ECON 3133 Microeconomic Theory

YANGGUANG (SUNNY) HUANG

Department of Economics The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

- Instructor: Yangguang Huang Teaching assistant: Dominic Pegler
- Syllabus
- See the note for online learning
- Textbook: Christopher Snyder and Water Nicholson, Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions.
 Optional textbook: Hal Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus: A Modern Approach.
- Relationship to 3113
- L2 section taught by prof Qinggong Wu
- ECOF and MAEC

- Homework
 - ▶ Be serious about homework (no practice exam will be provided).
 - To cope with need of online teaching, homework will be done in a group of two students.
 - ► Homework may ask for things not covered in class. Learn from solutions.
 - ► Homework grading emphasizes participation. Correctness is secondary.
- Exams
 - ▶ midterm exam
 - ► final exam (cumulative)
- Attendance and participation

- Theme of this course
 - economic model with algebra and multivariate calculus
 - ► following the textbook
 - ▶ Discussion topics are mainly for fun.
- Study tips
 - ▶ Read relevant chapters of textbook before class.
 - ► Grasp the skill of handling economic model.
 - ▶ Use online resources come with the textbook.
 - ► Don't hesitate to seek help and advisory
 - ► Homework and what I write during lecture are important for exams.
 - ► Notes of lecture content will be provided.

• English is the official medium of instruction.



Course Information

Topic	Reading	No. of Lectures							
Course Introduction and Math Review	Ch. 1 and 2	1							
One Economic Agent: Profit-maximizing Firm									
Production Functions	Ch. 9	2							
Cost Functions	Ch. 10	2							
Profit Maximization	Ch. 11	2							
Many Economic Agents: Competitive Market and Partial Equilibrium									
Partial Equilibrium Competitive Model	Ch. 12	3							
Monopoly	Ch. 14	3							
Midterm Exam		1							
Multiple Strategic Economic Agents									
Game Theory	Ch. 8	5							
Imperfect Competition	Ch. 15	4							
Externalities and Public Goods	Ch. 19	3							
Final Exam									

- In Economic models, humans (or other economic agents) are simple (rational/mechanical)
- Consumer (in intermediate Micro)

$$\max_{x,y} u(x,y) \text{ s.t. } p_x x + p_y y = w$$




• Or, a more complicated version (in advanced Macro)

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c,l} \int_0^\infty U(c,l,g) e^{-\beta t} dt \\ \text{s.t. } c+\dot{k}+\dot{b} &= F(l,k)+rb-T \\ c+\dot{k}+\dot{b} &= wl+rk+rb-T \\ \dot{b} &= g+rb-T \\ \dot{k} &= F(k,l)-c-g \end{aligned}$$

- Economic agent, such as consumer, firm, and government, all make rational decision according to some objective function subject to some constraints.
 - ► In principle, it is still quite simple.

• Homo economicus (rational economic agent) vs. human being







• Popular view of human being in psychology and other social sciences (In the picture: Joy, Sadness, Fear, Anger, and Disgust)



 Human beings are complicated (e.g. Facebook's 71 gender options)



• Nearly impossible to study interaction of complicated agents





versus


- In Economics, we keep agents relatively simple, so we can study
 - ► how agent response to incentives
 - ► equilibrium with many agents
 - ► strategic interaction (game theory) among many agents






versus

- Most economic model are based on rational agents
 - ► Understanding the rational paradigm is very valuable
 - We can allow bounded rational agents but their behavior bias must be tractable.
 - ▶ "All models are wrong, but some are useful."



- Economic model
 - ► people response to incentive
 - ▶ understand how each economic agent affect the equilibrium of the system
 - ▶ prediction (comparative statics, counterfactuals)
 - ▶ policy implication
- \bullet **Assumption** + Data = Conclusion
 - ► Be serious about the assumptions when interpreting the data e.g. survivorship bias, hospital mortality rate
 - ▶ It is important to know how the data are generated.
 - ▶ Incentive in data generating and sample selection process.
- ECON4274: Programming Econometrics with R

Survivorship bias



• Maximize a single variable function

$$\max_{x} f(x)$$

- e.g., Firm chooses price to maximize profit.
- e.g., Individual chooses hours of working
- e.g., Government chooses tax rate.
- Solution

$$x^* = \arg\max_{x} f(x)$$

- First-order approach
 - replace max problem by first-order condition (FOC) $f'(x^*) = 0$
 - ► continuity and differentiability
 - ▶ be careful of boundary and second-order condition (SOC)

