KT Advance User Manual

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November 24, 2017

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1 Quick Start

1.1 System Requirements

1.1.1 Platform: MacOSX or Linux

The KT Advance C Analyzer consists of three components that may be run on different platforms:

- 1. Parser: A Mac/Linux executable (parseFile) that takes as input a preprocessed C source file and produces a set of xml files that precisely represent the semantics of the C source file. This program is an extension of the CIL parser front end, developed by George Necula, at UC Berkeley [3], an now maintained by INRIA in France. Except for very simple programs (typically programs that do not include any standard libraries), it is recommended to run the parser on a Linux platform, as the parser pulls in definitions from the standard header files resident on the system.
- 2. C Analyzer: A Mac/Linux executable (ktadvance) that takes as input the semantics files produced by the parser as well as analysis results files, if available, and produces a set of xml files that hold analysis results. This executable will be wrapped in a license manager to protect the contained intellectual property. The C Analyzer operates solely on the semantics files produced by the parser without any other dependencies on the local system, and thus it can be run equally well on Mac or Linux.
- 3. **PyAdvance:** Python code, provided as source code to licensed users, that performs linking and provides various analyzer invocation, integration, and reporting services. All reporting scripts (scripts whose name typically start with chc_report_ or chc_show_ rely only on python code and thus can (theoretically) be run on any platform that has python installed, including Windows platforms. Thus if analysis has been performed on a server and the results saved, the analysis results can then be viewed and queried by anyone with access to these results.

1.1.2 Utility Programs

The front-end parser makes use of the utility bear to record and reply the actions performed by the Make file when compiling an application. This utility is usually available via a package manager.

1.1.3 Other Dependencies

The analyzer and python scripts make use of jar files; being able to extract these requires a working Java installation.

1.2 Organization

The ktadvance repository has three top directories:

- 1. advance: python scripts and programs to run the analysis and view the results; Section ?? describes these scripts and programs in more details.
- 2. doc: KT Advance User Manual (this document) and a Reference Manual that explains the analysis approach and describes in detail the data representation of all intermediate data artifacts and analysis results data.
- 3. tests: regression tests and other test cases, several of which have been pre-parsed and are ready for analysis. The reason for having pre-parsed applications is to provide reference applications that enable longitudional study of analysis performance. Several of the test directories have dedicated scripts for parsing and analysis, as described in Section ??.

1.3 General Use Guidelines

The analysis consists of three phases that may be performed on different platforms.

- 1. **Parsing:** This phase takes as input the original source code, a Makefile (if there is more than one source file), and, in case of library includes, the library header files resident on the system. This phase produces as output a set of xml files that completely capture the semantics of the application, and are the sole input for the Analysis phase.
 - Because of the dependency on the resident system library header files it is generally recommended to perform this phase of the analysis on a Linux system, because of its more standard library environment than MacOSX (the CIL parser also may have issues with some of the Darwin constructs on MacOSX).
 - For several of the test cases in tests/sard/kendra and for all of the test cases in tests/sard/zitser and tests/sard/juliet_v1.3 the parsing step has already been performed (on Linux) and the resulting artifacts are checked in in files named semantics_linux.tar.gz. These gzipped tar files contain all xml files necessary for the analysis, and thus to analyze these files the parsing phase can be skipped altogether.
- 2. **Analysis:** This phase takes as input the xml files produced by the parsing phase. As long as the source code is not modified, the analysis can be run several times without having to repeat the parsing step. The Analysis step can be run on either MacOSX or

Linux, independently of where the parsing step was performed, as it operates solely on the xml files produced and is not dependent on any external programs or library headers.

3. Viewing Results: All analysis results are saved in a directory with the name semantics in the analysis directory. Various reporting scripts are provided to process and view these results. These scripts rely only on python code and thus can be run on any platform once the analysis results have been produced.

1.4 Getting Started

All interactions with the KT Advance C Analyzer are performed via python scripts from the command line. All scripts have been tested to work with python 2.7. An effort has been made, however, to have all python code also compliant with python 3.x.

All scripts to interact with the analyzer are in the directory ktadvance/advance/cmdline. This directory has a few subdirectories with scripts dedicated to some of the test sets in the tests directory, as follows:

- kendra: scripts to analyze and report on the test cases in tests/sard/kendra;
- zitser: scripts to analyze and report on the test cases in tests/sard/zitser;
- juliet: scripts to analyze, score, and report on the test cases in tests/sard/juliet_v1.3.

Two other subdirectories have scripts to parse, analyze, and report on any c file or c application:

- **sfapp:** scripts to parse and analyze an application that consists of a single c file that be compiled directly with gcc (without a Make file).
- **mfapp:** scripts to parse and analyze an application that comes with a Makefile. It is expected that the Makefile exists (that is, a configure script has already been run, if necessary).

Sections 2 through ?? provide a detailed description and walkthrough of the scripts available in the test-specific cmdline directories and Section ?? describes the scripts for the general files and applications. In general, user scripts start with the prefix chc_ followed by some verb that indicates the action performed; most scripts have a —help command-line option that describes the arguments expected.

2 Running Test Cases: Kendra

The ktadvance/tests/sard/kendra directory contains a collection of very small test programs retrieved from the NIST Software Assurance Reference Dataset (samate.nist.gov). These

programs are a subset of the collection of test cases developed by Kendra Kratkiewicz [2]. These test cases serve as a good first illustration of the KT Advance analysis approach and presentation of results. Section 2.3 has step-by-step instructions how to run these tests and some comments on particular cases.

2.1 Organization

The test cases are organized in groups of four related test cases, where the first three test cases have a given vulnerability with varying magnitude of overflow and in the fourth case that vulnerability is fixed (or absent). The names of the tests refer to the sequence numbers in the SARD repository, and the name of the group refers to the sequence number of the first test. For example, the test group id115Q contains the test cases id115.c, id116.c, id116.c, and id117.c.

The kendra tests are also used as regression tests for generating and discharging proof obligations. Each test directory has a reference file [testname].json (e.g., id115Q.json) that lists all proof obligations and their expected proof status, against which the analysis results are checked after each test run.

2.2 Summary of Scripts

Scripts to analyze and report on the kendra test cases are located in the advance/cmdline/kendra directory. They are (in alphabetical order):

- chc_clean_kendraset.py: removes the semantics for the given kendra set. Example: python chc_clean_kendraset.py id115Q
- chc_kendra_dashboard.py: outputs a summary of the results of all kendra sets (after analysis has been performed for all of them).

Example: python chc_kendra_dashboard.py

- chc_list_kendrasets.py: outputs a list of all kendra sets. Example: python chc_list_kendrasets.py
- chc_report_kendratest_file.py: outputs a report of all proof obligations and their analysis results for a given kendra c file.

Example: python chc_report_kendratest_file.py id115.c

• chc_show_kendra_file_table.py: outputs the entries for a particular kendra file in a given (file-level) data dictionary

Example: python chc_show_kendra_file_table id115.c --table predicate Example: python chc_show_kendra_file_table id115.c --list

• chc_show_kendra_function_table.py: outputs the entries for a particular kendra file in a given (function-level) data dictionary

Example: python chc_show_kendra_function_table id115.c main --table ppo_type Example: python chc_show_kendra_function_table id115.c main --list

- chc_show_kendraset.py: outputs a list of proof obligations for each file in the set Example: python chc_show_kendraset.py id115Q
- chc_test_kendraset.py: (parses and) analyzes the c files in the given test set Example: python chc_test_kendraset.py id115Q --verbose

 Example: python chc_test_kendraset.py id115Q --verbose

Below we give a more detailed walkthrough and illustration for invoking some of these scripts.

