

# Academic Research Monitor

## Advances in Momentum Investing

### Equities

Global

Quantitative

#### Economics and currency momentum

Does an improving economy drive improvements in the strength of the country's currency? The authors of our first paper suggest that it does. They create an economic momentum trading strategy which buys the currencies of countries where the underlying economy (measured by, for example, changes in interest rates or CPI) is improving relative to the other countries in the study. We extend the authors' results to the current day.

#### Does a company's home town have information?

Creating a basket of companies with the same centre of incorporation gives us a new momentum signal in the US – one which appears to be orthogonal to existing factors.

#### Idiosyncratic Momentum without Total Return Momentum Crashes

Constructing sorted portfolios according to idiosyncratic momentum rather than total return momentum generates anomalous returns for several global markets; Japan included! Whilst similar to conventional momentum from a factor perspective, it turns out that using idiosyncratic momentum instead as a signal results in more stable returns without the crashes momentum strategies typically suffer from.

#### Can you realise momentum profits after costs?

The fourth paper we review looks at the effect of costs on momentum strategies globally. Momentum is more effective in medium sized stocks than in large cap in most markets globally. However attempting to realise a momentum (or other) strategy in small companies will probably fail due to low trading volumes.

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
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**Figure 1: Idiosyncratic Momentum vs. Total Return Momentum**



Source: Figure 1 from "Idiosyncratic Momentum" by Blitz, Hanauer & Vidojevic. Used by permission

## Introduction

In this issue of our Academic Research Monitor, we return to the topic of momentum investing (Figure 2). We have covered momentum in previous editions of the ARM. These are available here ([ARM, Jan 2015](#) [ARM, July 2013](#))

The first paper takes an interesting approach to investing in currency momentum – it uses momentum in economic data as the signal rather than in the underlying price of the currency. The authors find a significantly large return to this economic momentum effect. Given the attractiveness of the strategy we extend the authors' results to the end of Feb 2018.

The second paper investigates the novel idea of geographic momentum – is there momentum driven by the location where the company is based? We attempt to replicate the signal within Europe but as we only have country of incorporation the results are not successful.

The third paper we review shows that the idiosyncratic momentum effect, as given in Gutierrez and Pirinsky (2007), offers anomalous returns, like conventional momentum but is, in itself, distinct and does not suffer from crash risk which total return momentum is prone to. The authors show that portfolios sorted according to idiosyncratic momentum offer better risk-adjusted returns than conventional momentum sorted portfolios for several global markets including Japan; a region where momentum-based strategies typically don't work. Again we replicate the results and find the idiosyncratic momentum strategy is successful in all markets except for Europe.

The final paper that we review investigates the feasibility to exploit the momentum premium in different firm size categories (*small*, *medium* and *large*) in the presence of transaction costs. Despite its high turnover, the returns to medium-sized portfolio remain statistically and economically strong, while those within the small stock universe appear to be unrealizable.

### Figure 2: Papers on Momentum

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"Economic Momentum and Currency Returns" <i>Magnus Dahlquist and Henrik Hasseltoft</i>	<i>SSRN working paper, Jan 2017</i>
"Geographic Momentum" <i>Christopher Parsons, Riccardo Sabbatucci &amp; Sheridan Titman</i>	<i>SSRN working paper, June 2016</i>
"Idiosyncratic Momentum" <i>David Blitz, Matthias Hanauer &amp; Milan Vidojevic</i>	<i>SSRN working paper, Jan 2018</i>
"Size and Momentum Profitability in International Stock markets" <i>Peter Schmidt, Urs von Arx, Andreas Schrimpf, Alexander Wagner, Andreas Ziegler</i>	<i>SSRN working paper, Feb 2017</i>

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Source: UBS.

## "Economic Momentum and Currency Returns"

by Magnus Dahlquist and Henrik Hasseltoft

Most analysis of currency momentum considers simply the momentum in the currency returns themselves – ranking on the past 12 months return and going long the currencies with the best return and shorting those with the worst (or going long those with a positive return and shorting those with a negative return) is a successful strategy. This paper analyses a different sort of momentum – that in the economic fundamentals of the underlying countries. As the authors say “a strategy that goes long currencies in countries with relatively strong economic momentum and short currencies in countries with relatively weak economic momentum exhibits an annualised Sharpe ratio close to one over the 1976-2014 period and delivers a statistically significant alpha when controlling for common currency strategies.”


The authors look at eight economic variables, which are listed in Figure 3. As we detail in the table the changes are measured so an increase in the variable should be associated with higher growth<sup>1</sup>.

These variables are analysed across 19 countries, all of whose currencies are analysed against the USD. A twentieth region, the Euro, replaces a number of the currencies at the end of 1998. In our reproductions of the authors’ results below we use the G10 currencies against the USD, a subset also used by the authors.

### Portfolio construction

For each variable the authors consider lookback periods from 1 to 60 months. Each month they rank on the relevant change in the macroeconomic variable and then use a demeaned rank weighting, which is detailed in Figure 4, to create a dollar neutral portfolio. Given they have 8 macroeconomic variables and 60 lookback periods, this means each month they create 480 separate portfolios.

