Local Policy Recommendations for Crime Reduction

Final Report

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8/7/2019

Abstract

This is our study on crime. Crime does not pay. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

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
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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

In this report, we seek to examine and discuss determinants of crime and offer recommend actionable policy recommendations for local politicians running for election at the county level in North Carolina. For our analysis, we draw on sample data collected from a study by Cornwell and Trumball, researchers from the University of Georgia and West Virginia University. Our sample data includes data on crime rates, arrests, sentences, demographics, local weekly wages, tax revenues and more drawn from local and federal government data sources. Although the age of the data may be a potential limitation of our study, we believe the insights we gather and policy recommendations remain appropriate for local campaigns today.

Our primary question that will drive our data exploration and subsequent analysis are to ask which variables affect crime rate the most.



1.2 The Variables

The crime_v2 dataset provided includes 25 variables of interest.

We include them below for reference by category of interest.

Data Dictionary

Category	Variable
Crime Rate	crmrte
Geographic	county, west, central
Demographic	urban, density, pctmin80, pctymle
Economic - Wage	wcon, wtuc, wtrd, wfir, wser, wmfg, wfed, wsta, wloc
Economic - Revenue	taxpc
Law Enforcment	polpc, prbarr, prbconv, mix
Judicial/Sentencing	prbpris, avgsen
Time Period	year

Table 1: Data Dictionary

The variables above operationalize the conditions we wish to explore and their affects on crime rate Chiefly, these break down as follows.

• The Economic variables measures the county's economic activity and health (e.g. opportunity to pursue legal forms of income). These variables come in the form of available wages and tax revenue returned to the county.

- The Law enforcment variables measures the county's ability to utilize law enforcment policy to deter crime. Similarly, the Judicial variables also signify impact of deterence to crime.
- The Demographic variables measure the cultural variability that represent the social differences between each county, such as urban vs rural and minority populations.
- The Geographic elements are categorical. They represent they ways in which the population is segmented by geography.

2 Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA)

2.1 Data Prep and Exploration

We begin our analysis by loading the data set and performing basic checks and inspections.

```
dfCrime = read.csv("crime_v2.csv")
summary(dfCrime)
```

county	year	crmrte	prbarr
Min. : 1.0	•	in. :0.005533	Min. :0.09277
1st Qu.: 52.0	1st Qu.:87 1	st Qu.:0.020927	1st Qu.:0.20568
Median :105.0	Median:87 M	edian :0.029986	Median :0.27095
Mean :101.6		ean :0.033400	Mean :0.29492
3rd Qu.:152.0		rd Qu.:0.039642	3rd Qu.:0.34438
Max. :197.0		ax. :0.098966	Max. :1.09091
NA's :6		A's :6	NA's :6
prbconv	prbpris	avgsen	polpc
: 5	Min. :0.150) Min. :0.000746
0.588859022: 2	1st Qu.:0.364	8 1st Qu.: 7.340	1st Qu.:0.001231
: 1	Median :0.423	4 Median : 9.100	Median :0.001485
0.068376102: 1	Mean :0.410	8 Mean : 9.647	7 Mean :0.001702
0.140350997: 1	3rd Qu.:0.456	8 3rd Qu.:11.420	3rd Qu.:0.001877
0.154451996: 1	Max. :0.600	0 Max. :20.700	Max. :0.009054
(Other) :86	NA's :6	NA's :6	NA's :6
density	taxpc	west	central
Min. :0.00002	Min. : 25.	69 Min. :0.000	00 Min. :0.0000
1st Qu.:0.54741	1st Qu.: 30.	66 1st Qu.:0.000	00 1st Qu.:0.0000
Median :0.96226	Median: 34.	87 Median :0.000	00 Median :0.0000
Mean :1.42884	Mean : 38.	06 Mean :0.252	27 Mean :0.3736
3rd Qu.:1.56824	3rd Qu.: 40.	95 3rd Qu.:0.500	00 3rd Qu.:1.0000
Max. :8.82765	Max. :119.	76 Max. :1.000	00 Max. :1.0000
NA's :6	NA's :6	NA's :6	NA's :6
urban	pctmin80	wcon	wtuc
Min. :0.00000	Min. : 1.2	84 Min. :193.6	6 Min. :187.6
1st Qu.:0.00000	1st Qu.: 9.8	45 1st Qu.:250.8	3 1st Qu.:374.6
Median :0.00000	Median :24.3	12 Median :281.4	4 Median :406.5
Mean :0.08791	Mean :25.4	95 Mean :285.4	1 Mean :411.7
3rd Qu.:0.00000	3rd Qu.:38.1	42 3rd Qu.:314.8	3 3rd Qu.:443.4
Max. :1.00000	Max. :64.3	48 Max. :436.8	8 Max. :613.2
NA's :6	NA's :6	NA's :6	NA's :6
wtrd	wfir	wser	wmfg
Min. :154.2	Min. :170.9	Min. : 133.0	Min. :157.4
1st Qu.:190.9	1st Qu.:286.5	1st Qu.: 229.7	1st Qu.:288.9
Median :203.0	Median :317.3	Median : 253.2	Median :320.2
Mean :211.6	Mean :322.1	Mean : 275.6	Mean :335.6
3rd Qu.:225.1	3rd Qu.:345.4	3rd Qu.: 280.5	3rd Qu.:359.6

```
Max.
       :354.7
                         :509.5
                                          :2177.1
                                                            :646.9
                 Max.
                                  Max.
                                                    Max.
       :6
                                          :6
                                                            :6
NA's
                 NA's
                         :6
                                  NA's
                                                    NA's
     wfed
                      wsta
                                       wloc
                                                        mix
Min.
       :326.1
                 Min.
                                          :239.2
                                                           :0.01961
                         :258.3
                                  Min.
                                                   Min.
1st Qu.:400.2
                 1st Qu.:329.3
                                  1st Qu.:297.3
                                                   1st Qu.:0.08074
Median :449.8
                 Median :357.7
                                  Median :308.1
                                                   Median :0.10186
       :442.9
                 Mean
                         :357.5
                                  Mean
                                         :312.7
                                                   Mean
                                                           :0.12884
                                  3rd Qu.:329.2
3rd Qu.:478.0
                 3rd Qu.:382.6
                                                   3rd Qu.:0.15175
Max.
       :598.0
                 Max.
                         :499.6
                                  Max.
                                          :388.1
                                                   Max.
                                                           :0.46512
NA's
       :6
                 NA's
                         :6
                                  NA's
                                          :6
                                                   NA's
                                                           :6
   pctymle
Min.
       :0.06216
1st Qu.:0.07443
Median :0.07771
       :0.08396
Mean
3rd Qu.:0.08350
Max.
       :0.24871
NA's
       :6
```

First, we will remove the missing rows from the dataset.

```
nrow(dfCrime)
```

```
[1] 97
```

```
dfCrime <-na.omit(dfCrime) # omit the NA rows
nrow(dfCrime)</pre>
```

[1] 91

Next, we will inspect the data to see if there are duplicate records

dfCrime[duplicated(dfCrime),]

```
county year
                  crmrte
                           prbarr
                                       prbconv prbpris avgsen
89
      193
            87 0.0235277 0.266055 0.588859022 0.423423
                                                          5.86 0.00117887
                taxpc west central urban pctmin80
     density
                                                       wcon
89 0.8138298 28.51783
                                  0
                                        0 5.93109 285.8289 480.1948
                         1
                                 wmfg
                wfir
                                        wfed
                         wser
                                               wsta
                                                      wloc
89 268.3836 365.0196 295.9352 295.63 468.26 337.88 348.74 0.1105016
      pctymle
89 0.07819394
```

A duplicate row exists. We'll remove it.

```
dfCrime <- dfCrime[!duplicated(dfCrime),] # remove the duplicated row
```

We also saw that pbconv was coded as a level. It is not a level but a ratio. We'll change that now.

```
dfCrime$prbconv<-as.numeric(levels(dfCrime$prbconv))[dfCrime$prbconv]
```

We also notice by comparision of pctymle and pctmin80 one of the variables is off by a factor of 100. We will divide pctmin80 by 100 so the two variables are in the same unit terms.

```
dfCrime$pctmin80<-dfCrime$pctmin80/100
```

County was expressed as a number. However, it is a categorical variable and we will convert it to a factor instead.

```
dfCrime$county<-as.factor(dfCrime$county)</pre>
```

Next we inspect the indicator variables to see if they were coded correctly.

```
dfCrime %>% group_by(west, central) %>% tally()
# A tibble: 4 x 3
# Groups:
            west [2]
   west central
  <int>
          <int> <int>
1
      0
              0
                    35
2
      0
              1
                    33
3
      1
              0
                    21
4
      1
              1
                     1
dfCrime %>%
filter(west ==1 & central ==1)
  county year
                 crmrte
                           prbarr prbconv prbpris avgsen
1
      71
           87 0.0544061 0.243119 0.22959 0.379175 11.29 0.00207028
              taxpc west central urban pctmin80
   density
                                                      wcon
                                                                wtuc
1 4.834734 31.53658
                                       0 0.13315 291.4508 595.3719 240.3673
                        1
                                1
      wfir
               wser
                       wmfg
                              wfed
                                      wsta
                                             wloc
                                                         mix
                                                                pctymle
1 348.0254 295.2301 358.95 509.43 359.11 339.58 0.1018608 0.07939028
```

One county was either mis-coded (with west=1 and central=1), or it truly belongs to both regions. However, this is very unlikely as the proper coding technique is to widen the data and introduce indicator variables for each category. It is not likely that data was captured for both categories.

We will need further analysis on this datapoint to assess proper treatment options.

For now, we will encode a new region variable and place the datapoint in its own category.

We will also introduce an indicator variable for counties located in the "other" region that are not west or central

```
dfCrime$other <- ifelse((dfCrime$central ==0 & dfCrime$west ==0), 1, 0)
```

And we'll add an indicator variable to serve as complement to the urban indicator variable and call this 'nonurban'

```
dfCrime$nonurban <- ifelse((dfCrime$urban==0), 1, 0)</pre>
```


By way of the 1980 Census fact sheet, we discover the urban field is an encoding for SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas). https://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980/1980censusofpopu8011uns_bw.pdf The value is one if the county is inside a metropolitan area. Otherwise, if the county is outside a metropolitan area, the value is zero.

