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Thomas H. Johnson (2018) The Illusion of Afghanistan's Electoral Representative Democracy: The Cases of Afghan Presidential and National Legislative Elections, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 29:1, 1-37.
<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56541>

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The Illusion of Afghanistan's Electoral Representative Democracy: The Cases of Afghan Presidential and National Legislative Elections

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ABSTRACT

This article is the latest in a series of published articles systematically examining Afghan Presidential and legislative elections. Structural problems including fraud, ethno-linguistic block voting, and the Single Non-Transferable Vote have had significant impacts on the development of Afghan democratic elections. The challenge now facing the current Afghan government and future elections is the daunting task of uniting the Afghan people while not repeating the electoral mistakes of the past. The tricky balancing act of fostering an overarching national identity without being perceived as privileging particular identities requires strong leadership and a willingness to challenge traditional ethnic, linguistic, and religious norms when need be. Karzai and Ghani Administrations have seriously failed relative to this dynamic.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 2 July 2017; Accepted 28 August 2017

KEYWORDS Afghanistan; Afghan Presidential and *Wolesi Jirga* elections; Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV); election fraud; ethno-linguistic block-voting

Introduction

On 9 October 2004 Afghanistan held a presidential election to replace the post-Taliban, transitional government that had administered Afghanistan since December 2001. Nearly a year later, September 2005, parliamentary and provincial council elections were held. This electoral sequence was repeated in August 2009 for Afghan presidential and provincial councils and in September 2010 for the Afghan Parliament. The establishment of an electoral system and process was a key foundation of the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, or UN-sponsored Bonn Accords and Process,¹ that established the

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political roadmap for the re-establishment of the sovereign state of Afghanistan following the American invasion in 2001 to rid the country of the Taliban.

In April 2014 in the midst of considerable controversy and the inability of President Karzai to run for President again due to term limits, Afghanistan held its third Presidential election with 11 candidates officially seeking election.² The three leading candidates proved to be Dr Ashraf Ghani (Ahmadzai),³ Dr Abdullah Abdullah and Zalmay Rassoul. No candidate received the required majority of the vote during the April election (Abdullah received 45% of the vote while Ghani received 31.6%) and as required by the Afghan Constitution the second-round of the election was conducted on 14 June 2014. There were numerous reports of significant fraud with over 3000 official complaints of voting irregularities and violations during the April election.⁴

On 14 June 2014 the second round of the presidential election was held. This election was 'won' by Ghani with 56.4% of the vote compared to Abdullah's 43.6%. The vote was so controversial that the results were not announced until 21 September.⁵ During the months before and after this election there were considerable violence and allegations of significant voter fraud that some argued cost Abdullah from receiving the required 50% of the vote.⁶ A similar dynamic was witnessed during the 2009 Presidential election where 1.3 million fraudulent votes were discarded (see below).

It has even been reported that the US Government conducted sophisticated analyses concerning the 2014 election's results and concluded that Ghani, based on statistical and modeling studies, did not fare well in the election:

Ashraf Ghani did *not* win the election. The U.S. Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) concluded in July [2014] that it was mathematically impossible for Ghani to win, given Afghan demographics and the initial 46 percent to 32 percent first-round vote spread, according to sources familiar with the analysis. According to sources who reviewed the private report, the top experts in statistical analysis in the United States used every known computer model of election balloting and concluded that a Ghani victory was scientifically impossible. In simple terms, there is no mathematical doubt that Abdullah Abdullah won.⁷

While I am presently conducting statistical analysis on the 2014 election and will delay any conclusions as to the legality of the election's results, the mere recognition of the *possible* illegitimacy of this election along with the very real possibility of violence⁸ resulting from the disputed election outcome could lead one to suspect that this was a significant basis for the power-sharing structure brokered by then-US Secretary of State John Kerry for a 'unity government' including Dr Abdullah Abdullah as 'Chief Executive Officer' of the Ghani Administration. And this National Unity Government has been fraught with continuing problems since its creation:

Sweeping political reforms are crucial if Afghanistan is to move forward. Halfway through its legal term, Ashraf Ghani's National Unity Government (NUG) has miserably failed against any benchmark set to gauge his performance – insecurity is widespread, the economy is stagnant, and the government has lost its support

among the Afghan political class. In his government, exclusion, manipulation, and intimidation outperform principled politics and consensus building. Few people inside and even fewer outside the government believe that Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah are capable of taking Afghanistan out of the current stalemate. The country is politically polarized, militarily insecure, and rapidly derailing from its semi-democratic path, with constant crackdowns on civic demonstrations and voices of dissent.⁹

Moreover, while beyond the scope of the research presented here, detailed analyses need to be conducted on the role of an external power like the US in brokering a deal such the one 'uniting' Ghani and Abdullah (the National Unity Government) and further indicates the important roles played by external power in many ethnically fragmented states. This dynamic needs a careful analysis and especially a focus on the role of external powers in post conflict stabilization. Fernando Pacheco et al. have assessed this question in Post-conflict Angola.¹⁰

While the Afghan election process was originally greeted with great international fanfare and enthusiasm in 2004, it is now widely recognized, as suggested above, that recent Afghan elections raise significant and serious questions concerning the legitimacy and utility of the entire Afghan electoral system, as well as the 'democratic process'. Indeed a number of years ago the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested that the 'prolonged crisis over Afghanistan's ... elections has undermined [then] President Hamid Karzai's credibility' and has politically isolated him. The ICG goes on to posit that the Afghan election process 'could plunge the country deeper into not just political but armed conflict'.¹¹ Things have not changed with the election of Ashraf Ghani. Moreover, with long-delayed parliamentary and provincial elections scheduled for 7 July 2018 and the presidential elections scheduled for 2019, it is important to raise fundamental questions concerning the Afghan election process.¹²

The US, since the initial Bonn Accords, has vigorously pushed Afghanistan towards a democratic government, not just in name, but in practice, but the US administration would be well advised to look closer at the complexity involved in building a lasting democracy in ethnically divided and democratically inexperienced country. Afghanistan is a society fragmented by ethnic groupings¹³ where concerns over rights of distinct ethno-linguistic groups often seem to dominate over the rights of the individual or the state. Indeed a western-style liberal democracy, designed to promote and protect individual rights, is often viewed as doing little to address to the needs or desires of these groups.¹⁴ As Donald Horowitz points out, young democracies often fall victim to the problems of their past as they appropriate colonial institutions or western constitutional provisions,¹⁵ neither of which takes into account the reality facing the new nation. In Afghanistan's case, it would appear that addressing the ethnic divisions that permeate the country is paramount if democracy is to take hold, assuming that is even possible.

Afghans, especially rural Afghans, have traditionally based their lives and preferences around local concerns. Rural Afghan identity is based at the village (kalay). Public faith is based on 'traditional' local organizations that deliver public goods.¹⁶ And it is important to recognize that over 73% of the Afghan population lives in rural areas.¹⁷ Ethnic differences are a particular, deeply complicating issue for Kabul. Afghans tend to perceive themselves, and more importantly, chose leaders based partly, but significantly, on ethno-linguistic considerations. This strongly implies Afghans tend to think about their interests as well as their future in fragmented, primarily ethnic terms that in large part often align poorly, or not at all, to the interests of the central government.

Over at least the past hundred years, Afghan national politics have not been of much concern to the ordinary rural Afghan who made decreasing the state's influence at local levels a key priority. This constant deflection of central authority in the everyday lives of the Afghans allowed for traditional governing structures to remain and slowed their evolution to more modern structures. While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had important impacts on traditional, local governance, as the central government fought to gain access to these local structures of governance, it was met with increased resistance.¹⁸

Legitimization is the most important measurement of social control, and the Afghan central government, quite frankly, does not have much of this. The idea of state legitimacy was deeply important to Afghans in 2002–2004, but less so to the Westerners who were largely steering the formation of the government, and therefore largely ignored while they pushed, instead, an agenda of *jirgas* followed by democratic elections.¹⁹ The West compounded the legitimacy issue by failing to follow up development and reconstruction of the government with significant financing or international strategies (at least until 2008). The population waited, in vain, for effective rule of law and judicial institutions; responsive dispute resolution in matters of irrigation, land and water rights, and tribal and ethnic affairs; maintenance and development of infrastructure; the establishment of security in villages, cities, roads, and the borders, as well as a business environment that was conducive to the establishment of profitable trade; basic education; effective economic development at the local level, but the government, which had little extractive capability and little predictive income besides aid, chose to focus instead on the development of patron–client relations and paid attention in a reactionary, scatter-shot ways to the issues of the West, which lacked a unified or regional strategy and stumbled from issue to issue.

The population, for the most part, has seen little reason to treat the Kabul Government with any significant measure of legitimacy, since it essentially displays and exerts no legitimacy. Arguably, '[t]he most important institutions are those necessary for providing citizens with security and justice: the police force and the judicial system. Yet these two are recognized as the most corrupt and the least effective by the Afghan people.'²⁰ This has led to an environment which is conducive to considerable rural support for the Taliban, but also a popular

perception among the population (especially the disenfranchised Pashtuns) that the Taliban, at least, are perceived as responsive, predictable, and honest. It seems likely that corruption drives as many people to join the insurgency as any other factor.²¹

This article addresses the question of the impact of ethnic and tribal divisions on the development of Afghan representative government. The specific objective of this article is to evaluate the 2009 Presidential Afghan election and the 2010 National Assembly election and what they portend for the future of Afghan 'representative democracy' using simple statistical, correlation analyses. The 2009 Presidential election and the 2010 National Assembly races were selected because the national election in 2014 was significantly impacted by explicit and wide-scale fraud as suggested above. Indeed, we know that the 2009 Presidential election was also tainted by massive fraudulent behavior. For example, a 'top United Nations official explicitly suggested that the election was 'marred by "widespread fraud."'²² Such fraud is explicitly assessed below. Also it is important to point out that no one, to my knowledge, has suggested that the fraud was as intense in 2009 as compared to the 2014 Presidential election that, as suggested above, actually 'elected' the wrong, losing, candidate. While a comparative assessment of the 2009 and 2014 Presidential elections would have been an extremely important study, 'valid' election data from the 2014 Presidential election needed for the kinds of analyses presented below were not readily available.