**Figure 4: Cross sectional demeaned rank weighting. Example with 9 assets, 6 with positive scores, 3 with negative scores**



Source: UBS Quantitative Research.

**Figure 3: Economic variables**

Variable	Measure / direction
10 year rates	Increasing / difference
1 month rates	Increasing / difference
Yield spreads (short – long)	Flatter / difference
Consumer prices	Increasing / log change
Producer prices	Increasing / log change
Industrial production	Growth / log change
Retail sales	Growth / log change
Unemployment	Decreasing / log change

Source: Economic Momentum and Currency Returns by Dahlquist et al. Used by permission.

<sup>1</sup> The authors report the results of a number of panel regressions which confirm the direction of the relationship.

The authors use three-month-lagged data for the non-interest rate variables to guarantee data availability. They have also created portfolios using non-revised real-time macroeconomic data; they report "the results are very similar to our main results."

The economic data is lagged to ensure it is available

The returns of these portfolios are calculated using one month forward returns. In our reproduction below we use the returns of the continuous first future which is analogous to the authors' approach. When combining the individual portfolios together this is done using inverse volatility weighting where the volatility used is calculated over the previous three years. They combine the portfolios either by macro variable, grouping the trends into short-, medium- and long-term and also an overall combined portfolio covering all 480 strategies.


## Performance

Dahlquist and Hasseltoft show that almost all their 480 portfolios have a positive Sharpe ratio over the full sample period, with only two of the industrial production, three of the retail sales and seven of the unemployment based portfolios. The highest individual Sharpe ratios are close to 0.8.

Almost all the portfolios have a positive return

Combining the individual portfolios using inverse volatility weighting gives the Sharpe ratios shown in Figure 5.

**Figure 5: Sharpe ratios of the separate macro factor based portfolios**



Source: Economic Momentum and Currency Returns by Dahlquist et al. Used by permission.

The average correlation between the eight strategies is 0.16 which means the combination portfolio of all 480 has a Sharpe ratio of 0.96, a skewness of -0.2 and a high excess kurtosis of 7.42.

Interestingly combining the strategies into short- (look back periods of 1-12 months), medium- (13-36 months) and long-term (37-60 months) shows that the highest Sharpe ratio, 0.95, is generated by the long term momentum signals, with the medium term giving 0.85 and the short term 0.63. In our reproduction of the analysis below we find a lower overall Sharpe ratio over a more recent period. The authors go on to show that the aggregate portfolio weights forecast future currency returns.

The long look back periods give the best performance

The obvious question to ask is whether these results are simply a repackaging of the standard carry, momentum and value strategies. The authors construct three cross sectional portfolios (using the same demeaned rank weighting approach described above in Figure 4) to represent these factors. They use the forward premium (one month forwards divided by the spot exchange rate), twelve month returns, and the negative of the log change of the real exchange rate over the past 60 months respectively.

**Is this just carry, momentum and value?**

Regressing the returns of the combo portfolio on these three factors leaves a significantly positive annualised alpha of 1.23%. The only beta which is significant is that to carry, which the authors interpret as “a portion of the [economic] trend returns reflects cross-sectional differences in interest rates”. A regression on changes in FX volatility, the TED spread and changes in the VIX has a marginally significant negative coefficient to FX volatility, suggesting the trend portfolio does badly when FX volatility is rising.

**No – there's a significant positive alpha after adjusting for these factors**

Reversing the analysis and regressing the returns to the carry strategy on momentum, value and the various groupings of the economic trend portfolios (either by factor type or look back period) has the result in every case that the alpha to carry is no longer significant at the 5% level. In the authors words “economic momentum subsumes the alpha of carry trades”.

**The return to carry is subsumed by the economic momentum returns**

Another way of considering the importance of a strategy is to introduce it into a mean-variance efficient portfolio. A portfolio containing just carry, momentum and value has weights of 29%, 27% and 44% respectively. Adding the economic trend portfolio changes these to 3%, 14% and 21% with the remaining 62% in the economic momentum portfolio. The Sharpe ratio rises from 0.89 to 1.10.

There are some further results in the paper which we briefly summarise here.

- Volatility targeting the combo portfolio showed “modest improvements” in the Sharpe ratio.
- Adding transaction costs of 10 basis points reduces the Sharpe ratio by a modest 0.08.
- Reducing the universe to just the G10 currencies produces similar results albeit with a somewhat reduced Sharpe ratio (0.81 from 0.96).
- Splitting the sample period in two gives a better performance in the first half, but the second half remains significant.

## Reproducing the results

Given the positive nature of these results, which stop in May 2014, the question has to be asked as to whether the success of the strategy continues out of sample. To investigate this we chose to just analyse the currencies of the G10 countries (Australia, Canada, Eurozone, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) against the USD from May 2002 to Feb 18. We start at May 2002 as this is when we have future available on all 9 currencies against the US dollar<sup>2</sup>. We have only analysed seven of the variables the authors considered as we struggled to find some of the industrial production data.

