Botan API Reference

2006/12/14

Contents

1	1.2 Tar	sic Conventions	
2		sing the Library	6
			_
3	Gotcha	S S	Č
4	4.1 Bas4.2 Key4.3 Syr4.4 Blo4.5 Str	sic Interface sic Algorithm Abilities sys and IVs mmetrically Keyed Algorithms ock Ciphers eam Ciphers sh Functions / Message Authentication Codes 10	6
5	Public	Key Cryptography 1:	2
	5.1 Cre 5.1 5.2 Key 5.3 Get 5.4 End 5.5 Sig 5.6 Key	eating PK Algorithm Key Objects 1 .1 Creating a DL-Group 1 y Checking 1 tting a PK algorithm object 1 cryption 1 natures 1 y Agreement 1 porting and Exporting PK Keys 1 .1 Public Keys 1 .2 Private Keys 1	223344557
6	6.1 Bas 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1	.2 Chain	9 0 1 1
			4

	6.5	Filter	Ca	talo	g.																														26
		6.5.1	K	eyec	l Fi	ilter	rs .																												26
		6.5.2	\mathbf{C}	iphe	r F	ilte	ers .																												27
		6.5.3	H	$ash\epsilon$	es a	nd	MA	ACs	s .																										27
		6.5.4	P	ΚF	ilte	rs.																													28
		6.5.5	E	ncoc	lers	3.																													28
7	Cer	tificate	e H	land	dlir	าช																													29
	7.1	So wha					509	cer	ctifi	ica	teʻ	? .																							
		7.1.1		.509																															
		7.1.2		evoc																															
	7.2	Readir																																	
	7.3	Storing																																	
	1.0	7.3.1	_	ddir		_																													
		7.3.2		ddir	-																														
		7.3.3		orin	-																														
		7.3.4		earcl	_																														
		7.3.5		ertif	,	_																													
		7.3.6		erify																															
	7.4	Certifi			_	•																													
	1.1	7.4.1		ener																															
		7.4.2		elf-S		_																													
		7.4.3		reat	0																														
		7.4.4		ertif	_						-																								
		1.4.4	0	51 011	icai	ie C	Jpι	1011	ь.	•	•		•	 •		•	•	•	•		•		•		•		•		•	•		•	•	•	3(
8	\mathbf{CM}																																		38
	8.1	Encod	ling																																
	8.2	Decod	ling	•										 •					•																38
9	Ran	dom N	Nui	mbe	er (Ger	ner	ato	ors	5																									39
	9.1	Entrop	pv]	Esti	$\mathrm{ma}^{\scriptscriptstyle{\mathrm{f}}}$	tion	1.																												39
	9.2	The G																																	
	9.3	Randp																																	
	9.4	ANSI																																	
	9.5	Entrop																																	
10	T I a o	r Inter	nfo.	200																															43
10		Pulses																																	
11		cy Coi	•	_																															45
		Option		-																															45
		Setting																																	
		Availa																																	46
	11.4	Config																																	49
		11.4.1	Sy	'nta	х.					٠			٠	 •		•		•	•		٠		٠		•		٠			•		٠			49
12	Mis	cellane	eou	ıs																															51
	12.1	S2K A	lgo	rith	$_{ m ims}$																														51
		12.1.1	Ŏ	pen.	PG	P S	52K																												51
	12.2	Checks																																	
		Except																																	52
		Thread																																	52
		Secure																																	
		Alloca																																	
	-	Timer		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	-	 •	•	•	- '	•		•		•	-	•	-	•	-	•	•	- '	•	•		•	59

13 Botan's Modules	55
13.1 Pipe I/O for Unix File Descriptors	55
13.2 Entropy Sources	55
13.3 Compressors	
13.3.1 Bzip2	
13.3.2 Zlib	
14 BigInt	57
14.1 Efficiency Hints	57
15 Removing Algorithms	5 9
16 Writing Modules	60
17 Compliance with Standards	61
18 Recommended Algorithms	62
19 Algorithms Listing	63
20 Support and Further Information	64
20.1 Compatibility	64
20.2 Patents	64
20.3 Recommended Reading	64
20.4 Support	
20.5 Contact Information	
20.6 License	CF

1 Introduction

Botan is a C++ library which attempts to provide the most common cryptographic algorithms and operations in an easy to use and portable package. Currently it runs on a wide variety of systems, using numerous different compilers and on many different CPU architectures.

The base library is written in ISO C++, so it can be ported with minimal fuss, but Botan also supports a modules system, which allows system dependent code to be compiled into the library for use by application code

While you are reading this, you may want to refer to the header files base.h and pipe.h. These files contain the classes that form the basic interface for the library.

1.1 Basic Conventions

With a very small number of exceptions, declarations in the library are contained within the namespace Botan. Botan declares several typedef'ed types to help buffer it against changes in machine architecture. These types are used extensively in the interface, and thus it would be often be convenient to use them without the Botan prefix. You can do so by using the namespace Botan_types (this way you can use the type names without the namespace prefix, but the remainder of the library stays out of the global namespace). The included types are byte and u32bit, which are unsigned integer types.

The headers for Botan are usually available in the form botan/headername.h. For brevity in this documentation, headers are always just called headername.h, but they should be used with the botan/prefix in your actual code.

1.2 Targets

Botan's primary targets (system-wise) are 32 and 64-bit systems with at least a few megabytes of memory. Generally, given the choice between optimizing for 32-bit systems and 64-bit systems, Botan chooses 64-bits, simply on the theory that where performance really matters (servers), people are using 64-bit machines. And also because two of the three machines owned by the primary developer have 64-bit CPUs. But performance on 32 bit systems is also quite good.

Today smaller systems, such as handhelds, set-top boxes, and the bigger smart phones and smart cards, are also capable of using Botan. However, Botan uses a fairly large amount of code space (up to several megabytes, depending upon the compiler and options used), which could be prohibitive in some systems. Actual RAM usage is quite small, usually under 64K, though C++ runtime overheads might require additional memory.

Botan's design makes it quite easy to remove unused algorithms in such a way that applications do not need to be recompiled to work, even applications that use the algorithms in question. They can simply ask Botan if the algorithm exists, and if Botan says yes, ask the library to give them such an object for that algorithm.

1.3 Why Botan?

Botan may be the perfect choice for your application. Or it might be a terribly bad idea. This section is basically to make it clear what Botan is and is not.

First, let's cover the major strengths:

- · Support is (usually) quickly available on the project mailing lists. Commercial support licenses are available for those that desire them.
- · Is written in a (fairly) clean object-oriented style, and the usual API works in terms of reasonably high-level abstractions.
- · Supports a huge variety of algorithms, including most of the major public key algorithms and standards (such as IEEE 1363, PKCS, and X.509v3).
- · Supports a name-based lookup scheme, so you can get ahold of any algorithm on the fly.
- · You can easily extend much of the system at application compile time or at run time.
- · Works well with a wide variety of compilers, operating systems, and CPUs, and more all the time.
- · Is the only open source crypto library (that I know of) that has support for memory allocation techniques that prevent an attacker from reading swap in an attempt to gain access to keys or other secrets. In fact several different such methods are supported, depending on the system (two methods for Unix, another for Windows).
- · Has (optional) support for Zlib and Bzip2 compression/decompression integrated completely into the system it only takes a line or two of code to add compression to your application.

And the major downsides and deficiencies are:

- · It's written in C++. If your application isn't, Botan is probably going to be more pain than it's worth.
- · Botan doesn't directly support higher-level protocols and formats like SSL or OpenPGP. SSH support is available from a third-party, and there is an alpha-level SSL/TLS library currently available.
- · Doesn't support elliptic curve algorithms; ECDSA support is planned at some point, but demand seems quite low.
- · Doesn't currently support any very high level 'envelope' style processing support for this will probably be added once support for CMS is available, so code using the high level interface will produce data readable by many other libraries.

2 Initializing the Library

The library needs to have various things done to it in order for it to work correctly. To make sure this is done properly, you should create a LibraryInitializer object at the start of your main() function, before you start using any part of Botan. The initializer does things like initializing the memory allocation system, setting up the algorithm lookup tables, finding out if there is a high resolution timer available to use, and similar such matters. With no arguments, the library is initialized with various default settings. So 99% of the time, all you need is

Botan::LibraryInitializer init;

at the start of your main. If you're not doing anything exotic, then you can safely skip the rest of this section.

The constructor takes an instance of another object, called InitializerOptions, which specifies the settings of various options. Normally you can ignore this and simply pass a human readable string, which the InitializerOptions constructor will parse. An empty string signifies using defaults; any options not specifically mentioned in the initialization string also assume the compiled in default. If more than one option is used, they should be separated by a space. Boolean arguments (all except for the "config" option) can take an argument of "true" (or "yes") or "false" (or "no") to explicitly turn them on or off. Simply giving the name of the option without any argument signifies that the option should be toggled on.

Option "secure_memory": Try to create a more secure allocator type – one that either locks allocated memory into RAM, or that memory maps a disk file that it erases after use. If both are available, it will prefer the memory mapping mechanism, because locking memory requires privileges on many systems.

On systems that don't (currently) have any specialized allocators, like MS Windows, this option is ignored.

Option "config=/path/to/configfile": Process the specified configuration file. Configuration files can specify things like the various options, new aliases, and new OIDs for algorithms. An example can be found in doc/botan.rc. Currently only one config= argument will be processed, the rest will be ignored.

Option "thread_safe": The library should use mutexes for guarding access to shared resources, such as the memory allocation system. If you pass the "thread_safe" option, and the initializer can't find a useful mutex module, it will throw an exception. Botan seems to work in threaded programs, but it hasn't been tested thoroughly, and problems may remain. Note that Botan is not thread safe at the object level; any objects shared between threads need explicit locking.