The 2009 Presidential Election

On 20 August 2009 Afghanistan held its second-ever presidential election.²³ Ostensibly 41 candidates vied for office; the most prominent of which were Hamid Karzai (incumbent Afghan President), Dr Abdullah Abdullah (United Front candidate, ethnic Tajik, former Northern Alliance leader, and former Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs), Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (former Afghan Finance Minister and leader of the Afghan diaspora), and Dr Ramazan Bashardost (ethnic Hazara and former Afghan Planning Minister). Each presidential candidate ran on a ticket with up to two vice presidential candidates.²⁴

While some in the international community did not believe that the Afghan Presidential Election should take place at all, deeming it an 'unnecessary risk to all involved,'²⁵ Karzai insisted that the election take place as planned. Arguments against the election were premised on the assumption that the presumed security risks involved in an accelerating Taliban insurgency/*jihad* were too threatening for a creditable election to be held; not only would the election require vast organizational efforts, due partly to the winter season, but also significant augmentation of security personnel and measures to protect the polls and participating population. Threats to the population were apparently high since the Taliban had advised people to boycott the elections. Afghanistan's Free and Fair

Elections Foundation (FEFA), the largest Afghan observer organization, feared that the inability of local and international observers to monitor the elections in all areas of the country, especially the most volatile and remote locations, would negatively affect the transparency of the elections. The foundation's head, Jandad Spinghar, stated that an issue of concern for observers would be the problems associated with the insecurity and the lack of information about the importance and the role of observers in the elections.²⁶

Lower Voter Turnout

Despite efforts to operate thousands of polling stations in rural areas, voter turnout was lower than expected, and much lower than the 2004 Afghan Presidential Election that was 70%. It was reported that overall turnout was approximately 35% nationwide, but many suggested that the turnout was much smaller; for example, both Kandahar and Helmand Provinces experienced less than 10% voter participation.²⁷ While Taliban threats designed to intimidate voters were probably responsible for some Afghans staying away from the polls, field research in Kandahar in May and June 2009 revealed significant apathy in regards to the election on the part of most Kandaharis.²⁸ Afghan women in particular seemed to have been disproportionately affected by violence and intimidation throughout the entire electoral campaign and election process. Though Afghan women expressed a high degree of interest in the elections, their election turnout numbers were much smaller than in previous elections.²⁹ The European Union Observation Mission to Afghanistan noted that women's participation in all aspects of the election was 'severely limited'.³⁰ Female candidates hardly received any news coverage, and women's issues were absent from media reports as well. Cultural and legal factors played a key role in curtailing women's participation in the elections, mostly due to opposition to women in public life and inconsistent implementation of national law. According to the National Democratic Institute, low female voter turnout was also associated with the lack of female staff members. A related situation is tied to the fact that most of the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) members were men, making it difficult for women to utilize the complaint mechanism.³¹ Furthermore, in the areas where the Taliban have a high degree of influence, many of the polling stations exclusively for women never opened. According to FEFA, at least 650 of these centers did not open. In Uruzgan province, for example, only 6 of the 36 planned women voting centers opened.³²

Election Results

Though Karzai emerged as the eventual winner, revelations of countrywide electoral fraud by all presidential candidates stripped him of the majority 50% plus votes attributed to him (see Table 1 for the uncertified and certified final

Table 1. September 16 uncertified Afghan presidential results.

Candidate	September 16 uncertified votes (%)	October 21 certified votes (%)
Hamid Karzai	3,093,256 (54.6)	2,283,907 (49.67)
Abdullah Abdullah	1,571,581 (27.8)	1,406,242 (30.59)
Ramazan Bashardost	520,627 (9.2)	481,072 (10.46)
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai	149,720 (2.7)	135,106 (2.9)
Total	5,662,758	4,823,090

results released by Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission (IEC) on 16 September 2009).³³ The ECC served as the key electoral watchdog, composed primarily of non-Afghan officials. It was the ECC which exposed the extent of the fraud in electoral registrations and ballots, and which subsequently invalidated about one million or approximately one-third of Karzai votes in the presidential election, forcing a second round of voting. The ECC investigated 600 of the most serious complaints and 'sample audited' suspect votes at 3377 polling stations. It dismissed all the votes cast at 210 of these stations. In the aftermath of the election analysis, the ECC determined that Karzai only received 48.29% of the vote.³⁴ On 19 October 2009 the ECC announced the completion of the audit process based on a review of the ballot boxes that had been quarantined by the IEC. The investigation showed that no candidate received over 50% of the vote, and that a run-off vote was required to determine a winner. Karzai's campaign team attributed the decision to foreign interference and hinted at not accepting the results. This triggered a series of high-diplomatic negotiations, encouraging the candidates to accept the findings. On October 21, the IEC announced that Karzai had received 49.67% of the vote and Abdullah received 30.59% of the vote (see Table 1).³⁵

A subsequent run-off election was scheduled for 7 November 2009 but on 1 November 2009 Abdullah Abdullah withdrew from the race, making the presidential run-off a one-man race. On 2 November 2009 the IEC declared Karzai as president-elect.

Impact of Ethno-linguistic Dynamics on the Election

Politics in Afghanistan has traditionally been driven primarily by local concerns and here ethnic and other contextual identities are critical. Ethnicity and the issues that arise from ethnic fragmentation are key factors facing any nation-state that is attempting to construct modern-state institutions and norms. Nation-states with more than one ethnic group that still rely on tribal structures find it more difficult to accomplish this task. This has been the case, not only in Afghanistan, but also in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and parts of Eastern Europe. As long as groups within the state place a greater importance on their ethnic or tribal identity than a real or imagined national one, there will likely be conflicting loyalties and this greatly complicates national democratic development.

Afghanistan is a prime example of how ethnicity can directly impact state formation and determine the success or failure of government.

According to the *Economist*, 'three interlocking factors shaped the Afghan Election Day: large disparities in turnout across the country; the threat of Taliban violence,³⁶ and allegations ... of systematic electoral fraud on behalf of Mr. Karzai.³⁷

In addition to these factors, the elections also demonstrated that kinship and ethno-linguistic dynamics continue to be the bedrocks of traditional Afghan social and political relations and play a critical role in shaping allegiance as well as patron-client relationships. As was demonstrated in the October 2004 presidential elections,³⁸ the 2009 Presidential election again witnessed no candidate receiving significant support outside of his particular ethno-linguistic group. Afghans voted along ethno-linguistic lines and, for the most part, failed to cross over to support a candidate outside their own group. This undermines Karzai's proclaimed image as protector and father of the Afghan nation, as well as creating obstacles to the international community's pronounced attempts to build a stable centralized state as well as its attempts to employ a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, prominent in 2009, without a credible Afghan partner.

As seen in Table 2 each candidate received the bulk of votes from the provinces in which the majority ethnic group corresponded to that of his own, with correlations (*r*) of ethnic provincial voting ranging from between 0.53 and 0.80. These results are statistically significant (*p*) suggesting that these results could not have occurred randomly.³⁹ Though causation cannot be determined, the results clearly indicate that ethnicity continues to play an overriding role in Afghan political affairs. This is particularly evident among Pashtuns⁴⁰ and Tajiks. Pashtuns voted primarily for the two leading Pashtun candidates – Karzai (*r* = .79) or Ahmadzai (*r* = .66) – and against the Tajik candidate Abdullah (*r* = –0.71) – while Tajiks voted overwhelmingly for Abdullah

Table 2. Correlation Coefficients (Pearson *r*): 2009 Afghan presidential candidates at the provincial level and ethno-linguistic provincial votes received (%).

	Karzai	Abdullah	Bashardost	Ahmadzai
Pashtun	0.79 (<i>p</i> < 0.0001)	–0.71 (<i>p</i> < 0.0001)	–0.30 (<i>p</i> < 0.05)	0.66 (<i>p</i> < 0.001)
Tajik	–0.64 (<i>p</i> < 0.001)	0.80 (<i>p</i> < 0.0001)	0.06 (<i>p</i> < 0.50)	–0.29 (<i>p</i> < 0.06)
Hazara	–0.37 (<i>p</i> < 0.05)	–0.06 (<i>p</i> < 0.50)	0.53 (<i>p</i> < 0.001)	–0.32 (<i>p</i> < 0.05)
Uzbek	–0.26 (<i>p</i> < 0.07)	0.34 (<i>p</i> < 0.04)	–0.08 (<i>p</i> < 0.55)	–0.36 (<i>p</i> < 0.05)

Notes: Official Afghan election data used in this and following analyses were drawn from: Official IEC Data and National Democratic Institute <http://afghanistanelectiondata.org/open/data>; Provincial Ethno-linguistic data came from: <http://www.aims.org.af/>; Ludwig W. Adamec, ed., *Historical and Political Gazetteer of Afghanistan*, 7 Vols, Vols 3–5 (London: HMSO, 1914; rev. and rep. Graz, Austria: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt); Thomas H. Johnson et al., *Afghanistan: The Northern Provinces* (Silver Spring: The Orkand Corporation, 1988), chap. 3; Thomas H. Johnson et al., *Afghanistan: The Southern Provinces*, (Silver Spring: The Orkand Corporation, 1989), chap. 4, and Thomas H. Johnson, et al., *Afghanistan: The Western Hinterland Provinces* (Silver Spring: The Orkand Corporation, 1989), chap. 4, as well as field research and expert judgments for some provinces. The bold diagonal figures suggest a MAJOR empirical result of the article; Afghan ethnolinguistic voters vote for their particular ethnolinguistic candidates.

