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Master's Thesis

SonicChain: A Wait-free, Pseudo-Static Approach Toward Concurrency in Blockchains

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"In the future, trusting an opaque institution, a middleman, merchant or intermediary with our interest, would be as archaic a concept, as reckoning on abacuses today"

– Dr. Gavin Wood

Prelude: Web 3.0

> *My wife asked me why I spoke so softly in the house. I said I was afraid Mark Zuckerberg was listening!*
> *She laughed. I laughed. Alexa laughed. Siri laughed.*
>
> – Web3 Summit 2019 - Berlin

I want to briefly recall how I got into the blockchain ecosystem, and how it turned out to be much more serious and important than what I thought, and why I think you should think the same way. I will be brief though, there is a lot more to read in this thesis.

I started developing blockchains in 2019, and at first I always admittedly said to my friends and colleagues that I am interested in it from an engineering perspective. The only other facade that I knew to blockchains was its monetary aspect. In short, blockchains were two things to me: Complex distributed systems, and getting rich overnight. I tried to convince myself that I am only interested in the former.

Soon after, through the works, papers, and talks of visionary pioneers of the blockchain ecosystem, I learned about the third, perhaps the most important facade of blockchains: That it is merely a tool in a much larger ecosystem of ideas and beliefs about how we collaborate, perform logistics, and live as a society. Different people have drawn different ideas here; I will stick to just one that I find the most relevant: Web 3.0.

Let us look back: web 1.0 was the static web of the '90s and the early years of the 20th century. It had limited interaction, and only served to show static information. The early web and its underlying protocols were designed for government and educational purposes. *Trust* is an absolutely vital asset in web 1.0.

Then came along Mark Zucker... I mean web 2.0. It was dynamic, it could do much more and started offering way more. We starter building financial and institutional systems on top of it. Except, we forgot to update any of the protocols. Web 2.0 expanded very quick and very fast, and brought us here: We can do many great things with web 2.0, it is great. But the data, privacy, and sovereignty of the user is entirely at the mercy of centralized, giant tech corporations. In a sense, we let web 2.0 expand exponentially, without thinking

that its underlying protocols – the *trust* – is still there, and it is becoming more dangerous every day.

It was quite a shock to me to learn that blockchain-enthusiasts are as excited to talk about Satoshi Nakatomo and the daily bitcoin price, as they are to talk about the Snowden revolution, privacy, advertising, and democracy. And this is where web 3.0 comes into play. Web 3.0, essentially, is supposed to eliminate the *trust* embedded in the web 2.0 protocols, allowing users to interact with one another in a trust-less, decentralized, and more secure manner, using protocols that are governed transparently, rather than being owned by a big cooperation. And in this picture, blockchain is really just the tip of the iceberg, just one piece of the puzzle. A much wider army of tools, protocols and science is needed to develop and build web 3.0. This ranges from bare-bone sciences such as probability and cryptography, to social matters such as privacy, identity, and transparent governance of protocols, all the way to the typical stuff: user-friendly interfaces and APIs for other developers to build upon.

I learned over time that blockchains are not as impressive as they seem. Rather it is the underlying aspiration that makes it truly exciting. I hope you feel similar someday, and this thesis might help you learn some of the basics of blockchain along the way.

Abstract

Blockchains have a two-sided reputation: they are praised for disrupting some of our institutions through innovative technology for good, yet notorious for being slow and expensive to use. In this work, we tackle this issue with concurrency, yet we aim to take a radically different approach by valuing *simplicity*. We embrace the simplicity through two steps: first, we formulate a simple runtime mechanism to deal with conflicts called *concurrency delegation*. This method is much simpler and has less overhead, particularly in scenarios where conflicting transactions are relatively rare. Moreover, to further reduce the number of conflicting transactions, we propose using static annotations attached to each transaction, provided by the programmer. These annotations are pseudo-static: they are static with respect to the lifetime of the transaction, and therefore are free to use information such as the origin and parameters of the transaction. We propose a distributor component that can use the output of this pseudo-static annotations and use them to effectively distribute transactions between threads in the *least*-conflicting way. We name the outcome of a system combining concurrency delegation and pseudo-static annotations as *SonicChain*. We evaluate SonicChain for both validation and authoring tasks against a common workload in blockchains, namely, balance transfers, and observe that it performs expectedly well while introducing very little overhead and additional complexity to the system.

Acknowledgements

I learned all of the engineering and blockchain knowledge needed to conduct this research through Parity Technologies, a pioneering company developing a wide variety of technologies for the decentralized future. I joined parity with almost no experience in such fields, and find myself extremely lucky that I was given the opportunity to learn from their engineers, make mistakes and grow along the way. My work with Parity will continue after this thesis is over, and I hope for it to last for many more years.

I took two courses in 2018 at UvA (even though I technically study at VU) about concurrency, both supervised by Dr. Ana Varbanescu. Both were so enticing that they sparked my interest in concurrency and performance engineering, eventually giving me the idea to mix it with blockchains for my final thesis. I recall the first meeting that I had with her about my thesis, and to this day I am grateful that she accepted and supported my work from that very first day. Looking back at it in hindsight, *I* probably wouldn't have accepted myself back then if I was in her shoe, give that I had a very vague idea of what my main idea is, and the rather unorthodox domain of the thesis. I can only hope to continue learning from Dr. Ana Varbanescu and enjoy it, as I always have.

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Glossary

Account Nonce An integer linked to each account and incremented per transaction. Used to prevent replay attacks, page 22

Block A bundle of transaction that can be appended to the chain, page 14

Block Authoring The sensitive task of preparing a new block and propagating it to the network, page 15

Blockchain Network The set of entire nodes holding (a partial) copy of a particular ledger, page 5

Canonical Chain The current based chain that most of the nodes agree upon (particularly in the context of a fork), page 18

Concurrency Avoidance A scheme in contrast to concurrency control in which no synchronization is used between the threads, page 37

Genesis Block The first block of each chain, and it has no parent hash, page 14

Node A single entity in a network, page 5

Origin The source (i.e. the sender) of a transaction. Usually Provided through public-key cryptography, page 12

Parent Hash A hash of the previous block, mentioned in the header of all blocks, page 14

Runtime The portion of the blockchain's code that executes transactions, page 21

State root The hash of the entire state, when represented as a Merkle tree, page 19

Taintable State Special HashMap-like data structure that assigns a taint to each key, page 39

Transaction Arbitrary data provided by the outer world that can update the blockchain's state, page 12

1

Introduction

> *"If Bitcoin was the calculator, Ethereum was the ENIAC[1]. It is expensive, slow, and hard to work with. The challenge of today is to build the **commodity, accessible and performant** computer."*
>
> *– Unknown.*

Blockchains are indeed an interesting topic in recent and coming years. Many believe that they are a revolutionary technology that will shape our future societies, much like the internet and how it has impacted many aspects of how we live in the last few decades (1). Moreover, they are highly sophisticated and inter-disciplinary software artifacts, achieving high levels of decentralization and security, which was deemed impossible so far. To the contrary, some people skeptically see them as controversial, or merely a "hyped hoax", and doubt that they will ever deliver much *real* value to the world. Nonetheless, through the rest of this chapter and this work overall, we provide ample reasoning to justify why we think otherwise.

In very broad terms, a blockchain is a tamper-proof, append-only ledger that is being maintained in a decentralized fashion and can only be updated once everyone agrees upon that change as a bundle of transactions. This bundle of transactions is called a **block**. Once this block is agreed upon, it is appended (aka. *chained*) to the ledger, hence the term *blockchain*. Moreover, the ledger itself is public and openly accessible to anyone. This means that everyone can verify and check the final state of the ledger, and all the transactions and blocks in its past that lead to this particular ledger state, to verify everything. At the same time, asymmetric cryptography is the core identity indicator that one needs to interact with the chain, meaning that one's personal identity can stay private in principle, if that is desired based on the circumstances. For example, one's public key is not revealing their

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[1] the first generation computer developed in 1944. It fills a 20-foot by 40-foot room and has 18,000 vacuum tubes.

personal identity, whilst using names and email addresses does, like in many traditional systems.

In some sense, blockchains are revolutionary because they remove the need for *trust*, and release it from the control of one entity (e.g. a single bank, an institute, or simply Google), by encoding it as a self-sovereign decentralized software. Our institutions are built upon the idea that they manage people's assets, matters and belongings, and they ensure veracity, *because we trust in them.* In short, they have **authority**. Of course, this model could work well in principle, but it suffers from the same problem as some software do: it is a **single point of failure**. A corrupt authority is just as destructive as a flawed single point of failure in a software is. Blockchain attempts to resolve this by deploying software (i.e. itself) in a transparent and decentralized manner, in which everyone's privacy is respected, whilst at the same time everyone can still check the veracity of the ledger, and the software itself. In other words, no single entity should be able to have full control over the system.

Now, all of these great properties do not come cheap. Blockchains are extremely complicated pieces of software, and they require a great deal of expertise to be written. Moreover, many of the machinery used to create this *decentralized* and *public* append-only ledger requires synchronization, serialization, or generally other procedures, that are likely to decrease the throughput at which the chain can process transactions. This, to some extent, contributes to the skepticism about blockchains' feasibility. For example, Bitcoin, one of the famously deployed blockchains to date, consumes a lot of resources to operate, and cannot execute more than around half a dozen transactions per second (2).

Therefore, it is a useful goal to investigate the possibilities through which a blockchain system can be enhanced to operate *faster*, effectively delivering a higher throughput of transactions per some unit of time.

1.1 Research Questions

We have seen that blockchains are promising in their technology, and unique traits that they can deliver. Yet, they are notoriously slow. Therefore, we pursue the goal of improving the *throughput* of a blockchain system. By throughput, we mean the number of successful transactions that can be processed per some unit of time. There are numerous ways to achieve this goal, ranging from redesigning internal protocols within the blockchain to applying concurrency. In this thesis, we precisely focus on the latter, enabling concurrency within transactions that are processed and then appended to the ledger. Moreover, we do

so by leveraging, and mixing the best attributes of two different realms of concurrency, namely static analysis and runtime conflict detection [1]. This approach is better compared with other alternatives in section 3.1.

Based on this, we formulate the following as our research questions:

RQ1 What approaches exist to achieve concurrent execution of transactions within a blockchain system, and improve the throughput?

RQ2 How could both static analysis and runtime approaches be combined together to achieve a new approach with minimum overhead and measurable benefits?

RQ3 How would such an approach be evaluated against and compared to others?

1.2 Thesis Outline

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: In chapter 2 we provide a comprehensive background on both blockchains and concurrency, the two pillars of knowledge that we will build upon. Chapter 3 starts by defining the *requirements* of a hypothetical system of interest. Then, some of the contemporary literature and the ways that they fulfill the requirements are mentioned, effectively acting as our mini "related work" section. Finally, we introduce our own approach and place it next to other approaches for comparison. Chapter 4 acts as a mini detour into the implementation of our system design. In chapter 5 we evaluate our design and implementation, finally bringing us to a conclusion and future work in chapter 6.

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[1]By static we mean generally anything which is known at the *compile* phase, and by runtime the *execution* phase

2

Background

"The use of credit cards today is an act of faith on the part of all concerned. Each party is vulnerable to fraud by the others, and the cardholder, in particular, has no protection against surveillance."

– David Chum et. al. - 1990

In this chapter, we dive into the background knowledge needed for the rest of this work. Two primary pillars of knowledge need to be covered: blockchains and distributed systems in section 2.1 and concurrency, upon which our solution will be articulated, in section 2.2.

2.1 Blockchains And Distributed Ledger Technology

In this section, we provide an overview of the basics of distributed systems, blockchains, and their underlying technologies. By the end of this section, it is expected that an average reader will know enough about blockchain systems to be able to follow the rest of our work, and understand the approach proposed in chapter 3 and onwards.

2.1.1 Centralized, Decentralized and Distributed Systems

An introduction to blockchain is always entangled with *distributed* and *decentralized* systems.

A distributed system is a system in which a group of nodes (each having their own processor and memory) cooperate and coordinate for a common outcome. From the perspective of an outside user, most often the distributed nature of the system is transparent, and all the nodes can be seen and interacted with, as if they were *one cohesive system* (3).

Indeed, some details differ between the distributed systems and blockchains, yet the underlying concepts resonate in many ways (4), and blockchains can be seen as a form of distributed systems. Like a distributed system, a blockchain also consists of many nodes,

operated either by organizations, or by normal people with their commodity computers. Similarly, this *distribution* trait is transparent to the end-user when they want to interact with the blockchain, and they indeed see the system as one cohesive unit. All of these nodes together form the *blockchain network*.

Blockchains are also **decentralized**. This term was first introduced in a revolutionary paper in 1964 as a **middle ground** between purely *centralized* systems that have a single point of failure, and 100% *distributed* systems, which are like a mesh (all nodes having links to many other nodes (5) [1]). A decentralized system falls somewhere in between, where no single node's failure can irrecoverably damage the system, and communication is somewhat distributed, where some nodes might act as hops between different sub-networks.

Blockchains, depending on the implementation, can resonate more with either of the above terms. Most often, from a networking perspective, they are much closer to the ideals of a distributed system. From an operational and economical perspective, they can be seen more as decentralized, where the operational power (i.e. the *authority*) falls into the hands of no single entity, yet a large enough group of authorities.

Figure 2.1: Types of Networks. - From left to right: Centralized, Decentralized, and Distributed.

2.1.2 From Ideas to Bitcoin: History of Blockchain

While most people associate the rise of blockchains with Bitcoin, it is indeed incorrect, because the basic ideas of blockchains were mentioned decades earlier. The first relevant research paper was already mentioned in 2.1.1. Namely, in (5), besides the definition of a decentralized system, the paper also describes many metrics regarding how secure a network should be, under certain attacks.

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[1]The design of Paul Baran, author of (5), was first proposed, like many other internet-related technologies, in a military context. His paper was a solution to the USA's concern about communication links in the aftermath of a nuclear attack in the midst of the cold war (6).

Next, (7) famously introduced what is know as Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, which is the backbone of public-key encryption. Moreover, this key exchange is heavily inspired by (8), which depicts more ways in which cryptography can be used to secure online communication. Together, these papers form the *digital signature scheme*, which is heavily used in all blockchain systems [1].

Moreover, the idea of blockchain itself predates Bitcoin. The idea of chaining data together, whilst placing some digest of the previous piece (i.e. a *hash* thereof) in the header of the next one was first introduced in (9). This, in fact, is exactly the underlying reason that a blockchain, as a data structure, can be seen as an append-only, tamper-proof ledger. Any change to previous blocks will break the hash chain and cause the hash of the latest block to become different, making any changes to the history of the data structure identifiable, hence *tamper-proof*.

Finally, (10) introduced the idea of using digital computers as a means of currency in 1990, as an alternative to the rise of credit cards at the time. There were a number of problems with this approach, including the famous double-spend problem, in which an entity can spend one unit of currency numerous times. Finally, in 2008, an unknown scientist who used the name Satoshi Nakatomo released the first draft of the Bitcoin whitepaper. In his work, he proposed Proof of Work as a means of solving the double-spend problem, among other details and improvements (11). Note that the idea of Proof of Work itself goes back, yet again, to 1993. This concept was first introduced in (12), as means of spam protection in early email services.

2.1.3 1000 Feet View of a Blockchain

Before going any further, we provide this, so-called, 1000 feet view of the blockchain. This small section provides the big picture in the blockchain world, while the upcoming sections go into the fine depth thereof. This section introduces a lot of jargon all at once, but will help comprehend the rest of the chapter.

Figure 2.2 shows a very broad overview of a blockchain network and the processes within it. Each red circle is a node in the decentralized network. We zoom into only one of them. Each node holds two very important components: A runtime, and a ledger (dashed blue box).

The **ledger** is composed of the chain of blocks, and some auxiliary **state** for each block. These two are basically the entire view of the world. The blocks are linked together by a

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[1]Many of these works were deemed military applications at the time, hence the release dates are what is referred to as the "public dates", not the original, potentially concealed dates of their discovery.

Figure 2.2: A 100ft View of the Blockchain Network - Nodes (red circles), Ledger state (dashed green box), Transaction (green diamonds).

hash chain. We see a block outside of the state (black block). This is a candidate block, one that this node might propose to the rest of the network at some point to be appended.

The **runtime** is simply the core logic of the chain. This core logic, the runtime, has the responsibility of *updating* the ledger based on *transactions*. Transactions (green diamonds) are sent to a node from the outer world, potentially from end-users. The transactions are kept in a separate data structure (transaction queue) until getting a chance at being put into a block.

2.1.4 Preliminary Concepts

Having known where the blockchain's idea originates from, and which fields of previous knowledge in the last half a century it aggregates, we can now have a closer look at these technologies and eventually, build up a clear and concrete understanding of what a blockchain is and how it works.