Option "use_engines": Use any available "engine" modules to speed up processing. Currently Botan has support for engines based on the AEP1000/AEP2000 crypto hardware cards, GNU MP, and OpenSSL's BN library. Further support for crypto acceleration hardware will be added in future releases.

Option "fips140": This option, in theory, toggles Botan into FIPS 140 mode. Please note that Botan *has not* been FIPS 140 validated at this time, and that a number of changes will be necessary before such a validation can occur. Do not use this option.

Option "fips140": This option, in theory, toggles Botan into FIPS 140 mode. Please note that Botan *has* not been FIPS 140 validated at this time, and that a number of changes will be necessary before such a validation can occur. Do not use this option.

Option "selftest": Run some basic self tests during startup. Specifically this runs a set of tests for DES, TripleDES, AES, CMAC(AES), SHA-1, HMAC(SHA-1), SHA-256, and HMAC(SHA-256).

This option, in theory, toggles Botan into FIPS 140 mode. Please note that Botan *has not* been FIPS 140 validated at this time, and that a number of changes will be necessary before such a validation can occur. Do not use this option.

Option "seed_rng": Attempt to seed the global PRNGs at startup. This option is toggled on by default, and can be disabled by passing "seed_rng=false". This is primarily useful when you know that the built-in library entropy sources will not work, and you are providing you own entropy source(s) later on.

If you do not create a LibraryInitializer object, pretty much any Botan operation will fail, because it will be unable to do basic things like allocate memory or get random bits. Note too, that you should be careful to only create one such object.

It is not strictly necessary to create a LibraryInitializer; the actual code performing the initialization and shutdown are in static member functions of LibraryInitializer, called initialize and deinitialize. If you choose to use this interface, you should be very careful to make sure that deinitialize is always called, even in the case of exceptions, premature exit or abort, and so on. For this reason using LibraryInitializer is preferred, but there are cases where using it is impossible and an interface using plain functions is the only option.

3 Gotchas

There are a few things to watch out for to prevent problems when using Botan.

Never allocate any kind of Botan object globally. The problem with doing this is that the constructor for such an object will be called before the library is initialized. Many Botan objects will, in their constructor, make one or more calls into the library global state object. Access to this object is checked, so an exception should be thrown (rather than a memory access violation or undetected uninitialized object access). A rough equivalent which will work is to keep a global pointer to the object, initializing it after creating your LibraryInitializer. Merely making the LibraryInitializer also global will probably not help, because C++ does not make very strong guarantees about the order that such objects will be created.

The same rule applies for making sure the destructors of all your Botan objects are called before the LibraryInitializer is destroyed. This implies you can't have static variables that are Botan objects inside functions or classes (since in most C++ runtimes, these objects will be destroyed after main has returned). This is inelegant, but seems to not cause many problems in practice.

Never create a Botan memory object (MemoryVector, SecureVector, SecureBuffer) with a type that is not a basic integer (byte, u16bit, u32bit, u64bit). More strongly, if you, as a user of the library, are creating any memory buffer object that's not a SecureVector
byte> or maybe a MemoryVector
byte>, you're probably doing something wrong (I suppose there may be exceptions to this rule, but not many).

Don't include headers you don't have to. Past experience with Botan has shown that headers get renamed fairly regularly as internal design changes are made, but this need not affect you, if you follow the "proper procedures". Using the lookup interface defined in lookup.h and look_pk.h will save you a great deal of pain in this regard, as it insulates you against many such changes.

Use a **try/catch** block inside your **main** function, and catch any **std::exception** throws. This is not strictly required, but if you don't, and Botan throws an exception, your application will die mysteriously and (probably) without any error message. Some compilers provide a useful diagnostic for an uncaught exception, but others simply abort the process, leaving your (or worse, a user of your application) wondering what went wrong.

4 The Basic Interface

Botan has two different interfaces. The one documented in this section is meant more for implementing higher-level types (see the section on filters, later in this manual) than for use by applications. Using it safely requires a solid knowledge of encryption techniques and best practices, so unless you know, for example, what CBC mode and nonces are, and why PKCS #1 padding is important, you should avoid this interface in favor of something working at a higher level (such as the CMS interface).

4.1 Basic Algorithm Abilities

There are a small handful of functions implemented by most of Botan's algorithm objects. Among these are: std::string name():

Returns a human-readable string of the name of this algorithm. Examples of names returned are "Blowfish" and "HMAC(MD5)". You can turn names back into algorithm objects using the functions in lookup.h. void clear():

Clear out the algorithm's internal state. A block cipher object will "forget" its key, a hash function will "forget" any data put into it, etc. Basically, the object will look exactly as it did when you initially allocated it.

clone():

This function is central to Botan's name-based interface. The **clone** has many different return types, such as BlockCipher* and HashFunction*, depending on what kind of object it is called on. Note that unlike Java's clone, this returns a new object in a "pristine" state; that is, operations done on the initial object before calling **clone** do not affect the initial state of the new clone.

Cloned objects can (and should) be deallocated with the C++ delete operator.

4.2 Keys and IVs

Both symmetric keys and initialization values can simply be considered byte (or octet) strings. These are represented by the classes SymmetricKey and InitializationVector, which are subclasses of OctetString.

Since often it's hard to distinguish between a key and IV, many things (such as key derivation mechanisms) return OctetString instead of SymmetricKey to allow its use as a key or an IV.

OctetString(u32bit *length*):

This constructor creates a new random key of size length.

OctetString(std::string str):

The argument str is assumed to be a hex string; it is converted to binary and stored. Whitespace is ignored.

OctetString(const byte input[], u32bit length):

This constructor simply copies its input.

4.3 Symmetrically Keyed Algorithms

Block ciphers, stream ciphers, and MACs all handle keys in pretty much the same way. To make this similarity explicit, all algorithms of those types are derived from the SymmetricAlgorithm base class. This type has three functions:

void set_key(const byte key[], u32bit length):

Most algorithms only accept keys of certain lengths. If you attempt to call **set_key** with a key length that is not supported, the exception **Invalid_Key_Length** will be thrown. There is also another version of **set_key** that takes a **SymmetricKey** as an argument.

bool valid_keylength(u32bit length) const:

This function returns true if a key of the given length will be accepted by the cipher.

There are also three constant data members of every SymmetricAlgorithm object, which specify exactly what limits there are on keys which that object can accept:

MAXIMUM_KEYLENGTH: The maximum length of a key. Usually, this is at most 32 (256 bits), even if the algorithm actually supports more. In a few rare cases larger keys will be supported.

MINIMUM_KEYLENGTH: The minimum length of a key. This is at least 1.

KEYLENGTH_MULTIPLE: The length of the key must be a multiple of this value.

In all cases, **set_key** must be called on an object before any data processing (encryption, decryption, etc) is done by that object. If this is not done, the results are undefined – that is to say, Botan reserves the right in this situation to do anything from printing a nasty, insulting message on the screen to dumping core.

4.4 Block Ciphers

Block ciphers implement the interface BlockCipher, found in base.h, as well as the SymmetricAlgorithm interface.

```
void encrypt(const byte in[BLOCK_SIZE], byte out[BLOCK_SIZE]) const
void encrypt(byte block[BLOCK_SIZE]) const
```

These functions apply the block cipher transformation to *in* and place the result in *out*, or encrypts *block* in place (*in* may be the same as *out*). BLOCK_SIZE is a constant member of each class, which specifies how much data a block cipher can process at one time. Note that BLOCK_SIZE is not a static class member, meaning you can (given a BlockCipher* named *cipher*), call cipher->BLOCK_SIZE to get the block size of that particular object. BlockCiphers have similar functions decrypt, which perform the inverse operation.

```
AES_128 cipher;
SymmetricKey key(cipher.MAXIMUM_KEYLENGTH); // randomly created cipher.set_key(key);
byte in[16] = { /* secrets */ };
byte out[16];
cipher.encrypt(in, out);
```

4.5 Stream Ciphers

Stream ciphers are somewhat different from block ciphers, in that encrypting data results in changing the internal state of the cipher. Also, you may encrypt any length of data in one go (in byte amounts).

```
void encrypt(const byte in[], byte out[], u32bit length)
void encrypt(byte data[], u32bit length):
```

These functions encrypt the arbitrary length (well, less than 4 gigabyte long) string in and place it into out, or encrypts it in place in data. The **decrypt** functions look just like **encrypt**.

Stream ciphers implement the ${\tt SymmetricAlgorithm}$ interface.

Some stream ciphers support random access to any point in their cipher stream. For such ciphers, calling $void seek(u32bit \ byte)$ will change the cipher's state so that it as if the cipher had been keyed as normal, then encrypted byte-1 bytes of data (so the next byte in the cipher stream is byte number byte).

4.6 Hash Functions / Message Authentication Codes

Hash functions take their input without producing any output, only producing anything when all input has already taken place. MACs are very similar, but are additionally keyed. Both of these are derived from the base class BufferedComputation, which has the following functions.

Complete the hash/MAC calculation and place the result into *out*. OUTPUT_LENGTH is a public constant in each object that gives the length of the hash in bytes. After you call **final**, the hash function is reset to its initial state, so it may be reused immediately.

The second method of using final is to call it with no arguments at all, as shown in the second prototype. It will return the hash/mac value in a memory buffer, which will have size OUTPUT_LENGTH.

There are also a pair of functions called **process**. They are essentially a combination of a single **update**, and **final**. Both versions return the final value, rather than placing it an array. Calling **process** with a single byte value isn't available, mostly because it would rarely be useful.

