3.1

It strikes Smith as odd that you could both believe that you ought to do something and yet lack a reason to do that very thing. Assuming that you do not have a *weakness of will* issue or some other psychological failure, my believing that I should φ brings with it my being motivated to φ. This rough idea is generally known as *internalism* / *internalism about reasons*. There are various ways to flesh out the details of this position, and so a few varieties of internalism are surveyed by Smith.

> **Full-Stop Internalism (my name)**
> If an agent judges that it is right for her to φ in circumstances C, then she is motivated to φ in C. (Moral judgment brings motivation with it [full-stop])
>
> **The Practicality Requirement on Moral Judgement**
> If an agent judges that it is right for her to φ in circumstance C, then either she is motivated to φ in C or she is practically irrational. (Agents who judge it right to act in various ways either are motivated to act or are irrational)
>
> **Rationalism**
> If it is right for agents to φ in circumstances C, then there is a reason for those agents to φ in C. (Moral facts are facts about our reasons for action; they are themselves simply requirements of rationality / reason)

While Smith denies the full-stop version, he endorses both Practicality and Rationalism. Not everyone, however, accepts these two principles. Rejecting both of them leads to a position known as *externalism*. In what follows, Smith sets out to fully describe both views, and then to defend both Rationalism and the Practicality Requirement against what were (at the time) recent objections.[1]

3.2

Smith thinks that Mackie draws a distinction between two quite different claims that a rationalist might make.[2] The first is the *conceptual question*. Given any question about whether or not φ exists, we may first seek to get clear on what the concept of φ amounts to. Then, after getting clear on the concept, we must ask the *substantive question*. In this sense, being substantive is to ask whether or not there is anything in the world that this concept picks out.

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[1] Smith also briefly fleshes out a 'hybrid position' in which someone rejects Rationalism but accepts Practicality. This, Smith claims, was the position of Ayer. (pg 62)

[2] The section of Mackie that is cited indicates that Smith is using 'rationalist' to refer to a theorist, like Kant, who claimed that morality was entirely a matter of rationality. This is consistent with Rationalism as Kant himself claimed that categorical imperatives were requirements on an agent regardless of the agent's desires. In order to avoid confusion, where I take Smith to be referring to someone like Kant, I will use lower-case 'r' rationalism, and where Smith seems to be referring to the moral feature Rationalism, I will use an upper-case 'r'. Confusing your readers is, in general, a *bad* way to write. 😵

For Mackie, this resulted in his conclusion that there are no objective moral values; there is no objective prescriptivity. The concept picks out no actually existing thing. Smith thinks that these same two questions can be posed to the internalist. Is rationalism a conceptual claim or a substantive claim?

If Rationalism is a conceptual claim, then our concept of a moral requirement is a concept of a reason for action. It is a requirement of rationality or reason. If it is a conceptual claim, then Rationalism is a claim about the best analysis of moral terms. If Rationalism is a substantive claim, then there are requirements of rationality or reason corresponding to the various moral requirements. If it is a substantive claim, then it is a claim about the authority of the theory of rational action. (pg 64) Smith takes Mackie to be claiming both that the rationalist's conceptual claim is true but that the substantive claim is false.[3] The remainder of this chapter is to be understood as Smith's version of getting clear on the conceptual analysis of Rationalism.

3.3

Smith quotes an argument from David Brink where Brink indirectly threatens the conceptual coherency of Rationalism. This threat is usually known as the 'amoralist challenge'. An amoralist is supposed to be the kind of person who can genuinely believe that, say, 'stealing is wrong' but also lacks any motivation to act on that belief. This, Brink claims, threatens the idea that Practicality is a conceptual truth.[4] If the amoralist is possible then Practicality is false (since there does not seem to be anything irrational about the amoralists believing that φ is what they ought to do, while lacking motivation to φ).

While it would be excellent for the proponent of Practicality if amoralists were impossible, there appear to be both fictional and nonfictional examples which cannot be ignored. The standard response is two-fold: 1) deny that the amoralist is making genuine moral judgements, 2) attempt to explain what they are doing instead of making moral judgements. The idea is that their *use* of the English symbols 'g-o-o-d' mirrors ours, but, for them, it *means* something different. They are both spelled and pronounced the same in English, but the sense with which we use it is supposedly *not* the sense with which they use it. Hence, their judging that *φ is good* (now understood to be a different sense of good than ours), combined with their lack of motivation, is not a counterexample to Practicality. While Smith rejects this twofold argument, he does think it is on the right path.

