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Authors: A. Azimov E. Bogomazov R. Bush K. Patel K. Sriram  
*Qrator Labs & Yandex Qrator Labs IIJ & Arrcus Arrcus USA NIST*

## RFC 9234

# Route Leak Prevention and Detection Using Roles in UPDATE and OPEN Messages

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### Abstract

Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous systems (ASes). Existing approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes by operator configuration, with no check that the configuration corresponds to that of the External BGP (eBGP) neighbor, or enforcement of the two eBGP speakers agreeing on the peering relationship. This document enhances the BGP OPEN message to establish an agreement of the peering relationship on each eBGP session between autonomous systems in order to enforce appropriate configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked according to the agreed relationship, allowing both prevention and detection of route leaks.

### Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9234>.

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## 1. Introduction

Route leaks are the propagation of BGP prefixes that violate assumptions of BGP topology relationships, e.g., announcing a route learned from one transit provider to another transit provider or a lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer or announcing a route learned from one lateral peer to another lateral peer or a transit provider [RFC7908]. These are usually the result of misconfigured or absent BGP route filtering or lack of coordination between autonomous systems (ASes).

Existing approaches to leak prevention rely on marking routes by operator configuration, with no check that the configuration corresponds to that of the eBGP neighbor, or enforcement of the two eBGP speakers agreeing on the relationship. This document enhances the BGP OPEN message to establish an agreement of the relationship on each eBGP session between autonomous systems in order to enforce appropriate configuration on both sides. Propagated routes are then marked according to the agreed relationship, allowing both prevention and detection of route leaks.

This document specifies a means of replacing the operator-driven configuration-based method of route leak prevention, described above, with an in-band method for route leak prevention and detection.

This method uses a new configuration parameter, BGP Role, which is negotiated using a BGP Role Capability in the OPEN message [RFC5492]. An eBGP speaker may require the use of this capability and confirmation of the BGP Role with a neighbor for the BGP OPEN to succeed.

An optional, transitive BGP Path Attribute, called "Only to Customer (OTC)", is specified in [Section 5](#). It prevents ASes from creating leaks and detects leaks created by the ASes in the middle of an AS path. The main focus/applicability is the Internet (IPv4 and IPv6 unicast route advertisements).

## 2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## 3. Terminology

The terms "local AS" and "remote AS" are used to refer to the two ends of an eBGP session. The "local AS" is the AS where the protocol action being described is to be performed, and "remote AS" is the AS at the other end of the eBGP session in consideration.

The use of the term "route is ineligible" in this document has the same meaning as in [RFC4271], i.e., "route is ineligible to be installed in Loc-RIB and will be excluded from the next phase of route selection."

### 3.1. Peering Relationships

The terms for peering relationships defined and used in this document (see below) do not necessarily represent business relationships based on payment agreements. These terms are used to represent restrictions on BGP route propagation, sometimes known as the Gao-Rexford model [GAO-REXFORD]. The terms "Provider", "Customer", and "Peer" used here are synonymous to the terms "transit provider", "customer", and "lateral (i.e., non-transit) peer", respectively, used in [RFC7908].

The following is a list of BGP Roles for eBGP peering and the corresponding rules for route propagation:

Provider: **MAY** propagate any available route to a Customer.

Customer: **MAY** propagate any route learned from a Customer, or that is locally originated, to a Provider. All other routes **MUST NOT** be propagated.

Route Server (RS): **MAY** propagate any available route to a Route Server Client (RS-Client).

Route Server Client (RS-Client): **MAY** propagate any route learned from a Customer, or that is locally originated, to an RS. All other routes **MUST NOT** be propagated.

Peer: **MAY** propagate any route learned from a Customer, or that is locally originated, to a Peer. All other routes **MUST NOT** be propagated.

If the local AS has one of the above Roles (in the order shown), then the corresponding peering relationship with the remote AS is Provider-to-Customer, Customer-to-Provider, RS-to-RS-Client, RS-Client-to-RS, or Peer-to-Peer (i.e., lateral peers), respectively. These are called normal peering relationships.

If the local AS has more than one peering Role with the remote AS, such a peering relation is called "Complex". An example is when the peering relationship is Provider-to-Customer for some prefixes while it is Peer-to-Peer for other prefixes [GAO-REXFORD].

A BGP speaker may apply policy to reduce what is announced, and a recipient may apply policy to reduce the set of routes they accept.