2.3 Running the Tests

Set the PYTHONPATH environment variable (or adapt for a different location of the ktadvance directory):

> export PYTHONPATH=\$HOME/ktadvance

To see a list of test sets currently provided in the tests/sard/kendra directory:

- > cd ktadvance/advance/cmdline/kendra
- > python chc_list_kendratests.py

To run the analysis of a test set (staying in the cmdline/kendra directory):

> python chc_test_kendra_set.py id115Q

(or any other of the test set names provided in the list displayed earlier.) This will print the summary results for the four test programs included:

File	Parsing	PPO Gen	SPO Gen	PPO Results	SPO Results	
id115.c	ok	ok	ok	ok	ok	
id116.c	ok	ok	ok	ok	ok	
id117.c	ok	ok	ok	ok	ok	
id118.c	ok	ok	ok	ok	ok	

References

- [1] Paul E. Black and Athos Rebeiro. SATE V Ockham Sound Analysis Criteria. Technical Report NISTIR 8113, NIST, 2017.
- [2] Kendra Kratkiewicz and Richard Lippmann. Using a diagnostic corpus of C programs to evaluate buffer overflow detection by static analysis tools. In Paul E. Black and Elizabeth Fong, editors, *Proceedings of Defining the State of the Art in Software Security Tools Workshop*, number 500-264 in NIST Special Publication, pages 102–111. NIST, September 2005.
- [3] George C. Necula, Scott McPeak, Shree Prakash Rahul, and Westley Weimer. CIL: Intermediate language and tools for analysis and transformation of C programs. In R. Nigel Horspool, editor, CC, volume 2304 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 213–228. Springer, 2002.
- [4] Misha Zitser, Richard Lippmann, and Tim Leek. Testing static analysis tools using exploitable buffer overflows from open source code. In Richard N. Taylor and Matthew B. Dwyer, editors, SIGSOFT FSE, pages 97–106. ACM, 2004.

indicating that all stages ran without error, all proof obligations were correctly generated and the analysis results are as expected. To see more of the output while running the test, add –verbose as a command-line option.

To see which proof obligations are included in the test cases, with line numbers and expected proof status:

> python chc_show_kendra_test.py id115Q

```
id115.c
 main
      56 index-lower-bound
                                  safe
      56
         index-upper-bound
                                  violation
      56
         cast
                                  safe
id116.c
 main
      56
         index-lower-bound
                                  safe
          index-upper-bound
                                  violation
      56
                                  safe
         cast
id117.c
 main
         index-lower-bound
                                  safe
      56
         index-upper-bound
      56
                                  violation
      56
         cast
                                  safe
```

```
id118.c
  main
    56 index-lower-bound safe
    56 index-upper-bound safe
    56 cast safe
```

When a test case has been analyzed the analysis results are saved in the semantics/ktadvance directory and are available for inspection and to reporting scripts. To see a full report, including code, proof justifications, and summary for an individual test file (note the filename):

```
> python chc_report_kendratest_file.py id115.c
Function main
50 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
______
Api:
 parameters:
   int[] argc
   ((char[] *) *) argv
 -- no assumptions
 -- no postcondition requests
 -- no postcondition guarantees
 -- no library calls
______
Primary Proof Obligations:
51 {
52
    char buf[10];
53
54
55
    /* BAD */
56
    buf[4105] = 'A';
          56 index-lower-bound(4105) (safe)
<S>
              index value 4105 is non-negative
     2 56 index-upper-bound(4105,bound:10) (violation)
<*>
             index value 4105 violates upper bound 10
         56 cast(chr('A'),from:int[],to:char[]) (safe)
<S>
              casting constant value 65 to char
```

Primary Proof Obligations

function	s stmt	local	api	pos	t globa	l ope	n total
main	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
total	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
percent	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	

Proof Obligation Statistics for file id115

Primary Proof Obligations

	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
cast	 1	0	0	0	0	0	1
index-lower-bound	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
index-upper-bound	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
total	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
percent	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	

For each line of code that has associated proof obligations the report shows the proof obligation predicate, whether it is valid (safe, indicated by <S>) or violated (indicated by <*>), and the reason for the assessment. For the safe case, id118.c, the output shows that the proof obligation for the upper bound is indeed safe.

> python chc_report_kendratest_file.py id118.c

. . . .

```
-----
```

```
Primary Proof Obligations:
______
51 {
    char buf[10];
52
53
54
55
    /* OK */
    buf[9] = 'A';
56
<S>
          56 index-lower-bound(9) (safe)
              index value 9 is non-negative
<S>
          56 index-upper-bound(9,bound:10) (safe)
              index value 9 is less than bound 10
<S>
          56 cast(chr('A'),from:int[],to:char[]) (safe)
              casting constant value 65 to char
```

. . . .

For a list of all proof obligation predicates and their meaning, please see the KT Advance Reference Manual in this directory.

To analyze all kendra test cases run

```
> python chc_test_kendra_sets.py
```

If all of them complete all analysis results are available for inspection and reporting. Below we discuss some special cases.

2.4 Some Kendra Examples Discussed

2.4.1 Id151Q: Library Function Postconditions and Macros

The tests in this set program call two library functions: assert and malloc. Proving the memory safety of this program requires knowledge of the semantics of both of these library functions, in this case in particular the postconditions of these functions. To obtain this information the analysis makes use of library function summaries (provided in advance/summaries/cchsummaries.jar).

The malloc summary includes a postcondition that states that the return value points to a newly allocated region of memory with size (in bytes) given by the first argument, or the return value is NULL. Proof obligation 34 uses this information to determine that the buffer access on line 60 violates its bounds. Similarly in program id154.c (the safe version) the same information is used to prove the buffer access safe.

The assert call is actually a macro that expands into a conditional expression that calls a function __assert_fail. In particular, the call

```
if ((caste(unsigned long,buf) != caste(unsigned long,caste((void *),0))))
   { }
else
   { __assert_fail("buf != NULL","id151.c",57, "main"); }
```

which explains the many proof obligations that get generated for this seemingly simple instruction.

The __assert_fail function has postcondition false, that is, it does not return. This means only the then branch, with condition buf != NULL, continues, based on which proof obligation 31 (not-null(buf)) can be proven safe.

