Security of embedded Systems

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Organizational stuff

- Exam: most probably oral
- Lecture schedule subject of change due to „Bahn issues“
- No lectures at:
  - October 22
  - November 5

- Exercises on demand: Dr. Z. Dyka
  - dyka@ihp-microelectronics.com

Outline

- Introduction
- Design Principles
- Memory Management recap
- Attacks
- Protection means
  - Hypervisor/Micro kernels
  - Canaries
  - Isolation
  - Access control/rights management
- Code Attestation
- Secure Code Update

Side Remarks on the „WHY“

Address Binding

- Programs on disk, ready to be brought into memory to execute form an **input queue**
  - Without support, must be loaded into address 0000
- Inconvenient to have first user process physical address always at 0000
  - How can it not be?
- Further, addresses represented in different ways at different stages of a program's life
  - Source code addresses usually symbolic
  - Compiled code addresses **bind** to relocatable addresses
    - i.e. "14 bytes from beginning of this module"
  - Linker or loader will bind relocatable addresses to absolute addresses

Binding of Instructions and Data to Memory

Address binding of instructions and data to memory addresses can happen at three different stages

- **Compile time**: If memory location known a priori, **absolute code** can be generated; must recompile code if starting location changes
- **Load time**: Must generate **relocatable code** if memory location is not known at compile time
- **Execution time**: Binding delayed until run time if the process can be moved during its execution from one memory segment to another
  - Need hardware support for address maps (e.g., base and limit registers)

Multistep Processing of a User Program



Memory-Management Unit (MMU)

- Hardware device that at run time maps virtual to physical address
- To start, consider simple scheme where the value in the relocation register is added to every address generated by a user process at the time it is sent to memory
  - Base register now called **relocation register**
  - MS-DOS on Intel 80x86 used 4 relocation registers
- The user program deals with *logical* addresses; it never sees the *real* physical addresses
  - Execution-time binding occurs when reference is made to location in memory
  - Logical address bound to physical addresses

Dynamic relocation using a relocation register

- Routine is not loaded until it is called
- Better memory-space utilization; unused routine is never loaded
- All routines kept on disk in relocatable load format
- Useful when large amounts of code are needed to handle infrequently occurring cases
- No special support from the operating system is required
  - Implemented through program design
  - OS can help by providing libraries to implement dynamic loading



Dynamic Linking

- **Static linking** – system libraries and program code combined by the loader into the binary program image
- Dynamic linking –linking postponed until execution time
- Small piece of code, **stub**, used to locate the appropriate memory-resident library routine
- Stub replaces itself with the address of the routine, and executes the routine
- Operating system checks if routine is in processes' memory address
  - If not in address space, add to address space
- Dynamic linking is particularly useful for libraries
- System also known as **shared libraries**
- Consider applicability to patching system libraries
  - Versioning may be needed

Access Control/Protection

Chapter 14: Protection

- Goals of Protection
- Principles of Protection
- Domain of Protection
- Access Matrix
- Implementation of Access Matrix
- Access Control
- Revocation of Access Rights
- Capability-Based Systems
- Language-Based Protection

Goals of Protection

- In one protection model, computer consists of a collection of objects, hardware or software
- Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through a well-defined set of operations
- Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so

Principles of Protection

- Guiding principle – **principle of least privilege**
  - Programs, users and systems should be given just enough **privileges** to perform their tasks
  - Limits damage if entity has a bug, gets abused
  - Can be static (during life of system, during life of process)
  - Or dynamic (changed by process as needed) – **domain switching, privilege escalation**
  - "Need to know" a similar concept regarding access to data

Principles of Protection (Cont.)

- Must consider "grain" aspect
  - Rough-grained privilege management easier, simpler, but least privilege now done in large chunks
    - For example, traditional Unix processes either have abilities of the associated user, or of root
  - Fine-grained management more complex, more overhead, but more protective
    - File ACL lists, RBAC
- Domain can be user, process, procedure

Domain Structure

- Access-right = <*object-name*, *rights-set*>
  where *rights-set* is a subset of all valid operations that can be performed on the object

- Domain = set of access-rights



Domain Implementation (UNIX)

- Domain = user-id
- Domain switch accomplished via file system
  - Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit)
  - When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is set to owner of the file being executed
  - When execution completes user-id is reset
- Domain switch accomplished via passwords
  - `su` command temporarily switches to another user's domain when other domain's password provided
- Domain switching via commands
  - `sudo` command prefix executes specified command in another domain (if original domain has privilege or password given)

Access Matrix

- View protection as a matrix (**access matrix**)
- Rows represent domains
- Columns represent objects
- **`Access(i, j)`** is the set of operations that a process executing in Domain$_i$ can invoke on Object$_j$

domain \ object	F_1	F_2	F_3	printer
D_1	read		read	
D_2				print
D_3		read	execute	
D_4	read write		read write	

Use of Access Matrix

- If a process in Domain D_i tries to do "op" on object O_j, then "op" must be in the access matrix
- User who creates an object can define the access column for that object
- Can be expanded to dynamic protection
  - Operations to add, delete access rights
  - Special access rights:
    - *owner of O_i*
    - *copy op from O_i to O_j (denoted by "*")*
    - *control – D_i can modify D_j access rights*
    - *transfer – switch from domain D_i to D_j*
  - *Copy* and *Owner* applicable to an object
  - *Control* applicable to domain object

Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- **Access matrix** design separates mechanism from policy
  - Mechanism
    - Operating system provides access-matrix + rules
    - It ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced
  - Policy
    - User dictates policy
    - Who can access what object and in what mode
- But doesn't solve the general confinement problem

Access Matrix with Domains as Objects

domain \ object	F_1	F_2	F_3	laser printer	D_1	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D_2				print			switch	switch
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	read write		read write		switch			