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
<sup>2</sup> - The currency returns are retrieved as continuous first futures from Bloomberg.

Over this period we find the results are less impressive than those shown in the paper. The Sharpe ratios of the individual portfolios are shown in Figure 6 below. As can be seen the long rate, CPI and PPI based strategies remain successful, but the retail sales and unemployment strategies have very subdued returns.

The short rate and curve (short – long rates) strategy performances are mixed.

Note the data starts in 2005 to be comparable with the combined strategies where we use the first three years of data to calculate the volatility of the individual sub-portfolios.


**Figure 6: Sharpe ratios of the individual portfolios**



Source: UBS Quantitative Research. Data from May 2005 to Feb 2018. The lags are from 1 to 60 months. The non-interest rate data is lagged by 3 months.

Combining the individual sub-portfolios into seven strategies we show the time series returns in Figure 7 below. These results confirm those seen in the bar charts above.

**Figure 7: Time series returns for the portfolios combined by macroeconomic variable**



Source: UBS Quantitative Research. Data from May 2005 to Feb 2018. Subportfolios are combined using 1 / volatility weighting.

The overall portfolio – combining all 420 sub-portfolios – has a Sharpe ratio of 0.38 – somewhat down on the performance reported in the paper (although better than the returns to a simple price momentum strategy run over the same time period). The details of the performance for this portfolio are shown below.

**Figure 8: Performance statistics of the Overall portfolio**

Annualized Return (Geometric %)	1.09%
Annualized Return (Arithmetic %)	1.13%
Volatility (%)	2.85%
Skewness	0.87
Kurtosis	3.97
Max Drawdown (%)	-6.33%
Annualized Sharpe Ratio	0.38
Calmar Ratio	0.17

Source: UBS Quantitative Research. The figure reports various performance statistics using monthly excess returns for the overall combined portfolio, where the individual portfolios are weighted using 1/vol weighting. The Calmar ratio is defined as the annualised geometric mean return over the maximum drawdown. The sample period is May 2005 to Feb 2017.

## "Geographic Momentum"

by Christopher Parsons, Riccardo Sabbatucci and Sheridan Titman

In this paper, the authors contrast the effect of sector momentum to the much less well documented geographic momentum. They find strong evidence to support both, but note that sector momentum has greater explanatory power. However, they also find that the effect of sector momentum declines amongst stocks with high analyst coverage, while the effect of geographic momentum remains constant. This is important for investors because it means that geographic momentum remains a plausible investment strategy within the large-cap, highly liquid universe.

### Results

Parsons et al have data on US stocks from 1970 to 2013. They use 12 sector classifications and identify each stock's geography by the location of its headquarters. There are twenty different geographies, each representing a large urban centre e.g. Denver or New York.

They regress the excess returns of a stock onto the excess returns of a portfolio consisting of all its non-local sector peers and the excess returns of a portfolio consisting of the firms which share its city but not its sector.

$$r_{i,c,s,t+1} = \alpha + \beta_{city} r_{c,\#s,t} + \beta_{sector} r_{s,\#c,t} + \varepsilon_{i,c,s,t+1}$$

They find that both betas are significant, but that the beta to the industry (0.20) is approximately three times larger than the beta to the city (0.07). This suggests that, while both geographic and sector momentum are significant, the impact of sector shocks is considerably larger than the impact of geographic shocks.

The authors simulated the performance of a trading strategy based on geographic momentum. Each month, they created quintile of stocks based on the average lagged return amongst firms headquartered in the same geography but from different sectors. These quintile portfolios were then rebalanced monthly. The highest quintile had a Fama-French alpha of 21 basis points per month, compared to -24 basis points in the lowest quintile.

It is also notable that the Fama-French alphas are almost identical to the CAPM alphas, suggesting that geographic momentum is orthogonal to the classic quantitative signals.

The authors extend this analysis by examining how their results change if they examine parts of the universe with low analyst coverage vs high analyst coverage. They find that the sector beta declines as the number of analysts covering a stock increases, but that the city beta remains roughly constant.


**Evidence for both sector and geographic momentum, but sector momentum has a bigger impact**

**Strategy based on geographic momentum would have outperformed**

**Sector momentum effect declines for more highly covered stocks, but geographic momentum remains constant**



**Figure 9: Effect of city and sector momentum by number of covering analysts**



Source: Panel A of Table 5, "Predictive regressions with cross-sectional cuts (Fama-MacBeth)", taken from "Geographic Momentum" by Parsons, Sabbatucci & Titman, June 2016 Used with permission

This suggests that a sector momentum strategy will be less effective amongst highly scrutinised stocks, but that a geographic momentum strategy will remain equally effective.

This is important because it allows investors who are constrained to the more liquid parts of the market to use geographic momentum as an alpha signal and also because it suggests that a geographic momentum portfolio could remain profitable even with a large AUM.

### Theoretical explanation

The authors' explanation for their result hinges on one (plausible) assumption: when two firms are covered by the same analyst, then information gleaned from one firm is rapidly incorporated into the price of another firm. For example, if a firm issues a profit warning, then the analysts who cover it adjust their beliefs about the profitability of the other firms they cover accordingly, and this is then priced in by the market. In contrast, when two firms do not have any overlapping coverage, the information may be much slower to be priced in.

