NiSE: Non-interactive Simple and Efficient VSS using Class Groups and Application to Publicly Verifiable DKG

***Abstract*—Non-interactive Verifiable Secret Sharing (NI-VSS) enables the dealer to perform secret sharing such that *anyone* (potentially an outsider) can publicly verify the correctness of the sharing *without* any interaction. Public verifiability should hold even when all parties are corrupt. Assuming a PKI setup, a common template for constructing NI-VSS is to use a multi-receiver additively homomorphic encryption to encrypt the shares and then to produce a *proof of correct sharing*. Existing schemes, employing either exponentiated ElGamal [Groth, EPRINT 2021] or lattice-based Regev [Gentry, Halevi, and Lyubechevsky, Eurocrypt 2022] crucially use variants of range proofs, incurring complexities both in design and performance.**

In this work, we present cgVSS, a *simple* NI-VSS protocol that uses a class group based encryption instead. The usage of class groups enables encrypting large values directly in the exponent of an ElGamal-like encryption, thereby eliminating the need for *any* range proof. Not only does this yield an *simple design* for NI-VSS, but also gives us *the most efficient one* up to date (to the best of our knowledge). Our implementation shows that cgVSS outperforms (a simplified implementation of) Groth's protocol in overall communication complexity by 5.6x and about $2.4-2.7$x in computation time per node (for a 150 node system). We formally argue that our NI-VSS scheme satisfies our new definition, which captures public verifiability.

We then present a generic (and natural) transformation of our NI-VSS to a non-interactive distributed key generation (NI-DKG) protocol called cgDKG for generating discrete log-based key shares. Our transformation is efficiency-preserving, as shown by our benchmarking. The resulting NI-DKG satisfies our new UC-based definition, which substantially differs from prior definitions as it formally captures *public verifiability* and *non-interactivity* at the same time.

Contents

1. Introduction

In a threshold secret sharing scheme [1], [2], a dealer distributes a secret among a set of n parties in such a way that the secret can only be reconstructed if a subset of $t+1$ or more parties contribute their shares. A potential concern arises when a malicious dealer distributes shares in a manner that enables two different subsets of $t+1$ or more parties to reconstruct two different secret values. A verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme [3] addresses this concern and enhances security by ensuring that each party receives a share and proof that their share is a valid part of

the secret. This crucial feature allows parties to confirm the validity of their shares without needing to reconstruct the actual secret, rendering VSS highly valuable for secure distributed computing (SDC) applications such as randomness beacon [4], [5], [6], distributed key generation (DKG) [7], [8], [9], [10] for threshold cryptography [11], [12], [13], [14], and multiparty computation [15], [16], [17], [18].

Over the past decade, the increasing prominence of blockchains, cryptocurrencies, and the emergence of decentralized finance (DeFi) has sparked substantial practical interest in VSS and its various SDC applications. These applications encompass but are not limited to threshold signatures for wallet security [19], blockchain consensus certifcates [20], distributed randomness services [21], [22], [23], as well as generic secure multi-party computation [24]. Like blockchain ledgers, blockchain-based applications rely heavily on demonstrating the system's correctness to *any interested party*, possibly outside the system. Consequently, these applications require the employed SDC solutions to be publicly verifiable [25], [26]. In particular, the protocol execution transcript should be convincing evidence to anyone that the system output is correct, even when all parties are malicious.[1] Considering that an interested verifier might arise after the protocol execution concludes, the verification procedure should be non-interactive and transferable, allowing it to convince an unlimited number of verifiers.

Until recently, the SDC literature has mostly focused on unconditionally hiding VSS protocols [7], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32] as they can offer the best possible secrecy guarantee using secure and authenticated channels between the dealer and each party while being efficient as compared to perfectly secure (or unconditional) VSS schemes [33] due to their otherwise computational nature. However, any communication over secure and authenticated channels is not publicly verifiable [25] so are these VSS schemes. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, replacing secure and authenticated channels with public-key encryption does not solve the problem as these schemes continue to be incorrect when the number of malicious parties exceeds the threshold t. Nevertheless the notion of publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) already exists [3], [5], [8], [25], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38] assuming a public-key infrastructure (PKI) is in place and a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof of correct sharing is feasible. Furthermore, these protocols require participants to speak only once, if a PKI is in place (the PKI can be used unlimited times) and are also termed as non-interactive VSS (NI-VSS) – this is an important feature that often comes handy in permissioned blockchain ecosystems, especially when synchronization among the participants is a problem. Henceforth, whenever we refer to NI-VSS we mean non-interactive VSS (in the PKI setup) with public verifiability.

Recent works on NI-VSS [8], [38], developed in the blockchain context, follow a standard template to construct a NI-VSS: the dealer, with a secret s creates a share s_i for party P_i and then broadcasts a multi-receiver encryption vector of all s_i's encrypted with corresponding public keys, in that each s_i is encrypted under pk_i and so on. Every party P_i can decrypt their own s_i with sk_i, but nothing else. To enable (public) verifiability, the dealer additionally provides proof of correct encryption with respect to the commitments of shares. Notably, if the encryption scheme is additively homomorphic, then the proof of correctness can be made specialized and thus more efficient by exploiting the homomorphic structure. In particular, Gentry, Halevi, and Lyubashevsky [38] use a variant of Regev's lattice-based encryption, whereas Groth [8] uses exponentiated ElGamal encryption. While the lattice-based approach is asymptotically beneficial in terms of computation complexity, they additionally needed to employ range proof systems such as Bulletproofs [39], thereby incurring significant performance overhead and design complexity. Instead, Groth [8] uses exponentiated ElGamal encryption over cyclic groups where discrete log is hard; however, since the plaintexts have to be small to facilitate efficient decryption (because discrete log is hard), a so-called "chunking technique", in that a standard-sized (say, 256 bit) plaintext is split into small chunks (say, 16 bits each), is used.[2] However, this also requires the dealer to prove that the chunking is done correctly. To resolve this, a novel Schnorr-style Fiat-Shamir based NIZK proof technique, called *proof-of-correct-chunking* was employed by Groth [8]. While this makes their protocol more efficient compared to [38], it comes at the cost of rendering the final design more communication heavy and substantially more complex. For example, if we use a simplified variant (that is witout forward secrecy) of Groth's protocol [8] for a publicly verfiable DKG with 200 parties, as much as 441MB data (cf. Fig 6) needs to be communicated over the broadcast channel (or posted on the bulletin board/ledger) in total.

1.1. Our Work

A New and Simple NI-VSS. We propose a new NI-VSS scheme (in Section 5), which follows the same "encrypt-and-prove" paradigm as above, but completely avoids any range-proof and "chunking" of the secret key. In particular, we use a class group-based additively homomorphic encryption scheme [40], which is structurally similar to ElGamal, but supports encryptions of large plaintexts in the exponent. Specifically, the class group-based encryption puts the plaintext in the exponent of a sub-group where the discrete log is easy, thus enabling efficient decryption – security is based on *existing class group-based assumptions*. Usage of a class group in the above template not only *significantly simplifies* the design, but also makes *considerable gain in the performance* compared to the state-of-art (a simplified version Groth's NI-VSS [8]) as evident by our implementations

1. Note that when all parties are malicious, no privacy or robustness (a.k.a. guaranteed termination) properties can be guaranteed. Public verifiability solely focuses on the correctness of the protocol output, if the protocol terminates.

2. We note that other ways to encrypt large messages, such as hashed ElGamal, do not work as they lack the additive homomorphism structure for the specialized proof of correct sharing to work.

(cf. Section 7). Also, since deploying our NI-VSS scheme requires a PKI setup for class-group encryptions, we show in Section 4.1 how to realize that using NIZK proofs of the argument of knowledge over class groups. Our NIZK proofs are adapted from prior works such as [41], but supports a stronger knowledge extraction requirement – for this we provided a modified analysis in the full version [42].

Generic Transformation to NI-DKG. We then propose a generic efficiency-preserving transformation of our NI-VSS scheme to a NI-DKG protocol (in Section 6). Instantiating with cgVSS we obtain a simple and efficient class group-based DKG protocol for key generation in the discrete log (DLog)-based threshold settings (that supports popular threshold signatures such as BLS, Schnorr etc.). The resulting DKG protocol is non-interactive (NI-DKG) as well as publicly verifiable. However, we remark that due to the usage of DLog-based commitments our new NI-DKG protocol is susceptible to the so-called biasing public-key attack [7]. Nevertheless, as argued in [7], [18], [43] this suffices for many DLog based applications such as threshold Schnorr signature, BLS etc. We also note that it appears that this can be fixed by using the same technique proposed by Gennaro et al. [7], where they use a perfectly hiding commitment (such as Pederson's) instead of the DLog-based commitments. But this comes at the cost of more rounds of interactions. The (im)possibility of NI-DKG without the biasing public-key attack is an interesting and major open question.

New Definitions with Public Verifiability. We propose a new formal definition for NI-VSS (cf. Section 5) that takes public verifiability into account. Our definition is adapted from prior works [9], [44]. Our generic transformation from any NI-VSS scheme that satisfies our definition achieves a new UC-based NI-DKG definition, that we put forward in Section 6. Our NI-DKG definition differs substantially from existing ones [44], [45], [46] because of two reasons. Firstly, it is specially equipped to handle public verifiability for full corruption case, which happens when the adversary corrupts more than allowed number of parties, and therefore can breach privacy or robustness. However, our definition ensures that even in this case, public verifiability can be guaranteed. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first formalization of such concept in the literature, in the DKG context which might be of independent interest.[3] Secondly, our definition is weakened to account for public-key biasing, whereas prior definitions do not allow that. In Section 5 we formally prove that our NI-VSS scheme cgVSS satisfies our definition, and thus subsequently yields an NI-DKG scheme (via the generic transformation) realizing our UC ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{DKG}}$ (Fig. 4). We also remark that, (variants of) the prior NI-VSS schemes, namely the works such as Gentry et al. [38] and Groth [8], plausibly satisfy our definitions too. We do not investigate that formally.

3. Note that, this is, in spirit, somewhat similar to the concept of publicly auditable MPC [47], [48], that allows public verification of transcripts of an MPC protocol even when all parties are corrupt.

Benchmarking. Finally, we implement our NI-VSS protocol cgVSS and compare that with the closest existing scheme by Groth's [8] in terms of dealer/receiver times, and the total bit-length of the message broadcast by the dealer (in Section 7). For comparison, we implement a simplified version of the VSS mechanism (referred to as GrothVSS henceforth) proposed by Groth [8] without forward secrecy. Our implementation shows that the bit-length of the total broadcast message for a single execution for 150 users is 296.51 Kb for the cgVSS compared to 1.66 Mb in GrothVSS which is a 5.6x improvement. Also, in the same setting the gain in dealer's/receiver's computation time is about $2.4 - 2.7$x. In summary, our protocol cgVSS outperforms the state-of-art GrothVSS both in communication and computation. This is despite the class-group operations being in the regime of other similar composite order groups, such as RSA. Essentially the performance gain can be attributed for the design simplification, in that any range proof (or proof-of-chunking ala Groth [8]) is totally dispensed with.[4] Importantly, this means that our scheme cgVSS scales much better with the increasing number of parties compared to GrothVSS. We also benchmark the DKG protocols (cf. Sec. 7) end-to-end and compare GrothDKG with cgDKG; for a 50 node network, GrothDKG takes 69.7sec and cgDKGtakes 47.9sec.

1.2. Related Work

PVSS. In their seminal paper, Chor et al. [3] introduced the notion of verifiable secret sharing (VSS). Stadler [34] first proposed publicly verifiable VSS (PVSS) and two constructions using verifiable ElGamal encryption. A long line of works [25], [49], [50] , [5], [8], [34], [36], [37], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55] realized publicly verifiable and non-interactive VSS schemes. They typically employ encryption mechanisms, including Paillier [36], [37], [55], ElGamal-in-the-exponent [8], pairing [56], [57] and lattice-based encryptions [38]. The schemes, that use Paillier encryption suffer from long exponentiations and proof size, that use ElGamal in the exponent [8] requires small exponents due to hardness of DLog. The schemes involving pairing generate shares are group elements (not scalars) and are not suitable for settings such as threshold signatures. PVSS schemes based on lattice-encryption schemes [38] are indeed asymptotically efficient, albeit require large public keys and ciphertext sizes. In another line of work, asynchronous VSS schemes [58], [59], [60], [61] are proposed but public verifiability is not defined in such systems. In addition, they suffer from a so-called high replication factor ($n > 3t$) for a threshold t.

DKG. Several DKG protocols to support DLog based threshold systems have been studied [7], [8], [9], [61], [62], [62], [63], [64], [65] in the literature in the synchronous and asynchronous settings. However, to achieve public verifiablity, the nodes need to perform PVSS (instead of VSS or asynchronous VSS). Any aggregatable PVSS scheme [9] which supports homomorphic operations on the secret shares

4. Moreover, the simplified design itself is a substantial advantage from engineering/deployment perspective as well.

[8], [36], [37] may be employed to realize a publicly verifiable DKG mechanism. To achieve non-interactive DKG, one should employ a PVSS for the secret sharing. Groth [8] proposed a non-interactive distributed key generation mechanism using ElGamal encryptions of shares that can be publicly verified by all the parties from the commitments of the polynomial coefficients. We use a simplified variant of this scheme as our baseline.

Biasing the public key: Recently, Katz [62] proposed two round-optimal constructions for a 'robust' DKG mechanism, where they define *robustness* as guaranteed-output-delivery. Their definition requires that the DKG mechanism outputs an *unbiased* public key. However, unbiased public keys are not an absolute requirement for DKG mechanisms, since it has been shown that biased public keys can be securely employed for certain systems as long as the secret key is secure. Gennaro et al. [7] show that biased public keys can be securely employed for any cryptographic system relying on the DLog assumption, like the threshold version of the Schnorr signature scheme. Bacho and Loss [43] show that DKG mechanisms that output biased public keys can be employed for generating key shares of adaptively secure BLS scheme as long as they can be shown to be *oracle-aided-algebraic-simulatable* (see [43, Sections 3,4.3]. Braun, Damgård, and Orlandi [18] propose an encryption scheme based on class groups that is secure even with biased public keys. In this work, we explicitly define the functionality (see Figure 4) to allow the adversary to bias the public key. This allows us to achieve an efficient non-interactive DKG protocol. We show (see the extended version of the paper [42]) that our definition is oracle-aided-simulatable as defined in [43] and hence can be employed for BLS [66], making it suitable for DLog-based systems and signature schemes like BLS.

2. Preliminaries

2.1. Notation

We use $\mathbb{Z}$ for all integers, and $\mathbb{N}$ for all natural numbers $\{1, 2 \ldots\}$. Vectors are denotes as $\vec{v}$. For a vector $\vec{v}_i$, its j-th element is denoted $\vec{v}_{i,j}$. We use the notation $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}$ to indicate that x is randomly sampled from the distribution $\mathcal{D}$ and the notation $h \leftarrow y$ to indicate that the h has been assigned the value y. Also, for any (possibly randomized) algorithm A we denote $y \leftarrow A(x)$ to express that A on input x yields the output y. Sometimes we denote $A^B(\cdot)$ to denote that the algorithm A has oracle access to another algorithm B. Unless mentioned otherwise, all algorithms considered in this paper are probabilistic polynomial time (PPT). Sometimes, we explicitly use the notation $A(x; r)$ to determinize A when run on input x and fixed randomness r. We indicate the set $\{1, 2, \cdots, n\}$ by $[n]$. We use the symbol $\stackrel{?}{=}$ to indicate a check of equality of the left and right-hand side entities of the symbol. $(a \stackrel{?}{=} b)$ returns a boolean value denoting whether the equality holds or not. The computational security parameter is denoted by λ (a typical value 256), and the statistical security parameter is denoted by λ_{st} (typical value 40). To denote that a value x is polynomial in λ, we write $x \in \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$; similarly for exponential values, we write $x \in 2^{O(\mathsf{poly}(\lambda))}$. We say that a function is negligible in λ, if it vanishes faster than $1/\mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ for any polynomial poly.

Also, note that for our chosen values, we have $2^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}} = O(\mathsf{negl}(\lambda))$.

2.2. Shamir Secret Sharing

We use Shamir's secret sharing [1]. In a typical Shamir's secret sharing, a field element $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ can be shared in a t out of n fashion by choosing a t-degree uniform random polynomial $P(x) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q[x]^t$ with constraint $P(0) = s$. The i-th share is computed as $s_i \leftarrow P(i)$. To reconstruct one may use Lagrange coefficients L_is as $s = \sum_{i=1}^{t+1} L_i s_i$. Due to linearity, this can be performed in the exponent without computing s. We denote this by $\mathsf{Shamir}_{n,t,q}(s) = (s_1, \ldots, s_n)$.