2.1.4.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography

We mentioned the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme in section 2.1.2. Key exchange is basically a mechanism to establish a *symmetric* key, using only *asymmetric* data. In other words, two participants can come up with a common shared symmetric key (used for encrypting data) without ever sharing it over the network[1]. Indeed, while the underlying principles are the same, for better performance, most modern distributed systems work with another mechanism that is the more advanced variant of Diffie-Hellman, namely Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Elliptic Curves offer the same properties as Diffie-Hellman, with similar security measures, whilst being faster to compute and needing smaller key sizes. A key exchange, in short, allows for **asymmetric cryptography**, the variant of cryptography that needs no secrete medium to exchange initial keys, and therefore is truly applicable to distributed systems. In asymmetric cryptography, a key *pair* is generated at each entity. A **public** key, which can be, as the name suggests, publicly shared with anyone, and a **private** key that must be kept secret. Any data signed with the private key can be verified using the public key. This allows for integrity checks, and allows anyone to verify the *origin* of a message. Hence, the private key is also referred to as the **signature**. Moreover, any data encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the private key. This allows confidentiality.

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[1]Readers may refer to (7) for more information about the details of how this mechanism works.

Many useful properties can be achieved using asymmetric cryptography, and many massively useful applications adopt it [1]. For blockchains, we are particularly interested in **signatures**. Signatures allow entities to verify the integrity and the origin of any message. Moreover, the public portion of a key, i.e. a public key, can be used as an identifier for an entity.

For example, in the context of banking, a public key can be seen as an account number. It is public and known to everyone, and knowing it does not grant anyone the authority to withdraw money from an account. The private key is the piece that gives one entity *authority* over an account, much like your physical presence at the bank and signing a paper, in a traditional banking system. This is a very common pattern in almost all blockchain and distributed systems: using private keys to sign messages, and using public keys as identities.

RSA and DSA are both non-elliptic signature schemes that are commonly known to date. ECDSA, short for **E**lliptic **C**ureve DSA, is the Elliptic Curve variant of the latter. Albeit, ECDSA is a subject of debate, due to its proven insecurities (13), and its performance. Hence, more recent, non-patented and open standard [2] curves, such as EdDSA, are the most commonly used. EdDSA, short for Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm is based on the open standard Edward-curve and its reference, parameters, and implementation are all public domain.

All in all, cryptography, and specifically digital signatures, play an integral role in the blockchain technology, and allow it to operate in a distributed way, where external messages can be verified from their signatures.

2.1.4.2   Hash Functions

Hash functions, similar to elliptic curve cryptography, are among the mathematical backbones of blockchains. A hash function is basically a function that takes some bits of data as input and returns some bits of output in return. All hash functions have an important property: they produce a **fixed sized output**, regardless of the input size. Also, a hash function ensures that changing anything in the input, as small as one bit, does result in an entirely different output.

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[1] The device that you are using to read this line of text has probably already done at least one operation related to asymmetric cryptography since you started reading this footnote. This is how relevant they *really* are.

[2] Unlike ECDSA which is developed and patented by NIST, which in fact is the reason why many people doubt its security.

Given these properties, one can assume that the hash of some piece of data can be seen as its **digest**. If the hash of two arbitrarily large pieces of data is the same, you can assume that their underlying data are indeed the same. This is quite helpful to ensure that some cloned data is not tampered with, in a distributed environment. If we only distribute the hash of the original copy in a secure way, everyone can verify that they have a correct clone, without the need to check anything else.

Albeit, a secure hash function needs to provide more properties. First, the hash function needs to ensure that no two different inputs can lead to the same hash. This - the situation that different inputs generate the same hash - is called a *collision*, and the probability of collision in a hash function should be sufficiently low for it to be secure. Moreover, a hash function must be a *one way* function, meaning that it cannot be reversed in a feasible manner. By feasible we effectively mean **timely**: if reversing a function takes a few million years, it is *possible*, but not *feasible*. The entire security of hash functions and digital signatures is based on the fact that breaking them is not feasible [1]. So, given some hash output, one cannot know the input that leads to that hash. Hash functions that have this property are typically called *cryptographic* hash functions. Cryptographic hash functions are commonly used, next to asymmetric cryptography, for authentication and integrity checks, where the sender can sign only a hash of a message and send it over the network, such as in the common **M**essage **A**uthentication **C**ode, pattern (14) (MAC).

2.1.4.3 Peer to Peer Network

From a networking perspective, a blockchain is a purely peer to peer distributed network. A peer to peer network is one in which many nodes form a mesh of connections between them, and they are more or less of the same role and privilege.

A peer to peer network is the architectural equivalent of what was explained as a **distributed** network earlier in this chapter. The opposing architecture is what is known as the *client-server* model, in which one node is the server and everyone else is a client. In other words, the client-server model is **centralized**, in the sense that only the server contains valuable resources (whatever that resource might be: computation power, data, etc.) and serves it to all other clients.

Unlike a client-server model, a peer to peer network does not have a single point of failure: there is no notion of client and server, and all of the entities have the same role, being simply called *nodes*. Having no servers to serve some data, it is straightforward to say that peer to peer networks are *collaborative*. A node can consume some resources from

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[1] And, yes, we are aware of quantum computing, but that is a story for another day.

another node by requesting data from it, whilst being the producer for another node by serving data to it. This is radically different from the traditional client-server model, in which the server is always the producer and clients are only consumers, and effectively have no control over the data that they are being served.

Each node in a peer to peer network is constantly talking to other neighboring nodes. For this, they establish communication links between one another. Regardless of the transport protocol (TCP, QUIC (15), etc.), these connections must be secure and encrypted for the network to be resilient. Both elliptic curve cryptography and hash functions explained in the previous sections, provide the technology needed to achieve this.

In the rest of this work, we are particularly interested in the fact that in a blockchain system, the networking layer provides *gossip* capability. The gossip protocol is an epidemic procedure to disseminate data to all neighboring nodes, to eventually reach the entire network. In a nutshell, it is an *eventually consistent* protocol to ensure that some messages are being constantly gossiped around, until eventually everyone sees them. Blockchains use the gossip protocol to propagate the messages that they receive from the end-user (the most important of which being transactions, explained in 2.1.4.5).

A distributed system must be seen as a cohesive system from outside. Thus, a transaction that a user submits to one node of the network should have the same chance of being appended to the ledger by any of the nodes in the future. Therefore, it must be gossiped around. This becomes more clear when we discuss block authoring in section 2.1.4.7.

2.1.4.4　Key-Value Database

Shifting perspective, a blockchain is akin to a distributed database with very high redundancy, namely one copy per node. One might argue that this is too simplistic, but even the brief description that we have already provided (see 2.1.3) commensurates with this. Transactions can be submitted to a blockchain. These transactions are then added to a bundle, called a block, which is then chained with all the previous blocks, forming a chain of blocks. All nodes maintain their view of this chain of blocks, and basically, that is what the blockchain is: a database for storing some chain of blocks.

Now we can explain why in figure 2.2 each block was linked with some auxiliary data. Next to the block database, most blockchains store other data as well, to facilitate more complex logic. For example, in Bitcoin, that logic needs to maintain a list of accounts and balances, and perform basic math on top of them[1]. To know an account's balance, it is

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[1]In reality, Bitcoin does something slightly different, which is known as the UTXO model, which we omit to explain here for simplicity (16).

infeasible to re-calculate it every time from the known history of previous transactions. That would be equivalent to an ATM machine re-executing all your previous transactions to know your current balance every time you use it. Thus, we need some sort of database as well, to store the auxiliary data that the blockchain logic needs - like, the list of accounts and their balances in our example. This auxiliary data is called the **state**, and is usually implemented in the form of a key-value database.

A key-value database is a database that can be queried similar to a *map*. Any value inserted in the database needs to be linked with a *key*. This value is then placed in conjunction with that key. The same key can be used to retrieve, update, or delete the value. For example, in a bitcoin-like system, the keys are account identifiers (which we already mentioned are most often just public cryptographic keys), and the values are simply the account balances, some numeric value.

Indeed, a more complicated blockchain, that does more than simple accounting, will have a more complicated state layout. Even more, chains that support the execution of arbitrary code (e.g. Smart Contracts (17)), like Ethereum, allow any key-value data pair to be inserted into the state.

One challenge for nodes in a blockchain network is to keep a **persistent** view of the state. For example, Alice's view of how much money Bob owns needs to be the same as everyone else's view. But, before we dive into this aspect, let us first formalize the means of *updating the state*: the **transactions**.

2.1.4.5 Transactions and Signatures

Transactions are pieces of information submitted to the system, that are eventually appended to the blockchain in the form of a new block. And, as mentioned, everyone keeps the history of all blocks, essentially having the ability to replay the history and make sure that an account claiming to have a certain number of tokens[1] does indeed own it.

The concept of *state* is the main reason why transactions exist. Transactions most often cause some sort of *update* to happen in the state. Moreover, transactions are accountable, meaning that they most often contain a signature of their entire payload, to ensure both integrity and accountability. For example, if Alice wants to issue a `transfer` transaction to send some tokens to Bob, the chain will only accept this transaction if is signed with by Alice's private key. Consequently, if there is a fee associated with this transfer, it is deducted from Alice's account. This is where the link between identifiers and public keys also becomes more important. Each transaction has an *origin*, which is basically the identifier

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[1]Tokens are the equivalent of a monetary unit of currency, like a coin in the jargon of digital money.

of the entity which sent that transaction. Each transaction also has a signature, which is basically the entire (or only the sensitive parts of the) payload of the transaction, signed with the private key associated with the aforementioned origin. Indeed, a transaction is valid only if the signature and the public key (i.e., the *origin*) match.

This is a radically new usage of public-key cryptography in blockchains, where one can generate a private key using the computational power of a personal machine, and store some tokens linked to it on a network operated by many decentralized nodes; that private key is the one and only key that can unlock those tokens and spend them. Although in this chapter we mostly use examples of a cryptocurrency (e.g. Bitcoin), we should note that an online currency and token transfer is among the simplest forms of blockchain transactions. Depending on the functionality of a particular blockchain, its transactions can have specific logic and complexity. Nonetheless, containing a *signature* and some notion of *origin* is very common for most use cases.

Let us recap some facts from the previous sections:

- A blockchain is a peer to peer network in which a transaction received by one node will eventually reach other nodes.

- Nodes apply transaction to update some *state*.

- Nodes need to keep a persistent view of the state.

A system with the combination of the above characteristics can easily come to a race conditions. One ramification of this race condition is the double-spend problem. Imagine Eve owns 50 tokens. She sends one transaction to Alice, spending 40 tokens. Alice checks that Eve has enough tokens to make this spend, updates Eve's account balance to 10, basically updating her own view of the state. Now, if Eve sends the exact same transaction at the same time to Bob, it will also succeed, if Alice and Bob have not yet had time to gossip their local transactions to one another.

To solve this, blockchains agree on a contract: the state can **only** be updated via appending a new block to the known chain of blocks, not one single transaction at a time. This allows to compensate for potential gossip delays to some extent, and is explained in more detail in the next section.

2.1.4.6   Blocks

Blocks are nothing but bundles of transactions, and they allow for ordering, which some-what relaxes the problem explained in the previous section, namely the race condition between transactions. To do so, blocks allow nodes to agree on some particular *order* to apply transactions. Specifically, a node, instead of trying to apply transactions that it has received via the gossip protocol, in *some random order*, will wait to receive a block from other nodes, and then apply the transactions therein in the same order as stated in the block. This is called block *import*.

Transactions inside a block are ordered, and applying them sequentially is fully deter-ministic: it will always lead to the same result. Moreover, in the example of the previous section, it is no longer possible for Eve to spend some tokens twice, because a block will eventually force some ordering of her transactions, meaning that whichever appears second will indeed fail, because the effects of the first one are already apparent and persistent in the state of any node that is executing the block. In other words, as long as a node im-ports blocks, the transactions within it are ordered and the aforementioned race condition cannot happen.

A block also contains a small, yet very important piece of data called *parent hash*. This is basically a hash of the entire content of the last know block of the chain. There is exactly one block in each chain that has no parent, the first block. This is a special case, and is called the *genesis block*. This, combined with the properties of the hash function explained in 2.1.4.2, brings about the tamper-proof-ness of all the blocks. In other words, the history of operations cannot be mutated. For example, if everyone in the network already knows that the parent hash of the last known block is H_1, it is impossible for Eve to inject, remove, or change any of the previous transaction, because this will inevitably cause the final hash to be some other value, H_2, which in principle should be very different from H_1[1].

All in all, blocks make the blockchain more tamper-proof (at least the history of trans-actions), and bring some ordering constraints regarding the order in which transactions need to be applied. Nonetheless, with a bit of contemplation, one soon realizes that this is not really solving the race condition, but rather just changing its *granularity*. Instead of the question of which transaction to apply next, we now have the problem of which

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[1]In principle, the probability of collision (the hash of some **tampered** chain of blocks being the same as the valid one) is not absolute zero, but it is so small that it is commonly referred to *astronomically small*, meaning that it will probably take millions of years for a collision to happen. As a malicious user, you most often don't want to wait that long.

block to append next. This is because, intentionally, we haven't yet mentioned *who* can propose new blocks to be appended, and *when*. We have only assumed that we *somehow* receive blocks over the network. This brings us to the consensus and authorship of blocks, explained in the next section.

2.1.4.7 Consensus and Block Authoring

The consensus protocol in a blockchain consists of a set of algorithms that ensure all nodes in the network maintain an eventually consistent view of the ledger state (both the chain itself, and the state). The protocol needs to address problems such as emerging network partition, software failures, and the Byzantine General Problem (18), the sate in which a portion of the nodes in the network *intentionally* misbehave.

For brevity, we only focus on one aspect of the consensus which is more relevant to our work, namely, the decision of *block authoring*: deciding who can author blocks, and when.

Recall that nodes in a blockchain network form a distributed system. Therefore, each node could have a different view of the blockchain, and each node might also have a different set of transactions to build a new block out of (due to the fact that the underlying gossip might have delivered different transactions to different nodes at a certain point in time). In principle, any of these nodes can bundle some transactions in a block and propagate it over the network, *claiming* that it should be appended to the blockchain. This will indeed lead to chaos. To avoid this, block authoring is a mechanism to dictate who can author the next block[1]. This decision must be solved in a decentralized and provable manner. For example, in Proof of Work, each block must be hashed together with a variable such that the final of the block hash has a certain number of leading zeros. This is hard to compute, hence the system is resilient against an invalid block, namely those that were authored without respecting the authoring rules of the consensus protocol. Moreover, this is provable: any node that receives a candidate block can hash it again and ensure that the block is valid with respect to Proof of Work. In this thesis, the terms "block author" and "validators" are used to refer to the entity that proposes the candidate block, and all the other nodes that validate it, respectively.

Definition 2.1.1. *Authoring and Validating.*
  Author: the network entity that proposes a new candidate block. This task is called block *authoring*.
  Validators: All other nodes who receive this block and ensure its veracity. The act of ensuring veracity is called *validating* or *importing* a block.

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[1] In some sense, if blockchains are a democratic system, block authoring is a protocol to chose a *temporary* dictator.

In a Proof of Work scheme, the next author is basically whoever manages to solve the Proof of Work puzzle faster.

Definition 2.1.2. Given the adjustable parameter d and a candidate block data b, solving the Proof of Work puzzle is the process of finding a number n such that:

$$Hash(b||n) <= d \qquad (2.1)$$

Here, d is usually some power of 2 which is equal to a certain number of leading zeros in the output.

Indeed, this is very slow and inefficient, to the point that many have raised concerns even about the climate impact of the Bitcoin network[1]. There are other consensus schemes, such as Proof of Stake, combined with verifiable random functions (20), that solve the same problem, without wasting a lot of electricity.

Nonetheless, we can see how this solves the synchronization issue in blockchains. A block serializes a bundle of transactions. The consensus protocol, namely its block authoring protocol, regulates the block production, so that not everyone can propose candidate blocks at the same time.

2.1.4.8 Interlude: The types of blockchains

So far, we have only talked about *permissionless* blockchains, which are the focus of this work. Nonetheless, now is a good time to mention that a permissionless blockchain is only one out of three categories of blockchains:

- **Permissionless** blockchains: A type of blockchain in which no single entity has any power over the network. Such networks are called permissionless because one needs no permission from any authority to perform an action. For example, as long as one pays the corresponding fee, one can always submit a transaction to a permissionless network, i.e. one cannot be banned by some authority. Or, one can always decide to be a candidate for block authoring, if one wishes to do so. One might not succeed in doing so (e.g. in a Proof of Work, weak hardware always fails to find a proper hash in time and essentially waste power with no gain), but one has the freedom to do all of these actions. Such blockchains truly adhere to the decentralized goals of the blockchain ecosystem.

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[1]Some estimates show the annual carbon emission of the Bitcoin network is more than that of Switzerland(19).

