

# **The White Working Class and Voter Turnout in US Presidential Elections, 2004—2016 \***

Stephen L. Morgan  
Johns Hopkins University

Jiwon Lee  
Johns Hopkins University

October 2, 2017

---

\* Direct correspondence to Stephen L. Morgan ([stephen.morgan@jhu.edu](mailto:stephen.morgan@jhu.edu)) or Jiwon Lee ([jiwonlee@jhu.edu](mailto:jiwonlee@jhu.edu)) at Department of Sociology, 3400 N. Charles St., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218.

# **The White Working Class and Voter Turnout in US Presidential Elections, 2004—2016**

## **Abstract**

Through an analysis of the 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 Current Population Surveys, as well as the 2004 through 2016 General Social Surveys, this article investigates class differences and patterns of voter turnout for the last four US presidential elections. After developing some support for the claim that a surge of white working-class voters emerged in competitive states in 2016, a portrait of class differences on political matters among white non-Hispanic eligible voters between 2004 and 2016 is offered to consider the consequences of this compositional shift. These latter results are consistent with the claim that racial prejudice, anti-immigrant sentiment, concerns about economic security, and frustration with government responsiveness may have led many white working-class voters to support an outsider candidate who campaigned on these themes. However, these same results give no support to the related claim that the white working class changed its positions on these matters in response to the 2016 primary election campaign or in the months just before the general election.

## Introduction

In the hours following the 2016 US presidential election, pundits and pollsters constructed a white working-class narrative to explain why Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton. The *New York Times*, in its lead story the morning after the election, wrote that Trump's victory "was a decisive demonstration of power by a largely overlooked coalition of mostly blue-collar white and working-class voters who felt that the promise of the United States had slipped their grasp amid decades of globalization and multiculturalism" (Flegenheimer and Barbaro 2016, November 9). Front-page headlines included: "Working Class Speaks" and "Blue-Collar Whites Give Stinging Rebuke to Democratic Party." The online version of the same article linked directly to a piece by the newspaper's most prominent data journalist, Nate Cohn, entitled, "Why Trump Won: Working-Class Whites" (Cohn 2016, November 9).

The white working-class narrative, if true, is said to account for the unexpected breach of the Democratic "blue wall" states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, as well as Trump's more decisive victories in Florida and Ohio. It does have some face validity. Donald Trump had indeed called for a revitalization of working-class economic security through renegotiated trade agreements, reductions in immigration from Mexico, status-quo funding for Social Security, and (during the campaign) a middle-of-the road position on healthcare reform. He also delivered this bundle of policy priorities in effervescent rallies in competitive states that he then carried in the primary and general election. Embracing a totemic red hat, these rallies provided suggestive evidence for a secondary and more controversial component of the white working-class narrative – that anti-immigrant rhetoric and "dog whistle" warnings of racial threat can motivate white voters to support candidates who oppose increases in

multiculturalism, and that a disproportionate share of these sufficiently impressionable white voters are located within the working class.

The initial case for the white working-class narrative was based on one uncontested fact, and one clear pattern that emerged from exit poll data on election day. For the first, Trump won four rustbelt northern states – Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin – that Barack Obama had carried in both 2008 and 2012. For the second, more white voters without college degrees claimed to have voted for Trump in 2016 than was the case for Romney in 2012. Based on their analysis of exit poll data, the team of data journalists at the *New York Times* reported that 14 percent of white voters without a college degree had switched from voting Democrat to voting Republican between 2012 and 2016 (see Huang et al. 2016, November 8).<sup>1</sup>

In this article, we seek to contribute to the ongoing evaluation of the white working-class narrative, using measures and data sources that were unavailable to pundits and pollsters in the weeks and months just after the election. Our most important contribution is an analysis of changes in voter turnout patterns, using a genuine measure of social class with the Voting and Registration Supplements of the Current Population Surveys (CPS-VRS). Because the CPS-VRS does not include any measures of political or social attitudes, we also draw on the rich information collected for the General Social Surveys (GSS) in order to consider the portions of the explanation based on conjectures about class-specific economic interests, anti-immigrant

---

<sup>1</sup> Seeking more evidence, many long-form journalists and opinion writers sought corroborating evidence that could be extracted from media-organized focus groups as well as book-length testimonials – usually either Vance’s 2016 memoir, *Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis*, or Hochschild’s 2016 academic book, *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*. The more learned among these writers also sought support in Cramer’s *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*. All three books provide evidence for the narrative, albeit somewhat indirect because of their disproportionate attention to whites who live in rural areas.

sentiment, racial prejudice, and frustration with the responsiveness of government. Before offering our analysis, we summarize what has been learned about actual voting patterns since the white-working-class narrative was first constructed in November 2016.

### **Vote Tallies and Geographic Variation**

The sanctity of the voting booth prevents any direct analysis of how votes cast are related to the characteristics of individual voters, but other types of indirect analysis are possible. Precinct totals can be tabulated from official results and aggregated to larger geographic units. Then, variation in these totals can be related to aggregate measures of individual characteristics, calculated using data from the US Census Bureau. This sort of analysis, conducted by data journalists in the weeks following the election, revealed patterns that were mostly consistent with the white working-class narrative. Counties in which Trump gained votes in 2016 relative to Romney in 2012 tended to have larger relative shares of white residents with low average levels of education (see Silver 2016, November 22).

While these findings are supportive of the initial interpretations of exit poll data, it is important to appreciate their limitations.<sup>2</sup> Level of education completed is not a direct measure of class, and the larger vote shares captured in flipped “Trump counties” were more prevalent in rural areas. Most white working-class voters do not live in rural counties, and aggregate

---

<sup>2</sup> And the exit poll data should also be interpreted with more caution than is typically the case. The omnibus media-sponsored 2016 exit poll data comprises responses from approximately 25,000 short interviews spread across 350 polling places, along with a supplemental telephone poll of early voters and absentee ballot voters. The exit poll is not based on a traditional sampling frame of individuals, where a target population of eligible voters is first identified, and after which nonresponse patterns are tabulated in order to understand participation. Instead, the exit poll is a clustered opt-in design.

county-level analyses can yield misleading conclusions about individual-level patterns, generating what social scientists have labeled ecological fallacies of inference.

### **Votes Cast, Based on Retrospective Self-Reports**

The traditional method that university-based researchers use when analyzing votes is to ask samples of eligible voters whether they voted, and if so, for whom they voted. For decades, researchers have relied on the American National Election Studies (ANES), which survey a national sample of US citizens before and after each presidential election, using in-person interviews. For the 2016 election, two surveys of more recent vintage have also received a good deal of attention, especially among journalists: (1) a poll of adult internet users undertaken by YouGov for the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group and (2) a telephone-recruited but web-based monthly panel survey, the American Trends Panel, conducted by the Pew Research Center.<sup>3</sup>

Much research is ongoing with these data sources, and all of this research points to a common third finding that is also consistent with the white working-class narrative: a meaningful proportion of self-identified Trump voters reported that they had voted for Obama in a prior election. Evidence is mounting that these Obama-to-Trump voters are disproportionately white and have lower levels of education. Our expectation is that this finding is likely to withstand inevitable attempts to debunk it in the coming months and years.

Nonetheless, it should be recognized that this finding also provides no direct support for the white working-class conjecture. None of these surveys or polls collects information on

---

<sup>3</sup> See Democracy Fund Voter Study Group (2016) and Pew Research Center (2017), respectively.

occupation, and thus none enable a direct analysis of shifts in the support of the working class, relative to other shifts in support.<sup>4</sup> These surveys also show every other conceivable pattern of switching, such as non-trivial shares of Romney-to-Clinton voters, and so forth. We have yet to see an analysis that considers all shift patterns between 2012 and 2016, decomposed with a direct measure of class.

### **Voter Turnout, Also Based on Retrospective Self-Reports**

We know from tabulations of actual votes counted, as well as reliable estimates of the population of eligible voters, that the turnout rate for the 2016 presidential election was about 60 percent of eligible voters.<sup>5</sup> Unfortunately, none of the data sources just discussed can be used to estimate voter turnout to an acceptably accurate degree. Exit polls include information only on those who voted, and the other surveys yield self-reported turnout rates that are implausibly high. The most extreme is the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group's YouGov poll of internet-using adults, which, for example, yielded a turnout rate for 2016 of 92.7 percent. In addition, the calculable turnout rate for the YouGov poll differed little by the respondent's self-reported level of education – from a high of 97.6 percent of those with a graduate degree to a low of 88.7 percent of those with a high school diploma or less (see Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2017, Table 2). These are implausible turnout rates that demonstrate why this survey cannot be used to estimate actual turnout.

---

<sup>4</sup> The ANES collects the information but does not release codes that can be matched to the full distribution of occupations. Even a coarse coding of occupation has not been released by the ANES since 2004. The other surveys and polls do not even ask for the information.

<sup>5</sup> The group, Nonprofit VOTE, reports a turnout rate among eligible voters of 60.2 percent (see Pillsbury and Johannesen 2017), based on the United States Election Project maintained by Michael McDonald (see <http://www.electproject.org>).

The usual interpretation of upward biases like these is twofold.<sup>6</sup> First, individuals inclined to vote are more likely to agree to participate in surveys and polls that they are informed concern political matters. Second, for panel surveys with pre-election data collection, participation itself heightens interest in political matters.<sup>7</sup> For this second reason, it is thought that a substantial number of respondents decide to vote who would not have voted if they had not been a participant in the study. For these reasons, in order to study voter turnout, it is preferable to use a more general survey that mitigates these response dynamics, and the favored choice is the CPS-VRS that we analyze in the first portion of our results below.<sup>8</sup>

## Plan of Analysis

Through analysis of the 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 CPS-VRS, we will first consider the relationship between social class position and turnout in each of the last four presidential elections. The Voting and Registration Supplement to the regular monthly CPS is conducted in the weeks immediately after each year's November election.<sup>9</sup> It is the only data source with information on voter turnout that (a) has occupation measures that enable a social class coding

---

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Holbrook and Krosnick (2010) and Leighley and Nagler (2014).

<sup>7</sup> A third component of the explanation is also sometimes discussed. For surveys and polls that are focused on political matters, respondents feel pressure to claim that they voted so that others will regard their responses to attitudinal questions as meaningful. This over-reporting is a type of social desirability bias and is likely more prominent among eligible nonvoters with higher levels of education.

<sup>8</sup> While the CPS over-estimates turnout as well (by about 10 percent), it does not do so to the degree that most other data sources do. Its sampling design also allows it to be adjusted, as we explain in the Online Supplement, by known state vote totals. And, important for our analysis, we know of no evidence that the unadjusted upward bias varies substantially over the years we consider here in a way that would compromise our decomposition of turnout rates.

<sup>9</sup> The CPS seems not to collect information on the candidate chosen for two reasons: (1) As a flagship government survey with a primary mandate to estimate the monthly unemployment rate, such a question has traditionally been regarded as an invasion of privacy; (2) The CPS respondent for each household reports on voting for all adults in the household but does not necessarily know the votes casts by all of those adults.



and (b) has sufficient sample size to reliably disaggregate turnout by social class and geographic region.

After analyzing the CPS-VRS data to consider whether turnout increased in 2016 among white working-class voters in competitive states, we will then turn to an analysis of the 2004 through 2016 GSS in order to investigate the social and political attitudes of the white working class. In contrast to the CPS-VRS, the GSS asks many sensitive questions, including votes cast in presidential elections. Unfortunately, because the GSS is usually conducted in the months prior to the November election, it asks about the votes cast in the last presidential election. So, while the GSS contains vital information about the social and political attitudes of GSS respondents during the 2016 election season, the 2016 GSS does not contain any information that allows for a direct analysis of votes in the 2016 presidential election. With the fielding of the 2018 GSS, we will be able to use the GSS to analyze the 2016 presidential vote. Nonetheless, much can be learned from the GSS in the interim, as we show below, and in particular whether social class differences in attitudes changed to any substantial degree in 2016.

## **Data and Measures**

For both the CPS-VRS and the GSS, we select subsamples of eligible voters only (including individuals who are eligible to vote but not registered).<sup>10</sup> In the Online Supplement, we provide detail on the construction of the CPS-VRS analysis sample, as well as an explanation of our

---

<sup>10</sup> Both surveys include respondents who are not eligible to vote, either because they are not citizens or are subject to another type of voting restriction (e.g., for felony convictions in some states; see Manza and Uggen 2004). We drop these additional respondents, even though the reasons for ineligibility are not always discernible from the CPS-VRS or GSS data file. See the Online Supplement for more explanation.

implementation of a weighting procedure proposed by Hur and Achen (2013) to better align the CPS-VRS with known vote totals across states. For the GSS analysis, we enact the same basic sample-construction decisions chosen for Morgan and Lee (2017). Additional detail for the GSS sample is also provided in the Online Supplement, and more generally in Marsden (2012) and Smith et al. (2017).

### **Coding of Race and Ethnic Self Identification**

In the years following the 2000 US Census, both the CPS and GSS have allowed respondents to select multiple categories when expressing their racial and ethnic self-identification. The particular categories offered continue to evolve, and collectively they are still too constrained to represent all patterns of interest to all respondents. Nonetheless, both surveys elicit responses that allow for consistent measurement of the “white” portion of the “white working class.”

For this article, we define the particular whiteness of concern in the white working-class to be “white only and non-Hispanic.” Respondents in this category indicate that they do not consider themselves to have any type of Hispanic, Latin American, or Chicano ancestry when responding to the Hispanic ethnicity question, and they select only “white” from among the options for race. Accordingly, multiracial whites and white Hispanics are both excluded from the constructed category of “white” in this article.

We recognize that this analysis decision will be objectionable to some readers. Our position is that this measurement decision is most consistent with the white working-class narrative that we aim to evaluate, as well as the other polls and surveys that are being analyzed

by other researchers concurrently. For other research projects that utilize the CPS-VRS or the GSS, alternative operational definitions of white would be more appropriate.

In addition, we include all other eligible voters in an omnibus “all other” category for race-ethnicity. The focus of this article is the white working class for the reasons already stated, and a full analysis of variation attributable to all of the ethnoracial diversity present in the CPS-VRS and GSS is beyond the scope of this article. In addition, we want to avoid focusing on only the one or two additional groups that can be more easily measured because of their comparatively large size – eligible voters who are black or African-American and eligible voters who are non-black and Hispanic. This decision allows us to avoid contributing to the marginalization of smaller groups. Our choice is to retain all eligible voters in our analysis, and to focus our interpretations on the group most central to evaluating the white working-class narrative.

### **Coding of Class**

We adopt a coding for class based on the 2000 and 2010 US Census Occupational Classifications. Descriptions of the classes are presented in Table 1, and the coding is based on the employment relations perspective elaborated in cross-national work on social stratification and class voting (see Evans 1999; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). For more detail on the class coding for the CPS-VRS, see the Online Supplement and Morgan (2017).<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> The coding was developed for usage with the consistent 2010 occupational classification recently made available for the GSS, but versions of this class schema have been used with ANES data in the past when occupation codes were made available (e.g., Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1995; Manza and Brooks 1999; Brady, Sosnaud, and Frenk 2009).

**Table 1. Class Groups, Class Descriptions, and Example Occupations**

Group and class	Description
White-collar class group:	
I	Higher-grade professionals, administrators, managers, and officials Example occupations: physicians, accountants, engineers, management analysts, lawyers, software developers, and postsecondary teachers
II	Lower-grade professionals, administrators, managers, and officials Example occupations: elementary school teachers, human resources managers, computer programmers, counselors, social workers, and registered nurses
IIIa	Routine non-manual and service employees, higher-grade Example occupations: bookkeeping clerks, secretaries, computer support specialists, customer service representatives, and licensed vocational nurses
Working class group:	
IIIb	Routine non-manual and service employees, lower-grade Example occupations: cashiers, hairdressers, receptionists, waiters and waitresses, child care workers, nursing aides, and retail salespersons
VI	Skilled manual workers, lower-grade technicians, installers, and repairers Example occupations: mechanics, carpenters, machinists, painters and paper hangers, drywall installers, ceiling tile installers, and tapers
VIIa	Semiskilled and unskilled manual workers, not in agriculture Example occupations: construction laborers, dishwashers, janitors and building cleaners, food preparation workers, packaging and filling machine operators and tenders, and electrical and electronics assemblers
Intermediate class group:	
IVab	Non-professional self-employed workers Example occupations: self-employed incumbents of all occupations otherwise assigned to classes IIIa, IIIb, V, VI, and VIIa
V	Higher-grade technicians and repairers, public safety workers, performers, and supervisors of manual workers Example occupations: chefs and head cooks, drafters, clinical laboratory technicians, firefighters, police officers, construction managers, and first-line supervisors of production and operating workers
Farmers and agricultural workers:	
IVc	Owners and managers of agricultural establishments Example occupations: farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural managers
VIIb	Agricultural workers and their first-line supervisors, and other workers in primary production Example occupations: graders and sorters of agricultural products, miscellaneous agricultural workers, first-line supervisors of farming, fishing, and forestry workers, and fishing and hunting workers

*Notes:* For all detailed occupations assigned to each class, see the Online Supplement. For the rationale for the assignments, see Morgan (2017).