The authors note that the great majority of analysts work on sector teams rather than geographic teams e.g. there are many utilities specialists but fewer Ireland specialists. As a consequence, information may diffuse more rapidly across sectors than across geographies. Investors can take advantage of the slow incorporation of information into prices by buying momentum portfolios. This allows geographic momentum to be a successful strategy, even if sector shocks have a bigger impact on asset prices than geographic stocks.

The structure of the investment analyst business has another important consequence. As the number of analysts increases, the probability that any pair of stocks from the same sector have at least one overlapping analyst rises to nearly one. In contrast, increasing the number of analysts does not greatly change the probability that two stocks from the same geography but different sectors are covered by the same analyst. It will remain close to zero, because very few analysts cover multiple sectors.

That means that highly covered stocks rapidly incorporate information from other stocks in the same sector (via the overlapping analysts), so sector momentum is less effective. However, information from other stocks in the same geography does not diffuse rapidly even to highly covered stocks (as there aren't any overlapping analysts) so geographical momentum can still be a useful signal amongst these names.

**Because analysts typically work in sector teams, not geographic teams, information diffuses more rapidly across sectors than geographies**

**This allows geographic momentum to keep working even amongst stocks with high analyst coverage.**

## Our replication

We have attempted to replicate this work in Europe. Unfortunately, we do not have a dataset giving companies' location down to the city level. Instead, we define the geographies as countries rather than urban centres. We use the ten ICB sectors.

At each month end and for each stock, we compute the excess returns over the previous month of an equal weighted portfolio of stocks from the same country but a different sector and an equal weighted portfolio of stocks from the sector, but from different countries. All returns were total returns and were computed in USD.

We then run a panel regression, regressing the excess returns to the stocks onto the returns to these two portfolios. Figure 10 shows the results. We did not replicate the authors' findings. We find evidence of a positive sector momentum effect, but a negative geographic momentum effect i.e. geographic reversal.

Over the one-month horizon, the beta between past returns of the stock's country (ex its own sector) portfolio and future returns to the stock appears to be negative. This suggests the presence of geographic reversal rather than momentum.

**We find geographic reversal effect, not momentum**

**Figure 10: Panel regression of excess returns onto country and sector portfolio returns from the previous month**

	Value	T-statistic	P-value
Intercept	0.00	-0.04	97%
Country beta	-0.05	-8.74	0%
Sector beta	0.18	26.11	0%

Source: UBS Quantitative Research

There are a wide variety of explanations for this difference. One key difference is that countries are much bigger geographic sub-groups than urban centres. This may make information about other stocks in the same geography less relevant, and hence reduce the effect of momentum.

## "Idiosyncratic Momentum"

by David Blitz, Matthias X. Hanauer and Milan Vidojevic

Portfolios formed by sorting stocks on total return momentum, typically defined by the return over the past 6 or 12 months, have shown to deliver above-average returns in the subsequent period<sup>3</sup>. In this paper, Blitz, Hanauer and Vidojevic (2018) show that the idiosyncratic momentum effect (to be defined shortly) as given in Gutierrez and Pirinsky (2007) offers positive returns in a similar vein to conventional momentum but is, in itself, distinct and does not suffer from crash risk which total return momentum is prone to.

As we showed in "[Are you already timing styles successfully?](#)", price momentum has time-varying loadings on quality, value and size, a result corroborated elsewhere in the literature (see e.g., Kothari and Shanken, 1992). A negative consequence of the existence of these style exposures is when those styles reverse; during such periods, the total return momentum factor is known to experience large losses.

In summary, the findings of the paper are as follows:

- The idiosyncratic momentum anomaly is a phenomenon distinct from conventional momentum and cannot be explained by standard asset-pricing models;
- Neither the overreaction hypothesis, investor overconfidence nor risk-based reasons offer an explanation for idiosyncratic momentum;
- Profits to idiosyncratic momentum strategies are consistent with investor underreaction to news;
- Idiosyncratic momentum based portfolios in international equity markets also perform favourably, Japan included.


Total return momentum has proved successful but it has drawbacks...

...its time-varying loadings on other styles have negative consequences when those style reverse.

Idiosyncratic momentum is distinct from conventional momentum and does not suffer the same shortcomings.

It even works in Japan!

Figure 11: Cumulative Returns



Source: Figure 1 from "Idiosyncratic Momentum" by Blitz, Hanauer & Vidojevic. Used by permission. The plot shows cumulative performance of the top over bottom TR MOM and iMOM portfolios, equal-weighted and rebalanced monthly, over the period July 1963 – December 2015

<sup>3</sup> Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001)

## Motivation

The motivation for investing according to traditional momentum is associated with the empirically observed anomaly that stocks with strong past performance continue to outperform over the subsequent period. Whilst a strategy of buying past winners and selling past losers has proven effective, its success often does not persist beyond a couple of months and it has not demonstrated success in the Japanese equity market. It is also prone to crash risk which can be explained by its option-like behaviour. That is, in down-turning markets, a conventional momentum strategy is effectively a short call option on the market with bounded gains as the market further declines yet unbounded losses when the market rises. Broadly speaking, therefore, momentum performs better when market conditions persist than when the market transitions to another state.

