

Research and Implementation of Secure Industrial Communication Protocols

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Abstract—Industrial control systems(ICS) are widely used in national infrastructure such as electricity, water conservancy and energy to control the operation of production equipment. The ICS information security problems will cause a series of consequences. This paper focuses on the security problems existing in industrial communication protocols, studies the secure protocols to guarantee the secure transmission of industrial datas, and realizes the end-to-end identity authentication and data encryption transmission on Modbus/TCP protocol.

Keywords—ICS information security, industrial communication protocols, identity authentication, data encryption, Modbus/TCP

I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, attacks aimed at ICS happened frequently, which has caused serious impacts on industrial manufacturing. In December 2015, three energy companies in Ukraine were attacked by the malware "BlackEnergy", causing a large power outage in the capital and western area of Ukraine, 1.4 million residents were under the influence. In December 2016, the Ukrainian power grid encountered an attack again, causing its capital powered off for more than an hour. In July 2010, the Stuxnet virus invaded the Iranian nuclear power plant. It searched for the PLC and periodically changed its operating frequency to controlled the speed of the centrifuges, destroyed one-fifth of the centrifuges in Iran, and ruined Iran's nuclear plan[1]. People attach more importance to the information security of ICS because of the rising rates of the attacks. Industrial communication protocols utilized as a media of data transmission are suffering from the hostile attacks as well.

II. SECURITY ISSUES OF INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS

Industrial communication protocols are widely deployed in field devices, controllers and host computers for the transmission of industrial field datas. Strengthening the security protection of industrial communication protocols is an important part of ensuring the information security of ICS.

There are many specific protocols in the industrial control system, which applies in different industrial situations. However, these industrial communication protocols are not designed to take security issues into account due to the industry-specific real-time and high efficiency consideration[2]. At the same time, the industrial

control network before was an "island" and had no connection to the outside world, so it was quite safe at that time[3]. However, with the industrialization of the information technology, the security level of industry communication networks is gradually reduced. As a consequence, it is necessary to add the security functions to the industrial communication protocols.

The main reason for data tampering, data theft and replay attacks which are commonly occurred in industrial control systems is that the communication protocols are lack of the identity authentication protection mechanism in the process of data transmission, and the datas are plaintext while transmission. It is convenient for illegal intruders to attack the vulnerabilities of the protocols.

III. DESIGN OF THE SECURE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS

For the information security problems of ICS, the main solution is based on the improvement of Internet information security technologies to make them suitable for industrial control networks. The main protection measures include access control (identity authentication, network isolation, firewall, physical security), protection reinforcement (device reinforcement, host intrusion prevention, patch management), condition monitor (intrusion detection, security audit), and emergency response (equipment redundancy), etc[4]. The measures mentioned above are able to provide a system-level protection of the ICS.

For the security protection of the industrial communication protocols, the solution is utilized on the principle of cryptography. The design of a secure communication protocol can be considered in two aspects. The first option is to improve the protocol itself by adding some cryptographic protection techniques. E.g. Liu Fei et al, implemented the security requirements of Modbus/TCP protocol by using symmetric encryption and digital signature technology to achieve confidentiality requirements, identity authentication and hash chain-based anti-replay mechanism. They changed the data frame structure of the protocol to implement security features[5]. The second option is to protect the industrial communication protocol by adding an external encryption protocol.

This paper adopts the second method, and plans to achieve the goal of secure transmission of industrial field datas by adding the SSL/TLS protocol, which is widely used in the Internet for data secure transmission. Taking the traditional industrial communication protocol Modbus/TCP

as an example, developed the secure communication protocol based on the SSL/TLS technology.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS

A. Industrial Communication Protocol – Modbus

The Modbus protocol is a communication protocol developed by MODICON in 1979 and is an industrial fieldbus protocol standard[6]. Because of its openness, scalability and standard features, it has now become one of the most widely used communication protocols in industrial automation field.

The Modbus/TCP protocol is a Modbus message transmission protocol running on TCP/IP[6]. Field devices can communicate via a network such as Ethernet through this protocol. The port number of the Modbus/TCP protocol is 502. Fig. 1 shows the implementation of the Modbus protocol over serial links and TCP/IP.




Fig. 1 Modbus protocol OSI model

B. Secure Transport Protocol - SSL/TLS

The SSL/TLS protocol is located on top of the TCP connection, providing a transparent and secure transmission channel for both parties to ensure end-to-end secure communication[7]. The protocol includes encryption mechanism and certificate authentication mechanism to provide security protection for the upper layer protocols. Currently, the SSL/TLS protocol is widely used in the fields of Internet and e-commerce.