- **Consortium** blockchains: In this type of blockchains, users can still interact with the chain freely, but most *consensus critical* actions are not permissionless. For example, a chain might decide to delegate the task of block authoring to a fixed number of trusted nodes. In such a scenario, none of the mentioned Proof of Work schemes is needed, and the authoring rules can be simplified to a round-robin block authoring. Albeit, such chains are questionable because they don't really solve the main problem of making systems trustless. Such chains are called Proof of Authority, meaning that a node can author a block by the virtue of being a member of a fixed set of authorities (21). And from the perspective of the end-user, one must still *trust* in the honesty and goodwill of these authorities.

- **Private** blockchains: these blockchains use the same technology as Permissionless blockchains to establish trust between organizations, but they are not open to the public. A common example would be a chain that maintains government records between different ministries.

It is important to note that many aspects of the consensus protocol, including its complexity, change based on the above taxonomy. The permissionless chains will typically have the most difficult type of consensus, because ensuring veracity is quite hard in a decentralized environment where anyone might misbehave. Albeit, the rationale of the decentralization advocates is that by making the system transparent and open to the public, we actually gain more security comparing to hiding it behind servers and firewalls[1], because we can also attract more honest participants, who can check the system and make sure it behaves correctly.

Table 2.1: Types of blockchain based on consensus.

	Blockchain Type		
	Public	Consortium	Private
Permissionless?	Yes	No	No
Read?	Anyone	Depends	Invite Only
Write?	Anyone	Trusted Authorities	Invite Only
Owner	Nobody	Multiple Entities	Single Entity
Transaction Speed	Slow	Fast	Fast

Due to all this complexity, consensus remains a cutting-edge field of research in the blockchain ecosystem. In table 2.1, we show how the consensus is also a major factor

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[1]One reasonably might see this concept resonating with the Open Source Software movement, where open-source software is claimed to be more secure than a closed source one.

in the throughput of the blockchain, which is our metric of interest in this work. This correlation is later explained in 3.1.

2.1.4.9   Forks: A Glitch in The Consensus Protocol

Coming back to the *permissionless* block authoring schemes mentioned in 2.1.4.7, it turns out that a perfect consensus cannot exist in a permissionless network (22). Aside from problems such as a node being malicious and network partitions, there could be other non-malicious scenarios in which everything in the network is seemingly fine, yet nodes end up with different blockchain views. A simple scenario that can lead to this is if, by chance, two nodes manage to solve the Proof of Work puzzle almost at the same time. They both create a *completely valid* block candidate and propagate it to the network. Some nodes might see one of the candidates first, while the others might see another one first. Such a scenario is called a **Fork**: a state in which nodes have been partitioned into smaller groups, each having their own blockchain views. Most consensus protocols solve this by adopting a *longest chain* rule. Eventually, once all block candidates have been propagated, each node chooses the longest chain that they can build, and that is the accepted one. This chain is called the *canonical chain*, and the last block in it is called the *best-block* or the *head* of the blockchain. Based on the canonical chain, the state can also be re-created and stored.

Aside from malicious forks (that we do not cover here), and forks due to decentralization such as the example above, there could be *federated* forks as well. For example, if a group of nodes in a blockchain network decide to make a particular change in the history, and they all agree on it, they can simply fork from the original chain and make their new chain. This new chain has some common prefix with the original one, but it diverges at some point. A very famous example of this is the Ethereum Classic fork from Ethereum network (23). After a hack due to a software bug, a lot of funds got frozen in the main Ethereum network. A group of network participants decided to revert the hack. This was not widely accepted in the Ethereum ecosystem[1] and thus, a fork happened, giving birth to the *Ethereum Classic* network.

2.1.4.10   Merkle Tree and State Root

Recall from 2.1.4.4 that blockchains store some sort of **state** next to their history of blocks as well. We further explain the reasons for this design in this section. To recap, the state is a key-value database that represents the state of the world, i.e., all the data that is stored beside the history of blocks. States are mapped with block numbers. With each block, the

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[1]After all, it defies all the *immutability* properties of a blockchain.

Figure 2.3: Forks - The cannon chain and the forked chain both have a common prefix, yet have *different* best-blocks.

transactions within it could potentially alter the state. Hence, we can interpret this term: "state at block n": it means the state, given all the blocks from genesis up to n being executed.

First, it is important to acknowledge that maintaining the state seems optional, and it is indeed the case. In principle, a node can decide not to maintain the state, and whenever a state value needs to be looked up at a block n, all the blocks from genesis up to n need to be re-executed. This is indeed inefficient. On the contrary, maintaining a copy of the state for *all* the blocks also soon becomes a storage bottleneck. In practice, many chains adopt a middle-ground, in which normal nodes store only the state associated with the last k blocks.

Without getting into too all the details, we continue with a problem statement: in such a database, it is very expensive for two nodes to compare their state views with one another. In essence, they would have to compare *each and every* key-value pair individually. To be able to use this comparison more efficiently, blockchains use a data structure called a Merkle tree[1] (24). A Merkle tree[2] is a tree in which all leaf nodes contain some data, and all non-leaf nodes contain the hash of their child nodes.

There are numerous ways to abstract a key-value database with a Merkle tree. For example, one could hash the keys in the database to get a fixed size, base 16, string. Then, each value will be stored at a radix-16 tree leaf, which can be traversed by this base 16 hash string.

In such a data structure, we can clearly see that the root of the Merkle tree has a very important property: *it is the fingerprint of the **entire** data.* This piece of data is very important in blockchains, and is usually referred to as **state root**. In essence, if two nodes compute their individual state roots and compare them, this comparison would confidently

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[1]Sometimes referred to as "Trie" as well.

[2]Named after Ralph Merkle, who also contributed to the foundation of cryptography in (8).

Figure 2.4: Merkle Tree - A binary Merkel Tree. The root hash contains a digest of all the 4 data nodes.

show if they have the same state or not. This is very similar to how the existence of the parent hash in each block ensures that all nodes have the same chain of blocks: changing only a bit in a previous block, or a state value in this case, will cause the hashes to no longer match. Similarly, changing only one value in the entire key-value database will cause the state roots to mismatch.

Recalling the definition of author and validator from 2.1.1, we can now elaborate more on what a validator exactly does. A validator node, upon receiving a block, should check that the block's author is valid (for example check the proof of work puzzle), and then it re-executes all the transactions in the block, to compute a new state root. Finally, this state root is compared with the state root that the block author proposed in the block, and if they match, the block is valid.

We can now summarize all the common data that are usually present in a block's header:

- Block number: A numeric representation of the block count, also known as blockchain *height*.

- Parent hash: This is the signature of the blockchain prefix.

- State root: It is common for a block to also name the state root that should be computed, if the transactions inside the block body are executed on top of the afore-mentioned parent hash block's state.

Our definition of the basic concepts of blockchain almost ends here. In the next sections, we briefly explain concepts that are more relevant to the implementation of a blockchain, than to the protocol itself.

2.1.4.11 Runtime

We coin the term *Runtime* as the piece of logic in the blockchain that is responsible for *updating the state*. To be more specific, the runtime of any blockchain can be simplified as a function that takes a transaction as input, has access to read the state, and (as output) generates a set of new key-value pairs that need to be updated in the state (or the runtime itself can update the state directly, depending on the design of the system). This abstraction will be further used in chapter 3.

Definition 2.1.3. Generic Runtime. $runtime = fn(transaction) \rightarrow state$

2.1.4.12 Transaction Queue

By defining the transaction queue, we distinguish between transactions that are *included* in any block, and those that are not. As mentioned, a blockchain node might constantly receive transactions, either directly from end-users, or from other nodes, as their role in some sort of gossip protocol. These transactions are all *pending*, and their existence does *not* imply anything about the state of the blockchain. Only when, by some means of consensus, everyone agrees to append a block to the chain, the transactions within that block are included in the chain. Thus, a transaction can be categorized as either *included* and *pending*.

The transaction queue is the place where all the *pending* transactions live in. Its implementation details are outside the scope of this work, and depend on the needs of the particular chain. Nonetheless, we highlight the fact that the transaction queue is a component that sits next to the block authoring process. Once a node wants to author a block (or it just tries to do so, in cases such as Bitcoin, where some Proof of Work puzzle needs to be solved first), it will use the transactions that it has received and have been stored in the transaction queue as a source of block building.

Remark. The transaction queue is also sometimes called transaction *pool*. We prefer the term queue in this work because later on, we depend on the fact that a queue implies order while a pool implies no order.

2.1.4.13   Transaction Validation

Usually, a transaction needs to pass some bare minimum checks to even be included in the queue, not to mention being included in the canonical chain. Usually, checks that are mandatory, persistent, and rather cheap to compute can happen right when a transaction is being inserted in the queue. For example, the signature of a transaction must always be valid, and its validity status persists over time. In other words, if the signature is correct, it will *stay* correct over time. On the contrary, state-dependent checks usually need to be performed when a transaction is being *included*, not when it is being inserted into the queue. The reason for this is subtle, yet very important. If a transaction is asserting to transfer some tokens from Alice to Bob, the state-dependent check is to make sure Alice has enough tokens. In principle, it is wrong to check Alice's account balance at the time of inserting the transaction into the queue, since we *do not know* when this transaction is going to be *included*. What matters is that *at the block in which this transaction is being included*, Alice must have enough tokens.

That being said, an implementation could optimize the read from the state in some particular way to allow more checks to happen in the transaction queue layer (one of which is explained in the next section, 2.1.4.14). Although, it should be noted that transactions in the queue are not yet *accountable*, since they are not executed. In other words, a user does not pay any fees to have their transaction live in the queue. But, they do pay to have their transaction included in the chain. Therefore, if the queue spends too much time on validation, this can easily turn into a **Denial of Service** attack (DoS).

2.1.4.14   Account Nonce

We mentioned that signatures allow transactions to be signed only by an entity that owns a private key associated with the account. This allows anyone to verify a transaction that claims to spend some funds from an account. Nonetheless, given that the block history is public, this pattern is vulnerable to *replay attacks*. A replay attack is an attack in which a malicious user will submit some (potentially signed) data twice. In the case of a blockchain, Eve can simply look up a transaction that transfers some money out of Alice's account, and re-submit it back to the chain numerous times. This is an entirely valid operation by itself, since the transaction that Eve is submitting again indeed does contain a valid signature from Alice's private key.

To solve this, blockchains that rely on state usually introduce the concept of nonce: a counter that is associated with each account in state, initially set to zero for every potential

account. A transaction is only valid if, in its signed payload, it provides the nonce value associated with the origin, incremented by one. Once the transaction is included, the nonce of the account is incremented by one. This effectively alleviates the vulnerability of replay attacks. Any transaction that Alice signs, once submitted to the chain and upon being *included*, is no longer valid for re-submission.

2.1.5 Putting it All Together: Decentralized State Transition Logic

We close our introduction to blockchains by providing a final perspective on their nature. First, we enumerate some of the lenses through which we have seen blockchains:

- A distributed peer to peer network of nodes.

- A distributed database of blocks and states.

- A decentralized trustless transaction processing unit.

We can put all of this together into one frame by representing blockchains as **state machines**. This concept resonates well with our notion of state as well. A blockchain is a *decentralized* state machine. It is a state machine because the state-root hash at the end of each block is one potential state, and blocks allow for transition between states. Due to forks, one might have to revert to a previous state. It is decentralized because there is no single entity that can enforce transition from one state to another one. In fact, any participant can propose transitions by authoring a block candidate, but it will only ever be considered canon if it is agreed upon by everyone, through the consensus mechanism. Moreover, each participant stores a copy of the state. If a single node crashes, goes offline, or decides to misbehave, the integrity of the system is maintained, as long as there are enough honest participants.

2.1.6 Disclaimer: A Note About The Context of Technology

Before continuing with the chapter, we briefly address the issue of *technology context*. So far in this chapter, we have used simple examples from the banking world, since it is similar to Bitcoin, which is a well-known system, and it is easy to explain. Nonetheless, a reader who may have previously had some background knowledge with some other blockchain project X might soon find some details that we named here to be less than 100% compatible with project X. Moreover, we have even admitted throughout the text that some of our examples are not even exactly similar to Bitcoin (such as the state model, as opposed to the UTXO model).

Such perceived incompatibilities/inaccuracies are predictable to happen, as blockchain systems are a rapidly evolving field of science and engineering at the moment. Different projects diverge from one another, even in radical concepts, and experiment with new patterns. Nonetheless, we make the following assertions about our assumptions in this work:

- Whenever we build up a simple example (mostly with Alice and Bob) in this work, we do not tie it to any particular blockchain project. Instead, these examples are to be interpreted completely independently, and solely based on the relevant concepts explained.

- In this entire work, we aim to see blockchains in the most *generic* form that they can be seen. That is to say, we interpret blockchains exactly as we defined in 2.1.5: a decentralized state machine that can be transitioned through means of any form of opaque transaction. An example of this is the key-value state model that we used is more generic than the UTXO model[1].

To summarize, we have explained in this section only what we have deemed to be the most fundamental concepts of blockchains, and we noted whenever a detail could potentially be implementation-specific. This approach will persist throughout the rest of this work.

2.2 Concurrency

In this section, we introduce relevant concepts from the field of concurrency. As mentioned, the crux of our idea is to deploy concurrency in a blockchain system to gain throughput.

Concurrency is the ability of a software artifact to execute units of its logic (i.e. a *task*) **out-of-order**, without causing the outcome to be invalid (25). If done correctly, this out-of-order execution can be mapped to different hardware units and improve performance. The opposite viewpoint is a purely in-order execution, namely sequential.

We link this directly to our example of interest: a node in a blockchain system has a process that is responsible for executing blocks. By default, this process is purely sequential: all of the transactions in the block are executed in order, namely the same order as they appear in the block. Deploying concurrency *should* allow this process to divide the transactions within the block into a number of smaller groups. Then, these groups can be executed concurrently, without causing an invalid outcome.

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[1]We have not explained UTXO in this work yet, but suffice to say that you can easily implement UTXO with key-value but not the other way around.

The outcome of interest, of course, is only the aforementioned **state database** after all of the transactions of the block are applied. Specifically, as nodes in the network receive blocks and apply them to a common state, the only acceptable outcome is for all of the nodes to reach the same state after applying the block[1]. This comparison is done by means of the state root.

Definition 2.2.1. *Valid Block*: A block is valid only if its execution is deterministic among all of the nodes in the network, and leads to the same state root S', if applied on top of a known previous state S.

Remark. The deterministic replayability of the transactions is in fact the property that ensures that the state is, in principle, optional to keep around, because it is *deterministically reproducible* from the chain of blocks.

Thus, the **need for determinism is absolute** in a blockchain's runtime environment. This is in fact why blockchains are designed to work sequentially by default: because it is easy to ensure determinism when all the transactions are applied sequentially.

Given the execution model of a block, we can reduce the problem to a single node's hardware. Assume a node is attempting to execute a block, and it has the entire state loaded in memory. If a single thread executes the transactions within the block, the outcome is deterministic by definition. On the other hand, if multiple threads try to execute the transactions concurrently and access the state as they move forward, the result is moot. This is because threads will have to compete over access to the blockchain state and a typical race condition happens (26). The challenge is to allow these threads to cooperate and achieve concurrency, while still maintaining determinism. Therefore, we have translated our blockchain scenario to a typical shared-state concurrency problem[2]. In such a setup, multiple threads are competing for access to some shared data (the state), and the runtime environment needs to resolve the race conditions between the threads.

In the next sections, we present practical ways to use *concurrency over a shared state*, while still generating valid results. Generally, mechanisms that provide more control over the behavior of concurrent programs are referred to as *concurrency control*. Among those, we are essentially looking for those that will allow a valid block to be authored and re-executed, as defined in 2.2.1, most notably deterministically.

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[1]Note that this is only the case of block validation (block *import*). There is also the task of block authoring, which is actually more complicated, but irrelevant to the discussion of this section – see 2.1.1.

[2]We note that the determinism requirement is somewhat special to our use case and some systems might not require it.

2.2.1 Locking: Pessimistic Concurrency Control

Locks are a common and intuitive mechanism[1] for concurrency control. A lock is an abstract marker applied to a shared object (or, generally, to any memory region) to limit the number of threads that can access it at the same time. The idea of using locks in database systems that want to achieve higher throughput by using multiple threads goes back many decades ago (27, 28), among other fields.

The simplest form of a lock will not distinguish between reads and writes and the only operations on it are `acquire` and `release`. To access the data protected by the lock, first, the lock itself needs to be acquired. Once a thread acquires a lock, no other threads can: they have to wait for it. Once the holding thread is done with the lock (more accurately, done with the data protected by the lock), they release the lock. Upon being released, the lock is acquired by one of the waiting threads, and the process restarts. This process can easily ensure that some data is never accessed by multiple threads at the same time. The processor usually ensures that these primitive operations (`acquire` and `release`) are done atomically between threads. Such locks that do not distinguish between reading and writing are called a `Mutex`, short for mutual exclusion (29).

