BENZENE: A Practical Root Cause Analysis System with an Under-Constrained State Mutation

Younggi Park, Hwiwon Lee, Jinho Jung, Hyungjoon Koo, Huy Kang Kim












Software Crash?

Software Crash




Software Crash






① Behavior Collection

Collect both crashing and non-crashing behaviors







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


② Difference Observation

Extract predicates that statistically describe a crashing condition







- ① Behavior Collection
 - Collect both crashing and non-crashing behaviors

② Difference Observation


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
③ Predicate Ranking


Rank the extracted predicates by their suspiciousness
















• CVE-2019-6977: A heap buffer overflow due to the insufficient size allocation

```
int gdImageColorMatch (...) {
          ...
buf = malloc(0x28 * colorsTotal);
for (x=0; x < sx; x++) {
    for ( y=0; y < sy; y++ ) {
         bp = buf + (color * 5);
          (*(bp++))++;
          ...
}</pre>
```




Program Memory




Program Memory


buf 0x28 byte




Program Memory buf 0x28 byte



Program Memory buf 0x28 byte





Real-world Example: PHP

Let's locate the root cause of this example

• colorsTotal : Observed values for colorsTotal

```
int gdImageColorMatch(...) {
          ...
buf = malloc(0x28 * colorsTotal);
for (x=0; x < sx; x++) {
    for ( y=0; y < sy; y++ ) {
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}</pre>
```

Behavior Sample	colorsTotal	Crash?

• Crash? (Yes/No) denotes whether the program has crashed for a given behavior

```
int gdImageColorMatch(...) {
          ...
buf = malloc(0x28 * colorsTotal);
for (x=0; x < sx; x++) {
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Behavior Sample	colorsTotal	Crash?


• First, we have the behavior of **the given input** that (obviously) crashes

Behavior Sample	colorsTotal	Crash?	
Crash	0x1	Yes	


• Suppose behavior #1 is collected (colorsTotal is 0x400)

Behavior Sample	colorsTotal	Crash?	
Crash	0x1	Yes	
#1	0x400	No	

• Suppose behavior #1 is collected (colorsTotal is 0x400)




• Suppose behavior #1 is collected (colorsTotal is 0x400)



• Similarly, suppose we additionally collected 4 program behaviors...


Behavior Sample	colorsTotal	Crash?
Crash	0x1	Yes
#1	0×400	No
#2	0x60	Yes
#3	0×80	No
#4	0x79	Yes
#5	0×20	Yes

• Observe a difference between crashing and non-crashing behaviors




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
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• Observe a difference between crashing and non-crashing behaviors





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Observe a difference between crashing and non-crashing behaviors





Extracting Crashing Condition

Extract the predicates for the rest of the variables using the same method

extract predicates using the same method

Extracting Crashing Condition

Crashing condition that consists of three predicates

```
for ()

Crashing Condition

p_1 := \text{colorsTotal} < 0 \times 80


p_2 := \text{sx} > 0 \times 0

p_3 := \text{sy} > 0 \times 0

Micates using method
```

Extracting Crashing Condition

Crashing condition that consists of three predicates




Essentials of root cause analysis?


" $p_1 := colorsTotal < 0x80"$

• Suppose non-crashing behavior #1 and #3 were not collected...

Collected Behaviors




• Then, no behavioral difference exists for colorsTotal...




They are NOT included anymore


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
• Our synthesized crashing condition will not contain the root cause



• Our synthesized crashing condition will not contain the root cause



• Our synthesized crashing condition will not contain the root cause



The root cause p_1 is not extracted!!

Crashing Condition $p_1 := \text{colorsTotal} \leftarrow 0 \times 80$ $p_2 := \text{sx} > 0 \times 0$ $p_3 := \text{sy} > 0 \times 0$

• Behaviors with the following two conditions at the same time

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 - ① Non-crashing behaviors
 - We should observe the behavioral differences comparing to crashing ones


- Behaviors with the following two conditions at the same time
 - ① Non-crashing behaviors
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 - ② Similar behaviors with the original crash
 - If not, the observed differences would not be relevant to the root cause


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
Crash-similar *AND* non-crashing behavior!


How do we get such key behaviors?

Fuzzing with a given crash
(Crash Exploration)










But, they exhibit <u>*NO*</u> behavioral differences associated with the root cause




Root Cause Revealing Behavior

• CVE-2019-6977 requires...

