are introduced in the

¹⁷These are relatively wide intervals that encompass measurements of depreciation rates of technological knowledge by Park, Shin, and Park (2006) and of technology cycle times (the median age of the patents cited on the front page of a patent document) by Kayal and Waters (1999).




Figure 7: **The Impact of Obsolescence on Experimentation.** The two lines depict the aggregate amount of experimentation X_n^* as a function of the number of agents in the economy, for two different values of the rate of obsolescence λ .

economy, each variety matters less in the aggregate, which becomes less volatile. Technological diversification has been advanced by [Koren and Tenreyro \(2013\)](#) as an explanation for the negative association between aggregate volatility and the level of development ([Lucas, 1988](#)).

Our model can be extended to account for diversification by adding a new, independent shock to the output process δ_t^E :

$$\frac{d\delta_t^E}{\delta_t^E} = \left(g - \frac{k^2\sigma^2}{2}X \right) dt + k\sigma \left(\varphi dW_t + \sqrt{1 - \varphi^2} dW_t^E \right), \quad (53)$$

where W_t^E is a Brownian motion independent of W_t , and we assume $\varphi \in [-1, 1]$.

We are back to the baseline model if $\varphi = 1$. If $|\varphi| < 1$, the new technology has a diversification benefit. A smaller parameter φ decreases the diffusion of δ_t , yielding a diversification gain from adopting the new technology. The dynamics described in Proposition 1 are now given by:

$$\frac{d\delta_t}{\delta_t} = \left(\bar{f} + \hat{\beta}_t X - \frac{c}{2}X^2 \right) dt + \sigma \sqrt{1 + k^2X^2 + 2\varphi kX} d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (54)$$

$$d\hat{\beta}_t = \frac{X\nu_t}{\sigma \sqrt{1 + k^2X^2 + 2\varphi kX}} d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (55)$$

$$d\nu_t = -\frac{X^2\nu_t^2}{\sigma^2(1 + k^2X^2 + 2\varphi kX)} dt, \quad (56)$$




Figure 8: **The Impact of Diversification on Experimentation.** The two lines depict the aggregate amount of experimentation X_n^* as a function of the number of agents in the economy, for two different values of the diversification parameter φ .

where $d\widehat{W}_t \equiv dW_t + \frac{X(\beta - \widehat{\beta}_t)}{\sigma\sqrt{1+k^2X^2+2\varphi kX}}dt$ is an independent Brownian motion under agents' filtration and represents the “surprise” change in aggregate consumption.

The following is the counterpart of Proposition 4.

Proposition 10 *There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate level of experimentation under competition among n agents solves*

$$X_n^* = \frac{(\widehat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \varphi \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + \frac{n-1}{X_n^*}}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X_n^*)}, \quad (57)$$

and $x_i^* = X_n^*/n \ \forall i$. The quantity X_n^* is strictly increasing in n and $X_n^* > X^*$, $\forall n \geq 1$.

Diversification ($\varphi < 1$) increases the aggregate level of experimentation and amplifies all of the results in Section 2. The amplification arises because the term $\widehat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \varphi \sigma^2$ now takes into account the diversification benefits of the new technology. Figure 8 illustrates the magnifying effect of diversification. The asset pricing results of Section 3 remain qualitatively the same, with a slight change in the diffusion of the aggregate consumption, as shown in (54).

The setup with technological diversification further allows us to consider an alternative learning exercise. In Section 2, instead of assuming that the agent learns by observing the history of aggregate consumption (6) only, we can assume that the investor learns by observing (4) and (53) separately. This is now possible, because the new Brownian

motion dW_t^E prevents full revelation of β . This alternative does not affect our main result of over-experimentation (see Appendix A.11.1).

4.3 Competition and Inequality

We assumed in Section 2.2 that all agents can actively experiment with the new technology. We now depart from this and consider that there are two groups of agents. The first are $n \geq 1$ *active agents*, who are similar to those in Section 2. The second are *passive agents*, who are residual claimants in the economy. Since they are passive, we aggregate them into one agent p .

All agents derive utility from consumption with the same coefficient of risk aversion as in (2). Together they consume the aggregate consumption basket δ_t . The distinguishing feature between active and passive agents is that only the active agents are able to allocate capital to the production of the experimental good: the n active agents in aggregate choose a level of experimentation $X_n = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$. By doing so, they are rewarded for introducing innovation into the economy and collectively receive the rents associated with the experimental good. We show in Appendix A.1 that the size of these rents is measured as the aggregate expenditure share of the experimental good,

$$p_t^E \delta_t^E = \frac{X_n}{1 + X_n} \delta_t, \quad (58)$$

where p_t^E is the equilibrium price of the experimental good, expressed in terms of the numéraire (the aggregate good δ_t). Thus, the main difference with the baseline model of Section 2.2 is that the active agents compete for a share $X_n/(1 + X_n)$ of the total consumption stream, which itself is *increasing* in aggregate experimentation.

In keeping with Section 2.2, we assume that each individual active agent's experimentation choice dictates her own share of the aggregate consumption:

$$\theta_i = \frac{x_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n x_j} \frac{X_n}{1 + X_n} = \frac{x_i}{1 + X_n}. \quad (59)$$

This yields a modified Tullock contest, in which the success functions are $x_i/(1 + X_n)$ instead of x_i/X_n .

The following is the counterpart of Proposition 4 in this modified version of the game.

Proposition 11 *There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which the aggre-*

gate level of experimentation under competition among n agents solves

$$X_n^* = \frac{(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + \frac{n-1}{X_n^*} + \frac{1}{X_n^*(1+X_n^*)}}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X_n^*)}, \quad (60)$$

and $x_i^* = X_n^*/n \forall i$. The quantity X_n^* is strictly increasing in n and $X_n^* > X^*$, $\forall n \geq 1$.

For any value $n \geq 1$, the equilibrium level of experimentation that results from Proposition 11 is always higher than the level of experimentation in the baseline model. This arises because the active agents together increase their total share of consumption, $X_n^*/(1+X_n^*)$, which provides them with an additional incentive to experiment. It creates a new term in the numerator of (60), $1/[X_n^*/(1+X_n^*)]$. Since this term is positive, the left-hand side must be higher than in Proposition 4 in order to restore the equality.

In turn, when active agents experiment more here than in the baseline model, this imposes a displacement effect and added risk on the passive agent (Kogan et al., 2020). So, rent seeking and competition by active agents not only reduces the consumption share for passive agents, it worsens the quality of the dividend stream. This latter effect arises because rent seeking exposes the passive agent to too much risk relative to the expected benefits, and lowers her expected utility from future consumption. In turn, then, innovation and competition may worsen income inequality (Jones and Kim, 2018).¹⁸

4.4 Competition in a Model with Recursive Preferences

In a final extension, we attempt to relax the assumption of isoelastic preferences employed in Section 2. An unfortunate feature of standard isoelastic preferences is that, by imposing equality between risk aversion and aversion to intertemporal substitution, they hide the determinant role played by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In Appendix A.13, we develop an alternative model with stochastic differential utility (Epstein and Zin, 1989), which departs from the time-additive isoelastic framework of our paper by separating risk aversion from aversion to intertemporal substitution.

With stochastic differential utility, a log-linear approximation of the price-dividend ratio is necessary to reach a solution (Restoy and Weil, 2010; Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Beeler and Campbell, 2012; Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein, 2011). We are able to solve the alternative model using this approximation, and we show that it delivers

¹⁸Innovation and top income inequality in the US and other developed countries tend to follow a parallel evolution. According to Aghion et al. (2015), 11 out of the 50 wealthiest individuals across US in 2015 “are listed as inventors in a US patent and many more manage or own firms that patent.”

qualitatively similar results: 1) competition for market share yields over-experimentation, which in turn increases with the number of competitors in the economy; 2) technological uncertainty generates over-valuation of the risky asset; and 3) this latter effect is further exacerbated by competition.

When agents have recursive preferences, they are sensitive to long-run uncertainty about consumption growth. Section 2 shows that our setup with experimentation creates uncertainty about future consumption growth (which in our model is represented by technological uncertainty) and inserts a small but persistent component $\hat{\beta}_t$ in the growth rate of consumption. In short, our model endogenously creates long-run risks in the spirit of [Bansal and Yaron \(2004\)](#). This connects our study with a growing literature initiated by [Kung and Schmid \(2015\)](#) and [Kung \(2015\)](#), who provide equilibrium foundations of long-run risk through innovation and R&D. Indeed, Appendix A.13 shows that the market price of risk in our version of the model with recursive utility increases with technological uncertainty, and this is further exacerbated by strong levels of competition and experimentation. While our main observations (over-experimentation and over-valuation caused by Schumpeterian competition) are preserved in this extension of the model, competition and its effect of experimentation are shown to increase long-run risks. An important avenue for future research is to better understand the interaction between Schumpeterian competition, experimentation through learning by doing, and long-run risk.

The Epstein-Zin framework further highlights the role of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) for our results. Specifically, the way technological uncertainty affects the quantity of risk (the volatility of stock returns) depends solely on the EIS: when the EIS is higher than one (consistent with the calibration of the long-run risk literature), technological uncertainty magnifies stock return volatility; the opposite occurs when the EIS is lower than one.¹⁹ These results point to a potentially important role played by the EIS (or the variation in the EIS) during technological revolutions.

5 Conclusion

This paper proposes a risk-return perspective on [Schumpeter \(1934\)](#)'s evolutionary economics ideas. Using a market penetration game in which agents compete for a share of the consumption stream, we study how competition affects risk, wealth, and prices.

¹⁹Empirical studies disagree about reasonable values for the EIS. Some studies find EIS greater than one ([Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio, 2003](#)), other studies find EIS smaller than one ([Campbell, 1999](#); [Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002](#)).

Risk arises from various sources. First, the new technology disrupts existing assets, making their future use uncertain. The second source of risk is technological uncertainty, which naturally arises when agents adopt and experiment with new ways of doing things. Agents' choice to experiment with the new technology creates both sources of risks, and competition for market share magnifies them.

What we learn from the model, however, is that the agents' actions also affect the duration of the consumption stream, that is, the weighted-average maturity of wealth. Higher wealth duration in our model exposes investors to more technological uncertainty. As experimentation with the new technology grows, wealth duration increases. Because of investors' hedging motives, a complementarity between wealth duration and technological uncertainty decreases systematic risk and the risk premium. Sufficiently intense competition can lead to a negative risk premium, but this effect is transient due to learning. Eventually, as agents learn more about the new technology, the risk premium becomes positive and reflects mainly the persistent disruption risk that investors bear when they hold the risky asset.

Finally, not all agents in the economy benefit from the new technology: in the model, passive investors are missing the rewards of the new technology and their welfare decreases monotonically when an increasing number of active agents fight for a share of the pie. Thus, Schumpeterian competition can worsen income inequality.

As such, we provide a new perspective on Schumpeterian competition with new implications. Indeed, Schumpeter not only emphasized monopoly rents and competition, but also the costs of innovation and its risks.

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A Appendix

A.1 Intratemporal Choice and Expenditure Shares

Consider the intratemporal choice of the agent at any time $t \in [0, T]$. Define the numéraire as δ_t and let p_t^S (p_t^E) denote the price of the status-quo (experimental) good. Thus

$$\delta_t = p_t^S \delta_t^S + p_t^E \delta_t^E. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

Given an equilibrium level of experimentation X , the expenditure shares $p_t^S \delta_t^S$ and $p_t^E \delta_t^E$ are determined by the following maximization problem subject to (A.1):

$$\max_{\delta_t^S, \delta_t^E} \frac{[\delta_t^S (\delta_t^E)^X]^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Solving for δ_t^E in (A.1) yields $\delta_t^E = (\delta_t - p_t^S \delta_t^S)/p_t^E$. Replacing this into (A.2) and taking the first-order condition with respect to δ_t^S yields $p_t^S \delta_t^S = \delta_t/(1+X)$. Thus, the agent spends a fraction $1/(1+X)$ on the status-quo good and a fraction $X/(1+X)$ on the experimental good.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 1

The proof of Proposition 1 follows from direct application of standard filtering theory:

Theorem A.1 (*Liptser and Shiryaev, 2001, theorem 12.1, p. 22*) Let $(\theta, \xi) = (\theta_t, \xi_t)$, $0 \leq t \leq T$, be a continuous random diffusion-type, conditionally Gaussian process with:

$$d\theta_t = [a_0(t, \xi) + a_1(t, \xi)\theta_t]dt + b_1(t, \xi)dW_1(t) + b_2(t, \xi)dW_2(t), \quad (\text{A.3})$$

$$d\xi_t = [A_0(t, \xi) + A_1(t, \xi)\theta_t]dt + B(t, \xi)dW_2(t), \quad (\text{A.4})$$

where W_1 and W_2 are mutually independent standard Brownian motions. If conditions (11.4)-(11.8) and (12.16)-(12.18) in *Liptser and Shiryaev (2001)* are satisfied and the conditional distribution $P(\theta_0 \leq a|\xi_0)$ is Gaussian, $N(m_0, \nu_0)$, then the a posteriori mean $m_t = \mathbb{E}(\theta_t|\mathcal{F}_t^\xi)$ and the a posteriori variance $\nu_t = \mathbb{E}[(\theta_t - m_t)^2|\mathcal{F}_t^\xi]$ satisfy equations

$$dm_t = [a_0(t, \xi) + a_1(t, \xi)m_t]dt + \frac{b_2(t, \xi)B(t, \xi) + \nu_t A_1(t, \xi)}{B^2(t, \xi)}[d\xi_t - (A_0(t, \xi) + A_1(t, \xi)m_t)dt], \quad (\text{A.5})$$

$$\frac{d\nu_t}{dt} = 2a_1(t, \xi)\nu_t + b_1^2(t, \xi) + b_2^2(t, \xi) - \left(\frac{b_2(t, \xi)B(t, \xi) + \nu_t A_1(t, \xi)}{B(t, \xi)} \right)^2, \quad (\text{A.6})$$

subject to the conditions $m_0 = \mathbb{E}(\theta_0|\xi_0)$, $\nu_0 = \mathbb{E}[(\theta_0 - m_0)^2|\xi_0]$.

