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| Analyzing Industry | | |
| Structure | | |
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| By Laurent ERRERA from L'Union, France (CC BY-SA 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by- na/2.0], via Wikimedia Commons | | |
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| The Fundamental Principle | | |
| of Business Strategy | | |
| "If everyone can do it, it's difficult to | | |
| create and capture value from it." | | |
| or, alternatively | | |
| "In a perfectly competitive market, no firm realizes economic profits (rents)." | | |
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Two Perspectives on Rents

Monopoly Rents (Industrial Organization View)



• Barriers to entry
• Industry structure matters

Ricardian Rents (Resource Based View)





Barriers to imitation
 Firm structure matters

The Role of Industry Structure

The Industrial Organization Perspective:

- Premise that industry structure matters most
- Economic rents due to barriers to competition
- (i.e., monopoly rents)
- Some industries are more profitable than others






ource: Fortune 500 2009, money.cnn.com

| The Strategist's Toolkit: Five Forces Analysis Threat of Entry | |
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| Bargaining Power of Suppliers Intensity of Rivalry Bargaining Power of Buyers Threat of Substitutes | |
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| Threat of Entry, Part 1 | |
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| The Strategist's Toolkit: Five Forces Analysis | |
| Bargaining Power of Suppliers Intensity of Rivalry Bargaining Power of Buyers | |
| Threat of Substitutes | |

| Threat of Entry | | |
|---|--|--|
| | | |
| Entry is less likely when Entrant faces high sunk costs | | |
| - Sunk costs are investments that cannot | | |
| be recovered Incumbents have a competitive advantage | | |
| Potential entrants are at a competitive | | |
| disadvantage compared to existing players, simply not profitable to enter | | |
| Entrant faces retaliation | | |
| - Potential entrants are likely to be forced | | |
| out of business by strategic (pricing) behavior of incumbents | | |
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| Competitive Advantages | | |
| o in potitivo / tavairtageo | | |
| Patents & licenses | | |
| Pioneering brands | | |
| Pre-commitment contracts | | |
| (e.g., distribution) | | |
| Large economies of scale | | |
| (relative to demand) | | |
| • Steep learning (experience) curves • Others | | |
| · Ouicis | | |
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
Economies of Scale



Competitive Advantages

- · Patents & licenses
- Pioneering brands
- Pre-commitment contracts (e.g., distribution)
- Large economies of scale (relative to demand)
- Steep learning (experience) curves
- Others

Learning Curves



| Learning Curve for | |
|---|--|
| Semiconductor Memories | |
| 11/6* | |
| 100 1077 | |
| Price Per Bit (millicents) 20 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 | |
| 6.1 1.0 10 100 | |
| Cumulated Output (bits x 1012) | |
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| Threat of Entry, Part 2 | |
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| Threat of Entry | |
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| Entry is less likely when Entrant faces high sunk costs | |
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| Incumbents have a competitive advantage Potential entrants are at a competitive | |
| disadvantage compared to existing players, simply not profitable to enter | |
| Entrant faces retaliation Potential entrants are likely to be forced out of business by strategic (pricing) | |
| out of publicas by strategic (pricing) | |

| Likelihood of Retaliation | |
|---|--|
| | |
| Excess capacity of incumbents Economies of scale or other cost | |
| advantage | |
| Substantial exit costs Exit costs are payments that must be | |
| made upon exit Exit costs provide an incentive to fight | |
| Aggressive reputation of incumbents | |
| Must be credible | |
| Suffers from free-riding problem | |
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| Threat of Substitutes | |
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| The Strategist's Toolkit: | |
| Five Forces Analysis | |
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| Bargaining Power of Suppliers Intensity of Rivalry Bargaining Power of Buyers | |
| Suppliers | |
| Threat of | |
| Substitutes | |
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| Threat | | |
|--------|--|--|
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- Substitute products are less of a threat when...
 - Cross-price elasticity of demand is low
 - Switching costs are high
 - One-time costs customers incur when switching to a new product or service

Cross-Price Elasticity

The ratio of the % change in demand for one good given a 1% increase in price of another good.







