

# A SMOOTH SEA NEVER MADE A SKILLED FISHERMAN

DEEP DIVE INTO THE EVER-EVOLVING  
WORLD OF PHISHING

Kuba Gretzky



@mrgretzky

# 00 // WHOAMI

## KUBA GRETZKY

Offensive Security Tools Developer

Ex-MMO Game Hacker

**breakdev.org** - offensive security blog

**EVILGINX + EVILGINX PRO** (coming soon)

**pwndrop** - dropbox for red teams

**BREAKDEV RED** - community for red teamers

**Evilginx Mastery** - phishing with Evilginx 101



@mrgretzky



**BREAKDEV RED**



**BREAKDEV**

# OO // WHOAMI

## IT STARTED @X33FCON

Lunchtime WiFi Hacking (7 years ago) 2017



# 01 // INTRO

## WHAT IS THE TALK ABOUT?

- Defences against phishing are evolving
- Phishing is getting harder
- Black market phishing toolkits keep evolving
- Red teamers left alone in the dark with open-source tools

# HELP?





evilginxpro

# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

- Bad guys like phishing
- Bad guys like free tools
- Red teams need to simulate bad guys
- Red teams need better tools
- Bad guys should not have better tools



**BREAKDEV** RED



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### CLIENT-SERVER ARCHITECTURE

- Evilginx server deployed as a daemon
- Evilginx client able to deploy servers and connect to them
- No need to SSH to each server
- Multi-user collaboration on servers
- Admin API carefully hidden behind HTTPS port 443
- Easy server deployment with several commands:

```
servers add evilx33f 1.2.3.4
servers register evilx33f
servers deploy evilx33f
```



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### CLIENT-SERVER ARCHITECTURE

- Evilginx API accessible via HTTPS requests or a persistent WebSockets connection:

```
1  {
2      "status": "ok",
3      "message": "",
4      "command": "sessions",
5      "data": {
6          "mode": "list",
7          "sessions": [
8              {
9                  "id": 6,
10                 "session_id": "833733b7-4b05-436d-aa0c-46a8212bc86a",
11                 "phishlet": "google",
12                 "username": [REDACTED],
13                 "password": [REDACTED],
14                 "landing_url": "https://accounts.google.fake.com/wKfhHahG",
15                 "user_agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Chrome/119.0.0.0 Safari/537.36",
16                 "origin": "127.0.0.1",
17                 "create_time": 1705169076,
18                 "update_time": 1705169121,
19                 "tokens": {
20                     "cookies": [
21                         {
```



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### EVILPUPPET

- Background browser controllable with phishlets
- Extraction of shadow tokens in real-time

```
1 evilpuppet:
2   triggers:
3     - domains: ['www.linkedin.com']
4       paths: ['/checkpoint/lg/login-submit']
5       token: 'apfc'
6       open_url: 'https://www.linkedin.com/login'
7       actions:
8         - selector: '#username'
9           value: '{username}'
10          enter: false
11          click: false
12          post_wait: 500
13         - selector: '#password'
14           value: '{password}'
15           enter: false
16           click: false
17           post_wait: 500
18         - selector: 'button[type=submit]'
```




# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### REVERSE PROXY AS A WEBSITE SPOOFER

- Display external websites in the context of the phishing domain
- Unauthorized clients will see a legitimate website under a phishing URL



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### TLS WILDCARD CERTIFICATES

- Automated retrieval and renewal
- Prevents exposing your phishing hostnames through TLS Transparency Log
- Scanners see TLS certificates registered for  
**\*.phish.com** instead of **your.phish.com**



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### AUTOMATED JAVASCRIPT OBFUSCATION