3.4

Essentially, Smith thinks people who endorse that response go one step too far. All that is needed is to deny that amoralists are making moral judgements. Offering an analysis of how the amoralist is using moral terms differently than us is a step too far. The internalist, Smith claims,

[3] I am disposed to this interpretation of Mackie myself. It is why the handout for *The Subjectivity of Values* was structured as it was.

[4] Conceptual truths tend to be characterized as inquiries about a things nature (think back to Smith's example of the concept of witch). They are usually contrasted with *empirical truths*. 'H2O is the chemical composition of water' is an empirical truth whereas 'no circle is a square' is a conceptual truth.

should simply state that amoralists try to make moral judgements, but they fail. It is helpful to formalize how Smith sees the argument, so I offer the following:

Amoralist
Use of moral terms is extensionally adequate
Using terms in an extensionally adequate way is sufficient for ‘mastery’ of the terms
Therefore, the amoralist is a counterexample to Practicality

As an analogy to this issue, Smith highlights a similar issue in the philosophy of color. The issue there is whether or not a visual experience of color is required for ‘mastery’ of the concept of that color. Some say yes, and others say no. The following table reflects the parallels insofar as they could help an internalist.

Blind Person	**Amoralist**
Use color terms is extensionally adequate	Use of moral terms is extensionally adequate
Using terms in an extensionally adequate way is not sufficient for ‘mastery’ of color terms	Using terms in an extensionally adequate way is not sufficient for ‘mastery’ of moral terms
Therefore, does not possess color concepts	Therefore, does not possess moral concepts
Therefore, does not make color judgements	Therefore, does not make moral judgements

The debate in both cases is whether or not the reliable use of certain terms is sufficient for ‘mastery’. If not, then the amoralist is not a threat to the internalist position. Smith concludes that it is prejudicial of Brinks to claim, without argument, that the amoralist does use moral terms with ‘mastery’. Afterall, it seems doubtful in the color case, so why assume it is in the amoralist case? The internalist, Smith claims, needn’t be worried that a bad or weak-willed person fails to have a reliable connection between their moral judgments and a corresponding motivation. Practicality allows for such individuals: they are practically irrational. Hence, unless Brinks can offer a response, we have no reason to think that the amoralist is a counterexample.

As a corollary of Smith’s response, it follows that ‘mastery’ of moral terms are part of why there is a reliable connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. This needs explanation since part of what Smith just introduced was a focus not on how moral motivation and moral judgment are reliably connected for all people, but that they are connected for good and strong-willed people.

3.5 (without appeal to the *de re* and *de dicto* distinction)[5]

Smith takes it for granted that good and strong-willed agents have a reliable connection between their moral judgements and the generation of the corresponding moral motivations. The task in this section is to see if the internalist or the externalist have the better explanation as to why.

The proponent of Practicality can explain why good and strong-willed agents reliably change motivation when a change in moral judgment occurs: it follows directly from the content of moral judgment itself (i.e. to judge something as good is, in part, to endorse it for yourself).[6] It is the nature of moral judgment that, when it occurs in a good and strong-willed agent, that this agent also acquires the corresponding motivation. In other words, when I judge that X is right, and they are good and strong-willed, then they must have the corresponding motivation. (pg 72-73) This may seem like 'table pounding', but most of you did agree that it would be very odd (irrational?) for someone to judge X as right without having the motivation. Insofar as we agree with that, then Smith is on strong intuitive grounds to pound the table.

Can the externalist make sense of this reliable connection in good and strong-willed agents? Smith thinks that they can, but instead of looking to the content of the moral judgment, the externalist must look to the content of moral motivation. If they started with the judgment first, then they would be essentially endorsing Practicality. (pg 73) Smith attempts to tease out what the externalist account of the content of moral motivation must look like.

Since the externalist is beginning with motivation, either their account is that we have specific motivations or general ones. If they were specific, then when I change my judgment about which political party to vote for, my motivation (according to the externalist) may not change. But, in good and strong-willed agents, it does change. So, the motivation must be something quite general. Smith proposes it is a very general motivation to *do the right thing*. Judging it right to vote for group X, combined with my general motivation to do the right thing, would explain why I am motivated to vote for X. My motivation to vote for X is *derived* from this very general desire and my judgment. When you change my mind that X is actually bad and Y is good, that judgment + my general motivation produce the new, derived motivation to vote for Y.

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[5] WV Quine gave a classic example of the difference. Take the claim that *Ralph believes that someone is a spy*. The *de re* reading is that *Ralph believes of somebody, x, that x is a spy*. The *de dicto* reading is that *Ralph believes that there is a spy, though he doesn't know who in particular it is*. (Quine 1956) *De dicto*, then, is about something having representational content without it being about something in particular (someone is a spy but I don't know who), whereas *de re* is about something in particular (someone is a spy and it is X!). For more, see: https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/de-re-de-dicto/v-1.

