

In the Mirror of Memory

**Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance
in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism**

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Mindfulness and Memory: The Scope of *Smṛti* from Early Buddhism to the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma

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Introduction

For virtually any Indian tradition, an examination of the cognitive process designated in the West as memory must begin with an investigation of the term *smṛti*. This Sanskrit designation, however, is used in a variety of contexts and has a range of meanings or connotations not indicated by *smṛti*'s standard English translation as memory. These various contexts would seem to suggest two distinct functions of *smṛti*: first, as a technique central to religious praxis; and second, as an aspect of ordinary psychological processes. As employed and refined in religious praxis, *smṛti* is a mode of attentiveness operative in several Buddhist models for practice. The second function of *smṛti* appears to coincide with some of the psychological operations normally associated in the West with memory: specifically, retention and recollection. Such a twofold distinction, though appealing in its descriptive simplicity, obscures a complex historical evolution during which the traditional meanings of the single term *smṛti* were preserved and accommodated to newly emerging meanings and shifts of emphasis. This twofold distinction also conceals the determinative historical and doctrinal constraints specific to a Buddhist context that frame any discussion of doctrinal issues, which in turn affect the further shaping of those very constraints. Finally, limiting one's examination of *smṛti* to a dichotomous framework also precludes an understanding of the connotative scope of *smṛti*, a scope that illumines both the interconnections among the various contexts in which *smṛti* is used and the connections with other similarly functioning terms.

In this chapter, I adopt another interpretative model, whereby the apparent twofold distinction in the functioning of *smṛti* does not represent a semantic bifurcation, but rather an interrelated semantic complex. Specifically, *smṛti*'s functions as a central component of religious praxis and as a psychological factor are mutually determining; underlying these two contexts of use is a common aspect of the functioning of *smṛti* that is otherwise obscured in a dichotomous model.

Thus, this chapter proceeds with the assumption that the variant meanings of the term *smṛti* suggested by the dichotomous framework reflect an

underlying unity and interaction between models of memory and religious praxis and not a secondary and thereby negligible semantic overlap. For this reason, the inclusive and initially ambiguous term *mindfulness* has been chosen to translate *smṛti* in all of its contexts. Mindfulness is chosen here not, as in many cases, to avoid confusion with the psychological function of *smṛti* as memory, but precisely for the opposite reason; that is, to indicate at the outset what this chapter will illustrate: that the contexts for the operation of *smṛti* suggested by the term *mindfulness* actually encompass the psychological functions of memory as they were understood within Indian Buddhism.

To demonstrate this alternative interpretative model for *smṛti*, I will explore the range of technical uses of mindfulness. I will attempt to demarcate the boundaries of the psychological functioning of mindfulness and clarify its specific operations in religious praxis and in memory. First, I examine the various formulaic descriptions of mindfulness in early Buddhist scripture to uncover the role of mindfulness in religious praxis and, in particular, its most frequent occurrence in the practice of the applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*). Next, I explore the further specification and refinement of these descriptions undertaken in the taxonomies of the early scholastic Abhidharma texts. This will reveal the reorganization of the traditional descriptions of practices involving *smṛti* and their incorporation into the complex path structure that forms the centerpiece of Abhidharma doctrinal synthesizing. Finally, the ordinary psychological functions of mindfulness that are carefully analyzed in later Abhidharma treatises will be examined in the context of *smṛti*'s continuing functions in praxis. Throughout, attention will be directed to the differences that occur in descriptive formulas. Even in the early period, the descriptions of mindfulness had attained a formulaic regularity, reflecting the didactic and mnemonic requirements of scriptural transmission and the predilection of the growing tradition to utilize repeatedly stereotypical characterizations. Consequently, deviations in the standard formulas, even within the earliest sources, are instructive either as a remnant of an earlier stratum, or as a sign of further intentional development.

Mindfulness in Early Buddhist Scriptures

In the early Buddhist scriptural collections, *mindfulness* refers almost exclusively to techniques of religious praxis. Its importance is amply indicated by its inclusion in many of the lists of exercises or qualities that the early scriptural collections recommend as aids in abandoning all defilements and attaining enlightenment. Mindfulness occurs, for example, within the five or seven forces (*bala*), the five controlling factors (*indriya*), the seven

limbs of enlightenment (*bodhyaṅga*), and the eightfold noble path.¹ Mindfulness is often paired with awareness (*samprajanya*). It also appears in the mindfulness of respiration (*ānāpānasmṛti*), an independent practice, which serves as the prerequisite for advanced stages of trance (*dhyāna*) or equipoise (*samāpatti*) in the later Abhidharma.² The closely related term *anusmṛti*, or “reflection,” occurs in discussions of distinctly religious exercises, and is said to be of six, eight, or ten varieties. *Anusmṛti* is also applied to previous rebirth states (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛti*).³

The most frequent context in which mindfulness occurs within the early materials is the four applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*): mindfulness of the body (*kāya*), mindfulness of feelings (*vedanā*), mindfulness of mind events (*citta*), and mindfulness of factors (*dharma*). Like the mindfulness of respiration (*ānāpānasmṛti*), the set of four applications of mindfulness becomes the topic of individual dialogues in the early scriptures. This is an indication of their importance within the as yet relatively unstructured array of alternative techniques for praxis, an array characteristic of this early period in the development of Buddhism.⁴ Further, mindfulness in its other praxis-related functions as a force, controlling factor, limb of enlightenment, or member of the eightfold noble path is also customarily defined in terms of these four applications of mindfulness.⁵

The Four Applications of Mindfulness as a Path to Enlightenment

The development of the four applications of mindfulness in the early scriptural collections has been examined in depth by both Lin Li-kouang and Lambert Schmithausen.⁶ Lin Li-kouang suggests that the standard set of four applications found from the early scriptural period onward represents an expansion of an original single application of mindfulness with regard to the body.⁷ Schmithausen admits the probable antiquity of the body-focused practice, but suggests that Lin’s assertion that the canonical account of the four applications is an amplification of an original mindfulness of the body does not withstand a text-historical analysis of the relevant early scriptural materials.⁸

Whatever the origin of the four applications, their significance among the range of early Buddhist practices is underscored by the formulaic passages that proclaim the objectives and results of the practice of mindfulness. The separate dialogue on the mindfulness of the body declares that through that practice, “one abandons remembrance and intention rooted in ordinary life and becomes inwardly stilled, concentrated,” and so on.⁹ As a result, one is able to enter the four trance states, from which one gains ten beneficial results culminating in the destruction of the fluxes, which is the last of the

three clear intuitions (*vidyā*) that together constitute the experience of enlightenment.¹⁰ Moreover, the general formula that introduces the dialogues on the four applications unequivocally declares that the four constitute the single path of practice, leading ultimately to the final goal of all praxis, the realization of nibbāna.¹¹ Elsewhere, the four applications are said to constitute the basis from which Buddhas of the past, present, and future cultivate the seven limbs of enlightenment and finally attain the incomparable right complete enlightenment.¹² According to other formulas, the four applications lead to the abandonment of inclinations (*chanda*) that arise from the objects of each of the four applications or to the state of having completely understood (*pariññāta*) and, thereby, having removed the defilements dependent upon these four objects. This understanding and removal results ultimately in the realization of the deathless (*amata*).¹³

Such descriptive formulas suggest that the practice of mindfulness is tantamount to the central praxis of Buddhism: namely, as the single path leading to the ultimate soteriological goal of enlightenment and nirvāṇa. However, mindfulness also plays a prominent role in stylized scriptural enumerations of various practices that function together as a comprehensive path. According to one account, praxis begins with the purification of discipline (*sīlaṃ suvisuddham*) and straight views (*diṭṭhi ujukā*), which constitute the foundation of virtuous factors (*kusaladhamma*). It then proceeds through the cultivation of the four applications of mindfulness and culminates in the growth of virtuous factors and the recognition that constitutes the verification of one's enlightenment and one's status as an arhat: namely, that "birth is exhausted, the religious life (*brahmacariya*) is lived, what is to be done is done, and there is nothing further after this life."¹⁴ In the Buddha's directive that his disciples should abide taking themselves and the Dharma as their lamp and refuge, mindfulness is identified as the proper mode of abiding.¹⁵ Conversely, the failure to cultivate the four applications is cited as the primary reason for the decline of the teaching.¹⁶

Scriptural Descriptions of the Operation of Mindfulness and its Relation to Other Mental Functions

Although the early formulaic descriptions of the four applications of mindfulness do not provide a comprehensive picture of the operation of mindfulness per se, some passages do offer clues as to those states and activities with which mindfulness is associated. The standard formula states: "a monk abides observing the body in the body, zealous, possessed of awareness and mindfulness, having restrained covetousness and dejection in the world; [a monk] abides observing the feelings in the feelings" and so on, for each of the four applications.¹⁷ According to a slightly different pattern, "you should abide observing the body in the body, zealous, possessed of awareness, fo-

cussed, having a clear mind, composed, having one-pointedness of mind, for the sake of knowledge of the body as it truly is," and so on, for each of the four applications.¹⁸ The former formula emphasizes the moral preconditions for the practice of mindfulness, whereas the latter pattern, the concomitant meditative concentration.¹⁹ The cultivation of each of the four applications includes several stages, each of which concludes with three formulas: first, one observes an object inwardly, outwardly, and both inwardly and outwardly; next, one observes the facts of arising (*samudaya*) and passing away (*vaya*) as regards the object; and third, mindfulness, while observing the object, is established to the point of possessing knowledge (*ñāna*) and recollection (*patissati*), and one abides being not dependent (*anissita*) and not grasping anything in the world.²⁰ One who practices thus attains one of two fruits: either final knowledge in this life, that is, the ultimate state of arhatship; or, if accompanied by some remainder of substratum (*upādi*), the penultimate state of the nonreturner.²¹

In some dialogues, this standard formulaic description of the four applications is expanded to include meditative techniques attendant to the practice of mindfulness.²² Mindfulness can be cultivated either by fastening (*paṇidhāya*) or not fastening the mind. In the first case, as one "abides observing the body in the body," for example, the mind may become outwardly distracted due to physical pain or mental sluggishness, and so on. To counteract this distraction, the mind should then be fastened on some worthy (*pasādanīya*) mark, which results in delight (*pāmojja*), joy (*prīti*), quieting of the body (*passaddhakāya*), ease (*sukha*), and concentrated mind. Having been fastened thus on a worthy mark, the mind is withdrawn and no initial inquiry (*vitakka*) or investigation (*vicāra*) remains; one becomes aware simply, "I am without initial inquiry or investigation, I am inwardly mindful and at ease."²³ Mindfulness may also be cultivated without fastening the mind: that is, one becomes aware that the mind is outwardly unfastened and that it is unfastened (*appaṇihita*), uncollected (*asaṅkhitta*), and liberated (*vimutta*) with regard to what comes after or before (*pacchāpure*). One then engages in the traditional practice of the four applications: that is, "one abides observing the body in the body," and so on.²⁴ Another dialogue sets out the requisites for the proper cultivation of mindfulness using the example of unskillful and skillful cooks.²⁵ An unskillful cook does not grasp the marks characterizing the tastes of the employer and, therefore, receives no reward. So also, an unskillful monk, though practicing the four applications in accordance with the formulaic description, does not grasp (*na ugganḥāti*) the marks of the mind and, therefore, does not experience concentration of the mind and the abandonment of defilements.²⁶ The skillful monk, in contrast, grasps the marks of the mind, experiences concentration of the mind and, thus, abandons defilements.

Although these two dialogues do not present a uniform picture of the activity of mindfulness, they do touch on certain factors important in its operation. The first dialogue suggests that mindfulness, as cultivated in the practice of the four applications, does not require that the mind be either fastened or unfastened on an object. The mind, if distracted, can be prepared for mindfulness through fastening on a mark. However, this initial fastening of the mind is followed by withdrawal from the mark and the disappearance of both initial inquiry and investigation.²⁷ Mindfulness also can be cultivated without the aid of a mark on which to fasten the mind, in which case one is aware of one's undirected state of mind and is openly mindful from the outset. By contrast, the second dialogue suggests a different view: the successful practice of mindfulness that leads to concentration of the mind and the abandonment of defilements, in fact, is contingent on the process of grasping marks, presumably the marks of the mind involved in the practice of mindfulness.

Further clues to the operation of mindfulness are found in the close connection between mindfulness (*smṛti*) and awareness (*samprajanya*). References to awareness appear in virtually all formulaic definitions of the four applications of mindfulness, as well as in descriptions of other praxis-related varieties of mindfulness and reflection (*anusmṛti*).²⁸ In other contexts, mindfulness and awareness characterize a state of concentration²⁹ or function as stages in hierarchies of practice culminating, for example, in one-pointedness of mind or in liberation and nirvāṇa.³⁰ This frequent linkage of mindfulness and awareness indicates that, in many contexts, the cultivation of mindfulness alone functions not as a self-sufficient practice, but rather as a necessary stage of simple observation that is merely preparatory to a subsequent stage of cognitive awareness. It is then possible that in those cases in which mindfulness does appear as a self-sufficient practice, for example, in the four applications, simple observation and cognitive awareness are conflated and subsumed within the category of mindfulness, here understood in a wider sense. However, when mindfulness and awareness do appear as a pair, mindfulness is defined using the standard formula of the four applications, whereas awareness is defined using the formula that appears particularly in the concrete description of mindfulness of the body. In these contexts, awareness functions as a conscious attentiveness in action: for example, one acts with awareness in going out and returning, or looking forward and backward, and so on.³¹ Or awareness may be defined as the fact that feelings (*vedanā*), initial inquiry (*vitakkā*), and conceptions (*saññā*) are known as arising, remaining, and disappearing.³² Thus, when paired with awareness, mindfulness is but a stage of calm and settled preparedness, which can be directed toward an object, as in the case of the four applications of mindfulness, but which, in itself, does not require such direction. However, as in the example

of the skillful cook cited earlier, mindfulness may also be described as involving the grasping of marks; in those cases, the sphere of mindfulness includes cognitive operations that in other contexts are associated with awareness.