In the present setup, the unobservable variable is the constant β . Hence, $a_0 = a_1 = b_1 = b_2 = 0$. The observable process is δ_t . Applying Itô's lemma on $\ln \delta_t$ yields

$$d \ln \delta_t = \left[\bar{f} + \beta X - \frac{c}{2} X^2 - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 (1 + kX)^2 \right] dt + \sigma (1 + kX) dW_t, \quad (\text{A.7})$$

and thus

$$A_0 = \bar{f} - \frac{c}{2}X^2 - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(1+kX)^2, \quad A_1 = X, \quad B = \sigma(1+kX). \quad (\text{A.8})$$

Because a_0 , a_1 , b_1 , b_2 , A_0 , A_1 , and B are constants, all the conditions of Theorem A.1 are satisfied. Direct application of (A.5) then yields

$$d\hat{\beta}_t = \frac{\nu_t X}{\sigma^2(1+kX)^2} \left[d\ln \delta_t - \left(\bar{f} + \hat{\beta}_t X - \frac{c}{2}X^2 - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(1+kX)^2 \right) dt \right] \quad (\text{A.9})$$

$$= \frac{\nu_t X}{\sigma^2(1+kX)^2} \left[X(\beta - \hat{\beta}_t)dt + \sigma(1+kX)dW_t \right] \quad (\text{A.10})$$

$$= \frac{\nu_t X}{\sigma(1+kX)} \left[\frac{X(\beta - \hat{\beta}_t)}{\sigma(1+kX)}dt + dW_t \right] = \frac{\nu_t X}{\sigma(1+kX)} d\widehat{W}_t. \quad (\text{A.11})$$

Eq. (A.11) defines $d\widehat{W}_t$ as a shock proportional to the “surprise” change in consumption that occurs in (A.9) in the square brackets. The division of this surprise by $\sigma(1+kX)$ in (A.11) ensures that \widehat{W}_t is a standard Brownian motion with respect to the agent’s filtration $\{\mathcal{F}_t^\delta\}$.

Eq. (A.6) further implies

$$\frac{d\nu_t}{dt} = -\frac{X^2\nu_t^2}{\sigma^2(1+kX)^2}. \quad \square \quad (\text{A.12})$$

A.3 Proof of Proposition 2

Part (a) of Proposition 2 Part (a) follows from the theory of affine processes (Duffie et al., 2003). An application of Fubini’s theorem yields

$$\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \frac{\delta_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} dt \right] = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t^{1-\gamma}] dt. \quad (\text{A.13})$$

Note that the expectation $\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t^{1-\gamma}]$ can be written as

$$\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t^{1-\gamma}] = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[e^{(1-\gamma)\ln \delta_t} \right]. \quad (\text{A.14})$$

The exponent in (A.14), $(1-\gamma)\ln \delta_t$, is an affine function of the vector $[\ln \delta_t \quad \hat{\beta}_t]'$, whose dynamics can be written under an affine form:

$$\begin{bmatrix} d\ln \delta_t \\ d\hat{\beta}_t \end{bmatrix} = \left(\begin{bmatrix} \bar{f} - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(1+kX)^2 - \frac{c}{2}X^2 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 & X \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln \delta_t \\ \hat{\beta}_t \end{bmatrix} \right) dt + \begin{bmatrix} \sigma(1+kX) \\ A(t) \end{bmatrix} d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (\text{A.15})$$

where $A(t)$ is a function of time that results from Proposition 1 and Eq. (13):

$$A(t) = \frac{\nu_0 X \sigma(1+kX)}{\nu_0 X^2 t + \sigma^2(1+kX)^2}. \quad (\text{A.16})$$

Because the diffusion of $\hat{\beta}$ depends on time, (A.15) is a *time-inhomogeneous* multi-factor

affine process (Filipović, 2005). Define:

$$K_0 \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \bar{f} - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(1+kX)^2 - \frac{c}{2}X^2 & \\ 0 & \end{bmatrix}, \quad (\text{A.17})$$

$$K_1 \equiv \begin{bmatrix} 0 & X \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (\text{A.18})$$

$$H_0(t) \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \sigma(1+kX) \\ A(t) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \sigma(1+kX) \\ A(t) \end{bmatrix}' = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma^2(1+kX)^2 & \sigma(1+kX)A(t) \\ \sigma(1+kX)A(t) & A(t)^2 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (\text{A.19})$$

Let $t, s \in [0, T]$ such that $t \leq s \leq T$, and define $\tau = s - t$. In order to compute the expectation $\mathbb{E}_t[\delta_s^{1-\gamma}] = \mathbb{E}_t[e^{(1-\gamma)\ln \delta_s}]$, we conjecture an exponential-affine solution of the form

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\delta_s^{1-\gamma}] = e^{\alpha_0(\tau) + \alpha_1(\tau) \ln \delta_t + \alpha_2(\tau) \hat{\beta}_t}, \quad (\text{A.20})$$

for some coefficient functions $\alpha_j(\cdot)$, $j = 0, 1, 2$, which satisfy

$$\begin{bmatrix} \alpha_1'(\tau) \\ \alpha_2'(\tau) \end{bmatrix} = K_1^\top \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_1(\tau) \\ \alpha_2(\tau) \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{A.21})$$

$$\alpha_0'(\tau) = K_0^\top \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_1(\tau) \\ \alpha_2(\tau) \end{bmatrix} + \frac{1}{2} [\alpha_1(\tau) \quad \alpha_2(\tau)] H_0(t) \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_1(\tau) \\ \alpha_2(\tau) \end{bmatrix}, \quad (\text{A.22})$$

with boundary conditions $\alpha_0(0) = 0$, $\alpha_1(0) = 1 - \gamma$, and $\alpha_2(0) = 0$. This is a system of Riccati ordinary differential equations (Duffie et al., 2003). Eq. (A.21) has a straightforward solution:

$$\alpha_1(\tau) = 1 - \gamma \quad (\text{A.23})$$

$$\alpha_2(\tau) = (1 - \gamma)X\tau, \quad (\text{A.24})$$

which can be now inserted in the remaining Riccati equation (A.22):

$$\alpha_0'(\tau) = \begin{bmatrix} \bar{f} - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(1+kX)^2 - \frac{c}{2}X^2 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 - \gamma \\ (1 - \gamma)X\tau \end{bmatrix} + \frac{1}{2} [1 - \gamma \quad (1 - \gamma)X\tau] H_0(t) \begin{bmatrix} 1 - \gamma \\ (1 - \gamma)X\tau \end{bmatrix}, \quad (\text{A.25})$$

leading to

$$\alpha_0'(\tau) = \frac{1}{2}(\gamma - 1)\{-2\bar{f} + cX^2 + \sigma^2(1+kX)^2 + (\gamma - 1)[\sigma(1+kX) + X\tau A(t)]^2\}. \quad (\text{A.26})$$

Replacing $A(t)$ from (A.16) and t by $s - \tau$ yields

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha_0'(\tau) &= \frac{1}{2}(\gamma - 1) [-2\bar{f} + cX^2 + \sigma^2(1+kX)^2] \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{2}(\gamma - 1)^2\sigma^2(1+kX)^2 \left(\frac{\sigma^2(1+kX)^2 + X^2\nu_0 s}{\sigma^2(1+kX)^2 + X^2\nu_0(s - \tau)} \right)^2, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.27})$$

with boundary condition $\alpha_0(0) = 0$. Solving this equation by integration is straightforward because only the last term depends on τ . Further using (13) to replace ν_0 with a function of ν_t

yields a solution for α_0 for any $t, s \in [0, T]$ with $s \geq t$ and $\tau = s - t$:

$$\alpha_0(\tau) = \frac{1}{2}(\gamma - 1) [-2\bar{f} + cX^2 + \gamma\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2] \tau + \frac{1}{2}X^2\nu_t(\gamma - 1)^2\tau^2. \quad (\text{A.28})$$

Written at time 0 and with $\tau = t$, the solution of the Riccati system (A.21)-(A.22) is

$$\alpha_0(t) = \frac{1}{2}(\gamma - 1) [-2\bar{f} + cX^2 + \gamma\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2] t + \frac{1}{2}X^2\nu_0(\gamma - 1)^2t^2, \quad (\text{A.29})$$

$$\alpha_1(t) = 1 - \gamma, \quad (\text{A.30})$$

$$\alpha_2(t) = (1 - \gamma)Xt, \quad (\text{A.31})$$

which can now be replaced into the conjecture (A.20). After multiplication with $e^{-\rho t}$, we obtain:

$$e^{-\rho t}\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t^{1-\gamma}] = \exp\left[-\rho t + \alpha_0(t) + \alpha_1(t)\ln\delta_0 + \alpha_2(t)\widehat{\beta}_0\right] \quad (\text{A.32})$$

$$= \exp\left[(1 - \gamma)\ln\delta_0 + \kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0)t + \frac{(\gamma - 1)^2X^2\nu_0}{2}t^2\right], \quad (\text{A.33})$$

where $\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0)$ is defined as in (14):

$$\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0) \equiv (1 - \gamma)\left(\bar{f} + X\widehat{\beta}_0 - \gamma\frac{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}{2} - \frac{c}{2}X^2\right) - \rho. \quad (\text{A.34})$$

Replacing (A.33) into (A.13) yields Eq. (15) of Proposition 2:

$$\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} \int_0^T \exp\left[\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0)t + \frac{(\gamma - 1)^2X^2\nu_0}{2}t^2\right] dt. \quad (\text{A.35})$$

Part (b) of Proposition 2 Part (b) follows from standard asset pricing theory (Duffie, 2010). In this setup with time-additive utility, we define the stochastic discount factor from the optimal consumption plan of the aggregate consumer as

$$\xi_t = e^{-\rho t} \frac{u'(\delta_t)}{u'(\delta_0)} = e^{-\rho t} \frac{\delta_t^{-\gamma}}{\delta_0^{-\gamma}}. \quad (\text{A.36})$$

The equilibrium price of the risky asset at time 0 is then

$$P_0(X) = \mathbb{E}_0\left[\int_0^T \xi_t \delta_t dt\right] = \delta_0^\gamma \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t^{1-\gamma}] dt, \quad (\text{A.37})$$

and we recognize the same integral as in (A.13). Using (A.33), the price-dividend ratio is then

$$\mathcal{P}_0(X) = \frac{P_0(X)}{\delta_0} = \int_0^T \exp\left[\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0)t + \frac{(\gamma - 1)^2X^2\nu_0}{2}t^2\right] dt. \quad (\text{A.38})$$

The following relation holds between expected lifetime utility and the price-dividend ratio

$$\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} \mathcal{P}_0(X). \quad \square \quad (\text{A.39})$$

A.4 Proof of Corollary 2.1

To prove Corollary 2.1, we write the lifetime utility under the following form:

$$\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \int_0^T e^{y(\hat{\beta}_0, \nu_0, X, t)} dt, \quad (\text{A.40})$$

and consider the second partial derivative of the function $y(\hat{\beta}_0, \nu_0, X, t)$ with respect to X ,

$$\frac{\partial^2 y(\hat{\beta}_0, \nu_0, X, t)}{\partial X^2} = t(\gamma - 1) [c + \gamma \sigma^2 k^2 + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 t], \quad (\text{A.41})$$

which follows from (A.33).

If $\gamma > 1$, the second derivative $\partial^2 y / \partial X^2$ is strictly positive $\forall t \in (0, T]$ and thus the function y is strictly convex in X . Since y is strictly convex, e^y is log-convex (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, p. 104). Furthermore, log-convexity is preserved under sums and integrals (Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004, p. 105-106). Thus, if $\gamma > 1$ the integral $\int_0^T e^{y(\hat{\beta}_0, \nu_0, X, t)} dt$, which represents the price-dividend ratio $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$ as defined in (16), is log-convex in X . Since a log-convex function is strictly convex, $\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \mathcal{P}_0(X)$ and $\gamma > 1$ imply that $\mathcal{U}_0(X)$ is strictly concave in X .

