MODEL CHECKING OF CONCURRENT SYSTEMS - PART II -

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BASIC INGREDIENTS

dependability engineering

- □ a language to model the system
 - -> formal semantics
 - -> many options, e.g. Petri nets
- a language to specify model properties
 - -> temporal Logics,
 - -> several options, e.g. Computational Tree Logic (CTL)
- an analysis approach to check a model against its properties
 - -> model checking,
 - -> various approaches (algorithms + data structures), e.g. using reachability graph (RG)
 - = labelled state transition system (STS) = Kripke structure
 - ≈ Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC)

MODEL CHECKING

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□ ACM Turing Award = Nobel Prize of computing goes to Model Checking Pioneers
Edmund M. Clarke, E. Allen Emerson and Joseph Sifakis

-> "For [their roles] in developing Model Checking into a highly effective verificatio technology, widely adopted in the hardware and software industries."





2007

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Temporal Logics, CTL a crash cours

MOTIVATION (1)

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- ☐ GENERAL PROPERTIES (REQUIREMENTS)
 - -> must be valid for any system, independently of its special functionality
 - -> boundedness
 - -> liveness
 - -> reversibility

. . .

- SPECIAL PROPERTIES (REQUIREMENTS)
 - -> reflect the special functionality
 - -> (i) insights into system behaviour
 - -> (c) consistency properties to check the model's integrity
 - -> (p) progress properties "something good will happen finally"
 - -> (s) safety properties "something bad never happens"

. . .


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SAFETY VERSUS FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

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functional

requirements



hard to read

wanted: general query language to specify any special property

flexible

readable

->

error-prone specification

most properties can not be expressed as


un-/reachability of a given system state (marking)

□ insights (i) -> Is it possible that both robot arms hold a plate simultaneously? -> How many plates can be concurrently inside the system? □ consistency (c) -> The robot swivel is always positioned at exactly one angle. -> At any time, a robot arm can be driven in one direction only. □ progress (p) -> Any plate at the input position will finally reach the cell's output position. □ safety (s) -> To avoid machine collisions, the robot will only rotate with arms retracted. -> The press will only be closed, when no robot arm is positioned inside. -> The feed belt may only convey a blank through its light barrier, if the table is in its loading position. monika.heiner(at)b-tu.de July 2017 MOTIVATION (2) dependability engineering some properties can be expressed as un-/reachability of a given system state (marking) safety property -> unreachability (weak) progress property -> reachability -> ☐ BUT, system states (marking) tend to be lengthy

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temporal logics



How to specify logical statements with respect to the execution of a system?

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
TEMPORAL LOGICS, BASICS

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- □ extension of classical (propositional) logics by temporal operators
- atomic propositions
 - -> elementary statements, having in a given state a well-defined truth value
 - -> e. g. fork1, for 1-bounded Petri net (Boolean)
 - -> e. g. buffer = 2, buffer > 2, else (Integer)
- constants
 - -> TRUE, FALSE
- □ classical Boolean operators