- Auto-obfuscation for all injected scripts with [obfuscator.io](#) engine

```
1 (function(_0x1e05dc,_0x208ad4){var  
_0x436649=_0x2ca9,_0x155dfb=_0x1e05dc();while(!![ ]) {try{var _0x2f832c=-  
parseInt(_0x436649(0x181))/0x1+parseInt(_0x436649(0x183))/0x2*(-  
parseInt(_0x436649(0x184))/0x3)+-parseInt(_0x436649(0x186))/0x4+-  
parseInt(_0x436649(0x187))/0x5+-parseInt(_0x436649(0x180))/0x6+-  
parseInt(_0x436649(0x182))/0x7*(-  
parseInt(_0x436649(0x17e))/0x8)+parseInt(_0x436649(0x17f))/0x9;if(_0x2f832  
c===_0x208ad4)break;else _0x155dfb['push'](_0x155dfb['shift']  
());}catch(_0x542cd7){_0x155dfb['push'](_0x155dfb['shift']());}}}  
(_0x3ecd,0xd69e1));function _0x2ca9(_0x3870af,_0xae0a46){var  
_0x3ecd1f=_0x3ecd();return _0x2ca9=function(_0x2ca948,_0x5e649f)  
{_0x2ca948=_0x2ca948-0x17e;var _0x2593b1=_0x3ecd1f[_0x2ca948];return  
_0x2593b1;},_0x2ca9(_0x3870af,_0xae0a46);}function hi(){var  
_0x86f3ba=_0x2ca9;console[_0x86f3ba(0x185)]  
('I\x20<3\x20Evilginx');}function _0x3ecd(){var _0x526cb7=  
['7013435NYJwOd','2481392SSpqkU','48156795eBkbpq','9789024TiKFkM','378423R  
DYQeT','14sbxCAG','2uGspka','3185043dQacAj','log','2470940hKdiuJ'];_0x3ecd  
=function(){return _0x526cb7;};return _0x3ecd();}hi();
```



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### SQLITE DATABASE

- BuntDB no more
- Sorry, Melvin!

Bobber: <https://github.com/Flangvik/Bobber>

The TriForce of Initial Access:

<https://trustedsec.com/blog/the-triforce-of-initial-access>



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### EXTERNAL DNS MANAGEMENT

- Multiple domains support
- DNS zones controlled through external nameservers
  - Cloudflare
  - Digital Ocean
  - Route 53 (AWS)
- Plug & play different providers using **libdns** interface:  
<https://github.com/libdns/libdns>



# 02 // EVILGINX PRO

## WHAT'S NEW?

### JA4 SIGNATURE SPOOFING

- Spoofing the outbound TLS connection fingerprint



# 03 // JA4 SPOOFING

## DESCRIPTION

*“ JA4+ is a suite of network fingerprinting methods that are easy to use and easy to share. These methods are both human and machine readable to facilitate more effective threat-hunting and analysis.*

- Created by **John Althouse** from **Fox-IO**
- Successor to JA3
- Signature generated from TLS handshake Client Hello packet

<https://blog.foxio.io/ja4+-network-fingerprinting>

<https://github.com/FoxIO-LLC/ja4>



# 03 // JA4 SPOOFING

## CLIENT HELLO


- Maximum supported TLS version
- ALPN (HTTP/2 or QUIC supported?)
- Supported cipher suites
- List of TLS extensions



# 03 // JA4 SPOOFING

## JA4: TLS Client Fingerprint

- Protocol, TCP = "t" QUIC = "q"
- TLS version, 1.2 = "12", 1.3 = "13"
- SNI, SNI = "d" (to domain), no SNI = "i" (to IP)
- Number of Cipher Suites
- Number of Extensions
- First ALPN value (00 if no ALPN)



- Truncated SHA256 hash of the Cipher Suites, sorted
- Truncated SHA256 hash of the Extensions, sorted
  - + Signature Algorithms, in the order they appear

▼ Transport Layer Security


- ▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
  - Content Type: Handshake (22)
  - Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
  - Length: 1989
- ▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
  - Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
  - Length: 1985
  - Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
  - Random: 23ed7af65e30c3b4fc5dfa79bdf1d1b4936abdc52fa0e1b3215cb7e92a0c35
  - Session ID Length: 32
  - Session ID: 00ee8edb84cb532e95daa9f683c7cef7078bfad717101a8e5eedb004dfc992e3
  - Cipher Suites Length: 32
  - Cipher Suites (16 suites)
  - Compression Methods Length: 1
  - Compression Methods (1 method)
  - Extensions Length: 1880
  - Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)
  - Extension: server\_name (len=17) name=breakdev.org
  - Extension: supported\_groups (len=12)
  - Extension: supported\_versions (len=7) TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2
  - Extension: psk\_key\_exchange\_modes (len=2)
  - Extension: application\_layer\_protocol\_negotiation (len=14)
  - Extension: ec\_point\_formats (len=2)
  - Extension: application\_settings (len=5)
  - Extension: compress\_certificate (len=3)
  - Extension: session\_ticket (len=208)
  - Extension: signature\_algorithms (len=18)
  - Extension: extended\_master\_secret (len=0)
  - Extension: renegotiation\_info (len=1)
  - Extension: key\_share (len=1263) X25519Kyber768Draft00, x25519
  - Extension: encrypted\_client\_hello (len=250)
  - Extension: signed\_certificate\_timestamp (len=0)
  - Extension: status\_request (len=5)
  - Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=1)
  - [JA4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862]
  - [JA4\_r: t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b]
  - [JA3 Fullstring: 771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,0-10-43-4]
  - [JA3: 5b786b79b935d4e93b450c2a80ca86ef]
- ▼ JA4 Fingerprint
  - JA4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862
  - JA4 Raw: t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b,
  - JA4 Raw (Original): t13d1516h2\_1301,1302,1303,c02b,c02f,c02c,c030,cca9,cca8,c013,c014,009c,009d,002f,0035\_000a,

