
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The evaluation of Network Anomaly Detection Systems: Statistical analysis of the UNSW-NB15 data set and the comparison with the KDD99 data set

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ABSTRACT

Over the last three decades, Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs), particularly, Anomaly Detection Systems (ADSs), have become more significant in detecting novel attacks than Signature Detection Systems (SDSs). Evaluating NIDSs using the existing benchmark data sets of KDD99 and NSLKDD does not reflect satisfactory results, due to three major issues: (1) their lack of modern low footprint attack styles, (2) their lack of modern normal traffic scenarios, and (3) a different distribution of training and testing sets. To address these issues, the UNSW-NB15 data set has recently been generated. This data set has nine types of the modern attacks fashions and new patterns of normal traffic, and it contains 49 attributes that comprise the flow based between hosts and the network packets inspection to discriminate between the observations, either normal or abnormal. In this paper, we demonstrate the complexity of the UNSW-NB15 data set in three aspects. First, the statistical analysis of the observations and the attributes are explained. Second, the examination of feature correlations is provided. Third, five existing classifiers are used to evaluate the complexity in terms of accuracy and false alarm rates (FARs) and then, the results are compared with the KDD99 data set. The experimental results show that UNSW-NB15 is more complex than KDD99 and is considered as a new benchmark data set for evaluating NIDSs.

KEYWORDS

Feature correlations; multivariate analysis; NIDSs; UNSW-NB15 data set

1. Introduction

Because of the ubiquitous usage of computer networks and the plurality of applications running on them, cyber attackers attempt to exploit weak points of network architectures to steal, corrupt, or destroy valuable information (DeWeese, 2009; Eom et al., 2012; Vatis, 2001). Consequently, the function of a NIDS is to detect and identify anomalies in network systems (Denning, 1987). NIDSs are classified into Misuse based (MNIDS) and Anomaly based (ANIDS) (Lee, Stolfo, & Mok, 1999; Moustafa & Slay, 2015a; Valdes & Anderson, 1995). In MNIDS, the known attacks are detected by matching the stored signatures of those attacks (Lee et al., 1999; Vigna & Kemmerer, 1999). While ANIDS creates a profile of normal activities, any deviation from this profile is considered as an anomaly (Ghosh, Wanken, & Charron, 1998; Valdes & Anderson, 1995). Several studies stated that the MNIDS can often accomplish higher accuracy and lower FAR than the ANIDS (Lee et al., 1999), but the ANIDS has the ability of detecting novel attacks (Lazarevic et al., 2003). Therefore, the ANIDSs are becoming a necessity rather than the MNIDS (Aziz et al., 2014; Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, & Kalita, 2014; García-Teodoro, Díaz-Verdejo, Maciá-Fernández, & Vázquez, 2009).

Evaluating the efficiency of any NIDS requires a modern comprehensive data set that contains contemporary normal and attack activities. McHugh (2000), Tavallaee et al. (2009), and Moustafa and Slay (2015a) stated that the existing benchmark data sets, especially, KDD99 and NSLKDD, negatively affect the NIDS results because of three major problems. Firstly, lack of modern low footprint attack fashions, for instance, stealthy or spy attacks that change their styles over time to become similar to normal behaviors (Cunningham & Lippmann, 2000; Tavallaee et al., 2009). Second, the existing data sets were created two decades ago, indicating that the

normal traffic of the existing benchmark data sets is different from the current normal traffic because of the revolution in networks speed and applications (McHugh, 2000). Third, the testing set of the existing benchmark data sets has some attack types which are not in the training set; this means that the training and testing set have different distribution (Tavallaee et al., 2009). The difference in the distribution persuades classifier systems to skew toward some observations causing the FAR (Cieslak & Chawla, 2009; Tavallaee et al., 2009).

In the light of the above discussion, to address these challenges the UNSW-NB15 data set has recently been released (Moustafa & Slay, 2014, 2015b). This data set includes nine categories of the modern attack types and involves realistic activities of normal traffic that were captured with the change over time. In addition, it contains 49 features that comprised the flow based between hosts (i.e., client-to-server or server-to-client) and the packet header which covers in-depth characteristics of the network traffic.

A part of UNSW-NB15 data set was decomposed into two partitions of the training and testing sets to determine the analysis aspects. The goal of the three aspects is to evaluate the complexity of the training and testing sets. First, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (Justel, Peña, & Zamar, 1997; Massey, 1951) defines and compares the distribution of the training and testing sets; skewness (Mardia, 1970) measures the asymmetry of the features; and kurtosis (Mardia, 1970) estimates the flatness of the features. The reliability of results can be achieved when these statistics are approximately similar to the features of the training and testing sets. Second, the feature correlations are measured in two perspectives: (1) the feature correlations without the class label, (2) and the feature correlations with the class label. To achieve the first perspective, Pearson's Correlation Coefficient (PCC) (Bland & Altman, 1995) is used. Gain Ratio (GR) method (Hall & Smith, 1998) is utilised to achieve the second perspective. Third, five existing techniques, namely, Naïve Bayes (NB)(Panda & Patra, 2007), Decision Tree (DT) (Bouzida & Cuppens, 2006), Artificial Neural Network (ANN) (Bouzida & Cuppens, 2006; Mukkamala, Sung, & Abraham, 2005), Logistic Regression (LR) (Mukkamala et al., 2005), **Expectation-Maximisation** and

Clustering (Sharif, Prugel-Benett, & Wills, 2012) are executed on the training and testing sets to assess the complexity in terms of accuracy and FARs. Further, the results of this data set are compared with the KDD99 data set (KDDCUP1999, 2007) to identify the capability of the UNSW-NB15 data set in appraising existing and novel classifiers.