2.3. DLog Commitments

We will be using discrete log (DLog) commitments, that are defined over any cyclic group $\bar{G}$ of prime order q. A commitment of a value $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is simply defined to be $\bar{g}^x$, where $\bar{g}$ is a generator of $\bar{G}$. Note that, the commitment scheme does not guarantee hiding, but provides computational binding, as long as the discrete log is hard over $\bar{G}$. A commitment of s is generally denoted by $\mathsf{cmt}(s)$.

2.4. Definition of NIZK

Let $\mathfrak{R}$ be an efficiently computable binary NP relation. For any pair $(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit}) \in \mathfrak{R}$, we refer to inst as the instance and wit as the witness. If it is computationally hard (in the average case) to determine a witness from a statement, then the relation is called a *hard relation*. For any hard relation $\mathfrak{R}$ we define *NIZK arguments of knowledge (resp. NIZK proof)* in the random oracle model.

Definition 1 (Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Argument of knowledge (resp. Proof) in ROM)**.** Let pp be some public parameters that include a computational security parameter λ, and a statistical security parameter λ_{st}, generated in a setup, and available to all algorithms. Let H be a hash function with an appropriate domain/range, modeled as a random oracle. A secure NIZK for a binary hard relation $\mathfrak{R}$ consists of two PPT algorithms Prove and Verify with oracle access to H defined as follows:

- $\mathsf{Prove}^H(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit})$. The algorithm takes as input an instance-witness pair and outputs a proof π if $(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit}) \in \mathfrak{R}$ and $\perp$ otherwise.
- $\mathsf{Verify}^H(\mathsf{inst}, \pi)$. The algorithm takes as input an instance inst and a candidate proof π, and outputs a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ denoting acceptance or rejection.

We call a ROM-based NIZK scheme a *secure argument of knowledge (resp. proof)* if the algorithms satisfy *perfect*

completeness, *statistical zero-knowledge in ROM* and *argument of knowledge (resp. statistical soundness in ROM)*, defined as follows:

- **Perfect completeness**: For any $(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit}) \in \mathfrak{R}$,

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{Verify}^H(\mathsf{inst}, \pi) = 1 \mid \pi \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}^H(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit})\right] = 1.$$

- **Statistical Zero-knowledge (in ROM)**: There must exist a PPT simulator $\mathcal{S}$ such that for any $(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit}) \in \mathfrak{R}$ the statistical distance between the following two probability distribution is bounded by a negligible function of λ_{st} as long as an unbounded verifier may ask a bounded (depends on $\lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}$) number of queries to the random oracle (simulated by $\mathcal{S}$):
  - Output $(\mathsf{inst}, \pi, Q_H)$ where $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{Prove}^H(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit})$;
  - Output $(\mathsf{inst}, \pi, Q_H)$ where $\pi \leftarrow \mathcal{S}'(\mathsf{inst})$

  where $\mathcal{S}'$ returns a simulated proof $\pi \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(\mathsf{inst})$ on input $(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit})$ if $(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit}) \in \mathfrak{R}$ and $\perp$ otherwise and Q_H denotes the random oracle query-answer pairs made by the verifier;
- **Argument of knowledge**: For all PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}^H$, there exists a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{A}}$ such that

$$\Pr\Big[(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit}) \notin \mathfrak{R} \text{ and } \mathsf{Verify}^H(\mathsf{inst}, \pi) = 1 \mid (\mathsf{inst}, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^H(1^\lambda); \mathsf{wit} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{A}}(\mathsf{inst}, \pi)\Big] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

  for some negligible function negl, where $\mathcal{A}$'s RO queries to H are simulated by the extractor.
- **Statistical Soundness (in ROM).** For any unbounded adversary $\mathcal{A}^H$, that may ask a bounded numner of RO queries to H we have that:

$$\Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathsf{Verify}^H(\mathsf{inst}, \pi) \wedge \mathsf{inst} \notin \mathfrak{R} \mid (\mathsf{inst}, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^H(pp_{\mathsf{PoC}})] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda_{\mathsf{st}})$$

Note that, we necessarily rely on unbounded adversaries making a bounded number of RO queries. This number, however, may be sub-exponential in $\lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}$. .

2.5. Class Groups

Castagnos and Laguillaumie [40] propose an ElGamal-like encryption scheme using class groups. The main idea is to use a composite order group of unknown order with an underlying subgroup of known order where the discrete logarithm is easy. Since then, a number of works showed the feasibility of several cryptographic tasks [18], [41], [67], [68] including two-party ECDSA [68], multi-party computation [18] etc.

In this paper, we follow a presentation similar to [18]. We consider a finite abelian group $\widehat{G}$ of *unknown* order $q \cdot \hat{s}$ with an unknown (and hard to compute) $\hat{s}$, and known q such that q and $\hat{s}$ are co-prime; $\widehat{G}$ is factored as $\widehat{G} \simeq \widehat{G}^q \times F$, where $F = \langle f \rangle$ is the unique subgroup of order q. An upper bound $\bar{s}$ is known for $\hat{s}$. We also consider a cyclic subgroup $G = \langle g \rangle$ of $\widehat{G}$, such that G has order $q \cdot s$ and s divides $\hat{s}$ – hence q and s are also co-prime. Both s, s' are odd and all s, s', q are exponential in λ. Unlike $\widehat{G}$, the elements of G are not efficiently recognizable. $G^q = \langle g_q \rangle$ denotes the cyclic subgroup of G of the q-th power. So, G can be factored as $G \simeq G^q \times F$ and $g = g_q \cdot f$. We also consider two distributions $\mathcal{D}$ and $\mathcal{D}_q$ over $\mathbb{Z}$ $\{g^x \mid x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}\}$ and $\{g_q^x \mid x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_q\}$, such that they induce distributions over G and G^q respectively, that are statistically close (within distance $2^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$) to uniform distributions over respective domains.

The framework specifies polynomial time algorithms $(\mathsf{CG.ParamGen}, \mathsf{CG.Solve})$ with the following description:

- $(q, \lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, \bar{s}, f, g_q, \widehat{G}, F, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}_q; \rho) \leftarrow \mathsf{CG.ParamGen}(1^\lambda, 1^{\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}, q)$. This algorithm, on input the computational security parameter λ, the statistical security parameter λ_{st} and a modulus q, outputs the group parameters and the randomness ρ used to generate them. For convenience, we include the descriptions of the distributions $\mathcal{D}$ and $\mathcal{D}_q$ as well.
- $x \leftarrow \mathsf{CG.Solve}(f^x, (q, \lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, \bar{s}, f, g_q, \widehat{G}, F, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}_q))$. This algorithm deterministically solves the discrete log in group F.

Hardness assumptions on class groups. We formally recall some of the computational hardness assumptions we require for proving the security of our scheme. All assumptions below use a common setup: for the security parameters $\lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}} \in \mathbb{N}$, modulus $q \in \mathbb{Z}$ consider a set of public parameters $pp_{\mathsf{CG}} := (q, \lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, \bar{s}, f, g_q, \widehat{G}, F, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}_q; \rho) \leftarrow \mathsf{CG.ParamGen}(1^\lambda, 1^{\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}, q)$ generated using a uniformly random ρ.

Definition 2 (q-Hard subgroup membership assumption [69])**.** Sample $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_q$ and $u \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$. Sample a bit $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random. If $b = 0$, define $h^* \leftarrow g_q^x$, otherwise if $b = 1$ define $h^* \leftarrow f^u \cdot g_q^x$. Then we say that the hard subgroup membership assumption holds over the classgroup framework, if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the following probability is negligible in λ.

$$\left|\Pr\left[b = b^* \mid b^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, h^*)^{\mathsf{CG.Solve}(\cdot)}\right] - \frac{1}{2}\right|$$

Definition 3 (Low order assumption [70])**.** *Let $\mathcal{B} \in \mathbb{N}$. Then we say that the low order assumption over $\widehat{G}$ holds if for any PPT algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, the following probability is negligible in λ:*

$$\Pr\left[\mu^d = 1 \wedge 1 \neq \mu \in \widehat{G} \wedge 1 < d < \mathcal{B} \mid (\mu, d) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}})^{\mathsf{CG.Solve}(\cdot)}\right]$$

Definition 4 (Strong root assumption [70])**.** *Sample $Y \xleftarrow{\$} \widehat{G}^q$. Then we say that the strong root assumption holds over $\widehat{G}$, if for any PPT algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ and any $k \in \mathbb{Z}$ the following probability is negligible in λ:*

$$\Pr\left[X^e = Y \wedge e \neq 2^k \wedge X \in \widehat{G} \mid (X, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, Y)^{\mathsf{CG.Solve}(\cdot)}\right]$$

3. Building Blocks

Our NI-VSS scheme is based on three building blocks over the class groups: (i) a NIZK proof for knowledge of exponent; (ii) a multi-receiver encryption scheme; (iii) and a non-interactive sigma protocol that ensures compact proof of correct secret-sharing. Next, we present them in order.

3.1. NIZK for Knowledge of exponent

Now we present our NIZK construction for knowledge of exponents over class groups. We use a simpler variant of different sigma protocols used in prior works [41], [70], [71]. Similarly to those, we show that NIZK proof system is a secure argument of knowledge (Def. 1) from two new assumptions, hardness of finding low-order elements (Def. 3), and hardness of finding a root (Def. 4) over group $\widehat{G}$. Below we describe the construction.

Consider the class group parameters $pp_{\mathsf{CG}} = (q, \lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, \bar{s}, f, g_q, \widehat{G}, F, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}_q; \rho)$ generated using $\mathsf{CG.ParamGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, q)$, an instance $\mathsf{inst} = (g_q, h) \in G^q \times G^q$ and witness $\mathsf{wit} = k \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_q$ such that $h \leftarrow g_q^k \in G^q$. Also, consider a hash function H (modeled as random oracle) which maps to a range $[\mathcal{B}]$ for an integer $\mathcal{B} = 2^\lambda$. The set of public parameters for the proof system is defined as $pp_{\mathsf{Kex}} \leftarrow (H, \mathcal{B}) \cup \{pp_{\mathsf{CG}}\}$. Then the proof system consists of the following two algorithms (for simplicity we keep the RO notation implicit):

- $\mathsf{Kex.Prove}(pp_{\mathsf{Kex}}, \mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit}) \rightarrow \pi$. This randomized algorithm takes an instance-witness pair $(\mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit}) = ((g_q, h), k)$ as input. Then it executes the following steps:
  - Samples an integer $r \xleftarrow{\$} [\mathcal{B} \cdot |\mathcal{D}_q| \cdot 2^{\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}]$
  - $a \leftarrow g_q^r$;
  - $c \leftarrow H(g_q, h, a) \in \mathcal{B}$;
  - $s \leftarrow r + kc \in \mathbb{Z}$;
  - Output the NIZK proof $\pi = (c, s)$
- $\mathsf{Kex.Ver}(pp_{\mathsf{Kex}}, \mathsf{inst}, \pi) \rightarrow 1/0$. This deterministic algorithm takes an instance $\mathsf{inst} = (g_q, h)$ and a candidate proof $\pi = (c, s)$ as input. Then:
  - Check if $s \leq (2^{\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}} + 1) \cdot \mathcal{B} \cdot |\mathcal{D}_q|$;
  - If the above check fails output 0 and stop. Else compute $a \leftarrow g_q^s \cdot (h^c)^{-1}$;
  - Output $(c \stackrel{?}{=} H(g_q, h, a)) \in \{0, 1\}$.

Security. As detailed in Definition 1, a NIZK proof system is called *secure argument of knowledge* if it satisfies *completeness*, *statistical zero-knowledge* and *argument of knowledge*. Completeness follows immediately. The statistical zero-knowledge argument is analogous to Schnorr's proof over cyclic groups, except that now the simulator needs to sample s carefully to match the range. Since we compute it over an integer as the group order is unknown, we need to ensure that the value s can be simulated without the knowledge of k. For that, we rely on a statistical argument. In particular, we choose a "mask" r randomly from a range, which is larger than the range of kc by a factor of $2^{\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$. So, to simulate, it is possible to sample s from a range such that the simulated value is within statistical distance $2^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$ to the actual value. The argument of knowledge is more intricate, and uses two more assumptions over class groups – this can be done by carefully adjusting analysis from prior works [41], [70], [71]. The main difference from Schnorr's proof is again that due to unknown order s is an integer. Nevertheless, using the class group structure we can ensure that unless the witness k is extracted, one of the low-order or strong root assumptions is broken. Formally we prove the following theorem.

Theorem 1. *For any $\lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}} \in \mathbb{N}$ and any modulus $q \in \mathbb{Z}$, for a correctly generated class group parameters $pp_{\mathsf{CG}} \leftarrow \mathsf{CGE.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, q)$ as long as the low order assumptions (Def. 3) and the strong root assumption (Def. 4) holds over the class group $\widehat{G}$, the NIZK proof system described above is secure argument of knowledge in the random oracle model.*

We defer the full proof to Appendix A.

3.2. Multi-receiver Encryption from Class groups

We first provide a definition of multi-receiver encryption by simply extending from prior notions [72], [73] where the adversary can corrupt t out of n parties and possibly know their secrets too.

Definition 5 (Multi-receiver Encryption)**.** Let $n, t, \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $N > t$. A multi-receiver encryption scheme consists of three algorithms $(\mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ with the following syntax:

- $\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{pp})$. The algorithm takes a set of system parameters and return a pair of keys (sk, pk).
- $\mathsf{mrEnc}(\mathsf{pp}, \vec{pk}, \vec{m})$. The algorithm takes a vector of messages and a vector of public keys to generate a vector of ciphertext of the form $(R, \vec{E})$, with the common randomness-dependent part R and message-dependent (and key-dependent) individual parts $E_1, \ldots, E_n$.
- $\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, sk, (R, E))$. The algorithm takes a specific secret key sk and the corresponding ciphertext (R, E) to output a message m.

We call such a scheme *secure*, if for any correctly generated pp any $n, t \in \mathbb{N}$ $(n > t)$ and for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ the probability that the following experiment outputs 1 is bounded by at most $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ away from $1/2$:

- Once generated, give pp to $\mathcal{A}$
- For all $i \in [n]$ run $\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{pp})$ (with fresh randomness) to obtain n pair of keys $\{(sk_i, pk_i)\}_{i \in [n]}$. Give all $\{pk_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ to $\mathcal{A}$.
- Receive $C \subset [n]$ of size at most t. Let $H \leftarrow [n] \setminus C$. Give $\{sk_i\}_{i \in C}$ to $\mathcal{A}$.
- Receive challenge vectors $(\vec{m}_0, \vec{m}_1)$ of length n from $\mathcal{A}$ such that for all $i \in C : m_{0,i} = m_{1,i}$; if this does not hold then output a random bit and abort.
- Choose a uniform random b and encrypt

$$(R, \{E_i\}_{i \in [n]}) \leftarrow \mathsf{mrEnc}(\mathsf{pp}, \{h_i, m_{b,i}\}_{i \in [n]}).$$

- Receive b' from $\mathcal{A}$, output $(b \stackrel{?}{=} b')$.

3.2.1. Construction of the Encryption. We present multi-receiver encryption from class groups in this section. This is a simple adaptation of the base scheme from [40].

Let pp_{CG} be the public parameters generated by running $(q, \lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, \bar{s}, f, g_q, \widehat{G}, F, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}_q) \leftarrow \mathsf{CG.ParamGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, q)$ for some appropriately chosen $\lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, q$. Let $n, t \in \mathbb{N}$ be such that $n > t$. The multi-receiver encryption scheme is comprised of three algorithms $\mathsf{CGE.KeyGen}$, $\mathsf{CGE.mrEnc}$ and $\mathsf{CGE.Dec}$ for generating the keys, (multi-receiver) encryption and decryption, respectively:

- $\mathsf{CGE.KeyGen}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}) \rightarrow (sk, h)$:
  - $sk \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_q$
  - $h \leftarrow g_q^{sk}$
- $\mathsf{CGE.mrEnc}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, \{h_i, m_i\}_{i\in[n]}) \rightarrow (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]})$
  - $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_q$
  - $R \leftarrow g_q^r$
  - For all $i \in [n]$: $E_i \leftarrow f^{m_i} h_i^r$
- $\mathsf{CGE.Dec}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, sk, R, E) \rightarrow m$
  - $M \leftarrow \frac{E}{R^{sk}}$
  - $m \leftarrow \mathsf{CG.Solve}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, M)$

In this description, we use the notation h for the public key instead of pk. Throughout the paper, we use them interchangeably.

