

Summary and Exam Preparation

# Software Security

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30th January 2019



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# Objectives of today's lecture

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- ➔ Understanding the *conditions* for the written examination
- ➔ Repetition of important content

# General Remarks: Written Examination

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**When?** Wednesday (13.2.), 11:30 - 13:00

**Where?** Large lecture hall (“Großer Hörsaal”), Note that this lecture hall has its own building, which is located between the main building and the ZHG.

**How long?** about 90 min

**Testing aids?** A non-programmable calculator is allowed

# Prerequisite and Module Examination

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## Exercises

- Successful treatment of two exercise sheets

## Presentation

- Successful presentation on one technical topic

## Final Module Examination

- Written examination, 90 min

# Repetition of Important Content

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## Foundations & Motivation

1. Overview and basic terms (mandatory)
2. Malware categorisation (mandatory)
3. Examples for software vulnerabilities, e.g. buffer overflow (mandatory)

## Security Analysis, Design & Anonymity (Part I)

4. Security process, misuse cases & attack trees (mandatory)
5. Multi-Level security, e.g. BLP & BIBA (probably)
6. Information flow control, e.g. JiF (probably)
7. Anonymity & pseudonymity, e.g. TOR & DC (probably)

# Repetition of Important Content

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## Encryption Techniques (Part II)

- 8. History of cryptology, monoalphabetic and polyalphabetic cipher, one-time pad, Pfitzmann's table (**mandatory**)  
Design and attacks for Enigma (**probably not**)
- 9. Pseudo-one-time pad using  $s^2$ -mod-n generator (**probably**)
- 10. GMR - strong cryptographic signature system (**probably not**)
- 11. RSA - encryption & signatures (**probably**)
- 12. DES/AES - symmetric encryption (**probably**)
- 13. Operation modes: block cipher vs. stream cipher (**probably**)  
Operation modes for full disc encryption (**probably not**)

# Repetition of Important Content

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## Security Protocol Engineering (Part III)

- 14. Needham-Schroeder protocol (probably)
- 15. Kerberos protocol, v4 & v5 (probably)
- 16. Analysis using BAN logic (probably not)
- 17. Verification using CSP/FDR (probably not)

# **Introduction & Motivation**



# Introduction & Motivation (1, 2, 3)

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- What is the difference between *safety* and *security*?
- What does *security* mean by C. Eckert? How is dependability defined by Laprie? What are the attributes of dependable systems?
- What are the three most important protection goals?
- Which types of *malware* do you know? What is an *universal* Trojan horse? What is a *transitive* Trojan horse?
- What are *worms* in contrast to viruses?
- How to protect against computer viruses? What is the *principle of least privilege*? Is it possible to detect known viruses all the time?
- How does an attacker manipulate the stack management to perform a buffer overflow?
- How works a *code injection* for an buffer overflow? What is a NOP command and how is it used?
- Do you know any countermeasures to prevent buffer overflow?

# **Security Analysis, Design & Anonymity (Part I)**

# Security Process, Misuse Cases & Attack Trees (4)

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- Which process models in security engineering do you know?  
What are typical activities of a security analysis?
- Which optimizations are suggested by the BSI?
- How to classify protection goals based on the categories *communication content* and *communication circumstances*?
- Which correlations between protection goals do you know?
- What are the most important artifacts for security analyses?
- What is the basic notation of misuse cases?
- How to use attack trees to refine attacker goals?
- Please illustrate misuse cases and attack trees for a given example
- How to annotate an attack tree by costs and probabilities?

# Multi-Level Security (5)

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- Which access control strategies are distinguished?
- Which protection goal is implemented by the Bell-LaPadula model (BLP)?
- What are the most important rules of BLP?
- How are security classes represented and how are these classes ordered? What is a sensitivity level and what is a compartment set?
- How to make BLP more flexible? What do you know about the *high watermark principle*?
- What is the difference between a strong and a weak *tranquility property*?
- How to bypass BLP with the help of covered channels?
- What are the differences between the BIBA and BLP model?
- What are the design principles of a *Trusted Computing Base* (TCB)?