The objective of the paper is to analyse the UNSW-NB15 data set statistically and practically. First, in the statistical aspect, the distribution of data points specifies the suitable algorithms of classification. To be clear, if a data set follows Gaussian distribution, many statistical algorithms, for instance, HMM and Kalman filter are used. However, if a data set does not fit Gaussian distribution, other algorithms, for example, particle filter and mixture models are applied. Second, in the practical aspect, the adoption of the best attributes decrease false alarm rates and reduce the execution costs. For that purpose, feature correlations with label and without label are demonstrated.

The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the UNSW-NB15 data set. Section 3 discusses the training and the testing sets extracted from this data set. Section 4 discusses the statistical mechanisms used on the two sets. Section 5 presents the feature correlation methods. Section 6 identifies the classification techniques which are involved to evaluate the complexity of the KDD99 and UNSW-NB15 data sets. Section 7 presents the experimental results of the statistical techniques, the feature correlations, and the complexity evaluation. Finally, section 8 provides a conclusion to the paper and examines the future research area.

2. Description of the UNSW-NB15 data set

The UNSW-NB 15 data set (Moustafa & Slay, 2014, 2015b) was created using an IXIA PerfectStorm tool (IXIA PerfectStormOne Tool, 2014) in the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) (Australian Center for Cyber Security (ACCS), 2014) to generate a hybrid of the realistic modern normal activities and the synthetic contemporary attack behaviors from network traffic. A tcpdump tool (tcpdump tool, 2014) was used to capture 100 GB of a raw network traffic. Argus (Argus tool, 2014), Bro-IDS (Bro-IDS Tool, 2014) tools were used and 12 models were developed for extracting the features of Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. These techniques were configured in a parallel processing to extract 49 features with the class label. After finishing the implementation of the

Table 1. Flow features.

No.	Name	Description		
1	Srcip	Source IP address		
2	Sport	Source port number		
3	Dstip	Destination IP address		
4	Dsport	Destination port number		
5	Proto	Protocol type (such as TC, UDP)		

Table 2. Basic features.

6	state	Indicates to the state and its dependent protocol (such		
		as ACC, CLO and CON).		
7	dur	Record total duration		
8	sbytes	Source to destination bytes		
9	dbytes	Destination to source bytes		
10	sttl	Source to destination time to live		
11	dttl	tl Destination to source time to live		
12	sloss	Source packets retransmitted or dropped		
13	dloss	Destination packets retransmitted or dropped		
14	service	Such as http, ftp, smtp, ssh, dns and ftp-data.		
15	sload	Source bits per second		
16	dload	Destination bits per second		
17	spkts	Source to destination packet count		
18	dpkts	Destination to source packet count		

Table 3. Content features.

19	swin	Source TCP window advertisement value
20	dwin	Destination TCP window advertisement value
21	stcpb	Source TCP base sequence number
22	dtcpb	Destination TCP base sequence number
23	smeansz	Mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the src
24	dmeansz	Mean of the flow packet size transmitted by the
		dst
25	trans_depth	Represents the pipelined depth into the
		connection of http request/response transaction
26	res_bdy_len	Actual uncompressed content size of the data
		transferred from the server's http service

Table 4. Time features.

27	sjit	Source jitter (mSec)
28	djit	Destination jitter (mSec)
29	stime	record start time
30	ltime	record last time
31	sintpkt	Source interpacket arrival time (mSec)
32	dintpkt	Destination interpacket arrival time (mSec)
33	tcprtt	TCP connection setup round-trip time, the sum of
		'synack' and 'ackdat'
34	synack	TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN
		and the SYN_ACK packets
35	ackdat	TCP connection setup time, the time between the
		SYN ACK and the ACK packets

Table 5. Additional generated features.