Table 1 presents the underlying classes that the coding yields, categorized into four groups that will represent our most prominent categorization of eligible voters in this article (but see the Online Supplement for parallel results that disaggregate all classes, when sample size constraints allow). We consider classes I, II, and IIIa to be a class group that is not working class. This group includes professionals and other highly skilled workers in classes I and II as well as office-based clerical and health workers, usually with some higher education, in class IIIa. For many projects, variation across these three classes is crucial to consider. For this article, this group will serve as our primary reference group for comparisons with the working class.

Our working-class group includes lower-grade service workers (class IIIb) as well as manual workers, both semiskilled (class VI) and unskilled (class VIIa). We also consider two other class groups, neither of which is clearly working class or not. The first is an intermediate class group that includes self-employed non-professional workers (class IVab) as well as higher-skilled manual workers and supervisors (class V), the latter of which includes public safety workers and others whose conditions of employment are typically more favorable than those in working classes IIIb, VI, and VIIa. The final group is composed of farmers, ranchers, and farm managers (class IVc) as well as agricultural workers (class VIIb). These last two underlying classes differ from each other in many ways. But, when restricted to “white only” respondents, their political attitudes are far more similar than one might otherwise expect, perhaps owing to common place of residence, typically rural.

## **Coding of Competitive and Noncompetitive States**

Turnout is known to be lower in noncompetitive states during presidential elections, and most explanations attribute this difference to voters' perceptions that their votes are less important in determining the outcome. Presidential candidates also do not campaign in the same way in noncompetitive states, and they commit fewer resources to their turnout ground game. For this reason, for our CPS-VRS analysis, we will consider only competitive states for our main results (but see the Online Supplement for parallel results for all states). These 18 states are

Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin

Based on publicly available vote totals, these are the states where the margin of victory was ten percent or less in either the 2012 presidential election or the 2016 presidential election. These states include bellwether battleground states, such as Florida and Ohio, but also the Democratic blue wall states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. They include states with more rapidly changing demographic profiles, such as Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and Texas. Our analysis of the CPS-VRS indicates that 47.4 percent of eligible voters resided in these competitive states in the 2016 election.

For our subsequent GSS results, we analyze a national sample. The GSS is not representative at the state level, and the sample size of the GSS is far smaller. In addition, there is no reason to expect that the attitudes we model for that portion of the analysis are particularly sensitive in any direct way to the ground game of alternative political parties, unlike turnout which is known to vary by the competitiveness of the state, especially from 2004 onward (see Green and Gerber 2015).

## Results

In this section, we present estimates of voter turnout for the last four presidential elections, within 18 states that were competitive in 2012 and 2016. Our goal is to assess whether turnout increased for the white working class in 2016 in comparison to 2012. The estimates for 2004 and 2008 are presented for context. In the second portion of our analysis, we then develop a portrait of class differences in attitudes central to political matters thought to be relevant to the white working-class narrative.

### Turnout Rates by Class and Race-Ethnicity

For voter turnout research, the pool of eligible voters includes those who voted, those who were registered to vote but did not vote, and those who were eligible to vote but were not registered. Before presenting our analysis of turnout patterns, we consider basic characteristics of the pool of eligible voters in 2016.

For the 2016 election, the CPS-VRS indicates that 69.3 percent of eligible voters self-identified as non-Hispanic and white only. This percentage has fallen steadily across the last four presidential elections from 75.5 percent in 2004. In the competitive states that we have selected for our primary analysis, the corresponding percentages are slightly higher, at 70.8 percent in 2016, falling gradually from 77.7 percent in 2004.<sup>12</sup>

Table 2 presents the joint distribution of race-ethnicity and class in 2016 for eligible voters living in the 18 competitive states. For CPS-VRS sample members who were unemployed, out of the labor force, or retired, no information on occupation was collected. It is

---

<sup>12</sup> See Tables S1–S3 in the Online Supplement for additional detail.

impossible to assign a class to these sample members, even though many of them still identify with an occupation and thus would be able to report a most recent occupation if asked.<sup>13</sup> To create an exhaustive classification of all eligible voters sampled for the CPS-VRS, we therefore allocated individuals without an assigned class to three additional groups: those with a bachelor's degree or higher, those with more than a high school diploma but without a bachelor's degree, and those with a high school diploma or less.<sup>14</sup>

The marginal distribution of class and education groups in competitive states for 2016 is presented in the final column of the first panel of Table 2. As shown there, 20.5 percent of eligible voters in competitive states were currently employed in the working-class group (classes IIIb, VI, and VIIa), with another 8.7 percent employed in the intermediate-class group (classes IVab and V). Only 0.7 percent were employed in farming or as agricultural workers (classes IVc and VIIb). These three groups together are slightly larger than the percentage of employed white-collar workers, which is 27.0 percent. Finally, the largest group of eligible voters without a class position is the 20.8 percent of eligible voters who have no more than a high school diploma. Many of these eligible voters would be members of the working class, if they had been asked about their most recent occupation, but this group also includes many younger voters still in the transition to adulthood.

---

<sup>13</sup> The CPS-VRS asks occupation and related questions only about sample members who were employed during the reference week of the survey (defined as the week of each month that includes the 12<sup>th</sup> day of the month). As discussed below, the GSS asks for the most recent occupation of all sample members, generating a class position for 98 percent of respondents in recent years.

<sup>14</sup> In addition, we allocate all sample members between the ages of 18 and 24 to an education group, regardless of whether they report that they are employed. When measured by current occupation, class position is misleading during the transition to adulthood. This is particularly true for individuals pursuing postsecondary education while working.



**Table 2. Class and Education Group by a Two-Category Coding of Race-Ethnicity in Competitive States in 2016**


Class/Education Group	Non-Hispanic White Only	All Others	Total
A. Percentages within column:			
White collar (I, II, IIIa)	28.5	23.3	27.0
Working class (IIIb, VI, VIIa)	18.6	25.3	20.5
Intermediate (IVab and V)	9.0	8.1	8.7
Farmers and agricultural workers (IVc and VIIb)	0.9	0.2	0.7
Without current occupation and class:			
Bachelor's Degree or More	10.1	5.7	8.9
Some College	13.3	13.8	13.4
High School Diploma or Less	19.7	23.5	20.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
B. Percentages within row:			
White collar (I, II, IIIa)	74.8	25.2	100.0
Working class (IIIb, VI, VIIa)	64.0	36.0	100.0
Intermediate (IVab and V)	72.9	27.1	100.0
Farmers and agricultural workers (IVc and VIIb)	92.4	7.6	100.0
Without current occupation and class:			
Bachelor's Degree or More	81.1	18.9	100.0
Some College	70.0	30.0	100.0
High School Diploma or Less	67.0	33.0	100.0
Total	70.8	29.2	100.0

*Notes:* CPS-VRS sample members, weighted by pwsswtg (including sample members eligible to vote but missing information on the voting questions). The raw N for the table is 34,659 (and the weighted N for comparison with other tables is 43,968).

Other percentage comparisons within the columns and rows of Table 2 are consistent with the structure of inequality and patterns of enfranchisement. Among non-Hispanic whites, 18.6 percent were employed in the working class, in comparison to 25.3 percent of all others. Still, because of relative size, non-Hispanic whites represent 64 percent of the employed working class. In fact, because of their prevalence among eligible voters, non-Hispanic whites are a clear majority of all class and education groups in Table 2.

Figure 1 presents our key results for turnout in competitive states, where the dots are point estimates of turnout rates and the vertical bars are plus-or-minus one standard error for each estimated rate. We utilize two separate panels for clarity, and they are scaled in the same way. As shown in the first panel, the white-collar group has the highest turnout rate, oscillating between 80 and 82 percent for non-Hispanic whites (in red). For all others (in gray), the turnout rate has an inverted-U-shaped pattern with a peak in 2008 of 76.6 percent and a decline through 2016 to 70.2 percent.

As shown in the same panel, the turnout rate for the working class was considerably lower. For non-Hispanic whites in the working classes of IIIb, VI, and VIIa, turnout increased from 53.5 percent to 56.9 percent between 2012 and 2016. Coupled with the decline for all others from 53.4 to 49.5 percent between 2012 and 2016, the race-ethnic gap in turnout within the working class was larger in 2016, at 7.3 percent, than in the three prior elections. It is notable that the next highest gap among the other three elections was observed in 2004, which was the last victory by a Republican presidential candidate. For 2004, the gap was 5.6 percent (i.e., 55.7 percent compared to 50.1 percent).



**Figure 1. Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States, 2004–2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others

Line Style Legend:

— — — — — Classes I, II, and IIIa (white-collar group)

- - - - - Classes IIIb, VI, and VIIa (working-class group)

. . . . . Classes IVab and V (intermediate group)


- . - . - Classes IVc and VIIb (farmers and agricultural workers)

The second panel gives corresponding turnout rates for the other two class groups, (although we suppress the “all other” farmer and agricultural worker turnout rates because the sample of eligible voters is too small to yield meaningfully precise estimates for this group).<sup>15</sup> Here, the intermediate class group shows a widening within-class race-ethnicity gap, but overall only a very small turnout increase for non-Hispanic whites in 2016. And, consistent with journalistic analyses of rural counties discussed in the introduction, the turnout rate for non-Hispanic white farmers and agricultural workers in classes IVc and VIIb increased from 64.1 percent to 74.2 percent from 2012 to 2016 (albeit with much larger standard errors of 3.7 and 3.6 percent, respectively, because of the sample size).

To complete our analysis of turnout patterns in competitive states, Figure 2 presents rates for the education groups introduced above in Table 2. These are large groups because they include all eligible voters who were unemployed, out of the labor force, or retired. For these groups, turnout rates evolved in patterns somewhat consistent with the class differences just presented in Figure 1. In particular, turnout increased to at least some extent for all groups of non-Hispanic whites between 2012 and 2016, on an absolute scale and especially in relative comparisons to all others in the same education group. The largest of these groups, which is composed of those not currently employed and with no more than a high school diploma, shows a trivially small increase in turnout among non-Hispanic whites. However, a gap nonetheless emerged within this group for 2016 because of a substantial decline in the turnout rate for all others.

---

<sup>15</sup> See Table 2 and also the class-disaggregated results in the Online Supplement (Figures S1-EGP-I through S1-EGP-VIIb) where it is provided.



**Figures 2. Differences by Education Group in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States Among Respondents Not Currently Employed, 2004—2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others

Line Style Legend:

Solid line for Bachelor's Degree or More

Dashed line for Some College

Dotted line for High School Diploma or Less

Altogether, the CPS-VRS offers some support for the white working-class narrative. Turnout increased between 2012 and 2016 by approximately 3.4 percent for non-Hispanic whites in the working class, and the impact of this increase was enhanced by a simultaneous turnout decrease of approximately 3.9 percent among all other eligible voters in the working class. In addition, the CPS-VRS suggests that turnout increased even more among non-Hispanic whites who worked as farmers, ranchers, or other agricultural workers, and this pattern is consistent with Trump's notable strength in rural counties in competitive states.

We will discuss these patterns in more detail below when synthesizing our results. In order to transition to the GSS analysis in the next section, consider what Figures 1 and 2 imply about the subpopulation of non-Hispanic whites in competitive states. Working-class voters, in addition to farmers and agricultural workers, became a larger share of the white-non-Hispanic vote in 2016 than in 2012. In the next two sections, we turn to an analysis of the GSS, aiming to examine class differences on political matters in order to gauge whether this compositional shift among non-Hispanic white voters is consistent with the white working-class narrative. Two issues must be assessed: whether class differences are present in attitudes and whether members of the working class, on average, changed their positions for 2016.

### **Class Differences and Change Between 2006 and 2016 in Attitudes Toward the Government**

In this section, we consider class differences and changes therein between 2006 and 2016 among eligible voters. We examine opinions on government responsiveness, self-avowed understanding of political issues, and the role of the government in the economy and in the provisioning of the social safety net. We focus on class differences among non-Hispanic white

eligible voters only. The goal is to inform our conclusions about the consequences of the compositional shift among non-Hispanic whites revealed by the CPS-VRS analysis above.

The analysis in this section is based on a comparison of two comparable government responsibility modules fielded for the GSS in both 2006 and 2016.<sup>16</sup> Before presenting the results, we should establish two points about the over-time comparison and the class coding for the GSS.

First, 2006 and 2016 constitute a reasonable comparison for an assessment of change in these items, which include opinions on the stewardship of the economy and the need for the social safety net. In both years, during the months when the GSS was fielded, the unemployment rate was low by historical standards, even if the Great Recession was still fresh in the minds of many 2016 respondents.<sup>17</sup> In other words, the consequences of a key determinant of current feelings about the role of government – the current state of the economy – is mitigated by a comparison of these two years.

Second, unlike the CPS-VRS, the GSS elicits each respondent's current or most recent occupation, which means that the GSS collects information on the class position of those who are not currently employed, which is most commonly the case because the respondent is unemployed, out of the labor force, or retired. We see this as a key advantage of the GSS, insofar as we adopt the position that the most recent occupation held is likely still a source of

---

<sup>16</sup> The GSS participates in an international consortium of surveys – the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) – that fields common topical modules on a rotating basis. To facilitate further comparative work on class politics, we utilize these items because they can be compared across many countries (rather than other GSS items that are similar but less strictly comparable across participating ISSP countries).

<sup>17</sup> The unemployment rate was between 4.6 and 4.7 during the months when the 2006 GSS was fielded, and between 4.7 and 4.9 for the same months in 2016.

identification among those not currently employed. We assume, for example, that retired lawyers and retired carpenters can be reasonably categorized as being members of classes I and VI respectively.<sup>18</sup>

**Responsiveness of the Government and Understanding of Political Matters.** In both 2006 and 2016, GSS respondents were presented with two items:

*Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:*

*People like me don't have any say about what the government does.*

*I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.*


Figure 3 presents percentage agreement with these two statements, separately by class groups and by year. The dots are point estimates of percentages, and the lines are plus-or-minus one standard error (truncated at the bound of 100 in two instances). The estimated percentage rates are adjusted by the respondent's age, following from the public opinion tradition that stresses the utility of interpreting cross-sectional differences only after adjusting for differences between age cohorts.<sup>19</sup> With the modest sample sizes available for the GSS (about 850 non-Hispanic white eligible voters per year for the items we consider in this section), this adjustment is also helpful in stabilizing between-class and between-year comparisons.

---

<sup>18</sup> As explained in the Online Supplement, we excluded about 2 percent of GSS respondents who reported that they had never held an occupation of any type. In addition, we exclude respondents aged 18-24 because their class location is misleading, and because the GSS does not sample college students who live in dorms (or others in group quarters).

<sup>19</sup> In particular, the results in Figure 3 are marginal predictions across year from pooled logit models that fit five coefficients for six age categories (in addition to main effects for year and class as well as all interactions between year and class). The agree-disagree scale was dichotomized so that agree represents the response option of both "agree" and "strongly agree."





**Figures 3. Class Differences Among Non-Hispanic Whites in Engagement with the Political Process in 2006 and 2016**

Color Legend:  
**Black** for 2006  
**Green** for 2016

Notes: The sample is eligible voters in the 2006 and 2016 GSS who self-identify as non-Hispanic and white only and who have an assigned social class because they reported a current or last occupation. The numbers of respondents are 1,673 (left) and 1,671 (right), with the variation in sample size reflecting different rates of “don’t know” and refusals for the two items.