Mindfulness as a Technique of Religious Praxis in Abhidharma

The northern Indian Abhidharma texts continue the tradition of mindfulness as a technique of religious praxis, but not without significant changes in its character and operation.³³ The four applications of mindfulness are no longer recommended as a completely independent and self-sufficient technique of praxis, but rather are included as the first four members in the standardized list of thirty-seven aids to enlightenment (*bodhipakṣya*).³⁴ The thirty-seven aids are further incorporated within a new path structure detailed in northern Indian Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts. This new gradualist path of theoretically successive stages begins with the stage of initial action (*ādikarmika*), in which one has not yet begun the cultivation expounded exclusively within the Buddha's teaching. This nonexclusive stage is followed by the distinctively Buddhist paths of preparation (*prayogamārga*), vision (*darśanamārga*), and cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*), each of which contains substages. The four applications of mindfulness, as the first group among the thirty-seven aids, are identified as the predominant form of practice within the first nonexclusive stage of initial action. The second group among the thirty-seven aids, the four right efforts (*samyakpradhāna*), is predominant in the first stage of the subsequent path of preparation: namely, the stage of heat. The third group, the four bases of magic powers (*rddhipāda*), is predominant in the second stage of the path of preparation, the stage of the summit, and so on, through the seven groups of thirty-seven aids.³⁵ Thus, the four applications of mindfulness are incorporated into the Sarvāstivādin path structure at its very basis in the stage of initial action, prior to the distinctively Buddhist practices of the three paths of preparation, vision, and cultivation. Therefore, they can, theoretically, be practiced by non-Buddhists as well.

Though particularly associated with and predominant in this initial stage of praxis, the four applications, like all of the subsequent aids, nonetheless are said to characterize the entire path from their stage of predominance onward. Therefore, they continue to be practiced throughout the entire path up to the final stage of arhatship, in which one attains the ultimate knowledge of the future nonarising of all defilements. We can hypothesize that the practice of mindfulness was incorporated at the initial stage of the path because of its strong traditional association with simple observation or calm preparedness,

which would serve as a propaedeutic to subsequent practice. But, despite its relegation to a merely preparatory and nonexclusive role, mindfulness was not omitted from the rest of the path because of an inherited precedent: namely, the widespread scriptural tradition establishing the importance of the practice of mindfulness.

When discussing the four applications of mindfulness, Abhidharma texts focus on three issues: the nature of their respective objects; the distinctive character of their mode of operation; and their relation to other techniques of religious praxis.

The Objects of the Applications of Mindfulness

In Abhidharma texts, the objects of the four applications—the body, feelings, mind events, and factors—taken together, are extended to encompass all possible factors.³⁶ This extension is especially evident in the ever more inclusive explanations offered for the object of the fourth application, the factors (*dharma*). In the early scriptures, the objects of the application of factors include the five hindrances, the five aggregates, the fetters that depend on the six sense bases, the seven limbs of enlightenment, and, in certain versions, the knowledge of the four noble truths.³⁷ In the Abhidharma, both traditional and new categories define the objects of the four applications so that they form four mutually exclusive sets, which together exhaustively encompass the range of potential experience. Some Abhidharma texts define the object of the fourth application as containing all factors not included in the other three.³⁸ Others employ the taxonomy of the five aggregates, identifying the conception (*saṃjñāskandha*) and motivations aggregates (*saṃskāraskandha*) as the contents of the factors application.³⁹ Still others employ both the aggregate and sense sphere taxonomies and identify the object of the fourth application with that portion of the nonmaterial dharma sense sphere (*dharmāyatana*) not included within the feelings aggregate (*vedanāskandha*).⁴⁰ Finally, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* completes the expansion by also subsuming unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtadharma*) within the fourth application. This expansion of the contents of the fourth application reflects the general purpose underlying the Abhidharma enterprise as a whole: namely, to provide a soteriologically coherent enumeration of all experienced phenomena.

Another innovation in the Abhidharma interpretation of the objects of the four applications is that the objects themselves are understood to encourage soteriologically significant recognitions. One early Abhidharma text states that the objects of each of the four applications of mindfulness promote the recognition of the impurity, impermanence, suffering, voidness, and non-self of the four objects of the body, feelings, mind events, and factors.⁴¹ In

later Abhidharma texts, each of the four applications is considered to be, respectively, a counteragent to one of the four mistaken views (*viparyāsa*) of purity, ease, permanence, and self.⁴² Post- *Vibhāṣā* Abhidharma compendia link this function of the four applications as counteragents to a description of their true intrinsic characteristics. To observe the objects of the four applications correctly is to observe their true characteristics, which are identified, in one case, as impurity, impermanence, suffering, and nonself.⁴³ In another case, these true characteristics are said to comprise both the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and generic characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of the four objects: the particular characteristic refers to their distinctive intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) or to their nature as belonging to a particular sense sphere (*āyatana*) and the generic characteristic is their general fourfold nature as impermanence, and so on.⁴⁴

Relationships between Mindfulness and Insight: The Bridge to the Psychological Understanding of Mindfulness

The functioning and character of mindfulness itself also receives increased attention in later Abhidharma texts. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* offers a three-fold interpretation of the scriptural term *applications of mindfulness*.⁴⁵ First, some scriptural passages are said to refer to the applications of mindfulness in their intrinsic nature (*svabhāvasmṛtyupasthāna*), here identified as insight (*prajñā*).⁴⁶ As an example, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* cites the scriptural passage that equates the applications with the single path.⁴⁷ Second, some passages refer to applications of mindfulness through connection (*saṃsargasmṛtyupasthāna*). In other words, the term *mindfulness* can refer either to the mental forces or to the dissociated forces (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*) that occur in the same moment as a particular application of mindfulness and have the same effect as that application. Therefore, these factors are called *applications of mindfulness* in connection with the principal application: for example, the passage that identifies the four applications as a heap of virtue.⁴⁸ Third, still other scriptural passages use the term *applications of mindfulness* to refer to the object-support (*ālambana*) of mindfulness: for example, the passage that identifies the four applications as all factors.⁴⁹ In short, *applications of mindfulness* denotes not only that insight with which mindfulness is intrinsically identified, but also those factors occurring simultaneously with the operation of this insight, as well as the objects to which this insight is applied.⁵⁰

The *Mahāvibhāṣā* and all later northern Indian Abhidharma texts devote particular attention to the first sense of the applications of mindfulness in their intrinsic nature, which is identified as insight (*prajñā*).⁵¹ The four applications, originally classified within the mindfulness component among the controlling factors, forces, limbs of enlightenment, and members of the

eightfold noble path, are reclassified in later Abhidharma texts among the corresponding insight components.⁵² As the *Mahāvibhāṣā* notes, if the intrinsic nature of the applications of mindfulness were not insight but mindfulness (*smṛti*), then the scriptural formula that identifies the operation of the applications of mindfulness as observation (*anupaśyanā*) would be contradicted, because observation is itself a form of insight.⁵³ Furthermore, the particular and generic characteristics said to be discerned through the applications of mindfulness actually can be cognized only through insight.⁵⁴ The later Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika master Saṅghabhadra (fifth century AD) adds a second reason for identifying the intrinsic nature of the applications of mindfulness as insight: the four applications are identified with the single path by which nirvāṇa is ultimately attained, and that single path is the eradication of defilements. Because insight is always required for eradicating defilements, the applications must be of the nature of insight.⁵⁵

This shift from mindfulness to insight in the Abhidharma characterization of the applications of mindfulness, however, raises new problems significant to this study. Specifically, if the applications of mindfulness are identified with insight, then what connection do they retain to mindfulness? The *Mahāvibhāṣā* offers eight possible solutions, five of which suggest differing relationships between mindfulness and insight.⁵⁶ In four of these five relationships, mindfulness performs a preparatory function that provides the requisite conditions for the subsequent proper functioning of insight: namely, stability, attentiveness, and retention with regard to the object-support. The remaining relationship suggests a reciprocity between insight and mindfulness: either the practitioner first applies mindfulness to the object-support and afterward investigates it, presumably through insight; or the practitioner penetrates the object-support first, again presumably through insight, and then afterward applies mindfulness. In the latter case, mindfulness protects that initial insight like a gatekeeper. Elsewhere, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* summarily characterizes this reciprocal relationship between mindfulness and insight in a similar manner: either insight is applied to an object-support through the initial power of mindfulness, or the initial power of insight enables the subsequent application of mindfulness to the object-support.⁵⁷

The *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* by Vasubandhu (fourth or fifth century AD), in the context of analyzing the compound *smṛtyupasthāna* (mindfulness applications), also presents these two alternative relationships between insight and mindfulness: namely, either insight is applied through mindfulness (*tad evaṃ smṛtyo 'patiṣṭhate*), or mindfulness is applied through insight (*smṛtir anayo 'patiṣṭhate*).⁵⁸ Though both alternatives are attested in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, as indicated above, Vasubandhu attributes the first, whereby mindfulness is the cause of insight, to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, while he endorses the second, whereby mindfulness is the consequence of insight. As

Vasubandhu explains, in the operation of these applications, one fixes or notes (*abhiṭṭapana*) the object through mindfulness as it had already been seen through insight.⁵⁹

Saṅghabhadra also explores various relationships between mindfulness and insight, correlating them to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*'s three senses of the scriptural term *applications of mindfulness* as discussed above.⁶⁰ In the case of the first sense, that is, the applications as intrinsic nature, Saṅghabhadra, apparently reflecting the view attributed to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas by Vasubandhu, asserts that insight is established and retained through the initial power of mindfulness; insight can be applied to the object only if assisted by the power of mindfulness. In the case of the second sense, that is, the applications through connection, mindfulness and insight are simultaneous and function reciprocally; insight is able to cognize the object clearly only if it is retained by the power of mindfulness, and mindfulness is able to fix the object only if retained by the power of insight. Finally, in the case of the third sense, that is, the applications as object-supports, initial insight applies mindfulness to a given object-support.

In the later Abhidharma literature, therefore, the set of applications of mindfulness lose their earlier scriptural status as a set of independent and self-sufficient practices and, instead, are incorporated within a comprehensive path structure. As a part of this larger set of practices, the applications of mindfulness become reinterpreted as modes of insight. In all probability, this reinterpretation results from a recognition that insight is indispensable for the eradication of defilements—the primary objective of the Abhidharma path. Further, the integration of the applications of mindfulness with insight is consistent with the earlier scriptural link between mindfulness and awareness (*samprajanya*) and indicates the partial assimilation of the operation of awareness by mindfulness. One moment of this reinterpretation, represented by the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, stresses the traditional observational and preparatory aspect of mindfulness; hence, they would traditionally be associated with the view that mindfulness precedes insight. This emphasis on the preparatory aspect of mindfulness parallels meditational interpretations in other traditions.⁶¹ The other moment, represented by Vasubandhu, who places insight before mindfulness, stresses, by implication, the psychologically retentive, and possibly recollective, aspects of mindfulness.

The Development of a Psychological Description of Mindfulness in Abhidharma

Parallel to the reinterpretation of the applications of mindfulness as varieties of insight, there emerges a new analysis of the function of mindfulness

as an ordinary psychological operation or, in Abhidharma terminology, as a mental factor concomitant with the mind (*caittadharma*). Evidence of this new psychological function of mindfulness is found not only in overtly psychological descriptions of mental processes, but also in Abhidharma formulas that define traditional mindfulness praxes. Such passages no longer simply equate the mindfulness force, controlling factor, limb of enlightenment, and member of the eightfold noble path with the soteriologically oriented four applications of mindfulness. Rather, the definition of these praxes is extended to include particular psychological operations, which are directed toward objects of contemplation.

In fact, some scriptural definitions of mindfulness techniques allude to this extended, more prosaic sense of mindfulness. For example, one recurrent scriptural formula describes the practice of mindfulness as involving the “retention or reflection upon what has been done or said in the past by one possessed of utmost mindfulness and prudence.”⁶² Another scriptural passage distinguishes two varieties of correct mindfulness (*samyaksmṛti*): that which tends toward the fluxes; and that which does not tend toward the fluxes, but which instead is directed toward the notion of the four noble truths. Both varieties operate through retention (**smaraṇa*) and recollection (**pratīkṣā*, **saṃsmaraṇa*).⁶³

Psychological description becomes the norm in Abhidharma definitions of the praxis-related modes of mindfulness and largely displaces the previously cited definitions of mindfulness in terms of the four applications. Among the Pāli Abhidhamma texts, the *Dhammasaṅgāṇi* and the *Vibhaṅga* use the same formula in defining virtually all modes of mindfulness: “that mindfulness, which is reflection, recollection; mindfulness which is retentiveness, the state of supporting, the state of nondrifting (or fixing), the state of nonlosing; mindfulness, which is the mindfulness controlling factor, the mindfulness force, correct mindfulness.”⁶⁴ Northern Indian Abhidharma texts employ a similar definition of the psychological functioning of mindfulness: “mindfulness is reflection, remembering, recollection, the non-removing, the nonlosing, the nonleaving, the nonflowing away, the state of the nonlosing of factors, the state of the nondrifting (or fixing or noting) of the mind.”⁶⁵

Whereas the *Dharmaskandha* combines the psychological description with the more traditional definition in terms of the four applications,⁶⁶ the psychological definition of the new function of *smṛti* as a discrete mental factor concomitant with the mind also appears alone in Abhidharma passages, with no reference to the four applications or to any other soteriologically oriented praxes. These psychological definitions tend to be similar, though they lack the formulaic regularity of the praxis-related definitions. This freer pattern of definition suggests a growing interest in psychological events per se,

and results in an innovative analytic categorization and investigation of individual psychological phenomena. Whereas the *Dhātukāya* offers a relatively lengthy definition very similar to that presented above,⁶⁷ the *Prakaraṇapāda*, *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*, and **Abhidharmahrdayaśāstra*, as well as later Abhidharma texts offer more abbreviated definitions that emphasize the retentive function of mindfulness with regard to a particular object: for example, mindfulness is the nonloss (or nondrifting) of mind events;⁶⁸ or mindfulness is retention (**smaraṇa*) and recollection (**pratīsmaraṇa*, **saṃsmaraṇa*).⁶⁹ In these abbreviated definitions, the early Abhidharma formulas that combine religious and psychological functions are reduced: the psychologically significant aspect is extracted, and the inherited meditational context along with its soteriological orientation is omitted. The occurrence of these reduced formulas confirms that the middle-period Abhidharma texts are no longer interested only in conditions necessary for religious praxis, but are now interested also in the general psychological components of all mental functioning.