A MAC can be viewed (in most cases) as simply a keyed hash function, so classes which are derived from MessageAuthenticationCode have update and final classes just like a HashFunction (and like a HashFunction, after final is called, it can be used to make a new MAC right away; the key is kept around).

A MAC has the SymmetricAlgorithm interface in addition to the BufferedComputation interface.

5 Public Key Cryptography

Public key algorithms were added in Botan 0.8.0. The major base classes can be found in pubkey.h.

5.1 Creating PK Algorithm Key Objects

The library has interfaces for encryption, signatures, etc that do not require knowing the exact algorithm in use (for example RSA and Rabin-Williams signatures are handled by the exact same code path).

One place where we do need to know exactly what kind of algorithm is in use is when we are creating a key (But: read the section "Importing and Exporting PK Keys", later in this manual).

There are (currently) two kinds of public key algorithms in Botan: ones based on integer factorization (RSA and Rabin-Williams), and ones based on the discrete logarithm problem (DSA, Diffie-Hellman, Nyberg-Rueppel, and ElGamal). Since discrete logarithm parameters (primes and generators) can be shared among many keys, there is the notion of these being a combined type (called DL_Group).

There are two ways to create a DL private key (such as DSA_PrivateKey). One is to pass in just a DL_Group object – a new key will automatically be generated. The other involves passing in a group to use, along with both the public and private values (private value first).

Since in integer factorization algorithms, the modulus used isn't shared by other keys, we don't use this notion. You can create a new key by passing in a u32bit telling how long (in bits) the key should be, or you can copy an pre-existing key by passing in the appropriate parameters (primes, exponents, etc). For RSA and Rabin-Williams (the two IF schemes in Botan), the parameters are all BigInts: prime 1, prime 2, encryption exponent, decryption exponent, modulus. The last two are optional, since they can easily be derived from the first three.

5.1.1 Creating a DL_Group

There are quite a few ways to get a DL_Group object. The best is to use the function get_dl_group, which takes a string naming a group; it will either return that group, if it knows about it, or throw an exception. Names it knows about include "IETF-n" where n is 768, 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, or 4096, and "DSA-n", where n is 512, 768, or 1024. The IETF groups are the ones specified for use with IPSec, and the DSA ones are the default DSA parameters specified by Java's JCE. For DSA and Nyberg-Rueppel, you should only use the "DSA-n" groups, while Diffie-Hellman and ElGamal can use either type (keep in mind that some applications/standards require DH/ELG to use DSA-style primes, while others require strong prime groups).

You can also generate a new random group. This is not recommend, because it is quite slow, especially for safe primes.

You can register a new DL group with **add_dl_group** with a string naming the group and the DL_Group. Future lookups on that name will return the group. There is no reason to register the group if you do decide to use a distinct DL group for each key.

5.2 Key Checking

Most public key algorithms have limitations or restrictions on their parameters. For example RSA requires an odd exponent, and algorithms based on the discrete logarithm problem need a generator > 1.

Each low-level public key type has a function named **check_key** which takes a **bool**. This function returns a boolean value that declares whether or not the key is valid (from an algorithmic standpoint). For example, it will check to make sure that the prime parameters of a DSA key are, in fact, prime. It does not have anything to do with the validity of the key for any particular use, nor does it have anything to do with certificates which link a key (which, after all, is just some numbers) with a user or other entity. If

check_key's argument is **true**, then it does "strong" checking, which includes fairly expensive operations like primality checking.

Keys are always checked when they are loaded or generated, so typically there is no reason to use this function directly. However, you can disable or reduce the checks for particular cases (public keys, loaded private keys, generated private keys) by setting the right config toggle (see the section on the configuration subsystem for details).

5.3 Getting a PK algorithm object

The key types, like RSA_PrivateKey, do not implement any kind of padding or encoding (which is generally necessary for security). To get an object like this, the easiest thing to do is call the functions found in look_pk.h. Generally these take a key, followed by a string that specified what hashing and encoding method(s) to use. Examples of such strings are "EME1(SHA-1)" for OAEP encryption and "EMSA4(SHA-1)" for PSS signatures (where the message is hashed using SHA-1).

Here are some basic examples (using an RSA key) to give you a feel for the possibilities. These examples assume rsakey is an RSA_PrivateKey, since otherwise we would not be able to create a decryption or signature object with it (you can create encryption or signature verification objects with public keys, naturally). Remember to delete these objects when you're done with them.

```
// PKCS #1 v2.0 / IEEE 1363 compatible encryption
PK_Encryptor* rsa_enc1 = get_pk_encryptor(rsakey, "EME1(RIPEMD-160)");
// PKCS #1 v1.5 compatible encryption
PK_Encryptor* rsa_enc2 = get_pk_encryptor(rsakey, "PKCS1v15");
// Raw encryption: no padding, input is directly encrypted by the key
// Don't use this unless you know what you're doing
PK_Encryptor* rsa_enc3 = get_pk_encryptor(rsakey, "Raw");
// This object can decrypt things encrypted by rsa_enc1
PK_Decryptor* rsa_dec1 = get_pk_decryptor(rsakey, "EME1(RIPEMD-160)");
// PKCS #1 v1.5 compatible signatures
PK_Signer* rsa_sig = get_pk_signer(rsakey, "EMSA3(MD5)");
PK_Verifier* rsa_verify = get_pk_verifier(rsakey, "EMSA3(MD5)");
// PKCS #1 v2.1 compatible signatures
PK_Signer* rsa_sig2 = get_pk_signer(rsakey, "EMSA4(SHA-1)");
PK_Verifier* rsa_verify2 = get_pk_verifier(rsakey, "EMSA4(SHA-1)");
// Hash input with SHA-1, but don't pad the input in any way; usually
// used with DSA/NR, not RSA
PK_Signer* rsa_sig = get_pk_signer(rsakey, "EMSA1(SHA-1)");
```

5.4 Encryption

The PK_Encryptor and PK_Decryptor classes are the interface for encryption and decryption, respectively.

Calling **encrypt** with a **byte** array and a length parameter will return the input encrypted with whatever scheme is being used. Calling the similar **decrypt** will perform the inverse operation. You can also do these operations with SecureVector
Syte>s. In all cases, the output is returned via a SecureVector
byte>.

If you attempt an operation with a larger size than the key can support (this limit varies based on the algorithm, the key size, and the padding method used (if any)), an exception will be thrown. Alternately,

you can call **maximum_input_size**, which will return the maximum size you can safely encrypt. In fact, you can often encrypt an object that is one byte longer, but only if enough of the high bits of the leading byte are set to zero. Since this is pretty dicey, it's best to stick with the advertised maximum.

Available public key encryption algorithms in Botan are RSA and ElGamal. The encoding methods are EME1, denoted by "EME1(HASHNAME)", PKCS #1 v1.5, called "PKCS1v15" or "EME-PKCS1-v1_5", and raw encoding ("Raw").

For compatibility reasons, PKCS #1 v1.5 is recommend for use with ElGamal (most other implementations of ElGamal do not support any other encoding format). RSA can also be used with PKCS # 1 encoding, but because of various possible attacks, EME1 is the preferred encoding. EME1 requires the use of a hash function: unless a competent applied cryptographer tells you otherwise, you should use SHA-1.

Don't use "Raw" encoding unless you need it for backward compatibility with old protocols. There are many possible attacks against both ElGamal and RSA when they are used this way.

5.5 Signatures

The signature algorithms look quite a bit like the hash functions. You can repeatedly call **update**, giving more and more of a message you wish to sign, and then call **signature**, which will return a signature for that message. If you want to do it all in one shot, call **sign_message**, which will just call **update** with its argument and then return whatever **signature** returns.

You can validate a signature by updating the verifier class, and finally seeing the if the value returned from **check_signature** is true (you pass the supposed signature to the **check_signature** function as a byte array and a length or as a MemoryRegion
byte>). There is another function, **verify_message**, which takes a pair of byte array/length pairs (or a pair of MemoryRegion
byte> objects), the first of which is the message, the second being the (supposed) signature. It returns true if the signature is valid and false otherwise.

Available public key signature algorithms in Botan are RSA, DSA, Nyberg-Rueppel, and Rabin-Williams. Signature encoding methods include EMSA1, EMSA2, EMSA3, EMSA4, and Raw. All of them, except Raw, take a parameter naming a message digest function to hash the message with. Raw actually signs the input directly; if the message is too big, the signing operation will fail. Raw is not useful except in very specialized applications.

There are various interactions which make certain encoding schemes and signing algorithms more or less useful.

EMSA2 is the usual method for encoding Rabin-William signatures, so for compatibility with other implementations you may have to use that. EMSA4 (also called PSS), also works with Rabin-Williams. EMSA1 and EMSA3 do *not* work with Rabin-Williams.

RSA can be used with any of the available encoding methods. EMSA4 is by far the most secure, but is not (as of now) widely implemented. EMSA3 (also called "EMSA-PKCS1-v1-5") is commonly used with RSA (for example in SSL). EMSA1 signs the message digest directly, without any extra padding or encoding. This may be useful, but is not as secure as either EMSA3 or EMSA4. EMSA2 may be used but is not recommended.

For DSA and Nyberg-Rueppel, you should use EMSA1. None of the other encoding methods are particularly useful for these algorithms.

5.6 Key Agreement

You can get ahold of a PK_Key_Agreement_Scheme object by calling get_pk_kas with a key that is of a type that supports key agreement (such as a Diffie-Hellman key stored in a DH_PrivateKey object), and the name of a key derivation function. This can be "Raw", meaning the output of the primitive itself is returned as the key, or "KDF1(hash)" or "KDF2(hash)" where "hash" is any string you happen to like (hopefully you like strings like "SHA-1" or "RIPEMD-160"), or "X9.42-PRF(keywrap)", which uses the PRF specified in

ANSI X9.42. It takes the name or OID of the key wrap algorithm which will be used to encrypt a content encryption key.