A more elaborate variant of Mutex is a read-write lock (RW-lock). Such locks leverage the fact that multiple reads from the same data are almost always harmless, and should be allowed - hence the read and write distinction. In an RW-lock, at any given time, there can be only one writer, but multiple concurrent readers are allowed.

Remark. We use the Rust programming language for the implementation of this work. Rust provides some of the finest compile-time memory safety guarantees among all programming languages (30). To achieve this, Rust references (i.e., addresses to memory locations) have the exact same aliasing rule: multiple *immutable* references to a data can co-exit in a scope, but *only one mutable* reference is allowed (31).

Locks are easy to understand, but notoriously hard to use *correctly*. A programmer needs to think about every single critical memory access, and acquire and release locks from different threads to prevent wrong outcomes. Even worse, immature use of locks often leads the programs to deadlock, i.e., reach a state in which all threads are infinitely waiting for a lock acquired (and never released) by another thread. These issues are common programming errors, but they remain very hard to detect and resolve (32).

Moreover, locks are a *pessimistic* mechanism for concurrency control: they assume that if two threads want to acquire the same (write) lock, their logic *will* cause a conflict to happen. Based on the granularity of the lock and the internal logic of each thread, a

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[1]Sadly, as we will see, the most intuitive way is not always the easiest to use.

conflict might not be the case all the time. This is exactly what the next section will address.

2.2.2 Transactional Memory: Optimistic Concurrency Control

Transactional memory is the opposite of locking when it comes to waiting. In locking, the threads often need to wait for one another. If a thread is writing, then all the readers and writers need to wait. This is based on the assumption that mutual acquirement of locks will always lead to conflicts, so it needs to be prevented in any case. Transactional memory takes the opposite approach, and assumes that mutual data accesses will *not* conflict by default. In other words, threads do not need to wait for one another, thus transactional memory is coined "lock-free" or sometimes "wait-free" (33).

In the context of transactional memory, a thread's execution is divided into smaller pieces of logic called transactions. A transaction attempts to apply one or more updates to some data, without waiting, and then *commits* the changes. Before a commit, the changes by any transaction are not visible to any other transaction. Once a commit is about to happen, the runtime must check if these changes are conflicting or not, based on the previous commits. If committed successfully, the changes are then visible to all other transactions. Else, none of the changes become visible, the transaction *aborts*, and the changes are reverted. The great advantage of this model is that if two transactions access the same memory region, but in a non-conflicting way[1], then there is a lot less waiting. In essence, there is *no* waiting in the execution of transactions, at the cost of some runtime overhead when they want to commit.

Transactional memory can exist either via specialized hardware or simulated in the software, referred to as *software* transactional memory, or STM (34). If implemented in software, transactional memory does incur a runtime overhead. Nonetheless, its programming interface is much easier and less error-prone than that of locks, because the programmer does not need to manually acquire and release locks. (35).

Transactional memory is likely to lessen the waiting time and conflicts. Nonetheless, it still allows threads to operate over the same data structure. This implies complications about commits, aborts, and coherence[2]. A radically different approach is to try and prevent these complications from the get-go, by disallowing *shared* data to exist; this mechanism

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[1]Textbook example: access two different keys of a concurrent hash map.

[2]The question of which changes from a local thread's transaction become visible to other threads and when, and under which conditions. We have barely touched this issue, which in itself deserves a thesis to be fully understood.

is described in the next section. But first, we briefly note a common trait of locking and transactional memory.

Note About Determinism

It is very important to note that both locking and transactional memory are non-deterministic. This means that executing the same workload multiple times may or may not lead to the same output. It is easy to demonstrate why: first, consider locking. Imagine two threads will soon attempt to compete for a lock, and each will try and write a different value to a protected memory address. Based on the fairness rules of the underlying operating system, either of them could be the first one. While the output of the program in both cases is *correct*, it is *not deterministic*.

The same can be said about transactional memory: if two transactions have both altered the same data in a conflicting way, one of them is doomed to fail upon trying to commit, and it is just a matter of which do it first. Again, both outputs are correct, yet the program is not deterministic.

Remark. A reader can, at this point, link our use of words "correct" and "determinism" to 2.1.4.7 and block authoring specifically. From the perspective of a block author, it does not matter what the outcome of a block is (i.e. which transactions are within it, which succeed, and which fail). All such blocks are probably *correct*. The first and foremost importance is for all validators to *deterministically* come to the same state root, once having received the block later. This is in stark contrast with the non-determinism nature of locking.

2.2.3   Sharing vs. Communicating

There is a great quote from the documentation of the Go programming language, which eloquently explains the point of this section: "Don't communicate by sharing memory; share memory by communicating." (36). This introduces a radical new approach to concurrency, in which threads are either stateless or pure functions (37), where their state is private. All synchronization is then achieved by the means of message passing. Like this, threads do not need to share any common state or data. If threads need to manipulate the same data, they can send references to the data to one another. In many cases, this pattern is advantageous compared to locking, both in terms of concurrency degree and the programming ease.

Nonetheless, we know that our use-case exactly needs some executor threads to have a shared state while executing the blockchain transactions. Therefore, we do not directly apply the message-passing paradigm, but we use it as inspiration, and take the possibility of message passing into account. We revisit this possibility in chapter 3.

2.2.4   Static Analysis

As mentioned in 2.2.2, transactional memory attempts to reduce the waiting time by assuming that conflicts are rare. This could bring about two downsides: reverts, in case a conflict happens, and the general runtime overhead that the system needs to tolerate (for all the extra machinery needed for transactional memory[1]). An interesting approach to counter these limitations is static analysis. *Static* refers to an action done at compile-time, contrary to runtime. The goal of static analysis is to somehow improve the concurrency degree by leveraging only compile-time information. In the case of transactional memory, this could be achieved by using static analysis to predict and reduce aborts(38). Similarly, other studies have tried to use static analysis to improve the usage of locking by automatically inserting the lock commands into the program's source code at compile time (39). This can greatly ease the user experience of programmers using locks, and reduce the chance of human errors to emerge. Similar to message passing, we take inspiration from the concept of static analysis in our design later in chapter 3.

2.3   Recap: Splicing Concurrency and Blockchain

2.1 and 2.2 cover the background knowledge needed for the rest of this work. To recap, we formulated blockchains as decentralized state machines that can be updated by the means of transactions. This state machine maps to a key-value state database. Attempting to deploy concurrency on blockchains is, therefore, very similar to shared state concurrency, plus the stark requirement of determinism. Shared state concurrency attempts to resolve the problem of multiple threads accessing the same underlying memory. We mentioned both optimistic and pessimistic concurrency, yet have not yet mentioned which one we use. This is yet to come, in the next chapter.

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[1]Which is even more if it is being emulated in the software.

3

A Novel Approaches Toward Concurrency in Blockchains

Don't share memory to communicate, communicate to share memory.
– Official Go Programming Language Documentation.

In this chapter, we build up all the details and arguments needed to introduce our approach toward concurrency within blockchains. We start with an interlude, enumerating different ways to improve blockchains' throughput from an end-to-end perspective, and highlight concurrency as our method of choice.

3.1 Prelude: Speeding up a Blockchain - An Out-of-The-Box Overview

Blockchains can be seen, in a very broad way, as *decentralized state machines that transition by means of transactions*. The throughput of a blockchain network, measured in transactions per second, is a function of numerous components, and can be analyzed from different points of view. While in this work we focus mainly on one aspect, it is helpful to enumerate different viewpoints and see how each of them affects the overall throughput [1].

3.1.1 Consensus and Block Authoring

We discussed how the consensus protocol provides the means of ensuring that all nodes have a persistent view of the state (see Section 2.1.4.7), and it can heavily contribute to the throughput of the system. Take, for example, two common consensus protocols: Proof of **Work** and Proof of **Stake**. They use the computation power (*work*) and an amount of bonded tokens (*stake*), respectively, as their guarantees that an entity has *authority* to

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[1]This categorization is by no means exhaustive. We are naming only a handful.

perform some operation, such as authoring a block. It is important to note that each of these consensus protocols has *inherently* different throughput characteristics (40). Proof of work, as the name suggests, requires the author to prove their legitimacy by providing proof that they have solved a particular hashing puzzle. This is slow by nature, and wastes a lot of computation power on each node that wants to produce blocks, which in turn has a negative impact on the frequency of blocks, which directly impacts the transaction throughput. Improving the throughput of Proof of Work requires the network to agree on an easier puzzle, that can, in turn, make the system less secure (2) (further details of which are outside the scope of this work).

On the contrary, Proof of Stake does not need puzzle solving, which is beneficial in terms of computation resources. Moreover, since the chance of any node being the author is determined by their stake[1], more frequent blocks do not impact the security of the chain as much as Proof of Work does. Recently, we are seeing blockchains turning to verifiable random functions (20) for block authoring, and deploying a traditional byzantine fault tolerance voting scheme on top of it to ensure finality (41, 42). This further *decouples block production and finality*, allowing production to proceed faster and with even less drag from the rest of the consensus system.

All in all, one general approach towards increasing the throughput of a blockchain is to *re-think the consensus and block authoring mechanisms* that dictate when blocks are added to the chain - specifically, at which frequency. It is crucially important to note that any approach in this domain falls somewhere in the spectrum of centralized-decentralized, where most often approaches that are more centralized are more capable of delivering better throughput, yet they may not have some of the security and immutability guarantees of a blockchain. A prime example of this was mentioned in table 2.1 of chapter 2.1.4.8, where private blockchains are named as being always the fastest.

3.1.1.1   Sharding

An interesting consensus-related optimization that is gaining a lot of relevance in recent years is a technique called *sharding*, borrowed from the databases field. Shards are slices of data (in the database jargon) that are maintained on different nodes. In a blockchain system, shards refer to sub-chains that are maintained by sub-networks of the whole system. In essence, instead of keeping *all* the nodes in the entire system synchronized at *all* times, sharded blockchains consist of *multiple* smaller networks, each maintaining their own cannon chain. Albeit, most of the time these sub-chains all have the same prefix and only

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[1]Using some hypothetical election algorithm which is irrelevant to this work.

differ in the most recent blocks. At fixed intervals, sub-networks come to an agreement and synchronize their shards with one another. In some sense, sharding allows smaller sub-networks to progress faster(43, 44, 45).

3.1.2 Chain Topology

Another approach to improve the throughput is changing the nature of the chain itself. A classic blockchain is theoretically limited due to its shape: a chain has only *one* head, thus only one new block can be added at each point in time. This property brings extra security, and makes the chain state easier to reason about (i.e. there is only one canonical chain). A radical approach is to question this property and allow different blocks (or individual transactions) to be created at the same time. Consequently, this approach turns a blockchain from a literal *chain of blocks* into a *graph of transactions* (46). Most often, such technologies are referred to as Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) solutions. A prominent example of this is the IOTA project(47).

Allowing the chain to grow from different heads (i.e. seeing it as a graph) allows true parallelism *at the block layer*, effectively increasing the throughput. Nonetheless, the security of such approaches is still an active area of research, and achieving decentralization with such loose authoring constraints has proven to be challenging (48).

Altering chain topology brings even more radical changes to the original idea of blockchain. While being very promising for some fields such as massively large user applications (i.e. "Internet of Things", micro-payments), we do not consider DAGs in this work. We choose to adhere to the definitions provided in chapter 2 as our baseline of what a blockchain is.

3.1.3 Deploying Concurrency over Transaction Processing

Finally, we can focus on the transaction-processing view of the blockchain, and try and deploy concurrency on top of it, leaving the other aspects, such as consensus, unchanged and, more importantly, *generic*. This is very important, as it allows our approach (to be explained further in this chapter) to be deployed on many chains, because it is independent of any chain-specific detail. Any chain will eventually come to a point where it must execute some transactions, be it in the form of a chain, or a DAG, with any consensus. Thus, concurrency is a viable solution as long as the notions of transactions and blocks exist.

Our work specifically focuses on this aspect of blockchain systems, and proposes a novel approach to achieve concurrency within each block's execution, both in the authoring phase and in the validation phase, thereby increasing the throughput.

3.1.4 Summary

Each of these methods brings about an improvement in the throughput (in terms of transactions processed per second) of the system in their own unique way. The question of *which one will be the dominant one* is too specific to a particular chain's assumptions, and outside the scope of what we are trying to tackle in this work. As an example, for some consortium chains where consensus is less of an issue, altering the consensus is likely to result in a significant throughput gain, without using any of the other methods such as sharding and concurrency.

Instead, we acknowledge that each of these approaches has its own merit and could be useful in a certain scenario. Therefore, we put our focus on concurrency for the rest of this work. We see concurrency as a universal improvement that can be applied to any chain. Moreover, It is worth noting that having optimal hardware utilization (to reduce costs) is an important factor in the blockchain industry, as many chains are run by people who are making a profit out of running validators and miners.

Finally, by seeing these broad options, we can clarify our usage of the word "throughput". One might notice that the first two options mentioned in this section (consensus, chain topology) can increase the throughput at the *block* level: more blocks can be added, thus more transaction throughput. This is in contrast to what concurrency can do. The concurrency explained in 3.1.3 is the matter of what happens *within* **a** block. Henceforth, by throughput, we mean throughput of transactions that are being executed within a (*single*) block. Similarly, by concurrent, we mean concurrent within the transactions of a (*single*) block, not concurrency between the blocks themselves.

3.2 Concurrency within Block Production and Validation

In this section, we explain in detail how a concurrent blockchain should function. Most notably, we define how a concurrent author and a concurrent validator differ from their sequential counterparts by defining their requirements. Note that these requirements are mandatory and *any* approach toward concurrency in blockchains must respect them, as long as it has a common definition of a blockchain as we named in chapter 2. As a reader might expect based on previous explanations, all of them boil down to one radical property: **determinism**.

To recap, the block author is the elected entity that proposes a new block consisting of transactions. The block author must have already executed these transactions in some protocol-specific order (e.g., sequentially), and noted the correct **state root** of the block

in its header. This block is then propagated over the network. All other nodes validate this block and, if they all come to the same state root, they append it to their local chain. An author that successfully creates a block gets rewarded for their work by the system.

3.2.1 Concurrent Author

We begin in a chronologically sensible way, with block authoring. Before anything interesting can happen in a blockchain, someone has to author and propose a new block. Else, no state transition happens.

A concurrent author has access to a pool[1] of transactions that have been received over the network, most often via the gossip protocol. From a consensus point of view, it is absolutely irrelevant to ensure all nodes have the same transactions in their local pool. In other words, from a consensus point of view, there is no consensus in the transaction pool layer. All that matters is that any node, once chosen to be the author, has a pool from which it can choose transactions. Then, the author has a *limited* amount of time to prepare the block and propagate it.

A number of ambiguities arise here. We dismiss them all in the following enumeration to be able to only focus on the concurrency aspect.

- Typically, the author needs some way to *prefer* a subset of the transactions pool, as most often all of it cannot be fit into the block. For this work, we leave this detail generic and assume that each author has first filtered out its *pool* into a new *queue* of transactions (noting that the former is *unordered* and the latter is *ordered*) that she prefers to include in the block. In reality, a common strategy here is to prioritize the transactions that will pay off the most fee, as this will benefit the block author.

- The fact that the authoring time is limited is the whole reason why the author is incentivized to use concurrency: the more transaction that can be fitted into the block in a limited amount of time, the more the sum of transaction fees, thus more reward for the author.

- A block must have some chain-specific *resource* (e.g. computation, state read/write, byte length of transactions) limit. For simplicity, we assume that each block can fit a fixed *maximum* number of transactions, but this limit is so high that the bottleneck is not the transaction limit itself, but rather the amount of *time* that that author has to prepare the block, bolstering the importance of high throughput. In reality, some

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[1]Also referred to as queue in 2.1.4.12, and sometimes called *mempool* in the industry.

blockchains have adopted a similar approach (i.e., a cap on *number* of transactions), or have limited the size of the block. Complex chains that support arbitrary code execution even go further and limit the *computation* cost of the transactions - see, for example, Ethereum's gas metering(49).

Having all these parameters fixed, we can focus on the block building part, namely executing each transaction and placing it in the block.

A **sequential author** would simply execute all the transactions one by one (in some order of preference) up until the time limit, and calculate the new state root. These transactions are then structured as a block. Concatenated with a header that notes the state root, the block is ready to be propagated. The created block is an *ordered* container for transactions, therefore it can be trivially re-executed deterministically by validators, as long as everyone does it sequentially.

A **concurrent author's** goal is to execute these transactions in a concurrent way, hoping to fit *more* of them in the same limited *time*, while still allowing the validators to come to the same state root. This is challenging, because, most often, concurrency is non-deterministic. Therefore, the author is expected to piggy-back some auxiliary information to its block, to allow validators to execute it deterministically. Maintaining determinism is the first and foremost criterion of the concurrent author.

Moreover, the second criterion is a net positive gain in throughput. The concurrent author prefers to be able to execute more transactions within the fixed time frame that she has for authoring, for she will then be rewarded with more transaction fees.