Excursus: The Development of the Psychological Function of Mindfulness

The development of the psychological characterization of mindfulness can be illumined by tracing the history and reinterpretation of key terms that provide transitional links between the early Abhidharma formulas and the succinct definitions of the mature Abhidharma compendia. The most problematic of these transitional terms are, in Pāli, *apilāpana*, and the apparently analogous Sanskrit term *abhilāpana*, which becomes so important in the later Abhidharma psychological definitions of mindfulness. The complicated and often obscure history of these terms, in fact, encapsulates the transformation of mindfulness and its emergence as an ordinary psychological component.

In Pāli Abhidhamma texts, the term *apilāpana* appears consistently in definitions of mindfulness as “the state of *apilāpana*” (*apilāpanatā*) and “the state of nonlosing” (*asammusanatā*). Later Pāli postcanonical texts set the two defining characteristics of mindfulness as *apilāpana* and *upagaṇhana*, or “sustaining” (as of an object).⁷⁰ Although the exact sense of *apilāpana* in these formulas is unclear, its usage in the postcanonical texts and the later commentarial explanations would suggest two possible interpretations. First, the *Milindapañha*, in explaining this *apilāpana* function of mindfulness, employs the simile of a storekeeper, who reminds (*sarāpeti*) the king of the contents of his stores. Mindfulness, likewise, notes (*api-lāpeti*) or causes one to be attentive to factors, in particular to those virtuous factors such as the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment, calming, discerning, intuition, and liberation. Through this process of duly noting, mindfulness thereby enables one

to cultivate those factors that are to be cultivated, and not to cultivate those that are not to be cultivated, and so on.⁷¹ As a second interpretation, later commentaries explain *apilāpana* as “plunging,” in the sense of entering into the object-support; it is the state of “not drifting” (*a-pilāpana-tā*), unlike gourd vessels, and so on, that float (*plāvanti*) and do not enter the water.⁷²

Both later Abhidharma and non-Abhidharma Sanskrit treatises use what would appear to be an analogous term, that is, *abhilapana*, in discussions of the psychological operation of mindfulness. Defining mindfulness as a separate mental factor, several Sanskrit sources use the term *abhilapana*, which involves some type of operation directed toward the object of consciousness. For example, the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* defines mindfulness as “having *abhilapana* that conforms to any given familiar object.”⁷³ The *Abhidharmāvatāraśāstra* and the later *Abhidharmadīpavibhāṣāprabhāvr̥tti* explain mindfulness as “*abhilapana* with regard to the object-referent of the mind, which is precisely the nonloss of past, present, or future action.”⁷⁴ Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* specifies mindfulness simply as “the nonloss (*asampramoṣa*) of the object-support;” Yaśomitra (c. eighth century AD) glosses this nonloss with the verb *abhilapati*: mindfulness is “that by connection with which the mind does not forget the object-support, and, as it were, *abhilapati* that [object-support].”⁷⁵ Sthiramati (sixth century AD) also, in commenting on the definition of mindfulness in Yogācāra treatises, includes the term *abhilapana*.⁷⁶ In his commentary on the *Triṃśikā*, Sthiramati identifies mindfulness as both the “nonloss of a familiar object and the state of *abhilapana* of the mind,” thereby underscoring a close connection between nonloss (*asampramoṣa*) and *abhilapana* in the operation of *smṛti*.⁷⁷

The precise meaning of *abhilapana* in these passages, however, is far from clear. One might expect that the sense of this term and its relationship to the Pāli *apilāpana* would be clarified by an examination of the early northern Indian Abhidharma materials. However, a precise terminological investigation using the extant Chinese versions of these texts, unfortunately, is virtually impossible. This is due in part to the absence of any detailed exegesis of the terms *abhilapana* or *apilāpana* in the early Abhidharma texts. Equally as important, however, is the obfuscating effect of the Chinese translations of the term, particularly those of Hsüan-tsang (seventh century AD), who translated the majority of the Abhidharma treatises.⁷⁸ Hsüan-tsang’s translations would appear to betray a systematic homogenizing that has retrospectively standardized the variation of the original Abhidharma materials according to norms derived from his earlier translations.⁷⁹ It is possible that Hsüan-tsang was influenced in his understanding of mindfulness by Sthiramati, specifically Sthiramati’s glosses on mindfulness in his commentary on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, which Hsüan-tsang translated prior to any early Abhidharma texts.⁸⁰

What then is the meaning of the term *abhilapana* in the later Sanskrit treatises, and how is it related historically either to the Pāli term *apilāpana* or to the analogous term as used in the early Abhidharma materials? The difficulty posed by these questions would be mitigated if the literature itself offered a univocal derivation of these terms. However, as was clear from the variant interpretations of *apilāpana* within the Pāli postcanonical and commentarial literature, no univocal derivation is recognized. As mentioned previously, later Pāli postcanonical texts connect *apilāpana* and *upagaṇhana*, or “sustaining,” in the definition of mindfulness. Reminiscent of this connection are Yaśomitra’s comments on Vasubandhu’s use of the term *abhilapana* to explain the function of mindfulness in the applications of mindfulness.⁸¹ Here Yaśomitra characterizes the activity of *abhilapana* toward the object of mindfulness as that of “taking up,” or “sustaining,” or perhaps more appropriately “noting” or “fixing.” Such a sense would be consistent with the traditional connection between mindfulness and attentiveness. As noted previously, however, there are at least two possible derivations for the terms *apilāpana* and *abhilapana*, each of which would lend a different sense to the operation of mindfulness: one derived from the root *plu*, “to float,” with a privative prefix (*a-pilāpana*); and the other apparently derived from the root *lap* possibly in the sense “to repeat” or, especially in the causative, “to note” with a prefix *api*, or possibly *abhi*.⁸² The derivation from the root *plu* with a privative would support the sense of “not drifting,” “entering,” or “fixing.” The derivation from the root *lap* could have the sense of “to repeat” or, especially in the causative, “to note,” or possibly the sense of “to chatter” or “to express.” Indeed some of the later Sanskrit commentators, especially Sthiramati, appear to have understood *abhilapana* as derived from the root *lap* with the sense, “to chatter” or “to express,” by analogy with other related technical derivations such as *abhilāpa*.⁸³

Given the vicissitudes of textual transmission and translation, it is impossible to determine which derivation, if either exclusively, is assumed by the early northern Indian Abhidharma treatises. It is possible that *apilāpana* and *abhilapana* were seen to have different derivations in some contexts, but were held to be equivalent in the context of *smṛti*. But it is also possible that a bifurcation in a once single term occurred through a later divergent derivation assumed by either the Pāli or Sanskrit commentators. Although the relationship between these terms cannot be unraveled, we should not assume that in the early northern Indian Abhidharma literature *abhilapana* necessarily has the technical sense of “mental chatter” that was later assigned to *abhilāpa* by commentators such as Sthiramati.⁸⁴ Indeed, *apilāpana*, *abhilapana*, and mindfulness itself in its early development as a mental factor may have no connection with verbal expression and its attendant negative connotations. Instead, these terms, whether derived from *plu* or *lap*, may be

intended simply to suggest an attentive noting or fixing. This function of noting or fixing is critical both to mindfulness in religious praxis and, as will be shown, to mindfulness in the ordinary psychological sense.

Irrespective of their original sense or etymological derivation, the terms *apilāpana* or *abhilapana* become prominent in Abhidharma analyses of the psychological functions of mindfulness. However, the use of the term *abhilapana* in the mature Abhidharma literature should not be interpreted in terms of the technical sense of mental chatter, a sense that probably represents a special, divergent interpretation associated with mindfulness by the later commentators. Rather, *apilāpana* and *abhilapana* should be seen as part of a progressive reinterpretation and reappropriation of a single, inherited tradition concerning mindfulness that traces back to the earliest sources.

The Psychological Operation of Mindfulness in Abhidharma

Though the early Abhidharma formulaic definitions of the psychological function of mindfulness as a discrete mental factor are not sufficient to provide a clear picture of its operation, later Abhidharma treatises furnish more information. This is provided in descriptions of the relation of mindfulness to other mental factors, in arguments concerning its existential status, and finally, in examinations of the events of retention and recollection, in which mindfulness plays a central role. In these passages, the operation of mindfulness and, in particular, its role in the act of recollection must be understood in terms of the general Buddhist model of psychological functioning.

The basic model of psychological functioning proposed in virtually all Abhidharma materials analyzes each mental event into its constituent factors; however, the number, identity, and modes of interaction among these mental factors become major points of disagreement among Buddhist Abhidharma schools. The Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādin school holds that each moment is defined by one mind event (*citta*). This mind event performs only the most general function of cognition; it serves primarily to define one moment of the mind, and to demarcate it from the next in the psychic stream. However, every mind event is accompanied by a number of concomitant mental factors (*caittadharma*), each of which fulfills a specific function occurring in that single moment. But certain Abhidharma masters, for example, the Dārṣṭāntikas, deny the discrete psychological functions and separate existence of the majority of these mental factors; therefore, they reject the model of the simultaneous occurrence of a mind event with other concomitant mental factors.⁸⁵ Instead, they propose a serial model of psychological functioning, in which a mind event and its concomitant mental factors operate in succession. They also drastically reduce the number of mental factors, and conflate their activities to only a few recognized factors. Thus, there are

two divergent interpretative models: that supported by the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādins of a single mind event associated with concomitant factors; and that advanced by the Dārṣṭāntikas of a mind event followed by mental factors in a series. These two models of psychological functioning entail a radically different understanding of the operation of mindfulness and the event of recollection.

Among the over forty-six possible concomitant mental factors enumerated by the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivādin school, ten, including mindfulness, are associated with and function in each and every mind event (*caittā mahābhūmikāḥ*).⁸⁶ These ten factors, whether by grasping the given object or discerning a particular quality of it, carry out some function integral to the constantly repeated process of perception that constitutes each moment.⁸⁷ As noted previously, mindfulness functions to cause the nonloss (*asampramoṣa*) of the object, and the fixing or noting (*abhilapana*) by the mind of the object. Such a definition is ambiguous—it could refer either to functions critical to the maintenance of meditative concentration, or to the more prosaic act of retention. However, there is some evidence to indicate that such a definition of mindfulness refers explicitly to the ordinary psychological event of recollection. In the course of a discussion on the relation between mindfulness and insight, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* presents several distinctive functions of mindfulness that relate to the event of recollection: for example, through the power of mindfulness, the object is not lost, enabling one to give rise to both specific and general activities with regard to it; or through the power of mindfulness, the practitioner thoroughly fixes or notes the object-support, and even if the object-support is forgotten, it can be recollected once again; or, mindfulness stabilizes or sustains the object-support, enabling insight to investigate it, or supports insight itself.⁸⁸ Here mindfulness performs the functions of retention, noting or fixing, and stabilizing that are requisite for recollection.

This connection between the operation of mindfulness and recollection is made explicit in an argument about the existential status of mindfulness. The argument occurs between the Kāśmīra Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika master Saṅghabhadra, and his major opponent, Sthavira, identified as the Dārṣṭāntika master, Śrīlāta (fourth–fifth century AD).⁸⁹ Saṅghabhadra identifies the activity of mindfulness as that of fixing or noting (*ming-chi*, **abhilapana*), which must occur when the mind cognizes any object.⁹⁰ But Śrīlāta, who denies the separate existence of all but three mental concomitants—feelings, conception, and volition⁹¹—claims that mindfulness is not a separate mental factor operating on present objects in each momentary mind event. Instead, mindfulness, which for Śrīlāta means specifically memory of the past, is used merely as a provisional designation to refer to mental operations directed toward past objects.⁹² The activity of fixing or noting

attributed to mindfulness by Saṅghabhadra, for Śrīlāta, is simply a feature of the operation of knowledge in general (*jñānākāra*) and does not necessitate the existence of mindfulness as a separate factor.

Saṅghabhadra's response indicates that it is precisely fixing or noting, which is the distinctive activity of mindfulness, that links mindfulness to ordinary memory:

[Śrīlāta's statement that mindfulness] is used as a provisional designation with regard to past objects establishes unequivocally that it functions with regard to present object-supports, [for] if there is no fixing (or noting) (*ming-chi*, **abhilapana*) with regard to a present object, no recollection (**pratīsmaraṇa*, **saṃsmaraṇa*) of the past object will be produced afterward.⁹³

In other words, memory of a past object occurs through the functioning of mindfulness, specifically in its operation of fixing or noting that occurs in each moment. Further, Saṅghabhadra contends that the features of knowledge (investigation and repeated examination of an object) are to be distinguished from those of mindfulness (fixing or noting and causing nonloss). For that reason, Saṅghabhadra claims, tradition asserts that mindfulness is that "fixing (or noting) which causes the mind not to lose the experienced object."⁹⁴

Thus, for Saṅghabhadra, mindfulness is not simply the recollection of past objects, but rather the activities of fixing or noting and retention as they occur with regard to every present object. Indeed, in the absence of this activity of mindfulness, which fixes or notes the present object in each and every moment, subsequent recollection would be impossible.⁹⁵ This interpretation of the activity of mindfulness undoubtedly shows the influence of the Sarvāstivādin model of psychological functioning that views all psychological events as separate factors, some of which, including mindfulness, occur in each moment. It is also, however, completely consistent with the traditional praxis-related function of mindfulness, which stabilizes and attentively observes a present object without distraction.

These different views of mindfulness as functioning with regard to past or present objects reflect different views of its role in the events of retention and recollection. For those who claim that mindfulness pertains only to past objects, *smṛti* provisionally refers to the conventional experience of memory: it is the recollection of a previously experienced object. Śrīlāta, Sthiramati, and Hsüan-tsang would all accept this view.⁹⁶ Memory is then not a distinct function attributed to a discrete and actually existing mental factor. Instead, as Vasubandhu explains, memory refers to a process whereby recollection arises as a result of a complex set of conditions.⁹⁷

For the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, however, *smṛti* is a separately existing factor that operates on present objects in each and every moment; it is this

So V. is on the opposite side —
on Śrīlāta's side

present functioning of fixing or noting that enables the subsequent event of recollection. Therefore, though the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas would accept that the process of recollection generally occurs as Vasubandhu describes, they would not limit *smṛti* to the event of recollection.