($r = 0.80$) and against Karzai ($r = -0.64$).⁴¹ While ethnic Hazaras tended to vote for Bashardost ($r = 0.53$), they did not explicitly vote against other candidates, although there was a significant but not overly strong anti-Karzai Hazara vote ($r = -0.37$). Unlike the 2004 election when Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum was the fourth leading Afghan Presidential vote getter, there was no prominent Uzbek candidate in the 2009 Presidential elections. Ethnic Uzbeks tended to vote mostly for Abdullah ($r = 0.34$) with no strong correlation of Uzbeks voting against the other three leading candidates or ethno-linguistic groups. Although the Uzbeks form at most five percent of the Afghan population, they are both ethnically and linguistically distinct from the other three groups in the study, and serve here almost as a kind of control group. When no candidate represented their ethnic interests, their votes were balanced among the three main candidates of the other ethnicities. The results from this group thus demonstrate in the negative the primacy of the ethnic factor in voting; in other words, only if it is *not* present can other selection criteria come into the voting decision.

These results mimic the 2004 Afghan Presidential Election results and present further evidence supporting the fact that:

Afghanistan faces an extremely difficult challenge of unifying a fragmented society and fostering the development of a national identity because each ethnic group is attempting to gain a foothold in government often at the expense of other groups. Because this attempt at entering government is taken from an ethnic approach, rather than a national one, the fragmentation of society will continue until either one dominant ethnic group controls all of the governmental power or ethnic politics makes way for increased internal conflict.⁴²

Precisely as we concluded for the 2004 Afghan Presidential election, the 2009 election appeared more 'procedural than substantive'.⁴³ The election did not find Afghanistan uniting behind a single national candidate. Rather, the voting results suggest that Afghanistan remains a deeply fragmented society and country. Moreover as suggested in Table 2, the fact that other ethno-linguistic groups explicitly voted *against* Karzai did not bode well for an Afghanistan free of ethno-political biases and preferences.

The results presented above also demonstrate the lack of development of the Afghan democratic electoral process and system. The criticality of ethnic voting preferences remains the single most important dynamic of the Afghan electoral process. Regardless of his rhetoric, Karzai was elected not only *without* a majority national vote; he also failed to garner any significant vote from any ethnic group outside of his own. Karzai's claim that he represented a truly national candidate that had support across ethnic lines was not borne out by these results. And just as we observed of the 2004 election, the 2009 Afghan Presidential elections was 'belied by ethnic divisions, which, unless properly addressed, threaten to derail any long-term hope of a democratic Afghanistan'.⁴⁴

Electoral Fraud

The *Economist* noted that the 2009 Afghan Presidential election was deeply flawed by fraud and that the election was characterized by 'more votes than voters'.⁴⁵ The extent of fraud was massive and widespread.⁴⁶ As noted above, over a million of ballots cast for President Karzai were eventually ruled invalid.⁴⁷ Most of the fraud that took place came in the form of proxy voting, underage voting, the use of multiple registration cards, and ballot-box stuffing. The *BBC* reported that in August 2009 thousands of voting cards were being sold and that money was being distributed to buy votes. An undercover reporter was offered 1000 cards for about \$10 each.⁴⁸ Such instances of fraud took place despite the presence of domestic and international election observers. Nur Mohammad Nur, spokesman for the IEC, noted that the commission had invited between 200,000 and 250,000 local and international election observers, representatives of political parties, candidates and Afghan and foreign media to monitor the elections in Afghanistan. There were also to be 100 European Commission observers from 25 European Union countries.⁴⁹ Most of the international observers understandably refused to monitor polling places in insecure (non-permissive) areas of the country. These were the exact areas where a majority of the election fraud took place.

Figure 1 represents a map of election fraud and suggests along with the data presented in Table 1 that the vast majority of fraudulent votes were cast for Hamid Karzai and, as posited above, were highly concentrated in the least secure areas of the country – where election monitors for the most part were unable or unwilling to go. Nevertheless, the fraud was witnessed to one degree or another in all districts of Afghanistan with most of the fraud occurring in the traditional Pashtun homeland areas of the east and southeast where, of course, the insurgency at the time was most intense (see Figure 2).

Table 3 (below) represents the results of a correlational analysis of fraudulent votes by candidate and ethno-linguistic groups (Figure 2). Interestingly this analysis suggests that relative to fraudulent votes, candidates seemed to receive the majority of fraudulent votes from those outside their ethno-linguistic group. As noted above, Pashtuns were more likely to vote for either Karzai or Ahmadzai; the votes that were cast fraudulently depict another picture – Pashtuns were less likely to fraudulently vote for Karzai ($r = -0.61$) or Ahmadzai ($r = -0.54$) and more likely to fraudulently vote for Abdullah ($r = 0.57$). The same holds true across the other major ethnic groups: Tajiks were less likely to fraudulently vote for Abdullah ($r = -0.63$) and instead voted for Karzai ($r = -0.36$); Hazaras were less likely to fraudulently vote for Bashardost ($r = -0.38$) and more likely to vote for Ahmadzai ($r = 0.67$); and lastly, Uzbeks, lacking a prominent ethnic counterpart, were more likely to fraudulently vote for Karzai ($r = 0.60$).

The interpretation of the results presented in Table 3 is not obvious. The fact that Afghan ethno-linguistic groups tended *not* to cast fraudulent votes for candidates from their particular group seems to suggest that they possibly made a concerted effort to make sure their vote was valid and counted. That they

Election Audit Results: Overview




Figure 1. Election audit results. Source: US Department of State, October 2009. See the Appendix 1 for maps depicting the fraudulent votes specifically directed towards Karzai and Abdullah.

Table 3. Correlation Coefficients (Pearson *r*): Afghan presidential candidates at the provincial level and invalid (fraudulent) ethno-linguistic provincial votes received (%).

	Karzai	Abdullah	Ahmadzai	Bashardost
Pashtun	-0.6058 ($p < 0.001$)	0.5726 ($p < 0.001$)	-0.5353 ($p < 0.001$)	0.2369 ($p < 0.28$)
Tajik	0.3640 ($p < 0.05$)	-0.6300 ($p < 0.001$)	-0.0087 ($p < 0.99$)	0.0751 ($p < 0.70$)
Hazara	0.2814 ($p < 0.06$)	0.0537 ($p < 0.48$)	0.6703 ($p < 0.001$)	-0.3756 ($p < 0.05$)
Uzbek	0.5977 ($p < 0.001$)	-0.2442 ($p < 0.29$)	0.2995 ($p < 0.06$)	-0.1272 ($p < 0.44$)

Notes: The bold diagonal figures suggest a MAJOR empirical result of the article; Afghan ethnolinguistic voters vote for their particular ethnolinguistic candidates.

tended to vote illegally for candidates outside of their ethno-linguistic group seems to suggest that they may have wanted to embarrass these candidates and their campaigns through their fraudulent votes, extensive voter fraud or intimidation, or there may simply have been extensive vote-buying. Another possible explanation for the results of Table 3 may be that provinces that have a heavy concentration of one particular ethno-linguistic group (and therefore primarily supported a candidate from the dominant group) may have been more vigilant in searching for ‘invalid votes’ of candidates with a different ethno-linguistic heritage. And conversely, not spending the time and effort in assessing the ballots of certain ethno-linguistic voters. For example, votes for Karzai in the




Figure 2. Voting fraud by Afghan provincial district. Source: US Department of State, October 2009.

Panjshir may have been more attentively examined than in provinces that have a clear Pashtun majority. These data should be viewed as another indicator of the importance of ethno-linguistic dynamics in the Afghan electoral process. Such dynamics have clearly become the driving force of Afghan electoral politics and have critically important implications for future Afghan elections as well as Afghan 'democratic' development. *Ethnicity remains at the forefront of Afghan politics; loyalty to an individual's ethno-linguistic group continues to prevail.*

In summary, the 2009 presidential elections demonstrated the continuation of the post-Bonn Accord legacy of Afghan elections deeply flawed both functionally (the ability even with intense international participation and funding to conduct a clean, safe, and fair election) and politically (the ability of the design and structure of the election to adequately address the obvious and predictable challenges inherent in the society). The entire process, as well as the results, further tainted Kabul's legitimacy in the eyes of many, with Karzai remaining 'under the cloud created by the massive fraud.'⁵⁰ The extensive corruption in Afghanistan, as highlighted by the elections, will be a difficult obstacle to overcome, or even to curtail. A legal framework was developed to fight corruption in Afghanistan based on the Afghan constitution, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and the law on overseeing the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy. Ershad Ahmadi, the deputy head of the High Office of

Oversight and Anti-Corruption, believes that the type of corruption and fraud experienced during the 2009 Presidential election is 'not only a problem for the development of Afghanistan, it is a danger to the overall reconstruction and nation-building'.⁵¹

The 2010 National Parliamentary Elections and the Single Non-Transferable Vote

The legislative elections for Afghanistan's parliament – the *Wolesi Jirga* – were scheduled for 18 September 2010. There was considerable contention as to when the elections should be held, if at all. Besides disagreement over the actual date for the elections – based partly on problems with security and election logistics, the role of the ECC and IEC – the original date for the election was postponed by the IEC ostensibly because of financial, logistical, and security concerns. The IEC also suggested that the later date for the election would allow for the enactment of new rules and safeguards to prevent the kind of large-scale corruption that was witnessed in the 2009 Afghan Presidential elections.⁵²

During his address to the first session of parliament on 20 February 2010 Karzai laid out his plans for parliamentary elections in September, highlighting his goal to 'fill the gaps' of the problems that arose during the presidential elections. He affirmed his avowed commitment to address these issues by limiting the 'interference by others in the election process', promising to reform the structure of the ECC and 'afghanizing' the election process.⁵³ As virtually all Afghans saw the international element as the only check against rampant corruption in a Karzai-packed commission, these efforts to try to deflect criticism away from his regime and onto foreign meddlers and agents fooled few Afghans and simply increased his own unpopularity. Absent from his comments was any discussion of possibly the most important factor influencing the Afghan legislative elections – the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV).

