
# Layer Optimization CS 118 Computer Network Fundamentals Peter Reiher


#### Where are we at?

- We understand communications over direct channels
- We understand building networking from layering and relaying
- We understand how a DAG explains layering
- We understand how to build routing for relaying purposes

  movements through a DAG using recursion

# For example,





HTTP->TCP

TCP->IP

IP->802.11

Now we need to relay through C


A sends an HTTP request to E

802.11->physical


We recurse down the DAG

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# Relaying through C



C now uses its DAG



IP<-802.11


802.11<-physical

IP->ATM


ATM->physical

Now relay through D

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# Delivering at E




HTTP<-TCP

TCP<-IP

IP<-ethernet

ethernet<-physical



E now uses its DAG

And the message is delivered to E's web server

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#### Where are we and where next?

- So now we know how to use networking between multiple network points
- Being able to communicate at all is more important than anything else
- But other things are important, too
- Like performance, reliability, security, and other properties
- How can we optimize the basic networking to achieve these goals?

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#### Outline

- Background
- Deficiencies
- Performance
- Emulation
- Examples...

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# Networks and optimizations

- Using fully general mechanisms can be expensive
- Common special cases can be optimized to reduce costs
- Optimizations are possible at many semantic levels of networking

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# But where to optimize?

• Is optimization a layer or a communication issue?

- Where do we optimize?
  - At some layer?
  - Or for some connection?

# Intra-layer vs. intracommunication?

- Optimizations involve shared context
  - Layers sharing common mechanisms
  - Connections managing shared state
- Either one can support optimization
  - Connections coordinate explicitly
  - Layer members coordinate implicitly

#### If layers, which ones?

- Do optimizations occur <u>only</u> at certain layers?
  - -No

- Are optimizations *typical* at certain layers?
  - Yes, for several reasons
- Do optimizations interact across layers?
  - Absolutely

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# Living at a layer

• Optimizations *can* occur at *any* layer

- They're increasingly used at many layers

# Living at a layer

- Some occur <u>more often</u> at <u>certain</u> layers
  - Most information errors are at the physical layer physical layer has more information errors
  - Once corrected at the next layer up,
     they tend not to occur again

correcting at one layer means it won't appear again at the next layer

 So optimizations based on these errors often at low levels

# Living at a layer

- Some optimizations occur <u>because of</u> a layer
  - I.e., TCP provides an ordered data stream but IP does not
  - So TCP corrects ordering, but IP does not
  - Therefore, any ordering optimization occurs above IP

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#### What connection?

- Optimizations often share state over a connection
- State can be
  - hard (maintained)
     2 types of states: remember hard and soft
- or
  - soft (recoverable)
- State can be for one connection or a group
- State can be explicit or inferred

#### What connection?

• Not everything is associated with an explicit, stateful connection

- I.e., there's more than TCP, web, and e-mail caching?

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# Now let's explore how to optimize:

Deficiencies

end to end principle

- put application specific network functionalities at the endpoints, not in the middle
- functionality in the middle should be generally usable by all applications
- not a hard and fast rule
- a principle that is influential

Performance

Emulation

#### Deficiencies

- Optimizations sometimes overcome deficiencies in the communication
- For example, deficiencies in:
  - Integrity
  - Authentication
  - Privacy

behave in a way that has a property that it does not have

be sure that the receiver does this

receive the content of the message

#### Why do you care about deficiencies?

- Deficiency impedes communication
  - You can't share state, which means you can't share information
- Deficiency impedes relaying
  - If you can't relay for others, they can't communicate
- Deficiency impedes networking
  - The two above also mean you can't automatically manage your network configuration, routing, DAGs, etc.

# Integrity

• Definition

- Types:
  - Corruption
  - Loss
  - Tampering

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#### Integrity


the quality of being whole

- Definition: the quality of being whole
  - WYGIWWS: what you <u>got</u> is what was <u>sent</u>
- For a message:
  - Not split up
  - Not missing pieces
  - Not altered (accidentally or deliberately)



# Integrity: Corruption

Accidental alteration



- Symbol changed (noise)
- Symbol is ambiguous (equivocation)
- A portion is deleted



#### Integrity: Loss

related to corruption

- Missing everything!
  - Degenerate case of corruption
  - Receiver doesn't know a message arrived



- Why?
  - Not sent (by origin or relay)
  - Not received (by destination or relay)
  - Corrupt beyond recognition

# It's 2:20pm, do you know where you are?

- Time is fleeting...
  - But it keeps coming up
  - How do you detect loss?