Security. The security argument of single-receiver scheme provided in [40] can be extended easily to the multi-receiver setting. Formally we can prove the following theorem:

Theorem 2. *For any $\lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}$ and any modulus $q \in \mathbb{Z}$ let $(q, \lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, \bar{s}, f, g_q, \widehat{G}, F, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}_q; \rho) \leftarrow \mathsf{CG.ParamGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, q)$ be a set of correctly generated class group parameters. Then, for that set of parameters as long as hard subgroup assumptions (Def. 2) holds, the above multi-receiver encryption scheme is secure according to Definition 5 for any $n, t \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $n > t$.*

We defer the proof to Appendix B.

3.3. Proof of Correct Secret Sharing

Looking ahead, in our NI-VSS protocol we shall require the dealer to produce a NIZK proof of correct sharing, where shares are encrypted with the above multi-receiver encryption. We essentially use the Groth's [8] variant of sigma protocol, adapted to our class group setting. The overall idea, as we recall from [8], is to use Schnorr-like proof for knowledge of exponent in a compact fashion. Note that, the multi-ciphertext consists of a group element $R = g_q^r$ and another n group elements of the form $E_i = f^{s_i} h_i^r$. The dealer is required to prove that the encrypted messages vector forms a legitimate t out of n Shamir's secret sharing. The crux of the idea is to combine these different exponents in a way such that they are consistent with the evaluation of t-degree secret polynomial used for secret-sharing – to enable these DLog commitments of the secret polynomial are used. Let us now describe the scheme in detail.

Consider any cyclic group (typically an elliptic curve) $\langle \bar{g} \rangle = \bar{G}$ of prime order q. Note that $\bar{G}$ is isomorphic to F. Also, consider hash functions (modeled as random oracles in the proof) H, H' both mapping $\rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$. The public parameter of the proof system is defined as $pp_{\mathsf{PoC}} := \{\bar{g}, \bar{G}, H, H'\} \cup pp_{\mathsf{CG}}$, where $pp_{\mathsf{CG}} \leftarrow \mathsf{CG.ParamGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, q)$.

Now consider a secret $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, and let $(s_1, \ldots, s_n)$ be a t out of n Shamir's secret-sharing of s, which is generated by randomly choosing a t-degree secret polynomial $P(x)$ over $\mathbb{Z}_q$ such that $P(i) = s_i$ for all $i \in [n]$. Also, denote the coefficients of P by $a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_t$ each in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ and corresponding DLog commitments over $\bar{G}$ as $A_0, A_1, \ldots, A_t$ where $A_i = \bar{g}^{a_i}$ for $i \in \{0, \ldots, t\}$. The shares $s_1, \ldots, s_n$ are then encrypted using the multi-receiver encryption scheme described above as $\mathsf{CGE.mrEnc}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, \{h_i, s_i\}_{i\in[n]}; r)$ using randomness $r \in \mathcal{D}_q$ (we determinize the encryption algorithm here) to produce a ciphertext tuple $(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]})$. The NIZK proof we describe below proves a hard relation $\mathfrak{R}_{\mathsf{CS}}$ that consists of instances (inst, wit) where each inst and the corresponding witness wit are of the form:

- $\mathsf{inst} = \big(\{h_i\}_{i\in[n]}, (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}), (A_0, \ldots, A_t)\big)$;
- $\mathsf{wit} = ((s_1, \ldots, s_n), r)$

such that the following holds:

- there exists a t-degree polynomial $P(x) = a_0 + a_1 x + \ldots a_t x^t$ over $\mathbb{Z}_q$ such that for all $i \in [n]$: $s_i = P(i)$; and for all $j \in \{0, \ldots, t\}$: $A_j = \bar{g}^{a_j}$;[5]
- encrypting $s_1, \ldots, s_n$ with randomness r using public keys $h_1, \ldots, h_n$ yields the multi-receiver ciphertext $(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]})$

Our proof of correct sharing consists of two algorithms $\mathsf{PoCS.Prove}$ and $\mathsf{PoCS.Ver}$, which are described in Figure 1.

Next we show that our construction (cf. Fig. 1) is a NIZK proof in ROM (as Def. 1) by formally proving the following theorem.

Theorem 3. *For any security parameters $\lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}} \in \mathbb{N}$ and any modulus $q \in \mathbb{N}$, our NIZK construction described in Fig. 1 is a secure proof system (as described in Def. 1) in the random oracle model.*

We provide the proof sketch for completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge in Section C.

4. System Model and PKI

System Model. For our non-interactive constructions, similar to all previous NI-VSS and NI-DKG construction schemes (such as [5], [8], [35]), we assume that every party has access to a *broadcast channel*. This is a common assumption for non-interactive publicly verifiable multiparty computation protocols [74], [75], where the adversary controls the communication channel and can delay the messages; however, it has to deliver those before the synchrony

5. Note that, the coefficients $a_0, a_1, \ldots$ of polynomial P can be computed from the evaluations $s_1, \ldots, s_n$, therefore we do not include the coefficients within the witness separately.

Proof of Correct Sharing

- $\mathsf{PoCS.Prove}(pp_{\mathsf{PoC}}, \mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit}) \rightarrow \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}$:
  - Parse wit as $\{(s_1, \ldots, s_n), r\}$.
  - Sample $\alpha, \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q, \rho \leftarrow [q \cdot |\mathcal{D}_q| \cdot 2^{\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}]$.
  - $W \leftarrow g_q^{\rho}$ and $X \leftarrow \bar{g}^{\alpha}$
  - Compute:
    - $\gamma \leftarrow H(\mathsf{inst})$.
    - $Y \leftarrow f^{\alpha} \cdot \left(h_1^{\gamma} \cdot h_2^{\gamma^2} \ldots \cdot h_n^{\gamma^n}\right)^{\rho} \in G$.
    - $\gamma' \leftarrow H'(\gamma, W, X, Y)$.
    - $z_r \leftarrow r\gamma' + \rho \in \mathbb{Z}$.
    - $z_s \leftarrow \gamma' \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i \gamma^i + \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q$.
  - Finally return $\pi_{\mathsf{CS}} \leftarrow (W, X, Y, z_r, z_s)$
- $\mathsf{PoCS.Ver}(pp_{\mathsf{PoC}}, \mathsf{inst}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}) \rightarrow 1/0$:
  - Parse π_{CS} as (W, X, Y, z_r, z_s).
  - Compute:
    - $\gamma \leftarrow H(\mathsf{inst})$.
    - $\gamma' \leftarrow H'(\gamma, W, X, Y)$.
  - Verify the following equality:
    - $W \cdot R^{\gamma'} \stackrel{?}{=} g_q^{z_r} \in G^q$;
    - $X \cdot (\prod_{j=0}^{t} A_j^{\sum_{i=1}^{n} i^k \gamma^j})^{\gamma'} \stackrel{?}{=} \bar{g}^{z_s} \in \bar{G}$;
    - $(\prod_{i=1}^{n} E_i^{\gamma^i})^{\gamma'} \cdot Y \stackrel{?}{=} f^{z_s} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} (h_i^{\gamma^i})^{z_r} \in G$.
  - Return 1 if all of the above holds, and 0 otherwise.

Figure 1: Proof System of Correct Sharing.

communication bound Δ. The adversary is also rushing and can delay the messages of the parties and inject its own messages after observing honest nodes' messages during the current round. Moreover, unlike interactive VSS/DKG constructions [7], [27], [28], we do not need any communication links between parties. Furthermore, we consider *static corruption*, in that the set of corrupt parties is fixed at the beginning of the execution and stays the same until the end.

4.1. PKI for Class-groups

Though non-interactive in the online phase, our NI-VSS and NI-DKG protocols require a PKI setup for class-group encryptions. Once a PKI is successfully established, unbounded number of non-interactive executions can take place. Nevertheless, since we are in the class-group setting, we need to describe how a PKI is established for our multi-receiver encryption scheme (cf. Section 3.2). Consider an instance of the multi-receiver encryption scheme with algorithms $(\mathsf{CGE.KeyGen}, \mathsf{CGE.mrEnc}, \mathsf{CGE.Dec})$ and public parameters pp_{CG}. Formally, we want parties to achieve the following ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{PKI}}^{pp}$, which is parameterized by public parameters pp that includes the class-group parameters pp_{CG}:

- Upon $(\mathsf{sid}, \mathtt{Start}, C)$ from the simulator (say, $\mathcal{S}$), only if sid is unmarked the for all honest parties (C denotes set of corrupt parties, and let H denotes the set of honest parties) P_i, run $(sk_i, pk_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{CGE.KeyGen}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}})$, and give each $(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, \{pk_i\}_{i \in H})$ to $\mathcal{S}$. Also mark sid `Active`.
- Upon $(\mathsf{sid}, \{sk_i, pk_i\}_{i \in Q_C})$ for $Q_C \subseteq C$ from $\mathcal{S}$, if sid is marked `Active`, send $(sk_i, \{pk_i\}_{i \in Q})$ where $Q = Q_C \cup H$ to all honest parties P_i in H. Record $(\mathsf{sid}, \{sk_i, pk_i\}_{i \in Q})$. Mark sid `Finished`.
- Upon $(\mathsf{sid}, \mathtt{Key})$ from P_i such that $i \in Q$, return $(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, sk_i, pk_i)$ only if sid is marked `Finished`.

We realize this by using the NIZK argument for knowledge of exponent (cf. Sec 3.1). Suppose that NIZK has algorithms $(\mathsf{Kex.Prove}, \mathsf{Kex.Ver})$ and public parameters pp_{Kex}, which is consistent with pp_{CG}. Then we describe a protocol Π_{PKI}^{pp} where $pp = \{pp_{\mathsf{CG}} \cup pp_{\mathsf{Kex}}\}$ to realize $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{PKI}}$:

- Each party P_i executes:
  - $(sk_i, pk_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{CGE.KeyGen}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}})$.
  - $\pi_i \leftarrow \mathsf{Kex.Prove}(pp_{\mathsf{Kex}}, pk_i, sk_i)$.
  - Broadcast (pk_i, π_i).
- On receiving $\{(pk_j, \pi_j)\}_{j \neq i}$ each P_i runs for all $j \neq i$: $\mathsf{Kex.Ver}(pp_{\mathsf{Kex}}, pk_j, \pi_j)$. Create the list Q by including all j for which Kex.Ver returns 1 and also include i. Output $(sk_i, \{pk_i\}_{i \in Q})$.

Security.

Now we can argue that the protocol always terminates with a unique set of $\{pk_i\}_{i \in Q}$ as long as we can construct a simulator that can interact with any adversary in an indistinguishable manner. We can argue this by constructing a simulator as follows:

- The simulator, on receiving pp_{CG} and $\{pk_i\}_{i \in H}$, simulates the proofs π_i for each $i \in H$ using the statistical zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proof.
- Then it sends $\{(pk_i, \pi_i)\}_{i \in H}$ to the adversary to obtain $\{(pk_i, \pi_i)\}_{i \in C}$ in return. For each $i \in C$ it runs $\mathsf{Kex.Ver}(pp_{\mathsf{Kex}}, pk_i, \pi_i)$. $\mathcal{S}$ creates list Q_C by including all i for which Kex.Ver returns 1. For each Q_C it extracts sk_i using the extractor $\mathcal{E}^{\mathcal{A}}$ (cf. Def 1). It sends $(Q_C, \{sk_i, pk_i\}_{i \in Q_C})$ to the ideal functionality and outputs $\{pk_i\}_{i \in Q}$ where $Q = Q_C \cup H$.

One can argue easily that the simulation is correct as long as the NIZK is a secure argument of knowledge. In particular, the simulated proofs are indistinguishable to the adversary. Furthermore, argument of knowledge implies that if $\mathsf{Kex.Ver}(pk_i, \pi_i)$ returns 1 for some i, then P_i indeed has a key pair (sk_i, pk_i) such that $pk_i = g_q^{sk_i} \in G^q$, which is then correctly extracted by $\mathcal{S}$ with overwhelming probability.

Finally, it is immediate to see that the protocol always terminates with a unique set of public keys output by the honest parties.

In the following sections, when we say that we assume a PKI setup, we assume that participants already invoked $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{PKI}}^{pp}$ by executing, for example, Π_{PKI}^{pp}. We assume the $Q = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ among them at most t parties can be corrupt. Each party P_i within Q can obtain their key pair by querying $(\mathsf{sid}, \mathtt{Key})$.

5. NI-VSS using Class Groups

We realize cgVSS, a non-interactive verifiable secret sharing mechanism from class groups and later in Section 6 employ it to achieve a non-interactive distributed key generation protocol cgDKG. Our cgVSS scheme first establishes a PKI setup. Once a PKI is successfully established the online execution is non-interactive, in that a dealer just broadcasts a single message to the recipients in the online phase. The message contains the class-group based multi-receiver ciphertext (Section 3.2) and associated proofs of correct sharing (Section 3.3). Each recipient then locally decrypt and verify the shares.

5.1. Definition:NI-VSS

We follow a property-based definition, (assuming a PKI setup) which is adapted from the VSS definitions provided in [76], [77]. We note that there are difference in naming different properties in the literature. Here we define three security properties for a NI-VSS scheme, namely *correctness*, *secrecy* and *publicly verifiable uniqueness* closely following [77]. The major difference, however, with prior works is in formalizing the concept of public verifiability. In particular, public verifiability refers to the fact that anyone, who is not even within the set of participants can verify the uniqueness of the output. As discussed in the introduction (cf. Sec 1) this has crucial applicability in the blockchain context. The other important (more syntactic) difference is that since we are only interested in *non-interactive* VSS, we provide a particular structure of the protocols, running specific algorithms. The properties are adjusted accordingly to reflect that. Also we use notations that are consistent with our building blocks.

Let $\mathcal{PP}$ be a domain of public parameters such that each public parameter $pp \in \mathcal{PP}$ includes a security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, and a modulus $q \in \mathbb{Z}$. We assume that a PKI has been setup by invoking $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{PKI}}^{pp}$ for a specific pp, after which the system consists of n parties, $n-1$ receivers $P_1, \ldots, P_{n-1}$ and a dealer P_n[6]. Each party P_i knows $pp, \{pk_i\}_{i\in[n]}$ and their own sk_i. If an adversary maliciously corrupts (upto) k parties we refer to the adversary as k-bounded. Then we define (n,t)-NI-VSS as follows:

Definition 6 ((n,t)-Non-interactive Verifiable Secret Sharing (NI-VSS))**.** An (n,t)-NI-VSS scheme is a multi-party protocol executed between n parties. according to Fig. 2 where the algorithms $(\mathsf{Share}, \mathsf{ShareEnc}, \mathsf{Verify}, \mathsf{ShareDec})$ have synatx:

- $\mathsf{Share}(pp, s) \rightarrow (\{s_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt}(s), \{\mathsf{cmt}(s_i)\}_{i\in[n]})$. The sharing algorithm produces t out of n Shamir's secret shares of a value s such that $(s_1 \ldots, s_n) = \mathsf{Shamir}_{n,t,q}(s)$ and the associated commitments $\mathsf{cmt}(s), \mathsf{cmt}(s_1), \ldots, \mathsf{cmt}(s_n)$. Denote all the commitments in short with just cmt.
- $\mathsf{ShareEnc}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}, \{s_i, pk_i\}_{i\in[n]}) \rightarrow (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}})$. On input n many shares $s_1, s_2, \ldots$, the associated commitments cmt, and corresponding public keys , this algorithm outputs a multi-receiver ciphertext $(R, E_1, E_2, \ldots, E_n)$ plus a proof of correct sharing π_{CS}.
- $\mathsf{Verify}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}, R, \{E_i, pk_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}) \rightarrow 1/0$. This algorithm verifies the entire ciphertext tuple with respect to the proof π_{CS} and the commitment to output a decision bit.
- $\mathsf{ShareDec}(pp, sk_i, R, E_i) \rightarrow s_i$. The decryption algorithm uses a specific secret-key sk_i to decrypt ciphertext (R, E_i). Note that, only the party who posses sk_i can decrypt (R, E_i).

A generic NI-VSS protocol

Input and Output. The dealer has an input $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. No other party has any input. After execution, each party P_i (including the dealer P_n) has an output y_i.

- **Dealing**. The dealer P_n executes:
  - $(\{s_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \{a_j\}_{j\in[t]}, \mathsf{cmt}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Share}(pp, s)$
  - Define its own output $y_n \leftarrow s_n$.
  - Compute $(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareEnc}(pp, \{s_i, pk_i\}_{i\in[n]})$
  - Broadcast dealing $D = (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}})$ to all receivers $\{P_i\}_{i\in[n-1]}$.
- **Receiving**. Each party P_i for $i \in [n-1]$, on receiving D performs the following steps:
  - $e \leftarrow \mathsf{Verify}(pp, \{pk\}_{i\in[n]}, D)$ where $D = (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}})$
  - If $e = 1$ then $s_i \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareDec}(pp, sk_i, R, E_i)$ and outputs $y_i \leftarrow s_i$ as its share corresponding to the dealing D. Otherwise, if $e = 0$ reject dealing D, and set $y_i \leftarrow \perp$.

