Gibbard begins chapter two by directly engaging - and endorsing - quite a bit of Moore's arguments from *Principia Ethica*. This might seem odd given that Moore is a non-naturalist and Gibbard is advancing the thesis that expressivism is compatible with realist conceptions of morality.

What's at Issue (pg 23):
While Gibbard finds Moore's open question argument important, it is not for the standard reasons.

> To test whether 'good' means desired, Moore proposed, construct the question "Is all that's desired good?" and see if the question is an open one. It's open, you'll see, whether all that's desired is good—and so 'good' and 'desired' can't mean the same. But this, critics respond, can't be a reliable test. Synonymy can be covert; if a philosopher labors to analyze a concept and discover the right analysis, the discovery won't be obvious on its face. The question whether the analysis is right will be open, because the analysis, correct though it be, is subtle. (pg 25)

Gibbard takes Moore's test as hitting upon an important topic in metaethics. It is not about actually defining *good*, however. It is about how we, as agents, can assert certain claims about morality, and the ways in which coherence in beliefs, and disagreements between agents, can arise. Imagine two agents, Hedda and Désiré discussing moral issues.

> Only pleasure is good. —Hedda (H)
> Not only pleasure is good. —Désiré (*H)

Désiré and Hedda, Moore thinks we can see, disagree when they say these things. But Désiré can't express his disagreement with Hedda by saying:

> Not only pleasure is desired. —Désiré (*D)

Hedda cannot both believe H and *H since these beliefs held simultaneously are incoherent, but Hedda could accept H and *D. Since H and *D can be held in coherence the two concepts (good and desired) are distinct. This, according to Gibbard is the lesson to be learned from Moore. More formally:

> Two concepts are distinct if they offer nonequivalent possibilities of coherent acceptance or rejection. (pg 25)

The important thing to note, is that this interpretation of the Morrean arguments gets us away from talking about non-natural properties, and replaces it with a discussion about what we can assert and what we can accept.

Property and Concept (pg 29):
Gibbard's focus on *concepts* is not by mistake. Concept identity and property identity are not the same. (pg 31 - 32) However, if the adjective 'good' is to be used correctly, then it must always apply, in every possible circumstance, pick out the actual good. If good just is pleasure, then both 'pleasure' and 'good' must pick out the same thing in every possible circumstance. This seems to be exactly Moore's original point, but Gibbard then asks one question: does the adjective 'good' pick out a property, or a concept? Properties, a naturalist like Gibbard claims, are all natural; but we have plenty of non-natural concepts.

Gibbard modifies Moore's test and claims that just because concepts are not identical, it may still be that the properties which the concepts pick out are identical. He elaborates:

> Claims are ethical, Moore thinks, when they involve, in an essential way, the specially ethical notions of good and bad. These notions are concepts, we can say, and they are non-naturalistic. Moore we can emend as proclaiming not non-natural properties, but non-naturalistic concepts. All properties are natural, but some concepts are non-naturalistic. (32)

Thus, Gibbard concludes, Moore's arguments are compatible with expressivism. This is obviously not what Moore himself would wanted, but that is not Gibbard's point. Gibbard's point is that this conclusion does not fail to pass Moore's test. Hence, Moore could not object to this interpretation.

Question: What is a concept? Is it something in the mind? Is it a relation between a thinker and the world? If either, what is a non-natural concept then, and is consistent with Gibbard's claim about natural properties?

Synthetic, *A Priori* Necessity:
How do we come to know moral truths? Do we do so by understanding the meanings of definitions? Do we do so by exercising our faculty of reason sufficiently? Must we go about the world and gather enough experience? Naturalists diverge into the following Gibbard described camps.

- **Ideal-Normal**: *Good*, for the ideal-normal theorist, is whatever passes this test:
    - every actual person would desire it to exist if that person were impartial, were normal as the actual run of people go, and had been aware, repeatedly and vividly, of all relevant facts (conversely for *bad*). Notice that this is an experience based account. This is in the spirit of Moore since it the good is not defined.

- **Definitional Naturalist**: Moral knowledge cannot rest on experience of the world, or this would introduce a regress which is vicious. Instead, moral knowledge is *a priori*, but is also analytic (and so a matter of definition setting). Notice that this is *not* an experience

based account. It would not satisfy Moore since it would define 'good' via natural definitions.

A Template to Match:

Gibbard does not think that Moore has succeeded in defeating all kinds of definitional naturalists, though Gibbard does grant that Moore has refuted some. One of the main points of this chapter, however, is to establish that perhaps a fully natural concept of 'good' can satisfy everything that the Moorean test requires without needing to be labeled non-natural.

> My claim now is this: that if clearly natural facts were all the facts there are, we would reason much as if there were facts of what to do. The concepts we use in this reasoning would behave, in many ways, like the non-naturalistic concepts proclaimed by my emended Moore. And reasoning with such concepts, as if there are such facts of what to do, is not to commit an error. (37)