- Useful to know about time
  - Longest time until delivery



#### Integrity: Corruption vs. loss

- Corruption
  - A message arrives
  - Unrecoverable error

- Loss
  - No message arrives
  - Timer implies loss
- Indistinguishable when:
  - Destination name is corrupted or missing
  - Source name is corrupted or missing
  - Key portions of message are corrupt or missing
- Difference
  - How much of the message is "gone"

# Integrity: Tampering

- Deliberate alteration
  - To corrupt
  - To alter to different content (thought to be non-corrupt)



- How?
  - Intercept and retransmit (e.g., during relay)
  - Overlap physical signals

# Integrity: Corruption vs. tampering

- Corruption
  - During origination, receipt, or relay
  - Detect via error checks

- Tampering
  - During relay or receipt
  - Detect via integrity checks
    - That a relay can't 'fake'

• Difference

Intent

know the difference between corruption and tampering

- Probability of generating different but valid message
- Tampering is similar to the worst case for corruption

#### What about order?

- Order is not a property of a message
  - It is a typical property of a channel
  - Only a deficiency if you need to assume it
  - We'll come to that when we talk about channel emulation
     misordered delivery when i thought it was all delivered

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#### How much integrity protection?

- Easy to encapsulate
  - You don't want to modify contents anyway
- Relay might become more difficult
  - May need to change portions of the message
  - E.g., hopcount, route path record, etc.
  - Does the integrity cover those?
- So you might not protect the entire message

#### Authentication

• Definition

- Types
  - Origin and/or destination
  - Control
  - Content

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#### Authentication

you can identify who created the information

• Definition: ensuring that particular information was created by a particular party

- For a message, ensuring:
  - All important elements of the message
  - Were created by the sender



#### Authentication: Name

- The source and/or destination noted in the message comes from the source that generated it
  - The message says it came from John,
     and it actually came from John
  - The message says it goes to Ben and that name came from John too
- Why?
  - Protects the entire message's path
  - Protects the endpoint machines

#### Authentication: Control

- The message includes control signals that come from the source that generated it
  - Such as what layers it uses
  - And parameters to those layers
  - Ensuring that sender used those
     layers and those parameters



- Why?
  - Layers use state machines
  - Protects operation of the state machines

#### Authentication: Content

• The content of the message comes from the source that generated it

- I.e., the data that is shared with John actually came

from John

protect integrity without providing authenticity if you want to know who sent it, then you need athentitiy

- Why?
  - Protects information that the machines share

# Why bother with all three?

- Why do we separate:
  - Identity
  - Control

three of these may have different parties sign the followig

we go up and down layers at the relays

we may want to authenticate what happens at the relays

- Content
- They could be signed by different parties
  - Different endpoints, different layers, etc.

Galiles Galiles

Picasio

John Hancock

# Why?

- For example, content comes from the "top" of the stack
  - So the top layer should authenticate content
- The identity might be associated with a proxy at a lower layer
  - So that layer should authenticate identity
- The control might be for a very low layer
  - So control must be authenticated there

### How much to authenticate?

the message will change from place to place

- Same problem as integrity
  - Easy to attest to the source of the entire message when encapsulated
  - Hard to make that guarantee if portions change
  - Again, might want to authenticate only part

# Privacy

• Definition

- Types
  - The origin and/or destination
  - Control
  - Content

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# Privacy

know the definition of privacy

 Definition: hiding the information in a message from all parties except the receiver

- For a message:
  - Hide the origin
  - Hide the message
  - From everyone but the receiver



# Privacy: Identifier

- Hide the endpoints
  - Who sent it
  - Who receives it
- From whom?
  - Source: everyone except receiver
  - Destination: everyone except relay and receiver
    - Perhaps even from relay
- Why?
  - "who talks to whom" exposes information!

metadata: who communicate to whom

clever data mining: find out a lot about who talked to who, when, and perhaps for how long?

# Privacy: Control

Hide the state machine control signals

- From whom?
  - Everyone except receiver
- Why?
  - Exposes what the state machine is doing
  - That information can be used to attack the machine
  - Or deduce things about the communications


# Privacy: Content

Hide the information shared between the parties

- From whom?
  - Everyone except receiver
- Why?
  - (should be obvious)

## Impact of deficiencies

- Need to balance
  - Relay, source, receiver perspective
  - Various preferences, requirements, and limits
  - Various costs (time, space, CPU effort)



## Performance deficiencies

• Time

know the three different performance deficiencies

• Space

• Energy

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### Time

a deficiency

- Rate
  - Messages per time

how much info from A to B in a given point of time



- Latency/jitter
  - Time per message (between send and receive)

it takes some time from getting one bit here to there

jitter - derivative of the latency; is it constant? better to have constant latency rather than changing latency

#### Rate

know what rate means

- How many messages can you send?
  - Messages per unit time
  - 1/(time to send a msg) \*(# msgs sent concurrently)
- How to improve?
  - Less time for each message (higher BW)
  - More messages sent concurrently (parallelism)
  - Messages at the rate the receiver supports
  - Messages at the rate the network allows