Violation of the route propagation rules listed above may result in route leaks [RFC7908]. Automatic enforcement of these rules should significantly reduce route leaks that may otherwise occur due to manual configuration mistakes.

As specified in Section 5, the OTC Attribute is used to identify all the routes in the AS that have been received from a Peer, a Provider, or an RS.

## 4. BGP Role

The BGP Role characterizes the relationship between the eBGP speakers forming a session. One of the Roles described below **SHOULD** be configured at the local AS for each eBGP session (see definitions in [Section 3](#)) based on the local AS's knowledge of its Role. The only exception is when the eBGP connection is Complex (see [Section 6](#)). BGP Roles are mutually confirmed using the BGP Role Capability (described in [Section 4.1](#)) on each eBGP session.

Allowed Roles for eBGP sessions are:

Provider: the local AS is a transit provider of the remote AS;

Customer: the local AS is a transit customer of the remote AS;

RS: the local AS is a Route Server (usually at an Internet exchange point), and the remote AS is its RS-Client;

RS-Client: the local AS is a client of an RS and the RS is the remote AS; and

Peer: the local and remote ASes are Peers (i.e., have a lateral peering relationship).

### 4.1. BGP Role Capability

The BGP Role Capability is defined as follows:

Code: 9

Length: 1 (octet)

Value: integer corresponding to the speaker's BGP Role (see [Table 1](#))

| Value | Role name (for the local AS) |
|-------|------------------------------|
| 0     | Provider                     |
| 1     | RS                           |
| 2     | RS-Client                    |
| 3     | Customer                     |
| 4     | Peer (i.e., Lateral Peer)    |
| 5-255 | Unassigned                   |

*Table 1: Predefined BGP Role Values*

If the BGP Role is locally configured, the eBGP speaker **MUST** advertise the BGP Role Capability in the BGP OPEN message. An eBGP speaker **MUST NOT** advertise multiple versions of the BGP Role Capability. The error handling when multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received is described in [Section 4.2](#).

## 4.2. Role Correctness

[Section 4.1](#) describes how the BGP Role encodes the relationship on each eBGP session between ASes.

The mere receipt of the BGP Role Capability does not automatically guarantee the Role agreement between two eBGP neighbors. If the BGP Role Capability is advertised, and one is also received from the peer, the Roles **MUST** correspond to the relationships in [Table 2](#). If the Roles do not correspond, the BGP speaker **MUST** reject the connection using the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode 11).

| Local AS Role | Remote AS Role |
|---------------|----------------|
| Provider      | Customer       |
| Customer      | Provider       |
| RS            | RS-Client      |
| RS-Client     | RS             |
| Peer          | Peer           |

*Table 2: Allowed Pairs of Role Capabilities*

For backward compatibility, if the BGP Role Capability is sent but one is not received, the BGP Speaker **SHOULD** ignore the absence of the BGP Role Capability and proceed with session establishment. The locally configured BGP Role is used for the procedures described in [Section 5](#).

An operator may choose to apply a "strict mode" in which the receipt of a BGP Role Capability from the remote AS is required. When operating in the "strict mode", if the BGP Role Capability is sent but one is not received, the connection is rejected using the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode 11). See comments in [Section 8](#).

If an eBGP speaker receives multiple but identical BGP Role Capabilities with the same value in each, then the speaker considers them to be a single BGP Role Capability and proceeds [[RFC5492](#)]. If multiple BGP Role Capabilities are received and not all of them have the same value, then the BGP speaker **MUST** reject the connection using the Role Mismatch Notification (code 2, subcode 11).

The BGP Role value for the local AS (in conjunction with the OTC Attribute in the received UPDATE message) is used in the route leak prevention and detection procedures described in [Section 5](#).

## 5. BGP Only to Customer (OTC) Attribute

The OTC Attribute is an optional transitive Path Attribute of the UPDATE message with Attribute Type Code 35 and a length of 4 octets. The purpose of this attribute is to enforce that once a route is sent to a Customer, a Peer, or an RS-Client (see definitions in [Section 3.1](#)), it will subsequently go only to the Customers. The attribute value is an AS number (ASN) determined by the procedures described below.