How key agreement generally works is that you trade public values with some other party, and then each of you runs a computation with the other's value and your key (this should return the same result to both parties). This computation can be called by using **derive_key** with either a byte array/length pair, or a SecureVector

byte> than holds the public value of the other party. The last argument to either call is a number that specifies how long a key you want.

Depending on the key derivation function you're using, you many not *actually* get back a key of that size. In particular, "Raw" will return a number about the size of the Diffie-Hellman modulus, and KDF1 can only return a key which is the same size as the output of the hash. KDF2, on the other hand, will always give you a key exactly as long as you request, regardless of the underlying hash used with it. The key returned is a SymmetricKey, ready to pass to a block cipher, MAC, or other symmetric algorithm.

The public value which should be used can be obtained by calling **public_data**, which exists for any key that is associated with a key agreement algorithm. It returns a SecureVector
Syte>.

"KDF2(SHA-1)" is by far the preferred algorithm for key derivation in new applications. The X9.42 algorithm may be useful in some circumstances, but unless you need X9.42 compatibility, KDF2 is easier to use.

There is a Diffie-Hellman example included in the distribution, which you may want to examine.

5.7 Importing and Exporting PK Keys

[This section mentions Pipe and DataSource, which is not covered until later in the manual. Please read those sections for more about Pipe and DataSource and their uses.]

There are many, many different (often conflicting) standards surrounding public key cryptography. There is, thankfully, only two major standards surrounding the representation of a public or private key: X.509 (for public keys), and PKCS #8 (for private keys). Other crypto libraries, like OpenSSL and B-SAFE, also support these formats, so you can easily exchange keys with software that doesn't use Botan.

In addition to "plain" public keys, Botan also supports X.509 certificates. These are documented in the section "Certificate Handling", later in this manual.

5.7.1 Public Keys

The interfaces for doing either of these is quite similar. Let's look at the X.509 stuff first:

```
namespace X509 {
   void encode(const X509_PublicKey& key, Pipe& out, X509_Encoding enc = PEM);
   std::string PEM_encode(const X509_PublicKey& out);

   X509_PublicKey* load_key(DataSource& in);
   X509_PublicKey* load_key(const std::string& file);
   X509_PublicKey* load_key(const SecureVector<byte>& buffer);
}
```

Basically, **X509::encode** will take an **X509_PublicKey** (as of now, that's any RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman key) and encodes it using *enc*, which can be either PEM or RAW_BER. Using PEM is *highly* recommended for many reasons, including compatibility with other software, for transmission over 8-bit unclean channels, because it can be identified by a human without special tools, and because it sometimes allows more sane behavior of tools that process the data. It will place the encoding into *out*. Remember that if you have just created the Pipe that you are passing to **X509::encode**, you need to call **start_msg** first. Particularly with public keys, about 99% of the time you just want to PEM encode the key and then write it to a file or

something. In this case, it's probably easier to use **X509::PEM_encode**. This function will simply return the PEM encoding of the key as a std::string.

For loading a public key, the preferred method is one of the variants of **load_key**. This function will return a newly allocated key based on the data from whatever source it is using (assuming, of course, the source is in fact storing a representation of a public key). The encoding used (PEM or BER) need not be specified; the format will be detected automatically. The key is allocated with **new**, and should be released with **delete** when you are done with it. The first takes a generic **DataSource** which you have to allocate – the others are simple wrapper functions that take either a filename or a memory buffer.

So what can you do with the return value of <code>load_key</code>? On its own, a <code>X509_PublicKey</code> isn't particularly useful; you can't encrypt messages or verify signatures, or much else. But, using <code>dynamic_cast</code>, you can figure out what kind of operations the key supports. Then, you can cast the key to the appropriate type and pass it to a higher-level class. For example:

```
/* Might be RSA, might be ElGamal, might be ... */
X509_PublicKey* key = X509::load_key("pubkey.asc");
   /* You MUST use dynamic_cast to convert, because of virtual bases */
PK_Encrypting_Key* enc_key = dynamic_cast<PK_Encrypting_Key*>(key);
if(!enc_key)
   throw Some_Exception();
PK_Encryptor* enc = get_pk_encryptor(*enc_key, "EME1(SHA-1)");
SecureVector<byte> cipher = enc->encrypt(some_message, size_of_message);
```

5.7.2 Private Keys

There are two different options for private key import/export. The first is a plaintext version of the private key. This is supported by the following functions:

```
namespace PKCS8 {
    void encode(const PKCS8_PrivateKey& key, Pipe& to, X509_Encoding enc = PEM);
    std::string PEM_encode(const PKCS8_PrivateKey& key);
}
```

These functions are basically the same as the X.509 functions described previously. The only difference is that they take a PKCS8_PrivateKey type (which, again, can be either RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman, but this time the key must be a private key). In most situations, using these is a bad idea, because anyone can come along and grab the private key without having to know any passwords or other secrets. Unless you have very particular security requirements, always use the versions that encrypt the key based on a passphrase. For importing, the same functions can be used for encrypted and unencrypted keys.

The other way to export a PKCS #8 key is to first encode it in the same manner as done above, then encrypt it (using a passphrase and the techniques of PKCS #5), and store the whole thing into another structure. This method is definitely preferred, since otherwise the private key is unprotected. The following functions support this technique:

To export an encrypted private key, call **PKCS8::encrypt_key**. The *key*, *out*, and *enc* arguments are similar in usage to the ones for **PKCS8::encode**. As you might notice, there are two new arguments for **PKCS8::encrypt_key**, however. The first is a passphrase (which you presumably got from a user somehow). This will be used to encrypt the key. The second new argument is *pbe*; this specifies a particular password based encryption (or PBE) algorithm.

The **PEM_encode** version shown here is similar to the one that doesn't take a passphrase. Essentially it encrypts the key (using the default PBE algorithm), and then returns a C++ string with the PEM encoding of the key.

If pbe is blank, then the default algorithm (controlled by the "base/default_pbe" option) will be used. As shipped, this default is "PBE-PKCS5v20(SHA-1,TripleDES/CBC)". This is among the more secure options of PKCS #5, and is widely supported among implementations of PKCS #5 v2.0. It offers 168 bits of security against attacks, which should be more that sufficient. If you need compatibility with systems that only support PKCS #5 v1.5, pass "PBE-PKCS5v15(MD5,DES/CBC)" as pbe. However, be warned that this PBE algorithm only has 56 bits of security against brute force attacks. As of 1.4.5, all three keylengths of AES are also available as options, which can be used with by specifying a PBE algorithm of "PBE-PKCS5v20(SHA-1,AES-256/CBC)" (or "AES-128" or "AES-192"). Support for AES is slightly non-standard, and some applications or libraries might not handle it. It is known that OpenSSL (0.9.7 and later) do handle AES for private key encryption.

There may be some strange programs out there that support the v2.0 extensions to PBES1 but not PBES2; if you need to inter-operate with a program like that, use "PBE-PKCS5v15(MD5,RC2/CBC)". For example, OpenSSL supports this format (though since it also supports the v2.0 schemes, there is no reason

not to just use TripleDES or AES). This scheme uses a 64 bit key, which, while significantly better than a 56 bit key, is a bit too small for comfort.

Last but not least, there are some functions which is basically identical to **X509::load_key**, which will load, and possibly decrypt, a PKCS #8 private key:

The versions that take std::string passphrases are primarily for compatibility, but they are useful in limited circumstances. The User_Interface versions are how load_key is actually implemented, and provides for much more flexibility. Essentially, if the passphrase given to the function is not correct, then an exception is thrown and that is that. However, if you pass in an UI object instead, then the UI object can keep asking the user for the passphrase until they get it right (or until they cancel the action, though the UI interface). A User_Interface has very little to do with talking to users; it's just a way to glue together Botan and whatever user interface you happen to be using. You can think of it as a user interface interface. The default User_Interface is actually very dumb, and effectively acts just like the versions taking the std::string.

After loading a key, you can use **dynamic_cast** to find out what operations it supports, and use it appropriately. Remember to **delete** it once you are done with it.

5.7.3 Limitations

As of now Nyberg-Rueppel and Rabin-Williams keys cannot be imported or exported, because they have no official ASN.1 OID or definition. ElGamal keys can (as of Botan 1.3.8) be imported and exported, but the only other implementation which supports the format is Peter Gutmann's Cryptlib. If you can help it, stick to RSA and DSA.

Note: Currently NR and RW are given basic ASN.1 key formats (which mirror DSA and RSA, respectively), which means that, if they are assigned an OID, they can be imported and exported just as easily as RSA and DSA. You can assign them an OID by putting a line in a Botan configuration file, calling OIDS::add_oid, or editing src/policy.cpp. Be warned that it is possible that a future version will use a format which is different from the current one (i.e., a newly standardized format).

6 Filters and Pipes

6.1 Basic Filter Usage

Up until this point, using Botan would be very tedious; to do anything you would have to bother with putting data into arrays, doing whatever you want with it, and then sending it someplace. The filter metaphor (defining a series of operations which take some amount of input, process it, then send it along to the next filter) works very well in this situation. If you've ever used a Unix system, the usage of filters in Botan should be very intuitive (and even if you haven't, don't worry, it's pretty easy). For instance, here is how you encrypt a file with AES in CBC mode with PKCS#7 padding, then encode it with Base64 and send it to standard output (we assume that file is an open istream):

Pipe works in conjunction with the Filter class (for example, the CBC_Encryption and Base64_Encoder types used above are Filters), but you never have to deal with them directly; Pipe handles all the required housekeeping. Pipe is fully documented in the section titled "The Pipe API", which appears later in this section.