Tab	Table 3. Additional generated leatures.						
36	is_sm_ips_ports	If <i>srcip</i> (1) equals to <i>dstip</i> (3) and <i>sport</i> (2) equals to <i>dsport</i> (4), this variable assigns to 1					
		otherwise 0					
37	ct_state_ttl	No. for each state (6) according to specific					
		range of values of sttl (10) and dttl (11)					
38	ct_flw_http_mthd	No. of flows that has methods such as Get					
50	ct_mv_mtp_mma	and Post in http service					
20	is_ftp_login	If the ftp session is accessed by user and					
39	is_itp_logili	password then 1 else 0					
40	-4 f4 d	•					
40	ct_ftp_cmd	No of flows that has a command in ftp					
41		session					
41	ct_srv_src	No. of records that contain the same <i>service</i>					
		(14) and <i>srcip</i> (1) in 100 records according to					
	_	the Itime (26)					
42	ct_srv_dst	No. of records that contain the same <i>service</i>					
		(14) and dstip (3) in 100 records according to					
		the Itime (26)					
43	ct_dst_ltm	No. of records of the same <i>dstip</i> (3) in 100					
		records according to the <i>Itime</i> (26)					
44	ct_src_ ltm	No. of records of the <i>srcip</i> (1) in 100 records					
		according to the Itime (26)					
45	ct_src_dport_ltm	No of records of the same <i>srcip</i> (1) and the					
	•	dsport (4) in 100 records according to the					
		Itime (26)					
46	ct_dst_sport_ltm	No of records of the same <i>dstip</i> (3) and the					
	, _	sport (2) in 100 records according to the ltime					
		(26)					
47	ct dst src ltm	No of records of the same <i>srcip</i> (1) and the					
17	cc_asc_src_ran	dstip (3) in in 100 records according to the					
		ltime (26)					
		IUIIIE (20)					

configured techniques, the total number of records, 2,540,044, were stored in four CSV files. The records and the features of the UNSW-NB15 data set are described in-depth as follows.

2.1. Attack types

Attack types can be classified into nine groups:

- (1) Fuzzers: an attack in which the attacker attempts to discover security loopholes in a program, operating system, or network by feeding it with the massive inputting of random data to make it crash.
- (2) Analysis: a type of variety intrusions that penetrate the web applications via ports (e.g., port scans), emails (e.g., spam), and web scripts (e.g., HTML files).
- (3) **Backdoor**: a technique of bypassing a stealthy normal authentication, securing unauthorized remote access to a device, and locating the entrance to plain text as it is struggling to continue unobserved.
- (4) **DoS**: an intrusion which disrupts the computer resources via memory, to be extremely

- busy in order to prevent the authorized requests from accessing a device.
- (5) Exploit: a sequence of instructions that takes advantage of a glitch, bug, or vulnerability to be caused by an unintentional or unsuspected behavior on a host or network.
- (6) **Generic**: a technique that establishes against every block-cipher using a hash function to collision without respect to the configuration of the block-cipher.
- (7) **Reconnaissance**: can be defined as a probe; an attack that gathers information about a computer network to evade its security controls.
- (8) Shellcode: an attack in which the attacker penetrates a slight piece of code starting from a shell to control the compromised machine.
- (9) Worm: an attack whereby the attacker replicates itself in order to spread on other computers. Often, it uses a computer network to spread itself, depending on the security failures on the target computer to access it.

2.2. Features

Features are categorized into five groups:

- (1) Flow features: includes the identifier attributes between hosts (e.g., client-to-serve or server-to-client), as reflected in Table 1.
- (2) Basic features: involves the attributes that represent protocols connections, as shown in Table 2.
- (3) **Content features**: encapsulates the attributes of TCP/IP; also they contain some attributes of http services, as reflected in Table 3.
- (4) **Time features**: contains the attributes time, for example, arrival time between packets, start/end packet time, and round trip time of TCP protocol, as shown in Table 4.
- (5) Additional generated features: in Table 5, this category can be further divided into two groups: general purpose features (i.e., 36-40), whereby each feature has its own purpose, according to protect the service of protocols, and (2) connection features (i.e., 41-47) that are built from the flow of 100 record connections based on the sequential order of the last time feature.

To label this data set, two attributes were provided: attack_cat represents the nine categories of the attack and the normal, and label is 0 for normal and otherwise 1.

3. Training and testing set distribution

A NIDS data set can be conceptualized as a relational table (T) (Witten & Mining, 2005). The input to any NIDS is a set of instances (I) (e.g., normal and attack records). Each instance consists of features (F) that have different data types (i.e., $\forall f \subset \{R \cup S\}$, where $\forall f$ means each feature in T, R is real numbers and S denotes characters). It is observed that NIDS techniques face challenges for using these features because no standard format for feature values (e.g., number or nominal) is offered(Shyu et al., 2005). In statistical perspective, T is a multivariate data representation which is codified in Definition 1.

 $I_{1:N} \in T, I_{1:N} = \{f_{ij} \in F\},\$ **Definition** $Y_{1:N} = \{c_i \in C\}, \text{ where } i, j = 1, 2, ..., N. \text{ Suppose } i \in C\}$ *F* is *iid* (independently and identically distributed). Defining $I_{1:N}$ and $Y_{1:N}$ as a column-vector, as given in Eq. (1).

$$I_{1:N} = \begin{bmatrix} f_{11} & f_{12} & \cdot \\ f_{21} & f_{22} & f_{ij} \end{bmatrix}, Y_{1:N} = \begin{bmatrix} c_1 \\ c_i \end{bmatrix}$$
 (1)

such that I represents the observations of T,Y is the class label (C) for each I, N is the number of instances, F denotes the features of I.