The following ingress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC Attribute on route receipt:

1. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Customer or an RS-Client, then it is a route leak and **MUST** be considered ineligible (see [Section 3](#)).
2. If a route with the OTC Attribute is received from a Peer (i.e., remote AS with a Peer Role) and the Attribute has a value that is not equal to the remote (i.e., Peer's) AS number, then it is a route leak and **MUST** be considered ineligible.
3. If a route is received from a Provider, a Peer, or an RS and the OTC Attribute is not present, then it **MUST** be added with a value equal to the AS number of the remote AS.

The following egress procedure applies to the processing of the OTC Attribute on route advertisement:

1. If a route is to be advertised to a Customer, a Peer, or an RS-Client (when the sender is an RS), and the OTC Attribute is not present, then when advertising the route, an OTC Attribute **MUST** be added with a value equal to the AS number of the local AS.
2. If a route already contains the OTC Attribute, it **MUST NOT** be propagated to Providers, Peers, or RSes.

The above-described procedures provide both leak prevention for the local AS and leak detection and mitigation multiple hops away. In the case of prevention at the local AS, the presence of an OTC Attribute indicates to the egress router that the route was learned from a Peer, a Provider, or an RS, and it can be advertised only to the Customers. The same OTC Attribute that is set locally also provides a way to detect route leaks by an AS multiple hops away if a route is received from a Customer, a Peer, or an RS-Client. For example, if an AS sets the OTC Attribute on a route sent to a Peer and the route is subsequently received by a compliant AS from a Customer, then the receiving AS detects (based on the presence of the OTC Attribute) that the route is a leak.

The OTC Attribute might be set at the egress of the remote AS or at the ingress of the local AS, i.e., if the remote AS is non-compliant with this specification, then the local AS will have to set the OTC Attribute if it is absent. In both scenarios, the OTC value will be the same. This makes the scheme more robust and benefits early adopters.

The OTC Attribute is considered malformed if the length value is not 4. An UPDATE message with a malformed OTC Attribute **SHALL** be handled using the approach of "treat-as-withdraw" [[RFC7606](#)].

The BGP Role negotiation and OTC-Attribute-based procedures specified in this document are **NOT RECOMMENDED** to be used between autonomous systems in an AS Confederation [RFC5065]. If an OTC Attribute is added on egress from the AS Confederation, its value **MUST** equal the AS Confederation Identifier. Also, on egress from the AS Confederation, an UPDATE **MUST NOT** contain an OTC Attribute with a value corresponding to any Member-AS Number other than the AS Confederation Identifier.

The procedures specified in this document in scenarios that use private AS numbers behind an Internet-facing ASN (e.g., a data-center network [RFC7938] or stub customer) may be used, but any details are outside the scope of this document. On egress from the Internet-facing AS, the OTC Attribute **MUST NOT** contain a value other than the Internet-facing ASN.

Once the OTC Attribute has been set, it **MUST** be preserved unchanged (this also applies to an AS Confederation).

The described ingress and egress procedures are applicable only for the address families AFI 1 (IPv4) and AFI 2 (IPv6) with SAFI 1 (unicast) in both cases and **MUST NOT** be applied to other address families by default. The operator **MUST NOT** have the ability to modify the procedures defined in this section.

## 6. Additional Considerations

Roles **MUST NOT** be configured on an eBGP session with a Complex peering relationship. If multiple eBGP sessions can segregate the Complex peering relationship into eBGP sessions with normal peering relationships, BGP Roles **SHOULD** be used on each of the resulting eBGP sessions.

An operator may want to achieve an equivalent outcome by configuring policies on a per-prefix basis to follow the definitions of peering relations as described in Section 3.1. However, in this case, there are no in-band measures to check the correctness of the per-prefix peering configuration.

The incorrect setting of BGP Roles and/or OTC Attributes may affect prefix propagation. Further, this document does not specify any special handling of an incorrect AS number in the OTC Attribute.

In AS migration scenarios [RFC7705], a given router may represent itself as any one of several different ASes. This should not be a problem since the egress procedures in Section 5 specify that the OTC Attribute is to be attached as part of route transmission. Therefore, a router is expected to set the OTC value equal to the ASN it is currently representing itself as.

Section 6 of [RFC7606] documents possible negative impacts of "treat-as-withdraw" behavior. Such negative impacts may include forwarding loops or dropped traffic. It also discusses debugging considerations related to this behavior.



## 7. IANA Considerations

IANA has registered a new BGP Capability ([Section 4.1](#)) in the "Capability Codes" registry within the "IETF Review" range [[RFC5492](#)]. The description for the new capability is "BGP Role". IANA has assigned the value 9. This document is the reference for the new capability.

