

CSE 484/M584: Computer Security (and Privacy)

Spring 2025

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Admin

- Lab 3 Weblab due next week.
 - Start early, etc etc
- Please double check your Lab 2 gradescope handins
 - Partner status for code, etc.
 - Remember that you need to make sure there is ONE handin for partners.


genai

- No really, please don't use this.

CSRF

Its just one POST request, how bad can it be?

Why does adding a magic value to the form from bank.com work?



Add Secret Token to Forms

```
<input type=hidden value=23a3af01b>
```

- “Synchronizer Token Pattern”
- Include a **secret challenge token** as a hidden input in forms
 - Token often based on user’s session ID
 - Server must verify correctness of token before executing sensitive operations
 - OR add it as an additional cookie, with different permissions (which ones?)
- Why does this work?
 - **Same-origin policy:** attacker can’t read token out of legitimate forms loaded in user’s browser, so can’t create fake forms with correct token

CSRF Defenses

Relevant and useful discussion: <https://github.com/golang/go/issues/73626>

- Double-submit
 - magic token in POST (and the cookie)
- Origin headers/refer[r]er checking:
 - Validate what the browser says about the request originating from
 - Pre-2020, some browsers didn't send on POST(??)
- Cookie restrictions (SameSite)
 - Tells browser not to send cookies unless starting page is same origin (ish)
- Etc.
- Honestly, go read filippo's golang discussion, its great.

Referer Validation

Facebook Login

For your security, never enter your Facebook password on sites not located on Facebook.com.

Email:

Password:

Remember me

[Login](#) or [Sign up for Facebook](#)

[Forgot your password?](#)

✓ Referer:
`http://www.facebook.com/home.php`

✗ Referer:
`http://www.evil.com/attack.html`

? Referer:

- **Lenient** referer checking – header is optional
- **Strict** referer checking – header is required


Why Not Always Strict Checking?

- Why might the referer header be suppressed?
 - Stripped by the organization's network filter
 - Stripped by the local machine
 - Stripped by the browser for HTTPS → HTTP transitions
 - User preference in browser
 - Intentional browser behaviors
 - etc


Surprise not-quiz time

XSS again


Reflected XSS



Stored XSS



XSRF (aka CSRF)




Privacy and web tracking

Aka: so what were all those cookies for anyway?


A topic in flux

- Tracking via cookies
- Tracking via other methods
- Fingerprinting

Ads That Follow You



Third-Party Web Tracking



These ads allow **criteo.com** to link your visits between sites, even if you never click on the ads.

Gradescope

- Do you take any particular precautions about tracking?
 - For web browsing?
 - Phone apps?
 - Phone tracking?
- Why do you take or not take those actions?
 - Any you would like to but don't?



Marketing Technology Landscape

The Martech 5000

Total Solutions 8,000

Advertising & Promotion 922


Content & Experience 1,936

Social & Relationships 1,969

Commerce & Sales

Data 1,258


Access all the data of this landscape & more at martech5000.com



MarTechMap


an initiative by  &  MartechTribe

2022 Marketing Technology Landscape May 2022



visit marotechmap.com to search, sort & filter

6,521% growth 2011 to 2022



<https://chiefmartec.com/2022/05/marketing-technology-landscape-2022-search-9932-solutions-on-martechmap-com/>

Concerns About Privacy

≡

The Washington Post
Democracy Dies in Darkness

TECH Help Desk Artificial Intelligence Internet Culture Space **Tech Policy**

House, Senate leaders nearing deal on landmark online privacy bill

The expected agreement vaults Congress closer to legislation that lawmakers have sought for decades



By [Cristiano Lima-Strong](#)

April 5, 2024 at 7:26 p.m. EDT

The file consists
identifies her as


On Friday, two bills were introduced in Washington in support of a Do Not Track mechanism that would give users control over how much of their data was collected by advertisers and other online companies.

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tion

By JENNIFER VALENTINO-DEVRIES,
JEREMY SINGER-VINE and ASHKAN SOLTANI
December 24, 2012


First and Third Parties

- **First-party cookie:** belongs to top-level domain.
- **Third-party cookie:** belongs to domain of embedded content (such as image, iframe).



Anonymous Tracking

Trackers **included in other sites** use **third-party cookies** containing unique identifiers to create browsing profiles.



Basic Tracking Mechanisms

- Tracking requires:
 - (1) re-identifying a user.
 - (2) communicating id + visited site back to tracker.


▼ Hypertext Transfer Protocol

```
▷ GET /pixel/p-3aud4J6uA4Z6Y.gif?labels=InvisibleBox&busty=2710 HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: pixel.quantserve.com\r\n
Connection: keep-alive\r\n
Accept: image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\r\n
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_2) AppleWebKit/537.36
Referer: http://www.theonion.com/\r\n
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate,sdch\r\n
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8\r\n
Cookie: mc=52a65386-f1de1-00ade-0b26e; d=ENkBRgGHD4GYEA35MMIL74MKiyDs1A2MQI1Q;
```

Tracking Technologies

- HTTP Cookies
- HTTP Auth
- HTTP Etags
- Content cache
- IE userData
- HTML5 protocol and content handlers
- HTML5 storage
- Flash cookies
- Silverlight storage
- TLS session ID & resume
- Browsing history
- window.name
- HTTP STS
- DNS cache
- “Zombie” cookies that respawn
(<http://samy.pl/evercookie>)


Other Trackers?



“Personal” Trackers




Personal Tracking



- Tracking is **not anonymous** (linked to accounts).
- Users **directly visit tracker's site** → evades some defenses.

1996-2016: More & More Tracking

- More trackers of more types, more per site, **more coverage**



Defenses to Reduce Tracking

- Do Not Track?




Send a 'Do Not Track' request with your browsing traffic

Do Not Track is not a technical defense:
trackers must honor the request.

Defenses to Reduce Tracking


- Do Not Track proposal?
- Private browsing mode?

Private browsing mode doesn't protect against network attackers fully.



Defenses to Reduce Tracking

- Do Not Track proposal?
- Private browsing mode?
- Third-party cookie blocking?



3rd party cookies

- Chrome...

“By undermining the business model of many ad-supported websites, blunt approaches to cookies encourage the use of opaque techniques such as fingerprinting (an invasive workaround to replace cookies), which can actually reduce user privacy and control. We believe that we as a community can, and must, do better.”

Aug 2022: Remove 3rd party cookies by 2024

The state of 3rd party cookies

- Safari:
 - Blocks most - <https://webkit.org/blog/10218/full-third-party-cookie-blocking-and-more/>
- Chrome
 - No longer removing. <https://privacysandbox.com/news/privacy-sandbox-next-steps/>
- Firefox
 - Specific blocks/etc <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/blog/goodbye-third-party-cookies/>
- Others
 - Variety of behaviors, wide variation

Cookie ghostwriting

- No 3rd party cookies allowed 😞
- Instead, <script src="https://trackerdomain/cookiewriter.js"/>
- No longer in an iframe... what can they do?

Fingerprinting

- An alternative, popular, approach is *fingerprinting*
 - Website runs some javascript to measure browser/machine behavior
 - Generates an ID from this
 - ID is semi-consistent even across things like incognito mode
- Fingerprinting is unaffected by 3rd party cookie changes!