The results for id151.c are

```
Function main
______
52 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
______
Api:
 parameters:
  int[] argc
   ((char[] *) *) argv
 postcondition guarantees:
  post-expr(eq,return-val,num-constant(0))
 library calls:
  assert:__assert_fail -- 1
  stdlib:malloc -- 1
______
Primary Proof Obligations:
53 {
54
    char * buf;
55
    buf = (char *) malloc(10 * sizeof(char));
______
        56 int-underflow(10, sizeof(char[]), op:mult, ikind:iulong) (safe)
<S>
    1
            underflow is well defined for unsigned types
        56 int-overflow(10, sizeof(char[]), op:mult, ikind:iulong) (safe)
<S>
            overflow is well defined for unsigned types
<S>
         56 pointer-cast(tmp,from:void[],to:char[]) (safe)
            cast to character type
<L>
         56 initialized(tmp)
                           (safe)
            assignedAt#56(rv:malloc)
57
    assert (buf != NULL);
```

```
______
            57 cast(buf,from:(char[] *),to:unsigned long[]) (safe)
<S>
      5
                 casting a pointer to integer type unsigned long
<L>
      6
            57 initialized(buf)
                                     (safe)
                 assignedAt#56
<S>
      7
            57 cast(caste((void[] *),0),from:(void[] *),to:unsigned long[]) (safe)
                 null-pointer cast
            57 cast(0,from:int[],to:(void[] *)) (safe)
<S>
      8
                 null-pointer cast
      9
            57 not-null(str(main)) (safe)
<S>
                 string literal
            57 null-terminated(str(main)) (safe)
<S>
     10
                 string literal
            57 ptr-upper-bound(str(main),ntp(str(main)),op:pluspi,typ:char[]) (safe)
<S>
     11
                 upperbound of constant string argument: main
            57 initialized-range(str(main),len:ntp(str(main))) (safe)
<S>
     12
                 constant string
<S>
     13
            57 not-null(str(id151.c)) (safe)
                 string literal
<S>
     14
            57 null-terminated(str(id151.c)) (safe)
                 string literal
<S>
            57 ptr-upper-bound(str(id151.c),ntp(str(id151.c)),op:pluspi,typ:char[]) (safe)
     15
                 upperbound of constant string argument: id151.c
<S>
            57 initialized-range(str(id151.c),len:ntp(str(id151.c))) (safe)
     16
                 constant string
<S>
     17
            57 not-null(str(buf != NULL)) (safe)
                 string literal
<S>
     18
            57 null-terminated(str(buf != NULL)) (safe)
                 string literal
            57 ptr-upper-bound(str(buf != NULL),ntp(str(buf != NULL)),op:pluspi,typ:char[]) (safe)
<S>
     19
                 upperbound of constant string argument: buf != NULL
<S>
     20
            57 initialized-range(str(buf != NULL),len:ntp(str(buf != NULL))) (safe)
                 constant string
<S>
     21
            57 valid-mem(str(buf != NULL)) (safe)
                 constant string is allocated by compiler
            57 lower-bound(char[],str(buf != NULL)) (safe)
<S>
     22
                 constant string is allocated by compiler
            57 upper-bound(char[],str(buf != NULL)) (safe)
<S>
     23
                 constant string is allocated by compiler
<S>
     24
            57 valid-mem(str(id151.c)) (safe)
                 constant string is allocated by compiler
<S>
     25
            57 lower-bound(char[],str(id151.c)) (safe)
                 constant string is allocated by compiler
            57 upper-bound(char[],str(id151.c)) (safe)
<S>
     26
                 constant string is allocated by compiler
            57 valid-mem(str(main)) (safe)
<S>
     27
                 constant string is allocated by compiler
            57 lower-bound(char[],str(main)) (safe)
<S>
     28
```

```
constant string is allocated by compiler
<S>
    29
         57 upper-bound(char[],str(main)) (safe)
            constant string is allocated by compiler
______
59
    /* BAD */
    buf[4105] = 'A';
60
<L>
    30
         60 initialized(buf)
                             (safe)
             assignedAt#56
<L>
    31
         60 not-null(buf)
                              (safe)
              null has been explicitly excluded (either by assignment or by checking)
<L>
    32
         60 valid-mem(buf) (safe)
              all memory regions potentially pointed at are valid: addrof_heapregion_1
<S>
    33
          60 ptr-lower-bound(buf,4105,op:indexpi,typ:char[]) (safe)
              add non-negative number: value is 4105
<*>
    34
          60 ptr-upper-bound-deref(buf,4105,op:indexpi,typ:char[]) (violation)
              increment is larger than or equal to the size of the memory region
              returned by malloc: violates ((4105 * 1) < 10)
<S>
    35
          60 not-null((buf + 4105)) (safe)
              arguments of pointer arithmetic are checked for null
<S>
          60 valid-mem((buf + 4105)) (safe)
              pointer arithmetic stays within memory region
<S>
          60 lower-bound(char[],(buf + 4105)) (safe)
              result of pointer arithmetic is guaranteed to satisfy lowerbound
              by inductive hypothesis
<S>
          60 upper-bound(char[],(buf + 4105)) (safe)
    38
              result of pointer arithmetic is guaranteed to satisfy upperbound
              by inductive hypothesis
<S>
          60 cast(chr('A'),from:int[],to:char[]) (safe)
              casting constant value 65 to char
Primary Proof Obligations
functions stmt local api post global open total
_____
    33 6 0 0 0 0 39
total 33 6 0 0 0 0
percent 84.62 15.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Proof Obligation Statistics for file id151
                                  Primary Proof Obligations
                      stmt local api post global open total
```

cast	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
initialized	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
initialized-range	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
int-overflow	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
int-underflow	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
lower-bound	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
not-null	4	1	0	0	0	0	5
null-terminated	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
pointer-cast	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
ptr-lower-bound	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
ptr-upper-bound	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
ptr-upper-bound-deref	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
upper-bound	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
valid-mem	4	1	0	0	0	0	5
total	33	6	0	0	0	0	39
percent	84.62	15.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	

For id154.c (the safe version) the results are:

```
Function main
52 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
Api:
  parameters:
    int[] argc
    ((char[] *) *) argv
  postcondition guarantees:
   post-expr(eq,return-val,num-constant(0))
  library calls:
   assert:__assert_fail -- 1
   stdlib:malloc -- 1
Primary Proof Obligations:
53 {
54
      char * buf;
55
     buf = (char *) malloc(10 * sizeof(char));
56
           56 int-underflow(10, sizeof(char[]), op:mult, ikind:iulong) (safe)
<S>
                  underflow is well defined for unsigned types
       2
           56 int-overflow(10, sizeof(char[]), op:mult, ikind:iulong) (safe)
<S>
```

overflow is well defined for unsigned types

```
<S>
            56 pointer-cast(tmp,from:void[],to:char[]) (safe)
                 cast to character type
<L>
            56 initialized(tmp)
                                    (safe)
                assignedAt#56(rv:malloc)
         ______
     assert (buf != NULL);
58
59
     /* OK */
60
     buf[9] = 'A';
<L>
     30
            60 initialized(buf)
                                    (safe)
                assignedAt#56
<L>
     31
            60 not-null(buf)
                                    (safe)
                null has been explicitly excluded (either by assignment or by checking)
<L>
     32
            60 valid-mem(buf)
                                    (safe)
                 all memory regions potentially pointed at are valid: addrof_heapregion_1
<S>
     33
            60 ptr-lower-bound(buf,9,op:indexpi,typ:char[]) (safe)
                 add non-negative number: value is 9
<L>
            60 ptr-upper-bound-deref(buf,9,op:indexpi,typ:char[]) (safe)
                 increment is less than the size of the memory region returned by
                 malloc: satisfies ((9 * 1) < 10)
<S>
     35
            60 not-null((buf + 9)) (safe)
                 arguments of pointer arithmetic are checked for null
            60 valid-mem((buf + 9)) (safe)
<S>
     36
                 pointer arithmetic stays within memory region
<S>
     37
            60 lower-bound(char[],(buf + 9)) (safe)
                result of pointer arithmetic is guaranteed to satisfy lowerbound
                 by inductive hypothesis
<S>
     38
            60 upper-bound(char[],(buf + 9)) (safe)
                 result of pointer arithmetic is guaranteed to satisfy upperbound
                 by inductive hypothesis
<S>
     39
            60 cast(chr('A'),from:int[],to:char[]) (safe)
                casting constant value 65 to char
```

2.4.2 Id167Q: Supporting Proof Obligations

The programs in this set illustrate the concept and use of *supporting proof obligations*. The safety of the array access in function1 depends on the size of the array buf that is passed in as an argument. Since function1 is not in a position to determine this size it must delegate the responsibility for the safety of the array access to the caller of the function. It does so by automatically generating the necessary conditions for safety on the argument value and

advertising these as assumptions in its api. In this case there are two safety conditions: (1) the argument should not be null, and (2) the size of the argument should be at least 4106 (since it accesses index 4105).