The SNTV electoral system allows multiple candidates to run for seats that have been allocated at a specified level per Afghan Province. For the 2010 election, 2577 candidates filed to run for 249 legislative positions. The number of seats allocated was based on the total population per province.⁵⁴ The SNTV electoral process allows one voter to cast a single vote for one candidate. Multiple candidates can obviously run for the available seats. The candidates that have the most votes would theoretically win the available seats. The basic premise of SNTV is that a candidate can win if they obtain $\frac{1}{n+1} + 1$ vote, where n is the number of seats. This is because the other candidates could not obtain more votes than $\frac{1}{n+1}$. This could result in a single candidate obtaining a very low percentage of the votes. Indeed, many Members of Parliament were 'elected' from their districts with *less than one percent* of the popular vote in that district. This fact was vividly evidenced by an earlier analysis of the 2005 Afghan Legislative Election results for Kabul Province:

Kabul is the most populous province in the country with over a three million people. However, 1,193,472 registered voters cast only 399,810 valid votes (35 per cent). ... Mohaqiq received the highest percentage of votes of any candidate in Kabul – 13.2 per cent. Qanooni and Dost were the next two largest voting percentages, with 7.8 and 7.7 per cent, respectively. The other 30 winning candidates received from 2.5 to 0.4 per cent of the vote. That 30 of the 33 representatives elected to the parliament from the country's capital individually received less than 3 per cent of their constituents' votes is amazing. Of the Kabuli electorate, 46 per cent voted for losing candidates, which would not be surprising if only two or three candidates were running; but for Kabul representation in the legislature there were 387 candidates. The aggregate nationwide votes collected by all Wolesi Jirga winners represented only 35.8 per cent of the total vote. Put another way, 64.2 per cent of the Afghan voters supported losing candidates.⁵⁵

The SNTV electoral system does not allocate seats by district but rather by population size. Provinces with fewer seats than districts cannot possibly have representation for all their districts.⁵⁶ Additionally, districts with larger populations generally have more political pull or influence than those with smaller populations.⁵⁷ On the surface, basing the number of seats on population might seem logical but the smaller population districts run the risk of not being represented or at least underrepresented. This results in an imbalance in the level of representation between urban and rural areas. And considering that Afghanistan primarily rural and that the urban-rural divide is one of the most contentious fissures in the country, this has the potential to cause long-term problems.

Table 4 vividly demonstrates the severe problems associated with the SNTV. 664 candidates competed for the 33 *Wolesi Jirga* seats available for the province of Kabul and a total of 486,111 valid ballots were cast. Muhammad Mohaqiq, chairman of the People's Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan and former Vice-President and the Minister of Planning in the interim government of Afghanistan was the leading vote getter just as he was during the 2005 election.⁵⁸ He received a total of 3.6% of the vote! That a mere 3.6% of the vote could represent the most popular candidate as indicated by total votes received is disturbing, and has serious implications for Afghan 'representative democracy'. Overall, *21 of the 33 candidates elected to the Wolesi Jirga from Kabul (64%) were elected with less than 1% of the total vote in their district.*

Election results of the sort illustrated in Table 4 were witnessed throughout the country. An analysis of the 2005 and 2010 *Wolesi Jirga* elections suggest that the aggregated votes of winning candidates, nation-wide, received an average of 35% of the votes cast. *This left the remaining 65 percent of the voters voting for losing candidates.* The breakdown of each province's winning candidates' percentage of vote is presented in Figure 3. As suggested by this figure, only three provinces across the two legislative elections – Uruzgan – 2005 (62%), Kabul – 2005 (57%), and Balkh – 2010 (59%) – witnessed election results where the aggregated winning candidates' votes were greater than 50%.

The disqualifications as well as other facets of this controversy resonated in Afghan politics. In early 2011, Afghan parliamentarians were complaining

Table 4. 2010 Kabul province Wolesi Jirga results.

Candidate Name	Votes received	Percent of vote (%)
Hajji Muhammad Mohaqiq	16233	3.61
Alhaj Zmarak Padkhuwani	9548	2.12
Dr Ramazan Bashar Dost	7935	1.77
Ustad Abdul Rab Rasol Sayaf	7158	1.59
Wakil Fatima Nazari	6834	1.52
Mir Amanullah Kuzar	6686	1.49
Farkhunda Zahra Naderi	6612	1.47
Hajji Muhammad Farhad Seddiqi	5128	1.14
Muhammad Ibrahim Qasemi	5014	1.12
Dr Jafar Mahdawi	5013	1.12
Said Hussain Anwari	4715	1.05
Baktash Siawash	4557	1.01
Alhaj Ezatullah Atif	4429	0.99
Alhaj Allah Gull Mujahid	4115	0.92
Hajji Muhammad Dawoud Kalakani	3926	0.87
Sharifullah Kamawal	3876	0.86
Dr Said Ali Kazemi	3764	0.84
Qais Hassan	3608	0.80
Said Hussain Alimi Balkhi	3423	0.76
Eng. Shir Wali Wardak	3409	0.76
Anwar Khan Oriakhill	3200	0.71
Ramazan Juma Zada	3148	0.70
Shenkai Zahren Karokhil	2999	0.67
Arfanullah Arfan	2977	0.66
Dr Abdullah Kalimzai Wardak	2918	0.65
Torpekai Patman	2258	0.50
Ustad Rababa Parwani Darwish	1309	0.29
Fawzia Nasiryar Guldarye	1119	0.25
Mina Khashaee	929	0.21
Masoma Tusali	848	0.19
Dr Anar Kali Hunaryar	764	0.17
Rana Nooristani	488	0.11
Khalida Alokozai	331	0.07

Notes: All of the data reported in this table as well as the tables and figures that follow were obtained from the Independent Election Council website (<http://www.iec.org.af/eng/>) and Democracy International website (<http://www.democracy-international.org/>). Appendix 4 presents a sample ballot used in the 2010 Wolesi Jirga election.

about President Karzai-appointed 'Special Elections Tribunals' – questionably mandated organizations 'created by presidential decree outside of the judicial framework of the Afghan constitution or its electoral law ... [that] has been denounced as illegal by both the IEC and the parliament.'⁵⁹ These Tribunals attempted to unseat up to 80 certified members of the *Wolesi Jirga* due to 'election fraud.' The extent of the problems associated with the election are suggested by *the Economist*:

Days after the preliminary results were announced on 20 October, the attorney general filed a broad indictment against more than a dozen senior elections officials and also against dozens of parliamentary candidates, after receiving information from the ECC about suspected fraud involving hundreds of candidates. The Supreme Court appointed a special tribunal on elections in late December. Tasked with investigating electoral fraud and corruption, the tribunal claimed it was empowered to annul the elections. The newly established Independent




Figure 3. 2005 and 2010 *Wolesi Jirga* winning vote percentage by province.

Notes: This chart was compiled by adding the votes for the winning candidates and dividing by the overall votes in the province. Invalid votes were not counted in this calculation. The total population of each province was adjusted to account for this subset. Many female candidates that were elected had fewer votes than some their male counterparts but were elected to fulfill constitutional and election quota mandates.

Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC), reportedly in correspondence with the president, rejected this presumption but never publicly announced its position. With the commission's role as an arbiter of constitutional disputes still unclear, the president was free to seek other, more favorable interpretations of the special tribunal's authority.⁶⁰

The possibilities for reforming Afghanistan's electoral system for the better were thwarted in February 2010 when Karzai slyly issued a presidential decree while parliament was in recess. Not only did it not reform the IEC, it voided any power the United Nations had to select the majority of the ECC independent members.

Moreover, Karzai had bestowed upon himself the sole power to appoint the ECC members.⁶¹ In February 2010, former-UN official Peter Galbraith commented on the significance of this move during an interview with Sir David Frost, calling it 'a finger in the eye of the western countries who have troops on the ground. It is a real blow to Afghan democracy, and it's a blow to the prospects of stability in Afghanistan.'⁶²

Disappointment concerning the Afghan electoral process and election results was expressed widely in the international community. On 4 November 2009 US Admiral Mike Mullen, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that the Afghan government's legitimacy 'is, at best, in question right now and, at worse, doesn't exist'. Mullen argued that for Karzai, this signifies that 'you have to rid yourself of those who are corrupt ... to actually arrest and prosecute them ... to show those visible signs ... [which] would be ... great positive indicators to the Afghan people.'⁶³

Afghan government officials were also frustrated with the formation of the new cabinet proposed by Karzai, which was seen as the first major test for the Afghan President after his 'reelection'. In mid-December 2009, a number of Parliament members were disappointed to find that Karzai's cabinet picks were a reflection that he had 'succumbed to pressure' from both the West and the warlords. Karzai continued reliance on regional power brokers and warlords as evidenced by his initial cabinet nominees. Pashtuns greatly dominated Karzai's original cabinet nominees suggesting ethnic-based selections. As posited by the International Crisis Group (ICG), 'the increasing Pashtun tilt in key appointments reflects a four-year long trend in which Karzai has sought to shore up his traditional ethnic base with the perks of patronage even as much of the Pashtun belt sinks deeper into revolt against the Karzai government.'⁶⁴

Sharifa Zourmati Wardak, a Member of Parliament from Paktia Province, expressed her dismay stating 'some of the corrupt ministers who were not efficient in the previous cabinet and could not serve the people of Afghanistan will remain in their posts. And the rest will be the nominees of the warlords.'⁶⁵ Other Afghan officials alluded to Karzai's new government being a Wall Street type business where stocks are bought and sold. Mir Ahmad Joyenda, a legislator from Kabul Province noted that there was a lack of professionals in the cabinet and that it was 'like a publicly traded company in which everyone has a share.'⁶⁶ The seats of the most powerful ministries were open to be filled, including the ministries of defense, interior, finance and foreign affairs.

Washington political analysts stated that the cabinet list reflected the 'real-politik of governing a country riven by ethnic and political divisions.'⁶⁷ Five of the nominees had links to warlord parties. As had been suspected by both the US and the Afghan Parliament, Ismail Khan, the minister of electricity, power and water at that time and a former warlord of Herat, was nominated to remain in his position. Although Khan was an effective if autocratic administrator of Herat province who kept the Taliban at bay while making Herat Afghanistan's

most prosperous and livable city, he had no knowledge or understanding of the issues facing his ministry, and his role in that post was a glaring example of ethnic pie-slicing. Furthermore, more than half of the 24 nominations were for ministers who already served under Karzai, including the interior and finance ministers. Both were alleged to have facilitated, if not directed, the voting fraud.⁶⁸ Meanwhile, missing from the list of nominations was a single prominent member of the opposition party.

