Democracy's Intrinsic Value

Introduction to Political Theory
Department of Political Economy
King's College London

I. What's at Stake in this Debate

II. Justice vs. Authority

III. Democracy and Equality

IV. Intrinsic and Instrumental Value: False Dichotomy?

Instrumental Value

Something is valuable because it *causally* contributes to a good outcome

A hammer only has value insofar as it helps to realize something else of value

Intrinsic Value

Something is valuable because of some qualities inherent to it or without regard to what it causally contributes to

(Some) art has *intrinsic value* because of its beauty

Intrinsic and instrumental values are both reasons that could weigh into our decision-making (why should we obey outcomes of democratic procedures?)

Important: Intrinsic value does not mean absolute value. It just means we have a pro tanto reason to do something.

Intrinsic and instrumental values are both reasons that could weigh into our decision-making

Why should we obey outcomes of democratic procedures?

Do we have reasons just because of the structure of the procedure?

Important: Intrinsic value does not mean absolute value. It just means we have a pro tanto reason to do something.

Democracy could be *intrinsically valuable* but there could be reasons that are *stronger than those intrinsic values* (i.e., violate law to save a life)

Recall the Instrumental View

Political power can only be justified by the good consequences it realizes

Thus, no inherent right to exercise power

Voting is an exercise of such power

Permissible, on the instrumentalist view:

Limits on *who can* participate: Competency requirements to vote

Limits on what they can decide: Judicial review, shift of decisions to expert bodies

"Only property can render men capable of exercising political rights. Only owners can be citizens."

Benjamin Constant, Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments

What, if anything, is disrespectful about non-arbitrary restrictions on who can vote?

What, if anything, is valuable about being allowed to vote as such?

Do we reason to prefer living in a democratic to a non-democratic regime regardless of outcomes?

If a non-democratic regime can be shown to better protect our basic rights and produce better outcomes, is there any reason to live in a democracy?

Instrumentalist View

The structure through which laws are created has no relationship to their authority

Laws are only justified if they contribute to the maximization of justice

But do we then have no obligation to obey laws if they *fail* to maximize justice vis-à-vis all feasible alternatives?

Authority: The idea that we may have an obligation to obey a law even if we believe that another law would better realize justice

Two Concepts that Explain Authority

Coordination

Content-Independent Reasons

Coordination

In many circumstances, we may be better off with a subpar single decision-maker than no decision-maker at all

"If each of us simply acts on her own best understanding of justice and the rights and rules it requires, we will often end up worse off than we would have been had we acted in some coordinated fashion—even if the coordination solution to which we are jointly contributing is in principle less just than the alternative either of us prefers." pg. 365

Another way to say this is we have a content-independent reason to obey the decisions of coordinating authorities

We obey a law not just because of what the law realizes (content) but because of how the law was made

The Flaw in Instrumentalism

Instrumentalist views of democracy cannot explain why we have an obligation to obey laws that fail to maximally realize justice

Viehoff's Suggestion

Democracy may help explain the *authority* of the law *even granting that the law may* not be the most just of all feasible alternatives

Democracy is how we can have coordination without subjection

Two Other Ways of Understanding Egalitarian Source of Democratic Authority

- 1. Equal Standing of Everyone's Judgment
 - 2. Public Recognition of Equality

Responses: Not substituting *my* judgment but *correct reason*

Unclear why equal respect for capacity for judgment means accepting someone's judgment as correct

If I follow law after voting against it, you will know I view your judgment as wrong

Viehoff's Alternative

Democracy is not about positive respect for other's judgments but about avoiding acting on the sorts of reasons that would undermine egalitarian relationships

"by treating as binding the outcome of an egalitarian decision procedure, we can avoid acting on various considerations—in particular, unequal power—that we have reason to exclude from our relationship. If democracy has special authority based on procedural equality, this is not because it enables us to rule ourselves, but because it protects us from the threat of being ruled over unequally."

- 1. We need political coordination in the face of disagreement
- 2. To have coordination, we need content-independent reasons for obeying the dictates of our authority

- 3. We live in a culture where the ideal of relating as equals is widely held
 - 4. Democratic procedures provide us content-independent reasons for obeying a coordinating authority, because it ensures such authority relates us as equals

What does it mean to relate to each other as equals?

Exclude certain considerations from the norms and practices that govern interactions

Considerations that rest on unequal power



Example: Friendship

Even if we are in some ways unequal, it would undermine friendship if that inequality influenced our collective activities

"Friendship is said to be equality"

Aristotle

Democratic Procedures

One Person, One Vote

When we follow the law, we are not acting based on our unequal power

Rather, we are acting on reasons that embody our commitment to equality

Some Assumptions

Authority is separate from justice

Non-subjection is a distinct value that can be realized without justice

Some Assumptions

Can draw an analogy between *personal* relationships like friendship and political relationships

What about the *voluntary nature* of personal relationships and the *right to exit?*

Some Assumptions

Consequence: We need to care, not just about the integrity of the procedure, but about whether our co-citizens have the right motivation and reasons

"even where a decision is only somewhat unjust, and the procedures themselves distribute political power relatively equally, a decision may lack authority because the citizens vote or act on the basis of the wrong kinds of reasons. This may seem like a surprising claim." pg. 373

But what about the coordination problem?

Are we ever going to be sure people are voting for a law for the right reasons

If we worry about this, what will stop coordination from breaking down?

Many (most?) activities are both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable at once

Example: Shopping

Realizing our ends also entails exercising our capacities and autonomy

Two Sides of the Coin:

- 1. Intrinsic value of activity is conditioned on instrumental success (playing music well is part of the pleasure of playing music)
- 2. Instrumental actions often reveal what we value intrinsically

Anderson: Democracy is grounded in principled of equal respect that we develop *through* collective problemsolving

Even if a computer could be better at solving those problems, something would be lost in abandoning democratic mechanisms

Democracy as a Way of Life

Against focus on institutions and laws

Success of those institutions requires broader culture of democracy as a way of life

Focus on *authority of laws* may lead to overly stark dichotomy between instrumental and intrinsic

If question is "why do we obey the law?," we will be lead to focus on the *singular* value democratic procedures realize and that explains the laws authority