1495 UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN

CELEBRATING 525 YEARS 1495 – 2020

ABERDEEN 2040

Network Security Technology

Digital signatures

September 2025

Outline of lecture

1. Introduction.
2. Digital signatures.
3. RSA signatures.
4. ElGamal signatures.



Physical signature

John Hancock's signature from the U.S. Declaration of Independence (public domain)

1. What guarantees might we want to go along with a physical signature on a document?
2. How will somebody relying upon the document be assured of these guarantees?

Essential elements of digital signature process

1. Bob wants to send a message to Alice.
2. It is not important to secure the message, but Bob wants to ensure that the message Alice receives is sent by him.
3. Bob generates a hash value, inputs his private key and hash value into a digital signature algorithm.
4. Alice receives the message plus signature.
5. Alice calculates a hash value for the message, uses Bob's public key and hash value as input into the verification algorithm.
6. If the result is valid, then the authenticity of the message is verified.



Properties of handwritten signature on a document

1. We may (want to) have some confidence that the following properties hold of a handwritten signature on a document:
    1. The signature is authentic:
        1. The signature convinces the document's recipient that the genuine signer (deliberately) signed the document.
    2. The signature-document pair has integrity:
        1. it cannot be altered later.
    3. The signature cannot be repudiated:
        1. the signer cannot claim later that he/she did not sign the document (as long as the document remains).

Properties of handwritten signature on a document (cont'd)

1. Relating to the above:
    1. The signature is unforgeable:
        1. The signature is proof that the signer, and no one else, deliberately signed the document.
    2. The signature is unalterable:
        1. After the document is signed, it cannot be altered.
    3. The signature is not reusable:
        1. The signature is part of the document; an unscrupulous person cannot move the signature to a different document.

Digital signatures

1. A **digital signature scheme** is a cryptographic mechanism.
2. It produces **digital signatures** for messages.
3. These are pieces of data that often accompany messages.
4. A **digital signature** is a mathematical scheme for demonstrating the authenticity (source) of a digital message or documents.
5. A **valid** digital signature gives a recipient reason to believe that the message was created by a known sender, and that it was not altered in transit.
6. Digital signatures are commonly used for software distribution, financial transactions, and in other cases where it is important to detect forgery or tampering.

Digital signatures (cont'd)

1. Digital signatures employ a type of asymmetric cryptography.
2. Digital signature is used as a hand-written signature:
    1. Authentication (of source).
    2. Integrity (message-integrity).
    3. Non-repudiation.
3. Basic security requirements:
    1. Unalterable: the document can not be modified once it has been signed.
    2. Not reusable: no one, except the sender can move the signature to another document.

Status of digital signatures

1. Digital signatures are central to (current implementations of) e-commerce, and to trust and security on the internet more generally.
2. Legal status of some schemes is changing to become more solid, like handwritten signatures.
3. Digital Signature Scheme consists of:
    1. Key generation algorithm.
    2. Signing algorithm.
    3. Verification algorithm.
    4. (Protocol for use).

Cryptographic operation

- Some signatures are encryptions:
  - The verifier applies a decryption algorithm
  - Sometimes hashing is involved, so the verifier only gets back the hash value, not the original message.
- Some signatures are not encryptions (verifier does not apply a decryption):
  - ElGamal
  - Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

Digital signatures & verification keys

- A **digital signature** is a value that depends on:
  - the value of the document/message, and
  - a secret known only to the signer:
    - a private signature key
    - NOT known to the receiver, in particular.
- The signature associates the document with a **verification key**:
  - this is known by the receiver and any 3*rd* party required to do verification,
  - it will often be public.

Digital signatures: Algorithms

1. A digital signature scheme typically consists of three algorithms:
    1. A key generation algorithm:
        1. input: a set of possible private keys
        2. output: the private key and corresponding public key
    2. A signing algorithm:
        1. input: a message and a private key,
        2. output: a value (digital signature).
    3. A signature verifying algorithm:
        1. input: a message, public key and a signature,
        2. output: binary (yes/no) result

Digital signature basics



Hashed digital signature

1. In practice, digital signatures are not very often not used quite as on the previous slide. Instead, we sign a hash of the original message (called 'message digest').
2. There are two main types of reason:
    1. The message might be big and encrypting them might require many blocks and many expensive asymmetric cryptographic operations.
    2. Security of the underlying scheme.

Digital signatures with hashing



1. The use of the hash does not disrupt the authenticity and integrity guarantees.

RSA signature: basic idea

1. The sender generates a public-private RSA key pair: (e, n), d, under the prime pair p, q with $pq = n$.
    1. Message to be signed is (coded as) an integer m.
    2. Message is hashed with suitable hash function h, with $1 < h(m) < n$.
2. The sender signs by '**encrypting**' with the private key d:
    1. Signature value: $S = h^d(m) \bmod n$
3. The verifier can use the public verification key to compute: $S^e \bmod n$

    this is '**decryption**' of S with the public key (e, n)

    verifier can then check whether the equation *SIG* below holds:

    $$h(m) = S^e \bmod n \qquad (SIG)$$

RSA: verification of a true signature

1. Verification of the true signature involves the calculation:

$$S^e \bmod n = h^{de}(m) \bmod n = h^{ed}(m) \bmod n = h(m) \bmod n$$

2. The equality holds because we showed that:

$$M^{ed} = M \bmod n$$

for an arbitrary M, when we showed that RSA decryption works.

