

In this chapter Gibbard attempts to resolve the Frege-Geach problem. In order to do this, Gibbard introduces us to a variety of mental machinery.

“A **contingency plan** deals with situations one might be in. In a situation there is a set of alternatives that are open to one. A plan is **complete**, for a situation, if for each alternative in this set it either rules out that alternative or permits it.”

“A **hyperplan**, we can stipulate, covers any occasion for choice one might conceivably be in, and for each alternative open on such an occasion, to adopt the plan involves either rejecting that alternative or rejecting rejecting it...An important requirement of consistency for a plan is that it must not rule out every alternative open on an occasion. A plan that did that—even a partial plan—would preclude offering any guidance on what to do on that occasion.”

“An **occasion**, as I have characterized it, contains much that the agent has no way of knowing, but one’s plans must respond to features of the occasion available to the agent...We might think of an occasion for action as given by a triple $\langle w, i, t \rangle$ consisting of a possible world w , an agent i , and a time t at which agent i in world w has something to decide.”

“A set of judgments is **consistent** if there is a hyperstate that every judgment in the set allows. It is inconsistent otherwise: it is **inconsistent** if every possible hyperstate is ruled out by one or another of the judgments in the set.”

“The **content** of a state of mind that mixes fact with plan, we can now say, is given by the hyperstates that it allows and the ones it rules out.”

“What, indeed, do I do in **accepting** any disjunction? I rule out a possibility. A disjunction A or B , as we all know, precludes the case where A and B are both false.”

“What do these states of “**ruling out**” or “**rejecting**” amount to? Consider plain belief: to reject belief in gods, as I mean the term, is to disagree with the belief that gods exist. The convinced agnostic does no such thing. She shuns belief in the gods and shuns disbelief in them too, but she doesn’t, in my sense, “reject” belief in the gods. She suspends both agreement and disagreement with theistic belief.”

“This maximally specific combination of decisional and factual content we might call a **fact-prac** world.”

“And one is in what I’ve been calling a “**decided state**” of mind if and only if some fact-prac world is the content of one’s combined beliefs and decisions.”

Remember that the Frege-Geach problem is basically a question: how is it that moral words have so many linguistic properties in common with non-moral words (what they contribute to complex sentences) given that the non-cognitivist claims that moral words have entirely different meanings than non-moral words? Gibbard's answer is quite simple.

For Gibbard, there is basically a proto-logical process that one undergoes when we create our contingency plans. As Gibbard says, "We pass easily, after all, between talk of the mental activity of planning, on the one hand, and the content of planning on the other... Combining, rejecting, and generalizing apply to mental operations, which then have a content. The content is expressible with the logical operators of conjunction, negation, and quantification. These logical devices mirror the mental operations of combining, rejecting, and generalizing."

So the reason that the Frege-Geach problem seems forceful is because there is an isomorphism between how we logically frame sentences and reasoning, and the mental activity that those logical processes express. "Instead of a table with 't' for true and 'f' for false, we can construct a like-appearing table where 't' means allows and 'f' means rules out." So for a normal logical connective like disjunction, the proto-logical process would have a table identical:

P	Q	$P \vee Q$
T	T	T
T	F	T
F	T	T
F	F	F

P	Q	$P \vee^* Q$
A	A	A
A	RO	A
RO	A	A
RO	RO	RO

Disjunction is truth-functional, and fully cognitive. Acceptance / Ruling Out is not. The reason that the Frege-Geach problem arises is because we do not appreciate that the truth-functional arises from our subjective preferences for plan acceptance and rejection. Once we have our

plan(s), we express them truth-functionally - but they are just expressions of our plans. So, our plans (moral claims) are not truth-functional.

Problems for his view:

Is this a solution to the Frege-Geach problem? Take the following case of *modus ponens*:

1. It is wrong to murder.
2. If it is wrong to murder, then it is wrong for me to encourage my sister to murder.
3. Therefore, it is wrong for me to encourage my sister to murder.

In standard logic, you cannot get 3 without both 1 and 2. However, in Gibbard's framework of plans and acceptance, it seems that you can bypass the need to 2. That is because 'it is wrong to murder' boils down to a plan whereby 'wrong' means something like 'I rule out murder'. This plan of mine must be, according to Gibbard, consistent (i.e. my judgements must be allowable in my contingency plans). But then, 3 just says that I couldn't encourage my sister to do something that I consider ruled out. But we already know that 3 follows from 1 since denying 3 would be inconsistent with 1. Premise 2 is doing nothing here.

Gibbard, however, claimed that logical arguments such as this are valid on his proposed understanding of valid. But logically speak, 2 is necessary for the inference to work. Not so according to his proto-logical mental processes. 1 entails 3 on his view. This failure at isomorphism actually means that Gibbard has not answered the Frege-Geach problem - he has made it worse.

The second problem is more general. Suppose that the previous criticism didn't work, and, in fact, Gibbard's solution solved the Frege-Geach problem. Is there any reason to believe that we have such proto-logical processes that generate our logical ones? Simply making expressivism consistent with what cognitivist claim is not the same thing as convincing us to adopt expressivism. Many aspects, for example, of Newtonian mechanics can be made consistent with relativistic physics, but that doesn't mean we should continue to believe in Newtonian mechanics. Has Gibbard told us why we should adopt this explanation, or has he only shown us that it could be true?