We create a metro factor variable to better describe this feature.


```
# create factor for SMSA (standard metropolitan statistical areas) with two levels
# (inside or outside)
    https://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980/1980censusofpopu8011uns_bw.pdf
dfCrime$metro =
            factor( dfCrime$urban , levels = 0:1 , labels =
                    c( 'Outside Metro',
                       'Inside Metro'
                   )
```

Next we will visualize each variable through boxplots and subdvide the datapoints by region.


```
#Plot of the economic and tax related variables vs crmrte
q1<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = wcon, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
q2<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = wtuc, color = regcode)) +</pre>
      geom_boxplot()
q3<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = wtrd, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
q4<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = wfir, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
q5<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = wser, color = regcode)) +
      geom boxplot()
q6<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = wmfg, color = regcode)) +
      geom boxplot()
q7<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = wfed, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
q8<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = wsta, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
q9<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = wloc, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
q10<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = taxpc, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
grid.arrange(q1, q2, ncol=2)
```



grid.arrange(q3, q4, q5, q6, ncol=2)



grid.arrange(q7, q8, q9, q10, ncol=2)



We observe a few data points of interest in the comparison above, notably, wser appears to have an extreme data point.

Other variables show outliers as well, but not as extreme. We will determine if any of these points have leverage or influence during model specification.

For now, lets dig deeper into wser as we see it is an extreme outlier from our visual inspection.

```
dfCrime %>%
filter(wser > 2000) %>%
select(county, wser)
  county  wser
1  185 2177.068
```

This average service wage is much too high based on what we know about the 1980s and every other wage recorded in comparison. A review of the detailed population statistics describing mean wage per industry (table 231) confirms this. https://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980/1980censusofpopu801352uns_bw.pdf

Outliers affect our ability to estimate statistics, resulting in overestimated or underestimated values. Outliers can be due to a number of different factors such as response errors and data entry errors. Outliers will introduce bias into our estimates and are addressed during the analysis phase. The mechanism for treatment include three approaches

- 1 Trimming remove outliers from the dataset based on a maxima or minima from the mean.
- 2 Winsorization replace extreme values so they fall at the edge of the main distribution
- 3 Imputation recode outliers by calculating the mean of the sample, or by applying a regression model approach to predict the missing value

Trimming will remove the entire record. This is not an preferred treatment as we will lose valuable information..

Winsorization is a symmetric process that will replace *all* of the smallest and largest data values in the sample. This is not a preferred treatment as we will again lose valuable information, especially when we only seek to replace values that are a result of a coding error.

Imputation recodes the data point using a predictive model derived from the remainder of the sample data points. Multiple imputations are performed to account for uncertainty, and each imputed data set is analyzed for its distribution. Then, the mean, mode or median can be chosen from this distribution as the replacement.

We favor the imputation method as we do not wish to apply Winsorization to our data set wholistically, nor do we wish to remove the entire observation and lose its contribution to other variables. Fortunately, a number of packages are available in R that predict this value through regression against the existing sample data. A commonly used imputation library can be found in the Hmisc package which we will use for our outlier treatment.


A full discussion of treatment methods can be found here: http://www.asasrms.org/Proceedings/y2004/files/Jsm2004-000559.pdf


Finally, we should make note that none of these methods are ideal. We would be better suited to discover the nature of the mistake and recode it from real data. Since we do not have access to the underlying data from which this sample set was derived we are not in the position to do that. Thus we continue our analysis.

```
133.0430603 172.4732666 182.0196228 192.3076935 196.1453247 209.6972198
         10
                       2
                                    1
                                                1
                                                             1
219.6342773\ 221.3903351\ 230.4980621\ 232.5915985\ 245.2060852
                                    1
                       1
                                                1
                                                             1
246.0152435 250.8361206 257.3344421 259.3390503 266.4674072 270.4866028
                                    1
                                                1
          1
                       1
                                                             1
                                                                          1
274.1774597 276.2629089 318.0335388 318.3635254
         67
                                    1
                       1
                                                1
```


Note from the distribution above we see a mode appear from the multiple imputation trials. One may argue that taking the mode is sufficient for replacement. Taking a mode would be required if this were a categorical value we were replacing. However, in this circumstance and to err on the side of caution, we will reassign this value by taking the mean from the trials.

```
dfCrime$wser[which(dfCrime$county==185)]<-mean(impute_arg$imputed$wser)</pre>
print("Newly Reassigned wser Value for County 185:")
[1] "Newly Reassigned wser Value for County 185:"
dfCrime$wser[which(dfCrime$county==185)]
[1] 254.6631
Next, we will examine the criminal justice variables.
#Plot of the criminal justice and law enforcment related variables vs crmrte
q1<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = prbarr, color = regcode)) +</pre>
      geom_boxplot()
q2<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = prbconv, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
q3<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = prbpris, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
q4<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = avgsen, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
q5<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = polpc, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
q6<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = mix, color = regcode)) +
      geom_boxplot()
```





grid.arrange(q3, q4, q5, q6, ncol=2)



The criminal justice and law enforcement variables show evidence of outliers, notably, pbarr and polpc appear to have extreme data points.

Upon further inspection, the extreme outlier value for polpc is .009. Based on records describing the US population on police officers per capita, the highest police per capita on record for United States counties is .007 in Atlantic City, NJ. https://www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/police-officers-per-capita-rates-employment-for-city-departments.html This datapoint is an error and we will impute it's replacement.

paste("R-squares for Predicting Non-Missing Values for Each Variable")

[1] "R-squares for Predicting Non-Missing Values for Each Variable" $impute_arg\$rsq$

polpc 0.9425164

paste("Predicted values")

[1] "Predicted values"

```
mean(impute_arg$imputed$polpc)
```

[1] 0.00243761


We will reassign this value using the mean from the trials.


dfCrime\$polpc[which(dfCrime\$county==115)]<-mean(impute_arg\$imputed\$polpc)</pre>

Our analysis into the demographic data is next.


#plot of demographic information for counties Outside and Inside the metro areas
population density, percent minority, percent young male

```
ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = density, color = regcode)) +
    geom_boxplot() + facet_wrap(~ metro)
```





ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(y = pctymle, color = regcode)) +
 geom_boxplot() + facet_wrap(~ metro)



Notably more outliers are observed in demographic information. Here, pctymle in one county outside of a metro area is nearly 25%. That seems quite high in normal statistical measures of the population. However, this can be explained as being county with a large college town population. Specifically, Appalachian State University in Watauga County (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watauga_County,_North_Carolina), where the presense of the university notably affects the overall age distribution and median age. This is further confirmed in county estimate records here: https://www.osbm.nc.gov/demog/county-estimates.

Finally, we can see our CW encoded county and where it appears in population density. It is clearly not an outside metro county. In addition to being improperly coded for both western and central regions it appears to be miscoded for its metro characteristics as well.

We will address the metro variable, and examine whether the region should be 'west', 'central' or 'other' instead of both central and west

```
dfCrime %>%
#filter(west ==1 & central ==1) %>%
filter(density > 2.5) %>%
select(county, west, central, other, urban, region, regcode, metro)
   county west central other urban region regcode
                                                               metro
1
       21
              1
                       0
                             0
                                                 West
                                                       Inside Metro
2
       25
              0
                             0
                                    0
                                            2 Central Outside Metro
                       1
3
       35
                                    0
              0
                       1
                             0
                                             Central Outside Metro
4
       51
              0
                       0
                             1
                                    1
                                            0
                                                Other
                                                       Inside Metro
5
       63
              0
                       1
                             0
                                    1
                                           2 Central
                                                       Inside Metro
6
       67
              0
                       1
                             0
                                    1
                                             Central
                                                        Inside Metro
7
       71
                             0
                                    0
                                            3
                                                   CW Outside Metro
              1
                       1
                                           2 Central
8
       81
              0
                       1
                             0
                                    1
                                                       Inside Metro
```


```
9
      119
                            0
                                  1
                                          2 Central Inside Metro
10
      129
             0
                      0
                                              Other Inside Metro
                            1
                                   1
      183
11
                                          2 Central Inside Metro
dfCrime$west[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<-NA
dfCrime$central[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<-NA
dfCrime$other[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<-NA
dfCrime$urban[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<-NA
impute_arg <- aregImpute(~ crmrte + urban + central + west +</pre>
                          prbarr + prbconv + prbpris + avgsen + polpc +
                          density + taxpc + pctmin80 + wcon + wtuc +
                          wtrd + wfir + wser + wmfg + wfed + wsta + wloc +
                          mix + pctymle, data = dfCrime, match="weighted",
                          nk=3, B=10, n.impute = 100)
paste("R-squares for Predicting Non-Missing Values for Each Variable")
[1] "R-squares for Predicting Non-Missing Values for Each Variable"
impute arg$rsq
    urban
            central
                          west
0.9845212 0.8330772 0.9232614
paste("Predicted values")
[1] "Predicted values"
Mode(impute arg$imputed$urban)
[1] 1
Mode(impute_arg$imputed$central)
[1] 1
Mode(impute_arg$imputed$west)
[1] 0
The results confirm the county is urban. It is also highly probable that county 71 is not west and most likely
associated with central. After correcting our data for urban and west, let's compare 'central' with 'other' to
be certain we have the right region.
dfCrime$urban[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<-Mode(impute_arg$imputed$urban)</pre>
dfCrime$nonurban[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<-1-Mode(impute arg$imputed$urban)
dfCrime$west[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<-Mode(impute_arg$imputed$west)</pre>
dfCrime$metro[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<-'Inside Metro'</pre>
impute_arg <- aregImpute(~ crmrte + central + other +</pre>
                          prbarr + prbconv + prbpris + avgsen + polpc +
                          density + taxpc + pctmin80 + wcon + wtuc +
                          wtrd + wfir + wser + wmfg + wfed + wsta + wloc +
                          mix + pctymle, data = dfCrime, match="weighted",
                          nk=3, B=10, n.impute = 100)
paste("R-squares for Predicting Non-Missing Values for Each Variable")
[1] "R-squares for Predicting Non-Missing Values for Each Variable"
impute_arg$rsq
```

```
central other
0.9583136 0.9353917
paste("Predicted values")
[1] "Predicted values"
Mode(impute_arg$imputed$other)
[1] 0
```

We show with high degree of certainty that the county is not 'other'. The case for central is high. Since the county is not western and not other it is central by process of elimination, and the Hmisc algorithm bolsters that suggestion. We'll assign our new values.

```
dfCrime$other[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<-Mode(impute_arg$imputed$other)
dfCrime$central[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<-1-Mode(impute_arg$imputed$other)
dfCrime$region[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<- 2 #Central
dfCrime$regcode[which(dfCrime$county==71)]<- 'Central'</pre>
```

We also wish to examine the density variable in more detail by looking at its distribution.