The api assumptions generated by function1 are converted by the calling function, main, into so-called supporting proof obligations that express the conditions applied to the actual arguments. In program id167.c the resulting proof obligation for the second api assumption, 4106; 10, evaluates to false, resulting in the report of a memory safety violation. In program id170.c both supporting proof obligations are shown valid.

Note that the violation in program 167.c is reported in main and not in function1, although the actual buffer overflow will happen in function1. In general a violation is placed at the highest applicable position in the call graph if there is a choice, because this will be the most likely position where a correction must be made. The program position of the actual buffer violation can be found by following the chain of assumptions and dependent ppo's/spos's that leads to the assumption that is being violated.

Results for id167.c:

```
Function function1
50 void function1(char * buf)
Api:
  parameters:
    (char[] *) buf
  api assumptions
   5 not-null(buf)
      --Dependent ppo's: [2]
   14 ptr-upper-bound-deref(buf,4105,op:pluspi,typ:char[])
      --Dependent ppo's: [5]
Primary Proof Obligations:
51 {
      /* BAD */
52
53
      buf[4105] = 'A';
<S>
             53 initialized(buf)
                                      (safe)
                 buf is a function parameter
<A>
             53 not-null(buf)
                                      (safe)
                 condition not-null(buf) delegated to api
<L>
             53 valid-mem(buf)
                                      (safe)
                  all memory regions potentially pointed at are valid:
                  addr_in_(buf_1_)#init
```

Supporting Proof Obligations:

```
<S>
           53 ptr-lower-bound(buf,4105,op:indexpi,typ:char[]) (safe)
               add non-negative number: value is 4105
           53 ptr-upper-bound-deref(buf,4105,op:indexpi,typ:char[]) (safe)
<A>
      5
               condition ptr-upperbound-deref(((buf +i 4105):char) delegated to api
<S>
      6
           53 not-null((buf + 4105)) (safe)
               arguments of pointer arithmetic are checked for null
           53 valid-mem((buf + 4105)) (safe)
<S>
               pointer arithmetic stays within memory region
           53 lower-bound(char[],(buf + 4105)) (safe)
<S>
      8
               result of pointer arithmetic is guaranteed to satisfy lowerbound
               by inductive hypothesis
           53 upper-bound(char[],(buf + 4105)) (safe)
<S>
      9
               result of pointer arithmetic is guaranteed to satisfy upperbound
               by inductive hypothesis
<S>
     10
           53 cast(chr('A'),from:int[],to:char[]) (safe)
               casting constant value 65 to char
Function main
56 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
______
Api:
 parameters:
   int[] argc
   ((char[] *) *) argv
 postcondition guarantees:
  post-expr(eq,return-val,num-constant(0))
 -- no library calls
______
Primary Proof Obligations:
57 {
58
     char buf[10];
59
60
    function1(buf);
      ______
<S>
          61 valid-mem(&(buf))
                                (safe)
               address of a variable is a valid memory region
     2 61 lower-bound(char[],&(buf)) (safe)
<S>
              address of a variable
<S>
          61 upper-bound(char[],&(buf)) (safe)
             address of a variable
```

57 58 59 60 61		r buf	[10]; 1(buf)				
<s></s>	1	5	61	<pre>not-null(&(buf)) (safe) address of variable buf</pre>			
<*>	2 14 61 ptr-upper-bound-deref(&(buf),4105,op:pluspi,typ:char[]) (violation) adding 4105 to the start of an array of length 10 violates the upperbound						
Prima	ary Pi	roof (Obliga	ions			
functions			stmt	local api post global open total			

function1	7	1	2	0	0	0	10
main	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
total	10	1	2	0	0	0	13
percent	76.92	7.69	15.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	

Supporting functions	Proof Oblig	gations local	api	post	global	open	total
main	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
total percent	2 100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2

Proof Obligation Statistics for file id167

Primary Proof Obligations

	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
cast	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
initialized	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
lower-bound	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
not-null	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
ptr-lower-bound	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
ptr-upper-bound-deref	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
upper-bound	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
valid-mem	2	1	0	0	0	0	3
total	10	1	2	0	0	0	13
percent	76.92	7.69	15.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	

Supporting Proof Obligations

	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
not-null	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
ptr-upper-bound-deref	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
total	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
percent	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	

3 Running Test Cases: Zitser

The test cases in the directory ktadvance/tests/sard/zitser are test cases number 1283 through 1310 from the NIST Software Assurance Reference Dataset (samate.nist.gov). These test cases were contributed by Misha Zitser, and are described in [4] All test cases have been pre-parsed and are ready for analysis.

3.1 Summary of Scripts

Scripts to analyze and report on the zitser test cases are located in the directory ktadvance/advance/cmdline/zitser. They are (in alphabetical order):

• chc_analyze_zitser.py: analyzes the given zitser test case.

Example: python chc_analyze_zitser.py id1283

Example: python chc_analyze_zitser.py id1283 --verbose

• chc_analyze_zitser_set.py: analyzes all zitser test cases (id1283-id1310); this may take 20-30 minutes.

Example: python chc_analyze_zitser_set.py

• chc_investigate_ppos.py: outputs all open primary proof obligations per predicate, per file, per function for a given test case that has been analyzed; may optionally be restricted to a single predicate

Example: python chc_investigate_ppos.py id1283

Example: python chc_investigate_ppos.py id1283 --predicate valid-mem

- chc_report_violations.py: outputs a list of all (universal) violations found. Example: python chc_report_violations.py id1283
- chc_report_zitser.py: outputs a summary of the status of the proof obligations for the given zitser test case that has been analyzed.

Example: python chc_report_zitser.py id1283

- chc_report_zitser_file.py: outputs a summary of the status for the proof obligations for the given zitser test case c file that has been analyzed (optionally with a listing of the code and the proof obligations associated with each line of code).
 - Example: python chc_report_zitser_file.py id1283 call_fb_realpath.c Example: python chc_report_zitser_file.py id1283 call_fb_realpath.c --showcode
- chc_report_zitser_function.py: outputs the code and associated proof obligations with justification, if closed, and diagnostic or invariants, if open for a given function in a given zitser test case.
 - Example: python chc_report_zitser_function.py id1283 realpath-bad.c wu_realpath
- chc_show_zitser_file_table.py: outputs the entries for a zitser test case file in a given (file-level) data dictionary
 - Example: python chc_show_zitser_file_table.py id1283 realpath-bad.c typ
- chc_show_zitser_function_table.py: outputs the entries for a zitser test case function in a given (function-level) data dictionary
 - Example: python chc_show_zitser_function_table.py id1283 realpath-bad.c wu_realpath local_varinfo
- chc_zitser_dashboard.py: outputs a summary of the results of all zitser test cases (after all test cases have been analyzed)

Example: python chc_zitser_dashboard.py

3.2 Running the Tests

To analyze all 28 zitser test cases:

- > export PYTHONPATH=\$HOME/ktadvance
- > cd ktadvance/advance/cmdline/zitser
- > python chc_analyze_zitser_set.py

Since all zitser tests have been pre-parsed the analysis can be run on either Linux or MacOS; the results will always be the same, as the analysis has no dependencies on the compiler or resident standard header files.

To analyze a single zitser test case, say id1283:

> python chc_analyze_zitser.py id1283

or

> python chc_analyze_zitser.py id1283 --verbose

to have intermediate output printed to the console.

