



Deduction, Induction, Statistics, and Topology

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INDUCTIVE VS. DEDUCTIVE INFERENCE

Taxonomy of Inference

- All the objects of human ... enquiry may naturally be divided into **two kinds**, to wit,
 1. **Relations of Ideas**, and
 2. **Matters of Fact**.

David Hume, *Enquiry*, Section IV, Part 1.

Taxonomy of Inference

- Any ... **inference** in science belongs to one of **two kinds**:
 1. either it yields **certainty** in the sense that the **conclusion is necessarily true**, provided that the premises are true,
 2. or it does not.
- The first kind is ... **deductive inference**
- The second kind will ... be called '**inductive inference**'.
- R. Carnap, *The Continuum of Inductive Methods*, 1952, p. 3 .

Taxonomy of Inference

- Explanatory arguments which ... account for a phenomenon by reference to **statistical** laws are not of the **strictly deductive** type.
- An account of this type will be called an ... **inductive** explanation.
- C. Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation", 1965, p. 302.

Deductive Inference

Truth Preserving

- In each possible world:
 - if the premises are true,
 - then the conclusion is true.

Monotonic

- Conclusions are stable in light of further premises.

Taxonomy of Inference

inference

deductive

truth preserving,
monotonic.

inductive

Everything else



Taxonomy of Inference

inference

deductive

- Calculation
- Refuting universal H
- Verifying existential H
- Deciding between universal H, H'
- Predicting E from H
- Hypotheses compatible with E




inductive

- Inferring universal H
- Choosing between universal H_0, H_1, H_2, \dots




Real Data

- All **real** measurements are subject to **probable error**.
 - It can be **reduced** through **redundancy** (sample size).




Real Predictions

- The predictions of probabilistic theories are subject to probable error.
 - It can be reduced through repeated sampling.



Real Calculations

- All **real** calculations are subject to **probable** error.
 - It can be **reduced** by redundant codes, circuits, and refereeing.



Stochastic Deductive Inference


Truth preserving in chance

- In each possible world:
 - if the premises are true,
 - then the chance of drawing an erroneous conclusion is low.


Monotonic in chance

- The chance of producing a conclusion is guaranteed not to drop by much.



Taxonomy of Inference




Taxonomy of Inference




Bad Taxonomy



Improved Taxonomy of Inference



Improved Taxonomy of Inference




Question

- In **strict** deduction, the evidence **rules out** possibilities.




Question

- In strict deduction, the evidence rules out possibilities.
- In **statistical deduction**, the sample is logically compatible with **every** possibility.



Question

- In strict deduction, the evidence rules out possibilities.
- In statistical deduction, the sample is logically compatible with every possibility.
- Is there a **common**, underlying sense of **empirical information**?



The Topology of Information


We ❤ topology!

CMU ILLC



Worlds


- The points in W are **possible worlds**.



The Structure of Information

An **information basis** \mathcal{I} is a **countable** set of information states such that in every world:


1. some information state true;
2. each **true** pair of information states is **entailed** by a **true** information state.



The Structure of Information


Local information basis at w :

$$\mathcal{I}(w) := \{E \in \mathcal{I} : w \in E\}.$$



Sleeping Beauty Theorist


- The theorist is **awakened** by her graduate students only when her theory is refuted.



Example: Sequential Binary Experiment


Worlds = infinite discrete sequences of outcomes.

Information states = cones of possible extensions:




Example: Measurement of X

- **Worlds** = real numbers.
- **Information states** = open intervals.




Example: Joint Measurement

- **Worlds** = points in real plane.
- **Information states** = open rectangles.




Example: Equations

- **Worlds** = functions $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$.




Example: Laws

- An **observation** is a joint measurement.



Example: Laws

- The **information state** is the set of all worlds that touch each observation.




Deductive Verification and Refutation

H is **verified** by E iff $E \subseteq H$.

H is **refuted** by E iff $E \subseteq H^c$.

H is **decided** by E iff H is either verified or refuted by E .




Will be Verified

w is an **interior [exterior] point** of H iff

iff H **will be** verified [refuted] in w

iff there is $E \in \mathcal{I}(w)$ s.t. H is **verified [refuted]** by E .




Will be Verified

int H := the proposition that H **will be verified**.


ext H := the proposition that H **will be refuted**.

bdry H := the proposition that H **will never be decided**.



Will be Verified


- $\text{bdry}(H) \cap H =$ “you face **Hume’s problem** w.r.t. H ”;
- $\text{bdry}(H) \cap H^c =$ “you face **Duhem’s problem** w.r.t. H ”



Verifiability, Refutability, Decidability


H is **verifiable** iff $H \subseteq \text{int}(H)$.

i.e., iff H will be **verified** however H is **true**.