We note that one of the counties has an extremely low density. Near zero.

```
dfCrime %>%
filter(density < 0.01)</pre>
```

```
crmrte prbarr prbconv prbpris avgsen
  county year
          87 0.0139937 0.530435 0.327869
                                             0.15
                                                      6.64 0.00316379
      density
                 taxpc west central urban pctmin80
1 2.03422e-05 37.72702
                                   0
                                          0 0.253914 231.696 213.6752
                           1
      wt.rd
              wfir
                        wser
                               wmfg
                                     wfed
                                             wsta
                                                     wloc
1 175.1604 267.094 204.3792 193.01 334.44 414.68 304.32 0.4197531
     pctymle region regcode other nonurban
                                                     metro
1 0.07462687
                   1
                        West
                                 0
                                           1 Outside Metro
In review of the North Carolina county density data from 1985, the smallest population density in any county
in North Carolina is 0.0952. http://ncosbm.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/demog/dens7095.xls
This makes the density of 0.0000203422 (ie. average of \sim 2.0 people per 10,000 square miles) for county 173
statistically impossible. It is miscoded.
dfCrime$density[which(dfCrime$county==173)]<- NA
#dfSubset <- we will use the non-urban western counties
impute_arg <- aregImpute(~ crmrte +</pre>
                          prbarr + prbconv + prbpris + avgsen + polpc +
                          density + taxpc + pctmin80 + wcon + wtuc +
                          wtrd + wfir + wser + wmfg + wfed + wsta + wloc +
                          mix + pctymle, data = dfCrime %>% filter(urban==0 & west ==1),
                          match="weighted", nk=3, B=10, n.impute = 30)
paste("R-squares for Predicting Non-Missing Values for Each Variable")
[1] "R-squares for Predicting Non-Missing Values for Each Variable"
impute_arg$rsq
density
paste("Predicted values")
[1] "Predicted values"
mean(impute_arg$imputed$density)
[1] 0.4353036
We will reassign this value using the mean from the trials.
dfCrime$density[which(dfCrime$county==173)]<-mean(impute_arg$imputed$density)
With our variables transformed, we now turn to discussion on collinearity and multicollinearity in our data
set. To facilitate the discussion we'll draw reference to a network plot.
options(repr.plot.width=6, repr.plot.height=6)
myData<-dfCrime
myData <-myData[, c("crmrte", "west", "central", "other", "urban", "prbarr", "prbconv", "prbpris", "avgs
           "pctmin80", "wcon", "wtuc", "wtrd", "wfir", "wser", "wmfg", "wfed", "wsta", "wloc",
           "mix", "pctymle", "density")]
plot<-myData %>% correlate() %>% network_plot(min_cor=.2)
Correlation method: 'pearson'
Missing treated using: 'pairwise.complete.obs'
```

Network plot for Correlation Study



Correlations Among Variables

First, we note the general proximity of variables with one another. Variables that are clustered together represent the overall magnitude of their correlations. In fact, the cluster of the wage variables are an indication of very tight correlation. Only state wages fall outside this group. The telecom and utlity wage variable, while still near the cluster, show a little relationship. We also see the wage variables are positively correlated with our crime outcome variable. Density also positively correlates with wage and the crime rate variable. Urban correlates with wage, but suprisingly the correlation between crime and urban is not as high.

Next, we notice the Law enforcement and Judicial variables are clustered and have a negative correlation with our outcome variable on crime. We also see they tend to be negatively correlated among one another. For example, probability of conviction is slightly negatively correlated with the probability of arrest, and both are negatively correlated with our outcome variable. We also see that police per capita and tax per capita are positively correlated with another. This makes sense as the more revenues collected the higher the ability to pay for law enforcement and protection. Both are also positively correlated with our outcome variable on crime. We also notice that percent young male has a positive correlation with crime rate. A possible explanation for this is that more crimes are committed by younger men as a whole. We also note that the state wage variable is in nearby proximity.

The mix variable is an odd one. It is possitively correlated with probability of arrests, negatively correlated with probability of convictions, and negatively correlated with service and manufacturing wages. It also has a slight positive correlation with the state wage variable and seems to be clustered with it.

Last, we turn to our region variables and notice the high negative correlation of the minority variable with the western region dummy variable. We also notice a high positive correlation of minorities with the 'other' (coastal) dummy variable. The pctmin80 variable also correlates positively with crime rate, although the two are not clustered. We especially note that west is negatively correlated with crime rate. There appears to be a lessor propensity for crime in this region, or perhaps a lack of sufficient means to detect it. For a futher examination of correlation plots for each of the regions please see the network diagrams in the appendix.

2.2 Additional Variables to Operationalize

As a final point of discussion we will identify variables we wish to operationalize for use in our models. We will include a variable that expresses the economic condition of the county and a variable that expresses criminal justice effectiveness.

The first variable on the economic condition will include the sum of all average weekly wages from the 1980 census information. Since we do not know how many were employed at that wage we use this summary the best available proxy. Additionally, we will scale this wage variable by 9 to highlight indication of industry diversity within a county.

As a second variable, we are interested in understanding the effectiveness of the criminal justice system as a crime deterrent. Our proxy will be the number of convictions per incident.

This is operationalized by taking the probability of arrests, pbrarr (which is defined as arrests per incident) and multiplying by the probability of convictions, pbrconv (which is defined as convictions per arrest). The new variable is defined below.

```
dfCrime$crimJustEff<-dfCrime$prbarr * dfCrime$prbconv</pre>
```


We will also create a logarithmic transformation of this variable based on our histogram analysis from before.

```
dfCrime$logcrimJustEff<-log(dfCrime$crimJustEff)</pre>
```

2.3 Summary and Results

Our outcome variable is the *crime rate* ("crmrte"), which is defined as the crimes committed per person in a specific county during 1987. The crime rate of the 90 counties in our sample dataset range between 0.0055 - 0.0990, with a mean of 0.0335.

From the boxplot below, most of the counties have a crime rate between 0.0055 and 0.0700, with 5 outliers having a crime rate > 0.0700.



While mix (the type of crime committed) is also potentially an outcome variable, our research focuses on providing policy recommendations to reduce crime in general and not a specific type of crime. Mix is also not a linear outcome and hence difficult to measure.

We propose 3 multiple linear regression models

- First Model: Has only the explanatory variables of key interest and no other covariates.
- Second Model: Includes the explanatory variables and covariates that increase the accuracy of our results without substantial bias.
- Third Model: An expansion of the second model with most covariates, designed to demonstrate the robustness of our results to model specification.

3 Model Analysis

3.1 Model 1

3.1.1 Introduction

Our base hypothesis is that county level crime can be fundamentally explained by three factors in county: regional variations, the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and economic conditions.

• Criminal Justice Effectiveness

Criminal Justice Effectiveness is an abstract concept that is operationalized by comparing the number of crimes to convictions. To track crimes, they must be reported to police, who can then make arrests. Then, the legal system provides judgement in the form of convictions and sentencing. Besides removing some criminals from society, criminal justice can serve as deterrent, as the probability of getting caught, convicted, sentenced could discourage some would be criminals from committing crimes.

We operationalize criminal justice effectiveness as (probability of Convictions * Crimes committed). We define this as: prbconv * prbarr = conv/arrest * arrest/crime = convictions/crime. Without more granular data, this provides a single parsimonious metric that helps understand how well the law enforcement and criminal justice system works.

• Region

Region is easily identified as possible factor for predicting crime as seen from our initial EDA in the Introduction. It would be expected that cultural, econocomic, government, geographic, and demographic profiles among other important variables would vary across the regions. Without the ability to measure and operationalize these variables, region offers a solid standin.

• Economic Conditions

Finally, we theorize that the third major cause of crime are economic conditions. We would expect that as someone's economic success and opportunity increases their propensity to commit crime is lowered. And similarly when there are worse economic conditions, crime would increase due to lack of means, lack of occupation or boredom. This also means that individuals have less to look forward to and are willing to risk their freedom or endanger themselves.


We operationalize economic conditions by looking at wages. For this base, parsimonious model, we define this as the unweighted average weekly pay from each sector provided in the data set. We think this is best proxy from our data because it answers all of the above (higher wages leads to better means and better opportunities). From our EDA we also confirm that in general these sums are not skewed by having one really high paying sector in each county as we see a strong relationship between average quartile across all job types and unweighted sector average wage.

3.1.2 Model 1 EDA

Data Transformations: Criminal Justice Effectiveness

First we look at the components of the Criminal Justice Effectiveness: Probability of arrest and Probability of conviction.

```
p1 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = prbarr, color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
    geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
    labs(title="Probability of Arrest", x="Arrest per Crime", y="Count")
p2 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = prbconv, color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
    geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
    labs(title="Probability of Conviction", x="Conviction per Arrest", y="Count")
grid.arrange(p2, p1, ncol=2)</pre>
```




The distribution of both probability of conviction and probability of arrest are skewed right. It could be argued that both of these variables should be bound between 0 and 1. However, these "probabilities" are proxied by ratios. It is in fact possible (and perhaps common) that defendents are charged with multiple crimes and convicted, but were only arrested once. For this reason we will not consider outliers in this variable.