Log-convexity of $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$ implies that the function $\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X) / \partial X$ is increasing in X . This result is important for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium level of experimentation with competition (Proposition 4). More precisely, using Definition 1,

$$\frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X)}{\partial X} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_0(X)} \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}_0(X)}{\partial X} = \frac{\partial \kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0)}{\partial X} \mathcal{D}_0(X) + (\gamma - 1)^2 X \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X) \quad (\text{A.42})$$

$$= (1 - \gamma) \left[\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2 (1 + kX) - cX \right] \mathcal{D}_0(X) + (\gamma - 1)^2 X \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X) \quad (\text{A.43})$$

$$= (1 - \gamma) (\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X) + X [(\gamma - 1)(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X) + (\gamma - 1)^2 \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X)]. \quad (\text{A.44})$$

Both $\mathcal{D}_0(X)$ and $\mathcal{C}_0(X)$ are weighted averages and thus their values are finite: $\mathcal{D}_0(X) \in (0, T]$ and $\mathcal{C}_0(X) \in (0, T^2]$. We can therefore find the limits of $\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X) / \partial X$ at $X = 0$ and $X \rightarrow \infty$. If $X = 0$ then $\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X) / \partial X = (1 - \gamma) (\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(0)$. Furthermore, when $\gamma > 1$,

$$\lim_{X \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X)}{\partial X} = \infty. \quad (\text{A.45})$$

and thus $\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X) / \partial X$ increases in X from $(1 - \gamma) (\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(0)$ to ∞ . \square

A.5 Proof of Proposition 3

In the first-order condition (20), compute

$$\frac{\partial \kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0)}{\partial X} = (1 - \gamma) \left(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma \sigma^2 k (1 + kX) - cX \right), \quad (\text{A.46})$$

which, after replacement into (20) leads to

$$(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X) = X [(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X)]. \quad (\text{A.47})$$

This equation in X has a positive solution only if $\widehat{\beta}_0 > \gamma k \sigma^2$, in which case the optimal level of experimentation solves the following implicit equation:

$$X^* = \frac{(\widehat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X^*)}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X^*) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X^*)}. \quad \square \quad (\text{A.48})$$

A.6 Experimentation as a Mean-Variance Tradeoff

We will show here that the optimal level of experimentation in (21) results from a mean-variance tradeoff, whereby the agent prefers higher expected future consumption at each t , $\{\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t], t \in (0, T]\}$, and dislikes higher variance of future consumption at each t , $\{\text{Var}_0[\delta_t], t \in (0, T]\}$.

The expectation $\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t]$ is computed using the same method as in Appendix A.3, with the sole difference that the boundary conditions for the Riccati system (A.21)-(A.22) are $\alpha_0(0) = 0$, $\alpha_1(0) = 1$, and $\alpha_2(0) = 0$. This yields

$$\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t] = \delta_0 \exp \left[\left(\bar{f} + X \widehat{\beta}_0 - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \right) t + \frac{X^2 \nu_0}{2} t^2 \right]. \quad (\text{A.49})$$

The variance $\text{Var}_0[\delta_t]$ is

$$\text{Var}_0[\delta_t] = \mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t^2] - \mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t]^2, \quad (\text{A.50})$$

where (using the same method as in Appendix A.3, with the sole difference that the boundary conditions for the Riccati system (A.21)-(A.22) are $\alpha_0(0) = 0$, $\alpha_1(0) = 2$, and $\alpha_2(0) = 0$):

$$\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t^2] = \delta_0^2 \exp \left[2 \left(\bar{f} + X \widehat{\beta}_0 - \frac{c}{2} X^2 + \frac{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}{2} \right) t + 2X^2 \nu_0 t^2 \right], \quad (\text{A.51})$$

and thus

$$\text{Var}_0[\delta_t] = \mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t]^2 \left(\exp \left[\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2 t + X^2 \nu_0 t^2 \right] - 1 \right). \quad (\text{A.52})$$

The expected lifetime utility, after replacing $\kappa(X, \widehat{\beta}_0)$ from (14), is

$$\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \int_0^T \frac{e^{-\rho t} \delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \exp \left[(1-\gamma) \left(\bar{f} + X \widehat{\beta}_0 - \gamma \frac{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}{2} - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \right) t + \frac{(\gamma-1)^2 X^2 \nu_0}{2} t^2 \right] dt \quad (\text{A.53})$$

$$= \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \frac{\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t]^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \left(\exp \left[\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2 t + X^2 \nu_0 t^2 \right] \right)^{\frac{1}{2}\gamma(\gamma-1)} dt \quad (\text{A.54})$$

$$= \int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \frac{\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t]^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \left(\frac{\text{Var}_0[\delta_t]}{\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t]^2} + 1 \right)^{\frac{1}{2}\gamma(\gamma-1)} dt, \quad (\text{A.55})$$

where the last equality follows from (A.52). It is straightforward to verify that, for any value of $\gamma > 0$, (A.55) strictly increases with $\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t]$ and strictly decreases with $\text{Var}_0[\delta_t]$.

The agent's experimentation choice X impacts both $\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t]$ and $\text{Var}_0[\delta_t]$. It is clear from (A.49) and (A.52) that, at $X = 0$, both $\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t]$ and $\text{Var}_0[\delta_t]$ strictly increase with X , consistent with the idea that adopting a new technology increases expected growth, but also makes the future more risky. Thus, when choosing the amount of experimentation, the risk-averse agent

trades off a higher path of expected consumption against a higher path of variance of future consumption, consistent with a classic mean-variance tradeoff (Markowitz, 1952).

A.7 Proof of Proposition 4

The proof starts from (29):

$$\frac{(\gamma - 1)(n - 1)}{X_n} = \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}. \quad (\text{A.56})$$

As discussed in the text, when $n \geq 2$ this equation in X_n has a unique positive solution. On the right-hand side of (A.56), we have

$$\frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_0(X_n)} \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n} = \frac{\partial \kappa(X_n, \hat{\beta}_0)}{\partial X_n} \mathcal{D}_0(X_n) + (\gamma - 1)^2 X_n \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X_n) \quad (\text{A.57})$$

$$= (1 - \gamma) \left[\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2 (1 + k X_n) - c X_n \right] \mathcal{D}_0(X_n) + (\gamma - 1)^2 X_n \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X_n) \quad (\text{A.58})$$

$$= (1 - \gamma) (\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n) + X_n [(\gamma - 1)(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n) + (\gamma - 1)^2 \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X_n)], \quad (\text{A.59})$$

and thus (A.56) yields

$$\frac{n - 1}{X_n} + (\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n) = X_n [(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X_n)], \quad (\text{A.60})$$

which leads to Eq. (30):

$$X_n^* = \frac{(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + \frac{n-1}{X_n^*}}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X_n^*)}. \quad (\text{A.61})$$

When $n = 1$, we are back to the one-agent economy and we recover the social optimum of Proposition 3. Since the left-hand side of (A.56) strictly increases in n (see panel (a) of Figure 1 for an illustration), the equilibrium X_n^* strictly increases in n and $X_n^* > X^*$, $\forall n \geq 2$.

We provide here more intuition for the result that X_n^* increases with n . The equilibrium level of experimentation in an economy with n agents solves:

$$\frac{(\gamma - 1)(n - 1)}{X_n^*} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{U}_0(X_n^*)} \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0(X_n^*)}{\partial X_n^*}. \quad (\text{A.62})$$

Using the fact that $\mathcal{U}_0(X_n^*)$ takes strictly negative values when $\gamma > 1$, we obtain

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0(X_n^*)}{\partial X_n^*} = \frac{(\gamma - 1)(n - 1)}{X_n^*} \mathcal{U}_0(X_n^*) < 0. \quad (\text{A.63})$$

Consider an economy with $n + 1$ agents. For any agent i , a marginal increase in x_i changes $\mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_{n+1})$ by (this is the equivalent of (26), written here for $n + 1$ agents):

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_{n+1})}{\partial x_i} = \frac{(1 - \gamma)(X_{n+1} - x_i)}{x_i X_{n+1}} \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_{n+1}) + \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0(X_{n+1})}{\partial X_{n+1}}. \quad (\text{A.64})$$

Assume now that the $n + 1$ agents experiment at the level X_n^* , that is, $x_j = X_n^*/(n + 1)$ for

all j . Replacing this into (A.64) and using (A.62) to replace $\partial \mathcal{U}_0(X_n^*)/\partial X_n^*$ yields

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_{n+1})}{\partial x_i} = \frac{(1-\gamma)n}{X_n^*} \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_n^*) - \frac{(1-\gamma)(n-1)}{X_n^*} \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_n^*) \quad (\text{A.65})$$

$$= \frac{1}{X_n^*} \theta_i^{1-\gamma} (1-\gamma) \mathcal{U}_0(X_n^*) > 0. \quad (\text{A.66})$$

Getting back to (32),

$$\mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_{n+1}) = \left(\frac{x_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{n+1} x_j} \right)^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_{n+1}), \quad (\text{A.67})$$

in the economy with $n+1$ agents in which we start from the aggregate equilibrium $X_{n+1} = X_n^*$, a marginal change in x_i decreases the total pie $\mathcal{U}_0(X_{n+1})$ according to (A.63), but also increases the consumption share $x_i / \sum_{j=1}^{n+1} x_j$. This latter effect dominates such that (A.66) is satisfied. Thus, every agent has an incentive to increase her own experimentation from the level $X_n^*/(n+1)$ so that in equilibrium the aggregate level of experimentation increases in n . \square

A.8 Proofs of Propositions 5 and 6

Propositions 5 and 6 follow from standard asset pricing theory. The following Lemma characterizes the dynamic process for the stochastic discount factor in an economy in which the aggregate level of experimentation is X_n^* .

Lemma A.1 *The stochastic discount factor, defined as $\xi_t \equiv e^{-\rho t}(\delta_t/\delta_0)^{-\gamma}$, follows*

$$\frac{d\xi_t}{\xi_t} = - \left[\rho + \gamma \left(\bar{f} + \hat{\beta}_t X_n^* - \frac{c}{2} (X_n^*)^2 \right) - \frac{\gamma(\gamma+1)}{2} \sigma^2 (1 + kX_n^*)^2 \right] dt - \gamma \sigma (1 + kX_n^*) d\widehat{W}_t. \quad (\text{A.68})$$

The equilibrium risk-free rate and the market price of risk (Sharpe ratio) are given by

$$r_t^f = \rho + \gamma \left(\bar{f} + \hat{\beta}_t X_n^* - \frac{c}{2} (X_n^*)^2 \right) - \frac{\gamma(\gamma+1)}{2} \sigma^2 (1 + kX_n^*)^2, \quad (\text{A.69})$$

$$\text{SR}_t = \gamma \sigma (1 + kX_n^*). \quad (\text{A.70})$$

The proof follows standard results in asset pricing (Duffie, 2010). Assuming time-additive expected utility, the stochastic discount factor is defined from the optimal consumption plan of the aggregate consumer as

$$\xi_t = e^{-\rho t} \frac{u'(c_t)}{u'(c_0)}. \quad (\text{A.71})$$

In our case investors consume fixed shares of the aggregate consumption and observe the economy under the same filtration. Thus, they all share the same stochastic discount factor. Given the CRRA assumption, the dynamics of ξ can then be expressed as in (A.68) using Itô's Lemma. The continuously compounded risk-free rate is the negative of the drift of the stochastic discount factor, whereas the market price of risk is the negative of the diffusion of the stochastic discount factor. This yields (A.69)-(A.70).

Proof of Proposition 5 To prove Proposition 5, start from the value function of any investor i . In an economy with n investors, investor i consumes a share θ_i of the aggregate consumption and thus her value function written at time t follows from Proposition 2:

$$J(\delta_t, \hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, \theta_i, X_n^*) = \frac{e^{-\rho t}(\theta_i \delta_t)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \mathcal{P}(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*), \quad (\text{A.72})$$

where $\mathcal{P}(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*)$, defined in (16) and written here at time t , is the price-dividend ratio:

$$\mathcal{P}(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*) \equiv \int_t^T \exp \left[\kappa(X_n^*, \hat{\beta}_t)(s-t) + \frac{(1-\gamma)^2}{2} (X_n^*)^2 \nu_t (s-t)^2 \right] ds. \quad (\text{A.73})$$

Denote by \mathcal{W}_t^i the wealth of investor i at time t . Since the risk-free asset is in zero-net supply, $\mathcal{W}_t^i = \theta_i \delta_t \mathcal{P}(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*)$ and the value function can further be written:

$$J(\mathcal{W}_t^i, \hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*) = \frac{e^{-\rho t}(\mathcal{W}_t^i)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \mathcal{P}(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*)^\gamma. \quad (\text{A.74})$$

From the analysis in Merton (1973) and Brennan (1998), investor i 's optimal portfolio demand can then be written as

$$\phi_t = \frac{J_{\mathcal{W}^i}}{-J_{\mathcal{W}^i \mathcal{W}^i} \mathcal{W}_t^i} \frac{\text{Risk Premium}_t}{\sigma_{P,t}^2} + \frac{J_{\mathcal{W}^i \hat{\beta}}}{-J_{\mathcal{W}^i \mathcal{W}^i} \mathcal{W}_t^i} \frac{\text{Cov}_t(d\hat{\beta}_t, dP_t/P_t)}{\sigma_{P,t}^2}. \quad (\text{A.75})$$