3.2.2 Concurrent Validator

A validator's role is simpler in both the sequential and concurrent fashion. Recall that a block is an ordered container for transactions. Then, the sequential validator has a trivial role: re-execute the transactions sequentially and compare state roots. The concurrent validator, however, is likely to need to do more.

More specifically, the concurrent validator knows that a concurrent author must have executed all or some of the transactions within the block concurrently. Therefore, conflicting transactions must have **preceded** one another in *some* way. The goal of the concurrent validator is to reproduce the *same precedence* in an efficient manner, and thus arrive at the same state root.

For example, assume the author uses a simple Mutex to perform concurrency. In this case, some transactions inevitably have to wait for other transactions that accessed the

same Mutex earlier. This leads to an *implicit* precedence between conflicting transactions. The author needs to somehow transfer the precedence information to the validator, and the validator must respect this order to arrive at the same state root.

3.3 Existing Approaches

In this section, we look at some of the already existing approaches toward concurrency in blockchains. These approaches are essentially a practical resemblance of what was explained in the previous section. While doing so, we denote their deficiencies and build upon them to introduce our approach.

Concurrency Control

Every tool that we named for concurrency in chapter 2 can essentially be used in blockchains as well, yet each takes a specific toll on the system in order to be feasible. All of these approaches fall within the category of **concurrency control**. We begin with the simplest one: locking.

A locking approach would divide the transactions into multiple threads[1]. Each transaction within the thread, when attempting to access any key in the state (Recall from 2.1.4.4 that the state is a key-value database), has to acquire a lock for it. Once acquired, the transaction can access the key. This process is not deterministic. Therefore, the runtime needs to keep track of which locks were requested by which thread, and the *order* in which they were granted. This information builds, in essence, a dependency graph. This dependency graph needs to be sent to the validators as well. The validators parse the dependency graph and, based on that information, spawn the required number of threads, and distribute the transactions among them. (50) is among the earliest works on concurrency within a blockchain, and adopts such an approach.

The details of generating the dependency graph with minimum size, encoding it in the block in an efficient way, and parsing it in the validator are being highly simplified here. These steps are critical, as they are the main overheads of this approach. The size of this graph needs to be small, as it needs to be added to the block and increases the network overhead. Moreover, the overhead of this extra processing must be worthwhile for the author, as otherwise, it would be in contrast to the whole objective of deploying concurrency. There are some works that only focus on the "dependency graph generating

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[1]A 1:1 relation between threads and transactions is also possible, given that the programming language supports green threads.

and processing" aspect of the process. They assume some means exist through which the read and write set of each transaction can be computed (i.e., by monitoring the lock requests that each thread sends at runtime). On top of this, they provide efficient ways to build the dependency graph, and use it at the validator's end (51).

The next step of this progression is to utilize transactional memory. This line of research follows the same pattern. More recent works use software transactional memory (STM) to reduce the waiting time and conflict rates. Similar to the locking approach, the runtime needs to keep track of the dependencies and build a graph that encodes this information. Different flavours of STMs are used and compared in this line of research, such as Read-Write STMs, Single-Version Object-based STMs, and Multi-Version Object-based STMs (52, 53). Nonetheless, the underlying procedure stays the same: some means of concurrency control to handle conflicts, track dependency, and use it to encode precedence, then re-create the same precedence in the validator.

Concurrency Avoidance

Next, we name an out-of-the-box work that takes a rather different path. Many studies in the blockchain literature use datasets from the database industry as their reference. Such datasets might have unrealistically high rates of contention. (54) is an empirical study that tries to determine the conflict rates within Ethereum transactions, a *live*, and arguably well-adopted network. While doing so, the study demonstrates a different, wait-free approach. In the concurrent simulator of this work, all transactions are executed in parallel, with the assumption that they do not conflict. If a conflict happens and a transaction aborts, it is discarded, and re-executed again at a later phase, sequentially. This essentially clusters transactions into two groups: concurrent and sequential. All of the concurrent transactions are guaranteed not to conflict. The sequential transactions do not matter as they are executed sequentially. Aside from their findings of the conflict rates in different periods of time in Ethereum, they also report speedups in *some* cases, not being too shy of the speedup amounts reported by (50), which uses locking.

This is an inspiring finding, implying that perhaps complicated concurrency control might not be needed after all for many of the transactions in *some* period of time, based on the contention of the transactions. In some sense, this work adopts a technique that we coin as **concurrency avoidance**, instead of **concurrency control**. As a consequence, the system need not deal with conflicts in any way, because they are rejected and dealt with separately in the sequential phase.

Static Analysis

Finally, we note that there has also been *some* work on pure static analysis in the field of blockchains, yet all of those that we have found require fundamental changes to the programmable language of the target chain. For example, (55) provides an extension to the Ethereum's smart contract language, Solidity, that allows it to be executed in a truly concurrent manner (by essentially limiting the features of the language). Similarly, RChain is an industrial example of a chain that has a programming model that is fundamentally concurrent(56), namely pi-calculus(57). Such approaches are also inspiring, yet we prefer devising an approach which does *not* need to alter such fundamental assumptions about the programming model, in favor of easy adoption and outreach.

The aforementioned 3 broad approaches (concurrency control, concurrency avoidance, static analysis) are essentially the taxonomy that we have found to answer the first research question, namely the different ways to utilize concurrency within a blockchain. We close this section with a remark about the scope of the referenced works in this chapter

Remark. Most of the surveyed related work name their work as approaches toward concurrency for **smart contracts**. At this point, it would be helpful to clarify that. The details of smart contract chains are well beyond the scope of this work. But, it is worth noting that a a smart-contract chain is a *fixed* chain that has a fixed state transition logic, and a part of that logic is to store codes (smart contracts) and execute them upon being dispatched. Moreover, since Ethereum is the prominent smart contract chain, all of these works present themselves with simulators that can hypothetically be implemented in the Ethereum node. To the contrary, we do not limit ourselves to smart contracts or any specific chain in this work; instead, we build upon the idea that the future of blockchains will not be a *single* chain (chain maximalism), but rather an abundance of domain-specific chains interoperating with one another. To achieve this, one needs to think in the context of a framework for building blockchains, not a particular blockchain per se.

3.4   Our Approach

In this section, we describe our approach towards concurrency in a blockchain runtime, both in the authoring phase and in the validation phase. First, we begin by drawing a conclusion from the surveyed studies in 3.3.

3.4.1   Core Idea: Finding a New Balance

We begin by pointing out that all of the mentioned works, regardless of their outcome, produce a sizable amount of overhead. We think these overheads are preventable and argue that perhaps a different approach can prevent them altogether.

Both locking and transactional memory results in a sizeable overhead while authoring. This is mostly hidden in some sort of runtime overhead, for example, the need to keep track of locking order, and consequently to parse it into a dependency graph. Moreover, this dependency graph inevitably increases the block size, because the dependency graph needs to be propagated to all other nodes. Finally, the validator also needs to tolerate the overhead of parsing the dependency graph and making informed, potentially complicated decisions based upon it. These are all overheads compared to the basic sequential model. In essence, we express skepticism toward these complex runtime machinery to deal with conflicts, and record precedence.

On the other hand, the pure *concurrency avoidance* model is likely to fail under any workload with some non-negligible degree of contention, because it basically falls back to the sequential model where most transactions are aborted and moved to the sequential model. Results from (54) show the same trend.

On the contrary, we aim to minimize these overheads by finding a new balance between the "concurrency control" and "concurrency avoidance" models. Moreover, we find a new balance between "runtime" and "static" as well. While *some* runtime apparatus is needed to orchestrate the execution and prevent chaos, tracking all dependencies is likely to be too much. Similarly, while a purely static approach toward concurrency is a radical change to the programmable language of a chain, we claim that *some* static information could nudge the runtime to the right path.

3.4.2 Key Ideas: Almost Wait-Free, Delegation, and Pseudo-Static

Our approach is based on three key pivotal ideas, explained in the next sections.

3.4.2.1 Almost Wait-Free: "Taintable" State

We have already seen that locking is a common primitive to achieve shared-state concurrency. In our approach, we relax this primitive such that any access to a shared state by a thread **does not incur long waiting times**, but instead, it might *immediately* fail. To do so, we link each key in the state database with a **taint** value. If a key has never been accessed before, it is untainted. Once it is accessed by any thread (regardless of the type of operation being read or write), it is tainted by the identifier of that accessor thread. Henceforth, any access to this key by any other thread fails, returning the identifier of the original tainter (aka, *owner*) of the key. As we shall see in the implementation (see 4),

this approach is *almost* wait-free, meaning that threads almost always proceed immediately with any state operation. Indeed, a thread can always freely access keys that it has already tainted before.

3.4.2.2 Not Control, Nor Avoidance: Concurrency Delegation

If a thread, in the process of executing a transaction, tries to access a tainted state key, it forwards this transaction to the owner of that key. By doing so, a thread basically *delegates* the task of executing a transaction concurrently to another thread because it cannot meet the state-access requirements of the transactions itself; based on the available error information, the recipient (i.e., the owner of the failing state key) is more likely to be capable of doing that. This is the middle ground between *concurrency avoidance* and *concurrency control*, which we have coined *concurrency delegation*.

Compared to concurrency control, threads in the concurrency delegation model do not try to resolve contention in any sophisticated way. Instead, they simply delegate (aka, *forward*) the transactions to whomever they think *might* be able to execute them successfully. There is no waiting involved, and no record is kept about access precedence.

On the other hand, compared with concurrency avoidance, concurrency delegation does not automatically assume that just because a transaction's state operation has failed, the transaction cannot be executed in any concurrent way. Instead, the transaction might be executable by another thread, which is known to be the owner of the problematic state key. Therefore, instead of immediately being discarded (and potentially executed sequentially at the end), each transaction is given a second chance to succeed in a concurrent fashion.

Finally, if a transaction is already forwarded and still cannot be executed, (only) then it is forwarded to a sequential queue to be dealt with later. We name such transactions **orphans**. This implies that each transaction is at most forwarded twice: once to another potential recipient, and next, when needed, to be declared as an orphan.

Why is "a failing transaction that has already been forwarded once" considered an orphan? We present an example to make this clearer: assume thread $T2$ receives a forwarded transaction from $T1$. Based on the protocol of delegation, we know that this transaction must have at least one key which is owned by $T2$, because $T1$ failed to access it and thus forwarded it to $T2$. Moreover, if the transaction still fails, it means that it has at least one other key that is owned by some other thread $T3$. This implies that $T2$ is not able to execute this transaction, and any further recipient of this transaction, including $T3$, will also fail to execute it because the transaction has at least one key owned by $T2$.

Therefore, no transaction ever needs to be forwarded more than once. A transaction can be forwarded at most once, and thereafter it is considered to be an orphan.

3.4.2.3 Pseudo-Static

We predict that concurrency delegation works well when threads need to seldom forward transactions to one another. In the delegation model, the transactions need to be *initially* distributed between the threads in some educated and effective way to minimize forwarding. This is where we turn to *pseudo-static heuristics* in the form of a hint. We use the term "*pseudo-static*" because we do not mean information that is necessarily available at compile-time, but is rather known *before* a particular transaction is executed. In other words, the information is *static with respect to the lifetime of a transaction* and can be inferred without the need to *execute* the transaction, but rather by just *inspecting* it.

Our approach is based upon these key ideas: taintable state, concurrency delegation, and pseudo-static hints. In the next section, we connect these ideas and depict how they work together in the form of a unified algorithm.

3.4.3 Baseline Algorithm

We first look into the baseline algorithm, which essentially combines the concurrency delegation and the taintable state, without any static heuristics. We consider a single master thread (henceforth called "master"), and 4[1] worker threads (henceforth called "workers"), each having the ability to send messages over channels to one another. The master has access to a potentially unbounded queue of (*ordered*[2], ready to execute) transactions. Moreover, it has an (initially) empty queue of orphan transactions, to which workers can forward transactions. Additionally, each worker has a local queue, to which the master and other workers can send transactions. The master and all workers share a reference to the same state database, S, which follows the logic of a taintable state as explained in 3.4.2.1.

Remark. As we will see, it is crucial to remember that both the transaction queue and the block are **ordered** containers for transactions. In other words, they both act like an ordered `list`/`array`/`vector` of transactions. The order of transactions in the queue will end up being used to order the transaction in the final block as well.

The master's (simplified) execution logic during **authoring** is as follows:

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[1] Needless to say, all of the arguments in this section are applicable to virtually any number of threads.

[2] Recall that each node has an unordered *pool* of transactions, from which they chose an ordered *queue* based on some arbitrary preference.

1. **Distribution phase**: The master starts distributing transactions between workers by some arbitrary function F. In essence, F is a $fn(transaction) \rightarrow identifier$, meaning that, for each transaction, it outputs one thread identifier. Once the distribution is done, each transaction in the queue is *tagged* by the identifier of one worker thread. The distribution phase ends with the master sending each transaction to its corresponding worker's local queue.

2. **Collection phase**: The master then waits for reports from all workers, indicating that they are done with executing all of the transactions that they have received earlier. During this phase, threads might forward transactions to one another, and might forward transactions back to the master, if deemed to be orphan, exactly as explained in the concurrency delegation model. Both of these events are reported to the master and the tag of each transaction might change in the initial queue. Once termination is detected by the master thread, a message is sent to all workers to shut them down.

3. **Orphan phase**: Once all worker threads are done, the master executes any transactions that it has received in its orphan queue. At this point, the master thread is sure that there are no other active threads in the system, thus accessing S without worrying about the taint is safe. The transactions are executed sequentially on top of S, and their tag is changed to a special identifier for orphan transactions.

Then, the master is ready to finalize the block. By this point, each transaction is either tagged to be orphan, or with the identifier of one of the 4 worker threads. In essence, we have clustered transactions into $4+1$ *ordered* groups. The validator who receives this block respects this clustering and executes transactions with the same tag in the same thread. In the first 4 groups, the transactions within a group might conflict with one another (e.g. attempt to write to the same key), but they are ordered and are known the be executed by the same thread, thus deterministic. The transactions in the last group, namely the orphan group, are executed sequentially and in isolation, thus deterministic.

The worker side of the processing (with slight simplifications) is as follows:

1. **Depleting local queue**: Having received a number of transactions from the master (after the "*Distribution phase*"), each worker then tries to deplete its local queue. For each transaction Tx, the logic is as follows:

   If Tx is executed successfully, nothing is done or reported. This is because the master is already *assuming* that Tx is executed by the current worker, therefore

nothing needs to be reported. If Tx fails due to a taint error, it is forward to the owner of the state key that caused the failure. Note that at this point we know that Tx has not been forwarded before, because it is being retrieved from the initial local queue.

At the end of this phase, the worker sends an overall report to the master, noting how many of the transactions it could execute successfully, and how many ended up being forwarded. This data is then used at the master to detect termination.

2. **Termination phase**: Once done with their local queue, the workers listen for two types of messages, namely *termination* or *forwarded* transactions from other threads. Termination is the message from the master to shut down the worker. Forwarded transactions are those that another worker is *delegating/forwarding* to the current worker because of a taint error. The forwarded transaction is then executed locally and, if it is successful, the result is reported to the master. If the execution fails again due to a taint error, then the transaction is forwarded to the master as an orphan.

Note that in this case, reporting is vital, because a worker is ending up executing a transaction and the master is *not* aware of it, because the worker who finally executes the transaction is not the same as assigned in the "Distribution phase" of the master. This reporting is also needed for the termination detection of this phase.

3.4.3.1 Analysis and Comments on the Baseline Algorithm

A number of noteworthy remarks exist on the baseline algorithm:

Termination Detection. We intentionally did not describe how the master detects the termination of the collection phase, because, if we wanted to describe it, we needed further information from the worker's logic. Recall that the master knows how many transactions it has initially distributed between all the workers. Moreover, from the reports sent by the worker at the end of "Depleting local queue" phase, it knows how many of them executed in their *designated thread*, and how many of them ended up being *forwarded*. Also, recall that each forwarded transaction, upon being executed successfully, is reported to the master. Similarly, each forwarded transaction that fails is also reported to the master (by being forwarded to the orphan queue residing in the master thread). Thus, the master can safely assert that *Termination is achieved once the sum of "all locally-executed transactions at workers", "forwarded and successfully executed transactions" and "orphan transactions" is equal to the initial count of transactions in the queue.* At this point, the termination message is created and broadcasted to all workers.

Definition 3.4.1. Termination of the master thread's collection phase.
Assume N initial transaction. Each worker thread, upon finishing the "deplete local queue" phase, reports back $\{r_1, r_2, r_3, r_4\}$ respectively, indicating the number of transactions that each executed locally. Given D as the number of reports of transactions being forwarded, and O as the size of the orphan queue, termination of the collection phase is achieved iff

$$\sum_{t=1}^{4} r_t + D + O == N \tag{3.1}$$

Maintaining Order: Aside from termination detection, it is also vital for determinism that the master takes action upon the report of a transaction being forwarded. This is because **once the tag of a transaction changes, it is likely that its order must also change within the queue**. For example, if a transaction, initially assigned to T_1 is known to be forwarded and executed by T_2, it is important to re-order it in the initial transaction queue such that it is placed *after* all the transactions initially assigned to T_2. This is because, in reality, T_2 *first* executed all of its designated transactions and *then* executes any forwarded transactions. Recall that the queue is an ordered container for transactions and its order will eventually end up building the order of the transaction in the block.