For "probability" of arrest, it could be possible there are multiple arrests for a single crime. However, the single data point that is greater than one, is >5 standard deviations away from the distribution. Since this value falls so far out of distribution, it will have high leverage on our model and will be preemptively imputed as the data supplied is likely in error and is not representative of the bulk of North Carolina counties.

```
# County number of outlier
(dfCrime$county[dfCrime$crimJustEff > 1])
[1] 115
90 Levels: 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 33 35 37 39 41 45 ... 197
# how many standard deviations away the outlier lies
(dfCrime[dfCrime$crimJustEff > 1,]$prbarr - mean(dfCrime$prbarr))/sd(dfCrime$prbarr)
[1] 5.779438
```

We will use the imputation method to replace the large prbarr value and remove the outlier effect, while also retaining the rest of the variables in the county.


```
wtrd + wfir + wser + wmfg + wfed + wsta + wloc +
                          mix + pctymle, data = dfCrime, match="weighted",
                          nk=3, B=10, n.impute = 100)
paste("R-squares for Predicting Non-Missing Values for Each Variable")
[1] "R-squares for Predicting Non-Missing Values for Each Variable"
impute_arg$rsq
   prbarr
0.9344601
paste("Predicted values")
[1] "Predicted values"
mean(impute_arg$imputed$prbarr)
[1] 0.3274832
We will reassign this value using the mean from the trials.
dfCrime$prbarr[which(dfCrime$county==115)]<-mean(impute_arg$imputed$prbarr)</pre>
With the outlier imputed, the Criminal Justice Effectiveness can be constructed as described above, and a
histogram can show how log transformation improves normality. Also, by log transforming we can understand
the resulting coefficient as a percent change in the ratio of Criminal Justice Effectiveness (convictions/crime).
dfCrime$crimJustEff<-dfCrime$prbarr * dfCrime$prbconv</pre>
dfCrime$logcrimJustEff<-log(dfCrime$crimJustEff)</pre>
dfCrime$logcrmrte <- log(dfCrime$crmrte)</pre>
options(repr.plot.width=4, repr.plot.height=4)
p1 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = crimJustEff, color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
  geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
  labs(title="Criminal Justice Effectiveness", x="Convictions per Crime", y="Count")
p2 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = logcrimJustEff, color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
  geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
  labs(title="log(Criminal Justice Effectiveness)", x="log(Convictions per Crime)", y="Count")
grid.arrange(p1, p2, ncol=2)
```



Data Transformations: Unweighted Average of Sector Wages


Now we turn our attention to the economic variable, unweighted average wage of all provided sectors. The wages trend together well, so there is limited information lost when combining them into one variable. This can be seen by plotting quartiles of each wage against the unweighted average and observing a relatively linear response.

plot(dfCrime\$scaledWages,dfWage\$qAvg)




We will again modify this variable with a log transformation for better interpretation. This allows us to interpret percent changes in wage which is more consistent across a range of wages. The result is a relatively normal distribution as seen in the below histogram. There exists a small "second mode" for the Central region, but this is not very concerning.

```
dfCrime$logScaledWages <- log(dfCrime$scaledWages)
p1 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = logScaledWages, color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
    geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
    labs(title="log(Scaled Wages)", x="log(Scaled Wages)", y="Count")
p1</pre>
```



Interestingly, when viewing the wage data plotted against crime rate (below). We see that there is a positive correlation between wages and crime. In model 1, we will see if this holds when taking into account the effect of Criminal Justice Effectiveness and discuss some possible causes.




Data Transformations: Regions

Regions will be used as explained in the EDA section. No transformations are necessary.

Data Transformations: Crime Rate

Our dependent variable is crime. Operationalized it is given as a rate of crimes per capita. We will apply a log transform for two reasons. First, since this value tends to be small (<.1), the log transform gives us a much better range away from zero, and limits the effect of high crime counties from exerting large leverage on our model. Second, the log transform allows us talk about relative percentage changes in crime rate for the counties. This allows changes in crime rate to be reported in percent which is relevant to all counties, irrespective of their current staus as low or high crime counties. In the below histograms, the improved normality is also observed in the log transformed variable.

```
dfCrime$logcrmrte <- log(dfCrime$crmrte)
options(repr.plot.width=4, repr.plot.height=4)
p1 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = crmrte, color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
    geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
    labs(title="Crime Rate", x="Crimes per Capita", y="Count")
p2 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = logcrmrte, color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
    geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
    labs(title="log(Crime Rate)", x="log(Crimes per capita)", y="Count")
grid.arrange(p1, p2, ncol=2)</pre>
```



3.1.3 Model 1 Linear Model

```
log(CrimeRate) = B_0 + B_1 log(UnweightedAverageWage) + B_2 log(CriminalJusticeEffectiveness) + B_3 West + B_4 Central \\ \#dfCrime\$unweighted\_avg\_wage <- dfCrime\$scaledWages/9 \\ mod1 <- lm(logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + regcode, data=dfCrime) \\ mod1 \# Coefficients
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + regcode,
    data = dfCrime)
```

Coefficients:

```
(Intercept) logScaledWages logcrimJustEff regcodeWest -15.8310 1.9939 -0.4795 -0.5919 regcodeCentral
```

summary(mod1)\$adj.r.square # Adjusted R^2 value.


[1] 0.6330099

Cook's Distance (Leverage/Influence) Analysis

None of the points approach a cook's distance of concern. Some of the higher leveraged points do trend towards larger negative residuals. This suggests that our model might not be capturing a phenomenon at more extreme values of the regressors. For an initial model there is nothing of major concern.

```
plot(mod1, which=5) # Variance Inflation Factor
```

Residuals vs Leverage



Model 1 CLM Assumptions:

* MLR1 Linear in parameters: The model has had its data transformed as described above to allow a linear fit of the model.

- MLR2 Random Sampling: The data is collected from a data set with rolled up data for each county. We cannot comment on the randomness of the samples, though nearly all counties are represented in North Carolina.
- MLR3 No perfect multicollinearity: None of the variables chosen for the model are constant or perfectly collinear as the economy and criminal justice effectiveness are independent. Our low VIF value shows very little colinearity, as would be expected from the diverse and limited variables included in the model.


vif(mod1) # Variance Inflation Factor

```
GVIF Df GVIF^(1/(2*Df))
logScaledWages 1.206814 1 1.098551
logcrimJustEff 1.048306 1 1.023868
regcode 1.171959 2 1.040466
```

- MLR4' The expectation of u is 0. This is difficult to prove in a data set like this one. It is possible that there are serious bias issues in the way crimes are reported and wages are recorded. However, if one agrees that the data has integrity and that the basic model presented for predicting crime rate is acceptable, then exogeneity can be accepted.
- MLR4 The zero conditional mean assumption is well supported when viewing the Residuals vs fitted plot. The spline fit is nearly flat and centered very close to zero.

plot(mod1, which=1)

Residuals vs Fitted



Fitted values
Im(logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + regcode)

• MLR5 There does appear to be heteroskedacity in the 'lips' appearance of the Residuals vs fitted plot. A Breusch-Pagan test shows that there is not heteroskedacity. However, to be conservative, we will proceed with heteroskedastic robust errors.

```
bptest(mod1)
##
##
    studentized Breusch-Pagan test
##
## data: mod1
## BP = 4.933, df = 4, p-value = 0.2942
coeftest(mod1, vcov=vcovHC) #coefficients with heteroskedastic consistent standard errors
##
## t test of coefficients:
##
##
                   Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
## (Intercept)
                  -15.83098
                               2.67683 -5.9141 6.776e-08 ***
## logScaledWages
                    1.99386
                               0.48984 4.0704 0.0001047 ***
## logcrimJustEff
                   -0.47954
                               0.10478 -4.5764 1.600e-05 ***
                               0.10226 -5.7881 1.162e-07 ***
## regcodeWest
                   -0.59188
## regcodeCentral
                   -0.24266
                                0.08128 -2.9855 0.0036976 **
##
                   0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
## Signif. codes:
```


• MLR6 The final assumption of linear regression is that the errors are normally distributed. This appears to hold for the bulk of the residuals however there is skewness on the tails. This non-normality

is also reflected in the significant return on the shapiro test. Our high sample size allows us to leverage the Central Limit Theorem and assume normally distributed errors.

```
shapiro.test(mod1$residuals) # test for normality
```

```
Shapiro-Wilk normality test
```

```
data: mod1$residuals
W = 0.95918, p-value = 0.006445
plot(mod1, which=2) # QQ plot for residuals
```



3.1.4 Model 1 Interpretation

The model 1 gives estimates and standard errors that are heteroskedastic consistent. All the coefficients are found to be statistically significant. The coefficient of the log of unweighted average wage is calculated to be ~2. This means that an increase of 1% in wages is correlated with an increase of 2% in crime rate. Generally an individuals increased wages are not associated with increased crime. This suggests that wages are correlated with a stronger omitted variable that affects crime. One aspect that may be missed is the economic inequality in the county. Averages are easily affected by extreme values. It is possible that there are very high earners that can influence a sector's average wage, but don't represent the bulk of workers. Further, there is no understanding of the weighting for each sector. For example, one sector, like telecom, may have high wages in a county but not have very many workers; further demonstrating inequality. This detail is missed when each sector is rolled up into a single average and then averaged with all other sector averages. However, the significant result of wage on crime suggests that we are capturing some cause of crime that is correlated to wages. We will continue to monitor how wage changes as a predictor when introducing more regressors in subsequent models.

Criminal justice effectiveness (convictions/crime) is given a coefficient of -0.5 which suggests that an increase of 1% increase in convictions per crime will decrease crime by nearly .5%. This suggests that we have found a relatively strong correlation and constructed a good operationalization of a county's criminal justice effect on crime rate. This variable will be monitored as we add more regressors.

Region dummy variables of West and Central are both significant. This suggests that regionally, there are differences that are not captured by the Wages and Criminal Justice Effectiveness variable that affect crime. While the West and Central regions both have lower crime than the Coastal/Other region, the West is much more pronounced with a value of -0.6. This suggests that when correcting for differences in Criminal Justice Effectiveness and Wages, the west will still have crime rate lower by about 60%.