The results in Figure 3 reveal class differences in feelings toward the government, but little evidence of change. Notice that for the results in Figure 3 we have separated the working class into two groups – the service-oriented working class (IIIb) and the manual working class (VI and VIIa). As we will show below, this disaggregation is useful for revealing a more nuanced portrait of racial prejudice, and it is sensible to divide the working class in this way for all GSS results. We should also note that there is a good deal of difference on GSS measures between the classes embedded in our white-collar group as well, and so we offer fully disaggregated results in the Online Supplement. However, for the main body of this article, we keep this class group together because it serves as a useful omnibus comparative group. This is

also consistent with the evolution of party identification patterns, as shown in Morgan and Lee (2017), where classes I, II, and IIIa stand apart from others.

The first panel of Figure 3 shows that the working class feels comparatively powerless in political matters, with more than half of all respondents reporting that people like them “don’t have any say about what the government does.” For class IIIb, the age-adjusted percent agreement with this statement is 54.8 and 59.8 percent in 2006 and 2016, respectively. Given sampling error (with standard errors of 5.3 and 5.5, respectively), we do not interpret this increase as reliably meaningful. For the manual working classes VI and VIIa, the corresponding percentages are similar, at 60.9 and 56.7 percent, and therefore oscillating in the opposite direction between 2006 and 2016. For these two estimates, the standard errors are 4.2 and 5.3 percent, which again prompts us to adopt an interpretation that this result offers no evidence of change.

In comparison, the white-collar group has somewhat greater confidence in its political influence, and the intermediate class group is midway between the white-collar group and the working class. Finally, the comparatively small group of farmers and agricultural workers appears to feel the most powerless, but estimation error is regrettably large for this group, preventing any clear conclusion.

The second panel of Figure 3 shows a closely related pattern, where those class groups who feel the most powerless are also those class groups who feel that they have the least developed understanding of the political issues facing the country. However, confidence is nonetheless high, with all groups well above fifty percent in expressing confidence that they understand the most important political issues facing the country.

Before carrying on to additional attitude items, we should concede that there are two ways to interpret the over-time differences in Figure 3. A cautious interpretation would suggest that we cannot say much of anything about change over time, given the width of the error bars associated with each point estimate. The less cautious interpretation is the one that we favor: even with independent samples of less than 1000 non-Hispanic white GSS respondents per year, and with each sample selected a decade apart from the other, the point estimates for each class group line up in rather close proximity for both 2006 and 2016. So, while it is possible that much larger samples than the GSS could detect genuine change between 2006 and 2016, we see the GSS as providing meaningful evidence that, on these two items, little has changed in the pattern of class differences.

**Material Interests and the Role of the Government in the Economy.** For Figure 4, we examine four items on government responsibility and management of the economy. GSS respondents were asked:

*On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to...*

*Reduce income differences between the rich and the poor?*

*Keep prices under control?*


*Provide a job for everyone who wants one?*

*Provide industry with the help it needs to grow?*

Respondents were provided with four response options – “definitely should be,” “probably should be,” “probably should not be,” and “definitely should not be” – and the percentages in Figure 4 are for those who selected probably should be or definitely should be. We again adjust for age cohort, as for the results in Figure 3. And, because these results are structured the same as for Figure 3, for brevity we discuss only the broad conclusions that these results suggest.

Across all four items, working class respondents favor more activist government intervention. They are more likely to see the government as responsible for reducing inequality between the rich and poor, and for providing jobs for those who want one. They also favor effort to control inflation, and they support providing help for industry to grow. Like all other respondents, working class respondents are more likely to favor government effort control of inflation and support industry than they are to favor government effort to reduce inequality and providing jobs. In other words, while working-class respondents would appear to favor their own material interests to some degree, their rank order of priorities is not sufficiently different from those of other respondents, when measured in the aggregate.

Again, what about over-time change? We see a bit more movement in these percentages than for those presented in Figure 3, but none that suggests any common directional change. As a result, we conclude, as above, that the GSS suggests considerable stability in working class attitudes toward government responsibility in these four domains.



**Figures 4. Class Differences Among Non-Hispanic Whites in Opinions on the Government's Responsibility for Addressing Inequality and Managing the Economy in 2006 and 2016**

Color Legend:  
**Black** for 2006  
**Green** for 2016

Notes: The sample is eligible voters in the 2006 and 2016 GSS who self-identify as non-Hispanic and white only and who have an assigned social class because they reported a current or last occupation. The numbers of respondents are 1,636 (upper left), 1,659 (upper right), 1,660 (lower left), and 1,642 (bottom right). The variation in sample size reflects different rates of "don't know" and refusals for each item. The marginal prediction for 2016 for the jobs question could not be computed for classes IVc and VIIb because of a lack of variation in the small proportion of the sample that is in these two classes.

**Government Responsibility for the Safety Net.** For Figure 5, we present results for an additional four items from the GSS government responsibility module, and these ones are focused on support for the safety net. GSS respondents were asked:

*On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to...*


*Provide for a decent standard of living for the unemployed?*

*Provide health care for the sick?*

*Provide a decent standard of living for the old?*

*Provide decent housing for those who can't afford it?*

Here, class differences are again present, but they appear less substantial than for Figures 3 and 4. Working class respondents favor greater government responsibility for providing a “decent” standard of living for the unemployed. Perhaps because of the collective memory (or experience) of the Great Recession, support for this type of government responsibility increased uniformly between 2006 and 2016. Class differences in government responsibility for “health care for the sick” follows the same weak class pattern. And, although government responsibility for healthcare remains high, it did fall uniformly for all classes between 2006 and 2016 (except for the very imprecisely estimated rate for farmers and agricultural workers). We cannot be certain that these small uniform changes are genuine, because of their size relative to expected estimation error. Nonetheless, the second pattern of change is consistent with other results using more GSS respondents and additional years, which suggest declining support for government involvement in health care following the passage of the Affordable Care Act, probably because of the post-passage campaign that the Republican party waged against it (see Morgan and Kang 2015).



**Figures 5. Class Differences Among Non-Hispanic Whites in Opinions on the Government's Responsibility for the Social Safety Net in 2006 and 2016**

Color Legend:  
**Black** for 2006  
**Green** for 2016

Notes: The sample is eligible voters in the 2006 and 2016 GSS who self-identify as non-Hispanic and white only and who have an assigned social class because they reported a current or last occupation. The numbers of respondents are 1,642 (upper left), 1,667 (upper right), 1,666 (lower left), and 1,642 (bottom right). The variation in sample size reflects different rates of "don't know" and refusals for each item. The marginal prediction for 2016 for the housing and old questions could not be computed for classes IVc and VIIb because of a lack of variation in the small proportion of the sample that is in these two classes.

For the item on a “decent standard of living for the old,” all classes agree that the government bears considerable responsibility, and this uniformity may dampen class differences because of a ceiling effect. For the item below it, on “decent housing for those who can’t afford it,” class differences are a bit more prominent. For both of these last two items, we see very little evidence at all of change over time.

Altogether, these ten items suggest a common narrative that is consistent with the white working-class narrative. Looking within the pool of non-Hispanic white eligible voters, members of the working class feel disproportionately powerless over their government, and only a little bit less confident in their understanding of political matters. They are more likely to favor an active government in managing the economy, including effort to reduce inequality, but their relative support for the social safety net is a bit less substantial than one might expect based on their likelihood of needing its protective benefits. Perhaps most importantly for the goals of this article, their attitudes appear to have changed little between 2006 and 2016. Where some very modest change might be present – for unemployment support and healthcare for the sick – the case for change only seems to barely pass a threshold of speculation because of small uniform change across all GSS respondents, suggesting a “thermostat” type of change that is not itself class-related (see Morgan and Kang 2015).

### **Prejudice, Affirmative Action, and Immigration**

The secondary theme of the white working-class narrative is that non-Hispanic whites in the working class are more prone to racial prejudice, anti-immigrant sentiment, and emergent



forms of right-populist white nativism. As a result, some portion of the white working class can be mobilized to vote by candidates who appeal to interests of this type.

The GSS offers many items on attitudes that can inform this theme, and for an excellent overview on findings from the racial attitude items since the 1970s, see Bobo, Charles, Kryson, and Simmons (2012). For Figure 6, we offer results for four representative items, and we analyze them in this article with the same social class coding utilized above.<sup>20</sup> We first consider items on racial intermarriage, where GSS respondents were asked:

*What about having a close relative marry a black person? Would you be very in favor, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed, somewhat opposed, or very opposed?*

*What about a Hispanic or Latin American person? Would you be very in favor, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed, somewhat opposed, or very opposed?*

These two items tap forms of racial prejudice grounded in the desire to preserve and promote racial separation.

To enable a consideration of group threat, which is often now referred to as racial resentment, we consider these two items:

*Some people say that because of past discrimination, Blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of Blacks is wrong because it discriminates against Whites. What about your opinion – are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks?*

*Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot?*

The first item allows for the construction of an outcome that expresses opposition to affirmative action in the workplace, but likely also opposition to affirmative action in other domains as

---


<sup>20</sup> Scales of racial prejudice can be constructed from items such as those we consider, and additional ones, and we offer results in the Online Supplement that do so. The results presented there are consistent with the analysis offered in the main text.

well. The second item allows construction of an outcome that expresses anti-immigrant sentiment.

Figure 6 shows that all groups of non-Hispanic whites display some degree of racial prejudice and susceptibility to group threat, belying lay claims that survey respondents are unwilling to offer responses that are indicative of racial animus. Before considering class differences, we should note that these GSS items were asked in each biennial survey for the GSS from 2004 through 2016. Accordingly, we have a good deal more information on which to base these estimates than for the analysis above in Figures 3 through 5. In particular, we are able to offer a comparatively precise modeled estimate for each item for 2004 through 2014, and then consider whether an analogous estimate for 2016 offers any evidence of change.<sup>21</sup> Notice that the error bar for each item for 2004-2014 (in black) is considerably shorter than the error bar for 2016 (in green).

---

<sup>21</sup> The results in Figure 6 are marginal predictions from pooled logit models that fit five coefficients for six age categories, an interval-scaled term for year, main effects for class group interacted with the term for year, and a dummy variable for 2016 that is also interacted with class group. The point estimate for each class group for 2004–14 is the marginal effect for each class group across years (a smoothed average, having removed the discrete shift for 2016 with its year-specific dummy, which can be thought of as an estimate in the middle of the time series, which is 2009, or the first year of the Obama presidency). The point estimate for each class group in 2016 is the marginal effect for 2016, which adds a modeled percentage generated by the class-specific 2016 difference to the underlying year effect generated by the linear term for year.



**Figures 6. Class Differences Among Non-Hispanic Whites in Racial Prejudice, Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action, and the Level of Immigration to the United States, 2004–2016**

Color Legend:  
**Black** for 2004 – 2014  
**Green** for 2016

Notes: The sample is eligible voters in the 2004-2016 GSS who self-identify as non-Hispanic and white only. The numbers of respondents are 6,099 (upper left), 5,899 (upper right), 6,097 (lower left), and 5,539 (bottom right). The variation in sample size reflects different rates of “don’t know” and refusals for each item. The marginal prediction for 2016 for the preferential hiring question could not be computed for classes IVc and VIIb because of a lack of variation in the small proportion of the sample that is in these two classes.

Now, to carry on to some sobering substance, consider first prejudice in the form of a preference for racial separation, as measured by opposition to “a close relative marrying a black person” and “a close relative marrying a Hispanic person.” Even for our comparison group of white-collar workers, more than 20 percent would oppose a close relative marrying a “black person” and more than 10 percent marrying a “Hispanic person.” For the service working class (IIIb), the corresponding rates of opposition are higher at 24 and 18 percent, respectively. And, for the manual working class (VI and VIIa), the rates are higher still at 32 and 24 percent, respectively. In other words, between about one-fourth and one-third of working class non-Hispanic white eligible voters were opposed to intermarriage with blacks, and to slightly lesser extent Hispanics. In addition, we see almost no evidence of change in 2016 in comparison to the 2004-2014 estimate; the point estimates are nearly the same for the working class across both time periods.

The upper-right panel demonstrates that non-Hispanic whites strongly oppose affirmative action in hiring and promotion, regardless of class position. While opposition may have declined a small amount in 2016 for a few class groups, the change is too small to yield any clear conclusion because of sampling error. And, even if genuine, the change seems trivial relative to the overwhelming opposition to this type of affirmative action.

Finally, the lower-right panel indicates that a clear majority of non-Hispanic whites favors at least some reduction in immigration. As with racial prejudice, this anti-immigrant sentiment is more substantial for the working class, with about 59 of the service working class (IIIb) and 65 percent of the manual working class (VI and VIIa) supporting at least some reduction in immigration. We cannot conclude from these results, or from any other GSS items,

whether the preference for a reduction in immigration applies to immigrants from all origin countries, or only some countries, and whether it applies across the full range of the education and skill distribution of immigrants or not. Nonetheless, a clear majority of classes IIIb, VI, and VIIa favor a reduction in immigration, and the preference, on average, has not changed between 2004 and 2016.

Altogether, the results in Figure 6 suggest that racial prejudice among non-Hispanic whites remains common, and, furthermore, that it is more common among working class eligible voters than others.<sup>22</sup> It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which racial prejudice is not an important component of both opposition to affirmative action and anti-immigrant sentiment. The GSS cannot reveal in any clear fashion how much of the preference for reduced immigration is attributable to prejudice and related forms of nativism, or instead to a perceived group threat to economic security. The two are intertwined in the survey responses, and nearly certainly within the minds of many non-Hispanic white eligible voters. Almost no one can cleanly apportion within their own mind the multiple sources of their support for a particular policy or a particular candidate, especially given the dynamic oscillation of components of sentiment. It would be odd to expect white working-class voters to be any better at this complex cognitive task than others.

What we do not have evidence for in the results of Figure 6 is change over time on these items. In particular, there is no evidence whatsoever from the GSS that attitudes such as these

---

<sup>22</sup> Still, as shown in Figure 6, there may be some evidence that prejudice is even more pronounced among farmers and agricultural workers, but estimation error is large. In addition, there may be some subtle evidence of an increase in prejudice among the intermediate class group (IVab and V), which includes non-professional self-employed workers as well as a large proportion of public safety workers. Again, however, estimation error is substantial. When the 2018 GSS data are collected and released, these small changes will be worthy of considered attention.

changed for the 2016 GSS. The bulk of the GSS interviews occurred from late spring 2016 through late summer 2016, and by that time the dominant themes of the presidential election campaign were set. Accordingly, the GSS suggests remarkable stability during a period of rising racial tension and a decline of generalized comity. In other words, the GSS does not support the claim that the racial prejudice or anti-immigrant sentiment of non-Hispanic whites increased in response to the political climate up through the first half of 2016. But, as we discuss below, it was high enough already that an opportunistic candidate, willing to break with norms of established political discourse on intergroup relations, could exploit it to his advantage.

## CONCLUSIONS

In the first portion of our analysis, we showed that the CPS-VRS provides some support for the white working-class narrative for the Trump victory in 2016. Turnout among non-Hispanic, working-class whites in competitive states did increase in 2016, and the impact of this increase was enhanced by a simultaneous relative decrease in turnout among other eligible voters within the working class. As a result, the race-ethnic gap measured in this way was substantially larger in 2016 than it was in both 2008 and 2012 when the Republican candidate lost. This is clear evidence of a relative surge among non-Hispanic, working-class whites, even if the magnitude of the surge may be only a few percentage points. This shift may have been particularly consequential because it was concentrated in the blue wall states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, but the CPS-VRS lacks the sample size to detect such localized change.

Consistent with the county-based analysis of votes discussed in the introduction, the turnout increase was even more substantial for non-Hispanic whites who worked as farmers, ranchers, or other agricultural workers. For the class voting literature, farmers and agricultural workers are not usually considered members of the working class, and so this pattern does not support a white working-class narrative that academic researchers would have constructed. Whether it is supportive of the working-class narrative splashed across the front page of the *New York Times* just after the election is probably a matter of reader interpretation.

The GSS analysis implies that this compositional shift generated an aggregate pool of non-Hispanic white voters that was more likely to favor the material interests of the working class and more supportive of appeals that subvert multiculturalism. As a result, we cannot make any convincing case that the modest surge of white working-class voters in 2016 is attributable to the “working class” or the “white” portion of the group identity that appears to a source of the relative turnout increase. Indeed, many working-class voters mobilized by the Trump campaign are unlikely to be able to apportion their enthusiasm between policies and rhetoric that promote working-class economic interests and those that supposedly facilitate a return to a past when a less multicultural United States had a more prominent and secure position in the world economy.