Related to this, the sign of momentum returns typically follows those of the market; a pattern associated with the overreaction hypothesis, investor overconfidence and self-attribution bias. The authors of this paper show that idiosyncratic momentum (henceforth iMOM) is less exposed to crashes as well as credit market factors<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, the premium realised by this alternative definition of momentum cannot be explained by investor overreaction or over confidence.

## Data and Definitions

The calculation process of iMOM is achieved in three stages:

- (1) Using a return history of 36 months, the following model is estimated each month for all stocks in the universe:

$$R_{i,t} - R_{f,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{mkt,i} \cdot (R_{mkt,t} - R_{f,t}) + \beta_{hml,i} \cdot R_{hml,t} + \beta_{smb,i} \cdot R_{smb,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

- (2) Idiosyncratic momentum returns are calculated using the estimated betas from stage (1):

$$\epsilon_{i,t} = R_{i,t} - R_{f,t} - \alpha_i - \beta_{mkt,i} \cdot (R_{mkt,t} - R_{f,t}) - \beta_{hml,i} \cdot R_{hml,t} - \beta_{smb,i} \cdot R_{smb,t}$$

- (3) The iMOM score is then computed as the last 12-2 month volatility-adjusted mean idiosyncratic return:

$$Idiosyncratic\ Momentum_{i,t} = \frac{\sum_{t-12}^{t-2} \epsilon_{i,t}}{\sqrt{\sum_{t-12}^{t-2} (\epsilon_{i,t} - \bar{\epsilon}_i)^2}}$$

For the U.S. case, security-level data is sourced from CRSP<sup>5</sup> over the period December 1925 – December 2015 where the universe consists of common shares traded on NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges with the usual selection criteria. Balance sheet and income statement data is obtained from Compustat annual files. The one-month U.S. Treasury bill is used to represent the risk-free rate. Finally, Fama-French factor returns are sourced from the website of Professor Kenneth French.

**Total return momentum has option-like behaviour. Hence, it is highly exposed to crash risk.**

**Idiosyncratic momentum is less exposed to crash risk and cannot be explained by those reasons often posited for conventional momentum.**

**iMOM is defined as the past 12-month vol-adjusted mean idiosyncratic return (excluding the latest month)**

<sup>4</sup> The authors cite a few papers which suggest that positive returns to momentum depend on the credit market during the holding period. This bias to the credit market, referred to as the "spillover effect", however, is not substantial for idiosyncratic momentum as it is for conventional momentum.

<sup>5</sup> Center for Research in Security Prices.

## Empirical Results

In their empirical analysis, equal-weighted portfolios are constructed and, for the purpose of validation, an iMOM factor is formed following the same methodology Fama and French employ for building their (WML) momentum factor. More specifically, the iMOM factor is the zero-investment, value-weighted portfolio which is long small and big (idiosyncratic) winners and short small and big (idiosyncratic) losers, rebalanced monthly and held for one month:

$$iMOM_t = \frac{1}{2}(Big_{idio}Winners_t + Small_{idio}Winners_t) - \frac{1}{2}(Big_{idio}Losers_t + Small_{idio}Losers_t)$$

The relative benefits of using iMOM rather than TR MOM as an investment signal.

iMOM factor definition.

In the first instance, iMOM decile portfolios are constructed, the performance of which is compared to the performance of equivalent portfolios formed according to total return momentum (henceforth TR MOM) and is summarised in Figure 12 and Figure 13.

**Figure 12: Performance of Idiosyncratic Momentum Decile Portfolios**

Decile	Excess Return	Vol	Sharpe Ratio	Alpha CAPM	tstat	Alpha 3FM	tstat	Alpha 5FM	tstat
D1	0.22	5.92	0.04	-0.38	(-3.48)	-0.53	(-5.81)	-0.47	(-5.04)
D2	0.43	5.54	0.08	-0.13	(-1.47)	-0.3	(-4.26)	-0.32	(-4.43)
D3	0.52	5.29	0.1	-0.03	(-0.41)	-0.2	(-3.58)	-0.24	(-4.17)
D4	0.64	5.2	0.12	0.1	-1.28	-0.08	(-1.62)	-0.11	(-2.14)
D5	0.73	5.12	0.14	0.2	-2.66	0.02	-0.39	-0.03	(-0.72)
D6	0.77	5.1	0.15	0.24	-3.21	0.07	-1.69	0.02	-0.42
D7	0.82	5.09	0.16	0.28	-3.97	0.12	-2.8	0.06	-1.49
D8	0.87	5.09	0.17	0.34	-4.46	0.18	-3.94	0.14	-2.99
D9	1.01	5.26	0.19	0.46	-5.74	0.31	-5.66	0.27	-4.74
D10	1.19	5.57	0.21	0.63	-6.7	0.52	-7.32	0.51	-6.86
D10-D1	0.98	3.33	0.29	1	-7.51	1.05	-7.78	0.98	-7.02

Source: Table 1 from "Idiosyncratic Momentum" by Blitz, Hanauer & Vidojevic. Used by permission. The table reports descriptive statistics to decile portfolios formed according to idiosyncratic momentum scores for U.S. stocks over the period July 1963 – December 2015.