The Problem of Accounting for Continuity: Sarvāstivādin Solutions

The source for the general model of recollection accepted by both Vasubandhu and the later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas can be found in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, in a passage containing a lengthy refutation of eight Buddhist and non-Buddhist theories concerning ordinary memory.⁹⁸ All the refuted theories attempt to explain memory by postulating a continuing objective or subjective substratum that underlies, and thereby unites, prior experiences and subsequent recollections. For example, some non-Buddhists propose a theory of impregnation, whereby essences of events exist latent in one another, providing the impetus for their mutual recollection. Some suggest a theory of transformation, whereby the events of one moment transform to become the events of the next moment. Others adopt a theory of transference, whereby the events of one moment are transferred to, or continue to exist within, the events of the next moment. Still others shift the unchanging substratum from an objective sphere to a subjective one. This position asserts that cognition is singular in essence, uniting the activities of both performance and recollection; the prior momentary mental event conveys its experiences to a subsequent moment of mind that is capable of recollection. Among the refuted Buddhist theorists, some propose a personality (*pudgala*) that unites prior and subsequent events within the same being. Others propose an additional mind element (**manodhātu*) that underlies all specific and transitory moments of perceptual consciousness and is able to remember their contents. Still others maintain that two aggregates constitute each being—a transitory active aggregate and a permanent fundamental aggregate that recollects events performed previously by the active aggregate. Other Buddhists propose a subtle transmission of mind, from a prior moment that performs action, to a subsequent moment that cognizes or recognizes that action.

All such theories, the *Mahāvibhāṣā* recommends, are to be rejected by true Buddhists in favor of a model that assumes no unchanging substratum or essential transference but, nonetheless, accounts for recollection. The model endorsed by the *Mahāvibhāṣā* anticipates later equations of *smṛti* with recollection: “through the power of familiarity, sentient beings obtain knowledge homogeneous with a certain factor, which enables them to cognize [that factor] in the same way in which it was previously experienced.”⁹⁹ Later in the same passage, a slightly different model is offered: a receptive moment of

mind becomes the primary cause of mindfulness of an object-support, which is then not lost.¹⁰⁰ In this definition, *mind* refers to a previously produced mental “bundle” (*kalāpa*), which was receptive in the sense that it assumed either the features (*ākāra*) of a particular object-support or the object-support (*ālambana*) itself.¹⁰¹ *Mindfulness* then refers to the subsequently produced mental bundle; its nonloss is further said to be contingent on the mind being not distracted and not oppressed by suffering.

In this definition from the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, mindfulness is one operational moment in the event of recollection. It requires the successful coordination of three conditions: (1) securely grasped characteristics of the object previously experienced; (2) the present occurrence of a series homogeneous with that previous experience; and (3) the nonloss of mindfulness.¹⁰² Using Buddhist terminology, an object, once forgotten, can be recollected when knowledge that accords with that object arises within the homogeneous stream of a particular sentient being. Therefore, recollection requires a single causally connected, that is, homogeneous, stream of experiences and some experience that is similar to that prior object. For example, recollection can be stimulated by repetition, by a similar object, or by circumstances conducive to recollection.¹⁰³ Contrariwise, an object, once recollected, can be forgotten once again. Forgetfulness, or lapse of mindfulness, ensues from distraction of the mind, which can be attributed to a number of causes: oppression by suffering at birth or death; the present occurrence of other deliberations; dulled sense organs occupied with other cognitive activity; oppression by the suffering of an undesirable rebirth state; the distraction, wavering, and carelessness of the five sense organs with regard to an object; the present occurrence of heavy obscurations due to defilements; or mental distraction due to the absence of the cultivation of concentration.¹⁰⁴

Saṅghabhadra clarifies the process of recollection described in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and renders explicit the function of mindfulness as a discrete mental factor in this process. He rejects the position of Śrīlāta, who argues that recollection of an object from the distant past arises not from the past object itself, but rather through the mediation of a series of successively dependent causes, originating from the prior perceptual consciousness of that object.¹⁰⁵ For Saṅghabhadra, who accepts the Śārvāstivādin view that factors of all three time periods exist, even a past object actually exists and can itself serve as the direct object of and, therefore, direct cause for a later recollection.

Saṅghabhadra also rejects Śrīlāta's theory that a residue of past experience, or a subsidiary element (*sui-chieh*, **anudhātu*) produced as a result of the original perception, is preserved and awakened in subsequent recollection.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, Saṅghabhadra rejects other theories that assign mindfulness a provisional existential status as a seed (*smṛtibīja*) or a potency,

which, once generated from a prior experience of knowledge, remains dormant until, with the proper conditions, it produces a subsequent experience of memory.¹⁰⁷ For Saṅghabhadra, mindfulness cannot be a ‘mindfulness seed’ that exists merely as a provisional designation for a complex process. Rather, in accordance with Sarvāstivādin psychological analysis, mindfulness is a discrete and actually existing mental factor that arises together with each mind event. That mindfulness, which arises simultaneously with the knowledge of a prior experience, has the capability to initiate a series of mindfulness factors, one of which will arise simultaneously with the subsequent recollecting knowledge. Thus, Saṅghabhadra, like Vasubandhu, Śrīlāta, and others, does assert that a successive cause and effect relation underlies the event of recollection. But, unlike them, he denies that this serial cause-and-effect relation is one simply between two moments of knowledge: one moment that grasps the original object and a subsequent one that is provisionally described as its recollection. Instead, according to Saṅghabhadra, the causal series consists of successive moments of *smṛti*, each of which is an actually existing concomitant mental factor, which appears simultaneous with mind events and performs a function essential to the process of recollection.¹⁰⁸

always present?

Conclusion

If the Abhidharma analysis of mindfulness ends as a psychological theory of recollection, it begins in the praxis-oriented cultivation of calm preparedness. Thus, an interpretation of mindfulness merely as an operational aspect of cognition and a corresponding translation as memory ignore not only its initial significance, but also the transformational history of its development, from the early scriptures through the various phases of Abhidharma literature. This transformation occurs through both a selective emphasis of components of the traditional formulaic definitions, and a progressive incorporation of new elements that reflect dogmatic and philosophical innovation. The development of the term *mindfulness* results not simply from an internal dynamic of independent inquiry, but reflects the broader evolution of Buddhist thought. Central to this evolution is a shift of emphasis from praxis-concerned formulations to analytical investigations and taxonomies. In the Abhidharma, this entails the expansion of the analytical categories to include exhaustively all aspects of experience and an increasingly detailed study of both individual phenomena and their dynamic interrelations. In the case of mindfulness this shift of emphasis is evident in the expansion of the traditional objects of the praxis-related applications of mindfulness to include all phenomena, in the integration of the formerly independent praxis-related variety of mindfulness into the larger path structure,

in the reinterpretation of the four applications of mindfulness as a mode of insight, and in the emergence of mindfulness as an independent event in the developing structural analysis of cognitive and psychological functioning.

The mature description of the function of mindfulness in recollection cannot be understood except as an outcome of continual molding and adaptation of the primary senses of mindfulness as an attentiveness operative in praxis. Even the later debates between the different Abhidharma schools still echo this original primary sense within the confines of their respective doctrinal concerns. For the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, mindfulness is a mental event that occurs with regard to each object in every moment of psychic life. It enables the simultaneous insight or cognition of that object to occur and provides a necessary condition for later recollection. This specific doctrinal position, like many others, is both a motive for and a consequence of the general Sarvāstivādin philosophical model: that factors exist as real entities in the past, present, and future, but are radically momentary in terms of their activity; and that each moment of psychological functioning consists of a demarcating mind event, which is accompanied by discrete simultaneous mental factors. Therefore, mindfulness, as one such mental factor, can occur together with other mental activities, and even when past, can itself serve as the real cause for present recollection. In fixing or noting every present object, mindfulness performs an action essential for subsequent recollection. Other Abhidharma schools accept a serial view of psychological functioning, whereby each moment consists in only one mental activity; therefore, the cognition of an object cannot be simultaneous with any other mental activity, including mindfulness. Rejecting the reality of anything other than present factors, they relegate mindfulness to the status of a provisional designation referring to subsequent recollection.

Both these theories, the Sarvāstivādin and the serial view, must be understood within the context of the general Buddhist cognitive model. As its central feature, that model rejects the existence of a stable perduring self (*ātman*) capable of serving as the basis for the transmission of memories and as the locus for the occurrence of recollection. But certain Abhidharma schools, for example, those that adhere to the theory of seeds, invoke a commonsense model of memory by implying a virtual substratum, even though they claim not to have incurred the consequences of positing a continuous self. Their system of storage and retrieval via the preservation of dormant seeds and their awakening at recollection becomes the basis for later Yogācāra models.

The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika model exhibits the strictest adherence to the Buddhist doctrine of nonself and momentariness, and the praxis-related function of *smṛti* as mindfulness. The problem of providing a coherent account of experience, including memory, in the face of this strict adherence

entailed the ontological position for which they are famous: that factors of all three time periods exist and can function as causes. In this Sarvāstivādin Buddhist model, the contradiction posed to Buddhist premises by a continuous substratum implicit within a strictly linear classical model of memory is avoided. However, there emerges the different problematic of, first, discriminating among the particular factors within the universe of equally real and available past, present, and future events that now constitute the experience of any individual and, second, distinguishing the experience of one individual from that of another. The Sarvāstivādins find the solution to these practical problems in a panoply of causes, mindfulness among them, whose purpose is to demarcate specific events for specific activities. Recollection then becomes a function of whether or not the mindfulness that is forever associated with a particular experienced object is activated by the requisite conditions in any given subsequent moment.

From the Buddhist perspective, the ingenuity of the Sarvāstivādins lies in their devising an ontological model that mediates experience in a way consistent with the Buddhist premises. Their model for mindfulness and recollection preserves the praxis emphasized in the early texts within a self-denying and moment-directed analysis, while still countering the obvious philosophical challenge of other models that assume the continuity of moral and psychic experience based on a self. From the Western perspective, which views memory primarily in terms of the simple recollection of past events, however, the Sarvāstivādin emphasis on the initial moment of a simultaneous attentive observation, cognitive fixing or noting, and retention, not only presents an alternative account for memory, but also suggests a radical reconsideration of Western models of psychological functioning.

Notes

See list of abbreviations below.

1. For a brief survey of uses of and references to *smṛti* throughout Indian Buddhist literature, see Kōgen Mizuno, *Pāri Bukkyō o chūshin to shite Bukkyō no shin-shikiron* (1964; reprint, Tokyo: Pitaka, 1978), pp. 603ff. See also Étienne Lamotte, trans., *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, 5 vols., Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 2 (Louvain: Institut Orientaliste Université de Louvain, 1979), vol. 3, pp. 1121–23; and Ryūjō Yamada, *Daijō Bukkyō seiritsuron josetsu* (Tokyo: Heirakuji shoten, 1959), pp. 49–51ff.

2. See SN 54 *Ānāpānasamyutta* 5: 311ff, SA 29 #803–814 T.2 206a–209b; MN #118 *Ānāpānasatisutta* 3: 78ff; cf. *Fo shuo ch'ih-i ching* T.1 (96) 918a–b. For mindfulness of respiration as a component of mindfulness with regard to the body, see MN #10 *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* 1: 56; MA 24 #98 T.1 582c12ff.

3. For the list of ten reflections, characteristic of the *Āṅguttaranikāya* and the *Ekottarāgama*, see AN 1.16 *Ekadhamma* 1: 30, EA 1 T.2 550b17–19, 1 T.2 552c–553c; and EA 2 T.2 554a–557a. Cf. also AN 1.20 *Aparaaccharāsaṅghātavaggo* 1: 42; EA 42 T.2 779c26ff, 42 T.2 780c4ff, 43 T.2 781a2ff. For six reflections, excluding the last four in this group of ten, that appear in the *Dīrghāgama* and *Samyuktāgama*, see DA 2 #2 T.1 12a13–15, 9 #11 T.1 58a20–21; SA 30 #858 T.2 218b27–28; cf. AN 11.2 *Anussativaggo* 5: 329ff, passim; SA 20 #550 T.2 143b18ff, 33 #932–33 T.2 238b24–27, 33 T.2 238c22–23; cf. AN 6.3.25–26 *Anussatiṭṭhanasutta* and *Mahākaccānasutta* 3: 312ff. Only the six reflections appear in northern Indian Abhidharma texts: see SP 16 T.26 433a2ff, Valentina Stache-Rosen, *Das Saṅgītisūtra und sein Kommentar Saṅgītiparyāya 1, Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im älteren Buddhismus* 2, Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden 9 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1968), 172; DS 8 T.26 492c6ff; ŚAŚ 16 T.28 637a20ff; MVB 15 T.27 74c22, 97 T.27 503c17–18, 106 T.27 547c19. For eight reflections, see **Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtrapadeśa* 21 T.25 218c21ff. For reflection on previous rebirth states as one of the supernormal powers, see, for example, MN #6 *Ākaṅkheyyasutta* 1: 35; SA 29 #815 T.2 209c27, passim.

4. Major dialogues on the four applications of mindfulness occur in the *Majjhimanikāya* and *Madhyamāgama* (MN #10 *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* 1: 55ff; MA 24 #98 T.1 582b9ff), and *Dīghanikāya* (DN #22 *Mahāsatiṭṭhānasutta* 2: 290–315). Cf. also MA 18 #74 T.1 543c1ff; EA 5 T.2 568a1ff. The *Āṅguttaranikāya* (AN 9.7 *Satipaṭṭhānavaggo* 4: 457ff), the *Samyuttanikāya* (SN 47 *Satipaṭṭhānasamyutta* 5: 141ff), and the *Samyuktāgama* (SA 24 #605–39 T.2 170c–77c) each contains a section of dialogues on the topic of the four applications. Chih-i's sixth century *Ssu nien-ch'u* T.46. (1918) testifies to the continuing importance of the four applications.

5. See SN 48.11 *Paṭilābhasutta* 5: 200; AN 5.2.15 *Daṭṭhabbasutta* 3: 12; SA 26 #655 T.2 183b29, 26 #658 T.2 184a4, 26 #675 T.2 185c12, 26 #691 T.2 188a27.

6. Lin Li-kouang, *L'aide-mémoire de la vraie loi (Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra), Recherches sur un Sūtra Développé du Petit Véhicule*, Publications du Musée Guimet Bibliothèque d'Études 54 (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1949), pp. 118–27; Lambert Schmithausen, "Die vier Konzentrationen der Aufmerksamkeit: Zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung einer spirituellen Praxis des Buddhismus," *Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft* 4 (1976): 241–66. Cf. Leon Hurvitz, "Fa-sheng's Observations on the Four Stations of Mindfulness," in *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation, Theory and Practice*, ed. Minoru Kiyota, (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 207–48.