Overall, the model shows a moderately good fit, with an adjusted R square of 0.63. This can be interpreted as: the model explains 63% of the variation in crime. In the next model we will try to improve our operationalization of economics and criminal justice by investigating police per capita and tax revenue per capita.

3.2 Model 2

3.2.1 Introduction

In this model, we introduce the additional covariates of tax per capita (taxpc) and police per capita (polpc) to give us more insight into our economic related variables.

• Police Per Capitas

The Police Per Capita in a county can be influential on the Criminal Justice Effectiveness. With more police in a given area, one would assume that crime rates would decrease, however, as we mentioned earlier in our report, polpc has a negative correlation with crmrte. Including this variable in our analysis will give us more insight into the variables used in model 1.

• Tax Per Capita

The Tax Per Capita can have a direct impact on the Police Per Capita. A higher tax per capita, means that the county has more tax dollars to spend on public services like the police force (ie. increasing the number of police in the county). This positive correlation relationship can be seen in our prior introductory data analysis.

 $logcrmrte = \beta_0 + \beta_1 log(UnweightedAverageWage) + \beta_2 log(CriminalJusticeEffectiveness) + \beta_3 log(PolicePerCapita) *WeightedAverageWage) + \beta_2 log(CriminalJusticeEffectiveness) + \beta_3 log(PolicePerCapita) *WeightedAverageWage) + \beta_3 + \beta_3 log(PolicePerCapita) *WeightedAverage Wage) + \beta_3 log(PolicePerCapita) *WeightedAverage Wage) + \beta_3 l$

3.2.2 Model 2 EDA and Data Transformations

Before we create our model, we will analyze each of the additional variables to see if transformations are needed.

To start, we will look at the polpc variable:

```
p1 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = polpc, color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
    geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
    labs(title="Police per Capita", x="Police per Capita", y="Count")
p2 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = log(polpc), color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
    geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
    labs(title="Log Transformed Police per Capita", x="Log(Police per Capita)", y="Count")
grid.arrange(p1, p2, ncol=2)</pre>
```




As we can see from the histograms above, taking the natural log of polpc brings its distribution closer to normal. As a result, we will use the log(polpc) in our analysis.

```
# creating the logpolpc variable
dfCrime$logpolpc <- log(dfCrime$polpc)</pre>
```

Next, we will take a look at our taxpc variable to see if a trasformation is warranted:


```
p1 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = taxpc, color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
    geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
    labs(title="Tax revenue per capita", x="Tax revenue per Capita", y="Count")
p2 <- ggplot(dfCrime, aes(x = log(taxpc), color=regcode, fill = regcode)) +
    geom_histogram(position="identity", alpha=0.5, bins=30) +
    labs(title="Log Transformed Tax revenue per Capita", x="Log(Tax revenue per Capita)", y="Count")
grid.arrange(p1, p2, ncol=2)</pre>
```



The histogram of taxpc, depicts each region as having an approximately normal distribution with each cenetred on a different mean. When we take the natural log of taxpc, we can see in the histogram, above, that each region has a more normal distribution. In addition, taking the natural log of taxpc reduces the extremity of the outlier seen in histogram of taxpc. As a result, we will use the log(taxpc) in our analysis.

dfCrime\$logtaxpc <- log(dfCrime\$taxpc)</pre>

Now that we have transformed the two variables we are adding to model two, we will take a look at how logtaxpc and logpolpc relate to logcrmrate and if these trends vary between each regcode.



Right away, we can see clear difference between each regions' logpolpc regression on logcrmerte."Other" and "Central" regions have positively sloped regression lines, while "West" has a negatively sloped regression line. This suggests that we should investigate the interactions between logpolpc and region (regcode) in our model.

logtaxpc to logcrmrte, on the other hand, does not demonstrate this regression slope variation between each regions. As result, we will not look into the interactions between logtaxpc and region in our model.

3.2.3 Model 2 Linear Model

```
logcrmrte = \beta_0 + \beta_1 logScaledWages + \beta_2 logcrimJustEff + \beta_3 logpolpc * regcode + \beta_4 logtaxpc + u model2 <- lm(logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + logpolpc*regcode + logtaxpc, data = dfCrime) model2
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + logpolpc *
regcode + logtaxpc, data = dfCrime)
```

Coefficients:


${ t logcrimJustEff}$	${ t logScaledWages}$	(Intercept)
-0.4235	1.1909	-6.8885
${\tt regcodeCentral}$	regcodeWest	logpolpc
1.0017	-5.7593	0.5633
logpolpc:regcodeCentral	logpolpc:regcodeWest	logtaxpc
0.1857	-0.7946	-0.1524

summary(model2)\$adj.r.square

[1] 0.6982419

From the Residuals vs Leverage graph, below, we can see that our model does not contain any outliers with have significant influence (ie. there are no points with a Cook's distance of 0.5 or greater).

plot(model2, which=5)



Im(logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + logpolpc * regcode + logta ...

Model 2 CLM Assumptions:

- MLR1 Discussed above.
- MLR2 Discussed above.
- MLR3: Non-perfect Collinearity We will use the VIF function to provide evidence that our variables in model2 are not perfectly multicollinear. As we can see from the VIF results, below, all of the variables' values are less than five, which allows us to conclude model2 is free from multicollinearity.


vif(model2)

```
##
                             GVIF Df GVIF^(1/(2*Df))
## logScaledWages
                     1.585675e+00
                                             1.259236
## logcrimJustEff
                     1.213546e+00
                                             1.101611
## logpolpc
                     3.163076e+00
                                             1.778504
## regcode
                     1.973196e+05
                                   2
                                            21.076212
## logtaxpc
                     1.436382e+00
                                             1.198492
## logpolpc:regcode 1.945745e+05
                                            21.002523
```

• MLR4: Zero Conditional Mean The residual vs. fitted chart, below, gives us evidence that we meet the zero conditional mean assumption as the majority of the residual means lie close to zero. The exceptions to this trend, lie on the left and right sides of the chart where there are fewer data points

(evidence for heteroscedasticity - see MLR5, below).

plot(model2, which=1)



Fitted values
Im(logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + logpolpc * regcode + logta ...

• MLR5: Homoscedasticity The above Residuals vs Fitted graph provides evidence of heteroscedasticity as right and left sides of the chart have fewer datepoints. To provide further evidence of heteroscedasticity, we will use the White-Huber test with the vcovHC method to generate coefficients that are robust to heteroscedasticity

coeftest(model2, vcov=vcovHC)

t test of coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
                        -6.88847
                                     3.59964 -1.9137 0.0591966 .
logScaledWages
                         1.19092
                                     0.47517
                                              2.5063 0.0142012 *
logcrimJustEff
                        -0.42353
                                     0.10738 -3.9443 0.0001693 ***
logpolpc
                         0.56325
                                     0.25341
                                             2.2227 0.0290253 *
regcodeWest
                        -5.75931
                                     2.91655 -1.9747 0.0517090 .
regcodeCentral
                                             0.6984 0.4869475
                         1.00167
                                     1.43430
logtaxpc
                                    0.19070 -0.7990 0.4266149
                        -0.15237
logpolpc:regcodeWest
                        -0.79463
                                    0.44558 -1.7834 0.0782744 .
logpolpc:regcodeCentral
                         0.18568
                                     0.21957
                                             0.8456 0.4002403
               0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Signif. codes:
```

As we can see from the coeffest results above, the interaction between logpolpc and west are slightly significant

while the interaction between logpolpc and central is not statistically significant.

However, they may be jointly significant. We will run a F-test to see if this might be the case:


```
linearHypothesis(model2, c("logpolpc:regcodeWest=0", "logpolpc:regcodeCentral"), vcov=vcovHC)
## Linear hypothesis test
```

```
##
## Hypothesis:
## logpolpc:regcodeWest = 0
## logpolpc:regcodeCentral = 0
##
## Model 1: restricted model
## Model 2: logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + logpolpc * regcode +
##
       logtaxpc
##
## Note: Coefficient covariance matrix supplied.
##
                   F Pr(>F)
##
    Res.Df Df
## 1
        83
## 2
        81 2 2.9377 0.05866 .
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

We can see frome the F-test, above, that the interactions between logpolpc and regcodes west and central are not quite statistically significant to the model. However, given the slight significance of the interaction between logpolpc and west, we will continue to look at the standalone effect of west and central in our third model.

• MLR6: Normal Distribution of Errors The Normal Q-Q plot, below, provides evidence that our residuals follow a normal distribution. While there are some data points on the left and right side of the graph that stray from the diagonal line, since our data set has over 30 datapoints, per the CLT, we can assume residuals have a normal distribution.

```
plot(model2, which=2)
```



Im(logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + logpolpc * regcode + logta ...

summary(model2)

```
##
  lm(formula = logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + logpolpc *
##
       regcode + logtaxpc, data = dfCrime)
##
  Residuals:
##
        Min
                  1Q
                                             Max
                       Median
                                     3Q
  -1.00062 -0.15398 0.03168 0.17675
                                        0.57295
##
##
  Coefficients:
##
                           Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
## (Intercept)
                           -6.88847
                                        2.84781
                                                 -2.419
                                                         0.01781 *
## logScaledWages
                            1.19092
                                        0.37323
                                                  3.191
                                                         0.00202 **
## logcrimJustEff
                           -0.42353
                                        0.06123
                                                 -6.917 9.73e-10 ***
## logpolpc
                            0.56325
                                        0.17335
                                                  3.249
                                                         0.00169 **
## regcodeWest
                                                 -3.278
                                                         0.00154 **
                           -5.75931
                                        1.75687
## regcodeCentral
                            1.00167
                                        1.48284
                                                  0.676
                                                         0.50128
## logtaxpc
                           -0.15237
                                        0.14450
                                                 -1.054
                                                         0.29480
## logpolpc:regcodeWest
                            -0.79463
                                        0.27086
                                                 -2.934
                                                         0.00436 **
## logpolpc:regcodeCentral
                           0.18568
                                        0.22844
                                                  0.813
                                                         0.41870
                   0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
## Signif. codes:
## Residual standard error: 0.3014 on 81 degrees of freedom
## Multiple R-squared: 0.7254, Adjusted R-squared: 0.6982
```

F-statistic: 26.74 on 8 and 81 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16

3.2.4 Model 2 Interpretation

The Adjusted R-squared variable penalizes for additional variables, which means there is a chance that this value will decrease if the added variables do not contribute to the model. By comparing the Adjusted R-squared value between our first and second models, we see that logtaxpc and the interaction between logpolpc and regcode help describe logcrmrte.