H is **refutable** iff $\text{cl}(H) \subseteq H$.

i.e., iff H will be **refuted** however H is **false**.



H is **decidable** iff H is both **verifiable** and **refutable**.



Methods

- A **verification method** for H is an inference rule $V(E) = A$ such that in **every** world w :
 1. $w \in H$: V converges to H without error.
 2. $w \in H^c$: V always concludes W .

Methods

- A **verification method** for H is an inference rule $V(E) = A$ such that in every world w :
 1. $w \in H$: V converges to H without error.
 2. $w \in H^c$: V always concludes W .
- A **refutation method** for H is just a verification method for H^c .
- A **decision method** for H converges to H or to H^c without error.

Methods

- A **limiting verification method** for H is an inference rule $V(E) = A$ such that in **every** world w :
 $w \in H$ iff V converges to some true H' that entails H .
- A **limiting refutation method** for H is a limiting verification method for H^c .
- A **limiting decision method** for H is a limiting verification method and a limiting refutation for H .

Methods

- A **verification method** for H is an inference rule $V(E) = A$ such that in every world w :
 1. $w \in H$: V converges to H without error.
 2. $w \in H^c$: V always concludes W .
- A **refutation method** for H is just a verification method for H^c .
- A **decision method** for H converges to H or to H^c without error.
- H is **methodologically verifiable [refutable, decidable, etc.]** iff H has a method of the corresponding kind.

Verification, Refutation, and Decision are Deductive

Proposition (truth preservation).


If V is a verifier, refuter or decider for H and $V(E) = A$,
then $E \subseteq A$.

Proposition (monotonicity).

If there is a verifier, refuter or decider for H , then
there is a monotonic one that never drops H or H^c
after having concluded it.

Limiting Verification, Refutation, and Decision are Inductive

Proposition. No limiting verifier of “never awakened” is truth preserving or monotonic.



Topology

Let \mathcal{I}^* denote the closure of \mathcal{I} under union.

Proposition:

If (W, \mathcal{I}) is an information basis

then (W, \mathcal{I}^*) is a topological space.

Topology

- H is **open** iff $H \in \mathcal{I}^*$.
- H is **closed** iff H^c is **open**.
- H is **clopen** iff H is both **closed** and **open**.


- H is **locally closed** iff H is a **difference of open sets**.

Sleeping Theorist Example

H_2 = “Awakened twice” is open.

H_1 = “Awakened once” is locally closed.

H_0 = “Never awakened” is closed.




Sequential Example

H_2 = “You will see 1 exactly twice” is open.

H_1 = “You will see 1 exactly once” is locally closed.

H_0 = “You will never see 1” is closed.




Equation Example

H_2 = “quadratic” is open.

H_1 = “linear” is locally closed.


H_0 = “constant” is closed.



Topology


- H is **limiting open** iff H is a countable union of locally closed sets.
- H is **limiting closed** iff H^c is limiting open.
- H is **limiting clopen** iff H is both limiting open and limiting closed.

deBrecht Hierarchy




Topology and Pragmatics

Prop.



Topology and Methodology

Prop.






OCKHAM'S TOPOLOGICAL RAZOR

Popper Was Doing Topology!

Popper's simplicity relation:

$$A \preceq B \Leftrightarrow A \subseteq \text{cl}B.$$

$$H_1 \preceq H_2 \preceq H_3.$$




A Slight Revision

Our simplicity relation:

$$A \triangleleft B \iff A \cap \text{cl}(B) \setminus B \neq \emptyset.$$

$$H_1 \triangleleft H_2 \triangleleft H_3.$$



Ockham's Razor

- A **question** partitions W into possible answers.
- A **relevant response** is a **disjunction** of answers.


Proposition. The following principles are **equivalent**.

1. Infer a **simplest** relevant response in light of E .
2. Infer a **refutable** relevant response compatible with E .
3. Infer a relevant response that is **not more complex than the true answer**.

Epistemic Mandate for Ockham's Razor


If you **violate Ockham's razor** then

1. either you **fail to converge** to the truth or
2. nature can force you into an **avoidable cycle of opinions**.



Does Not Presuppose Simplicity

Indeed, by **favoring** a **complex** hypothesis, you incur the avoidable cycle in a **complex** world!






STATISTICAL INFORMATION TOPOLOGY

Statistical Information Topology

= the topology that lifts the preceding results to statistical inference.



Skepticism

The above account...

“may be okay if the candidate theories are **deductively** related to observations, but when the relationship is **probabilistic**, I am **skeptical** ...”.




Elliott Sober, *Ockham's Razors*, 2015

Epistemology of the Sample


- The **sample space** S always comes with its **own topology** \mathcal{T} .
- \mathcal{T} reflects what is **verifiable** about the **sample itself**.

s definitely falls within **open interval** Z .