Once a test case is analyzed its results can be inspected. The command

> python chc_report_zitser.py id1283

outputs a summary of the status of all proof obligations:

Primary	Proof	Obligations
c files		

c files	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
call_fb_realpath realpath-bad	78 685	10 440	1 59	0	0	10 196	99 1380
total percent	763 51.59	450 30.43	60 4.06	0.00	0.00	206 13.93	1479
Supporting Proof O c files	bligations stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
call_fb_realpath realpath-bad	10 7	0 1	0 2	0 0	0 0	1 1	11 11
total percent	17 77.27	1 4.55	2 9.09	0.00	0.00	2 9.09	22

Proof Obligation Statistics

Primary Proof Obligations

	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
allocation-base	0	 2	0	0	0	0	2
cast	47	6	0	0	0	4	57
common-base	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
format-string	33	0	0	0	0	0	33
global-mem	5	0	0	0	0	2	7
index-lower-bound	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
index-upper-bound	5	0	0	0	0	0	5
initialized	49	156	1	0	0	9	215
initialized-range	40	0	0	0	0	49	89
int-overflow	12	2	0	0	0	5	19
int-underflow	19	0	0	0	0	0	19
lower-bound	82	66	0	0	0	17	165
no-overlap	4	8	2	0	0	4	18

not-null	58	56	46	0	0	1	161
null-terminated	40	1	0	0	0	47	88
pointer-cast	115	0	0	0	0	0	115
ptr-lower-bound	7	1	0	0	0	2	10
ptr-upper-bound	62	0	7	0	0	36	105
ptr-upper-bound-deref	3	0	4	0	0	3	10
signed-to-unsigned-cast	13	2	0	0	0	0	15
upper-bound	82	66	0	0	0	17	165
valid-mem	82	83	0	0	0	10	175
total	763	450	60	0	0	206	1479
percent	51.59	30.43	4.06	0.00	0.00	13.93	
Supporting Proof Obligation	ons						
	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
initialized	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
no-overlap	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
not-null	3	0	1	0	0	0	4
ptr-upper-bound	7	0	1	0	0	0	8
ptr-upper-bound-deref	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
total	17	 1	2	0	0	2	22
percent	77.27	4.55	9.09	0.00	0.00	9.09	

The command

> python chc_report_zitser_file.py id1283 realpath-bad.c

outputs the summary results for a single c file. Adding the option <code>--showcode</code> will produce a more detailed output that associates all proof obligations with the source code for all functions in the given c file. The command

> python chc_report_zitser_function.py id1283 realpath-bad.c fb_realpath

will output the source code for the function with the associated proof obligations and their status, as well as a summary of results for the function.

The script chc_investigate_ppos.py allows inspection of all open proof obligations or all proof obligations of a certain predicate, e.g.:

> python chc_investigate_ppos.py id1283 --predicate upper-bound upper-bound

```
File: realpath-bad
  Function: fb_realpath
           284 upper-bound(char[],q) (open)
    172
           292 upper-bound(char[],q) (open)
           293 upper-bound(char[const:],caste((char[const:]*),q)) (open)
     181
           299 upper-bound(char[const: ],caste((char[const: ] *),q)) (open)
     203
           305 upper-bound(char[],q) (open)
     223
     231
                upper-bound(char[],p) (open)
           313
     254
           315 upper-bound(char[],p) (open)
                upper-bound(char[const: ], caste((char[const: ] *),p)) (open)
     265
           316
           325 upper-bound(char[const:],caste((char[const:]*),p)) (open)
     320
     431
           359 upper-bound(char[const: ], caste((char[const: ] *),p)) (open)
     464
           365 upper-bound(char[const: ], caste((char[const: ] *),p)) (open)
                upper-bound(char[const: ], caste((char[const: ] *),p)) (open)
     567
           390
    586
           391 upper-bound(char[],p) (open)
     609
                upper-bound(char[const: ], caste((char[const: ] *),p)) (open)
           414 upper-bound(char[const:],caste((char[const:]*),p)) (open)
    628
 Function: wu_realpath
           180 upper-bound(char[],ptr) (open)
    137
    158
           181 upper-bound(char[],ptr) (open)
```

.

To see a summary of the analysis results of all zitser test cases (after they have all been analyzed):

Primary proof obligations

zitser testcase	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
id1283	 763	450	 60	0	0	206	1479
id1284	640	347	51	0	0	164	1202
id1285	871	294	35	0	0	271	1471
id1286	1195	356	43	0	0	334	1928
id1287	421	116	15	0	0	108	660
id1288	378	118	16	0	0	111	623
id1289	408	263	29	0	0	329	1029
id1290	371	246	24	0	0	301	942
id1291	1220	1099	58	0	0	399	2776
id1292	1219	1102	59	0	0	398	2778

id1293	807	805	47	0	0	262	1921
id1294	926	848	51	0	0	272	2097
id1295	302	164	32	0	0	99	597
id1296	312	166	32	0	0	99	609
id1297	355	521	16	0	0	219	1111
id1298	725	1320	17	0	0	222	2284
id1299	393	344	66	0	0	274	1077
id1300	490	351	74	0	0	277	1192
id1301	420	206	23	0	0	153	802
id1302	255	168	16	0	0	98	537
id1303	264	222	14	0	0	153	653
id1304	291	252	14	0	0	156	713
id1305	433	204	25	0	0	106	768
id1306	478	213	34	0	0	112	837
id1307	137	53	2	0	0	106	298
id1308	138	53	2	0	0	107	300
id1309	750	655	50	0	0	650	2105
id1310	765	661	50	0	0	653	2129
total	15727	11597	955	0	0	6639	34918
percent	45.04	33.21	2.73	0.00	0.00	19.01	

Secondary proof obligations

.

Proof obligation types

Primary proof obligations

	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
allocation-base	0	2	2	0	0	10	14
cast	1516	166	0	0	0	163	1845
common-base	0	193	16	0	0	13	222
common-base-type	0	91	0	0	0	10	101
format-string	593	0	0	0	0	2	595
global-mem	87	0	0	0	0	44	131
index-lower-bound	93	12	0	0	0	2	107
index-upper-bound	83	12	0	0	0	12	107
initialized	968	4581	48	0	0	824	6421
initialized-range	769	8	0	0	0	509	1286
int-overflow	218	26	0	0	0	145	389
int-underflow	316	21	8	0	0	44	389
lower-bound	1616	1178	0	0	0	690	3484
no-overlap	77	49	10	0	0	38	174
non-negative	179	0	0	0	0	0	179
not-null	1208	1709	785	0	0	600	4302
not-zero	2	0	0	0	0	0	2