To compute $\text{Cov}_t(d\hat{\beta}_t, dP_t/P_t)/\sigma_{P,t}^2$, we need to characterize the equilibrium price of the risky asset claim to aggregate consumption at time t , P_t , which equals $P_t = \delta_t \mathcal{P}(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*)$. Compute the following partial derivatives of the price-dividend ratio:

$$\mathcal{P}_t \equiv \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}}{\partial t} = -1 - \kappa(X_n^*, \hat{\beta}_t) \mathcal{P}(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*) - (1-\gamma)^2 (X_n^*)^2 \nu_t G(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*), \quad (\text{A.76})$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{\hat{\beta}} \equiv \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}}{\partial \hat{\beta}_t} = (1-\gamma) X_n^* G(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*), \quad (\text{A.77})$$

$$\mathcal{P}_{\hat{\beta}\hat{\beta}} \equiv \frac{\partial^2 \mathcal{P}}{\partial \hat{\beta}_t^2} = (1-\gamma)^2 (X_n^*)^2 H(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*), \quad (\text{A.78})$$

$$\mathcal{P}_\nu \equiv \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}}{\partial \nu_t} = \frac{(1-\gamma)^2}{2} (X_n^*)^2 H(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*), \quad (\text{A.79})$$

where we define the functions

$$G(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*) \equiv \int_t^T (s-t) \exp \left[\kappa(X_n^*, \hat{\beta}_t)(s-t) + \frac{(1-\gamma)^2}{2} (X_n^*)^2 \nu_t (s-t)^2 \right] ds \quad (\text{A.80})$$

$$H(\hat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*) \equiv \int_t^T (s-t)^2 \exp \left[\kappa(X_n^*, \hat{\beta}_t)(s-t) + \frac{(1-\gamma)^2}{2} (X_n^*)^2 \nu_t (s-t)^2 \right] ds. \quad (\text{A.81})$$

We can then write

$$\frac{J_{\mathcal{W}^i}}{-J_{\mathcal{W}^i \mathcal{W}^i} \mathcal{W}_t^i} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{J_{\mathcal{W}^i \hat{\beta}}}{-J_{\mathcal{W}^i \mathcal{W}^i} \mathcal{W}_t^i} = \frac{\mathcal{P}_{\hat{\beta}}}{\mathcal{P}}. \quad (\text{A.82})$$

Apply Ito's formula to $P_t = \delta_t \mathcal{P}(\widehat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t, X_n^*)$,

$$dP_t = \delta_t \mathcal{P} \frac{d\delta_t}{\delta_t} + \delta_t \mathcal{P}_{\widehat{\beta}} d\widehat{\beta}_t + \delta_t \mathcal{P}_{\nu} d\nu_t + \delta_t \mathcal{P}_t dt + \frac{1}{2} \left[\delta_t \mathcal{P}_{\widehat{\beta}\widehat{\beta}} (d\widehat{\beta}_t)^2 + 2\mathcal{P}_{\widehat{\beta}} (d\delta_t)(d\widehat{\beta}_t) \right], \quad (\text{A.83})$$

to obtain the dynamics of the stock price:

$$\frac{dP_t}{P_t} = \mu_{P,t} dt + \sigma_{P,t} d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (\text{A.84})$$

with

$$\mu_{P,t} \equiv \bar{f} + \widehat{\beta}_t X_n^* - \kappa(X_n^*, \widehat{\beta}_t) - \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}(\widehat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t)} + \gamma(1 - \gamma)(X_n^*)^2 \nu_t \frac{G(\widehat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t)}{\mathcal{P}(\widehat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t)}, \quad (\text{A.85})$$

$$\sigma_{P,t} \equiv \sigma(1 + kX_n^*) + (1 - \gamma) \frac{(X_n^*)^2 \nu_t}{\sigma(1 + kX_n^*)} \frac{G(\widehat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t)}{\mathcal{P}(\widehat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t)}, \quad (\text{A.86})$$

where we recognize the wealth duration at time t , $\frac{G(\widehat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t)}{\mathcal{P}(\widehat{\beta}_t, \nu_t, t)} = \mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*)$. Getting back to (A.75):

$$\phi_t = \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\text{Risk Premium}_t}{\sigma_{P,t}^2} + \frac{\mathcal{P}_{\widehat{\beta}}}{\mathcal{P}} \frac{X_n^* \nu_t}{\sigma(1 + kX_n^*) \sigma_{P,t}}, \quad (\text{A.87})$$

$$= \frac{1}{\gamma} \frac{\text{Risk Premium}_t}{\sigma_{P,t}^2} + (1 - \gamma) \frac{(X_n^*)^2 \nu_t}{\sigma(1 + kX_n^*) \sigma_{P,t}} \mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*). \quad \square \quad (\text{A.88})$$

Proof of Proposition 6 The equilibrium diffusion of stock returns has been determined in (A.86). To obtain the risk premium as in (39), multiply the market price of risk from (A.70), $\text{SR}_t = \gamma\sigma(1 + kX_n^*)$, with $\sigma_{P,t}$:

$$\text{RP}_t = \gamma\sigma(1 + kX_n^*) \left[\sigma(1 + kX_n^*) + (1 - \gamma) \frac{(X_n^*)^2 \nu_t}{\sigma(1 + kX_n^*)} \mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*) \right] \quad (\text{A.89})$$

$$= \gamma\sigma^2(1 + kX_n^*)^2 - \gamma(\gamma - 1)(X_n^*)^2 \nu_t \mathcal{D}_t(X_n^*). \quad \square \quad (\text{A.90})$$

A.9 Discretization of the Continuous-Time Setup

This appendix derives a discretization of our continuous-time setup (see Section 3.1).

$$\delta_{t+\Delta} = \delta_t e^{\left[\bar{f} + \widehat{\beta}_t X_n^* - \frac{\gamma}{2} X_n^2 - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 (1 + kX_n^*)^2 \right] \Delta + \sigma \sqrt{\Delta} (1 + kX_n^*) z_{t+\Delta}}, \quad (\text{A.91})$$

$$\widehat{\beta}_{t+\Delta} = \widehat{\beta}_t + \sqrt{\Delta} \frac{X_n^*}{\sigma(1 + kX_n^*)} \nu_t z_{t+\Delta}, \quad (\text{A.92})$$

$$\nu_{t+\Delta} = \nu_t - \frac{(X_n^*)^2 \nu_t^2 \Delta}{\sigma^2 (1 + kX_n^*)^2}, \text{ where } z_{t+\Delta} \sim i.i.d. N(0, 1) \text{ and } \Delta = \text{time step in years.} \quad (\text{A.93})$$

A.10 Appendix for Section 4.1 (Infinite Horizon)

Proof of Proposition 7 In the setup with obsolescence and infinite horizon, the unobservable variable, β_t , is now time-varying according to (42). Hence, in Theorem A.1, $a_0 = 0$,

$a_1 = -\lambda$, and $b_1 = b_2 = 0$. The observable process is δ_t . Applying Itô's lemma on $\ln \delta_t$ yields

$$d \ln \delta_t = \left[\bar{f} + \beta_t X - \frac{c}{2} X^2 - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 (1 + kX)^2 \right] dt + \sigma(1 + kX) dW_t, \quad (\text{A.94})$$

and thus

$$A_0 = \bar{f} - \frac{c}{2} X^2 - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 (1 + kX)^2, \quad A_1 = X, \quad B = \sigma(1 + kX). \quad (\text{A.95})$$

Because a_0 , a_1 , b_1 , b_2 , A_0 , A_1 , and B are constants, all the conditions of Theorem A.1 are satisfied. Direct application of (A.5) then yields

$$d\widehat{\beta}_t = -\lambda\widehat{\beta}_t + \frac{\nu_t X}{\sigma(1 + kX)} d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (\text{A.96})$$

where \widehat{W}_t is a standard Brownian motion with respect to the agent's filtration $\{\mathcal{F}_t^\delta\}$.

Eq. (A.6) further implies

$$\frac{d\nu_t}{dt} = -2\lambda\nu_t - \frac{X^2\nu_t^2}{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}, \quad (\text{A.97})$$

whose solution is Eq. (47) in the text. \square

Proof of Proposition 8 We follow the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2. The expected lifetime utility is defined in (A.13). We now compute the expectation $\mathbb{E}_0[\delta_t^{1-\gamma}]$. Write

$$\begin{bmatrix} d \ln \delta_t \\ d\widehat{\beta}_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \left[\bar{f} - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 (1 + kX)^2 - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \right] \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 & X \\ 0 & -\lambda \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln \delta_t \\ \widehat{\beta}_t \end{bmatrix} dt + \begin{bmatrix} \sigma(1 + kX) \\ A(t) \end{bmatrix} d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (\text{A.98})$$

where $A(t)$ is a function of time that results from Proposition 7 and Eq. (47):

$$A(t) = \frac{2\lambda\nu_0 X \sigma(1 + kX)}{(e^{2\lambda t} - 1)\nu_0 X^2 t + 2\lambda e^{2\lambda t} \sigma^2 (1 + kX)^2}. \quad (\text{A.99})$$

Define:

$$K_0 \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \bar{f} - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 (1 + kX)^2 - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (\text{A.100})$$

$$K_1 \equiv \begin{bmatrix} 0 & X \\ 0 & -\lambda \end{bmatrix}, \quad (\text{A.101})$$

$$H_0(t) \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \sigma(1 + kX) \\ A(t) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \sigma(1 + kX) \\ A(t) \end{bmatrix}' = \begin{bmatrix} \sigma^2(1 + kX)^2 & \sigma(1 + kX)A(t) \\ \sigma(1 + kX)A(t) & A(t)^2 \end{bmatrix}. \quad (\text{A.102})$$

Let $t, s \in [0, T]$ such that $t \leq s \leq T$, and define $\tau = s - t$. In order to compute the expectation $\mathbb{E}_t[\delta_s^{1-\gamma}] = \mathbb{E}_t[e^{(1-\gamma)\ln \delta_s}]$, we conjecture an exponential-affine solution of the form

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\delta_s^{1-\gamma}] = e^{\alpha_0(\tau) + \alpha_1(\tau) \ln \delta_t + \alpha_2(\tau) \widehat{\beta}_t}, \quad (\text{A.103})$$

for some coefficient functions $\alpha_j(\cdot)$, $j = 0, 1, 2$, which satisfy (A.21)-(A.22) with boundary con-

ditions $\alpha_0(0) = 0$, $\alpha_1(0) = 1 - \gamma$, and $\alpha_2(0) = 0$. This is a system of Riccati ordinary differential equations (Duffie et al., 2003). The solution of (A.21) is:

$$\alpha_1(\tau) = 1 - \gamma \quad (\text{A.104})$$

$$\alpha_2(\tau) = (1 - \gamma)X \frac{1 - e^{-\lambda\tau}}{\lambda}, \quad (\text{A.105})$$

which can be now inserted in the remaining Riccati equation (A.22). After replacing $A(t)$ from (A.99) and t by $s - \tau$, then further using (13) to replace ν_0 with a function of ν_t , we obtain a solution for α_0 for any $t, s \in [0, T]$ with $s \geq t$ and $\tau = s - t$:

$$\alpha_0(\tau) = \frac{1}{2}(\gamma - 1) [-2\bar{f} + cX^2 + \gamma\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2] \tau + \frac{1}{2}X^2\nu_t(\gamma - 1)^2 \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda\tau}}{\lambda} \right)^2. \quad (\text{A.106})$$

Written at time 0 and with $\tau = t$, the solution of the Riccati system (A.21)-(A.22) is

$$\alpha_0(t) = \frac{1}{2}(\gamma - 1) [-2\bar{f} + cX^2 + \gamma\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2] t + \frac{1}{2}X^2\nu_0(\gamma - 1)^2 \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2, \quad (\text{A.107})$$

$$\alpha_1(t) = 1 - \gamma, \quad (\text{A.108})$$

$$\alpha_2(t) = (1 - \gamma)X \frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda}, \quad (\text{A.109})$$

and we notice that taking the limit $\lambda \rightarrow 0$ yields the baseline case solution (Proposition 2). After replacing this solution into the conjecture (A.103) and multiplication with $e^{-\rho t}$, we obtain:

$$e^{-\rho t} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\delta_t^{1-\gamma} \right] = \exp \left[(1 - \gamma) \ln \delta_0 + \kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t) + \frac{(\gamma - 1)^2 X^2 \nu_0}{2} \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 \right], \quad (\text{A.110})$$

where $\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t)$ is now defined as in (48):

$$\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t) \equiv \left[(1 - \gamma) \left(\bar{f} - \frac{c}{2} X^2 - \gamma \frac{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}{2} \right) - \rho \right] t + (1 - \gamma) \hat{\beta}_0 X \frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda}. \quad (\text{A.111})$$

Replacing (A.110) into (A.13) yields Eq. (49) of Proposition 8:

$$\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} \int_0^\infty \exp \left[\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t) + \frac{(\gamma - 1)^2 X^2 \nu_0}{2} \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 \right] dt. \quad (\text{A.112})$$

Part (b) of Proposition 8 follows from standard asset pricing theory, as in Proposition 2. The equilibrium price-dividend ratio equals

$$\mathcal{P}_0(X) \equiv \int_0^\infty \exp \left[\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t) + \frac{(\gamma - 1)^2 X^2 \nu_0}{2} \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 \right] dt, \quad (\text{A.113})$$

and we also notice that

$$\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1 - \gamma} \mathcal{P}_0(X). \quad \square \quad (\text{A.114})$$

Transversality condition We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the expected lifetime utility in (A.112) and the price-dividend ratio in (A.113) to be bounded. When $\lambda > 0$, the term $(1 - e^{-\lambda t})/\lambda$ equals $1/\lambda$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$. Given this, to obtain finite values for the utility and price-dividend ratio, the exponent in (A.112)-(A.113),

$$\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t) + \frac{(\gamma - 1)^2}{2} X^2 \nu_0 \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2, \quad (\text{A.115})$$

must reach $-\infty$ as $t \rightarrow \infty$. Using the expression for $\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t)$ in (A.111), we obtain

