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Even setting aside the issues about cross-cultural comparisons, and the testability issues just surveyed, there is a disagreement argument yet to be addressed. Two versions of the disagreement argument arise: *expert vs. non-expert disagreement* and *expert vs. expert disagreement*. The expert vs. non-expert is, according to Sosa, easy to solve: we shouldn't take

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Phrase differently, the problem is whether or not there is progress in philosophy (akin to the progress we see in science). Aside from logic and the history of philosophy, the discipline itself has produced little knowledge. Such a fact is at odds with the history of science. Science has a distinctive methodology which allows for progress. That being said, Sosa distinguishes between two different kinds of expert disagreement: (i) disagreement about answers to agreed upon questions, and (ii) disagreement about the questions themselves.

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Here Sosa shifts to a discussion of philosophical methodology more generally which would include not only bare intuitions, but also argumentation, public dialectic, and whatever forms of explanatory inference might be of use in our discipline. In essence, Sosa claims that our methodology is applied in many other domains (such as art, morality, and politics). The question, then, is not just about the viability of intuitions, but about what hope there is in domains which are 'vital' but unscientific. (pg 464) To simply take an agnostic attitude towards all non-scientific domains would be to 'check out of life'. Intuition may be like scientific observation even though we hold less hope for its reliability. Perhaps the peer disagreement problem for philosophy is akin to the pessimistic induction for the scientific method, and in responding to the pessimistic induction, the philosophical method will find new life.[2]

And, finally, even if serious divergence is revealed experimentally, there may still be some wiggle room for armchair philosophers.

> "Unless we can spot reasons to suspect relevantly different positioning, or divergence of competence, we should suspect divergence of meaning, as this will quite possibly best explain the persistent ostensible disagreement." (pg 466)

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1-3

It is claimed by the critic that intuitive responses to cases disagree to such a degree that the entire project of philosophy can be called into doubt. Disagreement about intuitions, it is further claimed, show that there is not some grand and objective philosophical order to things.[1] No fancy explanation is needed about intuition; the skeptic holds that they are just reflections of the intuiters culture and/or socioeconomic status, and/or upbringing, etc.

If philosophers are to justify their use of intuitions, there is a question about what sense of 'justify' is required. Sosa surveys the standard ways of understanding epistemic justification by unpacking a simplified version of a common account: *foundationalism*.

In order to avoid an infinite regress of justification (even if one is a coherentist) we need something which can confer justification without being a belief. Perception and introspection are the two that Sosa discusses. Both, however, run into the famous 'speckled hen problem'. According to the speckled hen problem, there are aspects of our mental states, such as the rich detail of one's present visual experience, that we are not capable of knowing—e.g., if one is looking at a speckled hen, there will be a determinate number of speckles in one's visual experience, which one will not be able to know just in virtue of having the experience (Ayer 1940, Chisholm 1989) in response to this, Sosa claims that we need to involve the notion of *competence*.

> "Intellectual competence requires more than free-floating coherence. There is a broader competence that more fully constitutes knowledge. What in general renders a belief competent? Often it is the belief's being based rationally on other beliefs competently formed in their own right. But that can't go on forever, nor can each of a set of beliefs be competent by being based rationally on the others, and nothing more. Some beliefs must be competent through something other than support from other beliefs (at least in part through something other than that)." (pg 455)

When a subject is competent, then they will have reasons for the perceptual and/or introspective beliefs that they form. These kinds of competently formed beliefs are reliably true. This, however, is not all that there can be to foundational competence. Blindsight, for example, allows some patients to navigate around objects that they are not consciously aware of and yet their brain appears to have processed the object's visual data. Such patients appear to be employing concepts in a way similar to belief formation (at least at a subpersonal level). Though blindsight isn't a highly reliable process, it could have been. Sosa generalizes from this:

> Intuitions are seemings based on nothing beyond sheer understanding of the question. Such seemings are conceptual: assent requires understanding, and understanding requires concepts. This distinguishes seemings from sensory experiences. One can experience contents that one could not entertain in

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> thought, for lack of the required concepts. In contrast, seemings are conceptual deployments, and rationally evaluable as such. (pg 456-457)

4-5

By dropping the focus on experiences, and replacing it with Sosa's notion of competency, he claims to recover many classic epistemic debates without having *experience* muddying the waters. Does this help us justify intuitions? Not yet, as we need a way to distinguish intuitions that are epistemically justified from those that are not. Like blindsight cases, perhaps justified intuitions are those which are competently formed even if they are formed at the sub-personal level.

> What's distinctive of justified intuitions, I suggest, is that they manifest an epistemic competence, a rational ability to discern the true from the false, and to do so reliably. (458)

What we need, then, is a way to confirm the reliability of such intuitions. Without a way to confirm them, they are 'deplorably untestable' and not subject to 'rational correction'. Part of Sosa's answer here relies on other work he has done on the difference between what he calls *animal* and *reflective* knowledge.

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