Passwords are better with salt - hashing, salting and key stretching in kdb+

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AQUAQ ANALYTICS

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1 Introduction

Password security is often a weak link in hardening systems against intrusion, as can be seen by the many reports of high profile breaches, e.g. linkedin

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9227869/Hackers_crack_more_than_60_of_breached_LinkedIn_passwords and sony

http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/sony-hacked-again-1-million-passwords-exposed/d/d-id/1098113?.

With 32-bit kdb+ now free for commercial or educational use

http://kx.com/software-download.php

it is timely to look at best practices in password security. In this article the main focus will be on the storage and verification of user passwords. It is a large subject area beyond the confines of this article to fully cover, so links for the interested reader will be provided throughout.

A good overview of the history and future of password security can found at http://www.openwall.com/presentations/Passwords12-The-Future-Of-Hashing/Some useful background reading on password security is covered in: https://crackstation.net/hashing-security.htm
http://security.blogoverflow.com/2013/09/about-secure-password-hashing/

In this article, password hashing via MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 will be looked at. The need for salting passwords via a cryptographically secure random number generator is then introduced, leading to a discussion of key stretching via PBKDF2.

For other aspects necessary to consider when building an access control layer in kdb+, such as user classes and how to filter incoming queries, see http://www.firstderivatives.com/lecture_series_pp.asp?downloadflyer=q_for_Gods_July_2013.

Kdb+ 3.1 2014.05.21 (32 bit) was used for all examples described herein.

CONTENTS

2 Linking kdb+ to a cryptographic library

There are many freely available cryptography libraries that could be linked to kdb+ in a similar way to the examples to be discussed in this article. Some of the more popular libraries are listed at

```
http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Cryptography/Open_Source_Cryptography
Here, openssl will be used. To download and install openssl, see:
http://www.openssl.org/
http://http//www.geeksww.com/tutorials/libraries/openssl/installation/installing_
openssl_on_ubuntu_linux.php

This also noted that a ball to recover a record library labels is a recovered to recover.
```

It is also noted that a kdb+ wrapper around libcurl which is commonly used for secure file transfers using opensal has been released

```
http://curl.haxx.se/libcurl/
http://kx.com/q/c/c/curl.c
```

In this article a small set of wrapper functions will be used to interface kdb+ and certain opensal functions. The c code for this, qcrypt.c, can be compiled as follows (alter linking part of the compile line to suit particular opensal version, library location)

```
johnl@johnl: ~/crypto

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

johnl@johnl:~/crypto$

Johnl@johnl:~/crypto$
```

This produces a shared object querypt.so comprising of three functions quand, hash and pbkdf2 that can then be loaded into kdb+

```
KDB+ 3.1 2014.05.21 Copyright (C) 1993-2014 Kx Systems
l32/ 1()core 502MB johnl johnl 127.0.1.1 NONEXPIRE

Welcome to kdb+ 32bit edition
For support please see http://groups.google.com/d/forum/personal-kdbplus
Tutorials can be found at http://code.kx.com/wiki/Tutorials
To exit, type \\
To remove this startup msg, edit q.q
q)qrand:`qcrypt 2: (`qrand;1)
q)hash:`qcrypt 2: (`hash;2)
q)pbkdf2:`qcrypt 2: (`pbkdf2;4)
q)
q)
```

For details on interfacing kdb+ with C, see

http://code.kx.com/wiki/Cookbook/ExtendingWithChttp://code.kx.com/wiki/Cookbook/InterfacingWithC

3. HASHES CONTENTS

3 Hashes

```
A cryptographic hash is a one-way function that scrambles an input string. Kdb+
does have a built in hash function, namely md5 (Message-Digest algorithm 5), see
http://code.kx.com/wiki/Reference/md5
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1321
However md5 is no longer recommended for serious cryptographic protection due to
weaknesses in the algorithm
http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/
http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2012/06/06/more-information-about-
the-digital-certificates-used-to-sign-the-flame-malware.aspx
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flame_(malware)
As a first test of the kdb+ to opensel interface, the md5 function built into kdb+ will
be compared to the corresponding md5 function in openssl
https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/md5.html
KDB+ 3.1 2014.05.21 Copyright (C) 1993-2014 Kx Systems
132/ 1()core 502MB johnl johnl 127.0.1.1 NONEXPIRE
Welcome to kdb+ 32bit edition
For support please see http://groups.google.com/d/forum/personal-kdbplus
Tutorials can be found at http://code.kx.com/wiki/Tutorials
To exit, type \\
To remove this startup msg, edit q.q
q)hash:`qcrypt 2: (`hash;2)
q)md5"thisisatest"
0xf830f69d23b8224b512a0dc2f5aec974
q)hash["thisisatest"; "md5"]
0xf830f69d23b8224b512a0dc2f5aec974
The first argument to the qcrypt 'hash' is the input string and the second argument
is the hashing algorithm.
   A stronger set of hash functions is the SHA group of algorithms - SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. See
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6234
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sha-1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-2
For their implementation in opensal, see
https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/sha.html
The kdb+ results are shown below
```