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t) + \frac{(\gamma - 1)^2}{2} X^2 \nu_0 \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 \quad (\text{A.116})$$

$$= \left[(1 - \gamma) \left(\bar{f} - \frac{c}{2} X^2 - \gamma \frac{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}{2} \right) - \rho \right] \infty + \frac{(1 - \gamma)\hat{\beta}_0 X}{\lambda} + \frac{(\gamma - 1)^2 X^2 \nu_0}{2\lambda^2}, \quad (\text{A.117})$$

which reaches $-\infty$ only if (51) is satisfied:

$$(1 - \gamma) \left(\bar{f} - \frac{c}{2} X^2 - \gamma \frac{\sigma^2(1 + kX)^2}{2} \right) - \rho < 0. \quad (\text{A.118})$$

For similar transversality conditions in the existing literature, see Brennan and Xia (2001, Theorem 1) and Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009, Lemma 6). \square

Proof of concavity of expected lifetime utility Write (A.112) as

$$\mathcal{U}_0(X) = \frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \int_0^\infty e^{y(\hat{\beta}_0, \nu_0, X, t)} dt, \quad (\text{A.119})$$

and consider the second partial derivative of the function $y(\hat{\beta}_0, \nu_0, X, t)$ with respect to X ,

$$\frac{\partial^2 y(\hat{\beta}_0, \nu_0, X, t)}{\partial X^2} = (\gamma - 1)(c + \gamma \sigma^2 k^2)t + (\gamma - 1)^2 \nu_0 \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 > 0. \quad (\text{A.120})$$

This implies that $U_0(X)$ is concave in X , following the same reasoning as in Appendix A.4. It further implies that the price-dividend ratio is log-convex in X and thus $\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X)/\partial X$ is increasing in X . One can show that $\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X)/\partial X$ increases from $(1 - \gamma)[\hat{\beta}_0 \mathcal{D}_0^E(0) - \gamma k \sigma^2 \mathcal{D}_0(0)]$ to ∞ as X increases from 0 to ∞ , an important result for the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium level of experimentation with competition (Proposition 9). \square

Proof of Proposition 9 Any agent i 's lifetime expected utility, \mathcal{U}_0^i , can be written as

$$\mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \frac{(\theta_i \delta_t)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} dt \right] = \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0 \left(\sum_{j=1}^n x_j \right), \quad (\text{A.121})$$

where $\mathcal{U}_0(\cdot)$ is the function defined and characterized in Proposition 8.

To find the Nash equilibrium, write the first-order condition for agent i 's maximization

problem as

$$0 = \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_n)}{\partial x_i} = \frac{(1-\gamma)(X_n - x_i)}{x_i X_n} \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_n) + \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}, \quad (\text{A.122})$$

which, after dividing by $\theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_n)$ and replacing $\mathcal{U}_0(X_n)$ by $\frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)$, yields

$$\frac{(\gamma-1)(X_n - x_i)}{x_i X_n} = \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}. \quad (\text{A.123})$$

We rule out asymmetric equilibria using the same logic as in Section 2.2. In a symmetric equilibrium, X_n solves

$$\frac{(\gamma-1)(n-1)}{X_n} = \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}. \quad (\text{A.124})$$

The equilibrium price-dividend ratio $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$ is log-convex in X . This implies that the right-hand side of (A.124) strictly increases in X_n . We have showed above that $\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)/\partial X_n$ takes values from $(1-\gamma)[\hat{\beta}_0 \mathcal{D}_0^E(0) - \gamma k \sigma^2 \mathcal{D}_0(0)]$, which is finite, to ∞ as X increases from 0 to ∞ . When $n \geq 2$, the left-hand side strictly decreases in X_n , taking values from ∞ to 0. Thus, any equilibrium that satisfies (A.124) is unique, and X_n solves

$$X_n^* = \frac{\hat{\beta}_0 \mathcal{D}_0^E(X_n^*) - \gamma k \sigma^2 \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + \frac{n-1}{X_n^*}}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + (\gamma-1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0^E(X_n^*)}, \quad (\text{A.125})$$

where $\mathcal{D}_0^E(X)$, $\mathcal{C}_0^E(X)$, and $\mathcal{D}_0(X)$ are defined as

$$\mathcal{D}_0^E(X) = \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_0(X)} \int_0^\infty \frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \exp \left[\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t) + \frac{(\gamma-1)^2}{2} X^2 \nu_0 \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 \right] dt, \quad (\text{A.126})$$

$$\mathcal{C}_0^E(X) = \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_0(X)} \int_0^\infty \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 \exp \left[\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t) + \frac{(\gamma-1)^2}{2} X^2 \nu_0 \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 \right] dt. \quad (\text{A.127})$$

$$\mathcal{D}_0(X) = \frac{1}{\mathcal{P}_0(X)} \int_0^\infty t \exp \left[\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0, t) + \frac{(\gamma-1)^2}{2} X^2 \nu_0 \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda t}}{\lambda} \right)^2 \right] dt. \quad \square \quad (\text{A.128})$$

A.11 Appendix for Section 4.2 (Diversification Effects)

All the proofs in an economy with diversification follow exactly the same steps as in our baseline model. The sole difference is that the function $\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0)$ in Proposition 2 takes into account the new parameter φ and thus becomes:

$$\kappa(X, \hat{\beta}_0) \equiv (1-\gamma) \left(\bar{f} + X \hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma \frac{\sigma^2(1 + k^2 X^2 + 2\varphi k X)}{2} - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \right) - \rho. \quad (\text{A.129})$$

Given this, the parameter φ now appears in the implicit equation that solves for the aggregate level of experimentation (Propositions 3 and 4).

The socially optimal level of experimentation solves

$$X^* = \frac{(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \varphi \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X^*)}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X^*) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X^*)}, \quad (\text{A.130})$$

whereas the equilibrium level of experimentation with competition solves

$$X_n^* = \frac{(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \varphi \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + \frac{n-1}{X_n^*}}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + (\gamma - 1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X_n^*)}. \quad \square \quad (\text{A.131})$$

A.11.1 Alternative setup with learning from $\{\delta^S, \delta^E\}$ instead of δ

When the agent learns from $\{\delta^S, \delta^E\}$, she perfectly observes dW_t and therefore it is important in this case to have an additional shock as in Section 4.2, with $\varphi \neq \pm 1$, otherwise g is fully revealed. Thus, our starting point is the general setup with diversification from Section 4.2. When $X > 0$, we have:

$$\frac{d\delta_t^S}{\delta_t^S} = \left(\bar{f} - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \right) dt + \sigma dW_t, \quad (\text{A.132})$$

$$\frac{d\delta_t^E}{\delta_t^E} = \left(g - \frac{k^2 \sigma^2}{2} X \right) dt + k\sigma \left(\varphi dW_t + \sqrt{1 - \varphi^2} dW_t^E \right), \quad (\text{A.133})$$

which we can write

$$d \ln \delta_t^S = \left(\bar{f} - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \right) dt + \sigma dW_t, \quad (\text{A.134})$$

$$d \ln \delta_t^E = \left[g - \frac{1}{2} k^2 \sigma^2 (1 + X) \right] dt + k\sigma \left(\varphi dW_t + \sqrt{1 - \varphi^2} dW_t^E \right), \quad (\text{A.135})$$

where g is unobservable. Learning about g is equivalent with learning about β (see (7)). Filtering theory (Theorem A.1) then implies:

$$d\hat{g}_t = \frac{\nu_t}{k\sigma\sqrt{1 - \varphi^2}} d\widehat{W}_t^E, \quad \text{with } d\widehat{W}_t^E \equiv dW_t^E + \frac{g - \hat{g}_t}{k\sigma\sqrt{1 - \varphi^2}} dt, \quad (\text{A.136})$$

$$d\nu_t = -\frac{\nu_t^2}{k^2 \sigma^2 (1 - \varphi^2)} dt. \quad (\text{A.137})$$

Thus, Proposition 1 becomes

$$\frac{d\delta_t}{\delta_t} = \left(\bar{f} + \hat{\beta}_t X - \frac{c}{2} X^2 \right) dt + \sigma(1 + \varphi k X) dW_t + k\sigma X \sqrt{1 - \varphi^2} d\widehat{W}_t^E \quad (\text{A.138})$$

$$d\hat{\beta}_t = \frac{\nu_t}{k\sigma\sqrt{1 - \varphi^2}} d\widehat{W}_t^E \quad (\text{A.139})$$

$$d\nu_t = -\frac{\nu_t^2}{k^2 \sigma^2 (1 - \varphi^2)} dt. \quad (\text{A.140})$$

From here, everything follows as in the paper, with the main difference that the dynamics of ν_t do not depend on the level of experimentation.

A.12 Appendix for Section 4.3 (Competition and Inequality)

Any agent i 's lifetime expected utility, \mathcal{U}_0^i , can be written as

$$\mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^T e^{-\rho t} \frac{(\theta_i \delta_t)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} dt \right] = \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0 \left(\sum_{j=1}^n x_j \right), \quad (\text{A.141})$$

where $\mathcal{U}_0(\cdot)$ is the function defined and characterized in Proposition 2 and θ_i is now defined as in (59). The first-order condition for agent i 's maximization problem is

$$0 = \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0^i(x_1, \dots, x_n)}{\partial x_i} = \frac{(1-\gamma)(1+X_n-x_i)}{x_i(1+X_n)} \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_n) + \theta_i^{1-\gamma} \frac{\partial \mathcal{U}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}, \quad (\text{A.142})$$

which, after dividing by $\theta_i^{1-\gamma} \mathcal{U}_0(X_n)$ and replacing $\mathcal{U}_0(X_n)$ by $\frac{\delta_0^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)$, yields

$$\frac{(\gamma-1)(1+X_n-x_i)}{x_i(1+X_n)} = \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}. \quad (\text{A.143})$$

We rule out asymmetric equilibria using the same logic as in Section 2.2. In a symmetric equilibrium, X_n solves

$$(\gamma-1) \left(\frac{n-1}{X_n} + \frac{1}{X_n(1+X_n)} \right) = \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}. \quad (\text{A.144})$$

From Section 2.2, we know that the equilibrium price-dividend ratio $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$ is log-convex in X and that $\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n) / \partial X_n$ takes values from $(1-\gamma)(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(0)$, which is finite, to ∞ . When $n \geq 2$, the left-hand side strictly decreases in X_n , taking values from ∞ to 0. Thus, any equilibrium that satisfies (A.144) is unique. Using (A.59), the equilibrium aggregate level of experimentation solves (60), which is an implicit equation in X_n :

$$X_n^* = \frac{(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + \frac{n-1}{X_n^*} + \frac{1}{X_n^*(1+X_n^*)}}{(\gamma k^2 \sigma^2 + c) \mathcal{D}_0(X_n^*) + (\gamma-1) \nu_0 \mathcal{C}_0(X_n^*)}. \quad \square \quad (\text{A.145})$$

A.13 Appendix for Section 4.4 (Recursive Preferences)

We consider here an alternative setup in which agents derive utility from lifetime consumption and have stochastic differential utility (Epstein and Zin, 1989) with subjective discount rate β , relative risk aversion γ , and elasticity of intertemporal substitution $\psi = 1/\rho$. The indirect utility function of any agent i is

$$J_{i,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\int_t^\infty h(C_{i,s}, J_{i,s}) ds \right], \quad (\text{A.146})$$

where the aggregator h is defined as in Duffie and Epstein (1992):

$$h(C_i, J_i) = \frac{\beta}{1-\rho} \left(\frac{C_i^{1-\rho}}{[(1-\gamma)J_i]^{1/\phi-1}} - (1-\gamma)J_i \right), \quad \text{with } \phi \equiv \frac{1-\gamma}{1-\rho}. \quad (\text{A.147})$$

All agents share the same preference parameters. We focus on the empirically relevant case

when the coefficient of risk aversion is higher than one. The parameter ρ (the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ψ) represents agents' *aversion to intertemporal substitution* (Restoy and Weil, 2010). If $\rho = 0$, agents are indifferent to intertemporal substitution. The coefficient ϕ measures the departure from the time-additive isoelastic framework: when $\phi = 1$ (i.e., when $\gamma = \rho$), the preferences in (A.147) reduce to the standard CRRA utility representation. When $\rho < \gamma$, agents prefer early resolution of uncertainty.

An important difference with our main setup, in addition to the different utility specification, is that we consider here an infinite horizon problem. As we will show below, this will allow us to simplify the setup by eliminating one state variable.

The dynamics of the aggregate output stream in the economy is (for simplicity of exposition, we abstract away from opportunity costs):

$$\frac{d\delta_t}{\delta_t} = (\bar{f} + X\mu_t)dt + \sigma dW_t. \quad (\text{A.148})$$

where μ is unknown and plays the same role in β in (6). Because this is an infinite horizon economy, a constant μ would eventually be learned in finite time and technological uncertainty would be zero. To avoid this, we assume that μ_t has dynamics

$$d\mu_t = \lambda(\bar{\mu} - \mu_t)dt + \sigma_\mu dW_t^\mu, \quad (\text{A.149})$$

with known parameters λ , $\bar{\mu}$, and σ_μ . Finally, we further simplify the setup to focus only on technological uncertainty and assume that disruption risk is zero ($k = 0$).