## DISCUSSION

Conventional wisdom is sometimes wrong. The more common problem is that it is poorly calibrated. The white working-class narrative for the 2016 election outcome is a typical example. It was constructed quickly to account for an unanticipated event, using largely

suggestive evidence from a long campaign, and then supplemented just after the election with exit poll data that contained no direct measure of its key actor: the white working class.

Our overall goal is to calibrate this conventional wisdom, and thereby begin to evaluate it more deeply. In our analysis in this article, we have used two data sources, the CPS-VRS and the GSS, where we can deploy a genuine direct measure of the working class, building on decades of prior research in debates on class politics.<sup>23</sup> On balance, as just summarized above, we see considerable support for the conventional wisdom, and yet many unresolved questions that demand further attention.

The most important unresolved question is whether a direct analysis of the relationship between class position and votes cast in 2016 will line up with the white working-class narrative. Sadly, social science has collectively failed to generate any current data source that delivers both data on class and data on votes cast that can be analyzed now. With the collection of the 2018 GSS, we will have retrospective self-reports of votes cast (along with the errors typical of vote data when recalled 18 months after the fact).<sup>24</sup> When an analysis of the relationship between class and votes cast in 2016 becomes possible, it may be that Obama-to-Trump voters, possibly among dealigning independents (see Morgan and Lee 2017), will be a

---

<sup>23</sup> Some prominent data journalists have been rather myopic on these issues. Nate Silver (2016, November 22), for example, wrote in his county-based analysis: “Are these so-called white working-class counties? You could argue for it: They’re mostly white, and they have average or below-average incomes. But, of course, “class” is a slippery term, and definitions vary.” After his analysis comparing education to income at the county level, he concluded: “In short, it appears as though educational levels are *the* critical factor in predicting shifts in the vote between 2012 and 2016.” We fail to see how a closer relationship to education than income can be regarded so easily as evidence against the importance of class, which appears to be Silver’s conclusion.

<sup>24</sup> Of course, it would be far preferable if the ANES, or other data sources that are currently being used to assess the profile of Obama-to-Trump voters, would collect, code, and release data on occupation. It is time for political scientists to reevaluate their lack of interest in class dynamics.



much more important component of the full explanation of the 2016 election outcome than the modest turnout surge we show in this article.

Even for our more limited analysis, further work is needed to develop answers for some lingering questions. The turnout surge among non-Hispanic whites in competitive states was not dramatic, even though it was substantial enough to shift the profile of the electorate, especially when combined with decreases in turnout among eligible voters who identify as Hispanic and/or non-white. It is notable, we think, that this turnout boost for the white working class emerged in a period when the working class was moving away to some degree from traditional identification with either the Democratic or the Republican party, especially among those who had not recently voted (see the analysis of Morgan and Lee 2017). More work on turnout, using measures of party identification, will be needed to probe these possible relationships, and this also will be possible with the release of the 2018 GSS data.

Looking toward future elections, and with recognition that the CPS-VRS overstates turnout differences between highly educated voters and others to some degree, a massive gap in turnout nonetheless exists between white-collar voters and members of the working class. An important implication of this pattern is that there are many more individuals who can be converted from nonvoters to voters within the working class than within the white-collar class group. These eligible nonvoters in the working class represent an untapped source of political power, not obviously aligned with either party. If working-class voters who are white and non-Hispanic can be brought into voting booths at increasing rates in 2018 and 2020, then populist white nativism may have more longstanding support than many commentators assume.

Our analysis of the GSS suggests, contrary to concerns that a new equilibrium of racial resentment has arisen, that rather little has changed between 2004 and 2016 for non-Hispanic whites. Of course, the most recent GSS data were collected in the middle of 2016, and much has transpired since then. Our conclusion so far has been this: if Trump's 2016 victory is at least partly attributable to the racial resentment of the white working class, it is an opportunity seized and effectively exploited rather than one that Trump himself created during his campaign. This conclusion may need to be revised as the dynamic post-2016 political environment evolves. It is certainly possible that a wider examination of the GSS will support more change in racial attitudes than our analysis in this article has revealed. It could be, for example, that the small uptick in prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiment, on average, for members of classes IVab and V (see Figure 6) is the beginning of a trend that may become obvious when the 2018 GSS is returned from the field.

Finally, looking back at the CPS-VRS turnout results, one pattern deserves additional scrutiny. By our reading of the evidence, turnout patterns were most similar in 2004 and 2016, with a larger relative share of working class whites turning out to vote in both years. It may be that we should be interpreting the 2016 election in light of this similarity. Whereas post-9/11 patriotic devotion propelled Bush to a reelection victory in 2004 with a coalition that included white working class voters in swing states, in 2016 it would appear that an appeal to white populist nativism was similarly effective with many of the same voters. If this similarity has interpretive value, then the seeds of dealignment with the establishment Republican party may have been planted during the Bush presidency. The elections in 2004 and 2016 can then be reconciled, and the rise of the tea party movement during the Obama presidency can be seen as

the necessary catalyst that transformed a prior patriotic devotion into the right-populist fury that secured victory for Trump.

## References Cited

- Bobo, Lawrence D., Camille Z. Charles, Maria Kryson, and Alicia D. Simmons. 2012. "The Real Record on Racial Attitudes." Pp. 38-83 in *Social Trends in American Life: Findings from the General Social Survey Since 1972*, edited by P. V. Marsden. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brady, David, Benjamin Sosnaud, and Steven M. Frenk. 2009. "The Shifting and Diverging White Working Class in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1972–2004." *Social Science Research* 38:118-33. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2008.07.002>.
- Cohn, Nate. 2016, November 9. "Why Trump Won: Working-Class Whites." in *New York Times*. [https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/upshot/why-trump-won-working-class-whites.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/upshot/why-trump-won-working-class-whites.html?_r=0).
- Cramer, Katherine J. 2016. *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. 2016. "Views of the Electorate Research Survey, December 2016." Washington, DC: Democracy Fund. [Computer File; Release 1: August 28, 2017] URL: <https://www.voterstudygroup.org/>
- Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. 2017. "Top Lines and Crosstabs for the 2016 Voter Survey." Washington, DC: Democracy Fund. URL: <https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publications/2016-elections/data>.
- Erikson, Robert and John H. Goldthorpe. 1992. *The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, Geoffrey, ed. 1999. *The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Flegenheimer, Matt and Michael Barbaro. 2016, November 9. "Donald Trump Is Elected President in Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment." in *New York Times*. [https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html?_r=0).
- Green, Donald P. and Alan S. Gerber. 2015. *Get out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2016. *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*. New York: The New Press.

- Holbrook, Allyson L. and Jon A. Krosnick. 2010. "Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74:37-67. doi: 10.1093/poq/nfp065.
- Hout, Michael, Clem Brooks, and Jeff Manza. 1995. "The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States, 1948-1992." *American Sociological Review* 60:805-28. doi: 10.2307/2096428.
- Huang, Jon, Samuel Jacoby, Michael Strickland and K. K. Rebecca Lai. 2016, November 8. "Election 2016: Exit Polls." in *New York Times*.  
[https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-exit-polls.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-exit-polls.html?_r=0).
- Hur, Aram and Christopher H. Achen. 2013. "Coding Voter Turnout Responses in the Current Population Survey." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 77:985-93. doi: 10.1093/poq/nft042.
- Leighley, Jan E. and Jonathan Nagler. 2014. *Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality and Turnout in the United States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Manza, Jeff and Clem Brooks. 1999. *Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and US Party Coalitions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Manza, Jeff and Christopher Uggen. 2004. "Punishment and Democracy: Disenfranchisement of Nonincarcerated Felons in the United States." *Perspectives on Politics* 2:491-505. doi: 10.1017/S1537592704040290.
- Marsden, Peter V., ed. 2012. *Social Trends in American Life: Findings from the General Social Survey Since 1972*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Morgan, Stephen L. 2017. "A Coding of Social Class for the General Social Survey." Chicago, Illinois: GSS Methodological Report No. 125, National Opinion Research Center. doi: 10.17605/OSF.IO/9NKRW
- Morgan, Stephen L. and Minhyoung Kang. 2015. "A New Conservative Cold Front? Democrat and Republican Responsiveness to the Passage of the Affordable Care Act." *Sociological Science* 2:502-26. doi: 10.15195/v2.a24.
- Morgan, Stephen L. and Jiwon Lee. 2017. "Social Class and Party Identification During the Clinton, Bush, and Obama Presidencies." *Sociological Science* 4:394-423. doi: 10.15195/v4.a16.
- Pew Research Center. 2017. "American Trends Panel Methodology." Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. <http://www.pewresearch.org/methodology/u-s-survey-research/american-trends-panel/>.
- Pillsbury, George and Julian Johannesen. 2017. "American Goes to the Polls 2016: A Report on Voter Turnout in the 2016 Election." Cambridge, MA: Nonprofit VOTE. URL:

<http://www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2017/03/america-goes-polls-2016.pdf>

Silver, Nate. 2016, November 22. "Education, Not Income, Predicted Who Would Vote for Trump." in *FiveThirtyEight*. <http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/education-not-income-predicted-who-would-vote-for-trump/>.

Smith, Tom W., Michael Davern, Jeremy Freese, and Michael Hout. 2017. *General Social Surveys, 1972-2016, Cumulative Codebook*. Chicago: NORC.

Vance, J. D. 2016. *Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis*. New York: Harper.

# Online Supplement

## The White Working Class and Voter Turnout in US Presidential Elections, 2004—2016

### Table of Contents

Section	Page
Details of CPS-VRS Analysis . . . . .	S-2
Supplementary Results for the CPS-VRS Analysis. . . . .	S-7
Details of the GSS Analysis . . . . .	S-8
Supplementary Results for the GSS Analysis . . . . .	S-9
Tables . . . . .	S-11 – S-35
Figures . . . . .	S-36 – S-54

## Details of CPS-VRS Analysis

### Selection of the CPS-VRS Sample

For the voter turnout analysis, we utilized data drawn from the 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 November Current Population Surveys (hereafter, November CPS), each of which includes questions for the biennial Voting and Registration Supplement (hereafter, VRS).<sup>1</sup> The VRS supplement is analogous to other monthly topical supplements of the CPS – such as the March Social and Economic Supplement, the October School Enrollment Supplement, and the December Food Security Supplement – but is fielded only in even-numbered years when congressional and presidential elections are held.

The target population for the monthly CPS is the noninstitutionalized civilian population, aged 16 or older. Approximately 60,000 households are surveyed each month, and one respondent for each household responds on behalf of all resident household members aged 16 or older. The questions for the VRS are asked about individuals in the household who have been flagged by the household respondent as US citizens and aged 18 or older on the regular CPS questions that precede the VRS.

For the four years of the November CPS that we analyze, we first dropped core CPS sample members who were not in the universe of the VRS.<sup>2</sup> The resulting sample includes

---

<sup>1</sup> In particular, we used the CPS files available from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) website at <http://www.nber.org/data/current-population-survey-data.html>.

<sup>2</sup> The 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 November CPS have a combined sample size of 611,012. For our analysis of the VRS, we dropped the 234,095 core CPS sample members flagged in the combined data file as Not in Universe (NIU) for the VRS. These core CPS sample members include obvious exclusions for the VRS, such as those under age 18 and those who are not US citizens. But they also include others NIU that we have not been able to explain based on the publicly available data and documentation. We assume that most of the additional NIU exclusions are sample members in the augmented state samples. In addition, we also dropped from analysis an additional 61 CPS sample members who were supposedly in the universe of the VRS but who were members of the armed forces based on the occupation coding. The CPS is intended to be a sample of the noninstitutionalized civilian population, and we did not



376,856 individuals, of whom 203,410 are CPS-VRS respondents and 173,446 are CPS-VRS sample members whose voting and registration behavior were reported by their household's CPS respondent.

After the main monthly CPS questions are administered by the interviewer, the VRS proceeds by asking the CPS respondent to answer eight questions about each household member eligible for the VRS. The questions are:

S1. In any election, some people are not able to vote because they are sick or busy or have some other reason, and others do not want to vote. Did you [or {insert name}] vote in the election held on Tuesday, November {insert day}, {insert year}?

1. Yes
2. No
- Don't know
- Refused

If response is "Yes," then skip to question S5.  
Otherwise, carry on to question S2.

S2. Were you [or Was {insert name}] registered to vote in the November 8, 2016 election?

1. Yes
2. No
- Don't know
- Refused

If response is "Yes," and the response to S1 was "No," then skip to question S4.  
If response is "Yes," and the response to S1 was "Don't know" or "Refused," then skip to question S7.

\*If response is "No," then carry on to question S3.

\*If response if "Don't know" or "Refused," then skip to question S8.

S3. Which of the following was the MAIN reason you were [or {insert name} was] not registered to vote?

Note to interviewer:

READ EACH ANSWER CATEGORY TO THE RESPONDENT.

Enter only ONE answer.

---

know how to think about these respondents, whom we judge to be ineligible for the CPS, and hence not in the universe of the VRS either.

1. Did not meet registration deadlines
2. Did not know where or how to register
3. Did not meet residency requirements/did not live here long enough
4. Permanent illness or disability
5. Difficulty with English
6. Not interested in the election or not involved in politics
7. My vote would not make a difference
8. Not eligible to vote
9. Other reason
  - Don't know
  - Refused

If response is 1—9, then skip to question S8.

S4. What was the MAIN reason you [or {insert name}] did not vote?

Note to interviewer:

READ EACH ANSWER CATEGORY TO THE RESPONDENT.

Enter only ONE answer.

1. Illness or disability (own or family's)
2. Out of town or away from home
3. Forgot to vote (or send in absentee ballot)
4. Not interested, felt my vote wouldn't make a difference
5. Too busy, conflicting work or school schedule
6. Transportation problems
7. Didn't like candidates or campaign issues
8. Registration problems (i.e. didn't receive absentee ballot, not registered in current location)
9. Bad weather conditions
10. Inconvenient hours, polling place or hours or lines too long
11. Other
  - Don't know
  - Refused

If response is 1—11, then skip to question S7.

S5. Method of voting (in person or by mail). [wording omitted]

S6: Timing of voting (on election day, or before election day). [wording omitted]

S7. Place of last voter registration (nine options, such as department of motor vehicles). [wording omitted]

S8. Length of residence at current address (from less than one month to five years or more).  
[wording omitted]

For question S3, an additional response option (i.e., an additional “MAIN” reasons for not registering to vote) was introduced in 2004: “Not eligible to vote” (see response option 8 above). Utilizing this response, we also dropped from our analysis sample a further 3,530 CPS-VRS sample members. The VRS does not ascertain the reason for ineligibility to vote, but two genuine sources, beyond response errors, would seem reasonable: (1) a mismatch with the main CPS questions used as filters for the VRS (e.g., as would be the case if a purported citizen is actually only a permanent resident) and (2) having a felony conviction and residing in a state where felons are disenfranchised.

After these exclusions restrictions, the combined CPS-VRS sample includes 373,326 sample members. The analysis sample with which we estimate turnout rates includes a subset of 327,457 of these 373,326 CPS-VRS sample members. This subset is composed only of sample members who have nonmissing data on the voting questions (but see the section below on weighting to understand the methods we use to adjust for missingness). In other words, when estimating turnout, we exclude an additional 45,869 respondents who are missing information on our main questions of interest, defined by responses to questions S1—S3 above.<sup>3</sup>

### **Scaled Weights Utilized When Estimating Turnout Rates**

For this article, we utilized two weights (1) the CPS basic raw weight, *pwsswgt*, when offering descriptive patterns of the CPS-VRS sample, and (2) a scaled weight that we constructed for the

---

<sup>3</sup> Of those sample members excluded from the turnout-estimation sample, 47.7 percent (i.e. 21,869 out of 45,869) were CPS-VRS respondents. From our analysis, it appears that 76.5 (i.e. 35,087 of 45,869) percent of sample members with missing responses for the VRS questions were sample members in households where the CPS respondent quit the interview before the VRS could be administered. Most of the others were sample members for whom the CPS respondent reported “Don’t know” or refused to answer on behalf of the sample member.

estimation of turnout rates. The scaled weight is based on the recommendations of Hur and Achen (2013). As explained in their paper, we used the state-level turnout estimates tabulated by Michael McDonald of the University of Florida, which are publicly available on his website (<http://www.electproject.org/home/voter-turnout/voter-turnout-data>, accessed in August 2017) and which are available for the four elections we consider in this article. Following Hur and Achen (2013), we scaled the basic CPS person weight, *pwsswgt*, so that the CPS-VRS sample of voters in each state is weighted down by the fraction of actual voters while the sample of CPS-VRS eligible nonvoters is weighted up by the fraction of actual nonvoters.<sup>4</sup>

Applying these rates reproduces McDonald's estimates of turnout within state.