Attack outcomes on signature schemes

1. The goal of an adversary in this context is to **forge** signatures; that is, produce signatures which will be accepted as those of some other entity:
    1. existential forgery. An adversary is able to forge a signature for at least one message.
        1. The adversary may have little-or-no control over the message whose signature is obtained, and
        2. the legitimate signer may be involved in the deception.
    2. selective forgery. An adversary is able to create a valid signature for a particular message (or class of messages) chosen *a priori (up front)*.
        1. Creating the signature does not directly involve the legitimate singer.
    3. total break. An adversary is either able to compute the private key information of the signer or finds an efficient signing algorithm functionally equivalent to the valid signing algorithm.

Assumptions: methods of attack

1. Two basic attacks against public-key digital signature schemes:
    1. **Key-only attacks**: an adversary knows only the signer's public key.
    2. **Message attacks**: an adversary is able to examine signatures corresponding either to known or chosen messages.
        1. Known-message attack: adversary, E, has signatures for messages not chosen by E.
        2. Chosen-message attack: E has signatures for messages chosen by E; all messages are chosen before any sigs are seen.
        3. Adaptive chosen message attack: E can use signer to produce sigs for messages chosen by E, using sigs already produced.

RSA: basic selective forgery defeated

1. The attacker, Eve, has m and wishes to create a signature S for it.
2. The attacker can calculate hash value $H = h(m)$.
3. S will be verified as correct if $S^e = H \bmod n$, where e is the verification key.
4. It suffices for Eve to calculate the e^{th} root of H in modulus n.
5. This is an instance of the *RSA problem*.
6. The (weak) **RSA assumption** is that this is not possible.

RSA: basic existential forgery defeated

1. Attacker, Eve, has a signature value *s*, and wishes to find a document *m*, s.t. *s* is its signature.
2. The attacker can calculate s^e
3. Eve wants *m* s.t. the equation (SIG) holds, i.e.,

$$h(m) = s^e \bmod n.$$

4. The use of the hash function makes it hard to find such an *m*.
5. Important implementation details needed to avoid several vulnerabilities have been omitted.

Check RSA signature has required properties

1. **authentic**.
    1. the signature value must have come from the genuine signer.
2. **unforgeable**.
    1. only the signer has the private signature key.
3. **not reusable**.
    1. the signature is highly unlikely to match another given document.
4. **unalterable**.
    1. if the document is altered, the signature is highly unlikely to match.
5. **cannot be repudiated**.
    1. again, only the signer has the private key.

ElGamal

1. Asymmetric key encryption algorithm for public-key cryptography, which is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Described by Taher ElGamal in 1984.
2. The algorithm:
    1. Key generation.
    2. Signature and verification.
    3. Encryption.
    4. Decryption.

ElGamal: key generation

1. Alice wants to send a message to Bob:
    1. Bob choose a prime number p
    2. Bob choose two random numbers:
        1. generator g and an integer x, both less than p
    3. Bob compute $y = g^x \bmod p$
2. p, g and y are PUBLIC as verification key, x is PRIVATE as signature key.

ElGamal: signature

1. Consider a given message coded by integer m ($0 \ m < p$) Bob wants to sign, he:
    1. chooses a SECRET random number k ($1 < k < p - 1$) relatively prime to $p - 1$
    2. computes $s_1 = g^k \bmod p$
    3. computes s_2, such that $m = (xs_1 + ks_2) \bmod (p - 1)$
2. Signature $S = (s_1, s_2)$
3. Note that:
    1. s_2 depends on x which is PRIVATE
    2. s_1 depends on k which is SECRET
4. Signature verification: Alice verifies $y^{s1} s_1^{s2} \bmod p = g^m \bmod p$

ElGamal: consider the message $m = 5$ Bob wants to sign

1. consider $p = 11$ (PUBLIC), $g = 2$ (PUBLIC).
2. choose private key $x = 8$ (PRIVATE).
3. calculate $y = g^x \bmod p = 2^8 \bmod 11 = 3$ (PUBLIC).
4. choose a random $k = 9$ (SECRET) such that:

$$gcd(k, p - 1) = gcd(9, 10) = 1$$

5. compute $s_1 = g^k \bmod p = 2^9 \bmod 11 = 6$
6. compute s_2 such that $m = (x_{s1} + k_{s2}) \bmod p - 1$ that is

$$m = (8 \times 6 + 9 \times s_2) \bmod 10 \rightarrow s_2 = 3$$

7. generate signature $(s_1, s_2) = (6, 3)$

ElGamal: consider the message $m = 5$ Bob wants to sign (cont'd)

8. Alice verify the signature:

$$y^{s1} \times s_1^{s2} \bmod p = 3^6 \times 6^3 \bmod 11$$

$$= 729 \times 216 \bmod 11 = 10$$

$$g^M \bmod p = 2^5 \bmod 11 = 10$$

Forging ElGamal signatures

1. Forgery: given (p, g, y), find any message m and signature (s_1, s_2) with $y^{s1}s_1^{s2} = g^m \bmod p$
2. Try direct attack to find the private key, we have y and must solve for x in: $y = g^x \bmod p$
3. Technicalities - there are many:
4. There are attacks when ephemeral keys, k, are re-used or non-random
5. In the real Elgamal scheme, we sign the hash and not the message. This is because existential forgery is possible otherwise.
6. A further technicality is that in verification one should also only accept (s_1, s_2) with $1 < s_1 < p - 1$.