Our second model has an Adjusted R-squared value of 0.7000, which means 70.00% of the variation in the natural log of the crime rate is explained by the explanatory variables used in this model. This is a slight increase compared to our first model, that has an Adjusted R-squared value of 0.6345.

In addition, the F-statistic is 26.83 with a statistically significant p-value of < 2.2e-16. As a result, we reject the null hypothesis that none of the independent variables help to describe logcrmrte.

Coefficient Analysis (assuming ceterus paribus): - logcrimJustEff: -6.9018 . This suggests that for a 1% increase in criminal justice efficiency, there is a 6.9018% decrease in crime rate. - logpolpc: 0.5626. This suggests that for a 1% increase in police per capita, there is a 0.5626% increase in crime rate. - logScaledWages: 1.19182. This suggests that for a 1% increase in total average weekly wage, there is a 1.1918% increase in crime rate. - taxpc: -0.1512. This suggests that for a 1% increase in tax per capita, there is a 0.1512% decrease in crime rate.

Compared to model 1, the adjusted R^2 of model 2 is only marginally higher. This suggests that we should continue our analysis by focusing on the join significance of the variables added in model 2.

3.3 Model 3

3.3.1 Discussion of Variables

From Model 2, we noted that the addition of the transformed variable logpolpc had statistical significance and helped improve the fit of the model, as measured by adjusted R-squared, to 70%. To increase our understanding at the linkages between police presence, economic conditions, criminal justice effectiveness and region, we propose to also analyse the areas of demographics which could have an effect on both of our key explanatory variables.

Minorities

One key component of demographics is the race of the county inhabitants and how they are perceived and treated by others, especially for minorities in the population. For example, systemic racism could have an important effect on:


- * Criminal Justice Effectiveness: If police, lawyers and judges are racially biased, this could lead to more arrests and more convictions regardless of the strength of the legal case and the evidence. As a result, we hypothesize the crime rate would increase.
- * Economic Opportunity: Racism could prohibit members of the minority from having access to education, jobs and higher wages. Racism could also limit access to healthcare and social programmes which has a negative effect on economic opportunity.

However, since we cannot directly measure racism, we have to operationalize this covariate by examining its effect in the real world. We propose to use the variable pctmin80, which represents the percentage of minorities in the population of the county. This is also a continuous parameter and so given a higher the percentage of minorities, we should expect to see a greater effect.

From the summary and boxplot below, we can see that the percentage of minorities ranges from 0.0154 - 0.6435, with a mean of 0.2621. We note that there are no major outliers. In addition, different regions and counties can have different demographics. We can see from the boxplots below that counties in the West have a significantly lower percentage of minorities than the other two regions.

We will apply the natural log to the variable pctmin80 to 1) make it easier for us to interpret the coefficient in our linear model and 2) to better expose the linear relationship in the model.

geom_boxplot()



dfCrime\$logpctmin80 <- log(dfCrime\$pctmin80)</pre>

Density


Another component of demographics is the population density, which can have impacts that may be positive or negative on the crime rate:

- * Criminal Justice Effectiveness: With more people in a given area, there may be more opportunities for more people to commit crimes. However, a higher density may also result in higher deterents such as more eyewitnesses or faster law-enforcement response rates.
- * Economic Opportunity: In high density areas, there is an increase in demand for support services such as food, retail, utilities, etc. As a result, there is a high demand for service jobs, which increases the economic opportunities within the area. However, more people in a given area, there is a closer proximity to drugs, alcohol and gang violence all of which are inhibitors to better economic outcomes.

From the summary and boxplot below, we can see that the density ranges from 0.3006 - 8.8277, with a mean of 0.9792 persons per square mile. We note that while there are some outliers to the data, this does not appear at first glance to be an issue as some counties can contain major cities which would naturally lead

to a higher population density. As a result, we will not make adjustments to any outliers unless we detect datapoints having high influence in our model.

summary(dfCrime\$density)



Variables not considered

Tax per Capital: Given that we found taxes per capita insignificant from model 2, we will exclude it from model 3.

We have also chosen not to include other variables from our dataset in our model:

- * Urban: We believe the variable "density" better explains the same effects as "urban" while also being a continuous. We believe a continuous variable is more meaningful rather a binary indicator such as urban as there may be data points that failed to meet the cutoff for being defined as urban, but may still see the same effects as being urban and hence may distort our analysis.
- * Age and Gender: While age and gender are important demographic variables, the only variable in our dataset is pctymle which provides the percentage of young males in the population. However, given that this variable encompasses both male and young, we may not be able to discern if age or gender has the larger effect (if any at all).

* Judgement: We chose not to include the varibles concerning the probability of a prison sentence as well as the average sentence as we believe it is unlikely that potential criminals would have good access to this information. In addition, local county officials have limited influence over the decisions of the judiciary system, as they are separate branches of government.

Our equation for model 3 is as follows:

 $log(CrimeRate) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 log(UnweightedAverageWage) + \beta_2 log(CriminalJusticeEffectiveness) + \beta_3 West + \beta_4 Central + \beta_5 log(UnweightedAverageWage) + \beta_5 log(UnweightedAverageWage) + \beta_5 log(UnweightedAverageWage) + \beta_6 log(U$

```
3.3.2 Model 3 Linear Model
```

```
model3_initial<-lm(logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + regcode +</pre>
                     logpolpc + logpctmin80 + density, data = dfCrime)
summary(model3_initial)
Call:
lm(formula = logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + regcode +
    logpolpc + logpctmin80 + density, data = dfCrime)
Residuals:
    Min
               1Q
                   Median
                                 3Q
                                         Max
-0.94554 -0.13318  0.04809  0.14872  0.55677
Coefficients:
              Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
              -8.36727
                          2.50204 -3.344 0.00125 **
logScaledWages 1.05054
                           0.38727
                                     2.713 0.00813 **
logcrimJustEff -0.40940
                           0.06269
                                   -6.530 5.14e-09 ***
regcodeWest
                           0.13351
                                   -1.454 0.14969
               -0.19416
regcodeCentral -0.15083
                           0.07948
                                   -1.898 0.06127 .
logpolpc
               0.27607
                           0.10679
                                    2.585 0.01150 *
logpctmin80
               0.19415
                           0.05446
                                     3.565 0.00061 ***
                           0.02934
                                    2.892 0.00490 **
density
               0.08487
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Residual standard error: 0.2836 on 82 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.7539,
                                Adjusted R-squared: 0.7329
F-statistic: 35.89 on 7 and 82 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
```

We note from the the summary above and the F-test below that west and central were not statistically significant to the model, but the inclusion of logpctmin80 and density are significant at the 99% confidence level or better. It appears that after controlling for the minority percentage and density, we can better explain the variation between counties rather than purely based on their geographic location and we thus remove the latter 2 variables from our model.


linearHypothesis(model3_initial,c("regcodeWest=0","regcodeCentral=0"), vcov=vcovHC)

```
## Linear hypothesis test
##
## Hypothesis:
## regcodeWest = 0
## regcodeCentral = 0
##
## Model 1: restricted model
## Model 2: logcrmrte ~ logScaledWages + logcrimJustEff + regcode + logpolpc +
```

```
##
                          logpctmin80 + density
##
## Note: Coefficient covariance matrix supplied.
##
##
                 Res.Df Df
                                                                        F Pr(>F)
## 1
                                84
## 2
                                82 2 1.3608 0.2622
Our revised equation for model 3 is as follows:
log(CrimeRate) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 log(UnweightedAverageWage) + \beta_2 log(CriminalJusticeEffectiveness) + \beta_3 log(PolicePerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerCapitalPerC
model3<-lm(logcrmrte ~ logcrimJustEff + logScaledWages + logpolpc</pre>
                                                   + logpctmin80 + density, data = dfCrime)
model3
Call:
lm(formula = logcrmrte ~ logcrimJustEff + logScaledWages + logpolpc +
              logpctmin80 + density, data = dfCrime)
Coefficients:
           (Intercept)
                                                         logcrimJustEff
                                                                                                                   logScaledWages
                                                                                                                                                                                                    logpolpc
                                                                                                                                                                                                        0.28915
                      -7.68040
                                                                                -0.42893
                                                                                                                                             0.94129
           logpctmin80
                                                                                   density
                         0.25357
                                                                                   0.07587
summary(model3)$adj.r.square
## [1] 0.7267955
From the Residuals vs Leverage plot below, we also note that there are despite some data points have more
```

leverage than others, no major outliers that have significant influence on our model as measured by no points having a Cook's distance > 0.5.

```
plot(model3, which=5)
```



Im(logcrmrte ~ logcrimJustEff + logScaledWages + logpolpc + logpctmin80 + d ...

Model 3 CLM Assumptions:

- MLR1 and 2: Discussed earlier.
- MLR3 No perfect multicollinearity: We demonstrate that our independent variables are not perfectly multicollinear using the VIF function, and note that all of our variance inflation factors are less than 5.


vif(model3)

```
## logcrimJustEff logScaledWages logpolpc logpctmin80 density
## 1.361375 1.814602 1.320967 1.043891 2.129569
```

• MLR4' Zero Conditional Mean: From the residual vs. fitted chart below, we see that the mean of the residuals mostly lie along 0, except towards the right side of our chart where there are fewer data points. We can reasonably conclude that we satisfy MLR4.

plot(model3, which = 1)

Residuals vs Fitted



Fitted values
Im(logcrmrte ~ logcrimJustEff + logScaledWages + logpolpc + logpctmin80 + d ...