7. See Lin, *L'aide-mémoire*, pp. 122ff. See also the later Abhidharma text, the *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* (ŚAŚ 15 T.28 625a10–11, 625a26ff), where mindfulness with regard to the body alone is identified as the path consisting of one member and is listed apart from the set of four applications, which is then identified as one instance of the path of four members.

8. Schmithausen, "Die vier Konzentrationen," pp. 253ff. The textual priority of the mindfulness of the body is based, he argues, on the unfounded assumption that

the breath and corpse observation are original elements of the account. Through a detailed comparative examination of the specific stages of practice in each of the four applications, as presented in the Pāli and Chinese scriptural sources of these dialogues, Schmithausen attempts to prove that the breath and corpse observation are secondary in both form and content. Instead, he contends that the stereotyped formulaic accounts of mindfulness of feelings and of mind events represent, in these textual accounts, the prior stratum common to all four applications, which was later supplemented with concretizing examples that are not original, but instead represent a formulaic reworking of independent material.

9. MN #119 *Kāyagatāsatisutta* 3: 89: *tassa evaṃ appamattassa ātāpino pahitattassa viharato ye gehasitā sarasaṅkappā te pahīyanti. tesam pahānā ajjhattam eva cittaṃ santiṭṭhati sannisīdati ekodi hoti samādhīyati. evaṃ bhikkhave bhikkhu kāyagatāsatiṃ bhāveti.* Cf. MA 20 #81 T.1 555a14–17, *passim*. See also MN #125 *Dantabhūmisutta* 3: 136: . . . *ime cattāro satipaṭṭhānā cetaso upanibandhanā honti . . . gehasitānaṃ ceva sarasaṅkappānaṃ abhinimmadanāya.* Cf. MA 52 #198 T.1 758b5ff, where the Chinese translation reads “household” for *geha*, presuming a reading equivalent to the Sanskrit, *grha*, in contrast to both Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra, who cite *gardha*. Cf. AKB 6.70 p. 384.26ff: . . . *smṛtyupasthānāni cetasa upanibaddhāni bhavanti yāvad eva gardhāśrītānāṃ smarasaṅkalpānāṃ prativinodanāya*; SAKV p. 604.1ff: *gardhāśrītānāṃ tṛṣṇāśrītānāṃ ity arthaḥ. smara-saṅkalpānāṃ ity anubhūtavaiṣayasmṛtisaṅkalpānāṃ ity arthaḥ. kāmasaṅkalpānāṃ iti vā.* For another interpretation of *sarasaṅkappa*, see I. B. Horner, ed., *Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā of Buddhaghosācariya*, 5 parts, Indexes (London: The Pali Text Society, 1977), parts 4–5: p. 144.

10. Cf. MA 20 #81 T.1 557b7ff, for a listing of eighteen beneficial results.

11. See MN #10 *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* 1: 56; DN #22 *Mahāsatiṭṭhānasutta* 2: 290; SN 47.1 *Ambapālisutta* 5: 141: *ekāyano ayaṃ bhikkhave maggo sattānaṃ visuddhiyā sokaparidevānaṃ samatikkamāya dukkhadomanassānaṃ atthaṅgamāya nāyassa adhigāmaṃ nibbānassa sacchikiriyāya yad idaṃ cattāro satipaṭṭhānā.* Cf. SN 47.18 *Brahmasutta* 5: 167; SA 24 #607 T.2 171a9ff; MA 24 #98 T.1 582b9ff; and EA 5 T.2 568a2ff, which also offers a commentary on this formula. See also ŚAŚ 13 T.28 612b28ff, for an exegesis of this introductory formula, and MVB 188 T.27 943a19ff, for an extensive examination of its implications for the other members of the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment.

12. See MA 24 #98 T.1 582b11ff. Cf. SA 18 #498 T.2 131a11ff, SN 47.12 *Nālandāsutta* 5: 160ff.

13. SN 47.37–38 *Chandasutta* and *Pariññātasutta* 5: 181–82 (cf. SA 24 #634 T.2 176a7ff); AN 1.21 *Kāyagatāsativaggo* 1: 43ff. See SN 47.11 *Mahāpurisasutta* 5: 158, SA 24 #614 T.2 172a13ff; SN 47.50 *Āsavasutta* 5: 190. Cf. also SN 47.33 *Viraddhasutta* 5: 180; SN 47.31 *Ananussutasutta* 5: 179, where the four applications are identified with the noble path, through which one attains the knowledge (*nāṇa*), insight (*paññā*), and intuition (*vijjā*) that characterize the enlightenment experience; or SN 47.32 *Virāgasutta* 5: 179, where the practice of the four applications results in

unalloyed aversion (*ekantanibbida*), dispassion (*virāga*), cessation (*nirodha*), calm (*upasama*), special knowledge (*abhiññā*), complete enlightenment (*sambodha*), and nibbāna.

14. SN 47.3 *Bhikkhusutta* 5: 142ff; SA 24 #636 T.2 176a19ff; SA #635 176a10ff; SN 47.15 *Bāhiyasutta* 5: 165ff: *khīṇā jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparaṃ itthattāyā*; SA 24 #627 T.2 175a17ff. Cf. SN 47.46 *Pāṇimokkhasaṃvarasutta* 5: 187–88.

15. SN 47.13 *Cundasutta* 5: 161ff, SA 24 #638 T.2 177a7ff; SN 47.14 *Ukkacelasutta* 5: 164–65; SA 24 #639 T.2 177b2ff; DN #16 *Mahāparinibbānasutta* 2: 100, DN #26 *Cakkavattisutta* 3: 58, DA 6 #6 T.1 39a26ff. Cf. Hakuju Ui, “Agon ni arawaretaru bonten,” in *Indo tetsugaku kenkyū* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1965), vol. 3, pp. 69ff; Shōkan Andō, “Shibu Shiagon ni okeru shinenjo ni tsuite,” *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 30, no. 2 (1982): 138–39.

16. SN 47.22 *Ciraṭṭhitisutta* 5: 172ff, *passim*.

17. MN #10 *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* 1: 56: . . . *bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharati ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati* . . . ; DN #22 *Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta* 2: 290 (quoted in SAKV p. 531.18ff). Cf. SN 47.1 *Ambapālisutta* 5: 141; SA 24 #623 T.2 174c8ff; DN #16 *Mahāparinibbānasutta* 2: 95; DA 2 #2 T.1 13c26ff. For various interpretations of the phrase, “*kāye kāyānupassī viharati*,” see Kusum Mittal, *Fragmente des Daśottarasūtra aus zentralasiatischen Sanskrit-Handschriften, Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im älteren Buddhismus I*, Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden 4 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), pp. 61–62, n. 6.

18. SN 47.4 *Sālasutta* 5: 144: . . . *tumhe . . . kāye kāyānupassino viharatha ātāpīno sampajānā ekodibhūtā vippasannacittā samāhitā ekaggacittā kāyassa yathābhūtaṃ nāṇāya*. Cf. SA 24 #621 T.2 173c17ff. The majority of dialogues on the topic of mindfulness in the *Samyuktāgama* add to this introductory formula the three-fold qualification of inwardly, outwardly, and both inwardly and outwardly: “A monk abides observing inwardly the body in the body, zealous,” and so on. See SA 24 #610 T.2 171b17ff, 174a16ff, *passim*. Cf. EA 5 T.2 568a10ff; DS 5 T.26 475c27ff. The *Samyuktāgama* also contains several dialogues that simply list the four applications with no formulaic description: SA 24 #629 T.2 175b29ff, *passim*.

19. This formulaic definition is followed by detailed accounts of the specific stages through which one cultivates each of the four applications. Schmithausen (“Die vier Konzentrationen,” 246ff) examines these concretized descriptions in great detail, in particular noting the similarity between the accounts of mindfulness of feelings and of the mind and their difference from the greatly expanded accounts of mindfulness of the body and of factors.

20. See Schmithausen, “Die vier Konzentrationen,” 256. Cf. MN #10 *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* 1: 56ff, *passim*. These formulas, which conclude the description of mindfulness, vary. The *Madhyamāgama* (MA 24 #98 T.1 582b22–24, *passim*) omits the second formula concerning arising and passing away: “Observing the internal [i.e., one’s own] body in [or as] the body, observing the external [i.e., another’s] body

in [or as] the body, one establishes mindfulness in the body, and has knowledge, views, intuition, and penetration.’’ The *Ekottarāgama* (EA 5 T.2 568c13ff, 569a11ff) includes all three formulas only in the description of the applications of feelings and of the mind, but with the first formula following the second and third. In the description of the application of factors, only the second and third formulas appear, and in the application of the body, none of the three is used. However, as with the majority of the versions in Chinese translation, the introductory formula listing all four applications includes a reference to internal and external observation (EA 5 T.2 568a10ff). The *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* (ŚAŚ 13 T.28 613c20ff) recounts at length the observation internally, externally, and both, as the major portion of its presentation of each application, and concludes each discussion with the second and third concluding formulas (ŚAŚ 13 T.28 614ff, *passim*). For a description of the four applications in terms of internal and external observation alone, see SN 47.3 *Bhikkhusutta* 5: 143; for the observation of arising and passing away alone, see SN 47.40 *Vibhaṅgasutta* 5: 183.

21. MN #10 *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* 1: 62–63; MA 24 #98 T.1 584b22ff. Cf. SN 47.36 *Aññāsutta* 5: 181. The *Ekottarāgama* (EA 5 T.2 569b9ff) omits this concluding reference to two fruits. Cf. SA 24 #618 173a29ff, which claims that the four applications will lead to the four noble fruits of the stream-enterer, the once-returner, the nonreturner, and the arhat.

22. SN 47.10 *Bhikkhunupassayasutta* 5: 154ff; SA 24 #615 T.2 172a26ff.

23. SN 47.10 *Bhikkhunupassayasutta* 5: 156ff: *avitakko’ mhi avicāro ajjhataṃ satimā sukhā asmi’ ti pajānāti*. Cf. AN 1.21 *Kāyagatāsativaggo* 1: 44, which states that, if mindfulness with regard to the body is cultivated, then ‘‘the body is quieted, the mind is quieted, initial inquiry and investigation are calmed,’’ and so on: . . . *kāyo pi passambhati cittaṃ pi passambhati vitakkavicārā pi vūpasammanti*.

24. SN 47.10 *Bhikkhunupassayasutta* 5: 157.

25. SN 47.8 *Sūdasutta* 5: 149ff; SA 24 #616 T.2 172b23ff.

26. SN 47.8 *Sūdasutta* 5: 150: . . . *cittaṃ na samādhiyati upakkilesā na pahīyanti so taṃ nimittaṃ na ugaṇhāti*. See SA 24 #616 T.2 172c4ff.

27. Cf. the descriptions of the four trance states (*dhyāna*), where initial inquiry and investigation and mindfulness do not occur together, but characterize respectively the first and third trance states: MA 36 #146 T.1 657c21ff; MN #27 *Cūlahatthipadopamasutta* 1: 181–82; MVB 80 T.27 412a21ff; AKB 8.7–8a–b pp. 437.15ff.

28. For references to mindfulness and awareness in the practice of reflection (*anusmṛti*), see SA 20 #550 T.2 143b29ff.

29. See AN 4.20.195 *Vappasutta* 2: 198ff: . . . *neva sumano hoti na dummano upekkhako viharati sato sampanjāno*. Cf. MA 3 #12 T.1 434c19ff.

30. See MA 17 #72 T.1 536c24ff; MA 10 #44–46 T.1 485c22ff. Cf. AN 8.9.81 *Satisampajaññasutta* 4: 336–37; MA 18 #74 T.1 541c10ff, 542a26; MA 27 #109 T.1 598b25ff; AN 10.6.51 *Sacittasutta* 5: 93; MA 52 #196 T.1 753c22ff. See also AN

10.7.61–62 *Avijjāsutta* and *Taṇhāsutta* 5: 113ff, MA 10 #51 #52 #53 T.1 487b14ff, where both the mindfulness-awareness pair and the four applications of mindfulness appear separately in a list of practices.

31. See SN 47.2 *Satisutta* 5: 142; DN #16 *Mahāparinibbānasutta* 2: 94–95; SN 36.7 *Paṭhamagelaṇṇāsutta* 4: 211, where mindfulness and awareness function as the preparatory stage for observing impermanence of feelings in the body and the abandonment of the three defilements (*anusaya*). See MN #107 *Gaṇakamoggallānasutta* 3: 3; cf. MA 35 #144 T.1 652a25ff, where the mindfulness-awareness pair appears as one stage in a series of practices beginning with discipline and proceeding through guarding the doors of the senses; moderation in eating, wakefulness, mindfulness, and awareness; abandoning the five hindrances; and finally the four trance states. The *Dantabhūmisutta* (MN #125 3: 135ff; cf. MA 52 #198 T.1 758a8ff) contains the same definition of mindfulness and awareness, and a similar series, but after the abandonment of the five hindrances inserts the four applications of mindfulness, and to the end adds the three varieties of intuition that constitute enlightenment.

32. SN 47.35 *Satisutta* 5: 180–81.

33. Though, for the most part, one can proceed with the *prima facie* assumption that the corpus of Abhidharma literature follows, presumes, and builds on the scriptural corpus, in individual cases, the possibility cannot be excluded that the scriptural collections as currently extant have been influenced and modified by doctrinal and sectarian concerns usually considered characteristic of Abhidharma. The arrangement by numerical enumeration in the *Ekottarāgama* and *Aṅguttaranikāya*, and the topical arrangement of the *Samyuktāgama* and *Samyuttanikāya* serve as probable examples of this influence.