Statistics

- Worlds are probability measures over \mathcal{T} .



The Difficulty

- Every sample is logically consistent with all worlds!
- So it seems that statistical information states are all trivial!



Response

- Solve for the **unique** topology such that:
statistically verifiable = open.


Topology



Statistics


Feasible Sample Events

- It's impossible to tell whether a point right on the **boundary** of Z is in or out of Z .
- Z is **feasible** iff the chance of its boundary is zero in every world.




Feasible Method

A **feasible method** M is a measurable function from samples to propositions over W such that $M^{-1}(A)$ is feasible, for all A .



Feasible Tests


A **feasible test** of H is a **feasible method** that outputs H^c or W .



Statistical Information Topology

$w \in \text{cl } H$ iff there exists sequence (w_n) in H , such that
for all feasible tests M :

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} p_{w_n}(M \text{ rejects}) \rightarrow p_w(M \text{ rejects}).$$



Weak Topology

Proposition: If \mathcal{T} has a countable basis of feasible regions, then:

statistical information topology = weak topology.

Weak Topology

Proposition: If \mathcal{T} is second-countable and metrizable, then the weak topology is second-countable and metrizable e.g., by the Prokhorov metric.

Methods

- A **statistical verification method** for H at **level** $\alpha > 0$ is a sequence (M_n) of **feasible** tests of H^c such that for **every** world w and sample size n :
 1. if $w \in H$: M_n converges in probability to H ;
 2. If $w \in H^c$: M_n concludes W with probability at least $1-\alpha$.
- H is **statistically verifiable** iff H has a statistical **verification** method at **each** $\alpha > 0$.

Methods


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 1. if $w \in H$: M_n converges in probability to H ;
 2. If $w \in H^c$: M_n concludes W with probability at least $1-\alpha_n$,for $\alpha_n \rightarrow 0$, and dominated by α .

Methods


- A **limiting statistical verification method** for H is a sequence (M_n) of **feasible methods** such that:
 $w \in H$ iff M converges in probability to a true H' that entails H .
- A **limiting statistical refutation method** for H is a limiting verification method for H^c .
- A **limiting statistical decision method** for H is a limiting verification method and a limiting refutation for H .

Topology and Statistical Methodology


Prop.



Deduction vs. Induction: Wrong



Deduction vs. Induction: Right



Monotonicity

Conjecture: For any open H and $\alpha > 0$, there exists a verification method at level α such that if $w \in H$:

$$p_w^{n_2}(M_{n_2} = H) - p_w^{n_1}(M_{n_1} = H) < \alpha,$$

for $n_2 > n_1$.




Topological Simplicity

It still makes sense in terms of statistical information topology!

$$A \triangleleft B \iff A \cap \text{cl}(B) \setminus B \neq \emptyset.$$

$$H_1 \triangleleft H_2 \triangleleft H_3.$$



Ockham's Statistical Razor

Concern: “compatibility with E” is no longer meaningful.


Response: the third formulation of O.R. does not mention compatibility with experience!

3. Infer a relevant response that is more complex than the true answer **with chance $< \alpha$.**

Epistemic Mandate for Ockham's Razor

If you **violate Ockham's razor** with chance α , then

1. either you **fail to converge** to the truth in chance or
2. nature can force you into an **α -cycle of opinions** (complex-simple-complex), even though such cycles are avoidable.



A New Objective Bayesianism

How much **prior bias toward simple models** is necessary to avoid α -cycles?



 Indifference = ignorance.

 truth-conduciveness.

CONCLUSION

A Method for Methodology

1. Develop basic methodological ideas in **topology**.
2. Port them to **statistics** via **statistical information topology**.




Some Concluding Remarks

1. **Information topology** is the **structure** of the scientist's problem context.
2. The apparent **analogy** between statistical and ideal methodology reflects **shared topological structure**.
3. Thereby, **ideal logical/topological ideas** can be **ported** in a direct and uniform fashion to statistics.
4. The result is a new, systematic, **frequentist** foundation for **inductive inference** and **Ockham's razor**.

ETC.

Application: Causal Inference from Non-experimental Data

- Causal network inference from retrospective data.
- That is an inductive problem.
- The search is strongly guided by Ockham's razor.
- We have the only non-Bayesian foundation for it.



Symbols: "A" = cause (YFV); "B" = outcome (cancer); "C" = confounders (recreational solar exposure and high social class); "D" and "E" = mediators (HERV-K antigen and immune response).

Application: Science

- All scientific conclusions are supposed to be counterfactual.
- Scientific inference is strongly simplicity biased.
- Standard ML accounts of Ockham's razor do not apply to such inferences (J. Pearl).
- Our account does.