Modified Access Matrix of Figure B

domain \ object	F_1	F_2	F_3	laser printer	D_1	D_2	D_3	D_4
D_1	read		read			switch		
D_2				print			switch	switch control
D_3		read	execute					
D_4	write		write		switch			

Access Matrix with *Copy* Rights

object / domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	execute		write*
D_2	execute	read*	execute
D_3	execute		

(a)

object / domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	execute		write*
D_2	execute	read*	execute
D_3	execute	read	

(b)

Access Matrix With *Owner* Rights

object / domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	owner execute		write
D_2		read* owner	read* owner write
D_3	execute		

(a)

object / domain	F_1	F_2	F_3
D_1	owner execute		write
D_2		owner read* write*	read* owner write
D_3		write	write

(b)

Implementation of Access Matrix

- Generally, a sparse matrix
- Option 1 – Global table
  - Store ordered triples **`<domain, object, rights-set>`** in table
  - A requested operation M on object O_j within domain D_i -> search table for $< D_i, O_j, R_k >$
    - with $M \in R_k$
  - But table could be large -> won't fit in main memory
  - Difficult to group objects (consider an object that all domains can read)

Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- Option 2 – Access lists for objects
  - Each column implemented as an access list for one object
  - Resulting per-object list consists of ordered pairs **`<domain, rights-set>`** defining all domains with non-empty set of access rights for the object
  - Easily extended to contain default set -> If M ∈ default set, also allow access

Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- Each column = Access-control list for one object
  Defines who can perform what operation

  Domain 1 = Read, Write
  Domain 2 = Read
  Domain 3 = Read

- Each Row = Capability List (like a key)
  For each domain, what operations allowed on what objects

  Object F1 – Read
  Object F4 – Read, Write, Execute
  Object F5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy

Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- Option 3 – Capability list for domains
  - Instead of object-based, list is domain based
  - **Capability list** for domain is list of objects together with operations allows on them
  - Object represented by its name or address, called a **capability**
  - To execute operation M on object O_j, process requests operation and specifies capability as parameter
    - Possession of capability means access is allowed
  - Capability list associated with domain but never directly accessible by domain
    - Rather, protected object, maintained by OS and accessed indirectly
    - Like a "secure pointer"
    - Idea can be extended up to applications

Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)

- Option 4 – Lock-key
  - Compromise between access lists and capability lists
  - Each object has list of unique bit patterns, called **locks**
  - Each domain as list of unique bit patterns called **keys**
  - Process in a domain can only access object if domain has key that matches one of the locks

Comparison of Implementations

- Many trade-offs to consider
  - Global table is simple, but can be large
  - Access lists correspond to needs of users
    - Determining set of access rights for domain
    - Every access to an object must be checked
      - Many objects and access rights -> slow
  - Capability lists useful for localizing information for a given process
    - But revocation of capabilities can be inefficient
  - Lock-key effective and flexible, keys can be passed freely from domain to domain, easy revocation

Comparison of Implementations (Cont.)

- Most systems use combination of access lists and capabilities
  - First access to an object -> access list searched
    - If allowed, capability created and attached to process
      - Additional accesses need not be checked
    - After last access, capability destroyed
    - Consider file system with ACLs per file

Access Control

- Protection can be applied to non-file resources
- Oracle Solaris 10 provides **role-based access control** (**RBAC**) to implement least privilege
  - ***Privilege*** is right to execute system call or use an option within a system call
  - Can be assigned to processes
  - Users assigned ***roles*** granting access to privileges and programs
    - Enable role via password to gain its privileges
  - Similar to access matrix



Revocation of Access Rights

- Various options to remove the access right of a domain to an object
  - **Immediate vs. delayed**
  - **Selective vs. general**
  - **Partial vs. total**
  - **Temporary vs. permanent**

- **Access List** – Delete access rights from access list
  - **Simple** – search access list and remove entry
  - **Immediate**, **general** or **selective**, **total** or **partial**, **permanent** or **temporary**

Revocation of Access Rights (Cont.)

- **Capability List** – Scheme required to locate capability in the system before capability can be revoked
  - **Reacquisition** – periodic delete, with require and denial if revoked
  - **Back-pointers** – set of pointers from each object to all capabilities of that object (Multics)
  - **Indirection** – capability points to global table entry which points to object – delete entry from global table, not selective (CAL)
  - **Keys** – unique bits associated with capability, generated when capability created
    - Master key associated with object, key matches master key for access
    - Revocation – create new master key
    - Policy decision of who can create and modify keys – object owner or others?

Language-Based Protection

- Specification of protection in a programming language allows the high-level description of policies for the allocation and use of resources
- Language implementation can provide software for protection enforcement when automatic hardware-supported checking is unavailable
- Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on whatever protection system is provided by the hardware and the operating system

Protection in Java

- Protection is handled by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
- A **class** is assigned a protection domain when it is loaded by the JVM
- The protection domain indicates what operations the class can (and cannot) perform
- If a library **method** is invoked that performs a privileged operation, the stack is **inspected** to ensure the operation can be performed by the library
- Generally, Java's load-time and run-time checks enforce **type safety**
- Classes effectively **encapsulate** and protect data and methods from other classes

Stack Inspection

Ref to Book: page 648 & 649

protection domain:	untrusted applet	URL loader	networking
socket permission:	none	*.lucent.com:80, connect	any

class:	gui:
	...
	get(url);
	open(addr);
	...
		get(URL u):
		...
		doPrivileged {
		open('proxy.lucent.com:80');
		}
		<request u from proxy>
		...
			open(Addr a):
			...
			checkPermission (a, connect);
			connect (a);
			...