Orphan Transactions. An orphan transaction is a transaction that has already been forwarded and still fails to execute at its current host thread, due to a taint error. We now represent this from a different perspective. In our concurrency delegation scheme, threads race to access state keys and, upon successful access, they taint them. Any transaction has a number of state keys that it needs to access in order to be processed. *An orphan transaction is one that has state keys being tainted by at least two **different** threads.* For example, assume a transaction needs to access keys K_1 and K_2. Assume thread T_0 is executing this transaction. If K_1 is already tainted by a T_1 and K_2 by a T_2, then this transaction will inevitably end up being in the orphan queue. The transaction is first forwarded from T_0 to T_1, where it can successfully access K_1, but still fails to access K_2 and thus orphaned[1].

Minimal Overhead. Our approach incurs minimal overhead to the block. In fact, the only additional data needed is one identifier attached to each transaction, indicating which thread must execute it (and the special case thereof, orphan transaction), namely the *tag*. This can be as small as a single byte per transaction, which is negligible. Note that transactions within the block still maintain partial order: the transactions of a particular

---

[1]An interesting optimization can be applied on top of this logic, which is explained further in 4.4.

tag are sorted within their tag. Only the relative order of transactions from different tags is lost, which is not significant, because they are guaranteed by the author to not conflict.

Validation. We can now consider validation as well. As expected, due to the minimal overhead and the simplicity of the baseline algorithm, the validation logic is fairly simple. Each block is received with all of its transactions having a tag. The ones tagged to be orphans are set aside for later execution. Then, one worker thread is spawned per tag, and transactions are assigned to threads based on their tags, and in the same relative order. The workers can then execute concurrently, *without the need for any concurrency control*, because they effectively know that all contentious transactions already have the same tags, and thus are ordered *sequentially within that tag/thread*. In essence, the validation is fully *parallelizable* and does not need any synchronization. Once all threads are finished, the orphan transactions are executed sequentially and validation comes to an end.

3.4.3.2 Determinism in Concurrency Delegation

Finally, we must address the most important requirement: **Determinism**. We prove determinism by showing that the validation and authoring both have the exact same execution environment, and the transactions are executed in the exact same order in both phases. In more detail, both the author and the validator spawn the same number of threads, and all of the transactions executed by any thread during authoring is re-executed by a single thread in the validation phase as well.

First, consider all transactions that are executed in their initially designated worker, based on the aforementioned distributor function F. All of these transactions are assigned a tag, and have some partial order within the tag. By design, they are also placed in their designated worker thread's queue with the same order, and thus executed in the same order. Consequently, they are, yet again, placed in the final block with the same order within the tag. Therefore, the worker thread in the authoring phase and the worker thread in the validation phase will execute *exactly the same* transactions, in the exact same order.

Next, consider the transactions that ended up being forwarded. These transactions are executed *after* the designated transactions of their final host thread. The master thread, responsible for building the final block, has to note this change and ensure that this partial order is maintained in the final block. The first step for the master is to change the tag of this forwarded transaction to the tag of its newly designated thread. Then, to ensure that the order *within the tag* is maintained, the master simply places this transaction at the end of the queue. This ensures that this transaction will be placed in the final block in such a way that it is executed after all the transactions that have the same tag. Then, we

can apply the same logic as the previous paragraph and assert that the order of execution of all transactions with a specific tag stays the same within one thread in both authoring and validation, thus deterministic.

Last but not least, the orphan transactions also need the same property to be executed deterministically: maintaining order. The master needs to make sure that all the transactions that are tagged as `Orphan` within the block have the same order as they were executed.

Given the deterministic execution of all types of transactions in our concurrent system, we conclude that our approach is fully deterministic, with minimal additional effort . Indeed, the only subtlety that needs to be taken care of is the re-ordering of a transaction in the queue (and consequently the block) when it is *successfully* forwarded.

3.4.4 Applying Pseudo-Static Heuristics

The previous section is a complete description of a concurrent system that is deterministic and can be deployed as-is, without any further requirements. Nonetheless, one can argue that this system might not be efficient in the throughput gain that it can deliver. This is because we said nothing about the distribution function of the master, namely F. While we keep this distribution function generic in this entire work, we make one important claim about it: using static information of the transaction can be *very* beneficial, and is key to high performance.

Static information is anything that can be known about a transaction, before it hits the runtime and gets executed. In other words, we are interested in any information that can be inferred from the transaction, *without* needing to *execute* it. A clear example of such information is the origin of the transaction (i.e., the sender account). Because of public-key cryptography usage, all transactions carry a signature and the origin account as a part of their payload. Therefore, using the origin as static information is permitted, because it is known even *before* the transaction is executed. Similar reasoning applies to the arguments of the transaction as well. These are information that is encoded in the payload of the transaction, and the runtime of the master thread (before starting authoring) can effectively use them to optimize F. On the contrary, consider the return value of the transaction. This is a piece of information that is not considered static with respect to the transaction, because it can only be known by executing the transaction.

Remark. Given the above paragraph, we denote that our definition of static is different from the term which is usually referred to as compile-time information. Therefore, we used the term pseudo-static in some places to delineate the difference.

We use this pseudo-static information to our benefit, by proposing a static annotation to be added by the programmer to each transaction. Recall that the underlying state of the blockchain runtime is a key-value database, so each state access is linked to a key. Moreover, if F can know the list of keys accessed by each transaction, it could create a perfect distribution where no transaction is ever forwarded or orphaned, because no thread ever reaches a taint error while accessing the state. Of course, things are not simple. In practice, it is impossible to know the execution path of a complex transaction without executing it[1], therefore knowing the exact state keys that it must access is impossible.

The important point is to remember that the annotation can still be reasonably accurate without the need for executing the transaction. This annotation can state, in a best-effort manner, which state keys are *likely* to be accessed by this transaction, based on, for example, one of the common execution paths of the transaction. Listing 3.1 shows an abstract example of these static **annotations**.

Listing 3.1: Example of Static Hints

```
1  #[access = (origin.state_key(), arg1.state_key())] fn transaction(origin, arg1,
       arg2) {read(origin);
2  if condition {// more probable branch! read(arg1)} else {// less probable
       branch! read(arg2)}}
```

We observe a transaction, embodied as a function named `transaction`, which has 3 arguments: the origin and two auxiliary ones. Furthermore, we observe a macro[2] that is providing the state keys that *might* be accessed by this transaction. In this case, the second argument is not relevant, and seemingly only some state key of the origin and the `arg1` might be accessed.

This macro syntax is just one example - its specification is irrelevant at this point. What matters is that the transaction can provide the runtime with some easy-to-compute, pseudo-static information about the *state access* of the transaction (therefore we called the macro `#access` in listing 3.1). The runtime can then effectively use this information in the transaction distribution phase to come up with a better distribution that leads to less contention, and, consequently, to less forwarding and fewer orphans.

Remark. One might question: why is the system limited by the halting problem and cannot pre-execute all transactions in the first place? This is partially answered in the transaction validation section (see 2.1.4.13). The more detailed reason is that this static hinting must fit into the transaction validation pipeline, because the transactions for which we are keen

---

[1]An interested reader can refer to the "Halting problem" for a formal representation of this issue (58).
[2]This style refers to the Rust programming language, but is applicable to any other compiled language as well.

to know the access keys are not yet included in any block, thus not accountable. In short, executing all transactions in-order pool is an easy Denial Of Service attack vector, especially in chains that allow arbitrary code execution by the user.

3.4.5 System Architecture

In this section, we bring 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 into one picture, and explain the entire system architecture. The all-in-one system architecture is presented in Figure 3.1. In the following paragraph, we explain all its components, as indicated by the labels in the figure, finally connecting all the dots of our concurrent system as we move forward.

Figure 3.1: Overall System Architecture. -

- **1** shows the taintable state. We can see that each cell is not merely a key-value pair, but rather a (`taint, key, value`) triplet. Some keys are not tainted (`None`), while some are already tainted by a thread because they have been accessed by it. Access to each of the keys by a thread succeeds if the key is untainted, or is tainted by the accessor thread. Else, an error is returned, notifying the identifier of the thread that owns the key.

- **2** emphasizes the need of all threads to access the state; ideally, this access is wait-free. Any access to a key in the state either *immediately* succeeds, in which case the key is tainted. Else, it is *immediately* rejected because of a taint error.

- **3** shows the communication channels between the master and workers. These channels allow all of the threads to communicate by means of sending messages to one another. Most often these messages are simply a transaction to be forwarded. It is worth noting that worker threads can also communicate in the same manner.

- **4** indicates the local queue of each thread. This is where the transactions that the master thread designates to each thread live until they are executed. Needless to say, this queue is also ordered.

- **5** identifies the orphan queue, where the master thread maintains an ordered queue of transactions that are essentially rejected by the workers and need to be executed in a second sequential phase. Once all the workers are done accessing the state, the master thread exclusively starts using the state (essentially ignoring all the taint values) and executes all the orphan transactions sequentially.

- **6** importantly depicts the transaction distributor component of the master thread. This component is invoked prior to the process of authoring to tag all the transactions that are ready to be executed in the transaction queue. This effectively determines which thread gets to execute which transactions.

- **7** is the transaction queue, where an ordered subset of the transaction pool is verified and awaiting to be delegated to worker threads.

With this overall blueprint of the system's architecture, we conclude the design of Sonic-Chain and move forward to the next chapter, where we cover some of the implementation details of our prototype.

4

Implementation

> *Rust is like a futuristic laser gun with an almost AI-like foot detector that turns the safety on when it recognizes your foot.*
>
> – u/goofbe on reddit

In this chapter, we bring the system architecture mentioned at the end of the chapter 3 closer to a running prototype. This chapter is by no means extensive since there are many many implementation details that could be worth noting. Nonetheless, in favor of brevity, we minimize the details to only those that:

- Are important with regards to the evaluation of the system.

- Impose a particular practical challenge that we find interesting.

The entire source code of the prototype is available as free and open-source software (59).

For the implementation, we use the Rust programming language (60). Being backed by Mozilla, Rust has a lot to offer in the domain of system programming and low-level applications, such as a blockchain runtime. Rust is a unique language, among the few rare ones in which one can claim that the learning curve is indeed steep, as mastering it is *not* just a matter of learning the new syntax. One of the reasons for this learning curve is Rust's compile-time memory management system, which means all allocations and de-allocations are inferred and checked *at compile time*. This ensures that the program is memory-safe, even in a multi-threaded context[1], whilst having no garbage collector at runtime. Rust delivers, in some sense, the performance of C, combined with the abstractions and safety features of Java or C#(30).

---

[1]The Rust community often uses the term "Fearless Concurrency" for this combination – memory safety and concurrency (61)

Remark. We assume some basic Rust knowledge in the rest of this chapter. An interested reader without any Rust experience can also follow, yet they are likely to have to look up some types and concepts in the documentation.

Lastly, it is worth mentioning that our choice is not merely out of interest. In the last few years, Rust has been heavily invested in, by big blockchains companies and in their research (62).

4.1 The Rust Standard Library

First, we explain some of the primitive types available in Rust's standard library that we use in our implementation. Note that these types are merely *our choice* for this implementation. Although similar data types from other libraries (or *crates*, in the Rust jargon) are also acceptable, we prefer to limit ourselves to the standard library and remain dependency-free in our proof-of-concept implementation.

4.1.1 State: HashMap and Locks

For the taintable state, we need a data type that is *similar* to a typical concurrent `HashMap`(63), yet has slight differences. Rust does not provide a concurrent HashMap in the standard library, so the way to go is to implement our own custom data structure. To implement this, we use a `HashMap` and a `RwLock`, both of which are provided by the standard library. The HashMap behaves just like a typical `HashMap` in any programming language. The `RwLock` is a locking primitive with read-write distinction, where multiple *read* requests can be done at the same time, while a *write* request will block access of all-but-one requests.

Like most data types in languages that support generics, Rust's default `HashMap` is generic over both the key and value type that it uses. The final `HashMap` is using opaque byte arrays as both the key and value type. For the keys, we do our own hashing and concatenation to compute the location (i.e., the final key) of any given state variable. For example, to compute the key of where the balance of an account is stored, we compute: `"balances:balance_of".hash() + accountId.hash()` and use the final byte array as the key. As for the values, to be able to store values of different types in the same map, we encode all values to a binary format, thus, a byte array is used.

Listing 4.1: Key and Value Types (with slight simplification – see 4.8).

```
1  /// The key type.
2  type Key = Vec<u8>;
3  /// The value type.
```

```
4   type Value = Vec<u8>;
5
6   /// Final State layout.
7   type State = HashMap<Key, Value>;
```

Listing 4.1 shows how the final state type is created. Namely, we alias the state to be a hashmap with both key and values being opaque byte arrays.

Remark. A careful reader might notice at this point that we explained how we build the *key* byte array (hashing and concatenation), yet we have not yet discussed how the value byte array is built. This will be explained in 4.5.

4.1.2   Threading Model

In short, Rust's threading model is `1:1`: each thread will be mapped to an operating system thread (which sometimes directly maps to a hardware thread). Naturally, this means that the overhead of spawning new threads is not negligible, but there are no additional runtime overheads. This justifies using a small number of threads and assigning a large number of transactions to each, rather than, for example, creating one thread per transaction.

The main purpose of this decision is for Rust to remain a *runtime-free* programming language(64), meaning that there is zero-to-minimal runtime in the final binary. The opposite of the `1:1` threading model is the `N:M` model, also known as *green threads*. Such threads are lightweight, and do not map to a hardware/operating-system thread in any way. Instead, they are a software abstraction and are handled by a runtime[1]. Therefore, a language that wants to support green threads needs some sizeable runtime machinery to be able to handle that.

4.1.3   Communication

For communication, we use multi-producer-single-consumer(66) (`mpsc` for short) channels - the only type available in the standard library. 3.1 depicted the communication medium for the threads as something similar to a bus, where all threads can directly communicate with all other threads. In reality, the layout of the channels is a bit more complicated.

The process of using Rust's `mpsc` channels is such that each channel has one receiver and one producer handle, and the producer handle can be freely copied into different threads (while the the receiver cannot be copied around – this is ensured by Rust's compile-time checks). With this approach, each thread has an `mpsc` channel and keeps the receiving handle to itself, while giving a copy of the producer handle to all other threads.

---

[1]tokio is one of the best known such runtimes in the Rust ecosystem(65).

Listing 4.2 demonstrates this process. A producer and receiver pair is created at line 2. Further down, two threads are created, where each receives a `clone()` of the producer. The receiver will stay in the starting thread, and it is used at the end to checks for incoming messages.

Listing 4.2: How Channels Allow Communication Between Threads (with slight simplification)

```
1   // In the local thread.
2   let (producer, receiver) = std::mpsc::channel();
3
4   // spawn a new thread.
5   std::thread::spawn(|| {
6       // this scope is local to a new thread.
7       let local_producer = producer.clone();
8       // note the cloned handle ----^^^^^^^
9
10      local_producer.send("thread1");
11  });
12
13  // spawn another new thread.
14  std::thread::spawn(|| {
15      // this scope is local to a new thread.
16      let another_local_producer = producer.clone();
17      // note the cloned handle -----------^^^^^^^
18
19      another_local_producer.send("thread2");
20  });
21
22  // check incoming messages.
23  while let Ok(msg) = receiver.rcv() {
24      // do something with 'msg'.
25  }
```

4.2   Example Runtime: Balances

Next, we demonstrate an example runtime to help the readers get familiar with the context of the implementation and how the final outcome looks like. Recall from 2.1.4.11 that a runtime is the core state transition logic of each chain. Our final implementation supports multiple runtime *modules* within, each having their own specific business logic. The simplest example of such a module is a `balances` module that takes care of storing the balance of some accounts and allows the transfer of tokens between them. We now enumerate some of the important bits of code involved in this module.

First, there needs to be a `struct` to store the balance of a single account, which we named `AccountBalance` - see listing 4.3 for the full definition.

Listing 4.3: Balance Strict

```
/// The amount of balance that a certain account.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Eq, PartialEq, Encode, Decode)]
pub struct AccountBalance {
    /// The amount that is free and allowed to be transferred out.
    free: u128,
    /// The amount that is reserved, potentially because of the balance being
        used in other modules.
    reserved: u128,
}
```

The state layout of these modules is simple: there needs to be one mapping, with the key being an account identifier and the value being `AccountBalance`, as in listing 4.3.