• MLR5' Spherical errors: We note from the residuals vs fitted chart above that we have some evidence of heteroscedasticity, since there are less datapoints on both the left and right of the chart. As a result, we use the vcovHC method to estimate a robust variance-covariance matrix using White and Huber's method and generate coefficients that are robust to heteroscedasticity.


coeftest(model3, vcov=vcovHC)

t test of coefficients:

```
Estimate Std. Error t value
                                               Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
               -7.680402
                            4.257584 -1.8039
                                                0.07483 .
logcrimJustEff -0.428930
                            0.098282 -4.3643 3.609e-05 ***
logScaledWages
                0.941288
                            0.612902
                                      1.5358
                                                0.12835
logpolpc
                0.289152
                            0.185064
                                      1.5624
                                                0.12194
logpctmin80
                0.253570
                            0.042186
                                      6.0108 4.600e-08 ***
density
                0.075871
                            0.033654
                                      2.2544
                                                0.02677 *
                  '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Signif. codes:
```

• MLR6' Normality of errors: From the qqplot below, we see that the residuals in our model follow a fairly normal distribution. In addition, since we have a large sample size of 90 datapoints, we can rely on a version of the central limit theorem to assume normally distributed errors.

plot(model3, which=2)



By satisfying these assumptions, we can expect that our coefficients are approaching the true parameter

3.3.3 Model 3 Interpretation

values in probability.

The model shows a good fit, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.725, meaning that the model explains 72.5% of the variation in crime.

After accounting for coefficients that are robust to heteroscedasticity, we note only three them have individual statistical significance at the 95% level or better. These are criminal justice efficiency, minority percentages and density. However, running a F-test on the other two variables logpolpc and logScaledWages show that jointly they are still significant for our model.

linearHypothesis(model3,c("logpolpc=0","logScaledWages=0"), vcov=vcovHC)

```
## Linear hypothesis test
## Hypothesis:
## logpolpc = 0
## logScaledWages = 0
##
## Model 1: restricted model
  Model 2: logcrmrte ~ logcrimJustEff + logScaledWages + logpolpc + logpctmin80 +
##
##
       density
##
## Note: Coefficient covariance matrix supplied.
##
     Res.Df Df
                        Pr(>F)
##
```

```
## 1
         86
## 2
         84 2 4.9444 0.009331 **
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Interpretation of coefficients (Assuming ceterus paribus):
coeftest(model3, vcov=vcovHC)
t test of coefficients:
                Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept)
               -7.680402
                          4.257584 -1.8039
                                              0.07483 .
logcrimJustEff -0.428930
                          0.098282 -4.3643 3.609e-05 ***
logScaledWages 0.941288
                          0.612902 1.5358
                                              0.12835
logpolpc
               0.289152
                          0.185064
                                    1.5624
                                              0.12194
logpctmin80
                0.253570
                          0.042186 6.0108 4.600e-08 ***
density
                0.075871
                           0.033654 2.2544
                                              0.02677 *
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

Positive coefficients:

- * Police presence: If we increase police per capita by 1 percent, we expect the crime rate to increase by 0.28%.
- * scaledWages: If we increase wages by 1 percent, we expect the crime rate to increase by 0.94%.
- * Density: If we increase density by 1 person per square mile, we expect the crime rate to increase by 7.62%.
- * Percentage of minorities: If the percentage of minorities increase by 1%, we expect the crime rate to increase by 0.25%.

Negative coefficients:

* Criminal justice efficiency: If we increase the criminal justice efficiency by 1%, we expect the crime rate to decrease by 0.43%.

Of these different variables, we should pay particular attention to density given its large practical effect and statistical significance, which we address in our policy recommendations section below. In addition, as discussed

3.4 Comparison of Regression Models

```
#*** Function to convert coeftest results object into data frame
ctdf=function(x){
  rt=list()
                                         # generate empty results list
  for(c in 1:dim(x)[2]) rt[[c]]=x[,c]
                                         # writes column values of x to list
  rt=as.data.frame(rt)
                                         # converts list to data frame object
  names(rt)=names(x[1,])
                                         # assign correct column names
  rt[,"sig"]=symnum(rt$`Pr(>|z|)`, corr = FALSE, na = FALSE,
                    cutpoints = c(0, 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 1),
                    symbols = c("***", "**", "*", ".", " "))
  return(rt)
}
# Get vectors of robust standard errors from the coeftest output
se.model1 <- ctdf(coeftest(mod1, vcov=vcovHC))[,"Std. Error"]</pre>
se.model2 <- ctdf(coeftest(model2, vcov=vcovHC))[,"Std. Error"]</pre>
se.model3 <- ctdf(coeftest(model3, vcov=vcovHC))[,"Std. Error"]</pre>
```

```
stargazer(mod1, model2, model3, type = "text", omit.stat = "f",
    se = list(se.model1, se.model2, se.model3),
    star.cutoffs = c(0.05, 0.01, 0.001))
```

	Dependent variable:		
	(1)	logcrmrte (2)	(3)
logScaledWages	1.994*** (0.490)		0.941 (0.613)
logcrimJustEff	-0.480*** (0.105)	-0.424*** (0.107)	-0.429*** (0.098)
logpolpc		0.563* (0.253)	0.289 (0.185)
regcodeWest	-0.592*** (0.102)	-5.759* (2.917)	
regcodeCentral	-0.243** (0.081)	1.002 (1.434)	
logtaxpc		-0.152 (0.191)	
logpolpc:regcodeWest		-0.795 (0.446)	
logpolpc:regcodeCentral		0.186 (0.220)	
logpctmin80			0.254*** (0.042)
density			0.076* (0.034)
Constant	-15.831*** (2.677)	-6.888 (3.600)	-7.680 (4.258)
Dbservations R2 Adjusted R2 Residual Std. Error	90 0.650 0.633 0.332 (df = 85	90 0.725 0.698) 0.301 (df = 81)	90 0.742 0.727 0.287 (df = 84
======= Note:	========	*p<0.05; **p<	.=====================================

3.4.1 Interpretation and Discussion

Comparing the 3 models, we see that by increasing the complexity of our model specifications we have increased the fit of our model. The adjusted R2 value has steadily increased from 63% to 73% between model 1 and 3, indicating that we were able to explain approximately 10% more of the variation in our model. At the same time, our overall standard errors (which have been adjusted to account for hetereoscedacity) have also decreased.

- logScaledWages: As we dived deeper into our analysis of independent variables that operationalized economic conditions, we note that the unweighted average weekly wage has decreased both in terms of its practical significance (as measured by the magnitude of the coefficient) as well as its statistical significance. This indicates that as we controlled for additional covariates, the effect of wages was not as pronounced. In addition, our the size of our standard errors increased from model 1 to 3. As a result, we do not believe that the average wage is a good determinant of crime.
- logcrimJustEff: Criminal justice effectiveness has maintained relatively stable across all 3 models with a negative coefficient of approximately -0.4 to -0.5, holding constant the effect for other covariates. It also maintained high statistical significance at the 99.9% confidence level and has relatively low standard errors across the models.. Hence, criminal justice effectiveness is an important deterrent of crime, having the ability to lower the crime rate by 0.4% to 0.5% per 1% increase in convictions per crime.
- logpolpc: Police per capita was statistically significant in the model 2, but once we controlled for density and the minority percentage, it became statistically insignificant in model 3.
- West and Central: The two regions were statistically significant in model 1, but became less significant in the later two models once we started controlling for other variables. However, the western region in particular consistently demonstrated a negative effect on the crime rate and we believe that it would be meaningful for researchers to pursue further analysis with additional data beyond our existing dataset.
- Interactions between police presence and regions: These interactions were deemed not statistically significant and removed for model 3.
- Tax per capita: Taxes did not appear to be practically or statistically significant.
- Percentage of minorities: This variable was highly statistically significant, and its inclusion helped explain some of the variation in the different regions. In addition, compared to the other variables, it has a relatively low residual standard error. While we think that the percentage of minorities is an important consideration for crime rates, but due to the fact that is opertionalizes a difficult demographic concept (racism), it is unlikely that a high minority percentage in itself is a cause of crime.
- Density: Density is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level and represents a large practical effect as an increase in 1 person per square mile leads to approximately 8% increase in the crime rate.

From the analysis of the coefficients, as well as their practical and statistical significance, we highlight specifically 1) Criminal Justice Effectiveness, 2) Percentage of Minorities and 3) Population density as the most important factors in explaining crime. Criminal justice effectiveness can be increased by either increasing convictions or decreasing the number of crimes, while the two demographic variables indicate the areas of focus for policy recommendations. We also note that the western region may be deserving of further analysis beyond the scope of this paper.

3.4.2 Ommitted Variables

Expected correlation between omitted and included variables

Omitted Variable	Crime Rate (B_k)	Criminal Justice Effectiveness	Economic Conditions
Education	-	unknown	+
Social Services	-	unknown	unknown
Unemployment	+	unknown	-
Inequality	+	unknown	-
Gang Activity	+	-	-
Gov't Spending	-	+	+

The 5 major identified ommitted variables are shown above.

- Education is an important variable because of demographic insights it provides. First, adults with higher education are less likely to participate in Crime and are more likely to have better economic opportunity. Second, a strong school system is also likely correlated with less youth crime. Because of these expected correlations we are likely overestimating the economic conditions coefficient estimate.
- Available Social Services could also lower crime. Citizens with strong social services support have more
 options to get help when they lack means for purchasing basic life needs. However this is more difficult
 to predict, as some social service projects, like homeless shelters, could lead to more criminal activity.
- Unemployment is used as an important indicator of economic health and opportunity. This is would be highly correlated to economic conditions variables like sum of wages. This indicator variable if added to the model would decrease the magnitude of the sum of wage means coefficient estimate.
- Economic Inequality may also increase the crime rate as it may provide incentives for certain types of crime such as theft, kidnapping or extortion by people who have less economic means on those who have more economic means.
- Gang or Organized Crime is special case of crime that contains unique causes. It is expected that
 it would be negatively correlated with criminal justice effectiveness as large social pressures prevent
 witnesses from supporting prosecution. Gang crime is also negatively correlated with economic
 conditions. From these assumed correlations, we can say that criminal justice effectiveness and
 economic conditions are both underestimated compared to including gang activity operationalized
 variable in the model.
- Government spending: Our analysis showed that local tax revenues per capita were not an important
 variable and part of this may be because tax revenues and government spending may not actually be
 strongly correlated. Effective government spending could help boost criminal justice effectiveness as
 well as local economic conditions, including some of the variables noted above such as education, social
 services and inequality.

4 Conclusion

4.1 Policy Recommendations

We have shown in this report 3 different models that seek to explain and model changes in the crime rate in North Carolina in 1980. We start with the fundamental premise that crime is affected by criminal justice efficiency, economic conditions and regional differences, and further develop our definition of these key explanatory variables which each new model. We propose the following recommendations on crime policy for local political candidates.

- Crime is more prevalent in places with higher population density and higher minority populations. Those seeking election in these areas should make crime reduction an important part of their message. Note that we do not offer recommendations on how important the issue of crime is relative to other issues as that is beyond the scope of our analysis.
- Increase the number of rightful convictions by providing appropriate staffing and resources to local law enforcement and legal system. In highly populated areas, this could include increasing public safety infrastructure (such as security cameras) and reducing police response times. With the right

resources, density can be used against potential criminals and act as a deterrent to crime. However, note that simply increasing the number of police will not necessarily lead to an increase in criminal justice effectiveness.


- Provide additional support for areas with high minority populations, by conducting further studies on
 our ommitted variables. These could come in different forms such as better access to education, social
 support services or by reducing income equality. Our analysis has shown that average wages do not
 have a strong relationship with crime so it is important to get to the root of why these areas suffer
 from higher crime rates in order to provide more concrete recommendations to reduce crime in these
 areas.
- Provide racial suboncious bias training to local law enforcement and judiciary officials to reduce the number of wrongful arrests or incidents labelled as potential crimes.

4.2 Further Research Recommendations

Our findings can be further strengthed by studying the ommitted variables we have identified, the differences in the western region, as well as a time-panel of data that shows how criminal data and our independent variables change over time. Political candidates who are interested in making crime reduction an important campaign promise should consider funding these studies.


5 Appendix