null-terminated	792	62	0	0	0	451	1305
pointer-cast	1839	0	0	0	0	40	1879
ptr-lower-bound	728	28	12	0	0	129	897
ptr-upper-bound	938	24	25	0	0	508	1495
ptr-upper-bound-deref	122	9	49	0	0	696	876
signed-to-unsigned-cast	165	36	0	0	0	74	275
unsigned-to-signed-cast	67	41	0	0	0	157	265
upper-bound	1574	910	0	0	0	932	3416
valid-mem	1598	2439	0	0	0	546	4583
width-overflow	179	0	0	0	0	0	179
total	15727	11597	955	0	0	6639	34918
percent	45.04	33.21	2.73	0.00	0.00	19.01	
Secondary proof obligation	ıs						
Secondary proof obligation	ns stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
Secondary proof obligation allocation-base		local 	api 0	post 	global 	open 26	total 26
	stmt						
allocation-base	stmt 0	0	0	0	0	 26	26
allocation-base	stmt 0 0 0	0 4	0	0	0 0	26 0	26 4
allocation-base common-base initialized	stmt 0 0 6	0 4 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	0 0	26 0 54	26 4 60
allocation-base common-base initialized int-underflow	stmt 0 0 6	0 4 0 4	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	26 0 54 2	26 4 60 6
allocation-base common-base initialized int-underflow no-overlap	stmt 0 0 6 0 4	0 4 0 4 2	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	26 0 54 2	26 4 60 6
allocation-base common-base initialized int-underflow no-overlap not-null ptr-lower-bound ptr-upper-bound	stmt 0 0 6 0 4 46	0 4 0 4 2 52	0 0 0 0 0 0 30	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0	26 0 54 2 0 83	26 4 60 6 6 211
allocation-base common-base initialized int-underflow no-overlap not-null ptr-lower-bound	stmt 0 0 6 0 4 46 0	0 4 0 4 2 52 4	0 0 0 0 0 0 30	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	26 0 54 2 0 83 2	26 4 60 6 6 211 6
allocation-base common-base initialized int-underflow no-overlap not-null ptr-lower-bound ptr-upper-bound	stmt 0 0 6 0 4 46 0 16	0 4 0 4 2 52 4 7	0 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 3	0 0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	26 0 54 2 0 83 2	26 4 60 6 6 211 6 44

4 Running Test Cases: Juliet

The ktadvance/tests/sard/juliet_v1.3 directory contains a subset of the test cases from the Juliet Test Suite, developed by the NSA Center for Assured Software, and updated by NIST. The entire test suite is available from the NIST SARD repository, at samate.nist.gov. These tests are also part of the SATE V Ockham competition organized by NIST [1].

4.1 Organization

The test cases are organized in a similar way as the original Test Suite, except that the file hierarchy is extended by one level to create separate directories for each functional variant, that solely contain the flow variants for that functional variant. Furthermore, C++ variants have been removed.

CWE121/s01/CWE129_large CWE121/s01/CWE129_rand CWE121/s01/CWE131_loop CWE121/s01/char_type_overrun_memcpy CWE121/s01/char_type_overrun_memmove CWE121/s02/CWE193_char_alloca_loop CWE121/s02/CWE193_char_alloca_ncpy CWE121/s02/CWE193_char_declare_loop CWE121/s03/CWE805_char_declare_loop CWE121/s03/CWE805_char_declare_memcpy CWE121/s03/CWE805_char_declare_memmove CWE121/s03/CWE805_char_declare_ncpy CWE122/s01/char_type_overrun_memcpy CWE122/s01/char_type_overrun_memmove CWE122/s05/CWE131_loop CWE122/s05/CWE131_memcpy CWE122/s06/CWE131_memmove CWE122/s06/CWE135 CWE122/s06/c_CWE129_connect_socket CWE122/s06/c_CWE129_fgets

Table 1: Current set of Juliet Tests provided in tests/sard/juliet_v1.3

Each functional variant directory contains the following files:

- [name]_src.tar.gz: the original c source files, including a reduced main file, main_linux.c that contains a main function that calls the functions in the flow variants.
- semantics_linux.tar.gz: the result of preprocessing and parsing the source files (on a linux platform) into KT Advance Analyzer input format The files in this tar file provide all necessary information for the analysis; the analysis can be run on any platforms; all platform dependencies are included in the files.
- scorekey.json: a specification of the proof obligations and their locations that are relevant to the vulnerability being tested by the test case, for both the good and the bad versions of the functions.

The tests currently provided are shown in Table 1. More tests will be added in the near future.

4.2 Summary of Scripts

Scripts to analyze, report on, and score the juliet test cases are located in the advance/cmdline/juliet directory. They are (in alphabetical order):

- chc_analyze_juliettest.py: analyzes the given juliet test case Example: python chc_analyze_juliettest.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large
- chc_analyze_juliettest_sets.py: analyzes all juliet test cases in the juliet_v1.3 directory. This may take more than an hour.

Example: python chc_analyze_juliettest_sets.py

- chc_juliet_dashboard.py: outputs a summary of the proof obligation status of the proof obligations related to the vulnerability being tested (as specified in the scorekey.json file). Can only be run after all test cases have been analyzed and scored. Example: python chc_juliet_dashboard.py
- chc_list_juliettests.py: outputs the list of juliet tests in the tests/sard/juliet_v1.3 directory with date and times of their last analysis and scoring.
- chc_parse_juliettest.py: preprocesses and parses the given juliet test. This script is only used when adding new test sets; all existing tests have already been parsed.

 Example: python chc_parse_juliettest.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large
- chc_prepare_juliettest.py: renames the flow variants into x[nn].c to reduce filename and function-name lengths in reports. This script is only used when adding new test sets.

 Example: python chc_prepare_juliettest.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large
 CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_
- chc_report_juliettest.py: outputs a summary of the status of the proof obligations for all flow variants in the test.

Example: python chc_report_juliettest.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large

• chc_report_juliettest_file.py: outputs a summary of the status of the proof obligations for a given flow variant in the test.

Example: python chc_report_juliettest_file.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large x01.c Example:

python chc_report_juliettest_file.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large x01.c --showcode

- chc_report_juliettest_function.py: outputs the source code of the given function with all associated proof obligations and a summary of their status.

 Example:
 - python chc_report_juliettest_function.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large x01.c goodB2G
- chc_report_juliettest_sets.py: outputs a summary of the proof obligation status (for all proof obligations) for all juliet tests currently provided.

 Example: python chc_report_juliettest_sets.py
- chc_report_juliettest_vulnerability.py: outputs the source code for the given test with the proof obligations associated with the vulnerability tested (obtained from the scorekey)

 Example: python chc_report_vulnerability.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large 01
- chc_score_juliettest.py: compares the analysis results with the desired results as specified in the file scorekey.json and records the results in the file summaryresults.json and outputs a comparison report.

Example: python chc_score_juliettest.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large

4.3 Running the Tests

Set the PYTHONPATH environment variable (or adapt for a different location of the ktadvance directory):

> export PYTHONPATH=\$HOME/ktadvance

All tests provided in the tests/sard/juliet_v1.3 directory have been pre-parsed and thus are ready for analysis. To analyze a Juliet test case:

- > cd ktadvance/advance/cmdline/juliet
- > python chc_analyze_juliettest.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large

or, if multiple processors are available:

> python chc_analyze_juliettest.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large --maxprocesses 16

which allows the invariant generation and proof obligation checking to be performed in parallel for different c files. The analysis will produce a semantics directory in the test directory that contains all analysis results. These analysis results can be inspected by various reporting scripts. To see a summary of the results for this test case:

> python chc_report_juliettest.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large
Primary Proof Obligations

c files	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
io	298	 63	 14	0	0	47	422
main_linux	7	3	0	0	0	1	11
std_thread	70	84	14	0	0	28	196
x01	24	34	0	0	0	2	60
x02	42	54	0	0	0	3	99
x03	42	54	0	0	0	3	99
x04	52	54	0	0	0	3	109
x05	52	54	0	0	0	3	109
x06	52	54	0	0	0	3	109
x07	52	54	0	0	0	3	109
x08	57	73	0	0	0	4	134
x09	103	71	0	0	0	6	180
x10	103	71	0	0	0	6	180
x11	42	64	0	0	0	3	109

x12	55	74	0	0	0	5	134
x13	103	71	0	0	0	6	180
x14	103	71	0	0	0	6	180
x15	135	71	0	0	0	6	212
x16	24	34	0	0	0	2	60
x17	52	60	0	0	0	4	116
x18	24	34	0	0	0	2	60
x21	87	50	2	0	0	4	143
x22a	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
x22b	87	46	2	0	0	4	139
x31	24	40	0	0	0	2	66
x32	46	71	0	0	0	29	146
x34	46	44	0	0	0	8	98
x41	53	37	2	0	0	3	95
x42	49	44	0	0	0	5	98
x44	53	55	2	0	0	3	113
x45	49	44	0	0	0	5	98
x51a	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
x51b	53	34	2	0	0	3	92
x52a	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
x52b	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
x52c	53	34	2	0	0	3	92
x53a	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
x53b	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
x53c	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
x53d	53	34	2	0	0	3	92
x54a	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
x54b	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
x54c	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
x54d	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
x54e	53	34	2	0	0	3	92
x61a	46	44	0	0	0	5	95
x61b	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
x63a	9	0	0	0	0	0	9
x63b x64a	49	50	5	0	0	6	110
	12	0	0	0	0	0	12
x64b	49	53	3	0	0	11	116
x65a x65b	0 53	21 34	0 2	0 0	0	0 3	21 92
x66a	15	34	0			0	18
x66b	64	44		0	0	8	122
x67a	0	3	6 0	0	0	3	6
x67b	49	3 41	0	0	0	5 5	95
x68a	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
x68b	49	3 41	0	0	0	5	95
	49 	 41				ა 	90
total	2614	2122	60	0	0	267	5063
percent	51.63	41.91	1.19	0.00	0.00	5.27	5000
P 0 1 0 0 11 0	01.00	11.01	1.10	0.00	0.00	0.21	

Supporting	Proof	Obligations
------------	-------	-------------

c files	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
x21	0	 2	0	0	0	0	2
x22a	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
x41	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
x44	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
x51a	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
x52a	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
x52b	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
x53a	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
x53b	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
x53c	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
x54a	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
x54b	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
x54c	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
x54d	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
x63a	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
x64a	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
x65a	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
x66a	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
total	10	 19	 12	0	0	0	41
percent	24.39	46.34	29.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	

Proof Obligation Statistics

Primary Proof Obligations

	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
allocation-base	0	1	3	0	0	0	4
cast	35	0	0	0	0	4	39
format-string	17	0	0	0	0	0	17
global-mem	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
index-lower-bound	295	248	0	0	0	0	543
index-upper-bound	150	348	20	0	0	25	543
initialized	247	1225	3	0	0	161	1636
initialized-range	180	0	0	0	0	3	183
int-overflow	156	130	0	0	0	0	286
int-underflow	286	0	0	0	0	0	286
lower-bound	216	40	0	0	0	13	269
no-overlap	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
not-null	197	22	31	0	0	6	256
not-zero	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
null-terminated	180	1	0	0	0	2	183

pointer-cast	36	0	0	0	0	6	42
ptr-lower-bound	3	9	0	0	0	2	14
ptr-upper-bound	180	0	0	0	0	4	184
ptr-upper-bound-deref	0	0	3	0	0	11	14
signed-to-unsigned-cast	3	0	0	0	0	5	8
unsigned-to-signed-cast	2	0	0	0	0	2	4
upper-bound	214	37	0	0	0	15	266
valid-mem	214	61	0	0	0	8	283
total	2614	2122	 60	0	0	267	5063
percent	51.63	41.91	1.19	0.00	0.00	5.27	
Supporting Proof Obligation	ons						
	stmt	local	api	post	global	open	total
index-upper-bound	0	19	 12	0	0	0	31
not-null	7	0	0	0	0	0	7
ptr-upper-bound-deref	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
total	10	19	 12	0	0	0	41
percent	24.39	46.34	29.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	

The output of this report shows the number of and status of all proof obligations in all files included in the test (flow variants are renamed to x[nn].c). This report does not distinguish between proof obligations proven valid and proof obligations that are shown to be violated. The status is divided (currently) into four categories:

- stmt: the proof obligation was proven valid or a violation based on the information in the statement (or instruction) and its associated declarations. No invariants were necessary for the proof.
- local: the proof obligation was proven valid or a violation based on local invariants, that is, invariants generated within the function.
- api: the proof obligation was delegated to the api, possibly with the use of local invariants. This is done only if all variables in the proof obligations are shown to be in a linear equality relation with function parameters.
- open: the proof obligation could not be proven valid or a violation.

Thus juliet test CWE121/s01/CWE129_large has a total of 5063 proof obligations, 5.27% of which could not be proven valid or a violation.

To inspect the status of the proof obligations associated with the vulnerability being tested for, for a given file:

> python chc_report_juliettest_vulnerability CWE121/s01/CWE129_large 01

```
******* Function: CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_01_bad ***
Function CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_01_bad
______
22 void CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_01_bad()
Primary Proof Obligations:
23 {
24
       int data;
25
       /* Initialize data */
26
       data = -1;
27
       /* POTENTIAL FLAW: Use an invalid index */
28
       data = 10;
29
30
           int i;
31
           int buffer[10] = { 0 };
32
           /* POTENTIAL FLAW: Attempt to write to an index of the array that
                 is above the upper bound
33
           * This code does check to see if the array index is negative */
34
          if (data >= 0)
35
              buffer[data] = 1;
           36 index-upper-bound(data,bound:10) (violation)
<*>
     12
                index value, 10, is greater than or equal to length, 10
****** Function: goodB2G ********************************
Function goodB2G
                        -----
85 static void goodB2G()
Primary Proof Obligations:
86 {
87
       int data;
88
       /* Initialize data */
89
       data = -1;
90
       /* POTENTIAL FLAW: Use an invalid index */
91
       data = 10;
92
93
           int i;
           int buffer[10] = { 0 };
94
           /* FIX: Properly validate the array index and prevent a buffer overflow */
95
96
           if (data >= 0 && data < (10))
97
           {
              buffer[data] = 1;
98
```

```
<X> 13     98 index-upper-bound(data,bound:10) (dead-code)
              unreachable
****** Function: goodG2B ***********************************
Function goodG2B
______
55 static void goodG2B()
Primary Proof Obligations:
56 {
57
     int data;
58
      /* Initialize data */
59
      data = -1;
60
      /* FIX: Use a value greater than 0, but less than 10 to avoid attempting to
       * access an index of the array in the sink that is out-of-bounds */
61
62
       data = 7;
63
       {
          int i;
64
65
          int buffer[10] = { 0 };
          /* POTENTIAL FLAW: Attempt to write to an index of the array that
66
                 is above the upper bound
67
          * This code does check to see if the array index is negative */
          if (data >= 0)
68
69
        buffer[data] = 1;
70
<L>
          70 index-upper-bound(data,bound:10) (safe)
               index value, 7, is less than length, 10
______
which shows the code up to the location of the vulnerability together with the proof obligation(s)
that are violated due to the vulnerability. In cases where the proof obligation is delegated to
the caller, the callers are shown as well:
> python chc_report_juliettest_vulnerability CWE121/s01/CWE129_large 22
```

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****** Function: CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_badSink ***

25 void CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_badSink(int data)