Impact of Ethnicity on Wolesi Jirga Election Results

The following analysis of the general nature of Afghan *Wolesi Jirga* representation is aimed at answering two central questions: is the Afghan population being represented in the *Wolesi Jirga* according to the population distribution, and; how does ethnicity impact on the voting; are the voters voting for the candidates by ethnic background of the candidates?

Considering the continuing importance of ethno-linguistic factors in actual voting patterns, an analysis was conducted to verify if the *Wolesi Jirga* represented the population diversity and distribution of Afghanistan. This analysis compared the 2005 *Wolesi Jirga* winning candidates' ethnicity percentage to the population ethnicity percentages for individual provinces. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5 (above). These results indicate a strong and significant correlation between the candidates' ethnic affiliation and the ethnic affiliation of the provincial population as a whole (with the exception of the Turkomen population, and we suspect this finding is likely a reflection of the sample data used). This analysis clearly indicates that Afghan *Wolesi Jirga* candidates elected were highly correlated to the population distribution of their particular province. Hence the elected legislative members do seem to reflect their 'constituents' ethno-linguistic diversity. This is not unexpected considering the impact of ethno-linguist dynamics that we have seen in our previous research.

The analyses presented in Tables 6 and 7 (above) focus on the population's voting preferences in order to analyze the implications of ethnicity on the Afghan population's *Wolesi Jirga* 2005 and 2010 votes. As we found relative to the Presidential Elections of 2004 and 2009, the legislative elections were strongly and significantly related to ethno-linguistic factors – there is a strong correlation between the population's ethnic affinity and how the population votes.

As we found in earlier Afghan presidential elections, the results presented in Table 5 suggest a strong and significant correlation between 2005 *Wolesi Jirga* winning candidates' ethno-linguistic characteristics and the ethnic affinities of the population:

- Pashtuns vote for Pashtun candidates (2005 $r = .76$; 2010 $r = .85$);
- Hazaras vote for Hazara candidates (2005 $r = .87$; 2010 $r = .91$);
- Tajiks vote for Tajik candidates (2005 $r = .79$; 2010 $r = .70$), and;
- Uzbeks vote for Uzbek candidates (2005 $r = .76$; 2010 $r = .53$).

Table 5. Correlation coefficients (Pearson r): 2005 *Wolesi Jirga* winning candidates at the provincial level (calculated using Pairwise Method).

Population ethnicity	Pashtun candidates	Hazara candidates	Tajik candidates	Uzbek candidates	Turkmen candidates
Pashtun	0.8688 ($p < .0001$)	−0.4863 ($p < .0186$)	−0.4632 ($p < .0093$)	−0.2233 ($p < .0816$)	−0.2186 ($p < .0069$)
Hazara	−0.6010 ($p < .0024$)	0.9278 ($p < .0001$)	−0.2161 ($p < .0260$)	0.1668 ($p < .924$)	−0.0865 ($p < .7592$)
Tajik	−0.5570 ($p < .0058$)	−0.2039 ($p < .3507$)	0.7900 ($p < .0001$)	0.2676 ($p < .8268$)	−0.0388 ($p < .9299$)
Uzbek	−0.3703 ($p < .0323$)	−0.0211 ($p < .9239$)	0.0483 ($p < .8268$)	0.8097 ($p < .0001$)	0.7368 ($p < .0001$)
Turkmen	−0.4090 ($p < .0526$)	−0.0976 ($p < .6579$)	0.0194 ($p < .9299$)	0.9817 ($p < .0001$)	0.2511 ($p < .2479$)

Notes: This analysis was conducted using 24 provinces that contained sufficient data from which to draw a sample. A listing of provinces and the sample size used in the analysis is presented in Appendix 5. Data for this analysis as well as the analyses presented in Tables 5 and 6 were found in the sources cited in footnote 34 as well as Joint Election Management Body. (2005). Retrieved March 3, 2011 from Wolesi Jirga & Provincial Council Elections 2005: http://www.iec.org.af/jemb.org/eng/parliamentary_faq.html#11; Legal Framework: Laws and Decrees: Electoral Law. (2010, August 16). Retrieved March 1, 2011 from Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan: http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/legalframework/law/electoral_law_eng.pdf; Legal Framework: Laws and Decrees: Political Parties Law. (2008–2010); Retrieved March 1 2011 from Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan: http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/legalframework/law/politicalparties_law.pdf; Legal Framework: Laws and Decrees: Parties and Candidates: Candidate Nomination. (2008–2010) and; Retrieved March 3, 2011 from Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan: http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/wsfactsheets/fs_cn_verification_supporters_lists.pdf; Party and Candidate Services: Political Party Update. (2005, August 5). Retrieved February 25, 2011 from Joint Election Management Body: http://www.iec.org.af/jemb.org/eng/Political/political_update_20august_eng.pdf. The bold diagonal figures suggest a MAJOR empirical result of the article; Afghan ethnolinguistic voters vote for their particular ethnolinguistic candidates.

Table 6. Correlation coefficients (Pearson r) of Wolesi Jirga 2005 election votes and ethno-linguistic provincial population (calculated using Pairwise Method).

Population ethnicity	Pashtun vote	Hazara vote	Tajik vote	Uzbek vote	Turkmen vote
Pashtun	0.7609 ($p < .0001$)	-0.4669 ($p < .0247$)	-0.452 ($p < .0304$)	-0.2108 ($p < .3344$)	-0.2186 ($p < .3163$)
Hazara	-0.6439 ($p < .0009$)	0.8654 ($p < .0001$)	-0.1481 ($p < .5001$)	0.1824 ($p < .4049$)	-0.0865 ($p < .6947$)
Tajik	-0.4911 ($p < .0173$)	-0.1797 ($p < .4188$)	0.7901 ($p < .0001$)	0.2806 ($p < .1947$)	-0.0388 ($p < .8603$)
Uzbek	-0.3933 ($p < .0701$)	-0.0478 ($p < .8326$)	0.1147 ($p < .6114$)	0.7679 ($p < .0001$)	0.7369 ($p < .0001$)
Turkmen	-0.4085 ($p < .053$)	-0.1255 ($p < .8603$)	0.1541 ($p < .053$)	0.9898 ($p < .0001$)	0.2511 ($p < .2479$)

Notes: Because of a lack of data, the analyses presented in Tables 5 and 6 were conducted from a sample of the population. The sample size for these analyses is shown in Appendices 6 and 7. Some correlation coefficients that are greater than .35 are not statistically significant because of the small sample size. The bold diagonal figures suggest a MAJOR empirical result of the article; Afghan ethnolinguistic voters vote for their particular ethnolinguistic candidates.

Table 7. Correlation coefficients (Pearson r) of Wolesi Jirga 2010 election votes and ethno-linguistic provincial population (calculated using Pairwise Method).

Population ethnicity	Pashtun vote	Hazara vote	Tajik vote	Uzbek vote	Turkmen vote
Pashtun	0.8501 (<i>p</i> < .001)	−0.3219 (<i>p</i> < .1664)	−0.569 (<i>p</i> < .0088)	−0.3029 (<i>p</i> < .1942)	−0.2839 (<i>p</i> < .2251)
Hazara	−0.3805 (<i>p</i> < .0979)	0.9145 (<i>p</i> < .0001)	−0.2098 (<i>p</i> < .3746)	−0.1139 (<i>p</i> < .6325)	−0.0935 (<i>p</i> < .695)
Tajik	−0.3582 (<i>p</i> < .121)	−0.2212 (<i>p</i> < .3486)	0.7008 (<i>p</i> < .0006)	−0.1301 (<i>p</i> < .5847)	−0.1339 (<i>p</i> < .5736)
Uzbek	−0.4742 (<i>p</i> < .0347)	−0.1466 (<i>p</i> < .5373)	0.3147 (<i>p</i> < .1766)	0.5323 (<i>p</i> < .0157)	0.4571 (<i>p</i> < .0428)
Turkmen	−0.2636 (<i>p</i> < .2614)	−0.2159 (<i>p</i> < .3606)	0.2344 (<i>p</i> < .32)	0.4429 (<i>p</i> < .0505)	0.4924 (<i>p</i> < .0274)

Notes: The bold diagonal figures suggest a MAJOR empirical result of the article; Afghan ethnolinguistic voters vote for their particular ethnolinguistic candidates.

These analyses of *Wolesi Jirga* as well as presidential elections suggest unequivocally that Afghans clearly vote according to their ethnicity.

Conclusion

This analysis clearly suggests that Afghan elections as well as the entire Afghan electoral process are fraught with deep structural problems that ultimately undermine both the credibility and legitimacy of the Kabul regime. The International Crisis Group (ICG) suggests that the 'prolonged crisis' over Afghan elections 'is paralyzing government and weakening already fragile institutions ... [and] stoke ethnic tensions and could drive disenfranchised Afghans into the arms of the Taliban.'⁶⁹ Moreover, the continuing election crisis as we saw vividly in the 2014 election is already deepening an on-going conflict between the Afghan executive and legislative branches.

It is particularly problematic that many of the problems affecting the Afghan electoral system have long been known by Kabul, the UN and the US, yet little has been done resolve these problems or to promote election reform. It should also be noted that this analysis does not explore the broader and untested assumption that democracy and an electoral system per se are genuinely a source of legitimacy of governance, in the Weberian sense, in a country that has never known them and where literacy rates nationally hover around 10–20%. Democracy is a political system, not something instinctive in human DNA.