Listing 4.4: State Layout of the Balances Module

```
decl_storage_map!(
    // Auxillary name assigned to the storage struct.
    BalanceOf,
    // Auxillary name used in key hashing.
    "balance_of",
    // Key type.
    AccountId,
    // Value type.
    AccountBalance,
);
```

Note that the statement in listing 4.4 is a macro (denoted by the `!` notation), meaning that it generates a substantial amount of code at compile time. Most of this code deals with functions for generating the key of a specific account's balance, namely the hashing and concatenation method explained in 4.1.1. To recap, the code generated by this macro means: the final state key of an any account in the storage is computed as: `"balances:balance_of".hash() + account.hash()`.

Overall, the inline documentation of the listing should make it clear that: there exists a state *mapping* from `AccountId` to `AccountBalance"`. We have already seen what `AccountBalance` is, and `AccountId` is an alias for –no surprise– a public key.

Finally, we can look at the only public transaction that can be executed in this module: a transfer of some tokens from one account to another one, presented in listing 4.5.

Listing 4.5: Transfer Transaction

```
#[access = (|origin| vec![
    <BalanceOf<R>>::key_for(origin),
    <BalanceOf<R>>::key_for(dest)
])]
fn transfer(runtime, origin, dest: AccountId, value: Balance) {
```

```
 6      // read the balance of the origin.
 7      let mut old_balance = BalanceOf::read(runtime, origin).or_forward()?;
 8
 9      if let Some(remaining) = old_balance.free.checked_sub(value) {
10          // origin has enough balance. Continue.
11          old_balance.free = remaining;
12
13          // new balance of the origin.
14          BalanceOf::write(runtime, origin, old_balance).unwrap()
15
16          // new balance of the destination.
17          BalanceOf::mutate(runtime, dest, |old| old.free += value).or_orphan()?;
18
19          Ok(())
20      } else {
21          Err(DispatchError::LogicError("Does not have enough funds."))}
22      }
```

The logic of the transaction should be straightforward: (1) read the origin's balance; (2) if they have enough free balance, update the balance of the origin and destination, (3) Else, return an error.

The more interesting bit is in lines 1-4 of listing 4.5, where our long promised `access` macro is being used in action. The interpretation of the macro is basically as follows: this transaction will (most likely[1]) access two state keys, the balance of the origin and the balance of the destination.

4.3   Generic Distributor

Another noteworthy detail of the implementation is the distributor component. Recall that the distributor is responsible for tagging each transaction in the transaction queue with the identifier of one thread. We emphasize that we leave this detail *generic* in our implementation, similar to its position in chapter 3. This means that there is no concrete implementation of a distributor in our system. Instead, any function that satisfies a certain requirement can be plugged in and used as the distributor. The main detail to remember is that we *prefer* the distributor to use the hints provided by the `access` macro. because (see chapter 3) such a distributor will be a lot more effective at preventing transaction forwarding.

Two examples of distributor implementation are as follows:

---

[1]Recall that the `access` macro was supposed to be a best-effort *guess*.

- **Round Robin**: This distributor simply ignores the `access` macro and assigns transactions to threads one at a time, in a sequence.

- **Connected Components**(67): This graph processing algorithm is the exact opposite end of the spectrum compared to Round Robin, meaning that it *heavily* takes the `access` macro into account.

  Specifically: all transactions provide a list of state keys that they might access during their execution, via the `access` macro. This distributor builds a bipartite graph of transactions and state keys, where each transaction has an edge to all the keys that it might access. Therefore, two transactions that are likely to access the same state key end up being *connected*, because they both have an edge to that key. The connected component, as the name suggests, identifies these connected transactions. Every group of transactions that access a common set of state keys is grouped as a component. Once all components are identified, they are distributed among threads as evenly as possible[1]. In essence, keeping a full component as a unit of work distribution ensures that transactions that might conflict will end up being sent to the same thread, effectively minimizing forwarded and orphaned transactions.

4.4   Bonus: Optimizing Orphans

A closer look at 4.5 reveals that the first state access error is being handled by `.or_forward()?` and the second one with `.or_orphan()?`. The reason for this is quite interesting: Recall from 3.4.3.1 that an orphan transaction is basically one that needs access to state keys that are tainted by at least two different threads. From this, we can realize: if a transaction successfully accesses any state key, this means that no other thread can execute this transaction, because the key associated with that first state access is already tainted. Therefore, we can conclude a massive simplification: Only if the first state access of a transaction fails it will be forwarded. Any further failure is simply an orphan right off the bat.

4.5   Bonus: Taintable State

So far, all the mentioned details of this chapter are somewhat necessary to be able to comprehend the evaluation in chapter 5. Conversely, this last section is optional, and explains some of the details of the Taintable state implementation. This explanation does assume even more Rust knowledge from the reader.

---

[1]Using a simple greedy algorithm that we do not describe here.

Let us recap the situation in the state `HashMap`. We know that the state is basically a `HashMap<Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>`, and we already know how the key is constructed (hashing and concatenation of some prefixes and values). Two questions arise:

- How is the *value* constructed? For example the `decl_storage_map!()` in the balances module mapped an `AccountId` to an `AccountBalance`. How exactly is the `AccountBalance` encoded to `Vec<u8>`?

- We claimed that the state is almost wait-free. How can the underlying implementation support this? As noted, our tainting logic is very special to our use case, and the implementation of a typical concurrent `HashMap` will not be a good inspiration for us, because it would have different waiting semantics.

The answers are actually connected and are provided together.

Recall that our initial proposal was for the state to be wait-free, meaning that any access to the state would succeed or fail immediately. We can solidify this idea as such: *only the first* access to each key of the state *might* incur some waiting for other threads; thereafter, all operations are wait-free. It should be clear why we can obtain this property: if a key is accessed just once, it is tainted, and, therefore, all further accesses can be immediately executed based on that taint value. Specifically, following access from the owner thread succeeds, while a following access from another thread fails. It is, unfortunately, impossible to allow *all* accesses to be wait-free, because a write operation to a key that had not existed before could trigger a resize of the HashMap. Now it is clear why we titled SonicChain *almost* wait-free.

Next, we discuss how this behavior is implemented. First, we explain what the actual value stored in the state is. Listing 4.6 shows the data type stored in the state. Note that the generic `struct` has separate `taint` and `data` fields. Moreover, the taint is *optional*, meaning that it may or may not exist , as denoted by `Option<_>` in listing 4.6.

Listing 4.6: The state value type

```
1  pub struct StateValue<V, T> {
2      /// The data itself.
3      data: RefCell<V>,
4      /// The taint associated with the data.
5      taint: Option<T>,
6  }
```

The final state type is defined in listing 4.7. Note that the key type, the value type, and the taint type are all left out generic.

Listing 4.7: The final generic state type

```
1  pub type StateType<K, V, T> = HashMap<K, StateValue<V, T>>;
```

Now we can re-iterate on listing 4.1 and correct it, leading to the implementation in listing 4.8.

Listing 4.8: The final (**concrete**) state type

```
1  pub type Key = Vec<u8>;
2  pub type Value = Vec<u8>;
3  pub type ThreadId = u8;
4
5  pub type State = StateType<Key, Value, ThreadId>;
```

To recap, the `Key = Vec<u8>` is computed from hashing and concatenation, and the `Value = Vec<u8>` is the binary encoding of any data type that we may store in the state - for example `u128` for the case of balances (as seen in 4.3).

Finally, we can demonstrate the locking procedure. To implement the state, we wrap a `StateType` in a `RwLock` inside a new `struct`. This `struct` will then implement appropriate methods to allow the runtime to access the state - see listing 4.9.

Listing 4.9: The wrapper for `StateType`

```
1  /// Public interface of a state database.
2  pub trait GenericState<K, V, T> {
3      fn read(&self, key: &K, current: T) -> Result<V, T>;
4      fn write(&self, key: &K, value: V, current: T) -> Result<(), T>;
5      fn mutate(&self, key: &K, update: impl Fn(&mut V) -> (), current: T) ->
6          Result<(), T>;
6  }
7
8  /// A struct that implements 'GenericState'.
9  ///
10 /// This implements the taintable struct. Each access will try and taint that
       state key. Any further
11 /// access from other threads will not be allowed.
12 ///
13 /// This is a highly concurrent implementation. Locking is scarce.
14 #[derive(Debug, Default)]
15 pub struct TaintState<K: KeyT, V: ValueT, T: TaintT> {
16     backend: RwLock<StateType<K, V, T>>,
17 }
18
19 impl<K, V, T> GenericState<K, V, T> for TaintState<K, V, T> {
20     // implementation
21 }
```

The most interesting piece of code omitted in 4.9 is the `// implementation` part of

`GenericState` for `TaintState`: this where we define how and when we use the `RwLock` of `backend` in `TaintState`.

Specifically, each access to the backend will first acquire a read lock (which is not blocking, and other threads can also access it at the same time). Two possible outcomes exist:

- If the key is already tainted, the state operations will fail or succeed trivially: all non-owner threads will receive an error with the thread identifier of the owner, and all owner operations will succeed. Moreover, note that the inner data in the map itself is wrapped in a `RefCell`, which allows interior mutability(68). In essence, this means that the *owner* thread can manipulate the data only by acquiring a read lock. Our tainting logic and rules ensure that this will not lead to any race conditions.

- If a key is not already tainted (or non-existent in the inner `HashMap`), then the thread proceeds by trying to acquire a write lock. This is needed, because this operation is going to alter the `taint` field of a `StateValue`, and all other threads need to be blocked. Once the taint has been updated, the write access is immediately dropped, so that all other threads can proceed.

One final important remark is of interest. We mentioned Rust's concurrent memory safety with much confidence in earlier sections of this chapter, claiming that it can prevent memory errors in compile time. Nonetheless, we see that using a `RefCell`, we can alter some data, even when shared between threads, without any synchronization. How is this possible?

The key is that Rust does allow such operations in `unsafe` mode. The "unsafe mode" of Rust, sometimes called the "wild west" of Rust, is based on a contract between the programmer and the compiler, where the programmer manually testifies that certain operations are memory safe, and need not be checked by the compiler. In some sense, unsafe Rust is like a fallback to `C`, where memory can be arbitrarily accessed, allocated, deallocated, and such.

In our example, we have such a contract with the compiler as well. We know that:

- If all threads access the *taint* with a **write** lock, and

- If all threads access the *data* after checking the taint, via a **read** lock.

All race conditions are resolved, thus no compiler checks are needed.

Indeed, this contract needs to be delivered to the compiler by a single `unsafe` statement in our state implementation - listing 4.10. Here, `Sync` is a trait to mark data types that are

safe to be shared between threads. As the name recommends, it is a marker trait with no functions. `RefCell` is not `Sync` by default, because it allows arbitrary interior mutability. Because our `StateValue` contains a `RefCell`, it is also not `Sync` be default. The statement in listing 4.10, which needs to be `unsafe`, tells the compiler to make an exception in this case and allow `StateValue` to be used in a multi-threaded context. This allows us to wrap the `TaintState` in an `Arc` (atomic reference counted pointer) and share it between threads.

Listing 4.10: Unsafe Implementation in State

```
1  unsafe impl<V, T> Sync for StateValue<V, T> {}
```

5

Benchmark and Analysis

Rules of Optimization: Rule 1: Don't do it. Rule 2 (for experts only): Don't do it yet.

– Michael A. Jackson

4.2 introduced an example runtime module in our implementation, namely a balances module that can store the balance of different accounts and initiate transfers between them. In this chapter, we build upon this module and provide benchmarks to evaluate SonicChain, as described in 3.4. First, we begin by explaining the details of the benchmarking environment, including the data set.

5.1   The Benchmarking Environment

All experiments are executed on a personal laptop with `2,3 GHz 8-Core Intel Core i9` `CPU` and `32 GB 2400 MHz DDR4 RAM`. We keep the machine connected to power for consistent results, and run no additional resource-intensive software while taking measurements.

We measure the execution time of both the *authoring* and *validation* tasks. From the computed time, we derive the throughput in *transactions per second*. Recall that authoring is the process of creating a block, and validating is the task of re-importing it to ensure veracity; these tasks are performed by the *author* and *validator*, respectively. Moreover, recall that in our concurrency delegation model, by the end of the authoring phase, all transactions are tagged with the identifier of the thread that should execute them. Therefore, the validation task is fairly simpler. Furthermore, we set the `access` macro of the transfer transaction to point to the account balance key of the `origin` and `destination` account, as demonstrated in listing 5.1.

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Listing 5.1: Signature of the Transfer and its Access Hints

```
1  #[access = (|origin| vec![
2      <BalanceOf<R>>::key_for(origin),
3      <BalanceOf<R>>::key_for(dest)
4  ])]
5  fn transfer(runtime, origin, dest: AccountId, value: Balance) { /*
       implementation */ }
```

Then, we use this information to spawn two benchmarks, one with **connected components** and one with a **round robin** distributor. Indeed, we also use a **sequential** version as baseline.

The **dataset** is composed of two parts: the **initial state** and the **transactions**.

The initial state is the state of the world *before* any transactions are executed. In our case, this maps to a number of initial accounts and an initial balance in each of them. The initial balance can be parameterized. The second parameter is the number of transactions between the accounts. Recall that the only transaction in our balances module is `transfer`. For example, assuming 100 accounts and 50 transactions, each of the 50 transactions is generated by picking two random accounts (e.g., Alice and Bob) from the entire set of 100 accounts and creating a `transfer(Alice, Bob, Amount)` with a fixed transfer amount.

In this chapter, we only focus on a variation of this dataset that we call *the millionaire's playground*. This is because we assign a very large amount of initial balance to each account, ensuring that it is many times larger than the transfer amount. Consequently, all transfers will **succeed**.

Note that despite the transfer being a dead-simple transaction, the success or failure branches have different **state access requirements**. Namely, a succeeding transaction accesses the balance of both the origin and the destination of the transfer, while a failing one only accesses the former. This, next to the value placed as a hint in the access macro can lead to interesting combinations that are outside the scope of this chapter, but will be discussed further in chapter 6.

We assume that there are no time limits imposed on the author of the block, and allow it to finish executing all transactions. Of course, as we already delineated earlier, this is not how things work in reality (see 2.1.4.7). Nonetheless, this model allows us to be able to clearly see the throughput difference between the sequential execution and the concurrent ones.

From within authoring, we do not measure the execution time of the generic distributor. A critical reader might think this is a way for us to avoid taking the execution time of connected components into account. We strongly assert otherwise. In most modern

blockchains, authors know, well in advance, if and when they author blocks. Therefore, it is *very* sensible for them run the distributor procedure (be it the expensive connected components, or the cheap round-robin, or anything else) over their pool of transactions in advance, as a form of pre-processing. Even if they do not know when they might author a block, it is rather straightforward to *periodically/regularly* run the distributor on their local pool[1]. For the simpler task of validation, we measure the entire process of parsing the block and executing it.

We must also address the state storage issue. In a real-life scenario, the state database is likely to be kept on high latency storage, and therefore access to new keys might be orders of magnitude slower (particularly the first one, depending on the caching) than any computation. Our implementation keeps the entire state in an in-memory `HashMap`. We acknowledge that this is likely to be too simplistic and to compensate, we artificially insert `sleep` operations into the read and write operations of the final state implementation.

Lastly, we assume that both the authoring and validation uses the same degree of concurrency, meaning that everyone has the same number of worker threads, ready to receive tasks and transactions.

5.2 Benchmark Results

For the first demonstration, we fix the number of accounts and gradually create more (transfer) transactions between them. For all 3 classes of executions (sequential, round-robin, connected components) we generate 1000 members and increase the number of transactions from 250 to 2000. Both the validation and authoring times are measured. All executions utilize 4 worker threads. Table 5.1 presents all the results in one picture.

Despite our first benchmark being a simple one, it already unravels plenty of details and hidden traits about the system's behavior. Thus, we make the following observations:

Sequential

The sequential execution is nothing special. As expected, the execution time of both tasks increases linearly as the number of transactions increases. The throughput, as expected, stays more or less the same.

---

[1]Lastly, we anecdotally realized that running connected components is not a real bottleneck in graphs with sizes in the order of a few thousand transactions, and with our experimental setup.

Table 5.1: Benchmarking results with the millionaire's playground data set. All times are in ms. RR and CC stand from round robin and connected components distributors, respectively. "4" refers to the number of workers.

type	members	transactions	authoring (ms)	authoring tps	validation (ms)	validation tps
Sequential	1000	250	1899	**131.65**	1905	**131.23**
Sequential	1000	500	3639	**137.40**	3797	**131.68**
Sequential	1000	1000	7548	**132.49**	7508	**133.19**
Sequential	1000	2000	15053	**132.86**	14969	**133.61**
Concurrent(RR-4)	1000	250	898	**278.40**	704	**355.11**
Concurrent(RR-4)	1000	500	2161	**231.37**	1789	**279.49**
Concurrent(RR-4)	1000	1000	5517	**181.26**	4545	**220.02**
Concurrent(RR-4)	1000	2000	12788	**156.40**	10797	**185.24**
Concurrent(CC-4)	1000	250	625	**400.00**	453	**551.88**
Concurrent(CC-4)	1000	500	1210	**413.22**	887	**563.70**
Concurrent(CC-4)	1000	1000	9510	**105.15**	7162	**139.63**
Concurrent(CC-4)	1000	2000	19698	**101.53**	14820	**134.95**

Round Robin

The behavior of the round-robin distributor degrades over time. With a small number of transactions (e.g. 250), the throughput increase in authoring is more than 100%. As the number of transactions grows more toward 1000, the increase drops. At 1000 transactions, authoring is only a smidgen 20% more than the sequential throughput.

