

# Handout: Arthur Matas — “The Case for Living Kidney Sales”

## Context of the Article

Arthur J. Matas, a transplant surgeon, argues that due to the widening gap between kidney supply and demand, we should seriously consider a **regulated system of compensated living kidney donation**. This paper surveys the medical background, ethical arguments, and practical concerns surrounding such a system.

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## 1. The Medical and Policy Background

### Key Developments in Kidney Transplantation

- Advances in immunosuppressive drugs have made transplantation far more successful than in the past.
- Survival rates for kidney transplant recipients are **significantly higher** than for patients who remain on dialysis.
- Waiting times for deceased-donor kidneys have risen from ~1 year historically to **over 5 years** today.
- More than **6% of candidates die each year** while on the transplant waiting list.

### The Organ Shortage

- Living donation has increased in recent decades, but still falls far short of demand.
- Deceased-donor supply has plateaued.
- Even if every potential deceased donor became an actual donor, supply would still be insufficient.

### Existing Innovations (Insufficient Alone)

- ABO-incompatible transplant protocols.
- Paired exchanges.
- List-paired exchanges.
- Nondirected (altruistic) donation.

These strategies help but cannot close the supply gap.

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## 2. Matas's Proposal: A Regulated System of Kidney Sales

### Core Features of a Regulated Market

- **Fixed payment** to the vendor from the government or a designated agency.
- **Standardized allocation** of kidneys (not to the highest bidder).
- **Uniform evaluation and follow-up** protocols for vendors.
- **Strong safeguards** to protect the vendor's health, autonomy, and long-term well-being.
- Payment is structured so that it does not reduce welfare benefits or increase tax burdens.

### How This Differs from Unregulated Markets

- No private brokers or bidding.
- No exploitation through lack of medical oversight.

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- Vendors receive full payment; standards of care are enforced.
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## 3. Ethical Framework

Matas engages the four standard principles of biomedical ethics:

### 1. **Respect for Autonomy**

- Individuals should have the right to make choices about their own bodies, including selling an organ.

### 2. **Beneficence**

- Kidney sales could save lives and greatly improve quality of life for transplant recipients.

### 3. **Nonmaleficence**

- Since risks for living donation and compensated donation are medically identical, banning sales on grounds of harm would imply we should also ban living altruistic donation.

### 4. **Justice**

- A regulated system could expand access and potentially decrease socio-economic disparities in transplant outcomes.
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## 4. Arguments in Favor of Kidney Sales

### A. Saving Lives and Reducing the Shortage

- Most direct argument: more kidneys become available, reducing deaths on the waiting list.

- Empirical studies show transplant recipients have lower mortality than dialysis patients.

## **B. Consistency With Existing Practices**

- Society already permits:
  - Living kidney donation (more medically risky than donating blood or sperm).
  - Sale of bodily materials (blood, sperm, eggs).
  - Compensation for surrogate motherhood.
- If donation is allowed, Matas argues compensation should not suddenly make it immoral.

## **C. Respect for Autonomy**

- Prohibiting sales is paternalistic and denies individuals the freedom to make decisions about their own bodies.

## **D. Eliminating Harmful Underground Markets**

- Unregulated kidney sales already occur globally in dangerous conditions.
- A regulated market could:
  - Eliminate brokers.
  - Improve safety and payment fairness.
  - Prevent medical exploitation.

## **E. Cost-Effectiveness**

- In the U.S., paying vendors (up to ~\$100,000) could be **cost-neutral** compared with long-term dialysis expenses.
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## 5. Arguments Against Kidney Sales (and Matas's Responses)

### A. Exploitation of the Poor

**Objection:** The poor will feel pressured to sell.

**Matas's Response:**

- Hard choices are not the same as coercion.
- Society already permits risky jobs disproportionately filled by the poor.
- Selling a kidney may improve a vendor's quality of life.
- A regulated system could include safeguards (income thresholds, screening for voluntariness).

### B. Commodification of the Body

**Objection:** Treating the body as a commodity undermines human dignity.

**Matas's Response:**

- No evidence that individuals who sell eggs, sperm, or gestational services lose dignity.
- "My kidney is not my humanity": dignity resides in rational agency, not in retaining all body parts.
- People who value bodily integrity can simply refuse to participate.

### C. Harm to the Vendor

**Objection:** Vendors might die or suffer complications.

**Matas's Response:**

- Risk is the same as for living donors, whose actions are widely accepted.

- Death of a vendor may be emotionally unsettling, but the medical risk is not ethically distinguishable from donor risk.

## **D. Lack of Genuine Consent**

**Objection:** Financial incentives undermine voluntariness.

**Matas's Response:**

- Payment is not coercion; coercion requires threats.
- Screening and informed consent processes already exist for living donors and could be extended to vendors.

## **E. Negative Effects on Altruistic Donation**

**Objection:** Payment would reduce altruistic donation.

**Matas's Response:**

- Evidence does not show this.
- Some people prefer known donors; others will still seek preemptive transplants.
- A vendor system could actually reduce family coercion.

## **F. Loss of Trust (in Physicians or Government)**

**Objection:** Physicians or the government would be seen as exploiting the vulnerable.

**Matas's Response:**

- Proper regulation and transparency can preserve trust.
  - Comparable sensitive programs (e.g., surrogacy) have not undermined medical trust.
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## 6. Practical Challenges in Implementing a Regulated System

### Key Design Questions

#### 1. Vendor eligibility criteria

- Minimum age?
- Geographic limitations?

#### 2. Vendor follow-up and long-term health care

- Who pays for complications?
- How to track long-term outcomes?

#### 3. Payment logistics

- Lump sum vs. structured payments.
- Interaction with taxes, welfare, debt obligations.

#### 4. Health verification and fraud prevention

- How to ensure accurate reporting of medical history?

#### 5. Organ allocation procedures

- Maintain fairness similar to deceased-donor allocation.

#### 6. Setting a uniform price

- Fixed vs. variable prices?
- Higher payment for higher-quality kidneys?

#### 7. Limiting sales to kidneys

- Should markets include partial liver or lung donations?
  - Higher risks make these ethically more complex.
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## 7. Insights on Public Opinion

- Surveys show the **general public is more open** to organ sales than medical professionals.
  - Physicians' and nurses' reluctance is a barrier, since transplantation cannot occur without clinical participation.
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## 8. Matas's Conclusion

Matas does not claim that kidney sales are unquestionably ethical. Instead, he argues that:

- The current ban results in preventable deaths.
- A regulated system **could** be ethically justified and may be preferable to the status quo.
- The debate must include transplant professionals and the broader public, not just bioethicists.