Figure 2: The general structure of an NI-VSS protocol.

Definition 7 (Security of NI-VSS)**.** We say that an (n,t)-NI-VSS scheme is *secure* if the algorithms satisfy the following *correctness*, *secrecy* and *uniqueness* requirements as described below.

Correctness. For any appropriately chosen public parameters pp if parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ execute the protocol as specified in Fig. 2 *honestly*, then:

- for all party P_i, $y_i \neq \perp$;
- for any subset $S \subseteq [n]$ of size $|S| \geq t+1$ it must hold that: $s = \sum_{i\in S} L_i y_i$.

Secrecy. We say that an (n,t)-NI-VSS scheme has *secrecy* if for any appropriately chosen public parameter set $pp \in \mathcal{PP}$, and any PPT malicious t-bounded adversary $\mathcal{A}$ there exists a PPT simulator $\mathcal{S}$ such the following game outputs 1 with probability at most $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ away from $1/2$:

1) Denote the set of corrupt parties by $C \subset [n]$ such that $|C| \leq t$ and $n \notin C$ (the dealer is not corrupt). Define the set of honest parties as $H \leftarrow [n] \setminus C$.

6. The choice of dealer is without loss of generality and simplifies the presentation.

2) Sample a uniform random $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$. Run

$$(\{s_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \{a_j\}_{j\in[t]}, \mathsf{cmt}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Share}(pp, s),$$

where $\mathsf{cmt} = (\mathsf{cmt}(s), \{\mathsf{cmt}(s_i)\}_{i\in[n]})$. Then choose a uniform random bit b and:

– If $b = 0$ then compute using real execution

$$(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareEnc}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}, \{s_i, pk_i\}_{i\in[n]}).$$

– If $b = 1$ then: Compute using the simulator

$$(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}, \mathsf{cmt}') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}(s), C, \{pk_i\}_{i\in[n]}),$$

and re-define $\mathsf{cmt} \leftarrow \mathsf{cmt}'$.

3) Then give the following to $\mathcal{A}$:

$$\left(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}\right)$$

4) Finally receive a guess b' from $\mathcal{A}$. Output 1 if $b' = b$, and 0 otherwise.

Publicly Verifiable Uniqueness. We say that an (n, t)-NI-VSS scheme has *publicly verifiable uniqueness* if for any appropriately chosen public parameters $pp \in \mathcal{PP}$, and any PPT malicious adversary n-bounded $\mathcal{A}$ the following game outputs 1 with probability at most $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$:

– Let the set of corrupt parties be $C \subseteq [n]$ such that $n \in C$ (the dealer is corrupt).

– Receive $D = (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}})$ and two *distinct* sets $S_1, S_2 \subset [n]$ each of size $t + 1$ from $\mathcal{A}$ plus all required secret keys $\{sk_i\}_{i\in(S_1\cup S_2)\cap C}$. Then check $\mathsf{Verify}(pp, \{pk_i\}_{i\in[n]}, D)$, if it returns 0 then output 0. Otherwise verify whether the secret keys match with the corresponding public keys. If that fails output 0. Otherwise:

∗ for each $i \in S_1$: compute $y_i \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareDec}(pp, sk_i, R, E_i)$. Reconstruct $s_1^\star = \sum_{i\in S_1} L_i y_i$

∗ for each $i \in S_2$: compute $y_i \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareDec}(pp, sk_i, R, E_i)$. Reconstruct $s_2^\star = \sum_{i\in S_2} L_i y_i$

– If $s_1^\star \neq s_2^\star$ then output 1, else output 0.

5.2. Our NI-VSS Protocol: cgVSS

In this section we provide a concrete instantiation of our NI-VSS protocol based on the multi-receiver encryption scheme (cf. Section 3.2), a corresponding proof of correct sharing (cf. Section 3.3) in the PKI setup. The instantiation is provided in Figure 3. For security we prove the following theorem:

Theorem 4. *The* cgVSS *protocol described in Figure 2 is a* secure *NI-VSS according to our Definition 6 as long as the underlying multi-receiver encryption scheme is secure (Def 5) and the NIZK proof of correctness is a secure proof system (Def 1).*

Proof. The correctness of NIVSS follows immediately. So we argue secrecy and uniqueness below.

Secrecy. Let us call the secrecy game with bit $b = 0$, Game_0 and $b = 1$, Game_1. For simplicity, we assume $|C| = t$. We construct a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ in Game_1 as follows:

- Obtain input $(pp, \mathsf{cmt}(s), C, \{pk_i\}_{i\in[n]})$.
- Choose s_i uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q$ for all $i \in C$. Compute corresponding $\mathsf{cmt}(s_i) = \bar{g}^{s_i}$.
- Compute $\mathsf{cmt}(s_i)$ $=$ $\bar{g}^{s_i}$ for all $i \in H$ using Lagrange interpolation in the exponent. Define $\mathsf{cmt} \leftarrow (\mathsf{cmt}(s), \mathsf{cmt}(s_1), \ldots, \mathsf{cmt}(s_n))$.
- Let $s_i' \leftarrow 0$ for all $i \in H$. and $s_i' \leftarrow s_i$ for all $i \in C$.
- Compute $(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareEnc}'(pp, \mathsf{cmt}, \{s_i', pk_i\}_{i\in[n]})$ where $\mathsf{ShareEnc}'$ is the same as $\mathsf{ShareEnc}$ (as described in Fig. 3) except that the proof π_{CS} is generated using the zk simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{PoC}}$.
- Output $(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}, \mathsf{cmt})$.

Then we describe the following hybrid games:

- Hybrid Hyb_1. This hybrid is the same as Hyb_0, except that the proof of correctness π_{CS} is now simulated, and thus is independent of the witness $\mathsf{wit} = ((s_1, \ldots, s_n), r)$. Syntactically, instead of $\mathsf{ShareEnc}$ in Step 2, $\mathsf{ShareEnc}'$ (as defined above) is run. This step is statistically close to Game_0, which follows from the statistical zero-knowledge property of the proof of correctness.
- Hybrid Hyb_2. This hybrid is the same as Hyb_1 except that now, the secret s is not known, and the honest party's shares are defined to be 0.

We provide the details below with the changes highlighted in blue.

1) Denote the set of corrupt parties by $C \subset [n]$ such that $|C| \leq t$ and $n \notin C$ (the dealer is not corrupt). Define the set of honest parties as $H \leftarrow [n] \setminus C$.
2) Sample a uniform random $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$. Run

$$(\{s_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \{a_j\}_{j\in[t]}, \mathsf{cmt}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Share}(pp, s),$$

where $\mathsf{cmt} = (\mathsf{cmt}(s), \{\mathsf{cmt}(s_i)\}_{i\in[n]})$.
3) For all $i \in [n]$ sample $s_i' \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ if $i \in C$, and $s_i' \leftarrow 0$ if $i \in H$. Furthermore, use $\mathsf{cmt}(s_0)$ and $\{s_i\}_{i\in C}$ to re-define $\mathsf{cmt} = (\mathsf{cmt}(s_0), \mathsf{cmt}(s_1), \mathsf{cmt}(s_n))$ using Lagrange interpolation in the exponent.
4) Compute $(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareEnc}'(pp, \mathsf{cmt}, \{s_i', pk_i\}_{i\in[n]})$, where π_{CS} is a simulated proof.
5) Then give the following to $\mathcal{A}$: $\left(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}\right)$
6) Finally receive a guess b' from $\mathcal{A}$. Output 1 if $b' = b$, and 0 otherwise.

We prove that:

Lemma 5. Hyb_1 *and* Hyb_2 *are computationally indistinguishable as long as the underlying encryption scheme is secure.*

Proof. For any adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that distinguishes between the hybrids we construct a reduction which breaks the security of underlying multi-receiver encryption scheme as follows:

– Obtain pp_{CG} and n public keys $pk_1, \ldots, pk_n$ from the encryption challenger. Send C to the challenger to get

back $\{sk_i\}_{i\in C}$. Sample additional public parameters to compute pp_{PoC} for the proof of correct sharing scheme such that they are consistent with pp_{CG}. Give $pp_{\mathsf{CG}} \cup pp_{\mathsf{PoC}} \cup \{pk_i\}_{i\in[n]} \cup \{sk_i\}_{i\in C}$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

– Send $\vec{m}_0$ and $\vec{m}_1$ to the challenger where $\vec{m}_0$ and $\vec{m}_1$ are computed as follows:
  * Sample $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $s_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ for all $i \in C$. Using Lagrange interpolation compute $\{s_i\}_{i\in H}$.
  * For all $b \in \{0,1\}$ and all $i \in C$ set $m_{b,i} = s_i$.
  * For all $i \in H$ set $m_{0,i} \leftarrow s_i$ and $m_{1,i} \leftarrow 0$.
– When the challenger returns $(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]})$, compute:
  * $\mathsf{cmt} \leftarrow \mathsf{cmt}(s), \mathsf{cmt}(s_1), \ldots, \mathsf{cmt}(s_n)$.
  * Use the zero-knowledge simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{PoC}}$ of the proof of correct sharing to generate a simulated proof π_{CS} using the instance:
$$\big(\{h_i\}_{i\in[n]}, (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt})\big)$$
– Send the following to $\mathcal{A}$:
$$\big(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}\big)$$
– When $\mathcal{A}$ returns a bit b' forward that to the challenger.

It is easy to argue that if $b = 0$, $\mathcal{A}$'s view is the same as in Hyb_1, and when $b = 1$, that is the same as in Hyb_2. So the probability of $\mathcal{A}$'s breaking Hyb_1 and Hyb_2 is upper bounded by the probability of the reduction's breaking the security of the encryption. This concludes the proof. □

- Hybrid Hyb_3. In this hybrid, the only changes from Hyb_2 is that $\mathcal{S}$ is used to generate $(\{s_i\}_{i\in C}, R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}))$ in Step 2. Clearly, this is just a syntactic change, and is otherwise identical to Hyb_2.

Finally note that Hyb_3 is identical to Game_1. This concludes the proof.

Publicly verifiable uniqueness. This follows from the soundness of the underlying proof of correctness, and the fact that the Verify algorithm runs solely on public inputs. In particular, we construct a PPT reduction $\mathcal{B}$, which breaks the soundness of the proof of correctness using an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ (that may corrupt as many as all n parties) that breaks the uniqueness as follows:

- Receive pp_{PoC} from the challenger. Construct pp by additionally choosing pp_{CG} that is consistent with PKI. Give $pp = (pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, pp_{\mathsf{PoC}})$ to $\mathcal{A}$.
- Denote the set of corrupt parties $C \subseteq [n]$ from $\mathcal{A}$ such that $n \in C$ (the dealer is corrupt)
- Receive $D = (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}})$ and two distinct sets $S_1, S_2 \subset [n]$ each of size $t+1$ from $\mathcal{A}$ plus all required secret keys $\{sk_i\}_{i\in(S_1\cup S_2)\cap C}$. Then check $\mathsf{Verify}(pp, \{pk_i\}_{i\in[n]}, D)$, if it returns 0 then abort. Else, verify whether the secret keys match with the corresponding public keys. If that fails abort. Otherwise:
  – for each $i \in S_1$: compute $y_i \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareDec}(pp, sk_i, R, E_i)$. Reconstruct $s_1^\star = \sum_{i\in S_1} L_i y_i$
  – for each $i \in S_2$: compute $y_i \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareDec}(pp, sk_i, R, E_i)$. Reconstruct $s_2^\star = \sum_{i\in S_2} L_i y_i$

cgVSS-Algorithms

- **Ingredients.** The NI-VSS algorithms described below uses the following ingredients.
  – A multi-receiver encryption scheme (cf. Section 3.2) with algorithms $(\mathsf{CGE.KeyGen}, \mathsf{CGE.mrEnc}, \mathsf{CGE.Dec})$ and public parameters pp_{CG}.
  – An associated proof system of correct sharing (cf. Section 3.3) with algorithms $(\mathsf{PoCS.Prove}, \mathsf{PoCS.Ver})$ and public parameters pp_{PoC}, which is consistent with pp_{CG}.
- **Public parameters and PKI.** The public parameter pp is defined as $pp \leftarrow pp_{\mathsf{CG}} \cup pp_{\mathsf{PoC}}$. We also assume a PKI setup.

Construction

- $\mathsf{Share}(pp, s) \rightarrow (\{s_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt})$:
  – Sample $a_j \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q, j \in [t]$.
  – Set $s_0 \leftarrow s$.
  – Define $P(x) = a_0 + a_1 x + \ldots + a_t x^t$.
  – For each $i \in [n]$: set $s_i \leftarrow P(i)$.
  – Compute for all $j \in \{0, \ldots, t\}$: $A_j \leftarrow \bar{g}^{a_j}$.
  – Set $\mathsf{cmt} \leftarrow \{A_0, \ldots, A_t\}$.
- $\mathsf{ShareEnc}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}, \{s_i, pk_i\}_{i\in[n]}) \rightarrow (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}})/\perp$.
  – Sample $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}$
  – Compute $(R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}) \leftarrow \mathsf{CGE.mrEnc}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, \{h_i, s_i; r\}_{i\in[n]})$.
  – Define:
    * $\mathsf{inst} = \big(\{h_i\}_{i\in[n]}, (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}), \mathsf{cmt}\big)$.
    * $\mathsf{wit} = ((s_1, \ldots, s_n), r)$.
  – Compute $\pi_{\mathsf{CS}} \leftarrow \mathsf{PoCS.Prove}(pp_{\mathsf{PoC}}, \mathsf{inst}, \mathsf{wit})$.
- $\mathsf{Verify}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}, R, \{E_i, pk_i\}_{i\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}}) \rightarrow 1/0$:
  – Parse $\mathsf{inst} \leftarrow \big(\{h_i\}_{i\in[n]}, (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}), \mathsf{cmt}\big)$.
  – Output $\mathsf{PoCS.Ver}(pp_{\mathsf{PoC}}, \mathsf{inst}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}})$.
- $\mathsf{ShareDec}(pp, sk_i, R, E_i) \rightarrow s_i$:
  – Compute $s_i \leftarrow \mathsf{CGE.Dec}(pp_{\mathsf{CG}}, sk_i, R, E_i)$.

Figure 3: Algorithms that constitute cgVSS

- If $s_1^\star \neq s_2^\star$ then forward the instance $(\{pk_i\}_{i\in[n]}, (R, \{E_i\}_{i\in[n]}), \mathsf{cmt})$ and the proof π_{CS} to the challenger.

Clearly, if and only if the uniqueness is broken, the the instance (with overwhelming probability) can not be in the language $\mathfrak{R}_{\mathsf{CS}}$, and yet the public verification returns 1. Therefore, the probability of $\mathcal{B}$'s breaking the soundness of proof of correct sharing is at least as the probability of $\mathcal{A}$'s breaking the uniqueness. This concludes the proof. □

6. NI-DKG using Class Groups

An NI-DKG protocol can be thought of as a symmetric extension of NI-VSS, with the crucial difference that no one knows the secret in NI-DKG. Indeed, following prior works (e.g. [7], [8], [28]), we construct NI-DKG by deploying our NI-VSS scheme in Figure 3. First we provide a simple

new definition of DKG in the universal composability (UC) framework [78]. The ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{DKG}}$ is depicted in Fig. 4. To avoid confusion with PKI we denote the output of the functionality as follows: joint (resp. individual) public key by y (resp. y_i) and secret keys by x_i. Then we provide our construction cgDKG in Fig. 5, and prove that it satisfies the UC definition.