```
<?php
  $img1 = imagecreatetrucolor(0xfff, 0xfff);
  $img2 = imgcreate(0xfff, 0xfff);
  imagecolorallocate($img2, 0, 0, 0);

imagesetpixel($img2, 0, 0, 0x80);
  imagecolormatch($img1, $img2);
?>
```




```
<?php
  $img1 = imagecreatetrucolor(0xfff, 0xfff);
  $img2 = imgcreate(0xfff, 0xfff);
  for ($i = 0; $i < 255; $i+=1) {
    imagecolorallocate($img2, 0, 0, 0);
  }
  imagesetpixel($img2, 0, 0, 0x80);
  imagecolormatch($img1, $img2);
}</pre>
```


Our Idea:


Under-Constrained State Mutation


We forcefully mutate **a program state** in the middle of execution!

here









Source Code

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Machine Code

```
jle 0x555555800bc9
lea esi, [rax+rax*4]
xor edx, edx
...
```

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int gdImageColorMatch(...)
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          ...
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
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
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
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```

Machine Code







State mutation can obtain the root cause revealing behavior

```
<?php
  $img1 = imagecreatetrucolor(0xfff, 0xfff);
  $img2 = imgcreate(0xfff, 0xfff);
  imagecolorallocate($img2, 0, 0, 0);

imagesetpixel($img2, 0, 0, 0x80);
  imagecolormatch($img1, $img2);
?>
```



```
<?php
  $img1 = imagecreatetrucolor(0xfff, 0xfff);
  $img2 = imgcreate(0xfff, 0xfff);
  for ($i = 0; $i < 255; $i+=1) {
    imagecolorallocate($img2, 0, 0, 0);
  }
  imagesetpixel($img2, 0, 0, 0x80);
  imagecolormatch($img1, $img2);
}</pre>
```

Is the discovered behavior valid?

Validity Problem

- Typical Fuzzing (e.g., AFL, libfuzzer, ...)
 - It is for the bug (vulnerability) discovery
 - It must *validate* the <u>reachability</u> of the discovered behaviors

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Unfortunately, our state mutation does not guarantee reachability

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- Crash Exploration (for root cause analysis)
 - The bug (i.e., crash) is already given
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 - The bug (i.e., crash) is already given
 - What we need is to extract the crashing condition

preserved even with our state mutation!!

Which state should we mutate?

There are tons of states even in a single (crashing) execution

- State mutation in <u>a function granularity</u>
 - Similar to <u>LibFuzzer</u> and <u>in-memory fuzzing</u> techniques
 - Speed acceleration using fork()

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
Target Function!!



```
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
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
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- Target function extraction
 - Focusing on <u>crash-related functions</u>
 - Following data-flow & derefence edges




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
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
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 - Parameters, global variables, ...

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
- State mutation in a function granularity • Similar to LibFuzzer and in-memory fuzzing techniques Speed acceleration using fork() Target function extraction • Focusing on crash-related functions Following data Function behaviors are (solely) decided by entry nodes!! Target Function
- Focusing on instructions that use the values from outside of a function
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
- We collect 60 bugs from real-world applications
 - Targets include PHP, Python, SQLite, PDF reader, ...


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
- Our dataset spans 11 bug classes
 - heap overflow, integer overflow, UAF, ...

- BENZENE
- ARCUS
- AURORA









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- Under-constrained state mutation can efficiently discover the desired behaviors
- We introduce BENZENE, a root cause analysis system based on the under-constrained state mutation
- We evaluate BENZENE on 60 real-world bugs, successfully locating 93.3% root causes

Things Not Covered in This Talk

- Automatic predicate extraction
- Justification of validity problem for non-crashing behaviors
- Crashing behavior handling
- Detailed state mutation strategies
- Similarity-based ranking algorithm

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If interested, we encourage you to read our paper!!

Thank you!

• grill66@korea.ac.kr

• https://github.com/zer0fall/BENZENE