Fig. 2 SSL/TLS protocol structural model

This protocol is divided into two layers: the record

protocol and its upper Handshake protocol, Change Cipher Spec Protocol and Alert Protocol [8]. Fig. 2 is the structural model of the SSL/TLS protocol.

C. Secure industrial communication protocol—sec-Modbus

The design of the secure communication protocol in this paper utilized the SSL/TLS protocol to provide a encapsulation protects of the Modbus/TCP application layer datas. The SSL/TLS protocol is transparent to the application layer and data encrypted transmission is performed through a secure channel established during the handshake process. The Record protocol is under the Handshake Protocol and performs the function of data encryption. Fig. 3 shows the OSI model of the secure Modbus protocol.




Fig. 3 Secure communication protocol OSI model

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURE COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS

The solution of the security protocol proposed in this paper is mainly based on two parts: The first part is the Modbus protocol implementation. As for this part, we chose the FreeModbus protocol developed for embedded systems with an open source platform; The second part is the implementation of SSL/TLS protocol. Considering the system consumption, this paper chose to use mbedtls, an SSL protocol library developed for embedded environment. mbedtls mainly consists of three parts: SSL/TLS protocol library, encryption library and X.509 certificate processing library. This experiment was based on the PC platform.

A. Implementation of identity authentication

In this experiment, we carried out the server-side identity authentication. The authentication process is implemented by verifying the server's digital certificate exchanged during the TLS handshake phase. Fig. 4 shows the digital certificate generated by the server. The certificate includes the version number, user's name, validity, signature algorithm (sha256 was adopted in this experience) and public key, etc. The client validated the content after receiving the certificate. Only if the authentication is successful, the communication session can be continued, otherwise the session will be interrupted.

```

    > Certificate: 308203373082021fa003020102020102300d06092a864886...
    > signedCertificate
      version: v3 (2)
      serialNumber: 2
      > signature (sha256WithRSAEncryption)
      > issuer: rdnSequence (0)
      > validity
      > subject: rdnSequence (0)
      > subjectPublicKeyInfo
      > extensions: 3 items
    > algorithmIdentifier (sha256WithRSAEncryption)
    Padding: 0
    encrypted: 2e3ae452613ea7a5ef326780720726baa3ff0540c4600539...
  Certificate Length: 837
  0000 16 03 03 0b e0 0b 0b 0b dc 00 0b d9 00 03 3b 30 ..... ;0
  0010 82 03 37 30 82 02 1f a0 03 02 01 02 01 02 30 ..70.....0
  0020 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 3b ...*H.....0;
  0030 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 4e 4c 31 11 30 1 0...U...NL1-0
  0040 0f 06 03 55 04 0a 0c 08 50 6f 6c 61 72 53 53 4c ...U.... PolarSSL
  0050 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 10 50 6f 6c 61 72 1 0...U... Polar
  0060 53 53 4c 20 54 65 73 74 20 43 41 30 1e 17 0d 31 SSL Test CA0...1
  0070 39 30 32 31 30 31 34 34 34 30 36 5a 17 0d 32 39 90210144 4062...29
  0080 30 32 31 30 31 34 34 34 30 36 5a 30 34 31 0b 30 02101444 06Z041-0
  0090 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 4e 4c 31 11 30 0f 06 03 ...U....NL1-0...
  00a0 55 04 0a 0c 08 50 6f 6c 61 72 53 53 4c 31 12 30 U....Pol arSSL1-0
  00b0 10 06 03 55 04 03 0c 09 6c 6f 63 61 6c 68 6f 73 ...U.... localhos
  00c0 74 30 82 01 22 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 t0..."0...*H...

```

Fig. 4 digital certificate

Figure 5 shows the information exchange process captured during the handshake phase by using the Wireshark software. Multiple pieces of information were exchanged by the communication parties during the handshake process. The imformation was utilized for identity authentication and negotiating the meassage(e.g. the session key) used for next secure communication.

TLSv1.2	374 Client Hello
TCP	74 802 → 49311 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3
TLSv1.2	170 Server Hello
TCP	74 49311 → 802 [ACK] Seq=301 Ack=1
TCP	1514 802 → 49311 [ACK] Seq=97 Ack=1
TCP	1514 802 → 49311 [ACK] Seq=1537 Ack=1
TLSv1.2	239 Certificate
TCP	74 49311 → 802 [ACK] Seq=301 Ack=1
TLSv1.2	480 Server Key Exchange
TCP	74 49311 → 802 [ACK] Seq=301 Ack=1
TLSv1.2	83 Server Hello Done
TCP	74 49311 → 802 [ACK] Seq=301 Ack=1
TLSv1.2	217 Client Key Exchange
TCP	74 802 → 49311 [ACK] Seq=3557 Ack=1
TLSv1.2	80 Change Cipher Spec
TCP	74 802 → 49311 [ACK] Seq=3557 Ack=1
TLSv1.2	111 Encrypted Handshake Message
TCP	74 802 → 49311 [ACK] Seq=3557 Ack=1
TLSv1.2	80 Change Cipher Spec
TCP	74 49311 → 802 [ACK] Seq=487 Ack=1
TLSv1.2	111 Encrypted Handshake Message
TCP	74 49311 → 802 [ACK] Seq=487 Ack=1