Different guarantees by $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{DKG}}$. The functionality provides different guarantees depending on the modes. In particular, when $n \geq 2t+1$ and $t' = |C| \leq t$, then the mode is set STRONG, in which the functionality achieves guarantees such as *privacy* and *robustness* and *public verifiability*. In contrast, the WEAK mode only offers *public verifiability*. Informally, public verifiability guarantees that, from the transcript of the protocol anyone (even outside the system) can verify whether $\{y_i\}_{i\in[n]}$'s exponents are indeed t out of n secret sharing of y. The lack of robustness in WEAK mode is captured in Step 4, which allows the simulator to abort only in this case. Since this is not allowed in STRONG mode, that offers robustness. Privacy follows from the fact that, in STRONG mode the simulator never obtains the secret keys for the honest parties, whereas in WEAK mode, the simulator gets their initial dealings (Step 1(a)ii) and hence can learn all secrets. Finally, note that in either mode public verifiability is guaranteed as noted in Step 5. In STRONG mode public verifiability is captured easily, because the secret sharing executed by the functionality itself, and the list L has an entry only if that is done correctly. However, it is more involved to see in the WEAK mode, because in that mode the entries in L is defined by the simulator. Nevertheless, in Step 3a, the ideal functionality checks that whether the values returned by the simulator indeed forms a t out of n secret sharing of y.[7]

Our definition compared to state-of-art. Our definition differs from prior UC-based DKG definitions [9], [44], [45], [46] significantly. This is because, first we formalize public verifiability separately for the first time (as far as we know). In fact, our functionality offers public verifiability even when no privacy or robustness guarantee is possible (WEAK mode). We handle these two modes STRONG and WEAK within a single functionality in a more fine-grained manner. Furthermore, our definition achieves a guarantee in that the joint public key pk can be biased by the adversary in a manner, as described in Gennaro et al. [7]. Nevertheless, as also shown in earlier works, this weaker definition suffices for many threshold applications such as threshold Schnorr's signature [7], BLS [43] etc. while offering efficiency benefit. In fact, as we show in Appendix E, our definition satisfies the so-called oracle-aided simulatability requirement as defined by Bacho and Loss [43], thus is sufficient for many important applications. We note that, though Bacho and Loss showed that a number of prior interactive DKG (such as JF-DKG [79]) satisfies the required oracle-aided simulatability, our definition is the first formalization that captures the biasability of the joint public key in the UC model. We briefly discuss Appendix D the measures to remove biasability, which affects the efficiency.

Some intuitions on $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{DKG}}$. Note that, our functionality works by providing the DLog commitments of the honest parties to the simulator in STRONG mode. Since DLog commitments are not perfectly hiding, they reduce the overall privacy guarantee, for example, manifested by the key-biasing attack. However, we note that, although the joint public key y can be biased towards a specific value, it is not possible for the adversary to execute a more devastating attack. For example, the adversary can not predict x with non-negligible probability. This is captured by our functionality, as given the $\bar{g}^{s_i}$ values for honest i, the simulator may fix $y = \bar{g}^x$, but then $x = \sum_{i\in H} s_i + \sum_{i\in C} s_i$. So, predicting x implies knowing $\sum_{i\in H} s_i$ which is hard due to discrete log over $\bar{G}$.

Our protocol uses the algorithms from our NI-VSS scheme (in Figure 3). The basic idea is each party P_i now runs an NI-VSS instance using her own secret s_i; after the completion of the protocol, s_i is computed by *linearly combining* own share of s_i with shares of s_j received from other P_j.

We prove the following theorem formally.

Theorem 6 (Security of cgDKG)**.** *For parameters n, t consider a* secure *(according to Def. 6) instantiation of (n,t)-NI-VSS in Fig. 3 then the NIDKG protocol* cgDKG *(Fig. 5) UC-realizes the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dkg}}$ given in Fig. 4.*

Proof. We analyze two different modes. First let us consider the STRONG mode when $n \geq 2t+1$ and $t' = |C| \leq t$. Specifically, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that corrupts a set C of size $\leq t$ in the real protocol cgDKG, we construct a PPT simulator $\mathcal{S}$ in the ideal world. Using the secrecy property of the underlying NI-VSS our NI-DKG simulator $\mathcal{S}$ uses NI-VSS simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{vss}}$ (according to the secrecy definition in Def. 6) as follows:

1) Send (sid, C) to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dkg}}$ and receive back $\bar{g}^{s_i}$ for each $i \in [H]$, where $H = [n] \setminus C$.
2) It generates public parameter pp for the NI-VSS such that it is consistent with $\bar{G}$ and send that to the adversary.
3) Run a PKI setup by invoking $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{PKI}}^{pp}$, where the simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{PKI}}$ for that functionality interacts with $\mathcal{A}$.
   a) Run NI-VSS simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{vss}}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}(s_i) = \bar{g}^{s_i}, C, \{pk_i\}_{i\in[n]})$ to generate $(R_i, \{E_{ij}\}_{j\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}i}, \mathsf{cmt}_i)$.
   b) Send $(R_i, \{E_{ij}\}_{j\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt}_i, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}i})$ to $\mathcal{A}$.
4) On receiving $\{(R_i, \{E_{ij}\}_{j\in[n]}, \mathsf{cmt}_i, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}i})\}_{i\in C}$ for all $i \in C$ check $e_i \leftarrow \mathsf{Verify}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}_i, R_i, \{E_{ij}\}_{j\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}i}\})$. Let V consist of $i \in C$ if and only if $e_i = 1$. For all $i \in V$
   a) For each $j \in H$ decrypt $\mathsf{ShareDec}(pp, sk_j, R_i, E_{ij})$ to get s_{ij}.
   b) Reconstruct $\{s_{ij}\}_{j\in H}$ to obtain s_i. In this step if there are more than $t+1$ honest parties, pick any $t+1$ of them to Shamir's reconstruction.

   For all $i \in C \setminus V$ set $s_i \leftarrow \perp$.
5) Send $(\mathsf{sid}, \{s_i\}_{i\in C})$ to the ideal functionality to get back $(pk, \{sk_i, pk_i\}_{i\in V})$, which it forwards to $\mathcal{A}$.

7. This can be done by, for example, a simple linear code check in the exponent akin to [6].

$\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dkg}}$

The ideal functionality interacts with $n+1$ ideal parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n, P_v$ and an ideal adversary, the simulator $\mathcal{S}$. The functionality is also parameterized with a reconstruction threshold $t < n$ and a group $\langle \bar{g} \rangle = \bar{G}$ of prime order q where discrete log is hard. Since we assume a static corruption setting, we consider another parameter $t' = |C|$, that denotes the number of corrupted parties (also define $H = [n] \setminus C$). The functionality works in two modes STRONG and WEAK. If $n \geq 2t+1$ and $t' \leq t$ it sets the mode to STRONG, otherwise it sets to WEAK mode. It works as follows:

1) Upon receiving sid from $\mathcal{S}$: only if sid is unmarked then:
   a) For each $i \in H$ choose a uniform random $s_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$. Then:
      i) If mode is STRONG then send $\{\bar{g}^{s_i}\}_{i \in H}$ to $\mathcal{S}$./*In this mode $\mathcal{S}$ gets only the commitments, so privacy holds.*/
      ii) Else, send $\{s_i\}_{i \in H}$ to $\mathcal{S}$. /*In this mode, privacy is not guaranteed since s_is are provided to the simulator.*/
2) Upon $(\mathsf{sid}, \{s_i\}_{i \in C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q,)$ from $\mathcal{S}$: only if (i) sid is marked `Live`; (ii) and the mode is STRONG:
   a) Initialize a set V, and include i into V only if $s_i \neq \perp$.
   b) Compute $s = \sum_{i \in H \cup V} s_i$.
   c) Choose uniform random t-degree $P(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^t[x]$ subject to $P(0) = s$. Set $x \leftarrow s$ and $y \leftarrow \bar{g}^s$. Also set $y_i \leftarrow \bar{g}^{x_i}$ where $x_i \leftarrow P(i)$ for all $i \in [n]$.
   d) Finally send (x_i, y_i, y) to party $i \in H$; $(\mathsf{sid}, y, \{y_i\}_{i \in H \cup V}, \{x_i\}\}_{i \in V})$ to $\mathcal{S}$ and y to P_v.
   e) Mark sid `End` and store (sid, y) into a list L.

   /*This mode offers robustness, privacy and public verifiability.*/
3) Upon $(\mathsf{sid}, y, \{x_i\}_{i \in H}, \{y_i\}_{i \in [n]})$ from $\mathcal{S}$: only if (i) sid is marked `Live`; *and* (ii) the mode is WEAK:
   a) Let $y = \bar{g}^x$ and $y_i = \bar{g}^{x_i}$, where x and $\{x_i\}_{i \in C}$. Check whether x_i's are a t out of n Shamir's secret sharing of x. This can be checked in the exponent, for example, by choosing a random linear code in the orthogonal space defined by $y_0, \ldots, y_n$. If this check fails skip. Else go to the next step.
   b) Send(x_i, y_i, y) to party $i \in H$.
   c) Send $y, \{y_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ to P_v.
   d) Mark sid `End` and store $(\mathsf{sid}, y, \{y_i\}_{i \in [n]})$ into a list L.

   /*This modes guarantees only public verifiability.*/
4) Upon $(\mathsf{sid}, \texttt{Failure})$ from $\mathcal{S}$: only if (i) sid is marked `Live`; *and* (ii) the mode is WEAK: then send $\perp$ to everyone and mark sid `End`./*In the WEAK mode, abort is allowed, so robustness does not hold.*/
5) Upon $(y, \{y_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \texttt{Verify})$ from P_v: return 1 if and only if $\exists$ sid such that $(\mathsf{sid}, y, \{y\}_{i \in [n]}) \in L$ and 0 otherwise./*In all modes public verifiability holds.*/

Figure 4: Ideal Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dkg}}$

cgDKG

- **Ingredients.** We assume n parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ are running this protocol with a threshold t. Additionally we assume a public verifier P_v. For parameters n, t the following ingredients are needed.
  - We assume a PKI setup with public parameters pp that outputs public keys $\{pk_i\}_{i \in [n]}$, for which each party P_i (except P_v) knows a secret key sk_i.
  - An (n,t)-NI-VSS scheme $(\mathsf{Share}, \mathsf{ShareEnc}, \mathsf{Verify}, \mathsf{ShareDec})$ with the same public parameters pp.

Protocol

- **Dealing.** Execute the following steps:
  - $s_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$.
  - $(\{s_{ij}\}_{j \in [n]}, \mathsf{cmt}_i) \leftarrow \mathsf{Share}(pp, s_i)$.
  - $(R_i, \{E_{ij}\}_{j \in [n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}i}) \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareEnc}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}_i, \{s_{ij}, pk_j\}_{j \in [n]})$
  - Broadcast $(R_i, \{E_{ij}\}_{j \in [n]}, \mathsf{cmt}_i, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}i})$.
- **Receiving.** Each party P_i receives $n-1$ tuples:

$$\{(R_j, \{E_{jj'}\}_{j' \in [n]}, \mathsf{cmt}_j, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}j})\}_{j \in [n] \wedge j \neq i}$$

  then execute the following steps.
  - For all $j \in [n] \wedge j \neq i$: compute

$$e_j \leftarrow \mathsf{Verify}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}_j, R_j, \{E_{jj'}\}_{j' \in [n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}j})$$

  - Let U consist of j if and only if $e_j = 1$.
  - Initialize $k_i \leftarrow 0$
  - For all $j \in U$:
    - $s_{ji} \leftarrow \mathsf{ShareDec}(pp, sk_i, R_j, E_{ji})$.
    - $k_i \leftarrow k_i + s_{ji}$
  - Define its share to be $x_i \leftarrow k_i$ and individual public-key as $y_i \leftarrow \bar{g}^{k_i}$.
  - To compute the system public-key initialize $y = 1 \in \bar{G}$ and for each $j \in U$:
    - Parse cmt_j as $\{A_{0j}, \ldots, A_{tj}\}$.
    - $y = y \cdot A_{0j}$.
  - Define y as system public key.
- **Public Verifying.** P_v observes n tuples:

$$\{(R_j, \{E_{jj'}\}_{j' \in [n]}, \mathsf{cmt}_j, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}j})\}_{j \in [n]}$$

  then execute the following steps.
  - For all $j \in [n]$: compute

$$e_j \leftarrow \mathsf{Verify}(pp, \mathsf{cmt}_j, R_j, \{E_{jj'}\}_{j' \in [n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}j})$$

  - Let U consist of j if and only if $e_j = 1$.
  - To compute the public-keys initialize $y = 1 \in \bar{G}$ and $y_j = j \in \bar{G}$ for all $j \in [n]$. Then for each $j \in U$:
    - Parse cmt_j as $\{A_{0j}, \ldots, A_{tj}\}$.
    - $y = y \cdot A_{0j}$.
    - $y_i = y_i \cdot A_{ij}$.
  - Define y as joint public key, and $y_1, \ldots, y_n$ as individual public keys.

Figure 5: Our NI-DKG protocol

Next we prove that the simulation is correct. First note that due to publicly verifiable uniqueness, if there are more than $t+1$ honest parties, there is a unique value s_i for any $i \in V$. Therefore, the query from P_v is always returned correctly.

Then, we construct hybrids Hyb_i for $i \in |H|$ as follows:

Hybrid Hyb_i. This hybrid is same as the real world except that all parties P_j such that $j \leq i$ (without loss of generality we assume that parties $P_1, \ldots, P_{|H|}$ are honest) runs $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{vss}}(pp, \bar{g}^{s_j}, C, \{pk_i\}_{i\in[n]})$ to generate $(R_j, \{E_{jk}\}_{k\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}j}, \mathsf{cmt}_j)$.

Now clearly, Hyb_0 is the real world execution of cgDKG and $\mathsf{Hyb}_{|H|+1}$ is the ideal world execution using the simulator $\mathcal{S}$. We can argue that, if an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish between two successive hybrids Hyb_i and Hyb_{i+1}, we can construct a reduction which breaks secrecy of NIVSS as follows:

- When receive pp from the NIVSS secrecy challenger forward it to $\mathcal{A}$. Receive a set of corrupt parties C from $\mathcal{A}$, such that the dealer $i \notin C$ and forward that to the challenger.
- Invoke the PKI setup with $\mathcal{A}$ controlling C.
- For $j < i$ choose s_j uniformly at random and use $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{vss}}(pp, \bar{g}^{s_j}, C, \{pk_i\}_{i\in[n]})$ to generate $(R_j, \{E_{jk}\}_{k\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}j}, \mathsf{cmt}_j)$.
- For $|H| \geq j > i$ choose s_j uniformly at random and use $\mathsf{Share}(pp, s_j)$ and then $\mathsf{ShareEnc}(pp, \{s_j, pk_j\}_{j\in[n]})$ to generate $(R_j, \{E_{jk}\}_{k\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}j}, \mathsf{cmt}_j)$.
- Receive $(R_i, \{E_{ik}\}_{k\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}i}, \mathsf{cmt}_i)$ from the challenger.
- Send the generated values to $\mathcal{A}$.
- On receiving a bit b' from $\mathcal{A}$, forward that to the challenger.

Clearly, the reduction simulates Hyb_i if the challenger returns $(R_i, \{E_{ik}\}_{k\in[n]}, \pi_{\mathsf{CS}i}, \mathsf{cmt}_i)$ generated using Share and $\mathsf{ShareEnc}$ ($b = 0$), and Hyb_{i+1} if the challenger generates using $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{vss}}$ ($b = 1$). This concludes the proof for STRONG mode.

Next we consider the WEAK mode. In this mode, the simulation is relatively easy as it obtains the honest party's secrets s_i in Step 1(a)ii of $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{DKG}}$. Given that, the simulator can just execute steps from the cgDKG protocol (Fig. 5). As informally stated, this mode only guarantees public verifiability, the simulator needs to ensure that it submits $y, y_1, \ldots, y_n$ in Step 3 to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{DKG}}$ such that they form a correct Shamir's sharing in the exponent. If this does not happen, then the check in Step 3a fails, and simulation would not be correct. However, this is possible because of the public verifiability sub-routine in our protocol (cf. Fig. 5). In particular, the simulator can just execute the sub-routine to generate $(y, y_1, \ldots, y_n)$ correctly from the protocol messages solely (even without the secret keys of the corrupt parties). This makes sure that anytime a tuple $(\mathsf{sid}, y, \{y_i\}_{i\in[n]})$ is entered in L, the exponents of y_i form a t out of n Shamir's secret sharing. Finally, note that in case the corrupt parties behave in a way that the protocol execution is aborted (for example, when all parties are corrupt and aborting), then the simulator can issue a `Failure` command.

This concludes the proof for WEAK mode. □

7. Experimentation and Performance Analysis

Implementation and Setup. We implement cgVSS in C++ using the BICYCL library [80] for class groups, Miracl C++ library for cryptographic operations with $\sim$ 1858 lines of code. For comparison, we adapt and realize a version of the implementation of GrothVSS without forward secrecy in Rust in $\sim$ 4178 lines of code[8]

We run the experiments with each node realized on a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) instance with an Intel Xeon 2.8GHz CPU with 16 cores and 16GB RAM. We use HotStuff state machine replication [81] to realize the broadcast. Our SMR instance is realized over four GCP instances separate from the DKG nodes. All the reported timings are averages over 10 runs of the protocols.