This analysis does clearly suggest that legislative voting based on the SNTV continues to plague Afghanistan. The goal of any electoral process should be to ensure that a representative government can be formed, but in the case of Afghanistan, the SNTV is significantly hampering the development of representative institutions.⁷⁰ In addition, the SNTV system clearly distorts multi-seat constituencies. The fact that almost all legislators continue to be elected with a fraction of the popular vote, many less than 1% of the vote, presents a variety of problems. The mere fact that both the 2005 and 2010 *Wolesi Jirga* Elections witnessed winning candidates, nationwide, receiving an average of 35% of the votes cast suggests the unviability of the system as a means of expressing popular representation. It results in a group of parliamentarians who are seemingly not beholden to anyone but themselves. The simple fact is that these 'representatives' may be virtually unknown by the majority of the population and may thus have no support among their 'constituents', a system reminiscent of the 'rotten boroughs' of the British parliament before 1832. In the final analysis, the Afghan electoral system takes the power away from the people or constituents and puts it in the hands of a nontransparent, personality-based politics.

The SNTV electoral process is a complicated process that can only work under ideal conditions. Important factors in Afghanistan such as security, ethnic diversity, and gender roles all play a significant role making SNTV unworkable in the Afghan context, but the lack of a mature and disciplined (and officially

discouraged) Afghan political party system in particular makes SNTV inappropriate for Afghanistan. As suggested by the IGC, 'the absence of disciplined political parties to carefully analyze prospects and to ensure that their votes are evenly distributed among candidates results more often than not in inequitable political representation.'⁷¹

As was demonstrated by the initial Afghan Presidential Election of 2004⁷² and both the 2009 Afghan Presidential and 2010 Legislative Elections (as well as 2014 Afghan Presidential Election) witnessed voters casting their votes, both valid and fraudulent, according, in large part, to their ethno-linguistic affinities. Afghanistan remains a deeply ethnically fragmented and this fragmentation presents significant challenges for the development of democratic institutions and cohesive and legitimate governmental institutions.⁷³ The analyses presented here definitively suggest that Afghan ethnicities not only vote along ethnic lines whenever possible, they also vote *against* those outside their affinity group. In Afghanistan's case, addressing the ethnic divisions that seem to be so divisive is critical if any type of representative democracy is to ever be more than an illusion. Rather than endorse a procedural democracy that only highlights the completion of events, such as elections, the Afghan government must seriously address the issues that divide the citizenry. Until then, Afghan electoral representative democracy will remain primarily a theatrical process with little substance.

While ethnicity plays a central role in Afghan's voting preferences, other factors such as competition within ethnic groups, quams,⁷⁴ and other groupings are also important.

Over the past hundred years and as suggested above, national politics has not been of much concern to the ordinary Afghan, who made decreasing the state's influence at local levels his number one priority.⁷⁵ This constant deflection of central authority in the everyday lives of the Afghans allowed for traditional governing structures to remain and slowed their evolution into more modern structures. As the central government fights to gain access to these local structures of governance, it has been met with increased resistance and eventual revolt. This cycle has repeated itself over many different Afghan regimes using varying models of government.

The challenge now facing the current Afghan government is the daunting task of uniting the Afghan people while not repeating the mistakes of the past. And this all needs to be done in the context of massive government corruption and a continuing, significant Taliban insurgency wrapped in the narrative of jihad.⁷⁶ The tricky balancing act of fostering an overarching national identity without being perceived as privileging particular identities requires strong leadership and a willingness to challenge traditional ethnic, linguistic, and religious norms when need be. Karzai and Ghani Administrations have seriously failed relative to this dynamic. Literacy and civics are the sine qua non of any democracy and Afghanistan is severely deficient in both. The goal in every successful

new democracy over the last century has been to create a strong sense of national identity coupled with literacy and civic education. The success of Kemal Ataturk and Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s provides both an interesting analogy in this regard and a cautionary tale of the long and rocky road to effective democracy in a multiethnic state like Afghanistan. Successful governments seek to foster the common identity and work transparently and forcefully to remove ethnic and religious aspects of government, although this proves to be far more easily said than done. The likelihood of this kind of transformational change in Afghanistan in 2001 was limited, even without the tragic failings of the Bonn Process. After over a decade and half of failed democratic experimentation, in 2017 it seems more remote than ever.

With these conclusions in mind future research needs to include a comparative analysis of the election fraud in 2009 and 2014 elections. Such a study would have particular relevance and could make a significant contribution to the debate of viability of conducting elections in fragile states like Afghanistan. This seems particularly true for the future Afghan elections presently planned for 2019.

Notes

1. *United Nations Security Council, Agreement on the Provincial Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, 5 December 2001, S/2001/1154.*
2. 27 candidates official registered to run during the registration period that lasted from 16 September 2013 through 6 October 2013. Afghanistan's Independent Election Committee disqualified 16 of these candidates to run for a variety of reasons and three other candidates exited the race before the April election.
3. In 2014, Ghani stopped to using his tribal name – Ahmadzai.
4. For example see: "Afghan Election Complaints Commission Warns of Fraud." *Radio Free Europe/Radio, Liberty*, 9 April 2014. <https://www.rferl.org/a/afghan-election-complaints-commission-warns-of-fraud/25326898.html>.
5. Nordland, "Asraf Ghani named President of Afghanistan by Election Panel."
6. Gall, "In the Afghan Election."
7. Mason, "Fraud and Folly In Afghanistan."
8. For example, 'Fifteen thousand Abdullah supporters marched on the Arg to protest the election. Ghani's circle was equally adamant. His campaign coördinator at the time, Hamdullah Mohib, recalls a meeting in which Ghani advisers discussed bringing a hundred thousand people into the streets. Ghani told them, in his didactic way, "A civil war lasts on average ten or fifteen years, and even then they're very hard to end – ours is still going on. I can guarantee that tomorrow, if you March on Kabul, the first bullet will be fired. If anyone can guarantee when the last bullet will be fired, then I'll allow the March.'" Packer, "Afghanistan's Theorist-in-Chief."
9. Forugh, "Afghanistan's Uprising for Change."
10. Pacheco, "The Role of External Development Actors in the Post-conflict Scenarios. Also see: Noel, *From Power Sharing to Democracy*.

11. International Crisis Group, "Afghanistan's Elections Stalemate," 1.
12. For a series of excellent analyses of Afghan elections by the Afghan Analysis Network, see: van Bijlert, "Afghan Elections Dilemma"; van Bijlert, "Polling Day Fraud in the Afghan Elections"; Qaane and van Bijlert, "Elections in Hibernation"; Ruttig, "Elections (31)"; Ruttig, "Pluralistic within Limits, but Not Democratic."
13. For the seminal works on Afghanistan societal fragmentation, see: Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*; and Barfield. *Afghanistan*.
14. Peleg, "Transforming Ethnic Orders to Pluralist Regimes," 10.
15. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," 35.
16. For an excellent discussion of these phenomena based on extensive Afghan field research see: Murtazashvili, *Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan*.
17. *CIA World Fact Book*, 2016.
18. Generally see: Barfield. *Afghanistan*, op. cit.
19. Starr, "Sovereignty and Legitimacy in Afghan Nation-building," 108, 109.
20. International Center for Transitional Justice, *Stabilizing Afghanistan*.
21. Carter and Clark, *No Shortcut to Stability*, 12.
22. Tavernise and Wafa, "U.N. Official Acknowledges." Also see: Abdul-Ahad, "New Evidence of Widespread Fraud."
23. In addition to the presidential race this election also saw 3197 candidates vie for 420 provincial council positions. For an excellent analysis of the presidential election see: Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°96, *Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance*, 25 November 2009; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°171, *Afghanistan's Election Challenges*, 24 June 2009.
24. The selection of a particular vice presidential candidate was often aimed at ethnically balancing a candidate's 'ticket.' For example, Karzai retained Vice President Karim Khalilli, an ethnic Hazara. Karzai replaced his first Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud (a Tajik) with Mohammad Qasim Fahim, the powerful Tajik warlord, leader of the Northern Alliance and former Minister of Defense. Ironically during the 2004 Presidential election, Karzai dismissed Fahim from his ticket on the last official date for filing of presidential election candidacy forms and replaced him with another Tajik, Ahmad Zia Masood.
25. Bays, "The Words of the Professor."
26. "Violence to Prevent Observers from Widely Monitoring Polls."
27. "Low Turnout Seen in Afghan Election."
28. Interviews of Afghans concerning the Presidential election in Kandahar City and surrounding districts by Thomas H. Johnson, June–July, 2009.
29. United Nations General Assembly Security Council, "The Situation in Afghanistan."
30. European Union Election Observation Mission, "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Final Report."
31. Gall, "Observers of Afghanistan's Election."
32. Ibid.
33. The IEC is a constitutional body appointed by the president to oversee polls. It is tasked with registering voters, running polling stations, and issuing election results. The IEC is accountable to the Afghan parliament and population. Members of the IEC are selected by the president, which has cast doubt on the commission's independence. On the other hand, the ECC is an independent panel that reports any findings of fraud to the Independent Election Committee (IEC), which under law must accept ECC findings. It was established under Article 52 of the Afghan Electoral Law to investigate and oversee all challenges and

complaints associated to the electoral process. If an offense is found to have taken place, it has the right, under Article 54, to impose sanctions. The ECC can also review disputes regarding the eligibility of nominated candidates. It is made up of two national commissioners and three international commissioners. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Supreme Court of Afghanistan each select one commissioner; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations appoints the final three commissioners. The provincial embodiment of the ECC is the Provincial ECC, set up in each of the provinces and composed of three Commissioners and one support officer. During the 2005 and 2009 elections, the ECC required that at least one Afghan commissioner had voluntarily agreed with any finding in order to prevent the three international commissioners from abusing their majority to override the two Afghan commissioners.