▼ Transport Layer Security

- ▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
  - Content Type: Handshake (22)
  - Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
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- ▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
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  - Length: 1985
  - Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
  - Random: 23ed7af65e30c3b4fc5dfa79bdf1d1b4936abdc52fa0e1b3215cb7e92a0c35
  - Session ID Length: 32
  - Session ID: 00ee8edb84cb532e95daa9f683c7cef7078bfad717101a8e5eedb004dfc992e3
  - Cipher Suites Length: 32
  - Cipher Suites (16 suites)
    - Compression Methods Length: 1
    - Compression Methods (1 method)
    - Extensions Length: 1880
    - Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)
    - Extension: server\_name (len=17) name=breakdev.org
    - Extension: supported\_groups (len=12)
    - Extension: supported\_versions (len=7) TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2
    - Extension: psk\_key\_exchange\_modes (len=2)
    - Extension: application\_layer\_protocol\_negotiation (len=14)
    - Extension: ec\_point\_formats (len=2)
    - Extension: application\_settings (len=5)
    - Extension: compress\_certificate (len=3)
    - Extension: session\_ticket (len=208)
    - Extension: signature\_algorithms (len=18)
    - Extension: extended\_master\_secret (len=0)
    - Extension: renegotiation\_info (len=1)
    - Extension: key\_share (len=1263) X25519Kyber768Draft00, x25519
    - Extension: encrypted\_client\_hello (len=250)
    - Extension: signed\_certificate\_timestamp (len=0)
    - Extension: status\_request (len=5)
    - Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=1)
  - [JA4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862]
  - [JA4\_r: t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b]
  - [JA3 Fullstring: 771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,0-10-43-4]
  - [JA3: 5b786b79b935d4e93b450c2a80ca86ef]
- ▼ JA4 Fingerprint
  - J A4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862
  - J A4 Raw: t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b,
  - J A4 Raw (Original): t13d1516h2\_1301,1302,1303,c02b,c02f,c02c,c030,cca9,cca8,c013,c014,009c,009d,002f,0035\_000a,

**Cipher suites (JA4\_B)**

▼ Transport Layer Security

- ▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
  - Content Type: Handshake (22)
  - Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
  - Length: 1989
- ▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
  - Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
  - Length: 1985
  - Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
  - Random: 23ed7af65e30c3b4fc5dfa79bdf1d1b4936abdc52fa0e1b3215cb7e92a0c35
  - Session ID Length: 32
  - Session ID: 00ee8edb84cb532e95daa9f683c7cef7078bfad717101a8e5eedb004dfc992e3
  - Cipher Suites Length: 32
  - Cipher Suites (16 suites) 
  - Compression Methods Length: 1
  - Compression Methods (1 method)
  - Extensions Length: 1880
  - Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0)
  - Extension: server\_name (len=17) name=breakdev.org
  - Extension: supported\_groups (len=12)
  - Extension: supported\_versions (len=7) TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2
  - Extension: psk\_key\_exchange\_modes (len=2)
  - Extension: application\_layer\_protocol\_negotiation (len=14)
  - Extension: ec\_point\_formats (len=2)
  - Extension: application\_settings (len=5)
  - Extension: compress\_certificate (len=3)
  - Extension: session\_ticket (len=208)
  - Extension: signature\_algorithms (len=18)
  - Extension: extended\_master\_secret (len=0)
  - Extension: renegotiation\_info (len=1)
  - Extension: key\_share (len=1263) X25519Kyber768Draft00, x25519
  - Extension: encrypted\_client\_hello (len=250)
  - Extension: signed\_certificate\_timestamp (len=0)
  - Extension: status\_request (len=5)
  - Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=1)
- [JA4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862]  
[JA4\_r: t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b]  
[JA3 Fullstring: 771,4865-4866-4867-49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49171-49172-156-157-47-53,0-10-43-4]  
[JA3: 5b786b79b935d4e93b450c2a80ca86ef]
- ▼ JA4 Fingerprint
  - JA4: t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862
  - JA4 Raw: t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b
  - JA4 Raw (Original): t13d1516h2\_1301,1302,1303,c02b,c02f,c02c,c030,cca9,cca8,c013,c014,009c,009d,002f,0035\_000a