Communication/Storage Overhead. In cgVSS, the dealer generates 256-bit shares for each party in the system and encrypts them. The encryption of each share consists of two elements (c, d), where c is the exponentiated randomness. In the multi-receiver encryption mechanism, the randomness can be reused across multiple receivers. Hence while encrypting the share values for n receivers, the dealer uses one element for randomness and n elements for the second element of the encryption tuples. Each element in the compressed form takes 1752 bits. The dealer commits to the t coefficients of the polynomial. Hence the total bit-length length for the multi-receiver encryption and commitments is $(1752) \cdot (n + 1) + 384 \cdot t$. For the proof of correctness, the dealer also forwards 5 elements, including two class group elements, one elliptic curve element, and two scalars. Figure 6 shows the total bit-length of the dealing (the broadcast message). For 100 users, the dealer broadcasts a message (dealing) of length 201.55Kb whereas, for 150 users, it is 297.82Kb (vs 1.66MB for GrothVSS).

Computation Overhead. Figure 7 shows the time taken by the dealer and the receiver in the cgVSS protocol. The dealer's computation time includes the time to generate the multi-receiver ciphertext and the NIZK proof of correctness whereas a receiver's computation time includes the decryption time and the time for proof verification. We use multi-exponentiation to compute the product of multiple exponentiated values in the generation and verification procedures of the proof of correct sharing. For a 100 party system, the dealer takes 1.22sec for generating the ciphertext and 734msec to generate the proof, whereas for a 150 party system, it takes 1.80sec for encryption and 377msec for the proof generation. The decryption takes 38msec, while the proof verification takes 734msec for a 100 user system and 1.23sec for a 150 party system (the decryption time stays the same irrespective of the number of parties). Figure 7b shows the total receiver times taken by the party to verify the sharing and decrypt their shares.

In GrothVSS, to encrypt a share value, (assume) each share is divided into 24 chunks and encrypted individually. The ElGamal encryption constitutes two group elements; however, since the randomness is re-used across different users, the total number of elements for randomness is 24, amounting to $24*381 = 9144$ bits. For n users, the total bit-length of ciphertexts is $9144 \cdot (n+1)$, including the random

8. Available at the link https://anonymous.4open.science/r/niseDKG-ED42/README.md.



Figure 6: Comparison of broadcast (dealing) message length where $n = 2t + 1$. cgVSS dealing consists of encryptions and proof of correct sharing, while GrothVSS also consists of proof of correct chunking.



(a) Comparison of dealer times. cgVSS dealer time consists of times for encryption and proof of correct sharing, while GrothVSS also involves proof of correct chunking.



(b) Comparison of receiver times. cgVSS receiver time consists of decryption time and verification of correct sharing, while GrothVSS also involves verification of correct chunking.

Figure 7: Comparison of dealer and receiver times for cgVSS and GrothVSS.

values. The dealer also commits to the t coefficients of the polynomial, which amount to $257 \cdot t$. The dealer generates the NIZK proof of correctness of sharing, which constitutes 3 multiplicative group elements and two scalars of 381 bits each. GrothVSS uses the BLS12-381 curve, and hence the elements are 381 bits each. The dealer also generates proof of the correctness of chunking by showing that each 'chunk' is in a small range of values. For this, an approximate range proof is employed where the dealer forwards a set of elements, including $2\ell + 2$ group elements for a parameter ℓ and $\ell + n + 1$ masked values of the chunks. Taking a conservative estimate of 32 bits for the masked chunk value summations, we have the total bit-length of the approximate range proof to be $(2\ell + 2) \cdot 381 + (\ell + n + 1) \cdot 32$.

The total bit-length of the broadcast message (see Figure 6) for GrothVSS for a 150 party is 1.66Mb. This indicates a 5.6x improvement in total broadcast message length while using cgVSS when compared to GrothVSS for a 150 party system. The comparison also indicates that the broadcast message length increases slower in cgVSS when compared to GrothVSS. In GrothVSS, for a 100 party system, the dealer takes 1.36sec for generating ciphertexts, 68msec for generating the proof of correct sharing, and 2.41sec for generating proof of correct chunking, whereas the corresponding numbers for a 150 party system are 2.03sec, 101msec and 3.92 sec respectively. For decrypting their share, each receiver decrypts all the corresponding chunks, which amounts to 338msec. For verification, in a 100 party system, the receiver takes 341msec for proof of correct sharing and 1.32sec for proof of correct chunking; for a 150 party system, the receiver takes 804msec for proof of correct sharing and 2.00sec for the proof of correct chunking.

To also give a sense of how the scheme compares to other existing state-of-the-art PVSS schemes, we briefly mention the timing reported by Gentry et al. [38] for their LWE-based PVSS scheme. We present their reported numbers, though their performance has been evaluated on a more powerful machine (with 32 cores and 250GB RAM) compared to our benchmarks (10 core 16GB RAM machine). For 128 parties, their system takes 4.2sec for generating ciphertexts and 22.9sec for generating the proof of correctness of sharing totaling 27.1sec of dealer time, whereas for 256 parties, the total dealer time is 28.1sec. The receiver takes 1.4msec to decrypt and 15.3sec to verify the dealing totaling 15.301sec. The total receiver time for 256 parties is 15.901sec.

End-to-end Protocol Analysis. We realize the cgDKG and GrothDKG protocols and compare them. Figure 8 compares the time taken by each node in each DKG instance; it is the time taken from the start of dealing to the computation of the system public key after verifying $t + 1$ valid dealings. The nodes publish the encrypted shares and commitments using the HotStuff [81] SMR. The SMR is realized separately from the DKG nodes, which communicate with the SMR through RPC calls. For 10 nodes, GrothDKG takes 3.434 seconds, with cgDKG taking 2.656 seconds. For a 50 node network, GrothDKG takes 43.058 seconds while cgDKGtakes 17.950 seconds. From Figure 7 and Figure 8, it can be observed that the SMR takes significant time in the overall end-to-end scenario, and the optimizations in SMR usage (block rate, dummy blocks etc) would improve the performance.

In summary, our performance analysis demonstrates that cgDKG is efficient and continues to perform significantly better than GrothDKG with an increasing number of nodes in the system. Moreover, as we improve class-group implementation in the future, we expect the performance of our cgDKG to improve further.

8. Conclusion

The ability to convince external observers of the system's correctness, even when all participating parties may be malicious, has been pivotal to blockchains' progress so far. With the growing prominence of threshold cryptographic protocols in the blockchain domain, the importance of the pubic verifiability property cannot be over-



Figure 8: Comparison of time taken to perform a DKG. GrothDKG is realized using GrothVSS where each party acts as a dealer and runs an instance of GrothVSS. The times reported are aggregates of time taken from starting of dealing and computation of public key by each node, across nodes; 10 such DKG runs are aggregated.

stated. While notable advancements have been made recently towards achieving practicality in publicly verifiable non-interactive secret sharing (NI-VSS) and publicly verifiable non-interactive distributed key generation (NI-DKG), achieving practicality at scale remains a significant challenge. This work addresses this concern by presenting a provably secure design that excels in terms of communication, storage, and computation efficiency at a scale and in simplicity of design that are relevant to contemporary applications such as blockchains.

Furthermore, a critical observation from this study is the lack of a well-formalized definition for the pubic verifiability property in the existing NI-VSS/NI-DKG literature. To address this gap, we contribute a new comprehensive and detailed formalism that holds independent significance for the broader field of threshold cryptosystems.

References

[1] A. Shamir, "How to share a secret," *Communications of the ACM*, vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612–613, 1979.

[2] G. R. Blakley, "Safeguarding cryptographic keys," in *1979 International Workshop on Managing Requirements Knowledge (MARK)*, 1979, pp. 313–318.

[3] B. Chor, S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and B. Awerbuch, "Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults," in *FOCS*, 1985, p. 383–395.

[4] D. Galindo, J. Liu, M. Ordean, and J.-M. Wong, "Fully distributed verifiable random functions and their application to decentralised random beacons," in *2021 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)*, 2021, pp. 88–102.

[5] I. Cascudo and B. David, "Scrape: Scalable randomness attested by public entities," in *ACNS*, 2017, pp. 537–556.

[6] A. Bhat, N. Shrestha, A. Kate, and K. Nayak, "Optrand: Optimistically responsive reconfigurable distributed randomness," in *NDSS*, 2023.

[7] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin, "Secure distributed key generation for discrete-log based cryptosystems," in *EUROCRYPT'99*, 1999, p. 295–310.

[8] J. Groth, "Non-interactive distributed key generation and key resharing," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/339, 2021, https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/339.

[9] C. Komlo, I. Goldberg, and D. Stebila, "A formal treatment of distributed key generation, and new constructions," *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, 2023.

[10] K. Gurkan, P. Jovanovic, M. Maller, S. Meiklejohn, G. Stern, and A. Tomescu, "Aggregatable distributed key generation," in *Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2021*, 2021, pp. 147–176.

[11] A. Boldyreva, "Threshold signatures, multisignatures and blind signatures based on the gap-diffie-hellman-group signature scheme," in *Public Key Cryptography — PKC 2003*, 2002, pp. 31–46.

[12] Y. G. Desmedt, "Threshold cryptography," *European Transactions on Telecommunications*, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 449–458, 1994.

[13] J. Groth and V. Shoup, "Design and analysis of a distributed ECDSA signing service," *IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.*, p. 506, 2022.

[14] A. Kate and I. Goldberg, "Distributed private-key generators for identity-based cryptography," in *SCN*, 2010, pp. 436–453.

[15] R. Cramer, I. Damgård, and U. Maurer, "General secure multi-party computation from any linear secret-sharing scheme," in *International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques*. Springer, 2000, pp. 316–334.

[16] A. Patra, A. Choudhury, and C. Pandu Rangan, "Efficient asynchronous verifiable secret sharing and multiparty computation," *Journal of Cryptology*, vol. 28, pp. 49–109, 2015.

[17] D. Lu, T. Yurek, S. Kulshreshtha, R. Govind, A. Kate, and A. Miller, "Honeybadgermpc and asynchromix: Practical asynchronous MPC and its application to anonymous communication," in *ACM CCS*, 2019, pp. 887–903.

[18] L. Braun, I. Damgård, and C. Orlandi, "Secure multiparty computation from threshold encryption based on class groups," To appear at Crypto 2023, 2022. [Online]. Available: https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1437

[19] E. V. Mangipudi, U. Desai, M. Minaei, M. Mondal, and A. Kate, "Uncovering impact of mental models towards adoption of multi-device crypto-wallets," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/075, 2022, https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/075.

[20] I. Abraham, D. Malkhi, K. Nayak, L. Ren, and M. Yin, "Sync hotstuff: Simple and practical synchronous state machine replication," in *2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*. IEEE, 2020, pp. 106–118.

[21] "DRand - Distributed randomness beacon - Cryptography," https://drand.love/docs/cryptography/#setup-phase.

[22] "Dfinity-Internet Computer for Geeks," https://internetcomputer.org/whitepaper.pdf.

[23] D. Galindo, J. Liu, M. Ordean, and J.-M. Wong, "Fully distributed verifiable random functions and their application to decentralised random beacons," in *2021 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)*. IEEE, 2021, pp. 88–102.

[24] C. Gentry, S. Halevi, H. Krawczyk, B. Magri, J. B. Nielsen, T. Rabin, and S. Yakoubov, "Yoso: You only speak once: Secure mpc with stateless ephemeral roles," in *Advances in Cryptology — Crypto*, 2021, pp. 64–93.

[25] B. Schoenmakers, "A simple publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme and its application to electronic," in *Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO*, 1999, pp. 148–164.

[26] A. Scafuro, L. Siniscalchi, and I. Visconti, "Publicly verifiable proofs from blockchains," in *Public-Key Cryptography - PKC 2019*, 2019, pp. 374–401.

[27] M. Backes, A. Kate, and A. Patra, "Computational verifiable secret sharing revisited," in *Advances in Cryptology—ASIACRYPT*, 2011, pp. 590–609.

[28] T. P. Pedersen, "A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party," in *Workshop on the Theory and Application of of Cryptographic Techniques*. Springer, 1991, pp. 522–526.

[29] W. Neji, K. Blibech, and N. Ben Rajeb, "Distributed key generation protocol with a new complaint management strategy," *Security and Communication Networks*, vol. 9, no. 17, pp. 4585–4595, 2016.

[30] P. Feldman, "A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing," in *28th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1987)*, 1987, pp. 427–438.

[31] A. Kate, G. M. Zaverucha, and I. Goldberg, "Polynomial commitments," *Tech. Rep*, 2010.

[32] R. Gennaro, M. O. Rabin, and T. Rabin, "Simplified vss and fast-track multiparty computations with applications to threshold cryptography," in *ACM PODC*, 1998, p. 101–111.

[33] A. Chandramouli, A. Choudhury, and A. Patra, "A survey on perfectly secure verifiable secret-sharing," vol. 54, no. 11s, 2022. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/3512344

[34] M. Stadler, "Publicly verifiable secret sharing," in *Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT*, 1996, pp. 190–199.

[35] C. Gentry, S. Halevi, and V. Lyubashevsky, "Practical non-interactive publicly verifiable secret sharing with thousands of parties," in *Advances in Cryptology—EUROCRYPT*, 2022, pp. 458–487.

[36] A. Ruiz and J. L. Villar, "Publicly verifiable secret sharing from paillier's cryptosystem," in *WEWoRC 2005 – Western European Workshop on Research in Cryptology*, 2005, pp. 98–108.

[37] S. Heidarvand and J. L. Villar, "Public verifiability from pairings in secret sharing schemes," in *Selected Areas in Cryptography*, R. M. Avanzi, L. Keliher, and F. Sica, Eds. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 294–308.

[38] C. Gentry, S. Halevi, and V. Lyubashevsky, "Practical non-interactive publicly verifiable secret sharing with thousands of parties," in *Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2022*. Springer, 2022, pp. 458–487.

[39] B. Bünz, J. Bootle, D. Boneh, A. Poelstra, P. Wuille, and G. Maxwell, "Bulletproofs: Short proofs for confidential transactions and more," in *2018 IEEE symposium on security and privacy (SP)*. IEEE, 2018, pp. 315–334.

[40] G. Castagnos and F. Laguillaumie, "Linearly homomorphic encryption from ddh," in *Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference*. Springer, 2015, pp. 487–505.

[41] S. A. K. Thyagarajan, G. Castagnos, F. Laguillaumie, and G. Malavolta, "Efficient cca timed commitments in class groups," in *Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, ser. CCS '21, 2021.

[42] "Nise: Non-interactive simple and efficient vss using class groups and application to publicly verifiable dkg - extended version," 2023, https://anonymous.4open.science/r/niseDKGdoc-6CE4/ClassGroup_DKG%20extended.pdf.

[43] R. Bacho and J. Loss, "On the adaptive security of the threshold bls signature scheme," in *Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, 2022, pp. 193–207.

[44] D. Boneh and V. Shoup, "A graduate course in applied cryptography." [Online]. Available: https://toc.cryptobook.us/book.pdf

[45] S. Jarecki, A. Kiayias, H. Krawczyk, and J. Xu, "TOPPSS: cost-minimal password-protected secret sharing based on threshold OPRF," in *Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS) 2017*.

[46] D. Wikström, "Universally composable DKG with linear number of exponentiations," in *Security in Communication Networks, 4th International Conference, SCN 2004*, 2004.

[47] S. Kanjalkar, Y. Zhang, S. Gandlur, and A. Miller, "Publicly auditable mpc-as-a-service with succinct verification and universal setup," 2021.

[48] A. Ozdemir and D. Boneh, "Experimenting with collaborative zk-snarks: Zero-knowledge proofs for distributed secrets," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/1530, 2021, https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1530.

[49] E. Fujisaki and T. Okamoto, "A practical and provably secure scheme for publicly verifiable secret sharing and its applications," in *Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT'98*, 1998, pp. 32–46.

[50] F. Boudot and J. Traoré, "Efficient publicly verifiable secret sharing schemes with fast or delayed recovery," in *Information and Communication Security*, 1999, pp. 87–102.

[51] ——, "Efficient publicly verifiable secret sharing schemes with fast or delayed recovery," in *Information and Communication Security: Second International Conference, ICICS'99, Sydney, Australia, November 9-11, 1999. Proceedings 2*, 1999, pp. 87–102.

[52] A. Young and M. Yung, "A pvss as hard as discrete log and shareholder separability," in *Public Key Cryptography*, 2001, pp. 287–299.

[53] P.-A. Fouque and J. Stern, "One round threshold discrete-log key generation without private channels," in *Public Key Cryptography*, 2001, pp. 300–316.

[54] J. Camenisch and V. Shoup, "Practical verifiable encryption and decryption of discrete logarithms," in *Annual International Cryptology Conference*. Springer, 2003, pp. 126–144.

[55] A. Ruiz and J. L. Villar, "Publicly verifiable secret sharing from paillier's cryptosystem," 2005.

[56] T.-Y. Wu and Y.-M. Tseng, "A pairing-based publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme," *Journal of systems science and complexity*, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 186–194, 2011.

