

Williams recap:

- Williams argued that an agent's reasons depend on his psychological makeup, specifically on the contents of his "subjective motivational set" – a set which includes his desires, projects, loyalties, and commitments, as well as his "dispositions of evaluation" and "patterns of emotional reaction."
- "There is a reason for A to  $\phi$ " or "A has a reason to  $\phi$ " are true only if there is a "sound deliberative route" from A's subjective motivational set to the conclusion to  $\phi$  (or the conclusion that A should  $\phi$ ).

Two cases:

- Gin / Petrol: If the agent employed a sound deliberative route, they would have a reason to not drink the contents of the glass, but
- The nasty husband would not.

Such a view of reasons casts doubt on there being any categorical account of morality. Brunero intends to undermine three recent attempts to cash out Williams' notion of a 'sound deliberative route'. The idea being that if there is no good way to understand sound deliberation in the internalist framework, then internalism can be rejected. The upshot is that if there are only two options (internalism and externalism) then externalism wins by default.

### Analogy Between Practical and Theoretical Reasons

If there is just one concept of *reasons* then any light shed by an analysis of theoretical reasons would illuminate practical reasons. On the assumption that there is just one concept, Brunero proceeds.

Theoretical reasons are reasons for belief. Goldman claims (as do many others) that the constitutive aim of belief is truth. A successful belief, then, is a true belief. A reason for belief is an indicator of the truth of the belief. If some psychological state fails to be aimed at truth, it fails to count as a belief.<sup>1</sup>

This leads to an immediate problem since it is plausible that a belief being aimed at truth may be a sub-personal piece of our psychological makeup. If so, then these theoretical reasons are (at least sometimes) categorical (since they are not based on our desires). Goldman, however, doesn't seem to recognize this.

Despite that, Goldman claims that this view of theoretical reasons helps us understand practical reasons. Actions are successful when they fulfill the motivations that prompt the actions.

- Brunero's case of kicking the garage door (pg 5)
- Goldman's reply involves a distinction between *shallow* and *deep* desires.
- This reply, Brunero points out, changes the view.

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<sup>1</sup> It could be, for example, a hope or a wish.

- Now the view claims that it is part of the concept of action that an action is correct just when it maximally satisfies one's desires.

Another internalist who appeals to the analogy is Julia Markovits. She argues that just as your reasons for belief, *for the most part*, depend only upon what you already believe and the standards of procedural rationality, your reasons for action depend only upon what you already desire and the standards of procedural rationality. She, however, thinks that internalism about theoretical reasons is false since sensory data can give you a reason to believe something regardless of your antecedent beliefs. This, she claims, is not the case with practical reasons. There is nothing external that could provide such a reason.

- Brunero's case of the doctor that is negligent (pg 9)
- Upshot: sometimes theoretical reasons are constrained by the available evidence
- Additionally, Brunero offers variations on the doctor case to help justify when an agent is appropriately the target for blame or criticism.

### Reasoning With Others

Kate Manne appeals to the relationship between reasons and the social practice of reasoning with others.

- Some consideration is a reason for an agent to  $\phi$  only if that agent would come to recognize that consideration as a reason after her ideal advisor reasons with her.

Add to Manne's claim that of Judgment Internalism:

- The recognition of a consideration as a reason to  $\phi$  must involve a motivation to  $\phi$

Then we get:

- a person has a reason to  $\phi$  only if she would be motivated to  $\phi$  after her ideal advisor reasons with her.

Why accept the first bullet point?

- A reason for an agent A to  $\phi$  is a consideration which would be apt to be cited in favor of A's  $\phi$ -ing, by her ideal advisor, who is reasoning with her in an ideal way about what she ought to do.
- The ideal advisor is someone who is in the best position to play the social role of reasoning with A; she is "the person who is best suited to 'getting through' to her, morally." This social role is also characterized by Manne as that of "reasoning with her, or (similarly) offering her collaborative advice or friendly suggestions, about what she ought to do.
- This ideal advisor adopts the interpersonal stance which requires that the advisor treat the advisee as a sovereign creature both equipped and entitled to make her own decisions and over whom she has no authority.