**Figure 13: Performance of Total Return Momentum Decile Portfolios**

Decile	Excess Return	Vol	Sharpe Ratio	Alpha CAPM	tstat	Alpha 3FM	tstat	Alpha 5FM	tstat
D1	0.13	7.74	0.02	-0.58	(-3.29)	-0.81	(-5.12)	-0.59	(-3.72)
D2	0.48	5.97	0.08	-0.11	(-0.92)	-0.32	(-3.17)	-0.3	(-2.89)
D3	0.63	5.26	0.12	0.1	-1.03	-0.12	(-1.59)	-0.18	(-2.33)
D4	0.64	4.86	0.13	0.15	-1.85	-0.06	(-1.01)	-0.13	(-2.32)
D5	0.67	4.71	0.14	0.18	-2.47	-0.01	(-0.21)	-0.1	(-1.96)
D6	0.73	4.65	0.16	0.24	-3.58	0.06	-1.28	-0.05	(-1.19)
D7	0.83	4.69	0.18	0.34	-4.97	0.18	-3.76	0.07	-1.58
D8	0.86	4.94	0.17	0.35	-4.53	0.21	-3.77	0.1	-1.85
D9	1.04	5.6	0.19	0.48	-4.58	0.41	-5.19	0.37	-4.57
D10	1.2	7.09	0.17	0.55	-3.33	0.57	-4.6	0.64	-5.07
D10-D1	1.07	6.42	0.17	1.14	-4.42	1.37	-5.47	1.23	-4.77

Source: Table 1 from "Idiosyncratic Momentum" by Blitz, Hanauer & Vidojevic. Used by permission. The table reports descriptive statistics to decile portfolios formed according to convention total return momentum scores for U.S. stocks over the period July 1963 – December 2015.

If we first consult Figure 12, the second and fourth columns report monotonically increasing excess and risk-adjusted returns, respectively, going from low to high iMOM decile portfolio. This remains true even after adjusting for the standard factors, as is shown in the fifth, seventh and ninth columns. Furthermore, the self-financing  $D10 - D1$  iMOM portfolio delivers a monthly return of 0.98% which, although lower than the equivalent portfolio based on TR MOM (see the bottom row of Figure 13), offers a much lower monthly volatility of 3.3% (compared to 6.42%) resulting in a 77% improvement in Sharpe ratio (0.29 vs. 0.17). In general, Figure 12 and Figure 13 point to the conclusion that idiosyncratic momentum generates more stable alphas than its traditional counterpart. Note, as well, that the conclusions do not materially differ when the same statistics are computed for large cap decile portfolios<sup>6</sup>.

### Is Idiosyncratic Momentum distinct?

Beyond investigating the performance advantages of a newly defined factor, a necessary exercise is to show that those results thus documented are robust. The authors achieve this and examine whether iMOM is a "separate factor that expands the efficient frontier" via three sets of tests:

1. **Time-series: GRS** – quantifies whether the iMOM decile portfolios have a joint alpha of zero.
2. **Cross-section: Fama and MacBeth (1973)** – regresses the iMOM returns on a set of characteristics; the estimated coefficients of which represent premia associated with a unit of exposure to a factor (characteristic) holding all other factors constant.
3. **Factor Spanning** – time-series regressions on various sets of factors including conventional momentum and iMOM factors.

Regarding the first test, Figure 14 shows GRS statistics for the same asset-pricing models used for measuring the decile portfolio alphas in Figure 12 and Figure 13. The first thing to note is that neither of these models can explain the returns to either definition of momentum. Secondly, GRS statistics relating to iMOM are consistently higher than those relating to TR MOM.

The overall conclusion stemming from the Fama-French regressions is that, whilst both momentum strategies are highly economically and statistically significant, when both are jointly considered, the estimated coefficients associated with iMOM are stronger in magnitude with higher t-stats. We can interpret this as follows: "there is information about average returns in idiosyncratic momentum that is not considered in total return momentum."

Finally, the factor spanning tests show that TR MOM is subsumed by iMOM; the alpha to TR MOM becomes insignificant when we control for iMOM. On the other hand, iMOM is not subsumed by TR MOM. The same story emerges when the same computations are made for small and large caps.

In light of the above, whilst both definitions of momentum cannot be explained by any of the standard asset-pricing models; iMOM "seems to pose an even bigger challenge".

**Sharpe ratios for iMOM decile portfolios generally exceed those of their conventional counterpart.**

**Is iMOM superior to TR MOM according to time-series and cross-sectional factor tests?**

**Figure 14: GRS Test for joint alpha**

	iMOM	TR MOM
Alpha CAPM	7.72 (0)	5.14 (0)
Alpha 3FM	7.12 (0)	4.6 (0)
Alpha 5FM	5.7 (0)	3.66 (0)

Source: "Idiosyncratic Momentum" by Blitz, Hanauer & Vidojevic. Used by permission.