A useful ability of Pipe is to split up the work up into what are called "messages". Messages are blocks of data that are processed in an identical fashion (i.e., with the same sequence of Filters). Messages are delimited by the start_msg and end_msg functions, as shown above. There are two different ways to make use of messages. One is to send several messages through a Pipe without changing the Pipe's configuration, so you end up with a sequence of messages; one use of this would be to send a sequence of identically encrypted UDP packets, for example (note that the data need not be identical; it is just that each is encrypted, encoded, signed, etc in an identical fashion). Another is to change the filters that are used in the Pipe between each message, by adding or removing Filters; functions that let you do this are documented in the Pipe API section. Pipe's full interface definition can be found in pipe.h

6.1.1 Fork

It's fairly common that you might receive some data and want to perform more than one operation on it (*i.e.*, encrypt it with DES and calculate the MD5 hash of the plaintext at the same time). That's where Fork comes in. Fork is a filter that takes input and passes it on to *one or more* Filters which are attached to it. Fork changes the nature of the pipe system completely. Instead of being a linked list, it becomes a tree.

Before messages were added to Botan, using Fork was significantly more complicated, requiring you to keep pointers to Fork objects you allocated and sending control information to them when you wanted to read your output. Now, however, things are much simpler. Each Filter in the fork is given its own output buffer, and thus its own message. For example, if you have previously written two messages into a Pipe, then you start a new one with a Fork which has three paths of Filter's inside it, you add three new messages to the Pipe. The data you put into the Pipe is duplicated and sent into each set of Filters, and the eventual output is placed into a dedicated message slot in the Pipe.

Messages in the Pipe are allocated in a depth-first manner. This is only interesting if you are using more than one Fork in a single Pipe. As an example, consider the following:

In this case, message 0 will be the output of the first Base64_Encoder, message 1 will be a copy of the input (see below for how Fork interprets NULL pointers), message 2 will be the output of the second Base64_Encoder, and message 3 will be the output of the Hex_Encoder. As you can see, this results in message numbers being allocated in a top to bottom fashion, when looked at on the screen. However, note that there could be potential for bugs if this is not anticipated. For example, if your code is passed a Filter, and you assume it is a "normal" one which only uses one message, your message offsets would be wrong, leading to some confusion during output.

An alternate method (which is *not* used) would be to give the first message to the first Base64_Encoder, the second to the Hex_Encoder, and then the last two messages to the two Filters in the innermost Fork.

The hasher and hasher2 examples show two different ways of using Pipe and Fork.

There is a very useful trick that you can do with Fork. Let's say you had some data that had been encrypted with a block cipher, and then hex encoded. In addition, a hex encoded MAC of the plaintext had been calculated and included with the message. You not only want to decrypt the data, you want to verify the MAC. So the first two filters in the pipe will decode the hex, and decrypt the raw ciphertext. But now, how are you going to both a) get the plaintext, and b) calculate the MAC of the plaintext? This is actually very simple, if a bit obscure.

What you have to do is, after the filters that do the initial decoding, create a Fork. For the first argument, pass a null pointer. The fork object will understand that this means that you don't want to do any more processing on that line of the fork; you just want the data that was placed in. And then in the second argument you would pass in a MAC_Filter so you could compute a MAC of the plaintext. An alternative is to define a simple passthrough/null Filter, which just calls **send** whenever write is called. This is (in the author's opinion) pointless, but there is nothing stopping you from doing so if desired.

For an example of this technique, look at the rsa_dec example in doc/examples/.

Any Filters which are attached to the Pipe after the Fork are implicitly attached onto the first branch created by the fork. For example, let's say you created this Pipe:

And then called **start_msg**, inserted some data, then **end_msg**. Then *pipe* would contain two messages. The first one (message number 0) would contain the MD5 sum of the input in hex encoded form, and the other would contain the SHA-1 sum of the input in raw binary.

6.1.2 Chain

Chain is about as simple as it gets. Chain creates a chain of Filters and encapsulates them inside a single filter (itself). This is primarily useful for passing a sequence of filters into something which is expecting only a single Filter (most notably, Fork). You can call Chain's constructor with up to 4 Filter*s (they will be added in order), or with an array of Filter*s and a u32bit which tells Chain how many Filter*s are

in the array (again, they will be attached in order). See the section "A Filter Example" for an example of using Chain.

6.1.3 Data Sources

A DataSource is a simple abstraction for a thing that stores bytes. This type is used fairly heavily in the areas of the API related to ASN.1 encoding/decoding. The following types are DataSources: Pipe, SecureQueue, and a couple of special purpose ones: DataSource_Memory and DataSource_Stream.

You can create a DataSource_Memory with an array of bytes and a length field. The object will make a copy of the data, so you don't have to worry about keeping that memory allocated. This is mostly for internal use, but if it comes in handy, feel free to use it.

A DataSource_Stream is probably more useful than the memory based one. It's constructors take either a std::istream or a std::string. If it's a stream, the data source will use the istream to satisfy read requests (this is particularly useful to use with std::cin). If the string version is used, it will attempt to open up a file with that name and read from it.

6.1.4 Data Sinks

A DataSink (in data_snk.h) is a Filter which takes arbitrary amounts of input, and produces no output. Generally, this means it's doing something with the data outside the realm of what Filter/Pipe can handle, for example, writing it to a file (which is what the DataSink_Stream does). There is no need for DataSinks which write to a std::string or memory buffer, because Pipe can handle that by itself.

Here's a quick example of using a DataSink, which encrypts in.txt and sends the output to out.txt. There is no explicit output operation; the writing of out.txt is implicit.

A real advantage of this is that even if "in.txt" is large (say, 1 gigabyte), only as much memory is needed for internal I/O buffers will actually be used. A naive use of Pipe would, in that case, use up about 1 gigabyte of memory, by storing the full encrypted version of the file in memory, and then writing it all out at once.

6.2 The Pipe API

Using Pipe is supposed to be pretty easy (especially in the common, simple cases). The usage is generally as follows: Initialize a Pipe with the filters you want to use, write some data into it, and then read some processed data out.

6.2.1 Initializing Pipe

By default, Pipe will do nothing at all; any input placed into the Pipe will be read back unchanged. Obviously, this has limited utility, and presumably you want to use one or more Filters to somehow process the data. First, you can choose a set of Filters to initialize the Pipe with via the constructor. Namely, you can pass it either a set of up to 4 Filter*s, or a pre-defined array and a length:

```
Pipe pipe2(new Filter1(/*args*/), new Filter2(/*args*/));
Filter* filters[5] = {
   new Filter1(/*args*/), new Filter2(/*args*/), new Filter3(/*args*/),
   new Filter4(/*args*/), new Filter5(/*args*/) /* more if desired... */
};
Pipe pipe3(filters, 5);
```

This is by far the most common way to initialize a Pipe. However, occasionally a more flexible initialization strategy is necessary; this is supported by 4 member functions: **prepend**(Filter*), **append**(Filter*), **pop**(), and **reset**(). These functions may only be used while the Pipe in question is not in use; that is, either before calling **start_msg**, or after **end_msg** has been called (and no new calls to **start_msg** have been made yet).

The function **reset**() simply removes all the Filters which the Pipe is currently using – it is reset to an initialize, "empty" state. Any data which is being retained by the Pipe is retained after a **reset**(), and **reset**() does not affect the message numbers (discussed later).

Calling **prepend** and **append** will either prepend or append the passed Filter object to the list of transformations. For example, if you **prepend** a Filter implementing encryption, and the Pipe already had a Filter which hex encoded the input, then the next set of input would be first encrypted, then hex encoded. Alternately, if you called **append**, then the input would be first be hex encoded, and then encrypted (which is not terribly useful in this particular example).

Finally, calling **pop**() will remove the first transformation of the Pipe. Say we had called **prepend** to put an encryption Filter into a Pipe; calling **pop**() would remove this Filter and return the Pipe to it's state before we called **prepend**.

6.2.2 Giving Data to a Pipe

Input to a Pipe is delimited into messages, which can be read from independently (*i.e.*, you can read 5 bytes from one message, and then all of another message, without either read affecting any other messages). The messages are delimited by calls to **start_msg** and **end_msg**. In between these two calls, you can write data into a Pipe, and it will be processed by the Filter(s) that it contains. Writes at any other time are invalid, and will result in an exception.

As to writing, you can call any of the functions called **write**(), which can take any of: a byte[]/u32bit pair, a SecureVector
byte>, a std::string, a DataSource&, or a single byte.

Sometimes, you may want to do only a single write per message. In this case, you can use the **process_msg** series of functions, which start a message, write their argument into the Pipe, and then end the message. In this case you would not make any explicit calls to **start_msg/end_msg**. The version of **write** which takes a single byte is not supported by **process_msg**, but all the other variants are.

Pipe can also be used with the >> operator, and will accept a std::istream, (or on Unix systems with the fd_unix module), a Unix file descriptor. In either case, the entire contents of the file will be read into the Pipe.

6.2.3 Getting Output from a Pipe

Retrieving the processed data from a Pipe is a bit more complicated, for various reasons. In particular, because Pipe will separate each message into a separate buffer, you have to be able to retrieve data from each message independently. Each of Pipe's read functions has a final parameter which specifies what message to read from (as a 32-bit integer). If this parameter is set to Pipe::DEFAULT_MESSAGE, it will read the current default message (DEFAULT_MESSAGE is also the default value of this parameter). The parameter will not be mentioned in further discussion of the reading API, but it is always there (unless otherwise noted).

Reading is done with a variety of functions. The most basic are u32bit read(byte out[], u32bit len) and u32bit read(byte& out). Each reads into out (either up to len bytes, or a single byte for the one taking a byte&), and returns the total number of bytes read. There is a variant of these functions, all named peek, which performs the same operations, but does not remove the bytes from the message (reading is a destructive operation with a Pipe).