Proposition 1: A standard format for features (*F*) is prepared to have a same type (i.e., (number only) $\forall F \subset \{R\}$) to make the analysis of the data points easier. it assigns each nominal feature (S) to sequence numbers (i.e., $\forall S \rightarrow R_{0:R}$, of where $\{0: R\}$ denotes as equence of numbers (Salem & Buehler, 2012). For instance, the UNSW-NB15 data set has three major nominal features (e.g., protocol types (e.g., TCP, UPD), States (e.g., CON, ACC) and services (e.g., HTTP, FTP)). This issue can be tackled by converting each value in these features into ordered numbers such as TCP = 1, UDP = 2 and so on.

Table 6. A part of UNSW-NB15 data set distribution.

Category	Training set	Testing set
Normal	56,000	37,000
Analysis	2,000	677
Backdoor	1,746	583
DoS	12,264	4089
Exploits	33,393	11,132
Fuzzers	18,184	6,062
Generic	40,000	18,871
Reconnaissance	10,491	3,496
Shellcode	1,133	378
Worms	130	44
Total Records	175,341	82,332

Table 6 demonstrates the creation of the training and the testing sets from the UNSW-NB15 data set; a part of the data set records has been divided with an approximate 60%:40% ratio of the training and testing sets, respectively. To achieve the authenticity of NIDS evaluations, no redundant records among the training and testing set.

4. Statistical descriptive observations

In this section, the statistical analysis of the training and the testing sets attributes are elaborated to measure the relationship of the two set. The training and testing sets are prepared to in the form of Eq. (1), namely, TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} . Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test (Justel et al., 1997; Massey, 1951), Multivariate skewness and kurtosis functions (Mardia, 1970) are customized to examine the relationship and the distribution nature of the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} . The values of the features are not in a confidence interval, the z-score transformation (Jain, Nandakumar, & Ross, 2005) is used to make a standard format for these values of the attributes.

4.1. Z-score transformation of the feature values

The attributes of the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} have a large scale between the minimum and the maximum value. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to estimate their variance from the central tendency of the distribution. This issue is formulated as a multivariate problem of the varied distributions in Dilemma 1.

Dilemma 1: $\forall f$ involves in I_N has a wide range of values, such that

$$max(f_{ij}) - min(f_{ij}) < \infty \cap max(f_{ij}) \gg min(f_{ij})$$
(2)

In Eq. (2), each feature values are not specified into a confidence interval, for instance [-1, 1], and the maximum value (i.e., $Max(f_{ij})$) of the feature (F) is much larger than the minimum value (i.e., $Min(f_{ii})$). This causes a noise distribution, because the smallest and the largest values highly deviate from their mean (*M*) (Cherkassky & Mulier, 2007).

Proposition 2: To tackle Dilemma 1, the z-score function is utilised as formulated in Eq. (3). It is a linear transformation to standardise the format of the f_{ij} values, this makes it easier to compare values in diverse distributions without changing the shape of the original distribution.

$$z_{ij} = \frac{f_{ij} - M}{\delta} \tag{3}$$

In Eq. (3), the z-score of each value in $I_{1:N}$ is calculated by subtracting $\forall f$ from its M, and then the value is divided by the standard deviation (δ) of $\forall f$ to measure how far away $\forall f$ from its M. The sign of the z-score demonstrates that the value of $\forall f$ is either below or above M. After the transformation into z-score, all the distributions of the f_{ij} values are standardised with M=0 and $\delta=1$.

4.2. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test

The K-S test is used to decide the proper distribution of the features (Massey, 1951; Shyu et al., 2005). Let $\forall f$ has x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n be an ascending order sample, an empirical distribution function $F_n(x)$ is the fraction of sample observations less than or equal to the value x, then the empirical distribution function is defined as:

$$F_n(x) = \left\{ \frac{k}{n, x_k} \le x < x_{k+1}, k = 1, 2, \dots, n-1 \\ 1, x \ge x_n \right\}$$
(4)

The Kolmogorov distribution function is denoted as:

$$f(x) = \frac{\sqrt{2\pi}}{x} \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} e^{-(2n-1)^2 \pi^2 / (8x^2)}$$
 (5)

From Eqs. (4) and (5), K-S test achieves $F_n(x)$ fits f(x) by maximizing the absolute difference as follows:

$$D_n = \max_x |f(x) - F_n(x)| \tag{6}$$

In the case of the critical value $(D_{n,\infty})$ (i.e., \propto denotes significance level) falls into the Kolmogorov-Smirnov table (KDDCUP1999, 2007), do $P(D_n \leq D_{n,\infty}) = 1 - \infty .D_n$ that can be used to test $\forall f$ within f(x). Hence, the suitable fitting is accomplished in the case $max_x|f(x) - F_n(x)| \le D_{n,\infty}.F_n(x) \pm D_{n,\infty}$ affords a confidence interval to f(x) to present the proper distribution of $\forall f$.