However, the method assumes that the rate of missingness in the CPS-VRS, as well as the rate of upward bias in self reports, does not vary by individual characteristics, within states. These latter assumptions are, of course, unreasonable. The descriptive tables below suggest that the first assumption is only violated slightly, at least with respect to race and class. The second assumption, however, is likely more substantially violated, since the literature suggests that social desirability bias is positively associated with level of education, and thus likely class. For this reason, our models likely over-estimate between-class turnout differences to at least some extent.

---

<sup>4</sup> In particular, after CPS-VRS sampled members without valid voting data were dropped from the turnout-estimation sample, the person-specific CPS weights were scaled by the fraction of year-state specific turnout estimates based on both known vote totals and US Census estimates of state population totals (minus McDonald's tabulations of ineligible voters, which vary by state, primarily because of variation in felon enfranchisement).

## **Supplementary Results for the CPS-VRS Analysis**

### **Tables**

Tables S1-S3 describe the sample as it is narrowed to competitive states and to those with valid data on the voting questions, separately by categories of race-ethnicity.

Table S4 provides the distribution of class and education groups by year, as the sample is narrowed by dropping CPS-VRS sample members who had missing data for the voting questions.

Table S5 shows how we modified the EGP class coding presented in Morgan (2017) for the 2004 and 2008 CPS-VRS, which coded occupation with the 2000 Census Occupational Classification rather than the 2010 Census Occupational Classification that was used for 2012 and 2016.

### **Figures**

Figures S1-A and S2-A demonstrate how the scaled weighting utilized for turnout estimation does not change the turnout trends, even though it does accomplish what is intended: to decrease turnout rates for all class groupings.

Figures S1-B and S2-B demonstrate that similar turnout trends are present when all states are analyzed, not just competitive states. Demographic differences between states narrow the within-working-class gap when all states are considered, and the increase among farmers and agricultural laborers is reduced. Otherwise, similar basic patterns are present.

Figures S1-EGP-I through S1-EGP-VIIb disaggregate the class groups in Figure 1 and demonstrate that the class groupings for the main body of the article are sensible

representations of the full pattern of results. In addition, Figures S1-EGP-IVc and S1-EGP-VIIIb offer the trends for “all other” farmers, ranchers, and agricultural workers that were suppressed for the second panel of Figure 1. These two supplementary figures show how much sampling error is present for these trends, which make them hard to interpret. On the other hand, they do show a plausible upturn in turnout for 2008 that is consistent with increases for “all other” eligible voters in most other classes.

## **Details of the GSS Analysis**

### **Selection of the GPS Sample**

We follow the same basic strategy detailed in Morgan and Lee (2017) when constructing the GSS sample, but for this analysis we narrow the sample further to only those GSS respondents who report that they are non-Hispanic and white only.

For the core ballots on which the race items and the immigration item are placed, the 2004-2016 GSS includes 17,250 respondents. Dropping those who reported they were not eligible to vote in the last presidential election and were less than 25 years old at the time of the interview narrows the sample to 15,185 respondents. Dropping those who do not self-identify as non-Hispanic and white only decreases the sample further to 10,351. Of these respondents, 98 percent reported an occupation and hence were given an EGP social class.

For the results we offer in Figure 6 on racial prejudice and immigration sentiment, most items were asked on two of the three GSS ballots, yielding effective sample sizes, after setting don't knows and refusals to missing, of about 6,000 respondents for each item. For the ISSP government responsibility items, a different set of GSS ballots was used, and only two years of

data, 2006 and 2016. The effective sample sizes for Figures 3 through 5 are only about 900 in 2006 and 760 in 2016, with variation depending on the item under analysis.

## **Supplementary Results for the GSS Analysis**

Figures S3 through S6 offer the same results presented in Figures 3 through 6 in the main body of the article, but disaggregated for each underlying class. Because of declines in sample size for each class, relative to each of the more encompassing class groups, the estimates have more error and accordingly some point estimates move in anomalous ways. To our eyes, however, these results suggest that the class groupings used for the main body of the article yield sensible results.

Figure S7 offers a check on the conclusions for the four indicators of racial prejudice, opposition to affirmative action, and anti-immigrant sentiment presented in Figure 6. For Figure S7, we use the same basic analysis strategy in Figures 6 and S6, but for two separate scales. These scales are based on additional GSS items (four for opposition to affirmative action and a separate eleven items for racial prejudice; see notes to the figure). The scales are IRT-scored, which elegantly handles structural missing data across the ballot structure of the GSS, and they are standardized on a sample that includes only white and black respondents.

Figure S7 then presents class differences for non-Hispanic whites only, which locates all class-specific point estimates greater than zero, since the black respondents not included in the analysis for the figure dominate the left tail of the distribution. Most importantly, these results reinforce the point that there is little evidence that non-Hispanic whites have become more racially prejudiced in 2016. They also show that there is some weak evidence that their

opposition to affirmative action may have declined to a small degree, regardless of class.

Nonetheless, as Figure 6 shows, their overall opposition remains very substantial.



**Table S1. Race-Ethnic Composition of Eligible Voters by Year**

Race-Ethnicity	2004	2008	2012	2016	Total
Among All Eligible Voters:					
Non-Hispanic White-only (percent)	75.5	73.8	71.4	69.3	
All Other Race-Ethnicity (percent)	24.5	26.2	28.6	30.7	
Weighted N	87,413	91,290	95,329	99,294	373,326
Among All Other Race-Ethnicity:					
Black-only (incl. black Hispanics) (percent)	48.2	46.0	43.6	41.7	
Non-black Hispanics (percent)	31.6	34.1	35.2	36.2	
Non-Hispanic American Indian-only (percent)	2.4	2.2	2.6	2.5	
Non-Hispanic Asian-only (percent)	12.1	12.6	12.9	14.2	
Non-Hispanic Pacific Islander only (percent)	0.7	0.8	1.0	0.8	
Non-Hispanic all others/multiracial (percent)	4.6	4.3	4.8	4.7	
Weighted N	17,997	20,124	22,921	25,654	86,695

Notes: CPS-VRS sample members, weighted by pwsswgt (including sample members eligible to vote but missing information on the voting questions).

**Table S2. Race-Ethnic Composition of Eligible Voters by Year in Competitive States**

Race-Ethnicity	2004	2008	2012	2016	Total
Among All Eligible Voters:					
Non-Hispanic White-only (percent)	77.0	75.1	72.8	70.8	
All Other Race-Ethnicity (percent)	23.0	24.9	27.2	29.2	
Weighted N	35,080	37,096	38,775	40,466	151,417
Among All Other Race-Ethnicity:					
Black-only (incl. black Hispanics) (percent)	50.2	48.5	47.0	44.8	
Non-black Hispanics (percent)	35.6	38.3	38.3	38.7	
Non-Hispanic American Indian-only (percent)	2.9	2.3	2.6	2.4	
Non-Hispanic Asian-only (percent)	6.9	7.0	7.9	9.3	
Non-Hispanic Pacific Islander only (percent)	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.4	
Non-Hispanic all others/multiracial (percent)	4.2	3.6	3.7	4.4	
Weighted N	6,728	7,727	8,805	9,861	33,121

*Notes:* CPS-VRS sample members in competitive states, weighted by pwsswgt (including sample members eligible to vote but missing information on the voting questions).

**Table S3. Race-Ethnic Composition of Eligible Voters by Year in Competitive States, Excluding Sample Members with Missing Information on the Voting Questions**

Race-Ethnicity	2004	2008	2012	2016	Total
Among All Eligible Voters:					
Non-Hispanic White-only (percent)	78.3	76.0	73.0	72.0	
All Other Race-Ethnicity (percent)	21.7	24.0	27.0	28.0	
Weighted N	31,585	32,497	34,132	35,083	133,299
Among All Other Race-Ethnicity:					
Black-only (incl. black Hispanics) (percent)	49.6	48.0	46.5	44.7	
Non-black Hispanics (percent)	36.0	39.0	38.8	38.7	
Non-Hispanic American Indian-only (percent)	3.0	2.4	2.7	2.6	
Non-Hispanic Asian-only (percent)	6.6	6.5	7.6	9.0	
Non-Hispanic Pacific Islander only (percent)	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	
Non-Hispanic all others/multiracial (percent)	4.6	3.8	3.9	4.5	
Weighted N	5,696	6,476	7,534	8,183	27,889

*Notes:* CPS-VRS sample members, weighted by pwsswgt (excluding sample members eligible to vote who had missing information on the voting questions). These are the actual respondents for whom turnout is estimated, using the scaled weighted detailed above.

**Table S4. The Distribution of Class and Education Groups in All States, 2004—2016**

Class and Education Group	Percent of Total				Total
	2004	2008	2012	2016	
All Eligible Voters					
All CPS-VRS eligible voters					
I	6.4	6.5	6.5	6.7	
II	10.4	11.1	10.8	11.4	
IIIa	10.3	10.1	9.6	9.2	
IIIb	8.3	9.0	8.9	8.8	
IVab	5.0	4.6	4.3	4.1	
IVc	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	
V	5.1	5.0	4.8	4.7	
VI	3.8	3.7	3.3	3.0	
VIIa	8.9	8.7	8.4	8.2	
VIIb	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	
B.A or More	6.4	6.9	8.0	9.3	
Some College	11.7	12.2	13.4	13.5	
H.S or Less	23.0	21.5	21.5	20.6	
Weighted N	87,413	91,290	95,328	99,294	373,326
Excluding those with missing vote information:					
I	6.6	6.8	6.7	7.0	
II	10.6	11.5	11.2	11.7	
IIIa	10.4	10.2	9.8	9.4	
IIIb	8.3	8.8	8.8	8.7	
IVab	5.0	4.6	4.3	4.2	
IVc	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	
V	5.1	5.1	4.9	4.8	
VI	3.8	3.7	3.4	3.0	
VIIa	8.8	8.6	8.5	8.1	
VIIb	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	
B.A or More	6.3	7.0	7.9	9.3	
Some College	11.6	12.1	13.2	13.4	
H.S or Less	22.7	21.1	20.8	19.9	
Weighted N	78,668	79,401	83,835	85,552	327,457

**Table S5. Coding of EGP Social Classes for the 2000 and 2010 US Census Occupational Classifications, As Implemented for the Current Population Surveys, 2004 – 2016**

2000 Census Code	2000 Census Occupation Description	2000 Assigned EGP	2012 ACS Code	2010 Census Occupation Description	2010/12 Assigned EGP
0010	Chief Executives	I	10	Chief executives	I
0020	General and Operations Managers	II	10	Legislators	I
0030	Legislators	I	20	General and operations managers	II
0040	Advertising and Promotions Managers	II	40	Advertising and promotions managers	II
0050	Marketing and Sales Managers	II	50	Marketing and sales managers	II
0060	Public Relations Managers	II	60	Public relations and fundraising managers	II
0100	Administrative Services Managers	IIIa	100	Administrative services managers	IIIa
0110	Computer and Information Systems Managers	I	110	Computer and information systems managers	I
0120	Financial Managers	II	120	Financial managers	II
0130	Human Resources Managers	II			
			135	Compensation and benefits managers	II
			136	Human resources managers	II
			137	Training and development managers	II
0140	Industrial Production Managers	II	140	Industrial production managers	II
0150	Purchasing Managers	II	150	Purchasing managers	II
0160	Transportation, Storage, and Distribution Managers	V	160	Transportation, storage, and distribution managers	V
0200	Farm, Ranch, and Other Agricultural Managers	IVc	205	Farmers, ranchers, and other agricultural managers	IVc
0210	Farmers and Ranchers	IVc			
0220	Construction Managers	V	220	Construction managers	V
0230	Education Administrators	I	230	Education administrators	I
0300	Engineering Managers	I	300	Architectural and engineering managers	I
0310	Food Service Managers	IIIb	310	Food service managers	IIIb
0320	Funeral Directors	II	330	Gaming managers	V
0330	Gaming Managers	V	340	Lodging managers	IIIa
0340	Lodging Managers	IIIa	350	Medical and health services managers	I
0350	Medical and Health Services Managers	I	360	Natural sciences managers	I
0360	Natural Sciences Managers	I	410	Property, real estate, and community association managers	V
0400	Postmasters and Mail Superintendents	II	420	Social and community service managers	II

0410	Property, Real Estate, and Community Association Managers	V	425	Emergency management directors	II
0420	Social and Community Service Managers	II	430	Managers, all other	II
0430	Managers, All Other	II	430	Funeral service managers	II
0500	Agents and Business Managers of Artists, Performers, and Athletes	II	430	Postmasters and mail superintendents	II
0510	Purchasing Agents and Buyers, Farm Products	V	500	Agents and business managers of artists, performers, and athletes	II
0520	Wholesale and Retail Buyers, Except Farm Products	IIIb	510	Buyers and purchasing agents, farm products	V
0530	Purchasing Agents, Except Wholesale, Retail, and Farm Products	II	520	Wholesale and retail buyers, except farm products	IIIb
0540	Claims Adjusters, Appraisers, Examiners, and Investigators	IIIa	530	Purchasing agents, except wholesale, retail, and farm products	II
0560	Compliance Officers, Except Agriculture, Construction, Health and Safety, and Transportation	II	540	Claims adjusters, appraisers, examiners, and investigators	IIIa
0600	Cost Estimators	V	565	Compliance officers	II
0620	Human Resources, Training, and Labor Relations Specialists	IIIa	600	Cost estimators	V
			630	Human resources workers	IIIa
			640	Compensation, benefits, and job analysis specialists	II
			650	Training and development specialists	II
0700	Logisticians	II	700	Logisticians	II
0710	Management Analysts	I	710	Management analysts	I
0720	Meeting and Convention Planners	IIIa	725	Meeting, convention, and event planners	IIIa
0730	Other Business Operations Specialists	II	726	Fundraisers	II
			735	Market research analysts and marketing specialists	II
			740	Business operations specialists, all other	II
0800	Accountants and Auditors	I	800	Accountants and auditors	I
0810	Appraisers and Assessors of Real Estate	IIIa	810	Appraisers and assessors of real estate	IIIa
0820	Budget Analysts	I	820	Budget analysts	I
0830	Credit Analysts	IIIa	830	Credit analysts	IIIa
0840	Financial Analysts	I	840	Financial analysts	I
0850	Personal Financial Advisors	II	850	Personal financial advisors	II

0860	Insurance Underwriters	II
0900	Financial Examiners	II
0910	Loan Counselors and Officers	IIIa
0930	Tax Examiners, Collectors, and Revenue Agents	IIIa
0940	Tax Preparers	IIIa
0950	Financial Specialists, All Other	II
1000	Computer Scientists and Systems Analysts	II
1010	Computer Programmers	II
1020	Computer Software Engineers	I
1040	Computer Support Specialists	IIIa
1060	Database Administrators	II
1100	Network and Computer Systems Administrators	II
1110	Network Systems and Data Communications Analysts	II
1200	Actuaries	I
1210	Mathematicians	I
1220	Operations Research Analysts	I
1230	Statisticians	I
1240	Miscellaneous Mathematical Science Occupations	I
1300	Architects, Except Naval	I
1310	Surveyors, Cartographers, and Photogrammetrists	II
1320	Aerospace Engineers	I
1330	Agricultural Engineers	I
1340	Biomedical Engineers	I
1350	Chemical Engineers	I
1360	Civil Engineers	I
1400	Computer Hardware Engineers	I

860	Insurance underwriters	II
900	Financial examiners	II
910	Credit counselors and loan officers	IIIa
930	Tax examiners and collectors, and revenue agents	IIIa
940	Tax preparers	IIIa
950	Financial specialists, all other	II
1005	Computer and information research scientists	I
1006	Computer systems analysts	II
1007	Information security analysts	II
1010	Computer programmers	II
1020	Software developers, applications and systems software	I
1030	Web developers	IIIa
1050	Computer support specialists	IIIa
1060	Database administrators	II
1105	Network and computer systems administrators	II
1106	Computer network architects	II
1107	Computer occupations, all other	II
1200	Actuaries	I
1220	Operations research analysts	I
1240	Mathematicians	I
1240	Miscellaneous mathematical science occupations	I
1240	Statisticians	I
1300	Architects, except naval	I
1310	Surveyors, cartographers, and photogrammetrists	II
1320	Aerospace engineers	I
1340	Agricultural engineers	I
1340	Biomedical engineers	I
1350	Chemical engineers	I
1360	Civil engineers	I
1400	Computer hardware engineers	I