### Flow control

- Messages arrive at the receiver's rate
  - Avoid overwhelming the receiver
  - Avoid using excess storage resources
- How?
  - Control pacing (inter-message timing)
  - Control number of unanswered messages
  - Use feedback from the receiver

## Congestion control

- Messages arrive at the relay's rate
  - Avoid overwhelming the network
  - An aggregate, network variant of flow control
- How?
  - Similar mechanism as flow control
  - Different source of feedback (net, not receiver)

## Latency

- How long for a message to arrive?
  - Time per message between send and receive
- How to improve?
  - Decrease distance between sender/receiver
  - Increase BW

**—** ...

## Space

- How much space to represent a message?
  - Bits per message
- How to improve?
  - Compress (remove predictable patterns)
    - Within a message, across messages, etc.
  - Encode efficiently

# Energy

• CPU capacity

• Actual energy

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#### **CPU**

- How much work to process a message?
  - How many opcodes?
- How to improve?
  - Save reusable results / avoid duplicate effort
  - Alternate algorithm
    - Same result a different, "cheaper" way
    - Different, "cheaper" result with similar properties

## Actual energy

talk about energy for processing a message

- How much energy to process a message?
  - Electrical power, heat to dissipate, etc.
  - Not just "green"; saves \$, heat, and space
- How to improve?
  - Reuse rather than recompute
  - Lower clock rates
  - Avoid conversions

## Emulation

Wires

Boxes and bundles


Transactions and beyond

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## Wires

• Making a circuit from packets

• Pseudowire



## Circuits from packets

- Reliable info stream from messages
  - Ordered and reliable
  - Typically relies on endpoint state
  - Not necessarily guaranteeing performance
  - More <u>like</u> a wire than a message; not equivalent
- Examples
  - TCP from IP (Internet)
  - AAL 1-4 from ATM (ATM)
  - TP4 from CLNP (OSI)

## **Pseudowires**

remember what pseudowires are

- A channel from messages
  - Ordered, reliable, static capacity and delay
    - I.e., performance emulation, too
  - As close to a channel as possible
- Examples
  - SONET
  - TDMoIP (TDM emulation over IP)
  - PWE (pseudowire emulation)

### Order

- Circuits and pseudowires emulate channels
  - Most channels assume ordered signal transfer
  - Need to detect and correct misordering
- Examples
  - TCP over IP (Internet)
  - TP4 from CLNP
  - Not ATM! (ATM is never misordered!)

## Boxes and bundles

• Boundaries

• Flows



### Boundaries

- Marking edges between items
  - Multiple items in one message
  - An item that spans multiple messages
- Examples
  - IP message vs. its fragments
  - DCCP, SCTP
  - HTTP over TCP (stream)

#### Flows

what is flow?

- Grouping separate connections to act together
  - Striping (increased capacity)
  - Coordinated management (shared control)
  - Alternate/backup (fault tolerance)
- Examples
  - ISDN channel bonding
  - TCP control block sharing
  - Multipath TCP, SCTP

# Transactions and beyond

Transactions

Translation

• Other services

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# Transactions and beyond

- Extend service beyond information sharing
  - Support specific structured interactions
- Why?
  - Mostly software reuse

     (any of these can be built on any communication service)

### **Transactions**

- Conditional information flow
  - Serial: send B only if A is complete
  - Conjunction (AND): send C only after A and B
  - Disjunction (OR): send C only after A or B

three different kinds of information flow

- Many variations:
  - N of M: send Z only if at least 3 of 6 alternates
  - Send Z only if exactly 3 of 6 alternates

### Translation

- Convert one message to another
  - Occurs within the recursive block
  - Also occurs for "gateway" relays
- Examples
  - Language translation (content)
  - Format conversion (HTML to ASCII)
  - Display conversion (desktop to mobile web)

## Other services

- If you can dream it, you can do it!
  - Any capability another user/system wants



• Some dreams are nightmares, though...



## Overview of issues - sources

- Deficiencies
  - Integrity
    - Error
    - Loss
    - Reordering?
    - Tampering
  - Authentication
  - Privacy
- Performance
  - Time
    - Rate (flow, congestion)
    - Latency

- Space
  - Compression
  - Caching
- Energy
  - CPU, actual energy
- Emulation
  - Circuit/wire
    - Reordering?
    - Boundaries
    - Flows
  - Transactions
  - Translation

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## Summary

- Deficiencies need to be fixed first
  - Can't communicate if we can't communicate
- Then performance should be addressed
  - Go fast, go cheap
- Then emulation
  - Make it look like the user wants it to look

Deficiencies --> Performance --> Emulation