# Information Flow Control (6)

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- Why is the generalization of the Bell-LaPadula model by Dorothy Denning useful for information flow control?
- What do you know about implicit information flows inside of a program and how can we analyse the code using Denning's operators (maximum and minimum)?
- Where in a Java program implicit information flows can arise?
- How to specify a security policy for confidentiality or integrity using JiF?
- How are implicit information flows handled in JiF?
- What is the meaning of an empty security label in JiF?
- What does the JiF compiler check for an assignment?
- What is problematic with a method call? How the JiF-Compiler is able to solve this problem?
- What is the meaning of begin and end-labels in JiF? How is it possible to support JiF-refactorings?

# Anonymity and Pseudonymity (7)

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- How to define *ordinary* and *perfect* anonymity?
- How to classify pseudonyms with regard to anonymity and linkability?
- What are the design differences between JAP and TOR?
- Which protocol steps are performed by TOR to support anonymous web browsing and which steps are needed for hidden services?
- What are the characteristics of probabilistic anonymity? Is there any alternative way to achieve anonymity?
- Why do you need the Diffie-Hellmann protocol for TOR? Why is this protocol not secure when used naively?
- How to construct a ticket in the shape of onion shells in such a way that the information contained remains as anonym as possible?
- What is the process flow of the DC-example for three actors? What is the information that is communicated anonymously?
- How to extend the simple DC protocol to larger networks?

## **Encryption Techniques (Part II)**

# Introduction Encryption & History (8)

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- What are the differences between cryptography and cryptanalysis?
- How to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted by a monoalphabetic substitution using a frequency analysis?
- Do you know an example for a polyalphabetic substitution?
- How to decrypt messages encrypted by a Vigenère cipher
- What are the differences between *Vigenère cipher* and *Homophonic substitution*?
- How works the encryption using a Vernam cipher? Why is this cipher *information-theoretically* secure?
- How was the Enigma designed and what was the key for this electronic cipher machine? How was it possible to decrypt ciphers encrypted by the Enigma?
- How to categorize modern encryption systems using Pfitzmann's table? What means that a crypto system is *cryptographically strong*?



# Encryption using $s^2\text{-mod-}n$ (9)

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- What means *prime factorization* and why is this operation so important for asymmetric encryption systems?
- There are two other operations that are based on factorization. Why these operations are important too?
- What cryptographic assumption is the basis for  $s^2\text{-mod-}n$ ?
- Why is  $s^2\text{-mod-}n$  also called *Pseudo One-Time-Pad*?
- What are the differences between the symmetric and the asymmetric variant of  $s^2\text{-mod-}n$ ?
- Which part of the key is public, which part is secret?
- How is it possible to compute a square root efficiently? Illustrate the procedure using an example.
- Why is  $s^2\text{-mod-}n$  cryptographically strong? Note you do not need to provide a formal proof for this property, however you should be able to explain the rough idea behind this proof.

# GMR - Cryptographic Signature System (10)

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- How does GMR differ from other signature systems you know?
- What means *collision resistant* for two given permutations?
- How to generate a signature using GMR? Give an example.
- Why is it necessary to restrict the definition range for the square functions of GMR? How is this restriction implemented?
- How to use the *Chinese Remainder Algorithm* (CRA) to generate GMR signatures?
- Which part of the key is public, which part is secret?
- How is it possible to attack the signature system GMR and how can this attack be prevented?
- Why is GMR cryptographically strong? Note you do not need to provide a formal proof for this property, however you should be able to explain the rough idea behind this proof.