1410	Electrical and Electronics Engineers	I	1410	Electrical and electronics engineers	I
1420	Environmental Engineers	I	1420	Environmental engineers	I
1430	Industrial Engineers, including Health and Safety	I	1430	Industrial engineers, including health and safety	I
1440	Marine Engineers and Naval Architects	I	1440	Marine engineers and naval architects	I
1450	Materials Engineers	I	1450	Materials engineers	I
1460	Mechanical Engineers	I	1460	Mechanical engineers	I
1500	Mining and Geological Engineers, Including Mining Safety Engineers	I	1520	Petroleum engineers	I
1510	Nuclear Engineers	I	1520	Mining and geological engineers, including mining safety engineers	I
1520	Petroleum Engineers	I	1530	Engineers, all other	I
1530	Engineers, All Other	I	1530	Nuclear engineers	I
1540	Drafters	V	1540	Drafters	V
1550	Engineering Technicians, Except Drafters	V	1550	Engineering technicians, except drafters	V
1560	Surveying and Mapping Technicians	V	1560	Surveying and mapping technicians	V
1600	Agricultural and Food Scientists	I	1600	Agricultural and food scientists	I
1610	Biological Scientists	I	1610	Biological scientists	I
1640	Conservation Scientists and Foresters	I	1640	Conservation scientists and foresters	I
1650	Medical Scientists	I	1650	Life scientists, all other	I
			1650	Medical scientists	I
1700	Astronomers and Physicists	I	1700	Astronomers and physicists	I
1710	Atmospheric and Space Scientists	I	1710	Atmospheric and space scientists	I
1720	Chemists and Materials Scientists	I	1720	Chemists and materials scientists	I
1740	Environmental Scientists and Geoscientists	I	1740	Environmental scientists and geoscientists	I
1760	Physical Scientists, All Other	I	1760	Physical scientists, all other	I
1800	Economists	I	1800	Economists	I
1810	Market and Survey Researchers	II			
1820	Psychologists	I	1820	Psychologists	I
1830	Sociologists	II	1840	Urban and regional planners	I
1840	Urban and Regional Planners	I	1860	Sociologists	II
1860	Miscellaneous Social Scientists and Related Workers	II	1860	Survey researchers	II
1900	Agricultural and Food Science Technicians	V	1860	Miscellaneous social scientists and related workers	II
1910	Biological Technicians	V	1900	Agricultural and food science technicians	V
1920	Chemical Technicians	V	1910	Biological technicians	V
1930	Geological and Petroleum Technicians	V	1920	Chemical technicians	V



1940	Nuclear Technicians	V
1960	Other Life, Physical, and Social Science Technicians	V
2000	Counselors	II
2010	Social Workers	II
2020	Miscellaneous Community and Social Service Specialists	II
2040	Clergy	II
2050	Directors, Religious Activities and Education	II
2060	Religious Workers, All Other	IIIb
2100	Lawyers	I
2110	Judges, Magistrates, and Other Judicial Workers	I
2140	Paralegals and Legal Assistants	IIIa
2150	Miscellaneous Legal Support Workers	IIIa
2200	Postsecondary Teachers	I
2300	Preschool and Kindergarten Teachers	IIIb
2310	Elementary and Middle School Teachers	II
2320	Secondary School Teachers	II
2330	Special Education Teachers	II
2340	Other Teachers and Instructors	IIIa
2400	Archivists, Curators, and Museum Technicians	II
2430	Librarians	II
2440	Library Technicians	IIIa
2540	Teacher Assistants	IIIa
2550	Other Education, Training, and Library Workers	II

1930	Geological and petroleum technicians	V
1930	Nuclear technicians	V
1965	Social science research assistants	V
1965	Miscellaneous life, physical, and social science technicians	V
2000	Counselors	II
2010	Social workers	II
2015	Probation officers and correctional treatment specialists	V
2016	Social and human service assistants	IIIa
2025	Miscellaneous community and social service specialists, including health educators and community health workers	II
2040	Clergy	II
2050	Directors, religious activities and education	II
2060	Religious workers, all other	IIIb
2100	Judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers	I
2100	Lawyers	I
2105	Judicial law clerks	I
2145	Paralegals and legal assistants	IIIa
2160	Miscellaneous legal support workers	IIIa
2200	Postsecondary teachers	I
2300	Preschool and kindergarten teachers	IIIb
2310	Elementary and middle school teachers	II
2320	Secondary school teachers	II
2330	Special education teachers	II
2340	Other teachers and instructors	IIIa
2400	Archivists, curators, and museum technicians	II
2430	Librarians	II
2440	Library technicians	IIIa
2540	Teacher assistants	IIIa
2550	Other education, training, and library workers	II

2600	Artists and Related Workers	V	2600	Artists and related workers	V
2630	Designers	V	2630	Designers	V
2700	Actors	V	2700	Actors	V
2710	Producers and Directors	II	2710	Producers and directors	II
2720	Athletes, Coaches, Umpires, and Related Workers	V	2720	Athletes, coaches, umpires, and related workers	V
2740	Dancers and Choreographers	V	2740	Dancers and choreographers	V
2750	Musicians, Singers, and Related Workers	V	2750	Musicians, singers, and related workers	V
2760	Entertainers and Performers, Sports and Related Workers, All Other	V	2760	Entertainers and performers, sports and related workers, all other	V
2800	Announcers	V	2800	Announcers	V
2810	News Analysts, Reporters and Correspondents	II	2810	News analysts, reporters and correspondents	II
2820	Public Relations Specialists	II	2825	Public relations specialists	II
2830	Editors	II	2830	Editors	II
2840	Technical Writers	II	2840	Technical writers	II
2850	Writers and Authors	II	2850	Writers and authors	II
2860	Miscellaneous Media and Communication Workers	V	2860	Miscellaneous media and communication workers	V
2900	Broadcast and Sound Engineering Technicians and Radio Operators	V	2900	Broadcast and sound engineering technicians and radio operators	V
2910	Photographers	V	2900	Media and communication equipment workers, all other	V
2920	Television, Video, and Motion Picture Camera Operators and Editors	V	2910	Photographers	V
2960	Media and Communication Equipment Workers, All Other	V	2920	Television, video, and motion picture camera operators and editors	V
3000	Chiropractors	I	3000	Chiropractors	I
3010	Dentists	I	3010	Dentists	I
3030	Dietitians and Nutritionists	II	3030	Dietitians and nutritionists	II
3040	Optometrists	I	3040	Optometrists	I
3050	Pharmacists	I	3050	Pharmacists	I
3060	Physicians and Surgeons	I	3060	Physicians and surgeons	I
3110	Physician Assistants	II	3110	Physician assistants	II

3120	Podiatrists	I
3130	Registered Nurses	II
3140	Audiologists	II
3150	Occupational Therapists	II
3160	Physical Therapists	II
3200	Radiation Therapists	IIIa
3210	Recreational Therapists	II
3220	Respiratory Therapists	IIIa
3230	Speech-Language Pathologists	II
3240	Therapists, All Other	II
3250	Veterinarians	I
3260	Health Diagnosing and Treating Practitioners, All Other	II
3300	Clinical Laboratory Technologists and Technicians	V
3310	Dental Hygienists	V
3320	Diagnostic Related Technologists and Technicians	V
3400	Emergency Medical Technicians and Paramedics	V
3410	Health Diagnosing and Treating Practitioner Support Technicians	V
3500	Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses	IIIa
3510	Medical Records and Health Information Technicians	IIIa
3520	Opticians, Dispensing	V
3530	Miscellaneous Health Technologists and Technicians	V
3540	Other Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations	II
3600	Nursing, Psychiatric, and Home Health Aides	IIIb
3610	Occupational Therapist Assistants and Aides	IIIb

3120	Podiatrists	I
3140	Audiologists	II
3150	Occupational therapists	II
3160	Physical therapists	II
3200	Radiation therapists	IIIa
3210	Recreational therapists	II
3220	Respiratory therapists	IIIa
3230	Speech-language pathologists	II
3245	Therapists, all other	II
3245	Exercise physiologists	II
3250	Veterinarians	I
3255	Registered nurses	II
3256	Nurse anesthetists	II
3258	Nurse midwives	II
3258	Nurse practitioners	II
3260	Health diagnosing and treating practitioners, all other	II
3300	Clinical laboratory technologists and technicians	V
3310	Dental hygienists	V
3320	Diagnostic related technologists and technicians	V
3400	Emergency medical technicians and paramedics	V
3420	Health practitioner support technologists and technicians	V
3500	Licensed practical and licensed vocational nurses	IIIa
3510	Medical records and health information technicians	IIIa
3520	Opticians, dispensing	V
3535	Miscellaneous health technologists and technicians	V
3540	Other healthcare practitioners and technical occupations	II
3600	Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides	IIIb
3610	Occupational therapy assistants and aides	IIIb
3620	Physical therapist assistants and aides	IIIb

3620	Physical Therapist Assistants and Aides	IIIb
3630	Massage Therapists	IIIb
3640	Dental Assistants	IIIb
3650	Medical Assistants and Other Healthcare Support Occupations	IIIb
3700	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Correctional Officers	V
3710	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Police and Detectives	V
3720	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Fire Fighting and Prevention Workers	V
3730	Supervisors, Protective Service Workers, All Other	V
3740	Fire Fighters	V
3750	Fire Inspectors	V
3800	Bailiffs, Correctional Officers, and Jailers	V
3820	Detectives and Criminal Investigators	V
3830	Fish and Game Wardens	V
3840	Parking Enforcement Workers	V
3850	Police and Sheriff's Patrol Officers	V
3860	Transit and Railroad Police	V
3900	Animal Control Workers	IIIb
3910	Private Detectives and Investigators	V
3920	Security Guards and Gaming Surveillance Officers	IIIb
3940	Crossing Guards	VIIa

3630	Massage therapists	IIIb
3640	Dental assistants	IIIb
3645	Medical assistants	IIIb
3646	Medical transcriptionists	IIIb
3647	Pharmacy aides	IIIb
3648	Veterinary assistants and laboratory animal caretakers	IIIb
3649	Phlebotomists	IIIb
3655	Miscellaneous healthcare support occupations, including medical equipment preparers	IIIb
3700	First-line supervisors of correctional officers	V
3710	First-line supervisors of police and detectives	V
3720	First-line supervisors of fire fighting and prevention workers	V
3730	First-line supervisors of protective service workers, all other	V
3740	Firefighters	V
3750	Fire inspectors	V
3800	Bailiffs, correctional officers, and jailers	V
3820	Detectives and criminal investigators	V
3840	Parking enforcement workers	V
3840	Fish and game wardens	V
3850	Police and sheriff's patrol officers	V
3850	Transit and railroad police	V
3900	Animal control workers	IIIb
3910	Private detectives and investigators	V
3930	Security guards and gaming surveillance officers	IIIb
3940	Crossing guards	VIIa
3945	Transportation security screeners	IIIb

3950	Lifeguards and Other Protective Service Workers	IIIb
4000	Chefs and Head Cooks	V
4010	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Food Preparation and Serving Workers	IIIb
4020	Cooks	VIIa
4030	Food Preparation Workers	VIIa
4040	Bartenders	IIIb
4050	Combined Food Preparation and Serving Workers, Including Fast Food	IIIb
4060	Counter Attendants, Cafeteria, Food Concession, and Coffee Shop	IIIb
4110	Waiters and Waitresses	IIIb
4120	Food Servers, Nonrestaurant	IIIb
4130	Dining Room and Cafeteria Attendants and Bartender Helpers	IIIb
4140	Dishwashers	VIIa
4150	Hosts and Hostesses, Restaurant, Lounge, and Coffee Shop	IIIb
4160	Food Preparation and Serving Related Workers, All Other	IIIb
4200	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Housekeeping and Janitorial Workers	IIIb
4210	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Landscaping, Lawn Service, and Groundskeeping Workers	V
4220	Janitors and Building Cleaners	VIIa
4230	Maids and Housekeeping Cleaners	VIIa
4240	Pest Control Workers	IIIb
4250	Grounds Maintenance Workers	VIIa
4300	First-line Supervisors/Managers of Gaming Workers	IIIb

3955	Lifeguards and other recreational, and all other protective service workers	IIIb
4000	Chefs and head cooks	V
4010	First-line supervisors of food preparation and serving workers	IIIb
4020	Cooks	VIIa
4030	Food preparation workers	VIIa
4040	Bartenders	IIIb
4050	Combined food preparation and serving workers, including fast food	IIIb
4060	Counter attendants, cafeteria, food concession, and coffee shop	IIIb
4110	Waiters and waitresses	IIIb
4120	Food servers, nonrestaurant	IIIb
4130	Food preparation and serving related workers, all other	IIIb
4130	Dining room and cafeteria attendants and bartender helpers	IIIb
4140	Dishwashers	VIIa
4150	Hosts and hostesses, restaurant, lounge, and coffee shop	IIIb
4200	First-line supervisors of housekeeping and janitorial workers	IIIb
4210	First-line supervisors of landscaping, lawn service, and groundskeeping workers	V
4220	Janitors and building cleaners	VIIa
4230	Maids and housekeeping cleaners	VIIa
4240	Pest control workers	IIIb
4250	Grounds maintenance workers	VIIa
4300	First-line supervisors of gaming workers	IIIb

4320	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Personal Service Workers	IIIb	4320	First-line supervisors of personal service workers	IIIb
4340	Animal Trainers	VIIb	4340	Animal trainers	VIIb
4350	Nonfarm Animal Caretakers	IIIb	4350	Nonfarm animal caretakers	IIIb
4400	Gaming Services Workers	IIIb	4400	Gaming services workers	IIIb
4410	Motion Picture Projectionists	IIIb	4410	Motion picture projectionists	IIIb
4420	Ushers, Lobby Attendants, and Ticket Takers	IIIb	4420	Ushers, lobby attendants, and ticket takers	IIIb
4430	Miscellaneous Entertainment Attendants and Related Workers	IIIb	4430	Miscellaneous entertainment attendants and related workers	IIIb
4460	Funeral Service Workers	IIIb	4460	Embalmers and funeral attendants	IIIb
			4465	Morticians, undertakers, and funeral directors	IIIb
4500	Barbers	IIIb	4500	Barbers	IIIb
4510	Hairdressers, Hairstylists, and Cosmetologists	IIIb	4510	Hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists	IIIb
4520	Miscellaneous Personal Appearance Workers	IIIb	4520	Miscellaneous personal appearance workers	IIIb
4530	Baggage Porters, Bellhops, and Concierges	IIIb	4530	Baggage porters, bellhops, and concierges	IIIb
4540	Tour and Travel Guides	IIIa	4540	Tour and travel guides	IIIa
4550	Transportation Attendants				
4600	Child Care Workers	IIIb	4600	Childcare workers	IIIb
4610	Personal and Home Care Aides	IIIb	4610	Personal care aides	IIIb
4620	Recreation and Fitness Workers	IIIb	4620	Recreation and fitness workers	IIIb
4640	Residential Advisors	IIIb	4640	Residential advisors	IIIb
4650	Personal Care and Service Workers, All Other	IIIb	4650	Personal care and service workers, all other	IIIb
4700	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Retail Sales Workers	IIIb	4700	First-line supervisors of retail sales workers	IIIb
4710	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Non-Retail Sales Workers	V	4710	First-line supervisors of non-retail sales workers	V
4720	Cashiers	IIIb	4720	Cashiers	IIIb
4740	Counter and Rental Clerks	IIIb	4740	Counter and rental clerks	IIIb
4750	Parts Salespersons	IIIb	4750	Parts salespersons	IIIb
4760	Retail Salespersons	IIIb	4760	Retail salespersons	IIIb
4800	Advertising Sales Agents	IIIa	4800	Advertising sales agents	IIIa
4810	Insurance Sales Agents	IIIa	4810	Insurance sales agents	IIIa
4820	Securities, Commodities, and Financial Services Sales Agents	II	4820	Securities, commodities, and financial services sales agents	II