3. HASHES CONTENTS

```
KDB+ 3.1 2014.05.21 Copyright (C) 1993-2014 Kx Systems
l32/ 1()core 502MB johnl johnl 127.0.1.1 NONEXPIRE
Welcome to kdb+ 32bit edition
For support please see http://groups.google.com/d/forum/personal-kdbplus
Tutorials can be found at http://code.kx.com/wiki/Tutorials
To exit, type \\
To remove this startup msg, edit q.q
g)\c 2000 2000
q)hash:`qcrypt 2: (`hash;2)
q)hash["thisisatest"; "shal"]
0x42d4a62c53350993ea41069e9f2cfdefb0df097d
q)hash["thisisatest";"sha224"]
0x8143b8f30ad19141ed2aade0fc7eff74cd39d2b439ce5f33b665f688
g)hash["thisisatest";"sha256"]
0xa7c96262c21db9a06fd49e307d694fd95f624569f9b35bb3ffacd880440f9787
q)hash["thisisatest"; "sha384"]
0x2cb5eb7d54da9594424bf4a375dd2e1b678668f74d8a88d8747f58ab73bfc0afb8ddda07a3f9a2
4315c16a306c848821
q)hash["thisisatest";"sha512"]
0xd44edf261feb71975ee9275259b2eab75920d312cb1481a024306002dc57bf680e0c3b5a00edb6
ffd15969369d8a714ccce1396937a57fd057ab312cb6c6d8b6
```

To check the results, there are online calculators that can used, e.g. http://www.miniwebtool.com/hash-and-checksum/

SHA1 Hash Generator



SHA1 Hash of Input String

42d4a62c53350993ea41069e9f2cfdefb0df097d



SHA224 Hash of Input String

8143b8f30ad19141ed2aade0fc7eff74cd39d2b439ce5f33b665f688

3. HASHES CONTENTS

SHA256 Hash Generator	
Enter the text:	
thisisatest	<u></u>
Generate SHA256 Hash	
SHA256 Hash of Input String	
a7c96262c21db9a06fd49e307d694fd95f624569f9b35bb3ffacd880440f9787	$\hat{\circ}$
SHA384 Hash Generator	
Enter the text:	
thisisatest	Ç.
Generate SHA384 Hash	
SHA384 Hash of Input String	
2cb5eb7d54da9594424bf4a375dd2e1b678668f74d8a88d8747f58ab73bfc0afb8ddda07	a3f9a24315c16a306c848821
SHA512 Hash Generator	
Enter the text:	
thisisatest	Ç
Generate SHA512 Hash	
SHA512 Hash of Input String	
d44edf261feb71975ee9275259b2eab75920d312cb1481a024306002dc57bf680e0c3b5a00ed 6937a57fd057ab312cb6c6d8b6	b6ffd15969369d8a714ccce139

4. SALT CONTENTS

4 Salt


A hash of a password by itself is not sufficient to guarantee security. User passwords are often chosen insecurely and are amenable to dictionary attacks

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictionary_attacks

which compare the hashes of common passwords against the hash of the user password. It is also possible to pre-compute hashes and then check them against stored passwords via rainbow tables

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rainbow_table

To illustrate this consider the md5 hash of the string "password123".