**Cipher suites (JA4\_B)**

**TLS Extensions (JA4\_C)**

```
▼ Transport Layer Security
  ▼ TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
    Content Type: Handshake (22)
    Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
    Length: 1989
  ▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
    Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
    Length: 1985
    Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
  ▶ Random: 23ed7af65e30c3b4fc5dfa79bdfd1d1b4936abdc52fa0e1b3215cb7e92a0c35
    Session ID Length: 32
    Session ID: 00ee8edb84cb532e95daa9f683c7cef7078bfad717101a8e5eedb004dfc992e3
    Cipher Suites Length: 32
  ▼ Cipher Suites (16 suites)
    Cipher Suite: Reserved (GREASE) (0x8a8a)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x1301)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x1302)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0x1303)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02b)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc02c)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xccaa9)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0xccaa8)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009c)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009d)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)
    Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0035)
  Compression Methods Length: 1
  ▶ Compression Methods (1 method)
  Extensions Length: 1880
```

**Cipher suites**

# 03 // JA4 SPOOFING

## SIGNATURE GENERATION

**JA4:**

**t13d1516h2\_8daaf6152771\_02713d6af862**

**JA4 Raw:**

**t13d1516h2\_002f,0035,009c,009d,1301,1302,1303,c013  
,c014,c02b,c02c,c02f,c030,cca8,cca9\_0005,000a,000b  
,000d,0012,0017,001b,0023,002b,002d,0033,4469,fe0d  
,ff01\_0403,0804,0401,0503,0805,0501,0806,0601**



# 04 // THE HUNT FOR EVILGINX

## SCOUTING FOR PREY

Application	JA4
Google Chrome	t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_02713d6af862 (TCP) q13d0312h3_55b375c5d22e_06cda9e17597 (QUIC)
Mozilla Firefox	t13d1715h2_5b57614c22b0_7121afd63204
Safari	t13d2014h2_a09f3c656075_14788d8d241b
IcedID Malware	t13d201100_2b729b4bf6f3_9e7b989ebec8
Sliver Malware	t13d190900_9dc949149365_97f8aa674fd9
SoftEther VPN	t13d880900_fcb5b95cb75a_b0d3b4ac2a14
Evilginx	t13d191000_9dc949149365_e7c285222651



# 04 // THE HUNT FOR EVILGINX

## SCOUTING FOR PREY

Common **JA4\_B** signatures:

- Google Chrome: **8daaf6152771**
- Golang (Sliver, Evilginx): **9dc949149365**

Cloudflare uses JA3/JA4:

<https://developers.cloudflare.com/bots/concepts/ja3-já4-fingerprint/>



# 04 // THE HUNT FOR EVILGINX

## WHAT CAN BE DONE?

### SPOOF TLS CLIENT CONFIG

- Modify the list of supported TLS ciphers
- Use random TLS configurations with uTLS library:  
<https://github.com/refraction-networking/utls>
  - Different JA4 signature with every TLS connection
  - Good to avoid JA4 blacklists
  - Enough until defenders deploy more advanced detections
- Copy TLS configuration directly from client connecting to the proxy




What if we could harness the power of JA4 and  
use it to our advantage?


And make...

**THE HUNTERS  
BECOME  
THE HUNTED**


# LOOK AT ME



# LOOK AT ME



# I AM THE DEFENDER NOW



**WELL, WELL, WELL,  
HOW THE TURNTABLES...**

# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## THE WHEEL REINVENTED

- Cloudflare is already great at it
- Cloudflare Turnstile as Evilginx redirector:  
<https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2/blob/master/redirectors/turnstile/index.html>
- Why not implement our own botguard?

BEHOLD

POOR MAN'S CLOUDFLARE



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## PREPARATIONS

- Forked **go-vhost** library used to extract hostnames from the TLS ClientHello packet's SNI extension data  
<https://github.com/inconshreveable/go-vhost>
- Added code to generate JA4 signatures for every connection
- Set up database logging of JA4 and User-Agent for every unauthorized request
- Disabled usage of wildcard certificates to trigger as many scans as possible
- Uploaded the phishing link to any URL scanning service I could find
- I gathered data for one month



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## RESULTS

- 820 requests
- 680 unique IPs (IP blacklisting is dead)
- 52 different ASNs (database available for free on IPinfo.io)
- Most popular **JA4\_B** signatures:

JA4_B	Name	Count	Percentage
8daaf6152771	<b>Google Chrome</b>	650	80%
9dc949149365	<b>Golang</b>	90	11%
e8a523a41297	<b>Googlebot</b>	10	1%

IPInfo.io: <https://ipinfo.io/>



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## RESULTS

- Partial failure
- JA4 signatures are not enough to detect bots
- Most bots use the Chromium engine (headless browsers)



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## NEW IDEA

- Phished users must have JavaScript enabled
- Safe to assume JavaScript will always be available
- How many bots are able to run JavaScript?