Brunero replies:

- Manne's view still allows that the nasty husband still has no reason to be kind.
- Would our advisor cite true reasons or merely rhetorically effective reasons? It seems like truth should win, but on Manne's view, the advisor is concerned with persuading us.

But, according to Manne, the truth of a reasons claim isn't a separate matter from its rhetorical effectiveness. So, these replies beg the question.

Brunero replies:

- If we assume that there is just one concept of reasons, then Manne's account of practical reasons wouldn't help us understand theoretical reasons. It is commonly held that one's reasons for belief are provided by the available evidence (see the modified doctor case above). If I was brainwashed, however, then I wouldn't be sensitive to the evidence even after my ideal advisor reasoned with me
- There are more practices besides reasoning with others that are important to normativity than just reasoning with others. There is also reasoning about others.
  - Bernie case (pg 16)
  - If we idealize that kind of reasoning, we'd get an additional list to the reasoning with list.
  - Use both.
- Also, just because something does not persuade someone, this does not show that that something is false. Additionally, a kind husband doesn't need to be reasoned with to be kind (and may take offense at the attempted discussion). This does not change the truth of the claim that his spouse's needs and interests constitute such a reason.

One final wrinkle is that internalists cannot allow that there are reasons for my desires.

Goldman holds this view. It gives rise to the extensional objection:

- internalism is unable to recognize a class of reasons that intuitively exists – namely, reasons for intrinsic desires.

### Good Deliberation

Hille Paakkunainen has argued for internalism by starting with a conceptual connection between an agent's reasons and a motivation to act when one has deliberated well.

- Deliberative Constraint: The fact that  $p$  is a (decisive) normative reason for  $A$  to  $\phi$  only if  $A$  would  $\phi$  because  $p$  if  $A$  deliberated well.

When we combine this with the Williams styled view that deliberation must proceed from the agent's existing motivations, then we get another version of reasons internalism. Additionally, Williams required correcting for false beliefs (see the gin / petrol case above).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> It is not clear what Williams meant by using the term *sound* here. There is a logical notion of soundness whereby an argument is both valid and has all true premises. Whether Williams meant this or something less formal was, last time I heard Brunero speak about it, not a settled matter.

Brunero considers a variety of ways to resist this version of internalism:

- McDowell claims that deliberating well requires having the motivations that a virtuous person has. This results in rendering the nasty husband as having reason to be kind since that is what would motivate the virtuous person.
- Reject the deliberative constraint due to concerns about the conditional fallacy.  
Example: If I were deliberating perfectly well, then I wouldn't be motivated to improve my deliberations. But, my actual deliberating is faulty, and so I *\*should\** be so motivated. Also, James Bond and Nate cases (pg 20 - 21)
- After explaining possible responses to the Bond and Nate cases, Brunero responds to the responses 😊
  - Reasons for something seem to connect with the concept of ought. If you ought to do something, then you have the most reason to do that something. *Being glad* or *being dismayed* are not so connected. So, Nate ought to go into the living room. The deliberative constraint denies that Nate has this reason, and so he ought not to go into the living room which is the wrong conclusion.
  - The case of Kate vs Nate. (pg 24) In short, the explanation that defenders of the deliberative constraint would have to give to distinguish Nate from Kate doesn't track anything of normative significance.
  - In response to Paakkunainen, sometimes we end up doing what we ought to do by sheer accident. When the glass contains poison and tonic, rather than petrol, I should absolutely not drink it. But, instead of recognizing this by deliberation, I may just forget that I had the drink given some other factors of the party (e.g. engrossing conversation).

## Conclusion

Unpacking what a Williams-styled internalist account of deliberation amounts to is, as we have now seen, tricky. Appealing to an analogy between practical and theoretical reasons did not seem to help. Appealing to how we reason with others was incomplete. Appealing to the relationship between reasons and good deliberation rendered the wrong verdict. As such, Brunero concludes that the internalist options on offer fail to provide us with sufficient reason to accept internalism, nor any of the entailments from it.