[6] And, as Smith says a bit later, the agent's judgment that it is right to φ in C is also not derived from some more fundamental judgment about what is right to do in C. The reason for this further qualification about not being derived stems from it being pretty clear that if you judge that it is right to φ in C because of a more fundamental judgment about what is right to do, then your motivation to φ is 'piggy-backign' on the more fundamental judgment. Practicality requires that at least some judgements produce the corresponding motivation *on their own*.

While this account is internally coherent it does not match, according to Smith, how good people are actually motivated. Good people are not motivated by some general motivation to do what is right. They are not motivated to be honest because honesty is derived from a judgment about honesty being right and a general motivation to be good. Good people care about honesty [full stop]. If we did operate that way, then we couldn't (for example) prefer our loved ones over strangers *without having gone through a derivation to see if our moral judgements and our general motivation allowed it*. Surely, Smith thinks, this is absurd. We are right to prefer our loved ones, and we don't need to think it through. Externalism, then, is a coherent but implausible account of moral psychology.[7]

Hence, according to Smith, if we have mastery over moral terms then we can make moral judgments which, in good and strong-willed people, produces the corresponding moral motivation. This is not the end of the challenges to the internalist position though. To Philippa Foot we now turn.

3.5 (with an appeal *de re* and *de dicto* distinction)

In essence, Smith thinks that externalism is committed to explaining the good and strong-willed person by appealing to their being a de dicto motivation which, in conjunction with various moral judgements about what is good, results in derived de re motivations. Smith finds this account of moral psychology to be implausible, and so externalism can be rejected.

Smith claims that the externalist must claim that the motivation for any specific action must be *derived* from some *de dicto* motivation to be good. If it wasn't, then the externalist could not explain how my *de re* motivation for a *de re* judgment changes when I am good and strong-willed. The externalist certainly can't allow that the judgment produces the motivation, so they must be derived from some *de dicto* motivation.

Let: DDM(rt) mean *de dicto motivation to do the right thing*; J(φ) mean *judges that* φ *is good*; DerM(φ) mean *derived motivation to* φ; A(φ) mean *act in accordance with* φ; DRM(φ) mean *de re motivation to* φ, ⇒ mean produces. Scenario 1: I judge that person X is the right person to vote for and I am motivated to vote for X. Scenario 2: You convince me that person X is not the right person to vote for, and that person Y is the right person to vote for.

The externalist explanation Scenario 1: DDM(rt) + J(voting for X is good) ⇒ DerM(vote for person X) ⇒ A(vote for Y)

The externalist explanation of Scenario 2: DDM(rt) + J(voting for X is bad) + J(voting for Y is good) ⇒ DerM(vote for Y) ⇒ A(vote for Y)

[7] It seems as though Smith thinks that this would, according to the externalist, be a conscious process. Surely we do not consciously reason, at least not all the time, in the way that Smith characterizes the externalist. But, could it be that we do have such derivative motivation where that derivation occurs at the sub-personal level?

Smith's reply to this is that good people do not have such derived motivations, Rather they do something like the following:

J(X is the best candidate) ⇒ DRM(vote for X) ⇒ A(vote for X)

Is Smith right that his version of what motivates good and strong-willed people is correct?

3.6

Philippa Foot's famous paper has main aims, one positive and the other negative. The negative project is a direct attack upon Kant, and the rationalists who would follow him. She argues very persuasively that moral facts are not facts about our reasons for actions. Her positive project involves her arguments for an anti-rationalist, intuitional account of moral facts. Smith's goal is to defend against her negative project.

As a quick reminder of Kant's general view, there are two kinds of imperatives (commands) that Kant distinguishes between: hypothetical imperatives, and categorical imperatives. The hypothetical variety *include* aspects of your psychology (goals, wants, desires, etc.) whereas the categorical do not. *If you want coffee, then go to Dunkin* is an example of a hypothetical, and *do not lie is* an example of a categorical.[8] For Kant, it is only the categorical imperatives which can be morally binding on us.

Foot, in response, claims that this leads to a dilemma. The first horn involves her exploiting a feature of categorical imperatives that seems to have eluded Kant. This feature is that not all categorical imperatives are rules of reason. Violating, say, the rules of etiquette is not to render oneself irrational. Hence, just because the categorical *should* is not dependent on features of one's psychology does not entail that the categorical should is a rule of reason.