4.3. Multivariate skewness

The skewness method (Mardia, 1970) is an asymmetry measure of the probability distribution of $\forall f$ that has x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n from its M, skewness function can be defined as:

$$ske = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - M)^3}{n\delta^3}$$
 (7)

In Eq. (7), if result is positive, the distribution with an asymmetric tail spreads toward major positive values. On the other hand, a negative value indicates that the distribution with an asymmetric tail extends toward more negative values.

4.4. Multivariate kurtosis

The kurtosis technique (Mardia, 1970) is a peakiness measure of the probability distribution of $\forall f$ that has x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n , kurtosis is denoted as:

$$Kur = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - M)^4}{n\delta^4}$$
 (8)

In Eq. (8), if the outcome is positive, the distribution is more peaked than the normal distribution. Nevertheless, a negative value indicates a flatter distribution.

It is acknowledged that if skewness and kurtosis values tend to be 0, then the distribution approximates a normal distribution.

4.5. The statistical functions utilisation on the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N}

The K-S test, Multivariate skewness and kurtosis functions are customised on the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} to estimate the compatibility of them, as declared in Eqs. (9)–(11).

$$\forall f \epsilon_{TR_{I_N}} D_{n, TR_{I_N}} \stackrel{\rho}{\Leftrightarrow} \forall f \epsilon_{TS_{I_N}} D_{n, TS_{I_N}} \le D_{n, \infty, \forall f} \qquad (9)$$

$$\forall f \epsilon_{TR_{I_N}} ske_{TR_{I_N}} \stackrel{\rho}{\Leftrightarrow} \forall f \epsilon_{TS_{I_N}} ske_{TS_{I_N}}$$
 (10)

$$\forall f \epsilon_{TR_{I_N}} kur_{TR_{I_N}} \stackrel{\rho}{\Leftrightarrow} \forall f \epsilon_{TS_{I_N}} kur_{TS_{I_N}}$$
 (11)

Eq. (9) estimates the best fitting of the distribution to TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} of $\forall f$, achieving the two sides are less than or equal K-S test (i.e., $D_{n,\infty,\forall f}$), while Eqs. (10) and (11) calculate the skewness and the kurtosis to the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} of $\forall f$, respectively. It is observed that ρ assigns to a threshold operator (e.g., = , < or >) which compares the results between the two sides of the equations.

Based on the above explanation, the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} of $\forall f$ is analysed to evaluate the statistical relationship of them as in the following algorithm:

Algorithm 1: The statistical relationship **between** TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} of $\forall f$

Input
$$\leftarrow TR_{I_N}$$
 and TS_{I_N} of $\forall f$

- 1: **for** $\forall f$ **do** // for each feature contains in the training and testing sets do
- 2: convert the values of the nominal features to numerical as described in proposition 1.
- 3: apply z-score from Eq. (3), subject to Eq. (2) as discussed in section 4.1.
- 4: apply Kolmogorov-Smirnov and multivariate skewness and kurtosis measures as declared in sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 respectively).

5: compare the results of step 4 to the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} as in formulated equations 9, 10 and 11 respectively.

6: end for

Output \rightarrow the relationship of the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} of $\forall f$ via the results of step 5

5. Feature correlations of the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N}

Correlation analysis is another aspect to identify the relationship of the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} features. Two correlation analysis mechanisms are used. First, a Pearson's correlation coefficient technique (PCC) (Bland & Altman, 1995) measures the relevance between features without a label. Second, a Gain Ratio method (GR) (Hall & Smith, 1998) is applied to rank the correlation between features and the label. The major goal of these techniques is to recognise the correlation scores between the features either with or without the class label on the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} , to estimate the efficiency of the features for discriminating the normal and attack observations.

Definition 1.1 (the extension of Definition 1):

Let data set (*T*) has multiple features f_1, f_2 , ..., $f_d \in I_{1:N}$ and class (C), each feature and the class have multiple values. For $f_1 = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\}, f_2 = \{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_N\}$ and $C = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_w\}$, where d is the number of features, N denotes the number of instances and w is the number of classes.

5.1. Feature correlations without labeled

Pearson's correlation coefficient (PCC) (Bland & Altman, 1995) is one of the simplest linear correlation methods to measure the dependency between features. From Definition 1.1, the PCC of the features f_1 and f_2 is formulated as:

$$PCC(f_{1},f_{2}) = \frac{cov(f_{1},f_{2})}{\sigma_{f_{1}}.\sigma_{f_{2}}}$$

$$= \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} (x_{i} - M_{f_{1}}) (y_{i} - M_{f_{2}})}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{N} (x_{i} - M_{f_{1}})^{2}}.\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{N} (y_{i} - M_{f_{2}})^{2}}}$$
(12)

where cov() is the covariance and σ is the standard deviation, $M_{f_1} = 1/N \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_i$ and $M_{f_2} = N \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i$ indicate the means of f_1 and f_2 respectively.

Based on Eq. (12), the output of the PCC is in a range [-1, 1]. If the value is near to -1 or 1, it indicates a strong correlation between the two features. However, if the value is close to 0, it shows that there is no correlation between the features. A positive sign means that the two features are in the same direction, while a negative sign indicates that the two features are in the opposite trend.