- Derivatives
 - ► Basis derivatives

$$\frac{dx^n}{dx} = nx^{n-1}, \quad \frac{d\ln x}{dx} = \frac{1}{x}, \quad \frac{de^x}{dx} = e^x$$

► Product rule

$$\frac{d(f(x)g(x))}{dx} = f(x)\frac{dg}{dx} + g(x)\frac{df}{dx}$$

► Quotient rule

$$\frac{d}{dx}\left(\frac{f(x)}{g(x)}\right) = \frac{\frac{df}{dx}g(x) - \frac{dg}{dx}f(x)}{[g(x)]^2}$$

► Partial derivative

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial x} \left(f(x)g(y) \right) = \frac{df}{dx}g(y)$$

► Chain rule

$$\frac{df(g(x))}{dx} = \frac{df}{dq} \times \frac{dg}{dx}$$

► Direct effect and indirect effect

$$\frac{d}{db}\left(f(b,x^*(b)) = \frac{\partial f}{\partial b} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial x}\frac{dx^*}{db}\right)$$

• Maximize a multivariate function

$$\max_{x,y} f(x,y)$$

- First-order approach
 - ▶ replace max problem by $\frac{\partial f}{\partial x} = 0$, $\frac{\partial f}{\partial y} = 0$
- Second-order condition
 - ► global concavity
 - ► local concavity

Constraint maximization problem

$$\max_{x} f(x), \quad \text{s.t.} g(x) = b$$

$$\max_{x,y} f(x,y), \quad \text{s.t.} g(x,y) = b$$

- ▶ Utility maximization problem: choose a bundle given a budget constraint.
- Cost minimization problem: choose an input combination given a output level.
- ► b is **exogenous variable**: not controlled by the agent / determined outside of the model
- ightharpoonup x is **endogenous variable**: chosen by the agent / solved from the model
- $f(x^*(b))$ is the value function.

Solving an economic model

$$x^*(b) = \arg\max_{x \in \{g(x)=b\}} f(x)$$

- ► Find endogenous variables as functions of exogenous variables
- ► Comparative statics: How change of parameter affects the solution of maximization. $\frac{dx^*(b)}{db} > 0$ or < 0?
- e.g. effort as a function of wage e(w).
- Lagrangian for interior solution

$$\mathcal{L} = f(x,y) + \lambda(g(x,y) - b)$$

Envelop theorem

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial b} = \frac{\partial f\left(x^*(b)\right)}{\partial b}$$

• Game theoretical problem

$$\max_{x} f(x, y)$$
$$\max_{y} g(x, y)$$

• Best-response and equilibrium

$$x^*(y) = \arg\max_{x} f(x, y)$$

$$y^*(x) = \arg\max_{y} g(x, y)$$

$$\begin{cases} x^*(y^e) = x^e \\ y^*(x^e) = y^e \end{cases} \Rightarrow (x^e, y^e)$$

• Game theoretical problem

$$\max_{x} f(x, y, b)$$
$$\max_{y} g(x, y, b)$$

• Best-response and equilibrium

$$x^*(y,b) = \arg\max_x f(x,y,b)$$

$$y^*(x,b) = \arg\max_y g(x,y,b)$$

$$\begin{cases} x^*(y^e,b) = x^e \\ y^*(x^e,b) = y^e \end{cases} \Rightarrow (x^*(b),y^*(b))$$

- Agent always benefit from more choices?
- Mathematically

$$v_A = \max_{x \in A} u(x), \quad v_B = \max_{x \in B} u(x)$$

If $A \subset B$, then $v_A \leq v_B$.

• Yes, this is true for rational homo economicus.

- The more choice the better: it is true for two human beings?
- No. Strategic interaction changes things.
 - e.g. chicken game

	2				2		
		Swerve	Straight			Swerve	Straight
1	Swerve	3, 3	2, 7	1			
	Straight	7, 2	0, 0	_	Straight	7, 2	0, 0

- The more choice the better: it is true for for human being?
- Scenario A:

$$v_A = \max_{x \in \{\text{spent all, save some money}\}} u(x)$$

• Scenario B:

$$v_B = \max_{x \in \{\text{save some money}\}} u(x)$$

- Economic theory provides tools for us to understand bounded rational agents.
 - ► self-control
 - ► time inconsistency / present bias
 - ► information overload / inattention / unawareness
 - ► reference-dependent preferences
- Theory built upon homo economicus serves as important benchmark.