```
options(repr.plot.width=8, repr.plot.height=4)
#myData<-myData[, c("crmrte", "prbarr", "prbconv", "prbpris", "avgsen", "polpc", "density", "taxpc",</pre>
            "pctmin80", "wcon", "wtuc", "wtrd", "wfir", "wser", "wmfg", "wfed", "wsta", "wloc",
            "mix", "pctymle")]
myData<-dfCrime %>% filter(other==1)
myData<-myData[, c("crmrte", "prbarr", "prbconv", "prbpris", "avgsen", "polpc", "density", "taxpc",
          "pctmin80", "wcon", "wtuc", "wtrd", "wfir", "wser", "wmfg", "wfed", "wsta", "wloc",
          "mix", "pctymle")]
r0 <- myData %>% correlate() %>% network_plot(min_cor=.25)
Correlation method: 'pearson'
Missing treated using: 'pairwise.complete.obs'
myData<-dfCrime %>% filter(central==1)
myData<-myData[, c("crmrte", "prbarr", "prbconv", "prbpris", "avgsen", "polpc", "density", "taxpc",
          "pctmin80", "wcon", "wtuc", "wtrd", "wfir", "wser", "wmfg", "wfed", "wsta", "wloc",
          "mix", "pctymle")]
r1 <- myData %>% correlate() %>% network_plot(min_cor=.25)
Correlation method: 'pearson'
Missing treated using: 'pairwise.complete.obs'
myData<-dfCrime %>% filter(west==1)
myData<-myData[, c("crmrte", "prbarr", "prbconv", "prbpris", "avgsen", "polpc", "density", "taxpc",
          "pctmin80", "wcon", "wtuc", "wtrd", "wfir", "wser", "wmfg", "wfed", "wsta", "wloc",
          "mix", "pctymle")]
r2 <- myData %>% correlate() %>% network_plot(min_cor=.25)
Correlation method: 'pearson'
Missing treated using: 'pairwise.complete.obs'
grid.arrange(arrangeGrob(r1, bottom = 'Central Region Correlation Plot'), ncol=1)
```




Central Region Correlation Plot

grid.arrange(arrangeGrob(r2, bottom = 'Western Region Correlation Plot'), ncol=1)




Western Region Correlation Plot

grid.arrange(arrangeGrob(r0, bottom = 'Other Region Correlation Plot'), ncol=1)




Other Region Correlation Plot



Non-Urban Correlation Plot

grid.arrange(arrangeGrob(r1, bottom = 'Urban Correlation Plot'), ncol=1)




Urban Correlation Plot

5.1 Transformations


Transform examinations through ggplots.

```
#dfEconVars <- as.data.frame(cbind(dfCrime$wcon, dfCrime$wtuc, dfCrime$wtrd, dfCrime$wfir,
#
                                   dfCrime$wser, dfCrime$wmfg, dfCrime$wfed, dfCrime$wsta,
                                   dfCrime$wloc))
#names(dfEconVars) <- c('wcon', 'wtuc', 'wtrd', 'wfir', 'wser',</pre>
#
                               'wmfg', 'wfed', 'wsta', 'wloc')
#ggplot(melt(dfEconVars),aes(x=value)) + geom_histogram(bins=30) + facet_wrap(~variable)
#The economic variables
q1<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = wcon, y = crmrte, color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q1a<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(wcon), y = log(crmrte), color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom smooth(method = "lm")
q2<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = wtuc, y = crmrte, color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q2a < -ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(wtuc), y = log(crmrte), color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q3<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = wtrd, y = crmrte, color = metro)) +
```


```
geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q3a<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(wtrd), y = log(crmrte), color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q4<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = wfir, y = crmrte, color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q4a<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(wfir), y = log(crmrte), color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q5<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = wser, y = crmrte, color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q5a < -ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(wser), y = log(crmrte), color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q6<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = wmfg, y = crmrte, color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom smooth(method = "lm")
q6a < -ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(wmfg), y = log(crmrte), color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q7<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = wfed, y = crmrte, color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q7a < -ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(wfed), y = log(crmrte), color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q8<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = wsta, y = crmrte, color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q8a < -ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(wsta), y = log(crmrte), color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom smooth(method = "lm")
q9<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = wloc, y = crmrte, color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q9a < -ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(wloc), y = log(crmrte), color = metro)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom smooth(method = "lm")
options(repr.plot.width=8, repr.plot.height=16)
grid.arrange(q1, q1a, q2, q2a, q3, q3a, ncol=2)
```



grid.arrange(q4, q4a, q5, q5a, q6, q6a, ncol=2)



grid.arrange(q7, q7a, q8, q8a, q9, q9a, ncol=2)




The transforms make the relationship more linearly distributed. We will transform these variables to their log equivalents.


```
dfCrime$logwcon<-log(dfCrime$wcon)
dfCrime$logwtuc<-log(dfCrime$wtuc)
dfCrime$logwtrd<-log(dfCrime$wtrd)
dfCrime$logwfir<-log(dfCrime$wfir)
dfCrime$logwser<-log(dfCrime$wser)
dfCrime$logwmfg<-log(dfCrime$wmfg)
dfCrime$logwfed<-log(dfCrime$wfed)
dfCrime$logwsta<-log(dfCrime$wsta)
dfCrime$logwsta<-log(dfCrime$wsta)
```

We move to the justice an law enforcement variables. With these variables being mostly < 1 we'll also take the log for comparison.

```
geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q3<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = prbpris, y = crmrte, color = regcode)) +
     geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q3a < -ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(prbpris), y = log(crmrte), color = regcode)) +
     geom_point()+
  geom smooth(method = "lm")
q4<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = avgsen, y = crmrte, color = regcode)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q4a<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(avgsen), y = log(crmrte), color = regcode)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q5<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = polpc, y = crmrte, color = regcode)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q5a<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(polpc), y = log(crmrte), color = regcode)) +
     geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q6<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = mix, y = crmrte, color = regcode)) +
     geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q6a<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(mix), y = log(crmrte), color = regcode)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
grid.arrange(q1, q1a, q2, q2a, q3, q3a, ncol=2)
```



grid.arrange(q4, q4a, q5, q5a, q6, q6a, ncol=2)




The log transformation for these variables makes the relationship more linear. We will transform these variables to their log equivalents.

We also note that of the six variables, only prbarr, prbconv and polpc show univariate correlation with crime. We believe these will be better candidates for our model selection. Further, we see mix has no correlation with crimate and may be its own outcome variable.

```
dfCrime$logprbarr <- log(dfCrime$prbarr)</pre>
dfCrime$logprbconv <- log(dfCrime$prbconv)</pre>
dfCrime$logprbpris <- log(dfCrime$prbpris)</pre>
dfCrime$logavgsen <- log(dfCrime$avgsen)</pre>
dfCrime$logpolpc <- log(dfCrime$polpc)</pre>
dfCrime$logmix <- log(dfCrime$mix)</pre>
Next we take a look at the demographic variables and their log alternatives
q1<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = pctymle, y = crmrte, color = regcode)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom smooth(method = "lm")
q1a<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(pctymle), y = log(crmrte), color = regcode)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q2<-ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = pctmin80, y = crmrte, color = regcode)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
q2a < -ggplot(data = dfCrime, aes(x = log(pctmin80), y = log(crmrte), color = regcode)) +
      geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = "lm")
```

grid.arrange(q1, q1a, q2, q2a, q3, q3a, ncol=2)




Again we see improvements after transformation. We will include transforms of these variables as well.

```
dfCrime$logdensity <- log(dfCrime$density)
dfCrime$logpctmin80 <- log(dfCrime$pctmin80)
dfCrime$logpctymle <- log(dfCrime$pctymle)</pre>
```

Finally, we'll take a look at taxpc and a histogram of the crmrte variable itself.

geom_histogram(bins=30)

grid.arrange(q1, q1a, q2, q2a, ncol=2)



The crmrte and taxpc variables also show improvement after transformation. We'll add those to our dataframe.

dfCrime\$logcrmrte = log(dfCrime\$crmrte)
dfCrime\$logtaxpc = log(dfCrime\$taxpc)