There are also the functions SecureVector

which return the entire contents of the message, either as a memory buffer, or a std::string (which is generally only useful is the Pipe has encoded the message into a text string, such as when a Base64_Encoder is used).

To determine how many bytes are left in a message, call u32bit remaining() (which can also take an optional message number). Finally, there are some functions for managing the default message number: u32bit default_msg() will return the current default message, u32bit message_count() will return the total number of messages (0...message_count()-1), and set_default_msg(u32bit msgno) will set a new default message number (which must be a valid message number for that Pipe). The ability to set the default message number is particularly important in the case of using the file output operations (<< with a std::ostream or Unix file descriptor), because there is no way to specify it explicitly when using the output operator.

6.3 A Filter Example

Here is some code which takes one or more filenames in *argv* and calculates the result of several hash functions for each file. The complete program can be found as hasher.cpp in the Botan distribution. For brevity, most error checking has been removed.

```
string name[3] = { "MD5", "SHA-1", "RIPEMD-160" };
Botan::Filter* hash[3] = {
   new Botan::Chain(new Botan::Hash_Filter(name[0]),
                     new Botan::Hex_Encoder),
   new Botan::Chain(new Botan::Hash_Filter(name[1]),
                     new Botan::Hex_Encoder),
   new Botan::Chain(new Botan::Hash_Filter(name[2]),
                     new Botan::Hex_Encoder) };
Botan::Pipe pipe(new Botan::Fork(hash, COUNT));
for(u32bit j = 1; argv[j] != 0; j++)
   ifstream file(argv[j]);
   pipe.start_msg();
   file >> pipe;
   pipe.end_msg();
   file.close();
   for(u32bit k = 0; k != 3; k++)
      pipe.set_default_msg(3*(j-1)+k);
      cout << name[k] << "(" << argv[j] << ") = " << pipe << endl;</pre>
   }
```

6.4 Rolling Your Own

Well, now that you know how filters work in Botan, you might want to write your own. Lucky for you, all of the hard work is done by the Filter base class, leaving you to handle the details of what your filter is supposed to do. Remember that if you get confused about any of this, you can always look at the implementation of Botan's filters to see exactly how everything works.

There are basically only four functions that a filter need worry about:

void write(byte input[], u32bit length):

The **write** function is what is called when a filter receives input for it to process. The filter is *not* required to process it right away; many filters buffer their input before producing any output. A filter will usually have **write** called many times during it's lifetime.

void send(byte output[], u32bit length):

Eventually, a filter will want to produce some output to send along to the next filter in the pipeline. It does so by calling **send** with whatever it wants to send along to the next filter. There is also a version of **send** taking a single byte argument, as a convenience.

void start_msg():

This function is optional. Implement it if your Filter would like to do some processing or setup at the start of each message (for an example, see the Zlib compression module).

void end_msg():

Implementing the **end_msg** function is optional. It is called when it has been requested that filters finish up their computations. Note that they must *not* deallocate their resources; this should be done by their destructor. They should simply finish up with whatever computation they have been working on (for example, a compressing filter would flush the compressor and **send** the final block), and empty any buffers in preparation for processing a fresh new set of input. It is essentially the inverse of **start_msg**.

Additionally, if necessary, filters can define a constructor that takes any needed arguments, and a destructor to deal with deallocating memory, closing files, etc.

There is also a BufferingFilter class (in buf_filt.h) which will take a message and split it up into an initial block which can be of any size (including zero), a sequence of fixed sized blocks of any non-zero size, and last (possibly zero-sized) final block. This might make a useful base class for your filters, depending on what you have in mind.

6.5 Filter Catalog

This section contains descriptions of every Filter included in Botan. Note that modules which provide Filters are documented elsewhere – these Filters are available on any installation of Botan.

6.5.1 Keyed Filters

A few sections ago, it was mentioned that Pipe can process multiple messages, treating each of them exactly the same. Well, that was a bit of a lie. There are some algorithms (in particular, block ciphers not in ECB mode, and all stream ciphers) that change their state as data is put through them.

Naturally, you might well want to reset the keys or (in the case of block cipher modes) IVs used by such filters, so multiple messages can be processed using completely different keys, or new IVs, or new keys and IVs, or whatever. And in fact, even for a MAC or an ECB block cipher, you might well want to change the key used from message to message.

Enter Keyed_Filter. It's a base class of any filter that is keyed: block cipher modes, stream ciphers, MACs, whatever. It has two functions, **set_key** and **set_iv**. Calling **set_key** will, naturally, set (or reset) the key used by the algorithm. Setting the IV only makes sense in certain algorithms – a call to **set_iv** on an object that doesn't support IVs will be ignored. You *must* call **set_key** before calling **set_iv**: while not all Keyed_Filter objects require this, you should assume it is required anytime you are using a Keyed_Filter.

Here's a example:

```
Keyed_Filter *cast, *hmac;
Pipe pipe(new Base64_Decoder,
          // Note the assignments to the cast and hmac variables
          cast = new CBC_Decryption("CAST-128", "PKCS7", cast_key, iv),
          new Fork(
             0, // Read the section 'Fork' to understand this
             new Chain(
                hmac = new MAC_Filter("HMAC(SHA-1)", mac_key, 12),
                new Base64_Encoder
             )
   );
pipe.start_msg();
[use pipe for a while, decrypt some stuff, derive new keys and IVs]
pipe.end_msg();
cast->set_key(cast_key2);
cast->set_iv(iv2);
hmac->set_key(mac_key2);
pipe.start_msg();
[use pipe for some other things]
pipe.end_msg();
```

There are some requirements to using Keyed_Filter which you must follow. If you call set_key or set_iv on a filter which is owned by a Pipe, you must do so while the Pipe is "unlocked". This refers to the times when no messages are being processed by Pipe – either before Pipe's start_msg is called, or after end_msg is called (and no new call to start_msg has happened yet). Doing otherwise will result in undefined behavior, probably silently getting invalid output.

And remember: if you're resetting both values, reset the key first.

6.5.2 Cipher Filters

Getting ahold of a Filter implementing a cipher is very easy. Simply make sure you're including the header lookup.h, and call get_cipher. Generally you will pass the return value directly into a Pipe. There are actually a couple different functions, which do pretty much the same thing:

```
get_cipher(std::string cipher_spec, SymmetricKey key, InitializationVector iv, Cipher_Dir dir);
get_cipher(std::string cipher_spec, SymmetricKey key, Cipher_Dir dir);
```

The version that doesn't take an IV is useful for things that don't use them, like block ciphers in ECB mode, or most stream ciphers. If you specify a *cipher_spec* that does want a IV, and you use the version that doesn't take one, an exception will be thrown. The *dir* argument can be either ENCRYPTION or DECRYPTION. In a few cases, like most (but not all) stream ciphers, these are equivalent, but even then it provides a way of showing the "intent" of the operation to readers of your code.

The cipher_spec is a string that specifies what cipher is to be used. The general syntax for cipher_spec is "STREAM_CIPHER", "BLOCK_CIPHER/MODE", or "BLOCK_CIPHER/MODE/PADDING". In the case of stream ciphers, no mode is necessary, so just the name is sufficient. A block cipher requires a mode of some sort, which can be "ECB", "CBC", "CFB(n)", "OFB", "CTR-BE", or "EAX(n)". The argument to CFB mode is how many bits of feedback should be used. If you just use "CFB" with no argument, it will default to using a feedback equal to the block size of the cipher. EAX mode also takes an optional bit argument, which tells EAX how large a tag size to use – generally this is the size of the block size of the cipher, which is the default if you don't specify any argument.

In the case of the ECB and CBC modes, a padding method can also be specified. If it is not supplied, ECB defaults to not padding, and CBC defaults to using PKCS #5/#7 compatible padding. The padding methods currently available are "NoPadding", "PKCS7", "OneAndZeros", and "CTS". CTS padding is currently only available for CBC mode, but the others can also be used in ECB mode.

Some example *cipher_spec* arguments are: "DES/CFB(32)", "TripleDES/OFB", "Blowfish/CBC/CTS", "SAFER-SK(10)/CBC/OneAndZeros", "AES/EAX", "ARC4"

"CTR-BE" refers to counter mode where the counter is incremented as if it were a big-endian encoded integer. This is compatible with most other implementations, but it is possible some will use the incompatible little endian convention. This version would be denoted as "CTR-LE" if it were supported.

"EAX" is a new cipher mode designed by Wagner, Rogaway, and Bellare. It is an authenticated cipher mode (that is, no separate authentication is needed), has provable security, and is free from patent entanglements. It runs about half as fast as most of the other cipher modes (like CBC, OFB, or CTR), which is not bad considering you don't need to use an authentication code.

6.5.3 Hashes and MACs

Hash functions and MACs don't need anything special when it comes to filters. Both just take their input and produce no output until **end_msg()** is called, at which time they complete the hash or MAC and send that as output.

These Filters take a string naming the type to be used. If for some reason you name something that doesn't exist, an exception will be thrown.

Hash_Filter(std::string hash, u32bit outlength):

This type hashes it's input with hash. When **end_msg** is called on the owning Pipe, the hash is completed and the digest is sent on to the next thing in the pipe. The argument *outlength* specifies how much of the output of the hash will be passed along to the next filter when **end_msg** is called. By default, it will pass the entire hash.

Examples of names for Hash_Filter are "SHA-1" and "Whirlpool".

MAC_Filter(std::string mac, const SymmetricKey& key, u32bit outlength):

The constructor for a MAC_Filter takes a key, used in calculating the MAC, and a length parameter, which has semantics exactly the same as the one passed to Hash_Filters constructor.