Function CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_badSink

Primary Proof Obligations:

```
26 {
27
       if(CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_badGlobal)
28
29
30
              int i;
              int buffer[10] = { 0 };
31
32
              /* POTENTIAL FLAW: Attempt to write to an index of the array that
                    is above the upper bound
33
              * This code does check to see if the array index is negative */
              if (data >= 0)
34
35
36
                  buffer[data] = 1;
          36 index-upper-bound(data,bound:10) (safe)
                condition data < 10 delegated to api
______
Function CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_bad
27 void CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_bad()
Supporting Proof Obligations:
28 {
29
      int data;
      /* Initialize data */
30
31
     data = -1;
32
      /* POTENTIAL FLAW: Use an invalid index */
33
      data = 10;
34
      CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_badGlobal = 1; /* true */
      CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_badSink(data);
35
      1 77 35
                  index-upper-bound(data,bound:10) (violation)
                     index value, 10, is greater than or equal to length, 10
******* Function: CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodB2G1Sink ***
Function CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodB2G1Sink
61 void CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodB2G1Sink(int data)
Primary Proof Obligations:
_____
62 {
63
       if(CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodB2G1Global)
64
       {
```

```
/* INCIDENTAL: CWE 561 Dead Code, the code below will never run */
65
66
           printLine("Benign, fixed string");
67
       }
68
       else
69
70
71
               int i;
72
               int buffer[10] = { 0 };
               /* FIX: Properly validate the array index and prevent a buffer overflow */
73
74
               if (data >= 0 && data < (10))
75
76
                   buffer[data] = 1;
           76 index-upper-bound(data,bound:10) (safe)
                upper bound of index value range, 9, is less than length, 10
****** Function: CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodB2G2Sink ***
Function CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodB2G2Sink
92 void CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodB2G2Sink(int data)
Primary Proof Obligations:
93 {
       if(CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodB2G2Global)
94
95
96
           {
97
               int i;
98
               int buffer[10] = { 0 };
99
               /* FIX: Properly validate the array index and prevent a buffer overflow */
100
                if (data >= 0 && data < (10))
101
102
                    buffer[data] = 1;
<L>
    14 102 index-upper-bound(data,bound:10) (safe)
                upper bound of index value range, 9, is less than length, 10
******* Function: CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodG2BSink ***
Function CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodG2BSink
118 void CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodG2BSink(int data)
Primary Proof Obligations:
______
```

```
119 {
120
        if(CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodG2BGlobal)
121
122
            {
123
               int i;
               int buffer[10] = { 0 };
124
               /* POTENTIAL FLAW: Attempt to write to an index of the array
125
                      that is above the upper bound
                * This code does check to see if the array index is negative */
126
               if (data >= 0)
127
128
129
                   buffer[data] = 1;
        129 index-upper-bound(data,bound:10) (safe)
                condition data < 10 delegated to api
Function goodG2B
_____
78 static void goodG2B()
Supporting Proof Obligations:
79 {
80
       int data;
81
       /* Initialize data */
82
      data = -1;
       /* FIX: Use a value greater than 0, but less than 10 to avoid attempting to
83
84
       * access an index of the array in the sink that is out-of-bounds */
85
       data = 7;
86
       CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodG2BGlobal = 1; /* true */
87
       CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_22_goodG2BSink(data);
<L>
      1 11
             87
                   index-upper-bound(data,bound:10) (safe)
                      index value, 7, is less than length, 10
```

To see all proof obligations associated with the code:

```
> python chc_report_juliettest_file.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large x01.c --showcode or for a single function:
```

> python chc_report_juliettest_function.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large x01.c goodG2B

```
To check the analysis results against the scorekey:
> python chc_score_juliettest.py CWE121/s01/CWE129_large
x01.c
  {\tt CWE121\_Stack\_Based\_Buffer\_Overflow\_\_CWE129\_large\_O1\_bad}
     36 12: index-upper-bound
                                      <*> index value, 10, is greater than or equal to length, 10
  goodB2G
          13: index-upper-bound
                                        <X> unreachable
     98
  goodG2B
     70
        12: index-upper-bound
                                        <L> index value, 7, is less than length, 10
x02.c
  CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_02_bad
     41 12: index-upper-bound
                                       <*> index value, 10, is greater than or equal to length, 10
  goodB2G1
     84
          13: index-upper-bound
                                        <X> unreachable
  goodB2G2
    118
          13: index-upper-bound
                                        <X> unreachable
  goodG2B1
                                        <L> index value, 7, is less than length, 10
    159
          12: index-upper-bound
. . . . . .
x67b.c
  CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_67b_badSink
          13: index-upper-bound
  CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_67b_goodB2GSink
          14: index-upper-bound
                                        <L> upper bound of index value range, 9, is less than length,
  CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_67b_goodG2BSink
     66 13: index-upper-bound
x68b.c
  {\tt CWE121\_Stack\_Based\_Buffer\_Overflow\_\_CWE129\_large\_68b\_badSink}
          13: index-upper-bound
  CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_68b_goodB2GSink
```

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89 14: index-upper-bound <L> upper bound of index value range, 9, is less than length,

 ${\tt CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_large_68b_goodG2BSink}$

65 13: index-upper-bound '

Summary

test	violations						safe-controls						
	V	S	D	U	0		S	L	D	Х	U	0	
01	1	0	0	0	0	 	0	1	0	1	0	0	
02	1	0	0	0	0		0	1	0	2	0	0	
03	1	0	0	0	0	I	0	1	0	2	0	0	
04	1	0	0	0	0		0	2	0	2	0	0	
05	1	0	0	0	0		0	2	0	2	0	0	
06	1	0	0	0	0		0	2	0	2	0	0	
07	1	0	0	0	0		0	2	0	2	0	0	
80	1	0	0	0	0		0	3	0	1	0	0	
09	0	0	0	1	0		0	4	0	0	0	0	
10	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	
11	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	2	0	0	
12	0	0	0	1	0		0	3	0	2	0	0	
13	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	
14	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	
15	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	
16	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	
17	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	
18	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	
21	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	
22	1	0	0	0	0		0	3	0	0	0	0	
31	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	
32	0	0	0	1	0		0	1	0	0	1	0	
34	0	0	0	1	0		0	1	0	0	1	0	
41	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	
42	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	
44	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	
45	0	0	0	1	0		0	1	0	0	1	0	
51	1	0	0	0	0		0	2	0	0	0	0	
52	1	0	0	0	0		0	2	0	0	0	0	
53	1	0	0	0	0		0	2	0	0	0	0	
54	1	0	0	0	0		0	2	0	0	0	0	
61	0	0	0	1	0		0	1	0	0	1	0	
63	1	0	0	0	0		0	2	0	0	0	0	
64	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	
65	1	0	0	0	0	I	0	2	0	0	0	0	
66	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	
67	0	0	0	1	0	I	0	1	0	0	1	0	
68	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	

total 22 0 0 16 0 | 0 75 0 21 9 0

For each test this report shows the proof obligations associated with the vulnerability and their status. The summary shows how many of the violations were identified and how many of the safe controls were indeed proven safe. The column headers indicate:

violations

- V: violation proven
- S: proven safe (should not happen)
- **D:** delegated (without callers, should probably not happen)
- U: unknown, open proof obligation
- **O:** other

• safe controls

- S: proven statement safe (no invariants necessary)
- L: proven safe (using local invariants)
- **D:** delegated (without callers, should probably not happen)
- U: unknown, open proof obligation
- **O:** other

References

- [1] Paul E. Black and Athos Rebeiro. SATE V Ockham Sound Analysis Criteria. Technical Report NISTIR 8113, NIST, 2017.
- [2] Kendra Kratkiewicz and Richard Lippmann. Using a diagnostic corpus of C programs to evaluate buffer overflow detection by static analysis tools. In Paul E. Black and Elizabeth Fong, editors, *Proceedings of Defining the State of the Art in Software Security Tools Workshop*, number 500-264 in NIST Special Publication, pages 102–111. NIST, September 2005.
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- [4] Misha Zitser, Richard Lippmann, and Tim Leek. Testing static analysis tools using exploitable buffer overflows from open source code. In Richard N. Taylor and Matthew B. Dwyer, editors, SIGSOFT FSE, pages 97–106. ACM, 2004.