Fig. 5 Handshake process

B. Implementation of Data Encryption

The implementation of data encryption is based on the TLS record protocol. Modbus/TCP datas encrypted transmission is performed after the two parties handshake successfully. In this paper, the Modbus 04 function code (read input coils) was taken as an example to write datas to

10 coils, and the encrypted transmission was performed on the basis of the original Modbus/TCP data frame.

Fig. 6 shows an example of the data frame structure (hexadecimal) of Modbus/TCP in this experiment. 06BC stands for protocol identifier, 0000 stands for Modbus protocol, 0017 stands for data length, 01 stands for slave address, 04 stands for function code, 14 stands for data segment length, and the rest stands for Modbus/TCP data segment.

06BC 0000 0017 01 04 14 00010002...000A

Fig. 6 Modbus/TCP frame structure

The data frame above was encrypted and transmitted to the client through the encrypted channel , and the secret key used for encryption was negotiated while the TLS handshake phase. Fig. 7 shows the encrypted Modbus/TCP datas captured while transmisson. In this experience, taking real-time issues into consideration, chacha20-ploy1305 encryption algorithm was chose for data encryption. Chacha20-ploy1305 algorithm is a new stream encryption algorithm that Google optimized for mobile CPU. It can reduce the amount of encrypted and decrypted datas, and its performance is obviously improved compared to ordinary algorithms.

```

  0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 86 dd 60 01
  0010 d2 78 00 63 06 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0020 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 03 22 c0 9f a2 49 95 4d c8 2f
  0040 2f 4e 50 18 08 15 0a f9 00 00 17 03 03 00 4a b2
  0050 67 14 b9 f7 b8 57 8f 6a 93 a6 eb 3d 14 cd ac 41
  0060 3f 2c a6 47 db e4 0c 7f 7e 83 f9 9a bd fb 4c b5
  0070 b2 3a 7e 00 fc a1 30 d4 ec 83 c5 ff 14 6b fd bc
  0080 c7 1a 04 7a ad c2 9c 9d 86 5a bf 96 31 46 0c e6
  0090 dd 04 f3 f6 37 4b ac c1 da

```

Fig. 7 encrypted Modbus/TCP datas

```

. Seeding the random number generator... ok
. Loading the CA root certificate ... ok (0 skipped)
. Connecting to tcp/192.168.158.33/802... ok
. Setting up the SSL/TLS structure... ok
. Performing the SSL/TLS handshake... ok
. Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok
< Read from server:
SSL client read: 002700000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A
SSL client read: 002800000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A
SSL client read: 002900000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A
SSL client read: 002A00000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A
SSL client read: 002B00000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A
SSL client read: 002C00000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A
SSL client read: 002D00000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A
SSL client read: 002B00000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A
SSL client read: 002F00000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A
SSL client read: 003000000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A
SSL client read: 003100000017010414000100020003000400050006000700080009000A

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Fig. 8 Client secure communication process

Fig. 8 shows the entire communication process performed by the client during the transmission of the secure communication protocol. First, the client and the server performed a handshake process to establish a secure transmission channel. After the channel was built

successfully, the server sent the encrypted datas to the client. The Modbus/TCP protocol uses the polling mechanism so the client will continuously receive the datas sent by the server after the protocol is turned on. The datas showed in the figure below has been decrypted by the client.

VI. CONCLUSION

This paper analyzed the security problems existing in industrial communication protocols and protected the protocol datas by adding an external security protocol (TLS). The Modbus/TCP protocol was taken as an example to develop the secure protocol, and realized the end-to-end identity authentication and data encryption transmission of the industrial control networks. By adding the secure mechanism to the protocol, we improved the security of industrial datas in the transmission process.

This experiment has now completed the development of a secure communication protocol on the PC platform. It will be applied to embedded systems in the next plan. Considering of the real-time requirements and data processing capability of the ICS, the handshake process will be simplified to minimize the number of information exchanges. At the same time, encryption is a little bit heavy for ICS, so appropriate password length and password groups will be selected to ensure secure communications without affecting the normal operation of the system.

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