**According to factor spanning tests, TR MOM is subsumed by iMOM but iMOM is not subsumed by TR MOM.**

<sup>6</sup> See the appendix for the performance statistics for the large cap case.


As a final exercise, the authors test the robustness of their results in four global regions including Europe, Japan, Asia Pacific ex Japan and the emerging markets. Again, portfolios are equal-weighted but, since they apply country neutrality, they sort constituents into quintiles instead of deciles.

As Figure 15 illustrates, iMOM generates superior risk-adjusted returns for top-minus-bottom quintile portfolios across the regions tested. The same general conclusion was reported for t-statistics relating to CAPM and three-factor alphas. The most interesting finding here is for Japan; a region where momentum typically doesn't work as well. For this region, iMOM "generates a return on 0.44% per month which is statistically significant at the most conservative levels."

## Replication

In light of the positive conclusions documented for idiosyncratic momentum in this paper, we were keen to investigate whether the results remained true when applying the same methodology to global investible universes. In a similar vein to the analysis carried out in their paper, we computed and compared the performance of iMOM and past 12-month momentum (excluding the latest month) decile portfolios for global regions including Europe, North America, Japan, Asia ex Japan and World. In each case, we took the constituents from the universe<sup>7</sup> at the end of every month and grouped them into deciles according to both definitions of momentum.

**Figure 16: Sharpe Ratios of Global Momentum-based Strategies**




Source: UBS Quantitative Research: The bar charts show Sharpe ratios of global developed momentum-based portfolios (top and bottom decile) over the period Feb 1997 – Jan 2018.

Our dataset is slightly shorter in length than the period covered in the paper; our period of analysis starts in March 1994 but the strategies start 3 years later to allow for the 36 months of data we need to compute the idiosyncratic momentum values.

In general, our results mostly agree with the paper; iMOM portfolios typically generate higher risk-adjusted returns compared to their conventional equivalent. As Figure 16 shows, the difference in Sharpe ratios for Japan isn't as large in magnitude but is still greater for iMOM. Also, we didn't see the same outperformance in Europe. This is most likely due to the different period over

**Figure 15: International Results**




Source: Results are taken from Table 10 of "Idiosyncratic Momentum" by Blitz, Hanauer & Vidojevic. Used by permission. The table reports Sharpe ratios for the top-minus-bottom Q5-Q1 iMOM and TR MOM global portfolios relating to the period Dec 1989 – December 2015.

<sup>7</sup> We start, in all cases, with the constituents from an MSCI universe for all regions.

which we could run our backtests. In addition, the performance of conventional momentum strategies since December 2015 (when the momentum strategy performance ends in the paper) may have been highly positive to the extent that iMOM portfolios would have had to achieve phenomenal returns to significantly outperform it.

**Figure 17: Maximum Drawdown for Global Momentum-based Strategies**



Source: UBS Quantitative Research: The bar charts show the maximum drawdown of global developed momentum-based portfolios (top and bottom decile) over the period Feb 1997 – Jan 2018.

On a final note, excluding Asia ex Japan, Figure 17 shows that iMOM portfolios also typically experience lower drawdowns than the same portfolios formed on total return momentum.



## "Size and Momentum Profitability in International Stock Markets"

by Peter Schmidt, Urs von Arx, Andreas Schrimpf, Alexander Wagner, Andreas Ziegler

The strong performance of momentum strategies across time and markets is widely documented in the academic literature. When it comes to practical implementation, however, two major concerns emerge: (1) momentum is much stronger among small-cap stocks (2) momentum premium vanishes after accounting for trading costs.

In their paper Schmidt *et al* study the feasibility to implement investment strategies based on size and momentum in 14 countries by considering three aspects of trading costs:

- **Portfolio turnover with fixed trading costs.** Assume 30 basis points (bp) for small stocks before 2001 and 40bp after 2001 (numbers taken from Frazzini et al (2012)), and 15bp for large stocks for the whole period. The portfolio return with trading costs,  $r_t^{tc}$ , is calculated as:

$$r_t^{tc} = r_t - tc^l \cdot to_t^l - tc^s \cdot to_t^s,$$

Where  $tc^l$  and  $to_t^l$  denote the trading cost and the turnover of the long portfolio, respectively, while  $tc^s$  and  $to_t^s$  refer to the short portfolio.

- **Critical trading cost.** This is defined to be the maximum trading costs that an investor could bear and still obtain significant returns:

$$tc_{crit} = \frac{\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T sp_t - t_{crit} \sqrt{\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T (sp_t - \mu)^2}}{\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T to_t},$$

where  $sp_t$  is the return to a long-short spread portfolio with mean  $\mu$  at time  $t$ ,  $t_{crit}$  is the critical value of the assumed t-test and  $to_t$  is portfolio turnover.