34. The later standardized list of thirty-seven members includes the four applications of mindfulness, the four exertions, the four bases of magical powers, the five controlling factors, the five forces, the seven limbs of enlightenment, and the eightfold noble path. For this list of thirty-seven, see, for example, SA 26 #684 T.2 186c8–10, 26 #694 T.2 188b26–27; MA 52 #196 T.1 753c6–7; MN #104 *Sāmagāmasutta* 2: 245; SA 24 #638 T.2 176c14–17, which includes the term *bodhipakṣyadharma*; DN #16 *Mahāparinibbānasutta* 2: 120; *Ta pan-nieh-p'an ching* T.1 (7) 193a2ff, which includes the term *bodhipakṣyadharma*, and the number thirty-seven; DN #28 *Sampasādanīyasutta* 3: 102; DN #29 *Pāsādikasutta* 3: 127–28. Cf. DA 3 #2 T.1 16c10ff, 12 #17 74a14ff, 12 #18 76c28ff, which add the four trance states to the list of thirty-seven. For further canonical references to this list of thirty-seven factors and the term *bodhipakṣya*, see Lamotte, *Le traité*, vol. 3, pp. 1119–21. The history of the development and transmission of the taxonomy of the thirty-seven aids still remains to be written. The evidence presents several interesting questions. In the Chinese translations of the northern Indian canonical collections, references to the term *aids to enlightenment* together with the number, thirty-seven, occur almost exclusively in the *Ekottarāgama*. See EA 1 T.2 551a4, *passim*, where the thirty-seven aids are declared to be the topic of the *Ekottarāgama* and the source of all factors (*dharma*). This suggests that the school with which the *Ekottarāgama* is associated was possibly influential in the development of the thirty-seven aids. See also *Ta-lou-t'an ching* T.1 (23)

309b26, *Ch'i-shih ching* T.1 (24) 364c15, and *Ch'i-shih yin-pen ching* T.1 (25) 419c16, which refer to the thirty-seven aids, whereas DA 22 #30 T.1 149c6 refers to the seven limbs of enlightenment. Though the thirty-seven aids are listed in several of the seven early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts, the term *thirty-seven aids to enlightenment* is virtually absent: see DS 12 T.26 511b12ff; cf. Siglinde Dietz, ed., *Fragmente des Dharmaskandha: Ein Abhidharma-Text in Sanskrit aus Gilgit*, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse 3, 142 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), pp. 52–53; SP 6 T.26 389a23–24; VK 3 T.26 544a13ff. The term *thirty-seven aids to enlightenment* is mentioned in the **Āryavasumitrabodhisattvasaṅgītiśāstra* (8 T.28 788b18ff) and the **Abhidharmahrdaya* (AHŚ-D 4 T.28 828a29ff, AHŚ-U 5 T.28 862b26ff). The *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra* concludes with a list of aids that far exceeds the standardized list of thirty-seven (ŚAŚ 30 T.28 719a15ff). The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 96 T.27 495c27ff), in introducing a detailed discussion of the thirty-seven aids, claims that though the term *aids to enlightenment* is mentioned in the presumably Sarvāstivādin scriptural canon, these aids are identified as the seven limbs and not as the standardized list of thirty-seven. Several reasons are given for this omission, including the possibility that the scriptures containing references to the thirty-seven have been lost. Cf. AVB 48 T.28 364b11ff; *A-p'i-i'an wu fa hsing ching* T.28 (1557) 998b14; AARŚ T.28 977a23ff. For Pāli references to the thirty-seven aids, see V. Trenckner, ed., *The Milindapañho* (London: Pali Text Society, 1962), pp. 237; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, ed., *The Vibhaṅga* (London: Pali Text Society, 1904), pp. 372. See also MPPS 19 T.25 197b19ff; Lamotte, *Le traité*, vol. 3, pp. 1138ff.

35. MVB 96 T.27 496c22ff, 188 T.27 943c22–24; AKB 6.70 p. 384.15ff; SAKV pp. 602.32ff; NAS 71 T.29.727c9ff; ADV #450c–d pp. 362.12ff. For a general description of the *ādikarmika*, see MVB 6 T.27 26c9ff. For the *ādikarmika* as one of three varieties of practitioners who cultivate the meditation on the repulsive (*aśubhā*), including also those who practice thoroughly (*kṛtaparijaya*) and those who have surpassing attention (*atikrāntamanaskāra*), see MVB 40 T.27 205b11ff; AKB 6.10 pp. 338.3ff; SAKV pp. 526.15ff; NAS 59 T.29. 671a14ff. These three varieties of practitioners are correlated with the applications of mindfulness, (see MVB 187 T.27. 937a29ff) and, more generally, with progressive stages in practice (see SAHŚ 5 T.28. 907c25ff; and Hurvitz, “Fa-sheng’s Observations,” p. 209). According to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKB 6.9ff p. 337.7ff), the practitioner first cultivates the repulsive and develops mindfulness of respiration, thereby attaining concentration or calming, which prepares one to cultivate the four applications of mindfulness (cf. MVB 26 T.27 134b17ff). Through the applications of mindfulness, one perfects discerning, and from their cultivation, one produces, in succession, the first stage of heat within the path of preparation, the second stage of the summit, and so on. Cf. MVB 17 T.27 83b21–22, passim; AHŚ-D 2 T.28 818a15ff, AHŚ-U 3 T.28 848c1ff; SAHŚ 5 T.28 908a20ff.

36. See MVB 187 T.27 936c22ff, where this identification of the four applications with all factors is attributed to scripture. See AKB 6.14 p. 341.14; SAKV pp. 529.30–31. Cf. SA 24 #633 T.2 175c27ff.

37. For a comparison of scriptural treatments of the contents of the object of this fourth application, see Schmithausen, “Die vier Konzentrationen,” pp. 247–50. Cf. Ui, *Indo tetsugaku kenkyū*, vol. 3, pp. 69ff.

38. ŚAŚ 13 T.28 615b29ff.

39. DS 6 T.26 478b25ff.

40. SP 6 T.26 391b27ff; PP 12 T.26 (1542) 740c4ff; cf. AHS-U 5 T.28 862b15–17.

41. ŚAŚ 13 T.28 613a20ff, *passim*. For an examination of the Abhidharma treatment of the four applications of mindfulness and specifically of this innovation in the interpretation of their objects, see Kyōshō Tanaka, “Shoki Abidaruma ronsho ni okeru shinenjoron,” in *Bukkyō kyōri no kenkyū*, Tamura Yoshirō *hakushi kanreki kinen ronshū* (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1982), pp. 195–215.

42. AARŚ T.28 977a29ff; MPPS 19 T.25 198c10ff; SAHS 5 T.28 908c9ff; AARŚ T.28 977a29; AKB 6.15b pp. 342.24ff; SAKV pp. 531.28ff; NAS 60 T.29 677a27ff; ADV pp. 316.4ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 187 T.27 938a13ff) cites this correlation as one of six reasons why the applications were set at four. Cf. ADV pp. 316.8–9.

43. AHS-D 2 T.28 818a19ff.

44. AHS-U 3 T.28 848c14ff; SAHS 5 T.28 908b24ff; AKB 6.14b–c pp. 341.10ff; SAKV pp. 529.7ff. Cf. MVB 7 T.27 34b29, which identifies the generic characteristic as the sixteen aspects through which the four noble truths are to be observed, the first four of which are impermanence, suffering, voidness, and nonself. The fourfold generic characteristic is also identified as the fourfold aspect through which one observes combined objects (*sambhinna*) while stationed in the final application of mindfulness with regard to factors. See AHS-D 2 T.28 818a24ff, 3 T.28 848c27ff; MVB 187 T.27 937c15ff; SAHS 5 T.28 909b6ff; AKB 6.16 pp. 343.2ff; SAKV pp. 532.2ff; NAS 61 T.29 677c8ff; ADV #384–385a–b pp. 316.10ff. These passages suggest that the first three applications of mindfulness have only uncombined (*asambhinna*) objects or specific objects that are distinct from those of the other applications. Only the fourth application with regard to factors has both uncombined and combined objects: that is, two or more of the objects of any of the four applications. For various interpretations of particular and generic characteristics, see MVB 13 T.27 65a13ff, 127 T.27 665b1ff; AKB 1.10d pp. 7.18ff; SAKV pp. 28.10ff; NAS 60 T.29 675b3ff.

45. See MVB 187 T.27 936c8ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 187 T.27 937a10ff) also notes that earlier Abhidharma texts refer implicitly to these three varieties and cites, for example, the *Saṅgītiparyāya*: SP 6 T.26 391b23ff. Cf. SAHS 5 T.28 909a8ff; MPPS 19 T.25 200c29ff; NAS 60 T.29 675c6ff; AKB 6.15 pp. 341.16ff.

46. This Abhidharma redefinition of the applications of mindfulness as insight extends also to other modes of mindfulness, such as the mindfulness of respiration (*ānāpānasmṛti*) and the reflection upon previous rebirth states (*pūrvanivāsānasmṛti*).

See MVB 26 T.27 134b3ff, 100 T.27 517b22; AKB 6.12 pp. 339.5ff; NAS 60 T.29 673b7ff.

47. See note 11.

48. See SA 24 #611 T.2 171b26ff; SN 47.45 *Kusalarāsisutta* 5: 186–87.

49. See SA 24 #633 T.2 175c27ff.

50. See NAS 60 T.29 676b12ff.

51. MVB 187 T.27 938b5ff; MPPS 19 T.25 201a12; AKB 6.15b p. 342.5ff; NAS 60 T.29 676a2ff; ASPŚ 30 T.29 920a8ff. Not all Abhidharma schools accept this view that the intrinsic nature of mindfulness is insight. Saṅghabhadra (NAS 60 T.29 676b2ff) cites the view of the Vibhajyavādins, who claim that the intrinsic nature of the applications of mindfulness is, in accordance with their name, mindfulness and not insight. Saṅghabhadra responds that their intrinsic activity is indeed insight because they function through the two operations of observation (*anupaśyanā*) and awareness (*samprajanya*), which are both varieties of insight. However, these applications of mindfulness are not called *applications of insight* because this would exclude the second and third varieties of the applications of mindfulness through connection and with regard to the object-support, neither of which is identified with insight.

52. For this scriptural association of *smṛtīndriya* and the *smṛtyupasthāna*, see SA 26 #647 T.2 182b20, passim; SN 48.8 *Daṭṭhabbasutta* 5: 196, passim; AN 5.2.15 *Daṭṭhabbasutta* 3: 12; SA 26 #655 T.2 183b29, 26 #658 T.2 184a4, 26 #675 T.2 185c12, 26 #691 T.2 188a27. For the Abhidharma reclassification, see MVB 183 T.27 917c4ff; 187 T.27 937c22ff. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVB 187 T.27 938b28ff) explains that this association in the scriptures of the applications with the controlling factor of mindfulness indicates the predominance of the activity of the controlling factor of mindfulness in their operation, which further (MVB 101 T.27 522c22ff) accounts for their name as applications of mindfulness and not insight.

53. See note 17. Cf. MVB 187 T.27 936c27–28, 187 T.27 938b5–8; AKB 6.15b pp. 342.6ff; SAKV p. 529.32ff; NAS 60 T.29 675c13ff.

54. See MVB 39 T.27 200b24ff; especially, 42 T.27 217a8ff.

55. NAS 60 T.29 675c7–13ff. For references illustrating the role of insight in the eradication of defilements, see C. Cox, “Attainment Through Abandonment: The Sarvāstivādin Path of Removing Defilements,” in *Paths to Liberation: The Mārga and its Transformations in Buddhist Thought*, ed. Robert Buswell and Robert Gimello (Honolulu: Kuroda Institute, University of Hawaii Press, forthcoming). For a discussion of which of the three varieties of the applications of mindfulness is capable of eradicating defilements, see MVB 187 T.27 937b12ff; ADV #384c–d pp. 317.9ff. For a discussion of the definition of the four applications as the single path, see MVB 188 T.27 943a18ff; especially 188 T.27 943c15ff.

56. MVB 187 T.27 938b12ff. Cf. Kaidō 14 T.64 320c17ff.

57. MVB 141 T.27 724a19ff.

58. See AKB 6.15b pp. 342.9ff; SAKV pp. 530.12ff. Cf. P'u-kuang 23 T.41 343c5ff; Fa-pao 23 T.41 734a10ff; Kaidō 23 T.64 321a9ff.

59. AKB 6.15b p. 342.11: *yathādr̥ṣṭasyā 'bhilapanāt*. Cf. SAKV pp. 530.23–24: *yasmād yathādr̥ṣṭo 'rthah prajñayā tathai 'vā 'bhiapyate. smṛtyo 'dgr̥hyata ity arthah*. Cf. the *Nibandhana* commentary on the *Arthaviniścayasūtra*, N. H. Samtani, *The Arthaviniścaya-sūtra and its Commentary (Nibandhana)*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971), pp. 211.

60. NAS 60 T.29 676a4ff.

61. For a discussion of the analogous functioning of *smṛti* in the *Yogasūtra*, see Gerhard Oberhammer, *Strukturen Yogischer Meditation*, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse 322, 13, (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1977), pp. 143ff.

62. For this formula in the definition of *satindriya*, see SN 48.9 *Paṭhamavibhaṅgasutta* 5: 197: *satimā hoti paramena satinepakkena samannāgato cirakatam pi cirabhāsitaṃ pi saritā anussaritā*. For the same formula, see MN #53 *Sekhasutta* 1: 356. Buddhaghosa's commentary distinguishes *saritā* from *anussaritā* on the basis of remembering once or many times. See Horner, *Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā*, 3: 30: . . . *tāya satiyā esa sakim saraṇena saritā punapuna saraṇena anussaritā ti veditabbo*. Other passages refer to both the four applications and to retention or recollection: SN 48.10 *Dutiyavibhaṅgasutta* 5: 198. For this formula in the definition of *satisambojjhaṅga*, see C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Vibhaṅga*, p. 227; and in the definition of *satibala*, see AN 5.2.14 *Vitthatasutta* 3: 11. Cf. SA 26 #675 T.2 185c12, 26 #691 T.2 188a27, which mention only the four applications. For this formula in the definition of *sammāsati*, see MA 7 #31 T.1 469b19ff; *Fo-shuo ssu ti ching* T.1 (32) 816c7ff; cf. MN #141 *Saccavibhaṅgasutta* 3: 252, which mentions only the four applications of mindfulness.

63. SA 28 #785 T.2 203c25ff.

64. For this formula in the definition of *satindriya*, see E. Müller, ed., *The Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (London: Pali Text Society, 1885), p. 11: . . . *yā tasmim samaye sati anussati paṭissati sati saraṇatā dhāraṇatā apilāpanatā asammusanatā sati satindriyaṃ satibalaṃ sammāsati* . . . , and 12, 13, 16, 19, 21, 22; Rhys Davids, *Vibhaṅga*, pp. 124, 250; J. Kashyap, ed., *Cullaniddesa*, Nālandā-Devanāgarī-Pāli-Series (Bihar: Pali Publication Board, 1959), pp. 32, 34, 167. Cf. Müller, *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, pp. 62, 64, 65, 67; and Rhys Davids, *Vibhaṅga*, pp. 107, 229, 237, for the same formula, to which is added "a limb of enlightenment, a limb of the path, contained within the path": . . . *satisambojjhaṅgo maggaṅgaṃ maggapariyāpannaṃ*. The *Mahāniddesa* adds, "a limb of enlightenment, the single path": *satisambojjhaṅgo ekāyanamaggo*. See Louis de La Vallée Poussin and Edward J. Thomas, eds., *The Mahā-Niddesa* (London: Pali Text Society, 1916–17), p. 347

65. See DS 2 T.26 460b10ff, 2 T.26 462a15ff, 2 T.26 463a20ff, 6 T.26 482a6ff, 10 T.26 499c3ff; SP 2 T.26 372a18ff, 7 T.26 395a19ff, 16 T.26 433a7ff, 16 T.26 435a21, 17 T.26 437a13ff; PP 5 T.26 (1541) 652b25ff, 7 T.26 (1542) 720b25ff; PP 5

T.26 (1541) 654a12ff, 8 T.26 (1542) 723b14ff; cf. ŚAŚ 4 T.28 554b13ff, 5 T.28 560c21ff, 6 T.28 568b8ff, 6 T.28 568c21ff.