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## GATHERING BROWSER TELEMETRY

- JavaScript injected into the landing page (the reverse proxied spoofed page) to gather browser telemetry
- Telemetry sent back to the Evilginx server for analysis
- If authorized, Evilginx redirects to the phishing page

**Q: How many page views out of 820 resulted in telemetry data being sent back to the Evilginx server?**

**A:** ~35 

Fp-Collect: <https://github.com/antoinevastel/fp-collect>



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## ANALYZING BROWSER TELEMETRY

- Decided to go for the low-hanging fruit:
  - Browser window size
  - User-Agent
- Used **ua-parser-js** library for analyzing User-Agents:  
<https://github.com/faisalm/faisalm/ua-parser-js>



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## WINDOW SIZE ANALYSIS

### SCREEN SIZES

```
"wInnerHeight": 1200,  
"wInnerWidth": 1600,  
"wOuterHeight": 1200,  
"wOuterWidth": 1600,
```

- Possible only while browser is in fullscreen mode
- Unlikely anyone would be opening a phishing link while in fullscreen mode



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## WINDOW SIZE ANALYSIS

### OUTER WINDOW SMALLER THAN INNER WINDOW

```
"wDevicePixelRatio": 1,  
"wInnerHeight": 768,  
"wInnerWidth": 1024,  
"wOuterHeight": 600,  
"wOuterWidth": 800,
```

- Possible only when zoomed out (Control+'-')
- This should be reflected with **wDevicePixelRatio < 1**, but never is
- Unlikely anyone would be zoomed out when opening a new link



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## WINDOW SIZE ANALYSIS

### UNREALISTIC WINDOW SIZES

```
"wDevicePixelRatio": 1,  
"wInnerHeight": 768,  
"wInnerWidth": 1366,  
"wOuterHeight": 1,  
"wOuterWidth": 1,
```

- Outer window unnaturally small



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## BROWSER VERSION ANALYSIS

### OUTDATED VERSIONS

```
"browser": {  
    "major": "100",  
    "name": "Chrome",  
    "version": "100.0.4896.127"  
}
```

- Almost every single bot used a browser version older than 6 months



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## INTERESTING CASES

### SAFARI ON IPHONE

```
"browser": {  
    "major": "17",  
    "name": "Mobile Safari",  
    "version": "17.4"  
}
```

### WINDOW DIMENSIONS LOOKING GOOD

```
"wDevicePixelRatio": 3,  
"wInnerHeight": 664,  
"wInnerWidth": 390,  
"wOuterHeight": 664,  
"wOuterWidth": 390,
```



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## INTERESTING CASES

### VIDEO CARD (?!)

```
"videoCard": [  
    "Google Inc. (Google)",  
    "ANGLE (Google, Vulkan 1.3.0 (SwiftShader Device (Subzero)  
(0x0000C0DE)), SwiftShader driver)"  
]
```

JA4: **8daaf6152771** (Google Chrome)

**Safari - really?!**

**The real detection power comes from cross-checking  
the data from all the sensors**



# 05 // THE HUNT FOR BOTS

## EVILGINX PRO BOTGUARD

```
min_ver: '4.0.0'  
ja4:  
# if 'allow' is defined, whitelist mode is activated  
allow:  
deny:  
- {b: 'e8f1e7e78f70'}  
- {b: '9dc949149365'} # golang  
- {b: 'cbb2034c60b8'} # golang 1.22  
- {b: 'c7886603b240'} # Python requests 3.10  
- {b: '730fb1b0ac6a'} # Python requests 2.27  
- {b: 'e8a523a41297'} # Googlebot  
- {b: '1ce71f0edb1'} # Java 8.0  
- {b: '231e334592e8'} # bingbot  
- {b: '2b729b4bf6f3'} # bingbot  
- {b: '76e208dd3e22'} # curl  
  
user_agent:  
# if 'allow' is defined, whitelist mode is activated  
allow:  
- {browser: 'Chrome', version: '>= 120'}  
- {browser: 'Firefox', version: '>= 120.0'}  
- {browser: 'Edge', version: '>= 120.0'}  
- {browser: 'Opera', version: '>= 120.0'}  
- {browser: 'Safari', version: '>= 16.0'}  
deny:  
- {browser: 'Headless'}
```





**BREAKDEV** RED



Contact:  
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Subject:

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**evilginxpro**

**COMING SOON  
(2024)**



@mrgretzky



Questions?



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