[57] R. D'Souza, D. Jao, I. Mironov, and O. Pandey, "Publicly verifiable secret sharing for cloud-based key management," in *INDOCRYPT 2011: 12th International Conference on Cryptology 2011*. Springer, 2011, pp. 290–309.

[58] C. Cachin, K. Kursawe, A. Lysyanskaya, and R. Strobl, "Asynchronous verifiable secret sharing and proactive cryptosystems," in *Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, 2002, pp. 88–97.

[59] T. Yurek, L. Luo, J. Fairoze, A. Kate, and A. K. Miller, "hbacss: How to robustly share many secrets," in *NDSS*, 2022.

[60] J. Groth and V. Shoup, "Design and analysis of a distributed ecdsa signing service," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/506, 2022, https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/506.

[61] I. Abraham, P. Jovanovic, M. Maller, S. Meiklejohn, and G. Stern, "Bingo: Adaptively secure packed asynchronous verifiable secret sharing and asynchronous distributed key generation," *Cryptology ePrint Archive*, 2022.

[62] J. Katz, "Round optimal robust distributed key generation," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1094, 2023, https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1094. [Online]. Available: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1094

[63] R. Canetti, R. Gennaro, S. Goldfeder, N. Makriyannis, and U. Peled, "Uc non-interactive, proactive, threshold ecdsa with identifiable aborts," in *Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security*. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2020.

[64] E. Kokoris Kogias, D. Malkhi, and A. Spiegelman, "Asynchronous distributed key generation for computationally-secure randomness, consensus, and threshold signatures." New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2020.

[65] I. Abraham, P. Jovanovic, M. Maller, S. Meiklejohn, G. Stern, and A. Tomescu, "Reaching consensus for asynchronous distributed key generation," in *PODC'21*, 2021, pp. 363–373.

[66] D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham, "Short signatures from the weil pairing," in *International conference on the theory and application of cryptology and information security*. Springer, 2001, pp. 514–532.

[67] B. Wesolowski, "Efficient verifiable delay functions," in *Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2019*, 2019, pp. 379–407.

[68] G. Castagnos, D. Catalano, F. Laguillaumie, F. Savasta, and I. Tucker, "Two-party ecdsa from hash proof systems and efficient instantiations," in *Annual International Cryptology Conference*. Springer, 2019, pp. 191–221.

[69] G. Castagnos, F. Laguillaumie, and I. Tucker, "Threshold linearly homomorphic encryption on bfz/2^{kbfz}," in *Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2022*, 2022, pp. 99–129.

[70] G. Castagnos, D. Catalano, F. Laguillaumie, F. Savasta, and I. Tucker, "Bandwidth-efficient threshold ec-dsa," in *23rd IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography*, 2020, pp. 266–296.

[71] I. Damgård and E. Fujisaki, "A statistically-hiding integer commitment scheme based on groups with hidden order," Y. Zheng, Ed., 2002. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36178-2_8

[72] M. Bellare, A. Boldyreva, and J. Staddon, "Randomness re-use in multi-recipient encryption schemeas," in *Public Key Cryptography—PKC 2003: 6th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography Miami, FL, USA, January 6–8, 2003 Proceedings 6*. Springer, 2002, pp. 85–99.

[73] M. Bellare, A. Boldyreva, K. Kurosawa, and J. Staddon, "Multirecipient encryption schemes: How to save on bandwidth and computation without sacrificing security," *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, vol. 53, no. 11, pp. 3927–3943, 2007.

[74] B. Schoenmakers and M. Veeningen, "Universally verifiable multiparty computation from threshold homomorphic cryptosystems," in *Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS)*, 2015, pp. 3–22.

[75] C. Baum, I. Damgård, and C. Orlandi, "Publicly auditable secure multi-party computation," in *Security and Cryptography for Networks (SCN)*, 2014, pp. 175–196.

[76] A. Chandramouli, A. Choudhury, and A. Patra, "A survey on perfectly secure verifiable secret-sharing," *ACM Comput. Surv.*, vol. 54, no. 11s, pp. 232:1–232:36, 2022.

[77] C. Komlo, I. Goldberg, and D. Stebila, "A formal treatment of distributed key generation, and new constructions," *IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.*, p. 292, 2023. [Online]. Available: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/292

[78] R. Canetti, "Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols," in *42nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2001, 14-17 October 2001, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA*. IEEE Computer Society, 2001, pp. 136–145.

[79] P. Feldman, "A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing," in *28th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1987)*. IEEE, 1987, pp. 427–438.

[80] C. Bouvier, G. Castagnos, L. Imbert, and F. Laguillaumie, "I want to ride my bicycl: Bicycl implements cryptography in class groups," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1466, 2022, https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1466.

[81] M. Yin, D. Malkhi, M. K. Reiter, G. G. Gueta, and I. Abraham, "Hotstuff: Bft consensus with linearity and responsiveness," in *Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing*, 2019, pp. 347–356.

[82] R. Bacho and J. Loss, "On the adaptive security of the threshold bls signature scheme," in *ACM CCS*, 2022, p. 193–207.

Appendix A. Security of NIZK proof of exponent over class group

We recall the construction from Section 3.1. We restate the theorem.

Theorem 7. *For any $\lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}} \in \mathbb{N}$ and any modulus $q \in \mathbb{Z}$, for a correctly generated class group parameters $pp_{\mathsf{CG}} \leftarrow \mathsf{CGE.KeyGen}(1^{\lambda}, 1^{\lambda}_{\mathsf{st}}, q)$ as long as the low order assumptions (Def. 3) and the strong root assumption (Def. 4) holds over the class group $\widehat{G}$, the NIZK proof system described above is secure argument of knowledge in the random oracle model.*

Proof. Since completeness is immediate. We focus on statistical zero-knowledge and knowledge of argument in order.

Statistical Zero-knowledge. We build a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ as follows:

1) Input: $(g_q, h) \in G^q \times G^q$.
2) Sample a uniform random $s \xleftarrow{\$} [2^{\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}} \cdot \mathcal{B} \cdot |\mathcal{D}_q|]$.
3) Sample a uniform random $c \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{B}$
4) Compute $a \leftarrow g_q^s \cdot (h^c)^{-1}$.
5) Program the random oracle $H(g_q, h, a) = c$.
6) Output $\pi \leftarrow (c, s)$

Now note that, the proof (c, s) satisfies the verification test, because (i) s is in the correct range; (ii) the equation in Step 4 holds and (iii) the random oracle is correctly programmed in Step 5. Note that, if a malicious verifies makes Q_H many RO queries, then the probability of successfully obtaining a correct input-output pair is bounded by $Q_H^2/2|\mathcal{B}|$. Setting $Q_H^2 = 2^{\lambda - \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$ this probability is $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda_{\mathsf{st}})$.

Again, if the above event does not happen then the only event when the simulated s and an actual s produced by the prover does not match when $2^{\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}} \cdot |\mathcal{D}_q| \cdot \mathcal{B} \geq r > 2^{\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}-1} \cdot |\mathcal{D}_q| \cdot \mathcal{B}$. This happens with probability $2^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$. So the statistical distance btween the simulated and real proof is bounded by $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda_{\mathsf{st}})$ as required.

Knowledge of Argument. We can use the low order assumption and strong root assumption to argue knowledge of argument similar to prior works [41], [70], [71]. The idea is to use the standard forking/rewinding technique to obtain two challenges c, c' for the same a, and subsequently two different s, s' such that we have: $g_q^s \cdot h^{-c} = g_q^{s'} \cdot h^{-c'}$. Let $d = \gcd(s - s', c - c')$. Then we define

$$\gamma = g_q^{\frac{s-s'}{d}} \cdot (h^{-1})^{\frac{c-c'}{d}}$$

Clearly, $\gamma^d = 1$. Now there are two cases:

- Case-1: $\gamma \neq 1$. In this case, we have an element $\gamma \in \widehat{G}$ which has order $d < c - c' < \mathcal{B}$. That implies a break of $\mathcal{B}$-low order assumption. So the probability of this case is negligible.
- Case-2: $\gamma = 1$. In this case we have $g_q^{\frac{s-s'}{d}} = h^{\frac{c-c'}{d}}$. Define $f = \frac{c-c'}{d}$ Then there are two sub-cases:
  - Case-2.(a): $f \neq 2^{\rho}$ for any integer ρ. In this case we can write using Euclidean GCD: $d = \alpha(s - s') + \beta(c - c')$ for integers α, β. Then we have:

$$\begin{aligned} g_q^d &= g_q^{\alpha(s-s')+\beta(c-c')} \\ &= h^{fd\alpha} g_q^{fd\beta} \end{aligned}$$

    This means we can write:

$$g_q = (h^{\alpha} g_q^{\beta})^f$$

    So, for $Y = g_q$ we get $X = h^{\alpha} g_q^{\beta}$ and f is not a power of two – this solves the strong root assumption over $\widehat{G}$. We note that, g_q may not be a random element in $\widehat{G}^q$, but in G^q. However, in the reduction we can choose G to be a random power of $\widehat{G}$ to resolve this, since we

know that the order of G divides the order of $\widehat{G}$ (while both remains unknown) this is possible.

– Case-2.(b): $f = 2^\rho$. In this case let $w = \frac{s-s'}{d} \in \mathbb{Z}$ (since d is the gcd of $s-s'$ and $c-c'$). Then we have $h^f = g_q^w$. However, since the group G^q has an odd order (the order s divides $\widehat{s}$), the integer $f = 2^\rho$ must divide w, otherwise we would have an element that has an even order. Therefore, we can write $g_q^{\frac{w}{f}} = h$, where $\frac{w}{f} \in \mathbb{Z}$ which is a witness. Note that the witness is in the range $[(2^\lambda_{\mathsf{st}} + 1) \cdot |\mathcal{D}_q| \cdot \mathcal{B}]$ instead of the original range $\mathcal{B}$. But that suffices as they are equal modulo the order of G^q.

This concludes the proof for knowledge of argument. □

Appendix B. Security of the multi-receiver encryption scheme

We provide detailed proof of our class group-based multi-receiver encryption scheme from the HSM assumption. We restate the theorem below:

Theorem 8. *For any $\lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}$ and any modulus $q \in \mathbb{Z}$ let $(q, \lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, \bar{s}, f, g_q, \widehat{G}, F, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}_q; \rho) \leftarrow \mathsf{CG.ParamGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}, q)$ be a set of correctly generated class group parameters. Then, for that set of parameters as long as hard subgroup assumptions (Def. 2) holds, the above multi-receiver encryption scheme is secure according to Definition 5 for any $n, t \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $n > t$.*

Proof. The proof idea basically follows footsteps of the proof for the linearly homomorphic encryption scheme provided in [69], with adequate changes for the multi-receiver case. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that $n = 2$ and $t = 1$ – extending to the general case is straightforward. Suppose that $\mathcal{A}$ corrupts sk_2, and outputs two message vectors $\vec{m}_0 = (m_1, m_2)$ and $\vec{m}_1 = (m_1', m_2)$, where the second element is the same by condition. Let us call the indistinguishability game with $b = 0$: Game_0 and with $b = 1$: Game_1. We show that using the hard subgroup assumption (Def. 2) we can move from Game_0 to a mental game (via a sequence of hybrids) where the message m_1 is statistically hidden. A similar sequence of hybrid can be constructed to move from Game_1 to the same mental game. To start with first note that in Game_0 the adversary's view can be expressed as:

$$sk_2, h_1 = g_q^{sk_1}, h_2 = g_q^{sk_2}; R = g_q^r; E_1 = f^{m_1} h_1^r; E_2 = f^{m_2} h_2^r$$
$$\text{where} \quad sk_1, sk_2, r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_q$$

In Hyb_1 we can write $E_1 = f^{m_1} R^{sk_1}$ and $E_2 = f^{m_1} R^{sk_2}$, and clearly Hyb_1 and Game_0 are identically distributed. In the next hybrid Hyb_2, sk_1 is sampled as $sk_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}$ instead of $\mathcal{D}_q$. However, since the adversary is given sk_1 only in the exponents of g_q and R, both of which are in G^q, information-theoretically $\mathcal{A}$ only sees $sk_1 \bmod s$. Also drawing $sk_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_q$ induces a distribution with is $2^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$ close to the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_s$ in the exponent and similarly drawing $sk_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}$ induces a distribution with is $2^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$ close to the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_{qs}$ in the exponent. Therefore, we can conclude that the statistical distance between Hyb_1 and Hyb_2 is bounded by $2^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}+1}$.

In Hyb_3 we change R to $R = f^u g_q^r$ for $u \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$. Now we can argue that Hyb_2 is indistinguishable from Hyb_3 as long as the hard sub-group problem (Def. 2) holds. The reduction simply plugs in the challenge value into R as there is no dependency on any of exponent. In particular, the adverasry's view is computed as:

$$sk_2, h_1 = g_q^{sk_1}, h_2 = g_q^{sk_2}; R; E_1 = f^{m_1} R^{sk_1}; E_2 = f^{m_2} R^{sk_2}$$
$$\text{where} \quad sk_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}; sk_2 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{D}_q$$

Clearly when $R = g_q^r$ Hyb_2 is simulated, and when $R = f^u g_q^r$ then Hyb_3 is simulated.

In Hyb_3 we note that the adversary receives $E_1 = f^{m_1 + u \cdot sk_1} h_1^r$. Given adversary's view information theoretically h_1^r is fixed. Hence an unbounded adversary can obtain $m_1 + u \cdot sk_1 \bmod q$ (since the order of $\langle f \rangle = F$ is q). Now, note that in Hyb_2, we change the sampling of sk_1 from a distribution, which is $2^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$ close $\mathbb{Z}_{q.s}$. Now, $sk_1 \bmod qs$ can be written as $(sk_1 \bmod q, sk_1 \bmod s)$ using Chinese remainder theorem – in that $sk_1 \bmod q$ is uniform random in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ as long as $sk_1 \bmod qs$ is uniform random in $\mathbb{Z}_{qs}$. Furthermore, $sk_1 \bmod q$ is independent of $sk_1 \bmod s$. Therefore, although an unbounded adversary obtains a fixed $sk_1 \bmod s$ from the public key $h_1 = g_q^{sk_1}$ ($\langle g_q \rangle = G^q$ has order s), $sk_1 \bmod q$ is indeed $s^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$ close to uniformly random value in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. So, $m_1 + u \cdot sk_1 \bmod q$ is $2^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$ close to uniform random value in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Similarly we can arrive at Hyb_3 starting from Game_1. Hence we can conclude that Game_0 and Game_1 is computationally indistinguishable – this concludes the proof. □

Appendix C. Security of NIZK proof of correctness of secret-sharing

Theorem 9. *For any security parameters $\lambda, \lambda_{\mathsf{st}} \in \mathbb{N}$ and any modulus $q \in \mathbb{N}$, our NIZK construction described in Fig. 1 is a secure proof system (as described in Def. 1) in the random oracle model.*

Proof. We prove *perfect completeness*, statistical soundness in ROM and statistical zero-knowledge in ROM.

Completeness. The completeness can be seen from checking the verification equations:

- $W \cdot R^{\gamma'} = g^{\rho + r\gamma'} = g_q^{z_r}$;
- $X \cdot (\prod_{j=0}^t A_j^{\sum_{i=1}^n i^k \gamma^j})^{\gamma'}$
  $= X \cdot \left(A_0^{(\gamma + \gamma^2 + \ldots)} \cdot A_1^{(\gamma + 2\gamma^2 + \ldots)} \cdot A_2^{(\gamma + 2^2\gamma^2 + \ldots)} \ldots \right)^{\gamma'}$
  $= X \cdot \left(\bar{g}^{a_0(\gamma + \gamma^2 + \ldots)} \cdot \bar{g}^{a_1(\gamma + 2\gamma^2 + \ldots)} \cdot \bar{g}^{a_2(\gamma + 2^2\gamma^2 + \ldots)} \ldots \right)^{\gamma'}$

$$= X \cdot \left(\bar{g}^{(a_0+a_1+\ldots)\gamma+(a_0+2a_1+2^2a_2+\ldots)\gamma^2+\ldots}\right)^{\gamma'}$$
$$= X \cdot \left(\bar{g}^{s_1\gamma+s_2\gamma^2+\ldots}\right)^{\gamma'} = \bar{g}^{\alpha+\gamma'\sum_{i=1}^n s_i\gamma^i} = \bar{g}^{z_s};$$

- $(\prod_{i=1}^n E_i^{\gamma^i})^{\gamma'} \cdot Y$
$= \left(f^{\gamma'(\sum_{i=1}^n s_i\gamma^i)} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{r\gamma'\gamma^i}\right) \cdot \left(f^{\alpha} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n h_i^{\rho\gamma^i}\right)$
$= f^{\alpha+\gamma'\sum_{i=1}^n s_i\gamma^i} \cdot \prod_i h_i^{(r\gamma'+\rho)\gamma^i} = f^{z_s} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n (h_i^{\gamma^i})^{z_r}$

Statistical Soundness. The soundness argument is essentially the same as the one given by Groth [8](As mentioned in Groth's paper, we do not actually need simulation soundness.) but adjusted to our class group setting. The soundness holds unconditionally with overwhelming probability ($\geq 1 - \mathsf{negl}(\lambda_{\mathsf{st}})$) in the random oracle model with appropriately chosen λ_{st}.