4830	Travel Agents	IIIa	4830	Travel agents	IIIa
4840	Sales Representatives, Services, All Other	IIIa	4840	Sales representatives, services, all other	IIIa
4850	Sales Representatives, Wholesale and Manufacturing	IIIa	4850	Sales representatives, wholesale and manufacturing	IIIa
4900	Models, Demonstrators, and Product Promoters	IIIb	4900	Models, demonstrators, and product promoters	IIIb
4920	Real Estate Brokers and Sales Agents	IIIa	4920	Real estate brokers and sales agents	IIIa
4930	Sales Engineers	II	4930	Sales engineers	II
4940	Telemarketers	IIIb	4940	Telemarketers	IIIb
4950	Door-to-Door Sales Workers, News and Street Vendors, and Related Workers	IIIb	4950	Door-to-door sales workers, news and street vendors, and related workers	IIIb
4960	Sales and Related Workers, All Other	IIIa	4965	Sales and related workers, all other	IIIa
5000	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Office and Administrative Support Workers	IIIa	5000	First-line supervisors of office and administrative support workers	IIIa
5010	Switchboard Operators, Including Answering Service	IIIa	5010	Switchboard operators, including answering service	IIIa
5020	Telephone Operators	IIIa	5020	Telephone operators	IIIa
5030	Communications Equipment Operators, All Other	IIIa	5030	Communications equipment operators, all other	IIIa
5100	Bill and Account Collectors	IIIa	5100	Bill and account collectors	IIIa
5110	Billing and Posting Clerks and Machine Operators	IIIa	5110	Billing and posting clerks	IIIa
5120	Bookkeeping, Accounting, and Auditing Clerks	IIIa	5120	Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks	IIIa
5130	Gaming Cage Workers	IIIb	5130	Gaming cage workers	IIIb
5140	Payroll and Timekeeping Clerks	IIIa	5140	Payroll and timekeeping clerks	IIIa
5150	Procurement Clerks	IIIa	5150	Procurement clerks	IIIa
5160	Tellers	IIIa	5160	Tellers	IIIa
			5165	Financial clerks, all other	IIIa
5200	Brokerage Clerks	IIIa	5200	Brokerage clerks	IIIa
5210	Correspondence Clerks	IIIa	5220	Court, municipal, and license clerks	IIIa
5220	Court, Municipal, and License Clerks	IIIa	5230	Credit authorizers, checkers, and clerks	IIIa
5230	Credit Authorizers, Checkers, and Clerks	IIIa	5240	Customer service representatives	IIIa
5240	Customer Service Representatives	IIIa	5250	Eligibility interviewers, government programs	IIIa
5250	Eligibility Interviewers, Government Programs	IIIa	5260	File Clerks	IIIa
5260	File Clerks	IIIa	5300	Hotel, motel, and resort desk clerks	IIIa
5300	Hotel, Motel, and Resort Desk Clerks	IIIa	5310	Interviewers, except eligibility and loan	IIIa
5310	Interviewers, Except Eligibility and Loan	IIIa	5320	Library assistants, clerical	IIIa
5320	Library Assistants, Clerical	IIIa	5330	Loan interviewers and clerks	IIIa
5330	Loan Interviewers and Clerks	IIIa	5340	New accounts clerks	IIIa

5340	New Accounts Clerks	IIIa	5350	Correspondence clerks	IIIa
5350	Order Clerks	IIIa	5350	Order clerks	IIIa
5360	Human Resources Assistants, Except Payroll and Timekeeping	IIIa	5360	Human resources assistants, except payroll and timekeeping	IIIa
5400	Receptionists and Information Clerks	IIIb	5400	Receptionists and information clerks	IIIb
5410	Reservation and Transportation Ticket Agents and Travel Clerks	IIIa	5410	Reservation and transportation ticket agents and travel clerks	IIIa
5420	Information and Record Clerks, All Other	IIIa	5420	Information and record clerks, all other	IIIa
5500	Cargo and Freight Agents	IIIa	5500	Cargo and freight agents	IIIa
5510	Couriers and Messengers	IIIb	5510	Couriers and messengers	IIIb
5520	Dispatchers	IIIa	5520	Dispatchers	IIIa
5530	Meter Readers, Utilities	IIIa	5530	Meter readers, utilities	IIIa
5540	Postal Service Clerks	IIIa	5540	Postal service clerks	IIIa
5550	Postal Service Mail Carriers	VIIa	5550	Postal service mail carriers	VIIa
5560	Postal Service Mail Sorters, Processors, and Processing Machine Operators	VIIa	5560	Postal service mail sorters, processors, and processing machine operators	VIIa
5600	Production, Planning, and Expediting Clerks	IIIa	5600	Production, planning, and expediting clerks	IIIa
5610	Shipping, Receiving, and Traffic Clerks	VIIa	5610	Shipping, receiving, and traffic clerks	VIIa
5620	Stock Clerks and Order Fillers	VIIa	5620	Stock clerks and order fillers	VIIa
5630	Weighers, Measurers, Checkers, and Samplers, Recordkeeping	IIIa	5630	Weighers, measurers, checkers, and samplers, recordkeeping	IIIa
5700	Secretaries and Administrative Assistants	IIIa	5700	Secretaries and administrative assistants	IIIa
5800	Computer Operators	IIIa	5800	Computer operators	IIIa
5810	Data Entry Keyers	IIIa	5810	Data entry keyers	IIIa
5820	Word Processors and Typists	IIIa	5820	Word processors and typists	IIIa
5830	Desktop Publishers	IIIa	5840	Insurance claims and policy processing clerks	IIIa
5840	Insurance Claims and Policy Processing Clerks	IIIa	5850	Mail clerks and mail machine operators, except postal service	VIIa
5850	Mail Clerks and Mail Machine Operators, Except Postal Service	VIIa	5860	Office clerks, general	IIIa
5860	Office Clerks, General	IIIa	5900	Office machine operators, except computer	IIIa
5900	Office Machine Operators, Except Computer	IIIa	5910	Proofreaders and copy markers	IIIa
5910	Proofreaders and Copy Markers	IIIa	5920	Statistical assistants	IIIa
5920	Statistical Assistants	IIIa	5940	Office and administrative support workers, all other	IIIa



5930	Office and Administrative Support Workers, All Other	IIIa	5940	Desktop publishers	IIIa
6000	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Workers	VIIb	6005	First-line supervisors of farming, fishing, and forestry workers	VIIb
6010	Agricultural Inspectors	VIIb	6010	Agricultural inspectors	VIIb
6020	Animal Breeders	VIIb	6040	Graders and sorters, agricultural products	VIIb
6040	Graders and Sorters, Agricultural Products	VIIb	6050	Miscellaneous agricultural workers	VIIb
6050	Miscellaneous Agricultural Workers	VIIb	6050	Animal breeders	VIIb
6100	Fishers and Related Fishing Workers	VIIb	6100	Fishers and related fishing workers	VIIb
6110	Hunters and Trappers	VIIb	6100	Hunters and trappers	VIIb
6120	Forest and Conservation Workers	VI	6120	Forest and conservation workers	VI
6130	Logging Workers	VIIa	6130	Logging workers	VIIa
6200	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Construction Trades and Extraction Workers	V	6200	First-line supervisors of construction trades and extraction workers	V
6210	Boilermakers	VI	6210	Boilermakers	VI
6220	Brickmasons, Blockmasons, and Stonemasons	VI	6220	Brickmasons, blockmasons, and stonemasons	VI
6230	Carpenters	VI	6230	Carpenters	VI
6240	Carpet, Floor, and Tile Installers and Finishers	VI	6240	Carpet, floor, and tile installers and finishers	VI
6250	Cement Masons, Concrete Finishers, and Terrazzo Workers	VIIa	6250	Cement masons, concrete finishers, and terrazzo workers	VIIa
6260	Construction Laborers	VIIa	6260	Construction laborers	VIIa
6300	Paving, Surfacing, and Tamping Equipment Operators	VIIa	6300	Paving, surfacing, and tamping equipment operators	VIIa
6310	Pile-Driver Operators	VI	6320	Operating engineers and other construction equipment operators	VI
6320	Operating Engineers and Other Construction Equipment Operators	VI	6320	Pile-driver operators	VI
6330	Drywall Installers, Ceiling Tile Installers, and Tapers	VI	6330	Drywall installers, ceiling tile installers, and tapers	VI
6350	Electricians	VI	6355	Electricians	VI
6360	Glaziers	VIIa	6360	Glaziers	VIIa
6400	Insulation Workers	VI	6400	Insulation workers	VI
6420	Painters, Construction and Maintenance	VI	6420	Painters, construction and maintenance	VI
6430	Paperhangers	VI	6430	Paperhangers	VI
6440	Pipelayers, Plumbers, Pipefitters, and Steamfitters	VI	6440	Pipelayers, plumbers, pipefitters, and steamfitters	VI
6460	Plasterers and Stucco Masons	VIIa	6460	Plasterers and stucco masons	VIIa

6500	Reinforcing Iron and Rebar Workers	VI
6510	Roofers	VIIa
6520	Sheet Metal Workers	VI
6530	Structural Iron and Steel Workers	VI
6600	Helpers, Construction Trades	VIIa
6660	Construction and Building Inspectors	V
6700	Elevator Installers and Repairers	V
6710	Fence Erectors	VIIa
6720	Hazardous Materials Removal Workers	VI
6730	Highway Maintenance Workers	VIIa
6740	Rail-Track Laying and Maintenance Equipment Operators	VIIa
6750	Septic Tank Servicers and Sewer Pipe Cleaners	VIIa
6760	Miscellaneous Construction and Related Workers	VIIa
6800	Derrick, Rotary Drill, and Service Unit Operators, Oil, Gas, and Mining	VIIa
6820	Earth Drillers, Except Oil and Gas	VIIa
6830	Explosives Workers, Ordnance Handling Experts, and Blasters	VI
6840	Mining Machine Operators	VIIa
6910	Roof Bolters, Mining	VIIa
6920	Roustabouts, Oil and Gas	VIIa
6930	Helpers--Extraction Workers	VIIa
6940	Other Extraction Workers	VIIa
7000	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Mechanics, Installers, and Repairers	V
7010	Computer, Automated Teller, and Office Machine Repairers	VI
7020	Radio and Telecommunications Equipment Installers and Repairers	V
7030	Avionics Technicians	V

6500	Reinforcing iron and rebar workers	VI
6515	Roofers	VIIa
6520	Sheet metal workers	VI
6530	Structural iron and steel workers	VI
6600	Helpers, construction trades	VIIa
6660	Construction and building inspectors	V
6700	Elevator installers and repairers	V
6710	Fence erectors	VIIa
6720	Hazardous materials removal workers	VI
6730	Highway maintenance workers	VIIa
6740	Rail-track laying and maintenance equipment operators	VIIa
6765	Septic tank servicers and sewer pipe cleaners	VIIa
6765	Miscellaneous construction and related workers	VIIa
6765	Solar photovoltaic installers	VIIa
6800	Roustabouts, oil and gas	VIIa
6800	Derrick, rotary drill, and service unit operators, oil, gas, and mining	VIIa
6820	Earth drillers, except oil and gas	VIIa
6830	Explosives workers, ordnance handling experts, and blasters	VI
6840	Mining machine operators	VIIa
6940	Helpers--extraction workers	VIIa
6940	Roof bolters, mining	VIIa
6940	Other extraction workers	VIIa
7000	First-line supervisors of mechanics, installers, and repairers	V
7010	Computer, automated teller, and office machine repairers	VI
7020	Radio and telecommunications equipment installers and repairers	V
7030	Avionics technicians	V

7040	Electric Motor, Power Tool, and Related Repairers	V	7040	Electric motor, power tool, and related repairers	V
7050	Electrical and Electronics Installers and Repairers, Transportation Equipment	V	7100	Electrical and electronics repairers, industrial and utility	V
7100	Electrical and Electronics Repairers, Industrial and Utility	V	7100	Electrical and electronics installers and repairers, transportation equipment	V
7110	Electronic Equipment Installers and Repairers, Motor Vehicles	V	7110	Electronic equipment installers and repairers, motor vehicles	V
7120	Electronic Home Entertainment Equipment Installers and Repairers	V	7120	Electronic home entertainment equipment installers and repairers	V
7130	Security and Fire Alarm Systems Installers	VI	7130	Security and fire alarm systems installers	VI
7140	Aircraft Mechanics and Service Technicians	VI	7140	Aircraft mechanics and service technicians	VI
7150	Automotive Body and Related Repairers	VIIa	7150	Automotive body and related repairers	VIIa
7160	Automotive Glass Installers and Repairers	VIIa	7160	Automotive glass installers and repairers	VIIa
7200	Automotive Service Technicians and Mechanics	VI	7200	Automotive service technicians and mechanics	VI
7210	Bus and Truck Mechanics and Diesel Engine Specialists	VI	7210	Bus and truck mechanics and diesel engine specialists	VI
7220	Heavy Vehicle and Mobile Equipment Service Technicians and Mechanics	VI	7220	Heavy vehicle and mobile equipment service technicians and mechanics	VI
7240	Small Engine Mechanics	VI	7240	Small engine mechanics	VI
7260	Miscellaneous Vehicle and Mobile Equipment Mechanics, Installers, and Repairers	VIIa	7260	Miscellaneous vehicle and mobile equipment mechanics, installers, and repairers	VIIa
7300	Control and Valve Installers and Repairers	VI	7300	Control and valve installers and repairers	VI
7310	Heating, Air Conditioning, and Refrigeration Mechanics and Installers	VI	7315	Heating, air conditioning, and refrigeration mechanics and installers	VI
7320	Home Appliance Repairers	VI	7320	Home appliance repairers	VI
7330	Industrial and Refractory Machinery Mechanics	VI	7330	Industrial and refractory machinery mechanics	VI
7340	Maintenance and Repair Workers, General	VI	7340	Maintenance and repair workers, general	VI
7350	Maintenance Workers, Machinery	VI	7350	Maintenance workers, machinery	VI
7360	Millwrights	VI	7360	Millwrights	VI
7410	Electrical Power-Line Installers and Repairers	VI	7410	Electrical power-line installers and repairers	VI
7420	Telecommunications Line Installers and Repairers	V	7420	Telecommunications line installers and repairers	V
7430	Precision Instrument and Equipment Repairers	VI	7430	Precision instrument and equipment repairers	VI

			7510	Coin, vending, and amusement machine servicers and repairers	IIIb
7510	Coin, Vending, and Amusement Machine Servicers and Repairers	IIIb	7540	Locksmiths and safe repairers	VI
7520	Commercial Divers	VI	7550	Manufactured building and mobile home installers	VI
7540	Locksmiths and Safe Repairers	VI	7560	Riggers	VIIa
7550	Manufactured Building and Mobile Home Installers	VI	7610	Helpers--installation, maintenance, and repair workers	VIIa
7560	Riggers	VIIa	7630	Other installation, maintenance, and repair workers	VI
7600	Signal and Track Switch Repairers	VI	7630	Commercial divers	VI
7610	Helpers--Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Workers	VIIa	7630	Wind turbine service technicians	VI
7620	Other Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Workers	VI	7630	Signal and track switch repairers	VI
7700	First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Production and Operating Workers	V	7700	First-line supervisors of production and operating workers	V
7710	Aircraft Structure, Surfaces, Rigging, and Systems Assemblers	VIIa	7710	Aircraft structure, surfaces, rigging, and systems assemblers	VIIa
7720	Electrical, Electronics, and Electromechanical Assemblers	VIIa	7720	Electrical, electronics, and electromechanical assemblers	VIIa
7730	Engine and Other Machine Assemblers	VIIa	7730	Engine and other machine assemblers	VIIa
7740	Structural Metal Fabricators and Fitters	VI	7740	Structural metal fabricators and fitters	VI
7750	Miscellaneous Assemblers and Fabricators	VIIa	7750	Miscellaneous assemblers and fabricators	VIIa
7800	Bakers	VIIa	7800	Bakers	VIIa
7810	Butchers and Other Meat, Poultry, and Fish Processing Workers	VIIa	7810	Butchers and other meat, poultry, and fish processing workers	VIIa
7830	Food and Tobacco Roasting, Baking, and Drying Machine Operators and Tenders	VIIa	7830	Food and tobacco roasting, baking, and drying machine operators and tenders	VIIa
7840	Food Batchmakers	VIIa	7840	Food batchmakers	VIIa
7850	Food Cooking Machine Operators and Tenders	VIIa	7850	Food cooking machine operators and tenders	VIIa
			7855	Food processing workers, all other	VIIa
7900	Computer Control Programmers and Operators	V	7900	Computer control programmers and operators	V
7920	Extruding and Drawing Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	7920	Extruding and drawing machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa

7930	Forging Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	7930	Forging machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa
7940	Rolling Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	7940	Rolling machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa
7950	Cutting, Punching, and Press Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	7950	Cutting, punching, and press machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa
7960	Drilling and Boring Machine Tool Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	7960	Drilling and boring machine tool setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa
8000	Grinding, Lapping, Polishing, and Buffing Machine Tool Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	8000	Grinding, lapping, polishing, and buffing machine tool setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa
8010	Lathe and Turning Machine Tool Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	8010	Lathe and turning machine tool setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa
8020	Milling and Planing Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VI	8030	Machinists	VI
8030	Machinists	VI	8040	Metal furnace operators, tenders, pourers, and casters	VIIa
8040	Metal Furnace and Kiln Operators and Tenders	VIIa	8060	Model makers and patternmakers, metal and plastic	VI
8060	Model Makers and Patternmakers, Metal and Plastic	VI	8100	Molders and molding machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VI
8100	Molders and Molding Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VI	8130	Tool and die makers	VI
8120	Multiple Machine Tool Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	8140	Welding, soldering, and brazing workers	VIIa
8130	Tool and Die Makers	VI	8150	Heat treating equipment setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa
8140	Welding, Soldering, and Brazing Workers	VIIa	8200	Plating and coating machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa
8150	Heat Treating Equipment Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	8210	Tool grinders, filers, and sharpeners	VIIa
8160	Lay-Out Workers, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	8220	Milling and planing machine setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa
8200	Plating and Coating Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic	VIIa	8220	Metal workers and plastic workers, all other	VIIa
8210	Tool Grinders, Filers, and Sharpeners	VIIa	8220	Layout workers, metal and plastic	VIIa


8220	Metal Workers and Plastic Workers, All Other	VIIa	8220	Multiple machine tool setters, operators, and tenders, metal and plastic	VIIa
8230	Bookbinders and Bindery Workers	VIIa			
8240	Job Printers				
8250	Prepress Technicians and Workers	VI	8250	Prepress technicians and workers	VI
8260	Printing Machine Operators	VI	8255	Printing press operators	VI
			8256	Print binding and finishing workers	VIIa
8300	Laundry and Dry-Cleaning Workers	VIIa	8300	Laundry and dry-cleaning workers	VIIa
8310	Pressers, Textile, Garment, and Related Materials	VIIa	8310	Pressers, textile, garment, and related materials	VIIa
8320	Sewing Machine Operators	VIIa	8320	Sewing machine operators	VIIa
8330	Shoe and Leather Workers and Repairers	VIIa	8330	Shoe and leather workers and repairers	VIIa
8340	Shoe Machine Operators and Tenders	VIIa	8340	Shoe machine operators and tenders	VIIa
8350	Tailors, Dressmakers, and Sewers	VI	8350	Tailors, dressmakers, and sewers	VI
8360	Textile Bleaching and Dyeing Machine Operators and Tenders	VIIa	8400	Textile bleaching and dyeing machine operators and tenders	VIIa
8400	Textile Cutting Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders	VIIa	8400	Textile cutting machine setters, operators, and tenders	VIIa
8410	Textile Knitting and Weaving Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders	VIIa	8410	Textile knitting and weaving machine setters, operators, and tenders	VIIa
8420	Textile Winding, Twisting, and Drawing Out Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders	VIIa	8420	Textile winding, twisting, and drawing out machine setters, operators, and tenders	VIIa
8430	Extruding and Forming Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Synthetic and Glass Fibers	VIIa	8450	Upholsterers	VIIa
8440	Fabric and Apparel Patternmakers	VIIa	8460	Extruding and forming machine setters, operators, and tenders, synthetic and glass fibers	VIIa
8450	Upholsterers	VIIa	8460	Textile, apparel, and furnishings workers, all other	VIIa
8460	Textile, Apparel, and Furnishings Workers, All Other	VIIa	8460	Fabric and apparel patternmakers	VIIa
8500	Cabinetmakers and Bench Carpenters	VI	8500	Cabinetmakers and bench carpenters	VI
8510	Furniture Finishers	VIIa	8510	Furniture finishers	VIIa
8520	Model Makers and Patternmakers, Wood	VI	8530	Sawing machine setters, operators, and tenders, wood	VIIa
8530	Sawing Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Wood	VIIa	8540	Woodworking machine setters, operators, and tenders, except sawing	VIIa
8540	Woodworking Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders, Except Sawing	VIIa	8550	Model makers and patternmakers, wood	VI
8550	Woodworkers, All Other	VI	8550	Woodworkers, all other	VI

8600	Power Plant Operators, Distributors, and Dispatchers	VI	8600	Power plant operators, distributors, and dispatchers	VI
8610	Stationary Engineers and Boiler Operators	VI	8610	Stationary engineers and boiler operators	VI
8620	Water and Liquid Waste Treatment Plant and System Operators	VI	8620	Water and wastewater treatment plant and system operators	VI
8630	Miscellaneous Plant and System Operators	VI	8630	Miscellaneous plant and system operators	VI
8640	Chemical Processing Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders	VIIa	8640	Chemical processing machine setters, operators, and tenders	VIIa
8650	Crushing, Grinding, Polishing, Mixing, and Blending Workers	VIIa	8650	Crushing, grinding, polishing, mixing, and blending workers	VIIa
8710	Cutting Workers	VIIa	8710	Cutting workers	VIIa
8720	Extruding, Forming, Pressing, and Compacting Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders	VIIa	8720	Extruding, forming, pressing, and compacting machine setters, operators, and tenders	VIIa
8730	Furnace, Kiln, Oven, Drier, and Kettle Operators and Tenders	VIIa	8730	Furnace, kiln, oven, drier, and kettle operators and tenders	VIIa
8740	Inspectors, Testers, Sorters, Samplers, and Weighers	VIIa	8740	Inspectors, testers, sorters, samplers, and weighers	VIIa
8750	Jewelers and Precious Stone and Metal Workers	VI	8750	Jewelers and precious stone and metal workers	VI
8760	Medical, Dental, and Ophthalmic Laboratory Technicians	VI	8760	Medical, dental, and ophthalmic laboratory technicians	VI
8800	Packaging and Filling Machine Operators and Tenders	VIIa	8800	Packaging and filling machine operators and tenders	VIIa
8810	Painting Workers	VIIa	8810	Painting workers	VIIa
8830	Photographic Process Workers and Processing Machine Operators	VIIa	8830	Photographic process workers and processing machine operators	VIIa
8840	Semiconductor Processors	VIIa	8850	Adhesive bonding machine operators and tenders	VIIa
8850	Cementing and Gluing Machine Operators and Tenders	VIIa	8860	Cleaning, washing, and metal pickling equipment operators and tenders	VIIa
8860	Cleaning, Washing, and Metal Pickling Equipment Operators and Tenders	VIIa	8910	Etchers and engravers	VI
8900	Cooling and Freezing Equipment Operators and Tenders	VIIa	8920	Molders, shapers, and casters, except metal and plastic	VI
8910	Etchers and Engravers	VI	8930	Paper goods machine setters, operators, and tenders	VIIa
8920	Molders, Shapers, and Casters, Except Metal and Plastic	VI	8940	Tire builders	VIIa

8930	Paper Goods Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders	VIIa	8950	Helpers--production workers	VIIa
8940	Tire Builders	VIIa	8965	Cooling and freezing equipment operators and tenders	VIIa
8950	Helpers--Production Workers	VIIa	8965	Production workers, all other	VIIa
8960	Production Workers, All Other	VIIa	8965	Semiconductor processors	VIIa
9000	Supervisors, Transportation and Material Moving Workers	V	9000	Supervisors of transportation and material moving workers	V
9030	Aircraft Pilots and Flight Engineers	II	9030	Aircraft pilots and flight engineers	II
9040	Air Traffic Controllers and Airfield Operations Specialists	IIIa	9040	Air traffic controllers and airfield operations specialists	IIIa
			9050	Flight attendants	IIIa
9110	Ambulance Drivers and Attendants, Except Emergency Medical Technicians	IIIb	9110	Ambulance drivers and attendants, except emergency medical technicians	IIIb
9120	Bus Drivers	IIIb	9120	Bus drivers	IIIb
9130	Driver/Sales Workers and Truck Drivers	VIIa	9130	Driver/sales workers and truck drivers	VIIa
9140	Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs	VIIa	9140	Taxi drivers and chauffeurs	VIIa
9150	Motor Vehicle Operators, All Other	VIIa	9150	Motor vehicle operators, all other	VIIa
9200	Locomotive Engineers and Operators	VI	9200	Locomotive engineers and operators	VI
9230	Railroad Brake, Signal, and Switch Operators	VI	9230	Railroad brake, signal, and switch operators	VI
9240	Railroad Conductors and Yardmasters	V	9240	Railroad conductors and yardmasters	V
9260	Subway, Streetcar, and Other Rail Transportation Workers	VI	9260	Subway, streetcar, and other rail transportation workers	VI
9300	Sailors and Marine Oilers	VI	9300	Sailors and marine oilers	VI
9310	Ship and Boat Captains and Operators	V	9300	Ship engineers	VI
9330	Ship Engineers	VI	9310	Ship and boat captains and operators	V
9340	Bridge and Lock Tenders	IIIb	9350	Parking lot attendants	IIIb
9350	Parking Lot Attendants	IIIb	9360	Automotive and watercraft service attendants	IIIb
9360	Service Station Attendants	IIIb	9410	Transportation inspectors	V
9410	Transportation Inspectors	V	9415	Transportation attendants, except flight attendants	IIIb
			9420	Other transportation workers	IIIb
9420	Other Transportation Workers	IIIb			
9500	Conveyor Operators and Tenders	VIIa	9420	Bridge and lock tenders	IIIb
9510	Crane and Tower Operators	VI	9510	Crane and tower operators	VI



9520	Dredge, Excavating, and Loading Machine Operators	<b>VIIa</b>	9520	Dredge, excavating, and loading machine operators	<b>VIIa</b>
9560	Hoist and Winch Operators	<b>VIIa</b>	9560	Hoist and winch operators	<b>VIIa</b>
9600	Industrial Truck and Tractor Operators	<b>VIIa</b>	9560	Conveyor operators and tenders	<b>VIIa</b>
9610	Cleaners of Vehicles and Equipment	<b>VIIa</b>	9600	Industrial truck and tractor operators	<b>VIIa</b>
9620	Laborers and Freight, Stock, and Material Movers, Hand	<b>VIIa</b>	9610	Cleaners of vehicles and equipment	<b>VIIa</b>
9630	Machine Feeders and Offbearers	<b>VIIa</b>	9620	Laborers and freight, stock, and material movers, hand	<b>VIIa</b>
9640	Packers and Packagers, Hand	<b>VIIa</b>	9630	Machine feeders and offbearers	<b>VIIa</b>
9650	Pumping Station Operators	<b>VIIa</b>	9640	Packers and packagers, hand	<b>VIIa</b>
9720	Refuse and Recyclable Material Collectors	<b>VIIa</b>	9650	Pumping station operators	<b>VIIa</b>
9730	Shuttle Car Operators	<b>VIIa</b>	9720	Refuse and recyclable material collectors	<b>VIIa</b>
9740	Tank Car, Truck, and Ship Loaders	<b>VIIa</b>	9750	Mine shuttle car operators	<b>VIIa</b>
9750	Material Moving Workers, All Other	<b>VIIa</b>	9750	Tank car, truck, and ship loaders	<b>VIIa</b>
			9750	Material moving workers, all other	<b>VIIa</b>
9800	Military Officer Special and Tactical Operations Leaders/Managers	<b>Military</b>	9800	Military officer special and tactical operations leaders	<b>Military</b>
9810	First-Line Enlisted Military Supervisors/Managers	<b>Military</b>	9810	First-line enlisted military supervisors	<b>Military</b>
9820	Military Enlisted Tactical Operations and Air/Weapons Specialists and Crew Members	<b>Military</b>	9820	Military enlisted tactical operations and air/weapons specialists and crew members	<b>Military</b>
9830	Military, Rank Not Specified	<b>Military</b>	9830	Military, rank not specified	<b>Military</b>



**Figure S1-A (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States, 2004-2016 (Without Weighting Adjustment to Match State Vote Totals)**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others


Line Style Legend:

— — — — — Classes I, II, and IIIa (white-collar group)

- - - - - Classes IIIb, VI, and VIIa (working-class group)

. . . . . Classes IVab and V (intermediate group)

- . . . - Classes IVc and VIIb (farmers and agricultural workers)



**Figure S1-B (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in All States, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others


Line Style Legend:

— — — — — Classes I, II, and IIIa (white-collar group)

- - - - - Classes IIIb, VI, and VIIa (working-class group)

..... Classes IVab and V (intermediate group)

- . - . - Classes IVc and VIIb (farmers and agricultural workers)



**Figures S2-A (For Comparison with Figure 2). Differences by Education Group in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States Among Respondents Not Currently Employed, 2004–2016 (Without Weighting Adjustment to Match State Vote Totals)**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites


Gray for All Others

Line Style Legend:

— Bachelor's Degree or More

- - - Some College

..... High School Diploma or Less



**Figures S2-B (For Comparison with Figure 2). Differences by Education Group in Voter Turnout in *All States* Among Respondents Not Currently Employed, 2004–2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites


Gray for All Others

Line Style Legend:

— Bachelor's Degree or More

- - - Some College

..... High School Diploma or Less




**Figure S1-EGP-I (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States for EGP Class I, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others




**Figure S1-EGP-II (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States for EGP Class II, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others




**Figure S1-EGP-IIIa (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States for EGP Class IIIa, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others






**Figure S1-EGP-IIIb (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States for EGP Class IIIb, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others




**Figure S1-EGP-VI (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States for EGP Class VI, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others




**Figure S1-EGP-VIIa (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States for EGP Class VIIa, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others




**Figure S1-EGP-IVab (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States for EGP Class IVab, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others




**Figure S1-EGP-V (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States for EGP Class V, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others




**Figure S1-EGP-IVc (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States for EGP Class IVc, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites

Gray for All Others




**Figure S1-EGP-VIIb (For Comparison with Figure 1). Class Differences in Voter Turnout in 18 Competitive States for EGP Class VIIb, 2004-2016**

Color Legend:

Red for Non-Hispanic Whites


Gray for All Others



**Figures S3 (for Comparison with Figure 3). Class Differences Among Non-Hispanic Whites in Engagement with the Political Process in 2006 and 2016, Disaggregated by EGP Class**


Color Legend:  
**Black** for 2006  
**Green** for 2016






Figures S4 (for Comparison with Figure 4). Class Differences Among Non-Hispanic Whites in Opinions on the Government's Responsibility for Addressing Inequality and Managing the Economy in 2006 and 2016, Disaggregated by EGP Class

Color Legend:  
 Black for 2006  
 Green for 2016




**Figures S5 (for Comparison with Figure 5). Class Differences Among Non-Hispanic Whites in Opinions on the Government's Responsibility for the Social Safety Net in 2006 and 2016, Disaggregated by EGP Class**

Color Legend:  
**Black** for 2006  
**Green** for 2016



**Figures S6 (for Comparison with Figure 6). Class Differences Among Non-Hispanic Whites in Racial Prejudice, Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action, and the Level of Immigration to the United States, 2004 – 2016, Disaggregated by EGP Class**

Color Legend:  
 Black for 2004 – 2014  
 Green for 2016



**Figures S7 (for Comparison with Figure 6). Class Differences Among Non-Hispanic Whites for Two Multi-Item, IRT-Scored Scales of Opposition to Affirmative Action and Racial Prejudice, by Class Group (upper two panels) and Disaggregated by EGP Class (lower two panels, 2004—2016)**

Color Legend:  
**Black** for 2004 – 2014  
**Green** for 2016

Notes: The sample is eligible voters in the 2004-2016 GSS who self-identify as non-Hispanic and white only. The four items for the scale for opposition to affirmative action are the GSS variables HELPBLK, AFFRMACT, WRKWAYUP, and DISCAFF. The eleven items for the scale for racial prejudice are INTLWHTS, INTLBLKS, LIVEWHTS, MARBLK, MARASIAN, MARHISP, RACDIF1, RACDIF2, RACDIF3, RACDIF4, and LETIN