The issue of moral luck is, according to Driver, an issue about how much/little control we have over of our actions. It is uncontroversial that we do not fully control how our intended actions actualize. If the actualizing of our intentions is, at least in part, a matter of luck, then moral responsibility begins to dissolve. After all, you don't praise someone for how hard they worked when they win the lottery. Praise and blame are tired to effort and action, but if luck is present in many / most / all of our actions, then it seems like we cannot justifiably praise or blame them (i.e. they become much less responsible for their actions).

Driver is careful to distinguish the ethical theories for which luck is, in her estimation, an actual problem. Kant, for example, faces no moral luck problem. Remember, Kant cares not one bit about how intentions and actions align. All that matters for moral appraisal is whether or not your will was motivated by duty. Consequences and actions do not matter.

It is important to note that while we focused on consequentialist theories that focused solely on actions (Mill's Utilitarianism), a consequentialist needn't do so. Some consequentialists argue that our intentions are what really matter. What really matters in moral assessment is what the agent expected to happen given their intentions. Success is judged in terms of your actions, but those actions aren't themselves what we morally appraise. Hence, though you may fail (perhaps due to luck) to bring about the action that you intended, if you did intend something good, then you are morally praiseworthy (and if you intend something bad, then you are morally blameworthy). Luck, therefore, does not pose a problem for these kinds of theories either.

Objective Consequentialism	**Subjective Consequentialism**	**Kantianism**
● Actions are the target of moral appraisal.	● Intentions are the target of moral appraisal, though we judge if we were successful by our actions.	● Intentions are the sole target of moral appraisal.
● Luck, which is seemingly present in all of our actions, undercuts moral responsibility.	● Luck may interfere in our succeeding to bring about the actions that we intended, but insofar as our intentions are good / bad, then we are still morally responsible.	● Luck doesn't matter at all since the target of moral appraisal is only our intentions.

The problem that luck poses, according to Driver, is for *objective consequentialists*. What these theories hold is that your actions are the target of moral appraisal. Hence, if luck does interfere in a large number of our actions, then we seem to not be blameworthy or praiseworthy. Driver intends to avoid this conclusion, and show that luck isn't a problem for objective consequentialists.

Driver wants to, first, get straight on what she thinks is the best account of luck. There are, in fact, two options.

- Subjective Luck / Epistemic Reductionism. Subjective luck is, at its core, a claim that all attributions of luck (i.e. whenever we say someone was lucky / unlucky) is merely a result of our being ignorant of all the relevant details involved in a given circumstance. For example, on this understanding of luck we consider someone lucky when they win the lottery merely because we were/are ignorant of all the details involved in winning the lottery. If we, for instance, knew every detail about the motion and location of each particle[1], then we could have known which numbers were going to come up in the lottery. Generalizing from this case, if we in fact knew enough / all of the relevant details of any supposed case of luck, then we could predict with absolute certainty what the outcome would be. Hence, it the circumstance would unfold as it must, and not as a matter of so-called luck.

- Objective Luck: Luck is objective in the sense that, according to Driver, events that are lucky / unlucky are a matter of the proportion of possible worlds where the circumstance occurs weighed against the worlds where the circumstance does not occur. So, when we say someone is lucky for winning the lottery, what this amounts to involves the following:
    - First, we hold fixed what happened in the actual world (you won the lottery)
    - Second, we look at worlds just like ours but where you in fact lost the lottery.
    - Then, we find out that the number of worlds where you lose the lottery are in fact lose the lottery is enormous, and the world where you win the lottery is just one of the possible worlds (since there is only one string of numbers that would mean that you won)
    - Finally, since the worlds where we win the lottery are so small, and the worlds where we win are so numerous, we consider ourselves lucky (the converse also holds for unlucky).

Why does Driver reject the subjective understanding of luck? Well, it might not be convincing, but her stated reason captured in a thought experiment:

> John rushes to the train station but, unfortunately, the train happens to be a bit early that day and he misses the it. However, while waiting for the next train he

[1] Schroeder be damned

> happens to meet Lucy. Eventually, John and Lucy get married and live happily ever after. John, however, has forgotten by that time that he met Lucy as a result of missing the train. No one else is aware of that fact. (pg 17)

Driver claims that, "the epistemic reductionist is in a bit of a bind with cases like this. To avoid the rather counterintuitive result that John, in fact, has not been lucky, the epistemic reductionist needs to idealize a bit. But if she idealizes too far, then there is no such thing as luck at all." For Driver, not counting John as lucking is too far.

I said it might not be a satisfying argument.

That being said, she goes on to explain how the objective account of luck allows the objective consequentialist to retain moral responsibility. She asks us to consider the case of the *evil klutz*. The evil klutz is someone:

> "who tries to harm people but instead ends up helping them. Let's assume this is part of his make-up, and in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds he is still an evil klutz, intending to harm but helping instead. Although the bad intentions, systematically across agents, produce bad outcomes, in his particular case they regularly do not. This evil klutz is not blamed to the extent that the competent evil person is. This is moral good fortune for the evil klutz. He has a bad character, of the sort that systematically produces bad outcomes in this world. He is deserving of blame for this, but not deserving of the same blame as the competent evil person who is actually harming others, and thus actually doing something wrong." (pg 25)

The evil klutz is, according to Driver, morally lucky. That is, in most worlds close to ours, when the klutz intends to harm, he usually succeeds. Certain intentions usually produce certain actions, and Driver explains this using possible worlds. That is why the klutz is lucky. But, you may be thinking, since the klutz didn't *do* anything wrong, and the objective consequentialist is focused on appraising *actions*, then we cannot blame the klutz for wanting to harm since he didn't actually harm, and that just was the moral luck problem Driver was supposed to avoid.

Driver's move is to claim that since those intentions usually result (in most close possible worlds the intention is actualized), we can blame the klutz for wanting to do bad since that normally results in bad actions. If the klutz wasn't a klutz, and he did do something bad, then we can blame him *both* for his intentions and for his actions. But, even though he was lucky, we can still blame him. The converse holds too. If you intend to do good, but are morally unlucky and a bad action follows, you are not blameworthy for the bad action, and are praiseworthy for the good intention.