In particular, we consider an unbounded adversary, which can, however, make only bounded number of RO queries – we assume it makes Q_H queries to H and $Q_{H'}$ queries to H'. This adversary attempts to produce a "bad" protocol instance $\{h_i, E_i, A_j, R\}_{i\in[n],j\in[t]}$ which is not in $\mathfrak{R}_{\mathsf{CS}}$. Let us elaborate what that means. First, note that the DLog commitments $A_j = \bar{g}^{a_j}$ are perfectly binding for the coefficients $a_j \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ of the hidden polynomial P. Let $P(i) = s_i$ for all $i \in [n]$. Furthermore $R = \bar{g}_q^r$ information theoretically fixes $r \in \mathbb{Z}_s$. Also suppose each E_i has the form $f^{\tilde{s}_i} h_i^r$. Therefore, a "bad' instance must have at least one "bad" $E_i = f^{\tilde{s}_i} h_i^r$ such that $\tilde{s}_i \neq s_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. Now if the verification passes, that means the proof $\pi_{\mathsf{CS}} \leftarrow (W, X, Y, z_r, z_s)$ is well-formed, which means it satisfies the three verification equations. So, the only way the unbounded adversary wins are in the following three events:

- Event_1: The adversary predicts γ' correctly before fixing W, X, Y. If this is possible, then the adversary can easily choose uniform random z_r, z_s in the correct range plus $\gamma = H(\mathsf{inst})$. From these values it can easily compute X, Y, Z from the verification equations, such that they all satisfy.
- Event_2: The adversary manages to find a γ such that $\sum_{i=1}^n \tilde{s}_i\gamma^i = \sum_{i=1} s_i\gamma^i$ even when $\tilde{s}_j \neq s_j$ for (possibly more that one) j. In this case, if the first two equations verify (which does not depend on this fact), then by this fact the third equation also verifies. So this constitutes a break of the soundness.
- Event_3: In this event $\sum_{i=1}^n \tilde{s}_i\gamma^i \neq \sum_{i=1} a_i\gamma^i$, yet all three equations verify correctly.

Now, we show that:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[\mathsf{Event}_1 \vee \mathsf{Event}_2 \vee \mathsf{Event}_3] &\leq \Pr[\mathsf{Event}_1] + \Pr[\mathsf{Event}_2] + \Pr[\mathsf{Event}_3] \\ &\leq 3\Pr[\mathsf{Event}_1] + 2\Pr[\mathsf{Event}_2 \mid \neg\mathsf{Event}_1] \\ &+ \Pr[\mathsf{Event}_3 \mid \neg(\mathsf{Event}_1 \vee \mathsf{Event}_2)] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda_{\mathsf{st}})\end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality follows from a union bound, the second one from simple partitioning and the third one from the three lemmas we prove next.

Lemma 10. *As long as the adversary makes Q many queries to the RO such that $Q^2/2q$ is $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda_{\mathsf{st}})$, we have that*

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Event}_1] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda_{\mathsf{st}})$$

Proof. Assume that the adversary makes at most $Q_{H'}$ queries to H', the probability with which the adversary correctly predicts a corret γ' is upper bounded by $Q_{H'}^2/2q$. For $Q^2/2q = \mathsf{negl}(\lambda_{\mathsf{st}})$ we can set $Q^2 = O(2^{\lambda-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}})$, since $q = O(2^\lambda)$. □

Lemma 11. *As long as γ is chosen uniformly at random in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, we have that*

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Event}_2 \mid \neg\mathsf{Event}_1] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

Proof. First note that, since Event_1 does not happen, γ' is computed legitimately after computing γ, X, Y, Z. Then, by definition if Event_2 happens, we have that:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \tilde{s}_i\gamma^i = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i\gamma^i$$

and there is a $\tilde{s}_j \neq s_j$. Denote for each i: $s_i^\delta = s_i - \tilde{s}_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. So we can write:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n s_i^\delta\gamma^i = 0$$

and by the premise this n-degree polynomial $P_\delta = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i^\delta x^i$ is not identically zero. Using Schwartz-Zippel lemma we conclude that as long as γ is chosen uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q$ (which is true as we are in ROM), the probability of the the polynomial defined by $P_\delta(\gamma) = 0 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is at most n/q which is $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. □

Lemma 12. *As long as γ' is chosen uniformly at random, we have that:*

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Event}_3 \mid \neg(\mathsf{Event}_1 \vee \mathsf{Event}_2)] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

Proof. In this case since Event_1 and Event_2 are not happening, we can assume that all verification equations pass even when there exists an j for which $\tilde{s}_j \neq s_j$. In particular, the first two equations ensure that $z_r = r\gamma' + \rho \bmod s$ and $z_s = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i\gamma^i + \alpha \bmod q$. However, since q and s are coprime we can write $z_r = r\gamma' + \rho + s\xi$ over integer. Now the third equation over G (which has order qs) can be written as.

$$(\prod_{i=1}^n E_i^{\gamma^i})^{\gamma'} \cdot Y = f^{z_s} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n (h_i^{\gamma^i})^{r\gamma'+\rho+s\xi}$$

Now, since each h_i is in G^q, which has order s, we have $h_i^s = 1$ we can re-write the equation as:

$$(\prod_{i=1}^n E_i^{\gamma^i})^{\gamma'} \cdot Y = f^{z_s} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n (h_i^{\gamma^i})^{r\gamma'+\rho}$$

Now, expressing each E_i as $f^{\tilde{s}_i} h_i^r$ we can re-write the equation as:

$$f^{\sum_{i=1}^n \tilde{s}_i\gamma^i\gamma'} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n (h_i^{\gamma^i})^{r\gamma'} \cdot Y = f^{z_s} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n (h_i^{\gamma^i})^{r\gamma'+\rho}$$

Clearly, Y must be of the form $Y = f^{\beta} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n} h_i^{\gamma^i \rho}$ for some $\beta \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. Using the value of z_s we obtain:

$$\gamma' \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tilde{s}_i \gamma^i + \beta = \gamma' \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i \gamma^i + \alpha \bmod q$$

Again, defining $s_i^{\delta} = s_i - \tilde{s}_i \bmod q$ we obtain:

$$\gamma' \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^{\delta} \gamma^i + \alpha - \beta = 0 \bmod q$$

Unless the last equation is identically 0, for a fixed γ the probability of this holding equation over the choice of a uniform random γ' is at most $1/q$ which is $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. □

This concludes the proof. Finally note that, for example, a reasonable choice can be $q = O(2^{256})$ and $Q_H = O(2^{100})$, then the overall probability is smaller than 2^{-40} which is negligible in λ_{st} for a typical choice of $\lambda_{\mathsf{st}} = 40$.

Statistical Zero-knowledge. Following [8], we argue the statistical zero-knowledge of the proof of correct sharing in the ROM. The simulator works as follows:

1) Set $H(\mathsf{inst}) = \gamma$ where γ is uniformly at random.
2) Choose γ' uniformly at random.
3) Sample $z_r \xleftarrow{\$} [q \cdot |\mathcal{D}_q| \cdot 2^{\lambda}_{\mathsf{st}}]$.
4) Compute X, Y, W from the three verification equation.
5) Finally program $\gamma' = H'(W, X, Y, z_r, z_s)$.

Clearly, the verification succeeds always. However, similar to the proof of exponent, if the verifier asks a RO query on $H'(W, X, Y, z_r, z_s)$ then the simulation fails. But as long as the verifier makes a bounded number of queries, this probability can be made $\leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda_{\mathsf{st}})$ by adjusting the parameters. Finally, we note that the simulated value z_r is identically distributed to the real z_r as long as $\rho < q \cdot |\mathcal{D}_q|(2^{\lambda}_{\mathsf{st}} - 1)$. The probability of happening otherwise is upper bounded by $2^{-\lambda_{\mathsf{st}}}$, which is negligible in λ_{st}. □

Appendix D. Mitigating the biasing public key attack

cgDKG (and Groth's NI-DKG) suffer from the same public key biasing attack as the one presented by Gennaro et al. [7]. This is because a rushing adversary can observe the first t verified secret sharings and then perform a valid $t+1$st sharing to bias the public key while delaying the messages of the other honest parties in the system. The adversary can first compute the partial public of the t honest parties and choose the $t+1^{st}$ party (which the adversary controls) to bias the public key.

To overcome this, we use an approach [29] where the knowledge of the commitments does not aid the adversary in biasing the public key. After verifying the dealings, the parties use the first set of $t+1$ verified dealers to compute their secret key share. Each party now publishes the public key computed as exponentiation of the secret key with a *different* generator $g' \in \mathbb{G}_1$ than g_1, the one used in the initial commitment phase. After computing the qualified set, each party P_k broadcasts the value $(g')^{x_k}$ along with a NIZK proof that the exponent in $(g')^{x_k}$ is the same as the one computed using the verified dealings. The parties finally compute the public key of the DKG instance as $y = \prod_{k \in T} (g')^{x_k}$, where T is the set of parties that have forwarded their public key, the set T has at least $t+1$ parties as only a maximum of t parties are corrupted by the adversary. This adds one round of communication to the DKG protocol. A previously suggested approach [7] to overcome the biasing attack is to use perfectly hiding Pedersen's commitments. These commitments are published in the initial commit phase while the public key is computed in the next phase (round) using discrete log commitments, which are published along with proof of the equality of the exponents (shared secret). This approach also needs an extra round for the parties to agree on the public key. However, the mentioned approach of using a different generator for the public key is more efficient as no blinding factors (and the corresponding exponentiations) are needed.

Appendix E. Algebraic Simulatability of $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dkg}}$

In this section we argue that any DKG protocol that satisfies our definition, via the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dkg}}$, satisfies a static variant of *oracle-aided algebraically simulatable* DKG as defined by Bacho and Loss [82]. As a consequence, our DKG can be applied to the static settings of all applications for which their definition suffices – this includes Schnorr and BLS signature. Note that, the standard properties such as *consistency*, *correctness* and *unforgeability* are easily satisfied by our ideal functionality. The only thing that remains is to show *algebraic simulatability*.

In particular, we need to argue that for any DKG that satisfies our definition, it is possible to construct a simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ such that the simulator's output is indistinguishable with an adversary $\mathcal{A}$'s view that corrupts at most t parties. Consider a cyclic group $\langle \bar{g} \rangle = \bar{G}$ of order q. Then we note that on input k values $\bar{g}^{x_1}, \bar{g}^{x_2}, \ldots, \bar{g}^{x_k}$, $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ may access a discrete log oracle (which, on input $h \in \bar{G}$, returns $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $h = \bar{g}^x$) at most $k-1$ times. Now, let us formally present the definition of algebraic simulatability adapted from Bacho and Loss [43] in our setting of static corruption.

Definition 8 (Algebraic Simulatability)**.** *A NI-DKG protocol among n parties with threshold $t \leq 2n+1$ is said to have k-algebraic simulatability if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that corrupts at most t parties, there exists an algebraic PPT simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ that makes $k-1$ queries to a discrete log (for base $\bar{g}$) oracle and satisfies the following properties:*

- *On input $\mathsf{ip} = \{(\bar{g}^{z_1}, \ldots, \bar{g}^{z_k} \in \bar{G}), C \subset [n]\}$ such that $|C| \leq t$, $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ simulates the honest parties for a protocol execution. At the end of the simulation, $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ outputs the public key $pk = \bar{g}^{sk}$.*
- *Let $\bar{g}_i \in \bar{G}$ denote the i-th query to the discrete log (to the base $\bar{g}$) oracle. Define the corresponding algebraic coefficient as $(\hat{a}_i, a_{0,1}, \ldots, a_{0,k})$ where*

$\bar{g}_i = \bar{g}^{\hat{a}_i} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{k} (\bar{g}^{z_j})^{a_{i,j}}$. *Also denote the algebraic coefficient of* pk *as* $(\hat{a}, a_{0,1}, \ldots, a_{0,k})$. *Then the following matrix, called simulatability matrix for* $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ *over* $\mathbb{Z}_q$ *is invertible:*

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{0,1} & \ldots & a_{0,k} \\ \vdots & \ldots & \vdots \\ a_{k-1,1} & \ldots & a_{k-1,k} \end{bmatrix}$$

- *Denote by* $\mathsf{View}_{\mathcal{A},pk,Real}$ *the view of* $\mathcal{A}$ *in a real protocol execution conditioned on all honest parties outputting* pk *as the joint public key; and let* $\mathsf{View}_{\mathcal{A},pk,\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}(\mathsf{ip})}$ *denote the view of* $\mathcal{A}$ *in the simulated execution when simulator* $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ *has input* ip*, conditioned on* $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ *outputting the same* pk*. Then, for all* $pk \in \bar{G}$ *and all input* ip*,* $\mathsf{View}_{\mathcal{A},pk,Real}$ *is computationally indistinguishable from* $\mathsf{View}_{\mathcal{A},pk,\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}(\mathsf{ip})}$.

Now note that, if a DKG scheme satisfies our UC-definition (Fig. 4), there is a PPT simulator $\mathcal{S}$ which can simulate any given PPT $\mathcal{A}$ with overwhelming probability. Therefore, as long as we can construct $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ using $\mathcal{S}$ in a way such that $\mathcal{S}$ interacts with $\mathcal{A}$ directly while $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ plays the role of ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dkg}}$ to $\mathcal{S}$ and this is indistinguishable from a real execution from $\mathcal{A}$'s point of view then the implication holds. For simplicity we assume that there are exactly t corruptions, that implies size of honest set $|H| = t + 1$ and size of corrupt set $|C| = t$. Now we describe how $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$ can use $\mathcal{S}$ below:

1) Input: $\{\bar{g}^{s_i}\}_{i \in H}$ and the corrupt set $C = [n] \setminus H$.
2) Give $\mathcal{S}$ oracle access $\mathcal{A}$ for the corrupt set C.
3) Send $\{\bar{g}^{s_i}\}_{i \in H}$ to $\mathcal{S}$.
4) Once $\mathcal{S}$ returns $\{s_i\}_{i \in C}$ do as follows:
   a) Let $V \subseteq$ be the set that includes $s_i \neq \perp$.
   b) Compute $pk \leftarrow \prod_{i \in V \cup H} \bar{g}^{s_i}$.
   c) Compute $pk_i = \bar{g}^{P(i)}$ for all $i \in [n]$ by choosing a t-degree polynomial $P(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{t} c_i X^i$ implicitly subject to $\bar{g}^{c_0} = pk$ and each coefficient $\bar{g}^{c_i} = \prod_{j \in H} (\bar{g}^{s_j})^{r_j}$ for uniform random $r_j \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$.
   d) Using the discrete log oracle compute $sk_i = P(i)$ from $\bar{g}^{P(i)}$ for all $i \in C$.
   e) Finally send $(pk, \{pk_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{sk_i\}_{i \in C})$ to $\mathcal{S}$.

Now, first note that, the polynomial $P(X)$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q[X]$, subject to $c_0 = \sum_{i \in H} s_i + \sum_{i \in V} s_i$, as coefficients $c_1, c_2, \ldots$ are chosen as random linear combinations of $\{s_i\}_{i \in H}$ in the exponent. So, clearly the simulatability matrix can have a form:

$$\begin{bmatrix} c_0 & 0 & \ldots & 0 \\ c_0 & r_{1,1} & \ldots & r_{1,t+1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ldots & \vdots \\ c_0 & r_{t,1} & \ldots & r_{t,t+1} \end{bmatrix}$$

which is invertible over $\mathbb{Z}_q$ as long as $c_0 \neq 0$. Since our ideal functionality ensures that honestly chosen s_i are uniformly random, this happens only with probability $1/q \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. Finally, we note that although in our ideal functionality s_i for honest i are chosen uniformly at random, the simulator $\mathcal{S}$ does not depend on that. Basically it works for any s_i, and hence when fed with arbitrary ip by $\mathcal{S}_{\mathsf{oa}}$, nothing changes from $\mathcal{A}$'s view in the real and ideal executions. Of course for a low-entropy distribution would be not useful in the application. In fact, a closer look into the application of algebraic simulatability of their proof of BLS (Lemma 4.2) reveals that these are OMDL instances and hence are uniformly random.

With this, we can conclude that any DKG protocol that satisfies our definition with respect to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{dkg}}$, satisfies the static oracle aided algebraic simulatability definition from Bacho and Loss [43].