negation ! conjunction * disjunction + implication ->


- temporal operators
 - -> to refer to sequences of states



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EXAMPLE 3 - TRAVEL PLANING

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-> TRUE

□ this is a possible combination of choices EF (hotel * car);	-> TRUE
□ this is the only possible combination of choices AF (hotel * car);	-> FALSE
□ this is an impossible combination of choices ! EF (train * car);	-> TRUE
any travel planning will be finished finally AG (next_vacation -> AF (ready));	-> TRUE
□ atomic use of the phone only, the phone is never reserved over several steps AG (phone);	-> TRUE
D. liverage of transition and preparations	-> TRUE
☐ liveness of transition end_preparations AG (EF (accommodation * transport_means * luggage)); monika.heiner(at)b-tu.de	July 2017
AG (EF (accommodation * transport_means * luggage)); monika.heiner(at)b-tu.de	July 2017
AG (EF (accommodation * transport_means * luggage));	July 2017 July 2017 dependability engineering
AG (EF (accommodation * transport_means * luggage)); monika.heiner(at)b-tu.de	
AG (EF (accommodation * transport_means * luggage)); monika.heiner(at)b-tu.de EXAMPLE 3 - SOME SIMPLE PROPERTIES (2) livelock freedom/progress of transition end_preparations	dependability engineering
AG (EF (accommodation * transport_means * luggage)); monika.heiner(at)b-tu.de EXAMPLE 3 - SOME SIMPLE PROPERTIES (2) livelock freedom/progress of transition end_preparations	dependability engineering -> TRUE
AG (EF (accommodation * transport_means * luggage)); monika.heiner(al)b-tu.de EXAMPLE 3 - SOME SIMPLE PROPERTIES (2) livelock freedom/progress of transition end_preparations AG (AF (accommodation * transport_means * luggage)); undone luggage will always be done in one step AG (luggage_open -> AX (luggage)); it's possible that undone luggage will be done in one step	dependability engineering -> TRUE -> FALSE
AG (EF (accommodation * transport_means * luggage)); monika.heiner(at)b-tu.de EXAMPLE 3 - SOME SIMPLE PROPERTIES (2) livelock freedom/progress of transition end_preparations AG (AF (accommodation * transport_means * luggage)); undone luggage will always be done in one step AG (luggage_open -> AX (luggage)); it's possible that undone luggage will be done in one step AG (luggage_open -> EX (luggage)); undone luggage will be done finally	-> TRUE -> FALSE -> TRUE

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AG (luggage_open -> **A** (luggage_open **U** luggage));

□ reachability-related $\mathsf{EF}(\varphi)$ -> There exists at least one computational path to reach eventually a state, where φ will be true. ■ safety-related $AG(!\varphi)$ -> equivalent to ! EF (φ) -> For every computational path, φ will never be true. □ invariant-related AG (φ) -> equivalent to ! EF (! φ) -> For every computational path, φ will be true for ever. □ liveness-related AG (EF (φ)) -> What ever happens, there exists the chance (at least one computational path) that φ will be true again. progress-related $AG(AF(\varphi))$

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MODEL CHECKING, MORE EXAMPLES

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- □ insights / reachability
 - -> Is it possible, that both robot arms carry a plate at the same time?
 EF (arm1_mag_on * arm2_mag_on)
- consistency property
 - -> The swivel is always either stopped or moves in exactly one direction.

G (robot_stop <u>xor</u> robot_left <u>xor</u> robot_right)

-> For every computational path, φ will eventually be true.

- safety property
 - -> If a robot arm is loaded, its magnet is not deactivated until the robot is in its unloading position.

```
AG (\varphi -> A (!arm1_mag_off U \psi)), with \varphi = arm1_mag_on * arm1_pickup_angle * arm1_pickup_ext \psi = arm1_release_angle * arm1_release_ext
```

-> The feed belt may only convey a blank through its light barrier, if the table is in its loading position.

G (belt1_light_barrier_true -> (table_load_angle * table_bottom_pos))

Bottleneck: state explosion

(no primitive recursive function ...)

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DINING PHILOSOPHERS 1000, BDD-BASED

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Number of places/marked places/transitions: 7,000/2,000/5,000

[JSP 2001]

Number of states:

 $1137517608656205162806720354362767684058541876947800011092858232169918 \\ 1599595881220313326411206909717907134074139603793701320514129462357710 \\ 2442895227384242418853247239522943007188808619270527555972033293948691 \\ 3344982712874090358789533181711372863591957907236895570937383074225421 \\ 4932997350559348711208726085116502627818524644762991281238722816835426 \\ 4390437022222227167126998740049615901200930144970216630268925118631696 \\ 7921927977564308540767556777224220660450294623534355683154921949034887 \\ 4138935108726115227535084646719457353408471086965332494805497753382942 \\ 171781101168772051021154169003921176679956422929032376885414750385275 \\ \hline$

Number of places/marked places/transitions: 7000/2000/5000 Time to compute P-Invariants: 45885.66 sec