- **Trading volume** of the portfolios to assess the capacity of such strategies.


The data is sourced from Thomson Reuters Datastream, Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Kenneth French's website for the sample period 1991 through 2012. The portfolios under consideration are long-short, formed on the basis of a three-by-three independent double sort on size and momentum. The momentum signal is constructed using the past 12 months, excluding the most recent one.

Figure 18 shows the monthly returns to the long-short portfolios for each size group. Interestingly, the relationship between size and momentum profitability generally does not appear monotonic – the medium sized portfolios achieve higher absolute return than both large and small-cap portfolios (average over all countries is at 1.2%, 0.9% and 0.7% for medium, small and large, respectively). The difference between the returns to the medium and large size stocks is positive for 12 out of the 14 countries under consideration, with the difference being statistically significant at the 5% level for 5 of them (Germany, UK, France, Switzerland and US).

### Methodology

### Relationship between size and momentum – no transaction costs

**Figure 18: Momentum returns relative to size**



Source: "Size and Momentum Profitability in International Stock Markets" by P. Schmidt, U. Arx, A. Schrimpf, A. Wagner and A. Ziegler, based on the results in Table 2. Reproduced with permission. Dark-blue indicates that the monthly returns are significant at the 5% level; the dashed red line shows the average across all countries.


Another common criticism of momentum strategies is that its performance is driven by the short side. The authors examine the role of shorting by evaluating the performance of winners and losers separately and find that both sides contribute to the raw return of the momentum strategy. However, after accounting for the Fama and French 3 factors (market, size and value), the role of shorting becomes more prominent, particularly for the medium and large stocks.

#### Mixed results on the role of shorting

The results follow a similar pattern after adjusting for trading costs (Figure 19). In particular, the returns to medium size portfolios are positive for all countries (except Japan) and significant for the majority of them.

#### Fixed transaction costs

**Figure 19: Momentum returns relative to size with transaction costs**



Source: "Size and Momentum Profitability in International Stock Markets" by P. Schmidt, U. Arx, A. Schrimpf, A. Wagner and A. Ziegler, based on the results in Table 6. Reproduced with permission. Dark-blue indicates that the monthly returns are significant at the 5% level; the dashed red line shows the average across all countries.

With the exception of Japan and Singapore, the critical trading costs are positive in every country for at least one size group. In addition, 10 out of 14 countries in the middle group have maximum trading costs thresholds substantially exceeding the costs implied by the analysis based on portfolio turnover; the respective number is 6 for small and 3 for large caps.

As a final step the authors estimate *maximum fund size* for each country by combining portfolio turnover and trading volume as:

$$\text{max fund size} = \min\left(\frac{\text{trading volume, long side}}{\text{turnover, long side}}, \frac{\text{trading volume, short side}}{\text{turnover, short side}}\right)$$

Using the data for the US as an example, Figure 20 calculates the maximum fund size using the formula above. Following Frazzini *et al* (2012), the authors assume that a fund should have a size of at least \$1.5b in order to be created.

Given an implied maximum fund size of ~0.7b for small stocks, it transpires that the momentum premium for small caps is likely infeasible (even if one assumes that the hypothetical fund is equally split between small and large caps). On the other hand, the authors find that for medium stocks an investor will have to move about 10% of the market each month (given maximum fund size of \$15b), meaning that the momentum premium would remain significant if trading costs are below 50bp (on average). Finally, for big stocks, the maximum fund size is ~300b, meaning that rebalancing (the hypothetical fund) is unlikely to have a big impact.

The authors conclude "when accounting for trading costs we find that all strategies involving small size stocks are probably not realizable because the US dollar trading volume of the small size stocks needed for implementation is too low and because actually trading these stocks with appropriate quantities would presumably increase stock prices and decrease the profitability of these strategies significantly. For the momentum strategies, which involve medium size and big stocks this problem is not that severe."

## Positive critical trading cost for all countries except Japan and Singapore

**Figure 20: Max fund size, US**

		Small	Med	Large
Volume	Long	527	11,570	787,836
	Short	735	7,700	193,841
Turnover	Long	76%	48%	37%
	Short	56%	51%	65%
Ratio	Long	693	24,104	2,129,286
	Short	1,305	15,098	298,999
Max fund size		693	15,098	298,999

Source: "Size and Momentum Profitability in International Stock Markets" by P. Schmidt, U. Arx, A. Schrimpf, A. Wagner and A. Ziegler, based on the results in Table 9 and Table 10. Reproduced with permission.

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Neutral	FSR is between -6% and 6% of the MRA.	39%	24%
Sell	FSR is > 6% below the MRA.	16%	13%
Short-Term Rating	Definition	Coverage <sup>3</sup>	IB Services <sup>4</sup>
Buy	Stock price expected to rise within three months from the time the rating was assigned because of a specific catalyst or event.	<1%	<1%
Sell	Stock price expected to fall within three months from the time the rating was assigned because of a specific catalyst or event.	<1%	<1%

Source: UBS. Rating allocations are as of 31 December 2017.

1: Percentage of companies under coverage globally within the 12-month rating category.

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