Examples for mac are "HMAC(SHA-1)", "MD5-MAC", and the exceptionally long, strange, and probably useless name "CMAC(Lion(Tiger(20,3),MARK-4,1024))".

6.5.4 PK Filters

There are four classes in this category, PK_Encryptor_Filter, PK_Decryptor_Filter, PK_Signer_Filter, and PK_Verifier_Filter. Each takes a pointer to an object of the appropriate type (PK_Encryptor, PK_Decryptor, etc) which is deleted by the destructor. These classes are found in pk_filts.h.

Three of these, for encryption, decryption, and signing are pretty much identical conceptually. Each of them buffers it's input until the end of the message is marked with a call to the **end_msg** function. Then they encrypt, decrypt, or sign their input and send the output (the ciphertext, the plaintext, or the signature) into the next filter.

Signature verification works a little differently, because it needs to know what the signature is in order to check it. You can either pass this in along with the constructor, or call the function **set_signature** – with this second method, you need to keep a pointer to the filter around so you can send it this command. In either case, after **end_msg** is called, it will try to verify the signature (if the signature has not been set by either method, an exception will be thrown here). It will then send a single byte onto the next filter – a 1 or a 0, which specifies whether the signature verified or not (respectively).

For more information about PK algorithms (including creating the appropriate objects to pass to the constructors), read the section "Public Key Cryptography" in this manual.

6.5.5 Encoders

Often you want your data to be in some form of text (for sending over channels which aren't 8-bit clean, printing it, etc). The filters Hex_Encoder and Base64_Encoder will convert arbitrary binary data into hex or base64 formats. Not surprisingly, you can use Hex_Decoder and Base64_Decoder to convert it back into it's original form.

Both of the encoders can take a few options about how the data should be formatted (all of which have defaults). The first is a bool which simply says if the encoder should insert line breaks. This defaults to false. Line breaks don't matter either way to the decoder, but it makes the output a bit more appealing to the human eye, and a few transport mechanisms (notably some email systems) limit the maximum line length.

The second encoder option is an integer specifying how long such lines will be (obviously this will be ignored if line-breaking isn't being used). The default tends to be in the range of 60-80 characters, but is not specified exactly. If you want a specific value, set it. Otherwise the default should be fine.

Lastly, Hex_Encoder takes an argument of type Case, which can be Uppercase or Lowercase (default is Uppercase). This specifies what case the characters A-F should be output as. The base64 encoder has no such option, because it uses both upper and lower case letters for it's output.

The decoders both take a single option, which tells it how the object should behave in the case of invalid input. The enum (called <code>Decoder_Checking</code>) can take on any of three values: <code>NONE, IGNORE_WS</code>, and <code>FULL_CHECK</code>. With <code>NONE</code> (the default, for compatibility with previous releases), invalid input (for example, a "z" character in supposedly hex input) will simply be ignored. With <code>IGNORE_WS</code>, whitespace will be ignored by the decoder, but receiving other non-valid data will raise an exception. Finally, <code>FULL_CHECK</code> will raise an exception for <code>any</code> characters not in the encoded character set, including whitespace.

You can find the declarations for these types in hex.h and base64.h.

7 Certificate Handling

A certificate is essentially a binding between some identifying information of a person or other entity (called a *subject*) and a public key. This binding is asserted by a signature on the certificate, which is placed there by some authority (the *issuer*) which at least claims that it knows the subject that is named in the certificate really "owns" the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.

The major certificate format in use today is X.509v3, designed by ISO and further hacked on by dozens (hundreds?) of other organizations.

When working with certificates, the main class to remember is X509_Certificate. You can read an object of this type, but you can't create one on the fly; a CA object is necessary for actually making a new certificate. So for the most part, you only have to worry about reading them in, verifying the signatures, and getting the bits of data in them (most commonly the public key, and the information about the user of that key). An X.509v3 certificate can contain a literally infinite number of items related to all kinds of things. Botan doesn't support a lot of them, simply because nobody uses them and they're an impossible mess to work with. This section only documents the most commonly used ones of the ones that are supported; for the rest, read x509cert.h and asn1_obj.h (which has the definitions of various common ASN.1 constructs used in X.509).

7.1 So what's in an X.509 certificate?

Obviously, you want to be able to get the public key. This is achieved by calling the member function **subject_public_key**, which will return a X509_PublicKey*. As to what to do with this, read about **load_key** in the section "Importing and Exporting PK Keys". In the general case, this could be any kind of public key, though 99% of the time it will be an RSA key. However, Diffie-Hellman and DSA keys are also supported, so be careful about how you treat this. It is also a wise idea to examine the value returned by **constraints**, to see what uses the public key is approved for.

The second major piece of information you'll want is the name/email/etc of the person to whom this certificate is assigned. Here is where things get a little nasty. X.509v3 has two (well, mostly just two ...) different places where you can stick information about the user: the *subject* field, and in an extension called *subjectAlternativeName*. The *subject* field is supposed to only included the following information: country, organization (possibly), an organizational sub-unit name (possibly), and a so-called common name. The common name is usually the name of the person, or it could be a title associated with a position of some sort in the organization. It may also include fields for state/province and locality. What exactly a locality is, nobody knows, but it's usually given as a city name.

Botan doesn't currently support any of the Unicode variants used in ASN.1 (UTF-8, UCS-2, and UCS-4), any of which could be used for the fields in the DN. This could be problematic, particularly in Asia and other areas where non-ASCII characters are needed for most names. The UTF-8 and UCS-2 string types are accepted (in fact, UTF-8 is used when encoding much of the time), but if any of the characters included in the string are not in ISO 8859-1 (i.e.0 ... 255), an exception will get thrown. Currently the ASN1_String type holds it's data as ISO 8859-1 internally (regardless of local character set); this would have to be changed to hold UCS-2 or UCS-4 in order to support Unicode (also, many interfaces in the X.509 code would have to accept or return a std::wstring instead of a std::string).

Like the distinguished names, subject alternative names can contain a lot of things that Botan will flat out ignore (most of which you would never actually want to use). However, there are three very useful pieces of information which this extension might hold: an email address ("person@site1.com"), a DNS name ("somehost.site2.com"), or a URI ("http://www.site3.com").

So, how to get the information? Simply call **subject_info** with the name of the piece of information you want, and it will return a **std::string** which is either empty (signifying that the certificate doesn't have this information), or has the information requested. There are several names for each possible item, but the most easily readable ones are: "Name", "Country", "Organization", "Organizational Unit", "Locality",

"State", "RFC822", "URI", and "DNS". These values are returned as a std::string.

You can also get information about the issuer of the certificate in the same way, using issuer_info.

7.1.1 X.509v3 Extensions

X.509v3 specifies a large number of possible extensions. Botan supports some, but by no means all of them. This section lists which ones are supported, and notes areas where there may be problems with the handling. You have to be pretty familiar with X.509 in order to understand what this is talking about.

- · Key Usage and Extended Key Usage: No problems known.
- Basic Constraints: No problems known. The default for a v1/v2 certificate is assume it's a CA if and only if the option "x509/default_to_ca" is set. A v3 certificate is marked as a CA if (and only if) the basic constraints extension is present and set for a CA cert.
- · Subject Alternative Names: Only the "rfc822Name", "dNSName", and "uniformResourceIdentifier" fields will be stored; all others are ignored.
- · Issuer Alternative Names: Same restrictions as the Subject Alternative Names extension. New certificates generated by Botan never include the issuer alternative name.
- · Authority Key Identifier: Only the version using Keyldentifier is supported. If the GeneralNames version is used and the extension is critical, an exception is thrown. If both the Keyldentifier and GeneralNames versions are present, then the Keyldentifier will be used, and the GeneralNames ignored.
- · Subject Key Identifier: No problems known.

7.1.2 Revocation Lists

It will occasionally happen that a certificate must be revoked before it's expiration date. Examples of this happening include the private key being compromised, or the user to which it has been assigned leaving an organization. Certificate revocation lists are an answer to this problem (though online certificate validation techniques are starting to become somewhat more popular). Essentially, every once in a while the CA will release a CRL, listing all certificates which have been revoked. Also included is various pieces of information like what time a particular certificate was revoked, and for what reason. In most systems, it is wise to support some form of certificate revocation, and CRLs handle this fairly easily.

For most users, processing a CRL is quite easy. All you have to do is call the constructor, which will take a filename (or a DataSource&). The CRLs can either be in raw BER/DER, or in PEM format; the constructor will figure out which format without any extra information. For example:

```
X509_CRL crl1("crl1.der");
DataSource_Stream in("crl2.pem");
X509_CRL crl2(in);
```

After that, pass the X509_CRL object to a X509_Store object with X509_Code add_crl(X509_CRL), and all future verifications will take into account the certificates listed, assuming add_crl returns VERIFIED. If it doesn't return VERIFIED, then the return value is an error code signifying that the CRL could not be processed due to some problem (which could range from the issuing certificate not being found, to the CRL having some format problem). For more about the X509_Store API, read the section later in this chapter.

7.2 Reading Certificates

X509_Certificate has two constructors, each of which takes a source of data; a filename to read, and a DataSource&.

7.3 Storing and Using Certificates

If you read a certificate, you probably want to verify the signature on it. However, consider that to do so, we may have to verify the signature on the certificate that we used to verify the first certificate, and on and on until we hit the top of the certificate tree somewhere. It would be a might huge pain to have to handle all of that manually in every application, so there is something that does it for you: X509_Store.

This is a pretty easy thing to use. The basic operations are: put certificates and CRLs into it, search for certificates, and attempt to verify certificates. That's about it. In the future, there will be support for online retrieval of certificates and CRLs (e.g.with the HTTP cert-store interface currently under consideration by PKIX).