To rank the strongest features, the mean for each PCC feature (i.e., M_{pcc_f}) is calculated, such that $M_{pcc_{f_i}} = 1/N \sum_{i=1}^{N} PCC_{f_i}$, then the means are ordered descendingly to define the closest dependency features.

5.2. Feature correlations with labeled

The Gain Ratio technique (Hall & Smith, 1998) estimates the ratio between an information Gain method (IG) (Jain et al., 2005) and feature values. The GA is prepared to solve the problem of the IG when a feature has a large number of values compared with other features values. The IG is a feature selection method depends on an entropy function which is a measure of uncertainty of any feature. Let I be set of samples with w distinct classes. The entropy or the expected IG that is required to classify the observations is given by:

$$G(I) = -\sum_{i=1}^{m} p_i \log_2(p_i)$$
 (13)

where p_i is a likely of the instance I that belongs to class C_i and is calculated by I_i/I_N .

For partitioning the I_i into subsets for each feature f, the expected IG is denoted as:

$$E(f) = -\sum_{i=1}^{m} G(I) \frac{I_{1i} + I_{2i} + \dots + I_{mi}}{I_{N}}$$
(14)

From Eqs. (13) and (14), the encoding information that is gained to *F* is:

$$Gain(f) = G(I) - E(f)$$
 (15)

The splitting value between the subsets I_{ir} is indicated as:

$$Split(I) = -\sum_{i=1}^{r} \left(\left| \frac{I_i}{I_N} \right| \right) \log_2 \left(\left| \frac{I_i}{I_N} \right| \right)$$
 (16)

In Eq. (16), the split value of I expresses the information generated by dividing I into r parts conforming to r on the features. From Eqs. (14) and (15), the GA can be defined as: GR(f) = Gain(f)/(15)Split(I), where the feature with the highest Gain ratio is selected as the splitting feature. Thus, the strongest features with the class label are evaluated and ranked by utilising the GR, where the scores of the features are in the descending order.

6. Techniques for evaluating the complexity

This section discusses the techniques that are used to evaluate the complexity in terms of accuracy and false alarm rates (FAR) on the UNSW-NB15 data set. The five techniques used are Naïve Bayes (NB) (Panda & Patra, 2007), Decision Tree (DT) (Bouzida & Cuppens, 2006), Artificial Neural Network (ANN) (Bouzida & Cuppens, 2006; Mukkamala et al., 2005), Logistic Regression (LR) (Mukkamala et al., 2005), and Expectation-Maximization (EM) Clustering (Sharif et al., 2012). Each technique has its own characteristics to learn and evaluate data points of the TR_{I_N} and TS_{I_N} which are described respectively in the following section. First, the NB classifier is a conditional probability model which constructs the classification of the two classes (i.e., normal (0) or anomaly (1)). It is applied by the maximum a posterior (MAP) function which is denoted as:

$$P(C|I) = \underset{w \in \{1,2,..,N\}}{\operatorname{argmax}} P(C_w) \prod_{j=1}^{N} P(I_j|C_w)$$
 (17)

where C is the class label, I is the observation of each class, w is the class number, P(C|I) denotes the probability of the class given a specified observation and $\prod_{j=1}^{\infty} P(I_j|C_w)$ indicates to multiply all the prob-

abilities of the instances conditionally to their classes to achieve the maximum outcome. Second, the DT classifier is a structure similar to a flowchart which consists of root, nodes and branches to represent the classification rules. Each node denotes rules or procedures on a feature, each branch contains the results of the rules; and each leaf node expresses a class label. Third, the ANN learning is used to approximate an activation function that depends on a large number of input observations I. The basic ANN function can be defined as:

$$f(I) = \tau \left(\sum_{j} W_{j} . I_{j} \right) \tag{18}$$

where f(I) represents a predicted output of the class label, τ is an activation function (i.e., Sigmoid), W_i is a weight of each input instance I_i . Fourth, Logistic Regression algorithm establishes the correlation between a dependent variable (C) and independent variables (*F*). It uses the maximum likelihood function to estimate the regression parameters. Fifth, Expectation-Maximization (EM) clustering technique depends on maximizing the probability density function of a Gaussian distribution to calculate the mean and the covariance of each instance I in T. The EM clustering algorithm encompasses into two steps (i.e., Expectation (E-step) and Maximization (M)). In the E-step, it estimates the likelihood for each instance I in T. whilst, the M-step is utilised to re-estimate the parameter values from the E-step to achieve the best expected output.