66. This “combinatory formula” appears in the commentarial exegesis of the traditional scriptural passage on the four applications as a gloss on the term *smṛtiman*: DS 5 T.26 476a20ff. Cf. ŚAŚ 13 T.28 613a10ff and 13 T.28 613c14ff; Rhys Davids, *Vibhaṅga*, pp. 193ff. For this scriptural passage, see note 17. Elsewhere, the *Dharmaskandha* (DS 8 T.26 491c3ff) first defines the praxis-related modes of mindfulness in terms of the four applications and then identifies them with the various processes included in the extended psychological definition.

67. DK T.26 614c20ff. Though the *Dharmaskandha* includes a list of mental factors in its examination of the factors sense sphere (*dharmāyatana*), neither the *Dharmaskandha* nor the *Saṅgītiparyāya* specify *smṛti* as a separate mental factor.

68. See PP 1 T.26 (1541) 627b23, 1 T.26 (1542) 693a18. Cf. PP 2 T.26 (1541) 635a10 and 2 T.26 (1542) 699c17ff, for a longer definition; AARŚ T.28 970b18–19; AHŚ-D 1 T.28 810c6, AHŚ-U 1 T.28 836c23; SAHŚ 2 T.28 881a8; *Sa-p'o-to-tsung wu shih lun* T.28 (1556) 996b3.

69. See ŚAŚ 14 T.28 624a21, 23 T.28 673a25ff, and 13 T.28 613c14ff, for a longer definition.

70. See *Milindapañho* 37. Cf. P. S. Jaini, ed., *Milinda-ṭīkā* (London: Pali Text Society, 1961), p. 10; P. V. Bapat and R. D. Vadekar, eds., *Aṭṭhasālinī*, Bhandarkar Oriental Series 3 (Poona: B.O.R. Institute, 1943), pp. 99–100. See also E. Hardy, ed., *The Nettī-pakaraṇa* (London: Pali Text Society, 1961), pp. 28, 54, which gives only *apilāpana* as the defining characteristic of mindfulness (*sati*); and the *Nettipakaraṇa* 15, which refers to “mindfulness in the sense of *apilāpana* in accordance with what has been seen”: *yathādiṭṭhaṃ apilāpanaṭṭhena sati*. For a similar definition used by Vasubandhu, see AKB 6.15b p. 342.11: . . . *yathādr̥ṣṭasyā 'bhilapanāt*.

71. See *Milindapañho* 37. Cf. *Aṭṭhasālinī* 99–100; Max Walleser and Hermann Kopp, eds., *Manorathapūraṇī* (London: Pali Text Society, 1967), vol. 2, p. 52. However, the *Milindaṭṭīkā* echoes the second interpretation cited next also given in the *Aṭṭhasālinī* (120): see Padmanabh S. Jaini, ed., *Milindaṭṭīkā* (London: Pali Text Society, 1961), p. 10. It is unclear whether this first interpretation is based on a derivation of *apilāpana* from the root, *lap*, with the addition of a prefix, *api*, or possibly, *abhi*; or whether it should be understood as an extension of meaning from *a-pilāpana* based on the root, *plu* with a privative prefix. The *Critical Pāli Dictionary* records the derivation from the root, *plu*: see Trenckner et al., eds., *The Critical Pāli Dictionary* (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1924–48), vol. 1, p. 292; cf. note 72. K. R. Norman argues for the derivation from the causative of the root *lap* with the prefix *api*: K. R. Norman, “Pāli Lexicographical Studies V: Twelve Pāli Etymologies,” *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 12 (1988): 50.

72. *Aṭṭhasālinī* 120. Here, it appears that *apilāpanatā* is to be understood as a nominal form derived from the causative of the root *plu*, “to float,” to which is added a privative prefix and an abstract suffix, yielding *a-pilāpana-tā*, meaning “the state

of not floating.’’ This second interpretation that assumes a privative prefix is supported by the explanation of ‘‘lapsed mindfulness’’ (*muṭṭhasacca*) in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (Müller, *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, p. 232). There the defining characteristics of mindfulness are negated: *apilāpanatā* is replaced with *pilāpanatā*, and *asammusanatā* with *sammusanatā*. *Pilāpanatā* in this passage is also glossed in the *Aṭṭhasālinī* (320) by the same reference to floating gourd vessels. Cf. R. Morris, ed., *The Puggala-paṇṇatti* (London: Pali Text Society, 1883), p. 21.

73. See Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, ed., *The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1957), pp. 60–61: *smṛtiḥ katamā. yatsamstute vastuni tatra tatra tadanugābhilapanā. . . . smṛtiḥ kiṃkarmikā. ciracintitakṛtabhāsitasmaraṇānusmaranākarmikā*. See YBŚ 3 T.30 291c2–3 and 291c13–14. Cf. YBŚ 55 T.30 601c22–23, 82 T.30 758a26ff.

74. See AAS T.28 982a18–19; Hajime Sakurabe, trans., ‘‘Nyūabidatsumaron [Chibetto bun yori no wayaku],’’ in *Bukkyō go no kenkyū* (Kyoto: Buneidō, 1975), p. 140. ADV #112 p. 69.6–7 ‘‘Mindfulness has as its form the functioning of the mind. It is the *abhilapana* of the object of the mind and has the characteristic of not losing the accomplishment of what has been, will be, or is being performed’’: *cittavyāpārārūpā smṛtiḥ cittasyā ’rthābhilapanā kṛtakartavyakriyamāṇakarmāntā-vipramoṣalakṣanā*.

75. AKB 2.24 pp. 54.21–22: *smṛtir ālambanāsampramoṣaḥ*. SAKV pp. 127.32ff: *yadyogād ālambanam na mano vismarati tac cā ’bhilapatī ’va sā smṛtiḥ*. Vasubandhu himself uses the term *abhilapana* in a discussion of the operation of the applications of mindfulness: AKB 6.15b p. 342.11.

76. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* defines *smṛti* as ‘‘the nonloss of mind events with regard to a familiar object, and its activity is nondispersal.’’ See V. Gokhale, ‘‘Fragments from the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* of Asaṅga,’’ *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 23 (1947): 16: *smṛtiḥ katamā. samstute vastuni cetaso ’sampramoṣaḥ. avikṣepakarmikā*. Cf. *Abhidharmasamuccaya* I T.31 664b1–2. Sthiramati glosses this ‘‘activity of nondispersal’’ as indicating ‘‘the state of the non-dispersal of mind events when there is *abhilapana* the object-support of mindfulness once again.’’ See N. Tatia, ed., *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣyam*, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 17 (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1976), p. 5: *samstutam vastu purvānubhūtam veditavyam. avikṣepakarmikatvaṃ punaḥ smṛter ālambanābhilapane sati cittāvikṣepatām upādāya*. Cf. *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣyam* I T.31 697b10–13. Sthiramati also uses *abhilapana* in commenting on the definition of *smṛti* in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* and its *bhāṣya* as the ‘‘nonloss of the object-support.’’ Gadjin M. Nagao, ed., *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya* (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), 52.4 (*kārikā* 4.5): *ālambane ’sammoṣa . . .*; 52.6 (*bhāṣya*): *smṛtir ālambane ’sampramoṣaḥ*; T.31 458c3; T.31 471c22ff. Sylvain Lévi, ed., *Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* (Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku, 1934), 175.7: *smṛtir ālambane ’sammoṣa iti vistarīkṛta ālambanam iti cittasthāpanīyam avavādavastrv abhilapanam ity arthaḥ*. Cf. Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya* 52.14 (*kārikā* 4.6): *ālambane ’sammoṣa . . .*; 52.16 (*bhāṣya*): *ālambanāsampramoṣādhi-*

paryataḥ; T.31 458c12; T.31 472a4. Lévi, *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā*, 176.21–22: *ālambanābhilapanalakṣaṇaṃ smṛtindriyam*.

77. Sylvain Lévi, ed., *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Deux traités de Vasubandhu, Viṃśatikā et Trīmśikā*, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études 245 (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1925), pp. 25–26: *smṛtiḥ samstute vastuny asaṃpramoṣaś cetaso 'bhilapanatā*.

78. Unfortunately, Chinese translations other than those by Hsüan-tsang also do not unequivocally establish an interpretation for what would apparently be the equivalent of *abhilapana*. For example, Guṇabhadra and Bodhiyaśas. (PP 1 T.26 (1541) 627b23) adopt a negative expression where Hsüan-tsang (PP 1 T.26 (1542) 693a18) translates “the state of the fixing (or noting) (*ming-chi*, **apilapanatā*) of the mind,” not employing a negative expression. Dharmaśrī's **Abhidharmahṛdaya* (AHŚ-D 1 T.28 810c6) employs a negative expression, Upaśānta's **Abhidharmahṛdaya* (AHŚ-U 1 T.28 836c23) does not, and Dharmatrāta's **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (SAHŚ 2 T.28 881a8) employs both. The *Sa-p'o-to-tsung wu shih lun* (T.28 (1556) 996b3) offers the same expression (*ming-chi*) used by Hsüan-tsang.

79. Hsüan-tsang uses five equivalents for **abhilapana*: *ming-chi* (HTAKB 23 T.29 119a9; cf. PAKB 16 T.29 271a26, which uses *pu-wang*), *ming-liao chi-i* (YBS 3 T.30 291c2–3, and 291c 13–14; in a comparable formula, only *ming-chi* is used: YBS 55 T.30 601c22); *ming-chi-i* (*Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* 1 T.31 697b10–13), or *chi* (*Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya chung* T.31 471c22ff). Hsüan-tsang also appears at times to equate *abhilapana* and *asaṃpramoṣa*, translating *asaṃpramoṣa* by *ming-chi pu-wang*, which combines *ming-chi*, his usual translation of *abhilapana*, with *pu-wang*, a frequent equivalent for *asaṃpramoṣa*. See *Abhidharmasamuccaya* 1 T.31 664b1–2; HTAKB 4 T.29 19a20; cf. PAKB 3 T.29 178b14–15, which uses *pu-wang*. Paramārtha also, however, uses *pu-wang* to translate both *abhilapana* and *asaṃpramoṣa*: see PAKB 3 T.29 178b14, 16 T.29 271a26. The identification of the original for Hsüan-tsang's equivalents is then very difficult. For example, in the definition of *smṛti* in the *Prakaranapāda* (1 T.26 (1542) 693a18) Hsüan-tsang uses *ming-chi* where the earlier translation (1 T.26 (1541) 627b23 by Guṇabhadra and Bodhiyaśas) uses *pu-wang*. Cf. PP 5 T.26 (1541) 652b25ff, 7 T.26 (1542) 720b25ff. See also PAKB 18 T.29 283c12–13, which includes a definition of *smṛti* that is not included in Hsüan-tsang's translation or Pradhan's edited Sanskrit text: HTAKB 25 T.29 132b12, AKB 6.68 p. 383.8, and NAS 71 T.29 726c20ff; cf. ADV #446 pp. 360.14ff. Here, Paramārtha defines *smṛti* as *hsin ming pu-wang*: possibly “**abhilapana* and **asaṃpramoṣa* of mind.” However, because both *abhilapana* and *asaṃpramoṣa* are attested in similar definitions of *smṛti* extant in Sanskrit, the positive identification of the original term is doubtful.

80. See Shōshin Kuwayama and Noriaki Hakamaya, *Genjō* (Tokyo: Daizō shuppan, 1981), pp. 252ff, which follows *K'ai-yüan shih-chiao lu* 8 T.55 555b27ff.

81. See AKB 6.15b p. 342.11; SAKV p. 530.24: . . . *tathai 'vā 'bhilapyate. smṛtyo 'dgrhyata ity arthaḥ*. Though Yaśomitra here uses *abhilapyate*, grammatically a passive derived from the root, *lap*, he appears not to support a connection with the

sense of “expression” since he glosses *abhilapyate* with *udgrhyate*, or “to be sustained.”