Number of P-Invariants: 3000

Time to compute compact coding: 385.59 sec

Number of Clusters: 3000 Number of Variables: 4000

Time: 3285.73 sec, ca. 54.75 min

- □ compositional methods
 - -> simple interfaces between modules
- abstraction by ignoring some state information
 - -> conservative approximation
- ☐ different logics -> different algorithms, e.g. LTL
- □ integer programming
- **□** compressed state space representations
 - -> BDD, IDD, ...
- □ lazy state space construction
 - -> partial order methods
- alternative state spaces
 - -> partial order representations, e.g. prefix

'BASE CASE'
TECHNIQUES

'ALTERNATIVE'
METHODS (PN)

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TEMPORAL LOGICS, OVERVIEW

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semantics time	interleaving	partial order
linear (LTL)	traces (no conflict, no concurrency) Manna & Pnueli, Kröger, jsp 2001 BDD/IDD-LTL,	runs (no conflict, but concurrency) Reisig tools: ?
branching (CTL)	reachability graph (conflict & concurrency not distinguishable) Emmerson, Clarke PROD, Charlie, BDD/IDD-CTL,	prefix (conflicts & concurrency) McMillan, Esparza, pd 2001 PEP

technique	CTL	LTL
reachability graph	INA, Charlie	PROD, MARIA
stubborn set reduced reachability graph	LoLA	PROD (LTL\X)
symmetrically reduced reachability graph	LoLA (symmetric formulas)	?
BDD, NDD,, xDD	BDD-CTL, SMART, IDD-CTL	BDD-LTL
Kronecker algebra	[Kemper]	?
prefix	PEP (CTL ₀)	QQ (LTL\X)
process automata	[pd]	?

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PRODUCTION CELL, ON-THE-FLY LTL MODEL CHECKING

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requirement formula	# states generated	time effort
8 a	2259	4.16'
8 b	1775	3.76'
9	2305	4.34'
10	1879	3.10'
15	1184	2.55'
29	704	2.16'
30	703	2.46'
31 a	27104	23.80'
31 b	6433	4.02'

-> control model, 5 plates, full state space: 1,657,242 [7,185,779]

case study	net size	# of states
production cell, 5 plates	231 P / 202 T	1.6 * 10^6
production cell, 3 plates		7.1 * 10^6
1000 dining philosophers	7,000 P / 5,000 T	1.1 * 10^667
solitaire, standard	65 P / 75 T	1.8 * 10^8
solitaire, non-standard	73 P / 91 T	2.9 * 10^9
Halobacterium, motor 44	38 P / 60 T	4.8 * 10^7
MAPK cascade, 80 levels	22 P / 30 T	5.6 *10^18
MAPK cascade, 120 levels		1.7 * 10^21
gene regulation, 6 cells, m01	144 P / 307 T / 2146 A	7.4 * 10^21
gene regulation, 6 cells, m02		3,3 * 10^25

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SUMMARY MODEL CHECKING (1)

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- model checking can only be as good as the model specification
 - -> readable <-> unambiguous
 - -> complete <-> limited size
- correct model checking requires correct requirement specifications
 - -> take your time, think twice
- model checking proves consistency of
 - -> model & requirements
- ☐ if the answer is NO (-> FALSE)
 - -> the model can be wrong
 - -> the requirements can be wrong
 - -> or both
- ☐ if the answer is YES (-> TRUE)
 - -> model & requirements can still contain (same) logical faults -> unlikely !?

(up to now) restricted to bounded systems

 numerous ongoing research
 CTL - undecidable
 LTL - decidable, but no tools (not yet?)
 unboundedness + inhibitor arcs = undecidability

 model checking is extremely time and resource consuming

 'external' quality pressure

 model checking is not manageable without theory supported by tools
 model checking needs knowledgeable professionals

 study / job specialization
 profession of "software validator", "software tester"

 There is no such thing as a fault-free model (system)!

 sufficient dependability for a given user profile

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Model checking is no substitute for thinking!

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
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Thanks! http://www-dssz.informatik.tu-cottbus.de