34. "Karzai 'Stripped of Outright Win'."
35. United Nations General Assembly Security Council, "The Situation in Afghanistan."
36. In Kandahar, the Taliban released a series of 'night letters,' instructing voters to stay home on Election Day. In one letter, the Taliban warned, "Dear citizens, we are warning you not to participate in the election. If you do, you will fall prey to our operations." (Matthew Fisher and Mike Blanchfield, "Afghanistan Clamps Down on News Media; Reporting on Violence Halted. Government Doesn't Want Key Election Disturbed by Images of Destruction," *The Gazette*, 19 August 2009). Baghlan and Kunduz were also greatly affected by violence, where of the incidents that took place in 2009, 42 and 31%, respectively, took place in August alone (Figures based on data collected from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, <http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/wits.htm>)
37. The Economist, "Afghanistan's Presidential Elections."
38. Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition," 13.
39. Analyses such as those presented in this paper are often criticized as possibly violating the 'ecological' or inference fallacy that warns against making inferences about the nature of specific individuals based on aggregate or group data. Sociologist William Robinson coined the term 'ecological fallacy' in his famous article – Robinson, W.S. "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals." *American Sociological Review* 15, no. 3 (1950): 351–357. Here he argued that it is incorrect to assume that variables observed at the aggregated or ecological level are the same at the individual level. This does not mean, however, that associations such as those presented here are necessarily defective. Rather, it suggests that the process of aggregating or disaggregating variables or data may conceal variations and that researchers need to be aware of this. Grunfeld and Griliches (Grunfeld, Yehuda and Zvi Griliches. "Is Aggregation Necessarily Bad?" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 42: 1–13), argue that "[I]n practice we do not know enough about micro behavior to be able to specify micro equations perfectly. Hence empirically estimated micro relations ... should not be assumed to be perfectly specified ... Aggregation of economic variables can, and in fact frequently does, reduce these specification errors. Hence, aggregation does not only produce aggregation error, but may also produce an aggregation gain.' It should be realized that the analyses presented here are not interested in individual behavior; rather the study is interested in ethno-linguistic group voting behavior. And the results recognized by the analyses presented here are similar to those found in earlier Afghan elections that were assessed. Moreover, the Appendices present a series of pairwise correlations that also reflect the

findings presented concerning the relationships between ethno-linguistic groups and presidential voting preferences. The findings presented are also supported by numerous qualitative discussions of Afghan politics that suggest the prominent role of ethnic affiliations in Afghan political life. For example see: Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, op. cit.

40. We are well aware that the Pashtuns, as well as the other Afghan ethno-linguistic entities do not necessarily represent homogenous groups. In the case of the Pashtuns numerous sub tribes and *khels* (clans) are relevant and these sub groupings often have inconsistent political views and desires. Pashtuns consist of five large confederations – Durrani, Ghilzai, Ghurgusht, Karlanri, and Sarbani – each of which traces its roots to a single ancestor.
41. Tajiks did not have a strong negative vote against Ahmadzai ($r = -0.29$); most of the Tajik voters disdain was clearly aimed at Karzai.
42. Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition," 14.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 14, 15.
45. The Economist, "Afghanistan's Presidential Elections." Irregularities have been witnessed in every Post-Bonn Afghan election. For example, it is cited that blatant irregularities were witnessed during the registration process for the 2004 Presidential election, including 140 per cent voter-registration rates in three provinces. (See: Baldauf, "Afghans Vote, Ready or Not.").
46. For example, see: Gopal, "Afghan Voter Registration Marred"; Coghlan, "President Karzai's Supporters 'buy' Votes for Afghanistan Election."
47. BBC, "Karzai Stripped of Outright Win."
48. Pannel, "Afghan Election Fraud is Unearthed." In May and June of 2009 the author of this article interviewed a number of Afghan citizens who had detailed information concerning the selling and purchase of voter registration cards in Kandahar City.
49. "Violence to Prevent Observers from Widely Monitoring Polls."
50. Worden, "Delays Will Not Improve Afghan Elections."
51. Saddique, "Afghanistan's Karzai Faces Pressure to Confront Corruption Menace."
52. Filkins, "Afghanistan Postpones Parliamentary Election by 4 Months."
53. Hamid Karzai, speech to first session of Afghanistan's Parliament, 20 February 2010.
54. See Appendix 2 for how the seats are distributed for both the 2005 and 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections. The number of seats allocated is based on the total population. This is shown in Appendix 3 in a simple linear regression analysis of number of seats to total population. The number of seats each province can have is important if true representational government is to be established. In the case of Afghanistan the guidelines for this process have been established in Article 20 in Chapter 5 of the Electoral Law. The law regulates the number of seats to each province is to be in proportion to the population size. Additionally the minimum number of seats for each province has been set at two seats. If this occurs the remaining provinces in which extra seats were not allocated to shall divide the remaining seats proportionally based on population size. (*Legal Frame Work: Laws and Decrees: Electoral Law, 2010*).
55. Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition," 20.
56. Astri Surhke suggests: 'The Parliament was ... weakened by an election law that introduced a curious and rarely used system designed to inhibit political party

representation (the Single, Non-transferable Vote system, or SNTV).⁵⁷ Surhke, "Electing to Fight in Afghanistan."

57. The Electoral Law also mandates the minimum number of seats to be filled by women. The minimum number of seats allocated to women shall be at least twice the number of provinces. Appendix 2 presents the number of seats allocated to each province. In Afghanistan's case the minimum number of seats required to be filled by women is 68 (*Seat Allocation, 2008–2010*). Article 83 of the Constitution established this number (*Legal Frame Work: Laws and Decrees: Electoral Law, 2010*). Special provisions are required to be taken if there are an insufficient number of women candidates to meet this requirement.
58. Mohaqiq received 13.2% of the vote in 2005 when he was the leading vote getter for the Kabul *Wolesi Jirga* positions.
59. Worden, *Afghanistan's Ongoing Election Drama*.
60. International Crisis Group, "Afghanistan's Elections Stalemate," op. cit., 1.
61. "Played for Fools: Hamid Karzai's Shenanigans Make the Going Even Harder for NATO."
62. Peter Galbraith in interview with David Frost, in Frost Over the World, *Al Jazeera English*, 26 February 2010.
63. Saddique, "Afghanistan's Karzai Faces Pressure to Confront Corruption Menace."
64. International Crisis Group, "Afghanistan's Elections Stalemate," op. cit., 3.
65. Rubin and Wafa, "Afghan President Tries to Please Both Warlords and West."
66. Ibid.
67. Rubin, "Afghan Cabinet Nominations Show Little Change."
68. Ibid.
69. International Crisis Group, "Afghanistan's Elections Stalemate," op. cit., 1.
70. Afghan Wolesi Jirga elections were scheduled to be held on 15 October 2016; they were postponed, in part, because the lack of resolution concerning the reform of Afghanistan's electoral laws. See: Mashal, "Afghan Panel Sets Election Date."
71. Ibid., 5.
72. Johnson, "Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition," 12–15.
73. See Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, op.cit.
74. For example, see: Roy and Volk, *The Failure of Political Islam*.
75. Ibid., 168.
76. For example, see: Johnson, *Taliban Narratives*.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank two former students – Suzette Lopez and LT Joseph Bubulka – for their assistance in the formulation of this article and its analyses. The author would also like to thank Matthew DuPee, Larry Goodson, Harold Ingram, M. Chris Mason, and Ahmad Waheed for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Disclosure Statement

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and should not be construed as an official position or policy of the United States Government, Department of Defense, Department of the Navy or the Naval Postgraduate School.

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
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
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Appendix 1. Maps of Election Fraud

Election Audit Results: Karzai



Election Audit Results: Abdullah




Appendix 2. Wolesi Jirga Seat Allocation (Seat Allocation, 2008–2010)

Province name	Population	Wolesi Jirga		Province name	Population	Wolesi Jirga	
		Seats	Female seats			seats	Female seats
Kabul	3013200	33	9	Kunduz	817400	9	2
Kapisa	367400	4	1	Samangan	321500	4	1
Parwan	550200	6	2	Juzjan	443300	5	1
Wardak	496700	5	2	Sar-i-Pul	463700	5	1
Logar	326100	4	1	Faryab	824500	9	3
Ghazni	1020400	11	3	Badghis	412400	4	1
Paktika	362100	4	1	Herat	1515400	17	5
Paktia	458500	5	1	Farah	420600	5	1
Khost	478100	5	1	Nimroz	135900	2	1
Nangerhar	1237800	14	4	Helmand	767300	8	2
Kunarha	374700	4	1	Kandahar	971400	11	3
Laghman	371000	4	1	Zabul	252700	3	1
Nooristan	123300	2	1	Urozgan	291500	3	1
Badakhshan	790200	9	2	Ghor	574800	6	2
Takhar	811700	9	2	Bamyan	371900	4	1
Baghlan	748000	8	2	Panjshir	127900	2	1
Samangan	321500	4	1	Daikondi	383600	4	1
Balkh	1052500	11	3	Kuchies		10	3
				Total	21,677,700	249	68

Appendix 3. Wolesi Jirga Seat Allocation Based on Population Analysis

Response Population Total
Whole Model
Regression Plot



Summary of Fit

RSquare	0.996533
RSquare Adj	0.996439
Root Mean Square Error	30036.35
Mean of Response	642574.4
Observations (or Sum Wgts)	39

Analysis of Variance

Source	df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F ratio
Model	1	9.594e + 12	9.594e + 12	10634.27
Error	37	3.3381e + 10	902182245	Prob > F
C. Total	38	9.6274e + 12		<.0001*

Lack Of Fit

Source	df	Sum of squares	Mean square	F ratio
Lack Of Fit	9	1.5198e + 10	1.6886e + 9	2.6004
Pure Error	28	1.8183e + 10	649390660	Prob > F
Total Error	37	3.3381e + 10		0.0255*

Appendix 4. Sample Ballot Sheet



Sample IEC Ballot Sheet 2010 Wolesi Jirga (Fact Sheets: Ballots, 2010)

Appendix 5. Ethnic Analysis 2005 Wolesi Jirga (Candidates)