82. See notes 71 and 72. The possible confusion or difficulty in determining the exact meaning of and relation between the Pāli term *apilāpana*, the Sanskrit term *abhilāpana*, and related terms may have had a linguistic impetus. Regardless of the original derivation of *apilāpana*—from the root *plu* with a privative or from the root *lap* with a prefix *api*—a Buddhist Middle Indic *apilāpana* can be assumed to have had the phonetic variant *avilāpana*, due to the common alternation of *v* and *p* (*A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, sub voce, *avilāpanatā*, cites the *Puggalapaññatti* 25. On this variation of *p* and *v*, see Heinrich Lüders, *Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons*, Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zum Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst, 1952, 10 [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1954] pp. 112ff, and for forms from *plu*, especially 114–115; Oskar von Hinüber, *Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick*, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse 467, 20 [Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1986], p. 98; K. R. Norman, “Dialect Forms in Pāli,” in *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes*, ed. Colette Caillat, Publications de l’Institut de Civilisation Indienne 55 [Paris: Institut de Civilisation Indienne, 1989], pp. 373ff.) In the case of derivation from the root *plu*, this variation of *v* and *p* might have obscured the derivation and facilitated resegmentation and root reassignment in conversion from Buddhist Middle Indic to Sanskrit. Northwest dialects or Gāndhārī, in particular, exhibit frequent phonetic or graphic alternation between *v* and the Sanskrit *b*, *bh*. (For this alternation, see T. Burrow, *The Language of the Kharoṣṭhi Documents from Chinese Turkestan* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937], p. 8; John Brough, *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, London Oriental Series 7 [London: Oxford University Press, 1962], pp. 87, 96–97; von Hinüber, *Das ältere Mittelindisch*, p. 101; Oskar von Hinüber, “Origin and Varieties of Buddhist Sanskrit,” in *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes*, pp. 341–67, especially 357–58; Norman, “Dialect Forms,” p. 374; for the less frequent alternation of *p* and *bh*, notably, however, in a variation of *api* for *abhi*, see Richard Salomon, “The Inscription of Senavarman King of Oḍi,” *Indo-Iranian Journal* 29 [1986]: 261–93, especially 276–77. For evidence that the Sarvāstivādins at one time employed Gāndhārī, see von Hinüber, “Origin and Varieties of Buddhist Sanskrit,” pp. 353–54.) Similarly, this dialectical variation may have led to a loss of distinction between forms derived from the prefix *api* and root *lap* and *abhi-lāpa* in the sense of chatter or express. Thus, instead of *a-v(p)ilāpana* or *api-lāpana*, the corresponding form *abhi-lāpana* might result, also induced by familiarity with the use of derivatives from *lap* in other contexts. In the Pāli canon *apilāpana* with the sense of “noting or fixing,” derived from the prefix *api* or *abhi* and root *lap* or understood by commentators, if only to underscore this distinct meaning, to be derived from the privative *a-* or the root *plu*, occurs alongside numerous forms of *abhi-lāpa* with the predominant sense of chatter or express. Thus, the Pāli tradition would appear to preserve a distinct semantic use of linguistically distinct derivatives. Accordingly, it is unlikely that Sanskrit redactors would conflate forms that were unequivocally recognized to have distinct meanings. Rather, one might assume that at some point early within the northern Indian Buddhism tradition before its lin-

guistic standardization, terms were merged or distinctions were lost. The enlarged semantic range of *abhilapana* resulting from this merging might later have been retrospectively narrowed by harmonizing commentary and standardizing translation.

83. *Abhilāpa* is clearly interpreted as derived from the root *lap* and is translated consistently in Chinese with some sense of “expression.” See, for example, AKB 4.77c p. 247.9, and *yen* in HTAKB 17 T.29 88a28; and *yü* in PAKB 12 T.29 243b12. See also AKB 7.38c–d p. 418.16; *shuo* in HTAKB 27 T.29 142a18; and *yen* in PAKB 20 T.29 293b1; for the same translation of *vāc*, see AKB 7.39b p. 419.3; HTAKB 27 T.29 142b8; PAKB 20 T.29 293b7. See also Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*, 66.9 (*kārikā* 5.16); *yen* or *yen-yü* in Paramārtha’s translation T.31 461c24, 29; *hsi-lun* in Hsüan-tsang’s translation T.31 475a20; Lévi, *Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṣīkā*, 219.8ff. Though it is not certain that Hsüan-tsang understood *abhilapana* as derived from the root, *lap*, support for this interpretation is found in one passage in his translation of the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*, where he uses *chi-yen* as a translation for *asampramoṣa*. This would only be possible if Hsüan-tsang identified *asampramoṣa* with *abhilapana*, as suggested in Sthiramati’s commentary and finally understood *abhilapana* as derived from *lap*. See Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*, 52.4 (*kārikā* 4.5): *ālambane ‘saṃmoṣo . . . ; 52.6 (bhāṣya): smṛtir ālambane ‘saṃpramoṣaḥ*; Hsüan-tsang’s translation T.31 471c22ff. Cf. Lévi, *Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṣīkā*, 175.7ff, 176.21–22. On the meaning in later Mahāyāna texts of *abhilāpa*, used in connection with the terms *prapañca* and *vikalpa* to denote verbal extension or conceptualization, see Lambert Schmithausen, *Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Vinīścayasamgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ*, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse 264, 8 (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1969), 137ff. For an example of a similar use of *abhilāpa* by Abhinavagupta, in the context of explanations of the verbalizing that in some form always accompanies or constitutes conceptualization or conscious recognition and identification, see K. A. Subramania Iyer, *Bharṭṛhari, A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries*, Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series, 68 (Poona: Deccan College, 1969), 107, 436.

84. In his various commentaries, Sthiramati appears to accept a relation between *abhilapana* and the various derivatives from the root, *lap*, involving some sense of “expression.” For example, in one passage, he identifies *abhilapana* as the teaching that is to be established in the mind. See Lévi, *Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṣīkā*, 175.7–8: *smṛtir ālambane ‘saṃmoṣa iti vistarikṛita ālambanam iti cittasthāpanīyam avavādavastv abhilapanam ity arthaḥ*. In another, he equates mental chatter (*jalpa*) with *abhilapana*, specifically, defining that mental chatter from which attention (*manaskāra*) results as *abhilapana* by the mind and speech. See *ibid.*, 218.17ff: . . . *vānmanobhyāṃ yad abhilapanam sa jalpa . . .* This attention resulting from mental chatter is then described as pervaded by expression (*abhilāpa*) and concept (*saṃjñā*). See *ibid.*, 219.11ff: . . . *abhilāpasamjñāparibhāvitavāj jalpamanaskāra ucyata iti*. It is of interest that *jalpamanaskāra* in this discussion is explained as attention resulting from chatter, which is in turn identified with *abhilapana* and finally with *smṛti*. This order echoes the Abhidharma lists of mental concomitants in which *manaskāra* follows *smṛti*.

85. See MVB 16 T.27 79c6ff, 90 T.27 463a20ff, 95 T.27 493c24ff, 145 T.27 745a7ff.

86. Yamada (*Daijō Bukkyō*, pp. 409ff) cites possible scriptural precedents for a classification of mental factors into ten groups (e.g., SN 45–47 *Okkantasaṃyutta*, *Uppādasāṃyutta*, *Kilesasaṃyutta* 3: 225ff) and proposes five stages in the development of the Abhidharma classification of mental factors; a listing of discrete mental factors first appears in the *Dharmaskandha* (DS 10 T.26 500c17ff); the term “ten *mahābhūmika* factors” first appears in the *Dhātukāya* (DK T.26 614b14ff) and *Prakaraṇapāda* (PP 2 T.26 (1541) 634a25ff, 2 T.26 (1542) 698c10ff); and the final classification of five groups of mental factors, adopted by later Abhidharma treatises, takes shape in the **Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdayasāstra* (SAHŚ 2 T.28 880c29ff). For the ten *mahābhūmika* factors, see MVB 42 T.27 220a2ff.

87. See Saṅghabhadra’s detailed treatment of each of the ten *mahābhūmika* factors, NAS 10 T.29 388b25ff.

88. MVB 187 T.27 938b12ff.

89. NAS 10 T.29 389b12ff.

90. Cf. AARŚ T.28 978c7ff, where *smṛti* is explained in terms of attention within the stream of mental events.

91. NAS 10 T.29 384b12ff.

92. Cf. TSŚ 6 T.32 288b7ff, which defines *smṛti* as knowing that which has been previously experienced.

93. NAS 10 T.29 389b19–21.

94. NAS 10 T.29 389b24–25.

95. Cf. P’u-kuang 4 T.41 74b21ff; Fa-pao 4 T.41 527c13ff.

96. Sthiramati, like Saṅghabhadra, accepts nonloss and fixing or noting as the activities of mindfulness, but differs from Saṅghabhadra in his definition of fixing or noting (*abhilapanatā*) as “the repeated retention of the features of the object-support pertaining to a given object grasped previously.” Lévi, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, 26: . . . *pūrvagrhitasya vastunaḥ punaḥ punarālambanākārasmaranam abhilapanatā*. For Sthiramati, fixing or noting is clearly the recursive operation of recollection: that is, grasping once again a previously experienced object. For further discussion of Sthiramati’s interpretation, see Paul Griffiths’s chapter in this volume. Hsüang-tsang also emphatically limits the activity of mindfulness to past objects; therefore, mindfulness cannot be accepted as functioning in each momentary mental event with regard to a present object. See *Ch’eng wei-shih lun* 5 T.31 28b20ff Cf. K’uei-chi’s *Ch’eng wei-shih lun shu-chi 5 pen* T.43 396b23ff For Hsüan-tsang, the proper function of mindfulness is to support concentration (*samādhi*): mindfulness is able to extract concentration because it recollects and retains previously experienced objects causing them not to be lost. See *Ch’eng wei-shih lun* 5 T. 31 28b18ff.

97. These conditions include: a particular state of mind that accords with the concept of the previously experienced object; orientation toward the object to be remembered; a similar or related concept; expectation; obligation; habit; and finally, a corporeal basis free of distraction. See AKB 9 p. 472.16ff; SAKV p. 710.32ff. *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* 5 T. 31 28b24–25. Cf ADV #27 p. 22.2ff. See also the chapter by P. S. Jaini in this volume.

98. MVB 11 T.27 55a16. Cf. AVB 6 T.28 42a12ff.

99. MVB 12 T.27 55c28ff.

100. MVB 12 T.27 57b9ff, 12 T.27 57c22ff.

101. For a discussion of the terms *ākāra* and *ālambana*, see Paul Griffiths's chapter in this volume.

102. This view is attributed to Vasumitra: MVB 12 T.27 57c24ff.

103. See MVB 12 T.27 57c28ff. For an analogous discussion of the process of forgetting, see MVB 12 T.27 58b5ff.

104. MVB 12 T.27 58b26ff. Three reasons for forgetfulness are also given by Vasumitra (MVB 12 T.27 58b24ff): (1) not securely grasping the characteristics of the previous object; (2) the present operation of a dissimilar series; and (3) losing mindfulness.

105. NAS 19 T.29 447c9ff, 19 T.29 448a2ff.

106. Cf. NAS 19 T.29 448a8ff, for a refutation of Śrīlāta's theory of the secondary or subsidiary element (*sui-chieh*, **anudhātu*).

107. AKB 5.2a p. 278.23ff: . . . *anubhavajñānājā smṛtyutpādanaśaktir* . . . Cf. SAKV p. 444.11ff.

108. NAS 45 T.29 597b10ff.

Abbreviations

ADV: Padmanabh S. Jaini, ed. *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 4. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1977.

AARŚ: *Abhidharmāmṛtarasāśāstra*. T.28 (1553). Ghoṣaka, trans. anonymous.

AAŚ: *Abhidharmāvatārasāśāstra*. T.28 (1554). Attributed to Skandhila(?), trans. Hsüan-tsang.

AHŚ-D: **Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*. T.28 (1550). Dharmaśrī, trans. Saṅghadeva.

AHŚ-U: **Abhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*. T.28 (1551). Upaśānta, trans. Narendrayaśas.

AKB: P. Pradhan, ed. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*, 2d ed. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975.

AN: Robert Morris and E. Hardy, eds. *The Aṅguttaranikāya*, 5 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 1885–1890; reprint, 1960.

ASPŚ: **Abhidharmasamayapradīpikāśāstra*. T.29 (1563). Saṅghabhadra, trans. Hsüan-tsang.

AVB: *Abhidharmavibhāṣāśāstra*. T.28 (1546). Trans. Buddhavarman, Tao-t'ai.

DA: *Dirghāgama*. T.1 (1). Trans. Buddhayaśas, Chu Fo-nien.

DK: *Dhātukāya*. T.26 (1540). Attributed to Pūrṇa (Skt.), Vasumitra (Ch.), trans. Hsüan-tsang.

DN: T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, eds. *The Dīghanikāya*, 3 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 1890–1911; reprint, 1960.

DS: *Dharmaskandha*. T.26 (1537). Attributed to Śāriputra (Skt.) Mahāmaudgalyāyana (Ch.), trans. Hsüan-tsang.

EA: *Ekottarāgama*. T.2 (125). Trans. Saṅghadeva.

Fa-pao: *Chü-she lun shu*. T.41 (1822). Fa-pao.

HTAKB: *A-p'i-ta-mo chü-she lun*. T.29 (1558). Vasubandhu, trans. Hsüan-tsang.

Kaidō: *Abidatsuma kusharon hōgi*. T.64 (2251). Kaidō.

MA: *Madhyamāgama*. T.1 (26). Trans. Saṅghadeva.

MN: V. Trenckner et al., eds., *The Majjhima-Nikāya*, 3 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 1896–1899; reprint, 1960.

MPPS: **Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtropadeśa*. T.25 (1509). Attributed to Nāgārjuna, trans. Kumārajīva.

MVB: *Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra*. T.27 (1545). Trans. Hsüan-tsang.

NAS: *Nyāyānusāraśāstra*. T.29 (1562). Saṅghabhadra, trans. Hsüan-tsang.

PAKB: *A-p'i-ta-mo chü-she lun*. T.29 (1559). Vasubandhu, trans. Paramārtha.

PP: *Prakaranapāda*. T.26 (1541). Attributed to Vasumitra, trans. Guṇabhadra, Bodhiyaśas. T.26 (1542). Attributed to Vasumitra, trans. Hsüan-tsang.

P'u-kuang: *Chü-she lun chi*. T.41 (1821). P'u-kuang.

SA: *Samyuktāgama*. T.2 (99). Trans. Guṇabhadra.

SAHŚ: **Samyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*. T.28 (1552). Dharmatrāta, trans. Saṅghavarman.

SAKV: Unrai Wogihara, ed. *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: The Work of Yaśomitra*. Tokyo: Publishing Association of the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, 1932.

ŚAŚ: *Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra*. T.28 (1548). Trans. Dharmayaśas, Dharmagupta.

SN: L. Feer, ed. *The Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, 5 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 1884–1898; reprint, 1960.

SP: *Saṅgītiparyāya*. T.26 (1536). Attributed to Mahākauṣṭhila (Skt.), Śāriputra (Ch.), trans. Hsüan-tsang.

T: Junjirō Takakusu, Kaikyoku Watanabe, and Gemmyō Ono, eds. *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō*. Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankōkai, 1924–1932.

TSS: **Tattvasiddhiśāstra*. T.32 (1646). Harivarman, trans. Kumārajīva.

VK: *Vijñānakāya*. T.26 (1539). Attributed to Devaśarman, trans. Hsüan-tsang.

YBŚ: *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. T.30 (1579). Attributed to Maitreya, trans. Hsüan-tsang.

Chinese Characters

chi 記

chi-yen 記言

hsi-lun 戲論

ming-chi 明記

ming-chi pu-wang 明記不忘

ming-chi-i 明記憶

ming-liao chi-i 明了記憶

pu-wang 不忘

hsin ming pu-wang 心明不忘

shuo 說

sui-chieh 隨界

yen 言

yen-yü 言語

yü 語