In order to make such attacks harder and more costly to the attacker, a random salt can be added to the password before it is hashed. As long as a unique salt is generated per password, this means that each password must be attacked individually

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography)

It is important that the salt is produced using a cryptographically secure random number generator. Here the openssl function RAND_bytes will be used

https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/RAND_bytes.html

http://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Random_Numbers

On linux, this uses /dev/urandom or /dev/random as sources of entropy to seed a pseudo-random number generator. The kdb+ function 'qrand' takes a single argument, the desired number of random output bytes

4. SALT CONTENTS

```
KDB+ 3.1 2014.05.21 Copyright (C) 1993-2014 Kx Systems
132/ 1()core 502MB johnl johnl 127.0.1.1 NONEXPIRE
Welcome to kdb+ 32bit edition
For support please see http://groups.google.com/d/forum/personal-kdbplus
Tutorials can be found at http://code.kx.com/wiki/Tutorials
To exit, type \\
To remove this startup msg, edit q.q
q)qrand:`qcrypt 2: (`qrand;1)
q) qrand(10)
0x4da2ef2116061d6af53a
q) qrand (20)
0x731807c68be02bb76d693c1611e4fb37209ac3d8
q) qrand (20)
0x4395647314f93966ed4247ca5acca98be622a938
q) grand (20)
0x9b1ff7ce6610a99243f7d32d7ffd579951ed130e
q)count qrand(20)
20
q)
```

5 Key Stretching

As has been seen, simply hashing an input password is not enough to stop an attacker. Adding a salt to the password before hashing strengthens security. By then iterating the hash of the salted password in a process known as 'key stretching', attacks can be made much more computationally expensive. There are various key stretching algorithms such as pbkdf2, bcrypt and scrypt.

```
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PBKDF2
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bcrypt
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scrypt
Here the pbkdf2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2) algorithm will be used, see
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt
http://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC.html
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/9771212/how-to-use-pkcs5-pbkdf2-hmac-sha1
```

The kdb+ function 'pbkdf2' takes 4 arguments - the password, salt, number of iterations and the length of the derived output key. Example usage is shown below,

```
KDB+ 3.1 2014.05.21 Copyright (C) 1993-2014 Kx Systems
l32/ 1()core 502MB johnl johnl 127.0.1.1 NONEXPIRE

Welcome to kdb+ 32bit edition
For support please see http://groups.google.com/d/forum/personal-kdbplus
Tutorials can be found at http://code.kx.com/wiki/Tutorials
To exit, type \\
To remove this startup msg, edit q.q
q)pbkdf2:`qcrypt 2: (`pbkdf2;4)
q)\c 2000 2000
q)pbkdf2["thisisatest";`byte$"salt";100;20]
0x04272da9bcf406ab081bd2f1e9ae114834589bce
q)pbkdf2["password";`byte$"salt";100;50]
0x8595d7aea0e7c952a35af9a838cc6b393449307cfcc7bd340e7e32ee901156509cd8f76e53cf8c
c09d851fd2da1388ce4518
q)
```

This can be compared to an online pbkdf2 calculator such as http://anandam.name/pbkdf2/

Demo of the PBKDF2 Jav	aScript implementation:			
Password:	thisisatest			
Salt:	salt			
Number of iterations:	100			
Number of bytes for Key:	20			
	Derive Key			
The derived 160-bit key is: 04272da9bcf406ab081bd2f1e9ae114834589bce				
The derived 160-bit key	15. 042720a5bC1400ab001b0211e5ae114054505bCe			
Demo of the PBKDF2 JavaScript implementation: Password: password				
Salt: salt				
Number of iterations: 100				
Number of bytes for Key: 50 Derive Key				
The derived 400-bit key is: 8595d7aea0e7c952a35af9a838cc6b393449307cfcc7bd340e7e32ee901156509cd8f76e53cf8cc09d851fd2da1388ce4518				

A higher number of iterations of the pbkdf2 algorithm provides more security. For example in tests it takes about a second to run the pbkdf2 function with a 512 byte salt, 25000 iterations and a 512 byte output key. However note the time versus security trade off here in that more security comes at the cost of more time spent in validating user connection requests.

```
KDB+ 3.1 2014.05.21 Copyright (C) 1993-2014 Kx Systems

132/ 1()core 502MB johnl johnl 127.0.1.1 NONEXPIRE

Welcome to kdb+ 32bit edition

For support please see http://groups.google.com/d/forum/personal-kdbplus

Tutorials can be found at http://code.kx.com/wiki/Tutorials

To exit, type \\

To remove this startup msg, edit q.q

q)pbkdf2:`qcrypt 2: (`pbkdf2;4)

q)qrand:`qcrypt 2: (`qrand;1)

q)salt:qrand[512]

q)\t pbkdf2["password";salt;25000;512]

1066

q)
```

6 Putting it all together

Now the various functions in querypt can be combined together to form the first stage of a simple access control layer. As mentioned in the introduction, a complete acl layer would also need to account for user classes and filtering of user function calls.