Cross-Price Elasticity

The ratio of the % change in demand for one good given a 1% increase in price of another good.








| Threat of Substitutes | |
|---|---|
| Timode of Substitutes | |
| Substitute products are <i>less</i> of a threat when | |
| Cross-price elasticity of demand is low | |
| Switching costs are high One-time costs customers incur when | |
| switching to a new product or service | |
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| Bargaining Power of | |
| Buyers, Part 1 | |
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| The Strategist's Toolkit: | |
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| Threat of Substitutes | |
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
| Barg | gaini | ng Power | of Buyers |
|------------|--|---|----------------------------------|
| • Buye | ers have | e less power w | hen |
| = B | uyers a | ire not concen opsony) | |
| | – Many | potential buyers accounts for a sn | |
| | sales | accounts for a sir | nan naction of |
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| Rela | tive | Concentra | ation |
| | | Monopoly | |
| Bunar | Many | Power | Competitive |
| Buyer | Few | Mutual | Monopsony |
| | | Dependence | Power |
| | | Few | Many |
| | | Supp | olier |
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| Barg | gaini | ng Power | of Buyers |
| | | _ | hen |
| | | e less power w | |
| ■ Bi | uyers h | ave few options | 5 |
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| ■ Bi | uyers ha Productindust High s specifi | ave few options cts are differenti ry CPE) witching costs (r ic assets) | ated (low intra- elationship- |
| ■ Bi | uyers ha Productindust High s specifi | ave few options cts are differenti ry CPE) witching costs (r | ated (low intra- elationship- |
| ■ Bi | uyers ha Productindust High s specifi | ave few options cts are differenti ry CPE) witching costs (r ic assets) | ated (low intra- elationship- |

| Bargaining Power of | |
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| Buyers, Part 2 | |
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| Bargaining Power of Buyers | |
| Buyers have less power when Buyers are not concentrated | |
| Buyers have few options Buyers are segmented | |
| Price information is not widely available | |
| Price discrimination possible Bundling possible | |
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| Price Discrimination | |
| DA | |
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| Consumer Surplus P _C | |

Price Discrimination




Self-Sorting 2nd Degree Price Discrimination




Self-Sorting 2nd Degree Price Discrimination





Self-Sorting 2nd Degree Price Discrimination



Sorting by Groups 3rd Degree Price Discrimination

| Willingness to Pay for Product | | | | | | |
|--|-------|-------|-------|------|---------------|--|
| Consumer Type | A | В | с | D | Type Total | |
| HR | \$100 | \$90 | \$70 | \$20 | \$280 | |
| Engineers | \$60 | \$120 | \$70 | \$70 | \$290 | |
| Sales | \$100 | \$80 | \$140 | \$60 | \$380 | |
| Consultants | \$70 | \$100 | \$60 | \$80 | \$310 | |
| | | | | | | |
| Min. Willingness to Pay for Product | \$60 | \$80 | \$60 | \$20 | \$220 | |

Bargaining Power of Suppliers

| The Strategist's Toolkit: Five Forces Analysis | |
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| Substitutes | |
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| Paraining Power of Suppliers | |
| Bargaining Power of Suppliers | |
| Suppliers are less of a threat when Sellers are not concentrated (no monopoly) The less of a threat when | |
| Firms have many alternatives Many substitutes for supplier's products Firms face low switching costs Supplier cannot forward integrate | |
| Sellers may not treat segments differently Price information is widely available Price discrimination not possible | |
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| Price Discrimination | |
| P s | |
| p _c | |
| Producer Surplus | |
| q _c Q | |

| Intensity of Rivalry | | |
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| Intensity of Rivalry | | |
| Physics is forest between them | | |
| Rivalry is less intense when The number of competitors is? | | |
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| Intensity of Rivalry | |
|---|------|
| • Rivalry is <i>less</i> intense when | |
| The number of competitors is small! | |
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| Intensity of Rivalry | |
| - Divolvy is less intense when | |
| Rivalry is less intense when The number of competitors is small! | |
| Incentives to "fight" are low Substantial market growth | |
| Especially if capacity constrained Opportunities to differentiate | |
| - Low exit costs | |
| Little excess capacity Demand is not cyclical | |
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| Intensity of Rivalry | |
| Rivalry is <i>less</i> intense when | |
| Coordination is feasible | |
| Explicit price / market fixingAntitrust violation! | |
| Tacit coordination Implicitly holding prices high, | |
| differentiating | |
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| Madula Laggana | |
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| Module Lessons | |
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| The Strategist's Toolkit: | |
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| Role of Threat of Role of | |
| Complements Substitutes Institutions | - |
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| Module Lessons | |
|--|--|
| A key task in a strategic analysis is to identify and address the competitive | |
| forces that limit economic rents: Entry is less likely when incumbent firms | |
| have a competitive advantage and can credibly retaliate against new entrants. Substitution is less likely when switching | |
| costs are high and cross-price elasticity is low. | |
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| Module Lessons | |
| A key task in a strategic analysis is to identify and address the competitive forces that limit economic rents: | |
| Buyer and supplier power depend on relative concentration, the viability of alternatives, and information availability. | |
| Rivalry is more intense when there are more competitors, incentives to fight are large, and tacit coordination is difficult. | |
| iango, and ador coordination is difficult. | |
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| Strategist's Toolkit: | |
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| The Strategist's Toolkit: Five Forces Analysis Threat of Entry | |
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