The reason for this behavior is of interest. Recall that round-robin will distribute the transactions between the threads with no particular knowledge. This is expected to cause a fairly large number of transactions to become forwarded or orphans. Our execution logs clearly demonstrate this behavior. For example, we have the following lines from the execution log of round-robin with 250 transactions.

```
1 [Worker#3] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(42, 20), from: 5
       }. From 42 executed, 42 were ok and 0 were logic error.
2 [Worker#1] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(45, 18), from: 3
       }. From 45 executed, 45 were ok and 0 were logic error.
3 [Worker#2] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(46, 16), from: 4
       }. From 46 executed, 46 were ok and 0 were logic error.
4 [Worker#0] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(46, 17), from: 2
       }. From 46 executed, 46 were ok and 0 were logic error.
5 [Master ] - Finishing Collection phase with [179 executed][32 forwarded][39
       orphaned]
```

Lines 1-4 contain the `AuthoringReport` message sent from the worker to master. The two numeric fields of this message are the number of transactions that got executed and forwarded respectively. As seen in the log, each worker notified the master that it failed to execute a portion of their designated transactions. Line 5 is the aggregate information log of the master thread once all the transactions, except the orphans, are executed. As seen in the log, from the 250 transactions, 179 were executed in their *designated* thread, 32 were

forwarded and executed, and finally, 39 were orphaned. This clearly shows the consequence of round robin's *blindness* toward the `access` macro. The amount of transactions that got forwarded and orphaned directly contributes to a reduction in throughput.

Now, we can see the equivalent log in the execution with 1000 transactions.

```
1  [Master] - Finishing Collection phase with [389 executed][146 forwarded][465
       orphaned]
```

With 1000 transactions, more than half of them failed to execute in their designated thread, and ended up being forwarded or orphaned. This further demonstrates why the throughput drops from 250 to 1000 in round-robin.

As for validation, we see that the validation throughput is analogous to that of authoring in each row, but slightly better. Moreover, similar to authoring, the throughput drops as we increase the transactions. It is very important to understand why. Recall that during validation, the validator simply uses the tags provided by the author to know which transaction needs to be executed where. Now, let us analyze the destiny of the imperfect transactions, namely forwarded ones and orphans. The forwarded transactions will be treated by the validator as if they were not forwarded. These transactions are still simply assigned to a thread, and the validator can effectively save time by executing them concurrently, in multiple threads. On the other hand, the orphan transactions are a *loss* of throughput for *both* the author and the transaction. If a transaction is declared as an orphan, not only the author, but also the validator both lose any throughput gains for that transaction. This clarifies the throughput trend of the validation in round-robin, and how it drops as we increase the transactions. The underlying reason is, in fact, that as the number of transactions grows, the number of orphans also increases in the round-robin benchmarks. Therefore, a decline in the throughput of the validator is also expected.

Connected Components

The outcome of the connected components is even more interesting. For transaction counts 250 and 500 we see much better throughput than both sequential and round-robin. This trend applies to both authoring and validation. Nonetheless, for transaction counts 1000 and 2000 we observe the throughput plummets down to rates lower than the sequential throughput.

The reason for this can also be explained by examining the logs. First, let us look at the same log lines for one of the *good* execution, namely 500 transactions.

```
1  [Worker#2] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(125, 0), from: 24
       }. From 125 executed, 125 were ok and 0 were logic error.
2  [Worker#1] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(125, 0), from: 23
       }. From 125 executed, 125 were ok and 0 were logic error.
3  [Worker#0] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(125, 0), from: 22
       }. From 125 executed, 125 were ok and 0 were logic error.
4  [Worker#3] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(125, 0), from: 25
       }. From 125 executed, 125 were ok and 0 were logic error.
5  [Master ] - Finishing Collection phase with [500 executed][0 forwarded][0
       orphaned]
```

Interestingly, this time all worker threads executed all of their designated transactions with no error, leaving no particular leftover work to do for the master thread. Such cases lead to slightly less than 4-fold throughput gain in authoring and a perfect 4-fold gain in validation.

Now let us examine what goes wrong in the case of 1000 transactions.

```
1  [Worker#3] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(8, 0), from: 29
       }. From 8 executed, 8 were ok and 0 were logic error.
2  [Worker#2] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(8, 0), from: 28
       }. From 8 executed, 8 were ok and 0 were logic error.
3  [Worker#1] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(8, 0), from: 27
       }. From 8 executed, 8 were ok and 0 were logic error.
4  [Worker#0] - Sending report Message { payload: AuthoringReport(976, 0), from: 26
       }. From 976 executed, 976 were ok and 0 were logic error.
5  [Master ] - Finishing Collection phase with [1000 executed][0 forwarded][0
       orphaned]
```

In this interesting case, jumping into line 5 of the logs that gives an overview actually unravels absolutely nothing: It still seems like all the transactions are executed in their designated thread. The problem is hidden in the number of transactions that each thread received. As seen in lines 1-4, the first 3 threads received a total of 24 transactions, while all the remaining transactions were given to the last worker thread. The reason for this is rooted in the number of accounts and transactions. Given 1000 accounts, generating 1000 transfers from them is likely to create a large blob of *interconnected* transactions. This is something that the connected components cannot deal well with. The outcome is that a very large chunk of transactions will be assigned to one giant component, consequently given to one worker thread to execute. This is, essentially, a typical work imbalance problem that can be seen in different fields of parallel and concurrent computing. Given this, the connected component execution, in this case, is basically sequential, *and* it has a whole lot of overhead from message passing. Therefore, the throughput drops significantly, even below the sequential one.

As for the validation, we can use the conclusions from the round-robin section to reason about its behavior. Recall that forwarded transactions are not an overhead for the validator, and only orphan transactions can cause an overhead. In the case of 1000 and 2000 transactions and connected components, the validation throughput is almost the same as that of the **sequential** execution. This is because the distributor essentially linearizes the transactions into a sequential group. Moreover, all of the overhead is for the author. Therefore, it is expected that the throughput of the validator is almost the same as sequential execution.

The results indicate different traits and characteristics of the entire system as a whole, and our two distributor components of choice. Round robin is an example of a system in which we use concurrency but without any pseudo-static hints. On the contrary, connected components is a prime example of scenarios where the decision of transaction distribution is entirely based upon pseudo-static hints. While the results are in favor of the latter, we also observed that in some niche scenarios, connected components is inflexible and therefore turns out to *not* be the best option. In the next chapter, we summarize these details into the conclusion of our work.

6

Conclusion

Simplicity is a prerequisite for reliability.

– Edsger Dijkstra

We have embarked on a long journey to reach this stage of our work. To make the conclusion more comprehensible, we first briefly recap what we have done so far, and what we have observed in the benchmarks of chapter 5. We then enumerate our conclusive observations in 6.2. We then answer the research questions in 6.3. Finally, we mention some of the future work to be done in 6.4.

6.1 Summary

We began by making minimal, yet important assumptions about what a blockchain system should look like, whilst explaining the details thereof in chapter 2. Looking back in hindsight, the most important assumption that we have is the key-value based *state* implementation. With the state, we can analogize a runtime executing transaction over a *state* to a thread in a multi-core CPU, trying to access *memory* as it executes code. We are then faced with a problem with a setup very similar to that of the shared state concurrency, except the absolute need for determinism. In essence, determinism is the main blockchain-specific challenged imposed on this problem.

We identified the de-facto way of solving this challenge in contemporary literature to be building dependency graphs and piggy-backing them into the block. With further investigation, we decided to not proceed further down this path: instead, we considered that a much simpler model can be sufficient, *if* we utilize all of the information available.

In chapter 3 we declared "*a much simpler model*" to be the *concurrency delegation* model, where conflicting transactions can be forwarded between threads when possible, or executed sequentially, at the end of the processing "cycle", otherwise. In essence, we

remove the chance of non-determinism by allowing threads to *only* execute non-conflicting transactions. In other words: *intra-thread* transactions can conflict as much as they want, but *inter-thread* transactions must not conflict at all. All transactions that generate inter-thread conflicts are deemed to be orphan, and will be executed sequentially. The main advantage of the delegation model is its final outcome: because of the absence of inter-thread conflicts, the only bit of data that needs to be added to each transaction is one final identifier about which thread should execute it. The validator is guaranteed to be able to deterministically re-execute the block, whilst gaining potential throughput benefits.

Furthermore, we make sure we "*utilize all of the information available*" by adding some pseudo-static hints on top of each transaction. These hints need to be provided by the programmer, and denote the state keys that are likely to be accessed by the transaction. These hints do not need to be highly accurate. Moreover, we restricted our hints to data that is cheap to know prior to the execution of the transaction. Basically, the dilemma is to, not solve, but rather find a way around the halting problem(58). To do so, we acknowledge that, most often, transactions are simple units of logic, with specific behavior given different inputs[1]. Given this, it is likely to be easy for the programmer to provide somewhat accurate hints about the behavior of a transaction.

We combined these features in a concurrent system for high-throughput transaction processing called SonicChain. Furthermore, we provided a prototype implementation of the system, where we included the `access` macro and the *distributors* - see Chapter 4. We used this prototype to evaluate an example application called "the millionaires' playground". We further benchmarked the performance of this example application. The results, presented in chapter 5, show throughput improvements for both distributor types, when executed against a synthetic balance transfer workload.

6.2 Discussion and observations

Our work has lead to the following observations.

The transactions are *key*. Needless to say, the type of transactions that are being executed, and the amount of inter-transaction state dependencies between them, is the first and foremost factor of throughput improvement. This factor trumps the underlying system as well. With a workload that is made almost entirely from interdependent transactions, even the best of systems probably fails to deliver high throughput. Moreover, with a

---

[1]Blockchain transactions are expensive pieces of code to execute, because they need to be re-executed by hundreds, if not thousands of other nodes. They are not designed to execute complex arbitrary logic, and are unlikely to evolve in this direction in the foreseeable future.

workload with almost no inter-transaction dependencies, probably most systems perform well. We showed, in our experiments, that our system is no different in that regard. Nonetheless, the important point is that we managed to achieve ideal throughput gains by effectively leveraging the static hints of the transactions.

Simplicity. Our work is, in some sense, a retaliatory demonstration against complicated concurrency control mechanisms deployed (mostly in academia) on blockchains. Our main goal was not to trump their results and prove that our system is better per-se. Rather, we showed that for certain workloads (that are –reasonably speculating– not far from reality), a much simpler system will also be enough. Moreover, the new and simpler system is actually beneficial upon a certain axis, for example, smaller runtime and block overhead.

Generic Design. This work is generic at two different levels. **First**, our `access` macro is merely one example of how the static[1] data that a transaction carries can be used. Implementations could vary, or different means of analysis can be used. The only point is to remain aware that the goal is to be able to infer the state access requirements of transactions **_without executing them_**. **Second**, with or without the **access** macro, we leave the decision of *how to use the output of static hints* to be generic in the form of component that we called the distributor. We do provide two such distributors, merely to illustrate the difference in complexity, and discuss their processing cost, but many other variants can be envisioned.

6.3 Research Questions and Answers

Based on this work, the answers to our research questions (formulated in section 1.1) are as follows.

RQ1 What approaches exist to achieve concurrent execution of transactions within a blockchain system, and improve the throughput?

Answer We identified the current usages of concurrency within blockchains to within one of the two categories that we depicted: concurrency control or concurrency avoidance. Both do result in a throughput gain. Full answer in 3.3.

RQ2 How could both static analysis and runtime approaches be combined together to achieve a new approach with minimum overhead and measurable benefits?

---

[1] As before, by static we mean static with respect to the execution of the transaction.

Answer We basically opted to reduce the runtime apparatus (coined: concurrency delegation) and instead compensate with pseudo-static advisory data that can complement the runtime to achieve an equally good result as concurrency control but with less overhead in validation. Full answer in 3.4.

RQ3 How would such an approach be evaluated against and compared to others?

Answer We used an empirical evaluation approach to measure the throughput gain. A *realistically* synthesized data set was created for this purpose. We concluded that our approach is sufficient to achieve ideal throughput gains (given the number of threads) under certain circumstances, which supports our claim that a simpler system could be well enough.

Summarizing, this work makes the following contributions:

1. A new runtime model for concurrency with minimal overhead, namely concurrency Delegation

2. A proposal to couple runtime machinery with pseudo-static information for better result.

3. A first prototype of such a system, namely SonicChain, implemented in the Rust programming language.

4. An empirical analysis of the system against realistic workloads.

6.4   Future Work

Our discussion and observations already hint at some of the future work that we propose to be pursued. Here, we enumerate such future work directions in more detail.

Inaccurate hints. We boldly mention that static hints do not need to be accurate for the system to work properly. Of course, they should not be totally unrelated. A good starting point to reason about hints is to look at the transaction's logic and proceed with the control flow optimistically or pessimistically. Which flow has the most state access? Which one has the least? The interesting follow-up question is how does the behavior of the system change when we move between different access macros? One might recall, the transfer transaction that we used before had a pessimistic access macro: we assumed the balance of both the `origin` and the `destination` will be accessed. This is not always the case. If the origin does not have enough funds, then the transaction finishes with an

error, and only the balance key of the origin is accessed (i.e. *tainted*). We excluded such experiments from our work here for the sake of brevity.

Probabilistic Hints. An interesting addition to the previous point is the mixing of probability theorems with the access macro. In essence, instead of relying on the programmer to provide the hints, the system could use benchmarks and previous data to build probabilistic models to accurately predict the access requirements of a transaction given specific inputs. This basically transforms the access macro from being (pseudo)*static* to *probabilistic*. At the very extreme end of this spectrum, one could even see the utilization of artificial intelligence to accurately generate the access requirements of a transaction.

Read-Write Taint. A comment on our work that can fundamentally question our approach is: why is there no distinction between read and write operations? This is a fair comment, and we agree that it is an unorthodox approach compared to the rest of the literature in concurrent computing. We did not opt for this approach in our work because of our strong preference for simplicity. There are many paths to follow along the line of read-write distinction. Most would make our system quite similar to a cache coherence model, where a write operation needs to be notified to others and potentially invalidate other previous read operations. This is already a red line for us, as we do not want to carry the burden of rollbacks, both because of their overhead and inherent non-determinism. A final interesting comment about this aspect would be that read-write taint is also likely to introduce read-only `access` macro hints. We foresee that it will be very useful for the distributor to be able to know if an access hint is read-only or not. All in all, we foresee interesting outcomes if the path of read-write taints is pursued, but express worry about how many complications it will add to the system, compared to the actual throughput gain. The obvious benefit of this addition to the work would be that threads that only *read* certain data will not block other threads.

Continuous Analysis of Real Chains. After all, everything that we have done here is in some sense hypothetical, because we do not use real transaction from a real chain. It is of great value for further studies to analyze different, domain-specific (e.g. Bitcoin) and general-purpose chains (e.g. Ethereum), and derive characteristics from their transactions (as it was already done in (54)). For example, an easy study is to apply connected components to different blocks of the Ethereum network and see how well they can be clustered into disjoint components with a balanced size. Will we face the same imbalance problem as with our experiments in chapter 5?

Hybrid distributor. In our work we did not explore the possibility of hybrid distributors. This can also be a fairly simple addition to the system, making it more versatile.

Even only within the two distributors that we discussed, we could see that it was not the case that one distributor is the best in all cases. Round robin had limited throughput gains, but it was still better than the ideal connected components in data sets that had highly intertwined transactions. We propose building hybrid distributors that potentially chose the best distribution function based on particular criteria, specific to the application and/or dataset at hand.

Nonce-aware execution. We explained what a nonce is in 2.1.4.14. A nonce is of importance to us because it is very likely to be the common key between many transactions that cause them to become interdependent. For example, imagine an account `Alice` that has state keys in different runtime modules. One for balance, and one for different each module. These state keys can be accessed independently, but bringing the logic of nonce into the picture, things get a wee bit more complicated. Now, all of these transactions need to write to the key that stores the nonce of Alice, and they are all dependent on one another. Things can get even worse. There could be special state keys that need to be accessed by *all* transactions (for example: a counter for all transaction in the block that is kept in the state). This forcefully makes all of the transactions in the block sequential if no special treatment is in place for them. And indeed, this is our main point: we omit such special cases from our work because they should be treated *specially* in order for any concurrency model to be sensible.

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