Two parameters (accuracy and false alarm rate) are calculated from the outcomes of these techniques to measure the complexity of the UNSW-NB15 data set. Let the factors of the classification are FC ={ *TP*, *TN*, *FP*, *FN*} where TP(i.e., true positive) denotes a number of the correctly attack classified, (i.e., true negative) expresses a number of the correctly normal classified, FP (i.e., false positive) is a number of the misclassified attacks and FN (i.e., false negative) is a number of the misclassified normal records (Sokolova, Japkowicz, Szpakowicz, 2006). The accuracy (So-In et al., 2014; Sokolova et al., 2006) is the rate of the correctly classified records to all the records, whether correctly or incorrectly classified, which is denoted as

$$accuracy = \frac{TP + TN}{TP + TN + FP + FN} \tag{19}$$

The false alarm rate (FAR) is the average ratio of the misclassified to classified records either normal or abnormal as denoted in Eq. (22). It is designed from Eqs. (20) and (21) to calculate the false positive rate (FPR) and the false negative rate (FNR), respectively.

$$FPR = \frac{FP}{FP + TN} \tag{20}$$

$$FNR = \frac{FN}{FN + TP} \tag{21}$$

$$FAR = \frac{FPR + FNR}{2} \tag{22}$$

7. Results and discussion

This paper examines analytical approaches to measure the complexity of the UNSW-NB15 data set which was developed to evaluate NIDSs. The study uses three approaches: (7.1) the statistical explanation (i.e., K-T test, multivariate skewness and kurtosis measures), (7.2) the features correlations (i.e., PCC and GR), and (7.3) and the complexity evaluation using the five classifiers. To measure the complexity of the UNSW-NB15 data set within the adopted part of the training and the testing sets, as presented in Table 6. The features that are selected to execute these aspects are reflected in Table 7.

7.1. The statistical explanation

The SPSS tool (SPSS tool, 2014) is utilised to analyse the statistical explanation and to determine the distribution nature of the training and the testing sets. Figure 1 shows the probability of the features on the training (TR) and the testing (TS) sets. The results demonstrate that the features distribution is a nonlinearity and nonnormality representation. The fitting percentage of these features in the two sets is 78%, when the two lines of the TR and the TS are identical. On the other hand, the nonfitting percentage is 22%, which is caused of the TR records are excessively more than the TS records.

To measure the asymmetry of the *TR* and the *TS* sets features (*F*); a multivariate skewness (*skw*) function is executed. In the *TR*, the empirical outcomes show that all the features, except 7, are positive. Therefore, the majority of the features are on the right side of the probability density function distribution which is longer or fatter than the left side.

Table 7. The features of the analysis.

ld	Names	Id	Names
1	dur	22	synack
2	spkts	23	ackdat
3	dpkts	24	smean
4	sbytes	25	dmean
5	dbytes	26	trans_depth
6	rate	27	response_body_len
7	sttl	28	ct_srv_src
8	dttl	29	ct_state_ttl
9	sload	30	ct_dst_ltm
10	dload	31	ct_src_dport_ltm
11	sloss	32	ct_dst_sport_ltm
12	dloss	33	ct_dst_src_ltm
13	sinpkt	34	is_ftp_logn
14	dinpkt	35	ct_ftp_cmd
15	sjit	36	ct_flw_http_mthd
16	djit	37	ct_src_ltm
17	swin	38	ct_srv_dst
18	stcpb	39	is_sm_ips_ports
19	dtcpb	40	proto
20	dwin	41	service
21	tcprtt	42	state




Figure 1. The probability distribution of the features on the training and testing sets.

The *TS* is approximately similar to the *TR*, almost majority of the features are positive, except the features 7, 17 and 20. Figure 2 demonstrates the skewness of the *TR* and *TS* features, where the relationship percentage is 82% when the two lines are similar. The most skewed features are 25, 26, 27 and 28, conversely, the lowest skewness are 6, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 29, 30, 31, 32, 37, 38 and 42.

To estimate the Preakness of the TR and TS features, a multivariate kurtosis function is




Figure 2. The skewness of the features on the training and testing sets.

implemented. In the *TR*, the experimental results indicate that the 7 features, 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 40, have a negative value which is a flatter distribution. However, the rest of the features are positive; this leads to the distribution are higher than a normal distribution. In Figure 3, the kurtosis comparative of the TR and TS features (F) illustrates that the two lines fit 76% of the features. The kurtosis of the TS is higher than the TR in the features 2–6, 10–12, 15–16, 25–28 and 35–37. Conversely, the other features are almost in the close proximity.




Figure 3. The kurtosis of the features on the training and testing sets.

Based on the above observation, the features of the training and testing sets are a highly statistical correlation. Consequently, this part of the UNSW-NB15 data set is reliable to evaluate classifier techniques because the training and the testing sets have the same characteristics of the non-linearity and non-normality, and the compatibility of the skewness and kurtosis values is acceptable. Overall, this shows that the data set can be used to evaluate the existing and novel methods of NIDSs.

7.2. Feature correlations

The correlation of features is evaluated based on two aspects; without the label using the PCC and with the label using the GR using the MTLAB tool (Matlab Tool, 2014) to identify the percentage of the closeness or the remoteness of the features.

The PCC estimates the score of each feature in the TR and the TS. As can be seen in Figure 4, in the TR and the TS, the features have the same correlated score. These features are ranked into a specified range [-0.01, 0.11]. The highest related features are 5, 3, 6, 12, 13, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38 and 39. On the contrary, the lowest correlated features are 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 40 and 41. Otherwise, the features almost fall into the middle of the range. The correlated features are classified into high, middle and low, which get probability values $\frac{12}{42}$, $\frac{23}{42}$ and $\frac{7}{42}$. This means that 87.5% are acceptable correlations of the high and middle correlated features.