# RSA - Encryption & Signatures (11)

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- How does RSA differ from other encryption systems you know? Why is RSA only classified as *well researched*?
- Which part of the key is public, which part is secret?
- How to generate a suitable RSA key pair?
- Why is the naive version of RSA not secure against attacks based on the multiplicative property? How can this attack be prevented?
- What are the technical challenges involved in implementing an RSA cryptosystem? Which algorithms must be provided?
- Why does the double exponentiation of a plaintext with secret and public keys result in the plaintext again? Note you do not need to provide a complete proof of correctness, however you should be able to explain the rough idea behind this proof.
- How works a total break of RSA by Fermat's factorization method? What is a suitable countermeasure?

# DES/AES - Symmetric Encryption (12)

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- What is the meaning of confusion and diffusion and how these concepts are usually implemented?
- What are the advantages of a Feistel network and which encryption system uses this technology?
- Why is DES considered insecure today and should not be used anymore?
- How works a *brute-force attack*? What is an important assumption of this attack?
- Why is the complementarity property of DES useful for an attacker?
- How much better is Triple-DES compared to DES? How works a Meet-in-the-Middle attack?
- Which four operations need to be implemented for AES? Which of these operations are based on polynomial arithmetic?
- How to implement polynomial arithmetic efficiently for AES?
- How many rounds are required for the AES algorithm?

# Operation Modes: Block Cipher vs. Stream Cipher (13)

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- What are the problems with the practical use of encryption methods? How can operation modes help to solve these problems?
- What is the difference between a synchronous and a self-synchronizing mode?
- Why is the Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) considered insecure and should not be used?
- Why could be Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) a better alternative? What are the disadvantages of this operation mode?
- What is the problem with error propagation? Which operation mode is not sensitive to this problem?
- How can random access implemented?
- Which operation modes are suitable for hard disk encryption? Why could be a tweaked-codebook mode (e.g. XTS) a good option? How many keys are required for this mode?

## **Security Protocol Engineering (Part III)**

# Needham-Schroeder Protocol (14)

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- Why is it so important to use secure protocols in addition to secure encryption algorithms?
- What principles (in addition to the security aspect) are considered when designing a security protocol?
- Which notation is usually used to specify a security protocol?
- Specify the steps of the traditional Needham-Schroeder protocol (symmetric variant)? Why is this protocol vulnerable?
- Specify the asymmetric variant of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. What attack for NSP has not been detected for many years?
- Specify a man-in-the-middle and a replay attack for the NSP example.
- Which countermeasures exist to prevent these attacks?

# Kerberos Protocol (15)

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- What are the differences between Kerberos and Needham-Schroeder protocol? What are the common features?
- What was the motivation for introducing the Kerberos protocol? Which concepts are used to avoid the frequent request for passwords during operation?
- What are the main differences between Kerberos v4 and v5?
- Which protocol step is particularly vulnerable to replay attacks on Kerberos? What would be a successful scenario from an attacker's point of view?
- What other vulnerabilities of the Kerberos protocol could an attacker use?
- How was it possible to avoid an explicit storing of passwords?
- Why can't timestamps provide absolute protection against replay attacks?



# Protocol Verification using BAN logic (16)

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## General Remarks

- Why does it make sense to formalize protocols using BAN logic?
- How much can you rely on a protocol that has been proven to be correct?

## How to apply BAN logic?

- What are the most important syntactical elements of this logic?
- What is critical about using the BAN logic? Why is the idealization step often a source of errors?
- How to derive a new proposition with the BAN logic?
- Can you specify two or three deduction rules of your own choice?
- What exactly is to be proven? What are the differences between first-order and a second-order goals?

# Protocol Verification using CSP/FDR (17)

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## Foundations

- What is the modeling idea of CSP? Which important CSP operators do you know? What are processes, channels and events?
- Which CSP semantics did we use in the course? Illustrate the semantics using a small example

## Protocol Specifications

- How modeled Gavin Lowe the NSP protocol using CSP? Describe only the rough idea behind this model.
- Which processes communicate with each other? Which events are used to synchronize?
- How is the attacker modeled? What knowledge does he have and how can he learn new information?
- What refinement proof was used to verify the Needham-Schroeder protocol's vulnerability by FDR?