IANA has created and now maintains a new subregistry called "BGP Role Value" within the "Capability Codes" registry. Registrations should include a value, a role name, and a reference to the defining document. IANA has registered the values in [Table 3](#). Future assignments may be made by the "IETF Review" policy as defined in [[RFC8126](#)].

| Value | Role name (for the local AS)  | Reference     |
|-------|-------------------------------|---------------|
| 0     | Provider                      | This document |
| 1     | RS                            | This document |
| 2     | RS-Client                     | This document |
| 3     | Customer                      | This document |
| 4     | Peer (i.e., Lateral Peer)     | This document |
| 5-255 | To be assigned by IETF Review |               |

*Table 3: IANA Registry for BGP Role*

IANA has registered a new OPEN Message Error subcode named "Role Mismatch" (see [Section 4.2](#)) in the "OPEN Message Error subcodes" registry. IANA has assigned the value 11. This document is the reference for the new subcode.

Due to improper use of the values 8, 9, and 10, IANA has marked values 8-10 as "Deprecated" in the "OPEN Message Error subcodes" registry. This document is listed as the reference.

IANA has also registered a new Path Attribute named "Only to Customer (OTC)" (see [Section 5](#)) in the "BGP Path Attributes" registry. IANA has assigned code value 35. This document is the reference for the new attribute.

## 8. Security Considerations

The security considerations of BGP (as specified in [[RFC4271](#)] and [[RFC4272](#)]) apply.

This document proposes a mechanism that uses the BGP Role for the prevention and detection of route leaks that are the result of BGP policy misconfiguration. A misconfiguration of the BGP Role may affect prefix propagation. For example, if a downstream (i.e., towards a Customer) peering link were misconfigured with a Provider or Peer Role, it would limit the number of prefixes that can be advertised in this direction. On the other hand, if an upstream provider were

misconfigured (by a local AS) with the Customer Role, it may result in propagating routes that are received from other Providers or Peers. But the BGP Role negotiation and the resulting confirmation of Roles make such misconfigurations unlikely.

Setting the strict mode of operation for BGP Role negotiation as the default may result in a situation where the eBGP session will not come up after a software update. Implementations with such default behavior are strongly discouraged.

Removing the OTC Attribute or changing its value can limit the opportunity for route leak detection. Such activity can be done on purpose as part of an on-path attack. For example, an AS can remove the OTC Attribute on a received route and then leak the route to its transit provider. This kind of threat is not new in BGP, and it may affect any Attribute (note that BGPsec [RFC8205] offers protection only for the AS\_PATH Attribute).

Adding an OTC Attribute when the route is advertised from Customer to Provider will limit the propagation of the route. Such a route may be considered as ineligible by the immediate Provider or its Peers or upper-layer Providers. This kind of OTC Attribute addition is unlikely to happen on the Provider side because it will limit the traffic volume towards its Customer. On the Customer side, adding an OTC Attribute for traffic-engineering purposes is also discouraged because it will limit route propagation in an unpredictable way.

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## Contributors

### Brian Dickson

Independent

Email: [brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com](mailto:brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com)

### Doug Montgomery

USA National Institute of Standards and Technology

Email: [dougmont@nist.gov](mailto:dougmont@nist.gov)

## Authors' Addresses

**Alexander Azimov**

Qrator Labs & Yandex  
Ulitsa Lva Tolstogo 16  
Moscow  
119021  
Russian Federation  
Email: [a.e.azimov@gmail.com](mailto:a.e.azimov@gmail.com)

**Eugene Bogomazov**

Qrator Labs  
1-y Magistralnyy tupik 5A  
Moscow  
123290  
Russian Federation  
Email: [eb@qrator.net](mailto:eb@qrator.net)

**Randy Bush**

Internet Initiative Japan & Arccus, Inc.  
5147 Crystal Springs  
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110  
United States of America  
Email: [randy@psg.com](mailto:randy@psg.com)

**Keyur Patel**

Arccus  
2077 Gateway Place  
Suite #400  
San Jose, CA 95119  
United States of America  
Email: [keyur@arccus.com](mailto:keyur@arccus.com)

**Kotikalapudi Sriram**

USA National Institute of Standards and Technology  
100 Bureau Drive  
Gaithersburg, MD 20899  
United States of America  
Email: [ksriram@nist.gov](mailto:ksriram@nist.gov)