The q script access.q provides a number of functions to add, delete and update user passwords and to verify incoming access requests. The default setting for the hashing algorithm (.acl.HASHFN) is pbkdf2 with a salt length (.acl.SALTLEN) of 512 bytes, 25000 iterations (.acl.ITERATIONS) and a derived key length (.acl.DKLEN) of 512. These default settings can be overridden by changing the 'saltlen', 'iterations', 'dklen' and 'hashfn' parameters in settings.csv. The 'hashfn' parameter can take the values: md5, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512 and pbkdf2.

```
/ define default configuration settings
.acl.SALTLEN:512; / salt length - ensure it is as long as the maximum hash length
.acl.ITERATIONS:10000; / number of iterations for pbkdf2 algorithm
.acl.DKLEN:512; / derived key length for pbkdf2 algorithm
.acl.HASHFN:`pbkdf2; / hash algorithm to be used
.acl.users:([u:`$()] p:();s:()); / users table schema
system["c 2000 2000"];

johnl@johnl:~/kdb$ cat settings.csv
saltlen,512
iterations,25000
dklen,512
hashfn,pbkdf2
johnl@johnl:~/kdb$
```

Usernames and passwords are stored in a file users.csv. Note that if you change settings.csv you will have to re-generate all saved password hashes, so no function is provided for this in order to reduce the risk of unplanned changes to the algorithm settings.

The message handler .z.pw is used to verify incoming user passwords against the stored hash.

Some examples are shown below to illustrate usage. The salt and pbkdf2 key lengths are reduced here to 10 with the number of iterations set to 100 iterations so as to make usage easier to demonstrate:

• Users can be added using the function .acl.addUser that takes two input arguments, a string for the username and a string for the password. The function then generates a random salt, encrypts a concatenation of the salt and password using the function .acl.enCrypt and then upserts it to the keyed table .acl.users that has columns for the user, password hash and salt. The users table is then saved down to a csv file, users.csv. The users.csv and settings.csv files are read when the access.q script is loaded

```
johnl@johnl:~$ q kdb/access.q
KDB+ 3.1 2014.05.21 Copyright (C) 1993-2014 Kx Systems
132/ 1()core 502MB johnl johnl 127.0.1.1 NONEXPIRE
Welcome to kdb+ 32bit edition
For support please see http://groups.google.com/d/forum/personal-kdbplus
Tutorials can be found at http://code.kx.com/wiki/Tutorials
To exit, type \\
To remove this startup msg, edit q.q
q)\f .acl
`addUser`delUser`enCrypt`hash`pbkdf2`qrand`reload`toString`toSymbol`userChk
q)\c 2000 2000
q).acl.users
u ps
q).acl.addUser["bob"; "bobspassword"]
q).acl.users
u p
bob| 0xc8312d1062eb5f26c0cb 0x3f9e342db8474db2d78c
q)\more kdb/users.csv
"u,p,s"
"bob,c8312d1062eb5f26c0cb,3f9e342db8474db2d78c"
q).acl.addUser
{[user;pass]
    user:.acl.toSymbol[user];
    salt:.acl.grand[.acl.SALTLEN];
     .acl.users upsert (user;.acl.enCrypt[salt;pass];salt);
    .acl.usersFile 0: csv 0: 0!update raze each string[p], raze each string[s] from .ac
l.users;
q).acl.enCrypt
{[salt;pass]
    if[.acl.HASHFN in .acl.hashes;:.acl.hash[;string .acl.HASHFN] raze .acl.toString s
alt,pass];
    if[.acl.HASHFN~`pbkdf2;:.acl.pbkdf2[pass;salt;.acl.ITERATIONS;.acl.DKLEN]];
q)
```