From investors' viewpoint, this partially observed economy is equivalent to a perfectly observed economy with

$$\frac{d\delta_t}{\delta_t} = (\bar{f} + X\hat{\mu}_t)dt + \sigma d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (\text{A.150})$$

$$d\hat{\mu}_t = \lambda(\bar{\mu} - \hat{\mu}_t)dt + \bar{\nu} d\widehat{W}_t, \quad (\text{A.151})$$

and $d\widehat{W}_t \equiv dW_t + \frac{X(\mu - \hat{\mu}_t)}{\sigma}dt$ represents the “surprise” component of the change in total output. Using standard filtering results (Theorem A.1 in Appendix A.2), the posterior variance of the estimated expected growth of the new technology (i.e., the *technological uncertainty* ν) converges to a constant that depends on the initial level of experimentation:

$$\bar{\nu} = \frac{\sqrt{\lambda^2\sigma^2 + X^2\sigma_\mu^2} - \lambda\sigma}{X} \geq 0. \quad (\text{A.152})$$

The function $\bar{\nu}$ is strictly increasing in X and in σ_μ , and strictly decreasing in λ . Furthermore, $\lim_{X \rightarrow 0} \bar{\nu} = 0$ and $\lim_{X \rightarrow \infty} \bar{\nu} = \sigma_\mu$.

As in the main setup (Proposition 2) the representative agent's problem is to choose a level of experimentation that balances between expected growth gains and the imposed disturbance on future consumption growth. Solving for the optimal level of experimentation in equilibrium involves writing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation,

$$\max_{C, X} \{h(C, J) + \mathcal{L}J\} = 0, \quad \text{where} \quad \mathcal{L}J = \frac{\mathbb{E}[dJ]}{dt}. \quad (\text{A.153})$$

We guess the following value function (Benzoni et al., 2011):

$$J(\delta, \hat{\mu}; X) = \frac{(\theta\delta)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} [\beta \mathcal{P}(\hat{\mu}; X)]^\phi, \quad (\text{A.154})$$

where $\mathcal{P}(\hat{\mu}; X)$ is the price-dividend ratio. The benefit of having a stationary value for technological uncertainty is that the price-dividend ratio depends on one state variable only, $\hat{\mu}$. This simplifies the approximation proposed below and allows us to show that our main results continue to hold. The drawback is that this setup has no dynamic implications related to time-variability in ν , such as Figure 6 in the main model.

Define the log price-dividend ratio:

$$I(\hat{\mu}; X) \equiv \log \mathcal{P}(\hat{\mu}; X). \quad (\text{A.155})$$

Substituting (A.154) in the HJB equation (A.153) and imposing the market clearing condition $C = \delta$ yields the following ordinary differential equation for the log price-dividend ratio:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 = & \frac{\gamma-1}{\phi} \left[-(\bar{f} + X\hat{\mu}) + \frac{\gamma\sigma^2}{2} \right] - \beta + e^{-I} \\ & + [\lambda(\bar{\mu} - \hat{\mu}) - (\gamma-1)\sigma\bar{\nu}] I_{\hat{\mu}} + \frac{\bar{\nu}^2}{2} \left(I_{\hat{\mu}\hat{\mu}} + \phi I_{\hat{\mu}}^2 \right). \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.156})$$

To obtain an approximate solution for $\mathcal{P}(\hat{\mu}; X)$, we use the customary log-linear approximation of the price-dividend ratio (Restoy and Weil, 2010; Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Beeler and Campbell, 2012; Benzoni et al., 2011):

$$\mathcal{P}(\hat{\mu}; X) = e^{A(X)+B \times X\hat{\mu}}. \quad (\text{A.157})$$

We checked the accuracy of this approximation using an alternative solution method with a high number of Chebyshev polynomials. The approximation (A.157) performed very well. Log-linear approximations of long-run risk models do not always guarantee reliable results (Pohl, Schmedders, and Wilms, 2018), but in our model with one state variable the approximation remains very accurate.

We conjecture the following form for the coefficients $A(X)$ and B :

$$\mathcal{P}(\hat{\mu}; X) = \exp \left[b(1-\rho) \left(c_0 + c_1 X - \frac{c_2}{2} X^2 + X\hat{\mu} \right) \right]. \quad (\text{A.158})$$

This form results from a second-order approximation of $A(X)$ around $X = 0$. When $X = 0$ the price-dividend ratio is constant and the approximation is exact; a further justification for the second-order approximation of $A(X)$ results from the CRRA case: dividend strips (assets that pay the aggregate consumption only at time $s > t$) have exactly the form in Eq. (A.158).²⁰

We wrote (A.158) into a slightly more complicated form, but this is without loss of generality (we still have four unknowns, c_0 , c_1 , c_2 , and b). The benefit of this specification, which will prove convenient for the rest of the analysis, is that it leads to clear signs for the coefficients.

²⁰The second-order approximation of $A(X)$ is crucial, because it pins down the optimal level of experimentation (see Proposition A.12). Without a second order term, the optimal level of experimentation is indeterminate (Devereux and Sutherland, 2011, make a similar argument in portfolio choice models).

Lemma A.2 *If $\gamma > 1$, $\rho \leq \gamma$, and $\rho \neq 1$, then $c_2 > 0$ and $b > 0$.*

Lemma A.2 follows from Restoy and Weil (2010) and states that as long as the risk aversion is higher than one and agents have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, the signs of the coefficients c_2 and b are unambiguously positive. This has two benefits. First, it leads to an optimal level of experimentation that is straightforward to interpret, as we will show below. Second, it implies that the price-dividend ratio is *always* convex in $\hat{\mu}$, meaning that technological uncertainty always implies over-valuation of the risky asset, as in our main setup.

The conjectured form (A.158) for the price-dividend ratio proves particularly convenient for the identification of the equilibrium level of experimentation, both in the representative-agent economy and in the economy with N active agents and one passive agent.

Proposition A.12 (a) *At $t = 0$, the representative investor chooses an optimal level of experimentation that maximizes total welfare:*

$$X^* = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{c_2}(c_1 + \hat{\mu}_0), & \text{if } c_1 + \hat{\mu}_0 > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (\text{A.159})$$

(b) *At $t = 0$, the aggregate level of experimentation in an economy with n competitors given by (23) is:*

$$X_n^* = \frac{1}{c_2} \left(c_1 + \hat{\mu}_0 + \frac{1}{b} \frac{n-1}{X_n^*} \right). \quad (\text{A.160})$$

Proof *The proof follows the same steps as in Section 2.* □

Comparing (a) with Proposition 3 and (b) with Proposition 4, the same results hold: there exists a socially optimal level of experimentation that maximizes welfare; this level can only be reached in the representative-agent economy. Competition generates over-experimentation, and the aggregate level of experimentation increases with n . The economy with competition can again generate experimentation with a sub-optimal technology, as in Section 2.2.

One disadvantage of the log-linear approximation (A.158) is that the coefficients, b , c_1 and c_2 , which dictate the equilibrium experimentation in Proposition A.12, do not clearly reveal the impact of technological uncertainty. Our numerical results suggest that the coefficient c_1 strongly depends on the parameters σ_μ and λ , which control the amount of technological uncertainty $\bar{\nu}$ (see Eq. (A.152)). If σ_μ is high and/or λ is low, then $c_1 + \hat{\mu}_0$ can become negative and the active agent is better off not experimenting.

Moving now to asset pricing, for any experimentation level X , the equilibrium risk premium in the economy is given by

$$RP_t = \underbrace{\left(\gamma\sigma + (\gamma-1)\frac{\phi-1}{\phi}Xb\bar{\nu} \right)}_{\text{Market price of risk}} \times \underbrace{\sigma \left(1 + X\frac{\psi-1}{\psi}\frac{\bar{\nu}}{\sigma}b \right)}_{\text{Quantity of risk}}, \quad (\text{A.161})$$

and the equilibrium stock market volatility is

$$\sigma_{P,t} = \sigma \left(1 + X\frac{\psi-1}{\psi}\frac{\bar{\nu}}{\sigma}b \right). \quad (\text{A.162})$$

Before analyzing these quantities, we note that when $\gamma > 1$, ϕ takes the following values:

$$\begin{cases} \phi \in [0, 1), & \text{if } \psi \in [0, 1/\gamma) \\ \phi \in [1, \infty), & \text{if } \psi \in [1/\gamma, 1) \\ \phi \in (-\infty, 1 - \gamma), & \text{if } \psi \in (1, \infty) \end{cases} \quad (\text{A.163}) \quad (\text{Bansal and Yaron, 2004}).$$

Over each one of the three intervals above, ϕ is a strictly increasing function in ψ . The first case in (A.163) represents preference for late resolution of uncertainty. The next two cases represent preference for early resolution of uncertainty, with the last case being the calibration of the long-run risk model (Bansal and Yaron, 2004).

We will focus our discussion in a setting with $\gamma > 1$ and preference for early resolution of uncertainty.

1. **Case** $\psi \in [1/\gamma, 1) \Rightarrow \phi \in [1, \infty)$.

When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is lower than one, the market price of risk increases with technological uncertainty. (In comparison, in the main model with CRRA utility, the market price of risk does not depend on technological uncertainty.) The quantity of risk, however, decreases with technological uncertainty. When competition is intense, high aggregate experimentation can again generate a negative risk premium, as in our main model (Figure 4).

2. **Case** $\psi \in (1, \infty) \Rightarrow \phi \in [-\infty, 1 - \gamma)$.

When the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is higher than one, as in the typical calibration of the long-run risk model (Bansal and Yaron, 2004), both the market price of risk and the quantity of risk strictly increase with technological uncertainty, and this is further exacerbated for strong levels of experimentation. In this case, although the risky asset remains over-valued due to technological uncertainty, the risk premium in the economy always increases in experimentation.

These two cases highlight the important role played by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) for the behavior of the risk premium in this alternative setup with stochastic differential utility. Empirical studies disagree about reasonable values for the EIS. Some studies find EIS greater than one (Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio, 2003), other studies find EIS smaller than one (Campbell, 1999; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). While our main results related to over-experimentation and over-valuation of the asset hold in both cases, the relationship between the risk premium and technological uncertainty depends on the value of the EIS.

To summarize, the main results in our paper are robust to an alternative utility function. But the analysis is less transparent due to the approximation of the price-dividend ratio and also because technological uncertainty is now constant, which prevents us to make statements about the dynamics of asset prices in the aftermath of experimentation.

A.14 Analysis of the case $\gamma < 1$

We have analyzed our main results under the assumption $\gamma > 1$. In this appendix, we show that most of the results hold as long as $\gamma \neq 1$. When $\gamma < 1$, Propositions 2 and 3 remain valid, but in this case agents prefer more uncertainty (see footnote 9), and thus uncertainty *amplifies* experimentation. Competition continues to generate over-experimentation when $\gamma < 1$, and

the level of experimentation increases in n (as in Proposition 4), but proof of uniqueness is no longer possible (when $\gamma < 1$, the agents' value functions are not globally concave). The results presented here are qualitatively similar to that of the case $\gamma > 1$, perhaps even stronger in the case $\gamma < 1$, because agents' preference for uncertainty strengthens their incentives to experiment. When $\gamma < 1$, technological uncertainty continues to imply asset over-valuation and a downward average path for prices in the aftermath of experimentation, as in Figure 6, and negative return predictability still obtains, as in Table 1. Proposition 6, however, yields a different result: when $\gamma < 1$, the risk premium and the stock market volatility are now strictly increasing with the level of experimentation.




Figure 9: **Equilibrium Experimentation with Competition, the case $\gamma < 1$.** Panel (a) depicts the solution of (29), where the solid line represents the right-hand side and the dashed (dotted) line represent the left-hand side for $n = 2$ ($n = 5$). Panel (b) depicts the aggregate level of experimentation as a function of the number of agents in the economy. Panel (c) shows the risk premium as a function of the aggregate experimentation level in the economy, similar with Figure 4. Panel (d) is similar with panel (b) in Figure 6. The calibration used is: $\gamma = 0.8$, $\bar{f} = 0.03$, $\hat{\beta}_0 = 0.015$, $\nu_0 = 0.03^2$, $\sigma = 0.05$, $k = 3$, $\rho = 0.03$, $T = 100$, $c = 0.02$, and $\delta_0 = 1$.

Proposition 2 holds for any positive value of γ . The optimal level of experimentation, X^* , is determined as in Proposition 3, but when $\gamma < 1$ the last term in the denominator of X^*

is negative, meaning that the agent likes uncertainty. This further amplifies our results and increase the optimal level of experimentation relative to the case $\gamma > 1$.

The representative agent's lifetime expected utility in (15) is positive when $\gamma < 1$ and it is not strictly concave over its entire domain. The same holds for the expected lifetime utility of any active agent i in the setup with competition in (24). Thus, uniqueness is not guaranteed. Nevertheless, the aggregate level of experimentation is still determined as in Proposition 4. We illustrate this in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 9, which use $\gamma < 1$ in the calibration and replicate Figure 1 in the paper. The two panels confirm our main result that experimentation increases with the number of competitors, as predicted by Proposition 4.

Panel (c) of Figure 9 depicts the risk premium as a function of aggregate experimentation when $\gamma < 1$. In this case, the risk premium is strictly increasing in experimentation: agents now hold positive hedging demands and according to (34) the risk premium increases in $\mathcal{H}_t(X_n^*, \nu_t)$. (See also Proposition 6, where the last term in (39) now increases with experimentation.)