Pairwise Correlations

Variable	by Variable	Correlation	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Signif Prob
Pashtun Vote	Pashtun	0.8688	0.7113	0.9432	<.0001*
Pashtun Vote	Hazara	-0.6010	-0.8120	-0.2510	0.0024*
Pashtun Vote	Tajik	-0.5570	-0.7882	-0.1880	0.0058*
Pashtun Vote	Uzbek	-0.3703	-0.6789	0.0495	0.0820
Pashtun Vote	Turkomen	-0.4090	-0.7027	0.0039	0.0526
Hazara Vote	Pashtun	-0.4863	-0.7485	-0.0927	0.0186*
Hazara Vote	Hazara	0.9268	0.8328	0.9689	<.0001*
Hazara Vote	Tajik	-0.2039	-0.5683	0.2274	0.3507
Hazara Vote	Uzbek	-0.0211	-0.4296	0.3945	0.9239
Hazara Vote	Turkomen	-0.0976	-0.4901	0.3278	0.6579
Tajik Vote	Pashtun	-0.4632	-0.7351	-0.0631	0.0260*
Tajik Vote	Hazara	-0.2161	-0.5769	0.2153	0.3221
Tajik Vote	Tajik	0.7900	0.5603	0.9069	<.0001*
Tajik Vote	Uzbek	0.0483	-0.3713	0.4515	0.8268
Tajik Vote	Turkomen	0.0194	-0.3959	0.4282	0.9299
Uzbek Vote	Pashtun	-0.2233	-0.5819	0.2080	0.3057
Uzbek Vote	Hazara	0.1668	-0.2635	0.5418	0.4468
Uzbek Vote	Tajik	0.2676	-0.1625	0.6123	0.2170
Uzbek Vote	Uzbek	0.8097	0.5965	0.9161	<.0001*
Uzbek Vote	Turkomen	0.9817	0.9565	0.9923	<.0001*
Turkomen Vote	Pashtun	-0.2186	-0.5787	0.2128	0.3163
Turkomen Vote	Hazara	-0.0865	-0.4815	0.3377	0.6947
Turkomen Vote	Tajik	-0.0388	-0.4439	0.3794	0.8603
Turkomen Vote	Uzbek	0.7368	0.4662	0.8813	<.0001*
Turkomen Vote	Turkomen	0.2511	-0.1797	0.6011	0.2479

Sample Used For Analysis

Province	# of Seats counted	# of Seats total	% of Seats	Province	# of Seats counted	# of Seats total	% of Seats
Badghis	3	4	75	Logar	4	4	100
Bamyan	4	4	100	Nangarhar	12	14	86
Daikondi	4	4	100	Neemroz	1	2	50
Ghazni	11	11	100	Paktia	5	5	100
Helmand	5	8	63	Paktika	4	5	80
Kabul	32	33	97	Panjsher	2	2	100
Kandahar	9	11	82	Parwan	5	6	83
Kapisa	3	4	75	Samangan	4	4	100
Khost	4	5	80	Urozgan	3	3	100
Kunarha	4	4	100	Wardak	5	5	100
Kunduz	7	9	78	Zabul	3	3	100
Laghman	2	4	50				

Percentage of Seats for the Sample
Percentage of Seats/Total Seats

88%
55%

Appendix 6. Wolesi Jirga Election 2005 (Population)

Pairwise Correlations

Variable	by Variable	Correlation	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Signif Prob
Pashtun Vote	Pashtun	0.7609	0.5081	0.8930	<.0001*
Pashtun Vote	Hazara	-0.6439	-0.8346	-0.3154	0.0009*
Pashtun Vote	Tajik	-0.4911	-0.7512	-0.0990	0.0173*
Pashtun Vote	Uzbek	-0.3933	-0.6990	0.0339	0.0701
Pashtun Vote	Turkomen	-0.4085	-0.7024	0.0044	0.0530
Hazara Vote	Pashtun	-0.4669	-0.7372	-0.0678	0.0247*
Hazara Vote	Hazara	0.8654	0.7045	0.9417	<.0001*
Hazara Vote	Tajik	-0.1797	-0.5511	0.2511	0.4118
Hazara Vote	Uzbek	-0.0478	-0.4602	0.3815	0.8326
Hazara Vote	Turkomen	-0.1255	-0.5113	0.3023	0.5682
Tajik Vote	Pashtun	-0.4520	-0.7285	-0.0489	0.0304*
Tajik Vote	Hazara	-0.1481	-0.5281	0.2813	0.5001
Tajik Vote	Tajik	0.7901	0.5605	0.9069	<.0001*
Tajik Vote	Uzbek	0.1147	-0.3225	0.5115	0.6114
Tajik Vote	Turkomen	0.1541	-0.2756	0.5325	0.4825
Uzbek Vote	Pashtun	-0.2108	-0.5732	0.2206	0.3344
Uzbek Vote	Hazara	0.1824	-0.2485	0.5530	0.4049
Uzbek Vote	Tajik	0.2806	-0.1488	0.6210	0.1947
Uzbek Vote	Uzbek	0.7679	0.5120	0.8986	<.0001*
Uzbek Vote	Turkomen	0.9898	0.9756	0.9957	<.0001*
Turkomen Vote	Pashtun	-0.2186	-0.5787	0.2128	0.3163
Turkomen Vote	Hazara	-0.0865	-0.4815	0.3377	0.6947
Turkomen Vote	Tajik	-0.0388	-0.4439	0.3794	0.8603
Turkomen Vote	Uzbek	0.7369	0.4574	0.8839	<.0001*
Turkomen Vote	Turkomen	0.2511	-0.1797	0.6011	0.2479

Sample Used

Province	# of Votes	# of Votes sampled	Province	# of Votes	# of Votes sampled
Badghis	24408	136,781	Logar	14837	76270
Bamyan	47848	126,296	Nangarhar	89875	383170
Daikondi	58345	156,630	Neemroz	1445	37750
Ghazni	122255	378577	Paktya	62150	251489
Helmand	31023	194,162	Paktika	96505	264858
Kabul	212085	399,810	Panjsher	13282	49218
Kandahar	64438	188,627	Parwan	23089	87517
Kapisa	18173	83966	Samangan	45693	109955
Khost	37225	188,473	Urozgan	21088	35363
Kunarha	28425	126,282	Wardak	31127	100663
Kunduz	58496	246,758	Zabul	5912	20695
Laghman	10765	87,484			

Percentage of Population Sampled	30.0%
Percentage of Sample Size to Total Registered Voters	19%

Notes: The sample size was obtained by first determining the ethnic background of the candidates. The 2005 election was used in this process because there was sufficient data available on the winning candidates. These votes were tallied by candidate and then correlated in Jump Statistical Package using the Pairwise correlation method.

Appendix 7. Wolesi Jirga Election 2010 (Population)

Pairwise Correlations

Variable	by Variable	Correlation	Count	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Signif Prob
Pashtun Candidate	Pashtun	0.8540	24	0.6875	0.9352	<.0001*
Pashtun Candidate	Hazara	-0.4022	24	-0.6932	0.0014	0.0514
Pashtun Candidate	Tajik	-0.4544	24	-0.7249	-0.0625	0.0257*
Pashtun Candidate	Uzbek	-0.4957	24	-0.7492	-0.1153	0.0138*
Pashtun Candidate	Turkomen	-0.3412	23	-0.6605	0.0826	0.1110
Hazara Candidate	Pashtun	-0.3306	24	-0.6476	0.0841	0.1146
Hazara Candidate	Hazara	0.9023	24	0.7845	0.9573	<.0001*
Hazara Candidate	Tajik	-0.1695	24	-0.5362	0.2511	0.4286
Hazara Candidate	Uzbek	-0.1120	24	-0.4931	0.3052	0.6023
Hazara Candidate	Turkomen	-0.1613	23	-0.5377	0.2688	0.4623
Tajik Candidate	Pashtun	-0.6074	24	-0.8119	-0.2702	0.0016*
Tajik Candidate	Hazara	-0.1166	24	-0.4966	0.3010	0.5875
Tajik Candidate	Tajik	0.7239	24	0.4526	0.8725	<.0001*
Tajik Candidate	Uzbek	0.3369	24	-0.0769	0.6517	0.1074
Tajik Candidate	Turkomen	0.2974	23	-0.1308	0.6321	0.1681
Uzbek Candidate	Pashtun	-0.3064	24	-0.6317	0.1106	0.1453
Uzbek Candidate	Hazara	-0.0955	24	-0.4804	0.3202	0.6571
Uzbek Candidate	Tajik	-0.0936	24	-0.4789	0.3219	0.6635
Uzbek Candidate	Uzbek	0.5396	24	0.1741	0.7744	0.0065*
Uzbek Candidate	Turkomen	0.4585	23	0.0571	0.7323	0.0278*
Turkomen Candidate	Pashtun	-0.2859	24	-0.6180	0.1329	0.1757
Turkomen Candidate	Hazara	-0.0777	24	-0.4665	0.3362	0.7182
Turkomen Candidate	Tajik	-0.1005	24	-0.4843	0.3157	0.6402
Turkomen Candidate	Uzbek	0.4650	24	0.0758	0.7312	0.0221*
Turkomen Candidate	Turkomen	0.5026	23	0.1141	0.7578	0.0145*

Population Sample

Province	# of Votes	# of Total Votes	% of Votes	Province	# of Votes	# of Total Votes	% of Votes
Badghis	8395	62,112	14	Parwan	39669	111,943	35
Bamyan	35166	121,746	29	Zabul	748	4,705	16
Ghazni	48348	179,316	27	Badakhsha	49360	231,040	21
Kabul	179770	449,528	40	Takhar	43302	215,388	20
Kapisa	11095	45,271	25	Balkh	75164	254,569	30
Kunduz	16473	115,476	14	Faryab	43113	187,561	23
Logar	4799	26,902	18	Herat	41867	287,013	15
Paktya	9837	80,593	12	Farah	5986	37,736	16
Paktika	3975	43,326	9	Kandahar	12562	75,502	17
Panjsher	9838	21,686	45	Ghor	42938	176,407	24

Percentage of Population Sampled	25%
Percentage of Sample Size to Total Registered Voters	17%

Notes: The sample size was obtained by first determining the ethnic background of the candidates. The 2010 election was used in this process because there was sufficient data available on the candidates. These votes were tallied by candidate and then correlated in Jump Statistical Package using the pairwise correlation method.