ASSIGNMENT7

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2019/5/6—My birthday, still working on assignment.

Q1.

1).

DHCP discovery: Broadcast

The DHCP client broadcasts a DHCPDISCOVER message on the network subnet using the destination address 255.255.255.255 (limited broadcast) or the specific subnet broadcast address (directed broadcast). A DHCP client may also request its last known IP address. If the client remains connected to the same network, the server may grant the request. Otherwise, it depends whether the server is set up as authoritative or not. An authoritative server denies the request, causing the client to issue a new request. A non-authoritative server simply ignores the request, leading to an implementation-dependent timeout for the client to expire the request and ask for a new IP address.

DHCP offer: Unicast

When a DHCP server receives a DHCPDISCOVER message from a client, which is an IP address lease request, the DHCP server reserves an IP address for the client and makes a lease offer by sending a DHCPOFFER message to the client. This message contains the client's client id (traditionally a MAC address), the IP address that the server is offering, the subnet mask, the lease duration, and the IP address of the DHCP server making the offer. The DHCP server may also take notice of the hardware-level MAC address in the underlying transport layer: according to current RFCs the transport layer MAC address may be used if no client ID is provided in the DHCP packet.

The DHCP server determines the configuration based on the client's hardware address as specified in the CHADDR (client hardware address) field. Here the server, 192.168.1.1, specifies the client's IP address in the YIADDR (your IP address) field.

DHCP request: Broadcast

In response to the DHCP offer, the client replies with a DHCPREQUEST message, broadcast to the server, requesting the offered address. A client can receive DHCP offers from multiple servers, but it will accept only one DHCP offer. Based on required server identification option in the request and broadcast messaging, servers are informed whose offer the client has accepted.[12]:Section 3.1, Item 3 When other DHCP servers receive this message, they withdraw any offers that they have made to the client and return the offered IP address to the pool of available addresses.

DHCP acknowledgement: Unicast

When the DHCP server receives the DHCPREQUEST message from the client, the configuration process enters its final phase. The acknowledgement phase involves sending a DHCPACK packet to the client. This packet includes the lease duration and any other configuration information that the client might have requested. At this point, the IP configuration process is completed.

The protocol expects the DHCP client to configure its network interface with the negotiated parameters. after the client obtains an IP address, it should probe the newly received address

2).

Without doing active man-in-the-middle, malicious sniffer can only see broadcast messages. Thus, Its **DHCP Acknowledgement** and **DHCP discovery**.

3).

SIADDR (Server IP address), YIADDR (Your IP address), SIADDR (Server IP address), CHADDR (Client hardware address).

4).

After a DHCP starvation attack and setting up a rogue DHCP server, the attacker can start **distributing IP addresses and other TCP/IP configuration settings to the network DHCP clients**. TCP/IP configuration settings include Default Gateway and DNS Server IP addresses. Network attackers can now **replace the original legitimate Default Gateway IP Address and DNS Server IP Address with their own IP Address**. Once the Default Gateway IP Address of the network devices are is changed, the network clients start sending the traffic destined to outside networks to the attacker's computer. The **attacker can now capture sensitive user data and launch a man-in-the-middle attack**. This is called as DHCP spoofing attack. Attacker can also set up a rogue DNS server and deviate the end user traffic to fake web sites and launch phishing attacks.

5).

the only thing he need to do is:

1.View initial ARP cache on the Victim PC

2.View initial ARP cache on the Attacker PC

3.View initial MAC Address-Table on the Cisco Catalyst (switch)

4.broadcast fake messages.

Only need one message.

6).

True,

A rogue DHCP server is a DHCP server on a network which is not under the administrative control of the network staff. It is a network device such as a **modem or a router** connected to the network by a user who may be either **unaware of the consequences of their actions** or may be knowingly **using it for network attacks** such as man in the middle. Some kind of computer viruses or malicious software have been found to set up a rogue DHCP, especially for those classified in the category.

7).

DHCP snooping is built on the switch by creating a bindings table block legitimate DHCP servers to mitigate issues with rogue DHCP servers.

Q2.

Mode = Allow Any:







Mode = Deny:

```
    1 0.000000000   0.0.0.0          255.255.255.255      DHCP      342 DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x1f482787
    2 0.000215756   10.0.2.3         255.255.255.255      DHCP      590 DHCP Offer    - Transaction ID 0x1f482787
    3 0.000438921   0.0.0.0          255.255.255.255      DHCP      590 DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x20482787
    4 0.000763126   10.0.2.3         255.255.255.255      DHCP      590 DHCP Offer    - Transaction ID 0x20482787
    5 0.000945571   0.0.0.0          255.255.255.255      DHCP      590 DHCP Request  - Transaction ID 0x21482787
    6 0.010198485   10.0.2.3         255.255.255.255      DHCP      590 DHCP ACK      - Transaction ID 0x21482787
```

```
▸ Frame 6: 590 bytes on wire (4720 bits), 590 bytes captured (4720 bits) on interface 0
▸ Ethernet II, Src: PcsCompu_0e:24:aa (08:00:27:0e:24:aa), Dst: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
▸ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.3, Dst: 255.255.255.255
▸ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 67, Dst Port: 68
▸ Bootstrap Protocol (ACK)
```

```
0000  ff ff ff ff ff ff 08 00  27 0e 24 aa 08 00 45 00   ........ '.$...E.
0010  02 40 00 03 00 00 ff 11  ad a7 0a 00 02 03 ff ff   .@...... ........
0020  ff ff 00 43 00 44 02 2c  f9 35 02 01 06 00 21 48   ...C.D., .5....!H
0030  27 87 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 0a 00 02 04 00 00   '....... ........
0040  00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00  27 87 1d 48 00 00 00 00   ........ '..H....
0050  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
0060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
0070  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
0080  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
0090  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
00a0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
00b0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
00c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
00d0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
00e0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
00f0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
0100  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ........ ........
0110  00 00 00 00 00 00 63 82  53 63 36 04 0a 00 02 03   ......c. Sc6.....
0120  35 01 05 01 04 ff ff ff  00 03 04 0a 00 02 01 06   5....... ........
0130  0c 01 00 00 01 01 01 01  01 0a c9 2d fe 0f 05 6d   ........ ...-...m
0140  6f 64 65 6d 33 04 00 00  04 b0 38 12 4f 6b 2c 20   odem3... ..8.Ok,
0150  6f 6b 2c 20 68 65 72 65  20 69 74 20 69 73 ff 00   ok, here  it is..
```