Social Optimum, $X^* = 0.314$ (medians of 1,000 simulations)

	4Q	12Q	20Q	40Q
Coefficient of Log (P/D)	-1.126	-3.258	-5.752	-10.85
t-stat	-1.939	-2.111	-2.371	-3.071
R-squared	0.028	0.082	0.138	0.268
Expected Excess Returns (annualized)	0.84%	0.72%	0.67%	0.50%

Competition, $n = 5$, $X_5^* = 2.444$ (medians of 1,000 simulations)

	4Q	12Q	20Q	40Q
Coefficient of Log (P/D)	-0.824	-2.265	-3.545	-6.653
t-stat	-2.092	-2.335	-2.504	-3.219
R-squared	0.033	0.097	0.151	0.262
Expected Excess Returns (annualized)	7.1%	5.5%	3.6%	4.4%

Table 2: Return Predictability with the Price-Dividend Ratio (Simulations) when $\gamma < 1$. This table is similar with Table 1 and reports the predictability of excess stock returns with the log price-dividend ratio. The two panels correspond to the social optimum and to the economy with $n = 5$ competitors. Both panels use a calibration with $\gamma < 1$ (see Figure 9).

The over-valuation due to technological uncertainty holds when $\gamma < 1$. (The price-dividend ratio in (40) is *always* convex in β ; the sole exception is the log-utility case $\gamma = 1$, when the price-dividend ratio is linear in β and there are no hedging demands.) Consequently, the result that the asset price on average goes down after strong experimentation remains valid. Panel (d) of Figure 9 depicts the average price paths after $t = 0$ in an economy with $n = 5$ competitors and is similar with panel (b) in Figure 6. Thus, our model continues to generate negative return predictability also in the case $\gamma < 1$, and Table 2 confirms. It presents results from simulated data at quarterly frequency, as in Table 1. The two panels of the table compare the first-best economy ($X^* = 0.314$, see also Figure 9, panel (a)) with an economy with competition and $n = 5$. Predictability is now present in both panels. We notice that average excess returns now increase with competition, in line with the risk premium result in panel (a) of Figure 9.

6 Answer to the AE

This is a potentially interesting paper with a new take on a relevant research question: the effect of competition on innovation and its macro/finance consequences.

Having said this, I believe the paper has technical and expositional weaknesses that rule out publication in its current form. Here is a list of everything that caught my eye in the order of appearance (I skipped pages 17-30 and 37-48):

We have revised the manuscript to address each one of your points. Our revision was not limited to the pages you have focused on with your comments, but we have also thoroughly checked the other pages (17-30 and 37-48) and rectified any inconsistencies we could find.

(1) Why do you assume a finite horizon? Typically, infinite horizon models are easier to handle because time is not a state variable. And the macro/finance story would sound better with an open-ended horizon, too... So why finite T here? It may be for technical reasons (the indefinite counterparts to the current definite integrals may not converge), but then this should be addressed and explained to the reader.

We have added a mention about the finite horizon assumption on page 5, before Eq. (2). We thoroughly address this point in Section 4.1, where we extend the model to an infinite horizon.

You have correctly guessed the reason of our finite horizon assumption: the indefinite counterparts to the definite integrals in Proposition 2, Eqs. (15)-(16), would not converge when $T \rightarrow \infty$ (the terms that multiply t^2 in are strictly positive). Bayesian learning implies that the posterior estimate of β is a martingale, as can be seen from Eq. (10). Thus, revisions to beliefs constitute permanent shocks. (See also Collin-Dufresne et al. (2016), who show that this property of belief updating generates subjective long-run consumption risks). We assume a finite horizon to keep the model stationary.

In Section 4.1, we consider an infinite-horizon extension that restores stationarity when the new technology becomes obsolete (Aghion and Howitt, 1992). In Eq. (42), the new parameter λ is the *rate of obsolescence of the new technology*. When $\lambda > 0$ the infinite horizon model is stationary. Our main results are robust to this extension of the model.

A final note about time being a state variable: in both our main model and the extension of Section 4.1 the technological uncertainty decays deterministically over time (Eqs. (13) and (47)). This gradual resolution of uncertainty is an important feature of the model that generates our dynamic results in Section 3.1. Thus, time continues to be a state variable in the infinite horizon model.

(2) Being a stranger to the international finance literature and "Cobb-Douglas composites", I am puzzled by equation (4) and would love to see a more detailed explanation. Would it make a difference if the Cobb-Douglas

exponents were normalized with weights $1/(1+x_0)$ on δ and $x_0/(1+x_0)$ on δ^E ? Probably not. More specifically, this composite is present in none of the three papers that you cite in footnote 3 (I could not check the book).

We first note here that we have slightly changed the notation from x_0 to X . This was necessary in order to better describe the game of Section 2.2.

Footnote 3 precisely states the pages where we encounter our Cobb-Douglas/isoelastic specification. The first occurrence that we could find in the literature is [Helpman and Razin \(1978\)](#): on page 101, they describe a setup in which “*two countries have Cobb-Douglas-type utility function which exhibit different degrees of risk aversion.*” This can be seen in Eqs. (7.18) and (7.19). A more recent reference is [Cole and Obstfeld \(1991\)](#), who on page 7 specialize their setup to the Cobb-Douglas/isoelastic-preference case, just above Eq. (3). The same Cobb-Douglas/isoelastic specification appears in [Zapatero \(1995, p. 790\)](#) and [Pavlova and Rigobon \(2007, p. 1144\)](#), in the special case of log utility. Finally, this goes back to [Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland \(1994\)](#), who on page 8 propose a CRRA utility function with an Armington aggregator (the Armington aggregator reduces to the Cobb-Douglas utility when the elasticity of substitution between the two goods is 1).

We have also added detailed explanations the text. Just above Eq. (5), we clearly state that the new technology “*yields a new variety in the consumption basket.*” In the paragraph below Eq. (7), we mention that “*the agent consumes a composite of the status-quo and experimental goods.*”

Finally, as you correctly pointed out, the Cobb-Douglas exponents are not normalized to sum up to one. Instead, their sum is $1+X$. The normalization that you are suggesting (dividing by $1+X$) would make the problem intractable if the choice variable remains X . But the change of variable $Y = X/(1+X)$ would restore tractability:

$$(\delta_t^S)^{\frac{1}{1+X}} (\delta_t^E)^{\frac{X}{1+X}} = (\delta_t^S)^{1-Y} (\delta_t^E)^Y \quad (164)$$

and the agent now maximizes lifetime utility by choosing $Y \in [0, 1]$ instead of X . Our results would be preserved if start with the normalized weights Y and $1-Y$. However, this alternative would impose the constraint $Y \leq 1$ and would further create a non linearity with respect to the cost that experimentation imposes on the existing asset (please see our answer below for more details about this cost). More precisely, if we consider the aggregate consumption basket to be $\delta_t \equiv (\delta_t^S)^{1-Y} (\delta_t^E)^Y$, we would obtain in the drift of (6) a cost term that is cubic in Y . Thus, our specification in which the Cobb-Douglas exponents are not normalized avoids technical difficulties without making a difference for our main results. We have added a statement on this in Footnote 3.

(3) With a large X , the new “variety” has the potential to completely overwhelm the status-quo consumption. This is in line with earlier talk about the capital X being “sufficiently important to affect the entire economy”. But it jars with the assumption that this capital has no opportunity costs, that is, no alternative uses. This assumption should be addressed explicitly.

In the new Eq. (4), allocating resources to the new asset has an opportunity cost:

if $X > 0$, the consumption stream that results from the old asset expected growth is reduced by $cX^2/2$, with $c > 0$. One could also consider a linear-quadratic specification of the type $c_1X + c_2X^2/2$, at the expense of adding one new parameter.

We interpret this cost below Eq. (4) as a displacement cost arising from transferring resources away from the existing asset. This cost adds up to the costs created by experimentation that already exist in our model: the disruption risk caused by the arrival of a new asset when $k > 0$ and the technological uncertainty generated by the new technology when $\nu_0 > 0$.

(4) Proposition 1 is incomplete in that it fails to say that \hat{W} is a standard Brownian motion on the agent's information filtration. This is the crucial ingredient for all subsequent computations and requires a reference to something else than Liptser and Shiryaev's Theorem 12.7 (some other result in that book, I presume).

We clearly say now that \hat{W} is a standard Brownian motion with respect to the agent's filtration $\{\mathcal{F}^\delta\}$, which we define beforehand. Proposition 1 is a direct application of Theorem 12.1, page 22 in Liptser and Shiryaev (2001), which is the univariate version of Theorem 12.7 that we were mentioning in the previous version of the paper. We mention the use of Theorem 12.1 on page 9, and we have also thoroughly verified in Appendix A.2 that all the conditions of the theorem are satisfied. We have also added Footnote 6, in which we cite the seminal applications of the Kalman-Bucy filter in continuous-time finance (Detemple, 1986; Dothan and Feldman, 1986; Gennotte, 1986). Our Proposition 1 is merely an application of these previous results.

(5) Just before and in Proposition 2, it is somewhat odd to refer to 4 as the variance of consumption – it is the variance of log consumption, after all.

We no longer make that statement in the text, but instead on page 11 we mention that the optimal level of experimentation in (21) resembles a mean-variance portfolio. Then, in Appendix A.6, we show that the agent's optimal choice is indeed consistent with a classic mean-variance tradeoff (Markowitz, 1952). Importantly, in Appendix A.6 we have updated the argument to address your concern: we refer to the variance of consumption as $\text{Var}_0[\delta_t]$ instead of $\text{Var}_0[\ln \delta_t]$.

(6) Statement (b) in Proposition 2 is wrong as it stands since change in an integrand at a time t does not affect the value of the integral. It is clear what you want to say but it needs to be said differently. One option would be to bring the expression for lifetime utility into the main text and then state that the expectation and variance depend on X in the stated way at each t .

The previous Proposition 2 is no longer necessary. Instead, we have followed your advice and brought the expression for lifetime utility into the main text. In Appendix A.6, we have updated our statements and avoided the inconsistency that you are pointing out (i.e., claiming that an integrand affects the value of the integral).

(7) Equation (15) is the first instance of two bad habits in the paper: using symbols before they have been defined, and suppressing the most important argument (i.e., X) in almost all expressions of interest. This gives a completely misleading impression of this FOC and the ensuing page-long discussion of the "duration" and "convexity" measures. And since these measures are apparently so central, they should be brought to the main text – especially in a theory journal such as JET!

We have thoroughly updated the writing to adhere to your advice. In the new version, no symbol is ever used before being defined, and we maintain X as an argument in all the quantities where it matters (for instance, in $\mathcal{U}_0(X)$ and $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$ in Proposition 3). Previous Eq. (15) is now (22), with all its terms defined and characterized beforehand (e.g., "duration" and "convexity").

(8) Proposition 3 is completely misleading in that the right-hand side of (16) looks as if it consists of exogenous parameters while (as you admit later on the page) in fact it contains x_0^* . This is below any reasonable standard of scientific writing.

Eq. (16) is now Eq. (21), and we clearly mention that it is an implicit equation.

(9) In the description of the experimentation game, equation (17) puzzled me. Where does the price p^E come from? How does this follow from the Cobb-Douglas specification? It would be good if you described the existing markets and corresponding prices in the model description. The sentence leading into (18) has also confused me with its "Furthermore" – as if agents received something on top of x_C ...

The previous Eq. (17) no longer applies to our baseline model. However, the price p_t^E appears again in the extension of the model in Section 4.3. We clearly describe in Appendix A.1 the intratemporal optimization exercise that leads to Eq. (58) in the text. We have also removed the confusing "Furthermore..." statement when describing the individual consumption shares in Eq. (23) (the previous Eq. (18)).

(10) Looking at (20) and (21) and several equations in Section 3, I wonder which variables are missing now.

In Section 2.2, we explicitly write dependence on X_n (the aggregate level of experimentation) for all important quantities. This includes Proposition 4 and Eq. (30), which is Eq. (21) in the previous version.

(11) It would be good to mention monopoly before Figure 1, so that the gap in the panel (a) does not come as a surprise.

We agree that the gap came as a surprise in the previous version of the paper. For this reason, we have modified the model to incorporate only active agents in the baseline model

(the previous version with passive agents is now an extension developed in Section 4.3). In the new version, there is no more gap for $n = 1$ between the equilibrium with competition and the social optimum (see panel (b) in Figure 1). This can also be understood directly from Proposition 4, where setting $n = 1$ leads to the social optimum (a statement we make on page 15).

(12) You claim that the parameters you chose are "economically plausible". Shall I take that on trust without any further justification?

We have added a thorough discussion of our calibration on page 16. We also motivate the calibration of every new parameter that we introduce in subsequent extensions (e.g., the *obsolescence* parameter on page 29), with clear references to the literature.

(13) On page 16, you give explicit expressions for D_t and kappa after all. You should do so much earlier!

We have rectified this by defining "duration" and "convexity" in Definition 1. On page 19, for the sake of completeness and clarity, we write again the duration (here computed at time $t > 0$ instead of $t = 0$) in Eq. (37).

(14) In the proof of Proposition 2, the sentence around (A.39) is repetitive. And J (which should have X as an argument) is not a value function, that is, not the payoff function under an optimal policy.

We have revised that section of the appendix, which is now Appendix A.6. We do not follow the previous approach as in (A.39), but directly compute $\text{Var}_0[\delta_t]$ starting from the usual formula of variance (Eq. (A.50)) and then relying on the theory of affine processes to directly compute both components on the right-hand side.

(15) The proof of Proposition 3 belongs into the main text – with X as an argument wherever it matters! Looking at (A.47), one observes that the FOC would also work when duration and convexity are defined without their denominator. Why do you incorporate the "price-dividend ratio" here?

We now state in the main text the first-order condition (19), before Proposition 3. We clearly mention that the division by $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$, which leads to Eq. (20) is done with the aim to interpret the results using terms defined beforehand ("duration" and "convexity"). You are right that this division is not necessary here, but it allows us to describe all the terms using quantities that have a clear economic interpretation. (The division by $\mathcal{P}_0(X)$ becomes necessary in Section 2.2 in order to prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.)