The second horn, the Kantian seems to simply assert that categorical imperatives are moral requirements without offering us an explanation of why. True, they do not depend on specific features of our psychology - but so what? It is not incoherent, or unpopular, to claim that practical rationality involves assessing our possible actions by how well they get us to our goals. When I have a goal to achieve X, and then act in such a way to prevent my achieving X, I am (in general) acting irrationally. Hence, her argument here is as follows:

1. Rationalists are committed to the claim that morality is necessarily connected to practical rationality.
2. Rationalists are committed to the claim that practically rationality is to act for the right reason.
3. Rationalists are committed to the claim that what offers us the right reasons to act are the categorical imperatives only.

[8] It is often the case that examples of hypothetical imperatives take the form of conditional statements (i.e. if you want X, then do Y). While this is a natural way to initially think of the distinction, it is inaccurate. For example,

4. But, 3 is false.
5. So, 2 is false.
6. So, 1 is false.

Morality, for Foot, is what she calls a set of *institutional facts*.[9] If it turns out that these facts are just hypothetical imperatives, though, you may think (along with Kant) that we'll be moral only if it satisfies some self-serving or pleasure-producing goal(s). Though her full theory is outside the scope of this chapter, it may comfort you to know that Foot does think that we can avoid such a worry. We just cannot do so if we stay committed to the view that links rationality and morality. As she famously stated:

> "...the man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency." (MSHI, pg 310)

3.7

While Foot does not elaborate more on what is meant by *institutional facts*, Smith attempts to make sense of it with the H.L.A. Hart's account of legal rules spelled out in his 1961 book *The Concept of Law*. The question at issue for Hart is how the coercive measures of the legal system differ from the mere exercise of coercive force. Hart's answer, in essence, is that the law *guides* conduct and it guides conduct in accordance with a 'supreme rule of recognition'. This supreme rule is constituted by those who make the laws. Those who make the laws are moved by the laws, and that explains why coercion is used: to make you moved by the laws too.

This account of institutional facts is 'bad news' if moral requirements have a similar analysis. It's perfectly possible for someone to follow a law without being motivated as the sub-group who made the laws. Hence, if this is what Foot meant by institutional facts, then she rejects Practicality. Morally good people would, on this externalist account, be subject to the very same criticisms presented in 3.5. Hence, to the degree that externalism was successfully criticized in section 3.5, so too is Foot.

3.8

The basis for Foot's criticism of Kant, it will be remembered, relied on her argument that requirements of rationality are hypothetical imperatives. Hence, the requirements of morality are not requirements of rationality. Smith claims that such a view, though quite intuitive and historically well supported, lacks supporting argument.

Smith's response is to offer his own argument in favor of the view that the requirements of rationality are categorical imperatives. Though that is focus of chapter five, Smith does want to provide an argument here for the claim that categorical moral requirements are requirements of rationality.

[9] Though this comes not from MSHI but from her 1977 work *Approval and Disapproval*.

3.9

Here is the argument:

1. If rational agents are morally required to act in a certain way, then we expect them to act in that way.
2. If we expect moral agents to act in accordance with moral requirements, then we do so because these requirements are categorical.
3. Rational agents are morally required to act in a certain way.
4. Therefore, moral requirements are categorical.

The word doing the most work in this argument is ‘expect’. One complication is that when we expect someone to do something, we can either mean that we believe that they will do X, or that they should do X. Smith thinks that the only sensible way to interpret ‘expect’ is with the former rather than the latter. After all, once an agent judges that X is right, Practicality and Rationality apply.[10]

Additionally, the fact that we have an attitude of approval for those who do the right thing, and disapprove of those who do the wrong thing is evidence that moral requirements are categorical. Such attitudes are distinguished from mere liking and disliking. According to Foot, liking and disliking is allowable in a wide range of circumstances, whereas approval and disapproval are reserved for actions which satisfy or transgress the standards that you and I have agreed to. Approval and disapproval, then, relate to expectations in a way that liking and disliking do not.

Approval and disapproval are in place in the arena of rational decision making. Rational decision making, unlike a chess club, is not something that we ‘enter into’. We are just rational creatures bound by the rules of rational thought. It doesn’t even make sense to think about ‘entering into an agreement’ without presupposing rationality. So, Smith concludes, that Rationalism must be true (as a conceptual claim) simply because moral approval and disapproval presuppose it.

[10] Unless you are an expressivist (i.e. you accept Practicality but reject Rationality). In response to this, Smith invokes moral disagreement as evidence that, at least on the face of it, that expressivism is mistaken. (pg 86-87)