Q3.



Fake:



REAL:



Q4.

Exit after capturing 2 packets: -c 2

Capture on eth0 interface: -i eth0

Only UDP packets with port 53: port 53

Save captured packets to dns.pcap: -w dns.pcap

arbitrary DNS lookups: dig examples.com


root@zarya:~# dig apple.com
; <<>> DiG 9.11.5-P4-1-Debian <<>> apple.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 19556
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 3, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1452
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;apple.com. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
apple.com. 1111 IN A 17.178.96.59
apple.com. 1111 IN A 17.142.160.59
apple.com. 1111 IN A 17.172.224.47
;; Query time: 20 msec
;; SERVER: 1.0.0.1#53(1.0.0.1)
;; WHEN: —
;; MSG SIZE
root@zarya: ~
文件(F) 编辑(E) 查看(V) 搜索(S) 终端(T) 帮助(H)
root@zarya:~# tcpdump -c 2 -i eth0 port 53 -w dns.pcap
tcpdump: listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 by
es
2 packets captured
2 packets received by filter
0 packets dropped by kernel
root@zarya:~# hexdump -C dns.pcap
00000000 d4 c3 b2 a1 02 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
00000010 00 00 04 00 01 00 00 00 f7 ef d0 5c 62 0d 0c 00 |...........\b...|
00000020 5c 00 00 00 5c 00 00 00 52 54 00 12 35 00 08 00 |\...\...RT..5...|
00000030 27 ad c2 d3 08 00 45 00 00 4e a9 5d 00 00 40 11 |'.....E..N.]..@.|
00000040 c4 32 0a 00 02 0f 01 00 00 01 be 86 00 35 00 3a |.2..........5.:|
00000050 0d 5b 4c 64 01 20 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 01 05 61 |.[Ld. ....a|
00000060 70 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 29 |pple.com.......)|
00000070 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 0c 00 0a 00 08 ee bb f1 49 |...............I|
00000080 b3 c7 d7 02 f7 ef d0 5c 60 5d 0c 00 80 00 00 00 |.......\`]......|
00000090 80 00 00 00 08 00 27 ad c2 d3 52 54 00 12 35 00 |......'...RT..5.|
000000a0 08 00 45 00 00 72 01 c5 00 00 ff 11 ac a6 01 00 |..E..r..........|
000000b0 00 01 0a 00 02 0f 00 35 be 86 00 5e 38 3e 4c 64 |.......5...^8>Ld|
000000c0 81 80 00 01 00 03 00 00 00 01 05 61 70 70 6c 65 |...........apple|
000000d0 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 |.com............|
000000e0 00 04 57 00 04 11 b2 60 3b c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 |..W....`;.......|
000000f0 00 04 57 00 04 11 8e a0 3b c0 0c 00 01 00 01 00 |..W.....;.......|
00000100 00 04 57 00 04 11 ac e0 2f 00 00 29 05 ac 00 00 |..W...../..)....|
00000110 00 00 00 00 |....|

Q5.

Code:

```
root@zarya:~# cat pcap.c
#include <pcap.h>
#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
pcap_t *handle;                 /* Sessi
char *dev;                      /* The d
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE];  /* Error
struct bpf_program fp;          /* The c
char filter_exp[] = "udp";      /* The f
bpf_u_int32 mask;               /* Our n
bpf_u_int32 net;                /* Our I
struct pcap_pkthdr header;      /* The h
const u_char *packet;           /* The a

/* Define the device */
dev = pcap_lookupdev(errbuf);
if (dev == NULL) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't find defau
    return(2);
}
```

```
/* Print its length */
printf("Jacked a packet with length of [%d]\n", header.len);
printf("And the message in this packet is: %xd\n",header);
/* And close the session */
pcap_close(handle);
    return(0);
}
```

Sample output:

```
root@zarya:~# nano pcap.c
root@zarya:~# gcc -o simplepcap pcap.c -lpcap
root@zarya:~# ./simplepcap
Jacked a packet with length of [90]
And the message in this packet is: 5cd118f4d
```

Reference:

http://www.omnisecu.com/ccna-security/dhcp-starvation-attacks-and-dhcp-spoofing-attacks.php

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_Host_Configuration_Protocol

https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/switches/catalyst-6500-series-switches/white_paper_c11_603839.html

http://www.pearsonitcertification.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2474170