Most of the proof of Proposition 3 is now in the text, and Eq. (20) directly leads to Proposition 3 (tedious derivations, which are unnecessary in the main text, have been relegated to Appendix A.5). Finally, we use X as an argument wherever it matters.

(16) I am not convinced by the argument at the bottom of page 36 that the purported fixed point is unique. Lemma A.8 is hard to parse because the crucial arguments are again missing from the relevant functions (which is especially bad in the analysis of a game). It seems to indicate that given what her opponents do, each player has a unique optimal choice. But that is no gurantee for uniqueness of equilibrium. For that, monotonicity of the right-hand side of (A.60) is sufficient and, according to Figure 7, apparently holds. So prove it.

We have revised our proof of existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium (Proposition 4). In keeping with the approach adopted for Propostition 3, most of the proof is now in the main text, starting from Eq. (26). We clearly develop all the steps that lead to Eq. (29), which is important for the main proof and reproduced here for your convenience:

$$\frac{(\gamma - 1)(n - 1)}{X_n} = \frac{\partial \ln \mathcal{P}_0(X_n)}{\partial X_n}. \quad (165)$$

When $n \geq 2$, the left-hand side strictly decreases in X_n , taking values from ∞ to 0. We prove in Appendix A.4 that the right-hand side strictly increases in X_n , taking values from $(1 - \gamma)(\hat{\beta}_0 - \gamma k \sigma^2) \mathcal{D}_0(0)$, which is finite, to ∞ . Thus, equation in X_n has a unique solution. We make this statement in the main text, on on page 14, and we also provide an illustration in panel (a) of Figure 1.

(17) Something like Figure 7 should be in the main text or left out.

The previous Figure 7 is now updated and in the main text (panel (a), Figure 1).

7 Answer to the Referee

My primary comments relate to ways of motivating/packaging the paper so that the model can speak to recent secular trends associated with declining competition in recent decades, which this model can shed light on. I think that motivating the paper with a set of established stylized facts would help give life to the theoretical predictions of the model.

1. *Motivating stylized facts.* In recent decades, there has been a secular decline in competition that accelerated in the early 2000s (e.g., Grullon et al., 2019; De Loecker et al., 2020). There are papers have attributed slumping investment and innovation (Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2018) and rising risk premia in equity markets (Corhay et al., 2020) to declining competition. The model predictions appear to be consistent with these patterns and it can therefore provide an economic explanation for why declining competition leads to slumping innovation and a rising equity premium since the early 2000s. These secular trends can be used to help motivate the model in the introduction. Also, the authors can use these trends in innovation and risk premia to frame the comparative statics of the model with respect to competition. The model can be used to provide an economic interpretation of how declining competition drives these empirical trends relating to innovation and risk premia.

We have made the link with this literature, following your advice, in the Introduction on page ... and in Section 3.1, on page 26. We agree that our model provides an intuitive link between the level of competition, the level of investment in innovation, and the level of risk premia. Our model is static and these conjectures are of course only made through comparative statics. But we agree with your statements and conjecture that that a model with time-varying competition may be a promising lead for future research. For instance, Philippon (2019, Chapter 5) points to the decline of free entry as a possible reason for increasing concentration in the last decades.

Your comment has sparked further thoughts about new established facts that can be interpreted through the lens of our model. On page 21, we link the results of Proposition 6 with a burgeoning literature that studies the risk premia of equity claims with different maturities. This literature documents that long-duration assets earn lower returns than short-duration assets (Lettau and Wachter, 2007, 2011; Weber, 2018; Van Binsbergen, 2020; Gonçalves, 2021). By lowering the risk premia at long maturities, our model is consistent with these findings and suggests that long-duration assets may be a good hedge against technological uncertainty. Further understanding the impact of Schumpeterian competition on the equity duration and the cross-section of returns may prove a fruitful avenue for future research.

2. *Schumpeterian models.* While the authors refer to the model as Schumpeterian, I think that the exposition of the model would benefit from explicitly relating some of the reduced-form mechanics of the endowment process in the model to the growth mechanics from standard Schumpeterian endogenous growth models like [Aghion and Howitt \(1992\)](#), especially in the way innovation/experimentation is assumed to affect the trend and diffusion components. Stochastic variants of the Schumpeterian growth models like in [Barlevy \(2004\)](#) or [Kung \(2015\)](#) provide a microfoundation for the way innovation impacts the diffusion and trend components. In particular, the presence of spillover effects of innovation in types of models allow first and second moment shocks that affect the demand or supply of innovation capital to simultaneously affect the diffusion and trend component of consumption growth.

We have added on page 7 an in-depth discussion of the reduced-form mechanics of the endowment process. We link our model with stochastic variants of Schumpeterian growth models (e.g., [Barlevy, 2007](#); [Kung, 2015](#); [Kung and Schmid, 2015](#)), which provide microfoundations for the way innovation impacts the drift and diffusion components of the aggregate output. Our model captures these effects in reduced form and focuses on the tradeoff between faster expected growth and more systematic risk and on the impact of competition on this tradeoff.

In addition, to reinforce the links with the existing literature, we have added precise references whenever concepts that we introduce are related to previous work. Examples are: page 33, [Kogan et al. \(2020\)](#), when we discuss the displacement effect that competition can have on the utility of passive agents; page 34, [Kung and Schmid \(2015\)](#) when we discuss the long-run risk of innovation and its pricing in a setup with recursive utility. We hope that these additions further connect the paper with the literature and clarify our contribution.

8 Letter to the Editor

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Professor Marzena Rostek
Editor, Journal of Economic Theory
[EMAIL HERE](#)

Month Day, Year

Object: Resubmission of Manuscript JET-D-21-00162

Dear Professor Rostek:

We are resubmitting the paper titled “Schumpeterian Competition in a Lucas Economy.” We are grateful for the feedback that we received from you, the Associate Editor, and an anonymous referee, and which we have used as a strict guideline for this revision. We include below excerpts from your letter, followed by our detailed answers.

The AE is concerned with the presentation of the technical details of your analysis. S/he thinks that they ought to be clarified before one can evaluate your paper’s economic insights.

Maintaining the same modeling choices, we have entirely re-written the theory part of the paper to address all the points raised by the AE; we have removed all ambiguities regarding notation, and have made mathematical concepts precise; we rigorously define all terms before using them (e.g., “duration” and “convexity”); we have double-checked all proofs; we have referred to previous work whenever necessary; and we have explained all our assumptions and relaxed them whenever possible.

The reviewers, including myself, appreciate your analysis of how competition affects innovation policies and asset prices. Based on their comments and my own reading, I am inviting a revision of your paper.

I share the AE’s view that there is substantial scope for improving technical exposition and agree with the referee’s suggestion that your paper would benefit if you could provide a tighter motivation for your analysis. At the same time, I think that your paper highlights interesting forces in a problem of great interest right now and the reviewers’ comments present an opportunity. Based on my reading of the paper, I decided to invite a revision.

The revision’s goal would be to highlight your results’ value added and their new economic insights. If you decide to submit a revised manuscript, please pay special attention to the following comments.

1. Please follow the requests in the AE’s report closely.

We have followed closely all the AE’s requests. In our answer to the AE, we point precisely to places in the paper where we have added revisions. All the requests are important and were dealt with, and some of them resulted in insightful extensions of our model. For instance, the AE questioned our finite horizon assumption (comment 1). This assumption is necessary to keep the model stationary, but we have also developed an infinite horizon version of the model (Section 4.1) in which we add the feature of *obsolescence* (Aghion and Howitt, 1992) to maintain stationarity and we show that all our results continue to hold.

The AE was unsatisfied with the technical exposition of the paper and, most importantly, was not convinced by some of our proofs (e.g., proof of Proposition 4 in comment 16). This for us was a major concern and we have entirely revised all the proofs and brought some of them directly into the paper. For instance, in Section 2.2 we write all the steps that lead to Proposition 4. We also provide an illustration of the equilibrium in panel (a) of Figure 1 (answering comment (17) from the AE) and we have added a thorough discussion of our calibration on page 16 (answering comment (12) from the AE).

2. Model and Motivation, I: Please motivate the main question and your game.

- (a) Why is it helpful/appropriate to consider a game in which agents compete for relative market shares?
- (b) In which other applications could “penetration games” be useful?
- (c) The idea of competing for a share brings to mind bargaining models. It would be helpful if you offer some discussion.

- (d) It would be useful and interesting if you could underscore in your analysis where/how the competition for share makes a difference (beyond what you do in Appendix A.1). Please be explicit if anything is non-standard.

Answer based on what we have in the text, Sec. 2.2 and in the introduction.

3. **Motivation, II:** You have many results: several implications for how creative destruction affects risk, wealth, and prices - including excessive disruption, higher technological uncertainty, risk premium - booms and busts, and inequality.

Which insights do you want the readers to take away? Please refocus your paper on the results that are the most novel and useful to the readers who might want to apply your model.

Say that we have reorganized the paper to keep the main results in Sections 2 and 3. Then say the main results.

Then in a new paragraph say that we have grouped additional results in Section 4.

Answer this after the introduction, abstract, and conclusion are written, to be consistent, but I would say that our main result is the over-experimentation and over-valuation, both caused by Schumpeterian competition, and the game modeled as a Tullock contest

the effect of competition on innovation and its macro/finance consequences (AE)

see also some statements made by the referee: “paper theoretically examines competition distorts optimal innovation policies and impacts asset pricing dynamics.”

Say also that we have updated the Introduction and emphasized our main insights.

4. **Exposition:** The reviewers suggest substantial scope for an improvement in the exposition.

- (a) Your paper is a tour de force. Please teach the readers more about your model. Target a reader who needs quite a bit of hand-holding, someone who would like to learn from and/or apply your model but is not proficient in all of the arguments you invoke.
- (b) Echoing the AE, please motivate the key ideas (and innovations relative to the standard model) before introducing them.

- (c) **Please interpret all the definitions and results.**
- (d) **It would be helpful if you provide both mathematical and economic intuition for the main arguments.**
- (e) **Please remove any ambiguities in the statements, arguments, and the notation, which are currently obscuring your paper’s take-away message.**

The entire paper has been revised according to these points. In Section 2, we clearly describe all the ingredients of our main model and elaborate on what experimentation implies for the aggregate consumption (in the paragraphs starting on page 7). Whenever we introduce new concepts, we provide important references from the existing literature (e.g., learning and Footnote 6; Tullock contests and Section 2.2). We also made sure that all the variables are defined and interpreted before being used. Importantly, for Propositions 3 and 4 we write down the steps that lead to Eqs. (21) and respectively (30), thus guiding the reader step by step through the process of finding the equilibrium.

We also interpret each one of our results. For instance, Proposition 4 states that competition increases experimentation above the social optimum, and that experimentation further increases with the number of competitors. We have added intuition for both of these results on page 15. We also connect many of the implications of the model with the existing literature, which again helps the reader understand our main contribution (more on this below when we answer your next point).

5. **Relation to the literature: The referee indicates two paths to clarify how your paper relates to and differs from the literature and let the readers appreciate the significance of your contribution—for methodology and economic implications.**

We have followed these two paths. First, at the suggestion of the referee, we elaborate on how new established facts can be interpreted through the lens of our model: on page 26 we link our model’s results to the secular decline in competition that accelerated in the latest decades; on page 21, we connect the results of Proposition 6 with a burgeoning literature that studies the risk premia of equity claims with different maturities; and on page 34 we discuss the long-run risk created by innovation and its pricing in a setup with recursive utility, which connects our work with Kung (2015) and Kung and Schmid (2015);

The referee also suggests explicitly relating some of the reduced-form mechanics of the endowment process (6) to the growth mechanics from standard Schumpeterian endogenous growth models. We have added on page 7 an in-depth discussion and a link with stochastic variants of Schumpeterian growth models (e.g., Barlevy, 2007; Kung, 2015; Kung and Schmid, 2015), which provide microfoundations for the way innovation impacts the drift and diffusion components of the aggregate output. In the same spirit, we clarify how the game of Section 2.2 relates to the seminal contribution of Tullock (1980) and a number of papers that have explored various aspects of rent-seeking competitions.

The discussion of Pastor-Veronesi (2009) adds value. It would be very helpful if you also relate your model and the main results to the broader literature on the topic.

We have updated the literature review in the introduction, starting from page 3. Instead of focusing on only one reference, we now relate our work to the broader literature. We describe our new perspective on technological revolutions and differentiate our work from Pastor and Veronesi (2009) and DeMarzo et al. (2007). We also discuss our contribution to the literature that has explored various aspects of rent-seeking competitions based on Tullock (1980). We then link our work with the literature that studies stochastic variants of Schumpeterian growth models, and we situate the implications of our model into the broader macro-finance literature (according to the suggestions proposed by the referee).

If you decide to pursue the revision, please prepare detailed responses to the comments of the reviewers. I have noted some of the main points; please also take into account the reviewers' suggestions for local improvement.

These comments ask for a nontrivial amount of work. However, incorporating these comments is feasible given all the work you have already done.

I am not requesting that you follow all the recommendations in this and other reports, but I would like you to carefully consider them and explain your choices.

We have followed the AE's and referee's comments and your suggestions as closely as possible. Please refer to our detailed answers to the AE and the referee. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to revise the paper.

Sincerely,

Daniel Andrei
Bruce I. Carlin