• Similarly if .acl.addUser is ran where the username matches an existing username, the entry for that user is updated with a new password. The function .acl.delUser takes a single input symbol for the username to be deleted.


```
To remove this startup msg, edit q.q
q).acl.users
u | p
bob | 0xc8312d1062eb5f26c0cb 0x3f9e342db8474db2d78c
q) .acl .addUser["alice";"alicespassword"]
q).acl.users
bob | 0xc8312d1062eb5f26c0cb 0x3f9e342db8474db2d78c
alice | 0x8eb13c43bc60b3b4c4d1 0xd929d1c4d57b6dc8a79c
q).acl.delUser[`bob]
q).acl.users
u | p s
alice 0x8eb13c43bc60b3b4c4d1 0xd929d1c4d57b6dc8a79c
q)\more kdb/users.csv
"alice,8eb13c43bc60b3b4c4d1,d929d1c4d57b6dc8a79c"
q).acl.addUser["alice";"alicesnewpassword"]
q).acl.users
alice | 0x2d17d8fbb57ae9f30c3a 0x5014b20becae8169588e
q)\more kdb/users.csv
"u,p,s"
"alice,2d17d8fbb57ae9f30c3a,5014b20becae8169588e"
q)
q).acl.delUser
{[user]
   delete from `.acl.users where u=user;
   .acl.usersFile 0: csv 0: 0!update raze each string[p],raze each string[s] from .ac
l.users;
}
q)
```

• Now a test connection can be made from another q session. Note that as well as .z.pw, other message handlers such as .z.po, .z.pc, .z.pg, .z.ps would also be overloaded in a full system.

```
johnl@johnl:~$
johnl@johnl:~$
                                                                       132/ 1()core 502MB johnl johnl 127.0.1.1 NONEXPI
                                                                      RE
johnl@johnl:~$
johnl@johnl:~$
johnl@johnl:~$
johnl@johnl:~$
                                                                       Welcome to kdb+ 32bit edition
                                                                      For support please see http://groups.google.com/
johnl@johnl:~$
johnl@johnl:~$
                                                                       d/forum/personal-kdbplus
                                                                      Tutorials can be found at http://code.kx.com/wik
johnl@johnl:~$
                                                                       i/Tutorials
                                                                      To exit, type \\
To remove this startup msg, edit q.q
johnl@johnl:~$
johnl@johnl:~$
johnl@johnl:~$
                                                                      q)\p
johnl@johnl:~$ q
                                                                      1234i
KDB+ 3.1 2014.05.21 Copyright (C) 1993-2014 Kx Systems
                                                                       q).z.pw
                                                                      {[user;pass]
$[.acl.userChk[user;pass]~.acl.users[.acl.toSy
l32/ 1()core 502MB johnl johnl 127.0.1.1 NONEXPIRE
                                                                      mbol[user]][`p];1b;0b]
Welcome to kdb+ 32bit edition
For support please see http://groups.google.com/d/forum/pe
                                                                       qj.acl.users
rsonal-kdbplus
Tutorials can be found at http://code.kx.com/wiki/Tutorial
                                                                            p
                                                                                                         S
To exit, type \\
To remove this startup msg, edit q.q
q)h:hopen `:localhost:1234:alice:alicesnewpassword
                                                                      alice| 0x2d17d8fbb57ae9f30c3a 0x5014b20becae8169
                                                                      588e
q)h"1+1"
                                                                      q) test
q)h"test:4"
q)[
```

7 Network Security

There is a loophole in the password encyption techniques discussed in the preceding sections, namely there is an implicit assumption that all communications are taking place over a secure network. If the network connection is untrusted, then kdb+ passwords can easily be retrieved. This can be done be using packet sniffers such as tcpdump to listen to network traffic. This is illustrated below for a password sent to a kdb+ server from a web browser where the password is sent over the network as unencrypted base64 encoded bytes.




Process now

or support please see http://groups.google.c utorials can be found at http://code.kx.com/ o exit, type \\ o memove this startup msg, edit q.q There a couple of solutions to this. A secure tcp connection can be achieved through the use of stunnel which wraps an insecure tcp connection with SSL/TLS.

http://code.kx.com/wiki/Cookbook/Websocket#Secure_sockets:_stunnel

However note that only tcp connections can be protected through the use of stunnel, non-tcp connections using q ipc still send passwords in the clear.



A more robust solution is the use of Kerberos which can provide secure authentication over an insecure network

http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/

Note that combining Kerberos with LDAP is often a good combination, with Kerberos used to authenticate clients and LDAP used for authorization, see

https://wiki.debian.org/LDAP/Kerberos