Figure 4. The PCC of the features on the training and testing sets.




Figure 5. The Gain Ratio of the features on the training and the testing set.

In the TR and TS, the GR measures the correlation of each feature with the class label. Figure 5 shows the features are extremely similar in the correlation. The specified range of the score is [0.01,0.56] which is classified into low, middle and high according to the ranges [0.01,0.2], [0.21,0.3], [0.31,0.56], respectively. The lowest related features are 1, 2, 3, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39. The middle ranked features are 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32 and 40. The highest correlated features are 8, 9, 30, 33, 41, and 42. The probability of this group is $\frac{18}{42}$, $\frac{18}{42}$, and $\frac{6}{42}$ respectively, thus the acceptable correlated features.

7.3. Complexity evaluation of the classifier techniques

To evaluate the complexity of the UNSW-NB15 data set (i.e., the training and the testing sets) in terms of accuracy and false alarm rate (FAR), the




Figure 6. The comparison of the fifth techniques on the UNSW-NB15 data set.

five techniques (e.g., NB, DT, ANN, LR, and EM clustering) are executed. These techniques are built in Visual Studio Business Intelligence 2008 (Visual Studio 2008, 2014) and are implemented with the default input parameters. Figure 6 represents the comparison of the fifth techniques in the terms of the accuracy and FAR in the x-axis and in the y-axis shows the percentage. The DT technique accomplishes the highest accuracy (i.e., 85.56%) and the lowest FAR (15.78%). On the other hand, the EM-clustering achieves the lowest efficiency where the accuracy is 78.47% and the FAR is 23.79%.

In Table 8, the comparative results of the KDD99 and the UNSW-NB15 data sets are elaborated. Overall, the results of the accuracy and the FAR of these techniques using the KDD99 data set are better than the UNSW-NB15 data set. There are two perspectives demonstrate the complexity of the UNSW-NB15 data set compared to the KDD99 data set. First, from the perspective of the network traffic behavior, the UNSW-NB15 data set contains a variety of the contemporary attack and normal

Table 8. Comparison between the results of the KDD99 and UNSW-NB15 data set.

	KD	KDD99 data set			UNSW-NB15 data set	
Techniques	Reference	Accuracy (%)	FAR (%)	Accuracy (%)	FAR (%)	
DT	(Bro-IDS Tool, 2014)	92.30	11.71	85.56	15.78	
LR	(Witten & Mining, 2005)	92.75	-	83.15	18.48	
NB	(Shyu et al., 2005)	95	5	82.07	18.56	
ANN	(Witten & Mining, 2005)	97.04	1.48	81.34	21.13	
EM clustering	(Salem & Buehler, 2012)	78.06	10.37	78.47	23.79	

behaviors. On the contrary, the attack and normal behaviors of the KDD99 data set are outdated. Additionally, the similarities of the normal and the attack observations in majority of the features add another factor to the complexity of the UNSW-NB15 data set.

Second, from the perspective of the statistical based test, as shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, the features of the training and the testing sets are a highly correlation because the features are almost similar in the skewness and the kurtosis indicators. Further, the training and the testing sets have the same distribution which is non-linear and non-normal. As a result, the two perspectives demonstrate the major reasons of the complexity of the UNSW-NB15 data set compared to the KDD99 data set.

8. Conclusion and future work

In this paper, the analysis and the evaluation of the UNSW-NB15 data set are discussed. A part from this data set is divided into a training set and testing set to examine this data set. The training and testing sets are analysed in three aspects of the statistical analysis phase, the feature correlation phase and the complexity evaluation phase. First, the features of the two sets are converted into numerical values to be statistically processed and normalized using the z-score transformation to prevent the change in the original distribution. The statistical results show that the two sets are of the same distribution, nonnormal and nonlinear, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Further, the skewness and kurtosis indicators of the training and the testing set are statistically similar. Second, the feature correlations of the training and the testing sets are measured either with the class label (i.e., the Pearson's correlation coefficient method) or without the label (i.e., the Gain Ratio technique). The feature correlations results demonstrate that these features are highly relevant observations. Third, the five techniques of the DT, LR, NB, ANN, and EM clustering are used to measure the complexity in terms of accuracy and False Alarm Rate (FAR) of this data set, and then the results are compared using the KDD99 data set. The evaluation results of the five techniques show that the DT technique accomplishes the best efficiency compared to others. For comparing the results of the two data sets, the efficiency techniques using the KDD99 data set are better than the UNSW-NB15 data set. As a consequence, the UNSW-NB15 data set is considered complex due to the similar behaviours of the modern attack and normal network traffic. This means that this data set can be used to evaluate the existing and the novel methods of NIDSs in a reliable way.

In the future, we plan to develop a new classification technique to identify the anomalies from the nonlinearity and non-normality data representation.

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