7.3.1 Adding Certificates

You can add new certificates to a certificate store using any of these functions:

```
add_cert(const X509_Certificate& cert, bool trusted = false)
add_certs(DataSource& source)
add_trusted_certs(DataSource& source)
```

The versions that take a DataSource& will add all of the certificates that it can find in that source.

All of them add the cert(s) to the store. The 'trusted' certificates are the ones which you have some reason to trust are genuine. For example, say your application is working with certificates which are owned by employees of some company, and all of their certificates are signed by the company CA, whose certificate is in turned signed by a commercial root CA. What you would then do is include the certificate of the commercial CA with your application, and read it in as a trusted certificate. From there, you could verify the company CA's certificate, and then use that to verify the end user's certificates. Only self-signed certificates may be considered trusted.

7.3.2 Adding CRLs

X509_Code add_crl(const X509_CRL& crl);

This will process the CRL and mark the revoked certificates. This will also work if a revoked certificate is added to the store sometime after the CRL is processed. The function can return an error code (listed later), or will return VERIFIED if everything completed successfully.

7.3.3 Storing Certificates

You can output a set of certificates by calling **PEM_encode**, which will return a **std::string** containing each of the certificates in the store, PEM encoded and concatenated. This simple format can easily be read by both Botan and other libraries/applications.

7.3.4 Searching for Certificates

You can find certificates in the store with a series of functions contained in the **X509_Store_Search** namespace:

These functions will return a (possibly empty) vector of certificates from *store* matching your search criteria. The email address and DNS name searches are case-insensitive but are sensitive to extra whitespace and so on. The name search will do case-insensitive substring matching, so, for example, calling **X509_Store_Search::by_name**(your_store, "dob") will return certificates for "J.R. 'Bob' Dobbs" and "H. Dobbertin", assuming both of those certificates are in your_store.

You could then display the results to a user, and allow them to select the appropriate one. Searching using an email address as the key is usually more effective than the name, since email addresses are rarely shared.

7.3.5 Certificate Stores

An object of type Certificate_Store is a generalized interface to an external source for certificates (and CRLs). Examples of such a store would be one that looked up the certificates in a SQL database, or by contacting a CGI script running on a HTTP server. There are currently three mechanisms for looking up a certificate, and one for retrieving CRLs. By default, most of these mechanisms will simply return an empty std::vector of X509_Certificate. This storage mechanism is only queried when doing certificate validation: it allows you to distribute only the root key with an application, and let some online method handle getting all the other certificates that are needed to validate an end entity certificate. In particular, the search routines will not attempt to access the external database.

The three certificate lookup methods are **by_SKID** (Subject Key Identifier), **by_name** (the Common-Name DN entry), and **by_email** (stored in either the distinguished name, or in a subjectAlternative-Name extension). The name and email versions take a **std::string**, while the SKID version takes a **SecureVector<byte>** containing the subject key identifier in raw binary. You can choose not to implement **by_name** or **by_email**, but **by_SKID** is mandatory to implement, and, currently, is the only version which is used by X509_Store.

Finally, there is a method for finding CRLs, called **get_crls_for**, which takes an X509_Certificate object, and returns a std::vector of X509_CRL. While generally there will be only one CRL, the use of the vector makes it easy to return no CRLs (e.g., if the certificate store doesn't support retrieving them), or return multiple ones (for example, if the certificate store can't determine precisely which key was used to sign the certificate). Implementing the function is optional, and by default will return no CRLs. If it is available, it will be used by X509_CRL.

As for actually using such a store, you have to tell X509_Store about it, by calling the X509_Store member function

```
add_new_certstore(Certificate_Store* new_store)
```

The argument, new_store, will be deleted by X509_Store's destructor, so make sure to allocate it with new.

7.3.6 Verifying Certificates

There is a single function in X509_Store related to verifying a certificate:

 ${\tt X509_Code\ validate_cert}({\tt const}\ {\tt X509_Certificate}\&\ cert, {\tt Cert_Usage}\ usage = {\tt ANY})$

To sum things up simply, it returns VERIFIED if the certificate can safely be considered valid for the usage(s) described by usage, and an error code if it is not. Naturally, things are a bit more complicated than that. The enum Cert_Usage is defined inside the X509_Store class, it (currently) can take on any of the values ANY (any usage is OK), TLS_SERVER (for SSL/TLS server authentication), TLS_CLIENT (for SSL/TLS client authentication), CODE_SIGNING, EMAIL_PROTECTION (email encryption, usually this means S/MIME), TIME_STAMPING (in theory any time stamp application, usually IETF PKIX's Time Stamp Protocol), or CRL_SIGNING. Note that Microsoft's code signing system, certainly the most widely used, uses a completely different (and basically undocumented) method for marking certificates for code signing.

First, how does it know if a certificate is valid? Basically, a certificate is valid if both of the following hold: a) the signature in the certificate can be verified using the public key in the issuer's certificate, and b) the issuer's certificate is a valid CA certificate. Note that this definition is recursive. We get out of this by "bottoming out" when we reach a certificate that we consider trusted. In general this will either be a commercial root CA, or an organization or application specific CA.

There are actually a few other restrictions (validity periods, key usage restrictions, etc), but the above summarizes the major points of the validation algorithm. In theory, Botan implements the certificate path validation algorithm given in RFC 2459, but in practice it does not (yet), because we don't support the X.509v3 policy or name constraint extensions.

Possible values for usage are TLS_SERVER, TLS_CLIENT, CODE_SIGNING, EMAIL_PROTECTION, CRL_SIGNING, and TIME_STAMPING, and ANY. The default ANY does not mean valid for any use, it means "is valid for some usage". This is generally fine, and in fact requiring that a random certificate support a particular usage will likely result in a lot of failures, unless your application is very careful to always issue certificates with the proper extensions, and you never use certificates generated by other apps.

Return values for validate_cert (and add_crl) include:

- · VERIFIED: The certificate is valid for the specified use.
- · INVALID_USAGE: The certificate cannot be used for the specified use.
- · CANNOT_ESTABLISH_TRUST: The root certificate was not marked as trusted.
- · CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: The certificate chain exceeded the length allowed by a basicConstraints extension.
- · SIGNATURE_ERROR: An invalid signature was found
- · POLICY_ERROR: Some problem with the certificate policies was found.
- · CERT_FORMAT_ERROR: Some format problem was found in a certificate.
- · CERT_ISSUER_NOT_FOUND: The issuer of a certificate could not be found.
- · CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: The certificate is not yet valid.
- · CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: The certificate has expired.
- · CERT_IS_REVOKED: The certificate has been revoked.
- · CRL_FORMAT_ERROR: Some format problem was found in a CRL.
- · CRL_ISSUER_NOT_FOUND: The issuer of a CRL could not be found.
- \cdot CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: The CRL is not yet valid.

- · CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: The CRL has expired.
- · CA_CERT_CANNOT_SIGN: The CA certificate found does not have an contain a public key that allows signature verification.
- · CA_CERT_NOT_FOR_CERT_ISSUER: The CA cert found is not allowed to issue certificates.
- · CA_CERT_NOT_FOR_CRL_ISSUER: The CA cert found is not allowed to issue CRLs.
- · UNKNOWN_X509_ERROR: Some other error occurred.

7.4 Certificate Authorities

Setting up a CA for X.509 certificates is actually probably the easiest thing to do related to X.509. A CA is represented by the type X509_CA, which can be found in x509_ca.h. A CA always needs it's own certificate, which can either be a self-signed certificate (see below on how to create one) or one issued by another CA (see the section on PKCS #10 requests). Creating a CA object is done by the following constructor:

X509_CA(const X509_Certificate& cert, const PKCS8_PrivateKey& key);

The private key is the private key corresponding to the public key in the CA's certificate.

Generally, requests for new certificates are supplied to a CA in the form on PKCS #10 certificate requests (called a PKCS10_Request object in Botan). These are decoded in a similar manner to certificates/CRLs/etc. Generally, a request is vetted by humans (who somehow verify that the name in the request corresponds to the name of the person who requested it), and then signed by a CA key, generating a new certificate.

X509_Certificate sign_request(const PKCS10_Request&) const;

7.4.1 Generating CRLs

As mentioned previously, the ability to process CRLs is highly important in many PKI systems. In fact, according to strict X.509 rules, you must not validate any certificate if the appropriate CRLs are not available (though hardly any systems are that strict). In any case, a CA should have a valid CRL available at all times.

Of course, you might be wondering what to do if no certificates have been revoked. In fact, CRLs can be issued without any actually revoked certificates - the list of certs will simply be empty. To generate a new, empty CRL, just call X509_CRL X509_CA::new_crl(u32bit seconds = 0) - it will create a new, empty, CRL. If seconds is the default 0, then the normal default CRL next update time (the value of the "x509/crl/next_update") will be used. If not, then seconds specifies how long (in seconds) it will be until the CRL's next update time (after this time, most clients will reject the CRL as too old).

On the other hand, you may have issued a CRL before. In which case, you will want to issue a new CRL which contains both all previously revoked certificates, along with any new ones. This is done by calling the X509_CA member function update_crl(X509_CRL old_crl, std::vector<CRL_Entry> new_revoked, u32bit seconds = 0), where X509_CRL is the last CRL this CA issued, and new_revoked is a list of any newly revoked certificates. The function returns a new X509_CRL to make available for clients. The semantics for the seconds argument is the same as new_crl.

The CRL_Entry type is a structure which contains, at a minimum, the serial number of the revoked certificate. As serial numbers are never repeated, the pairing of an issuer and a serial number (should) distinctly identify any certificate. In this case, we represent the serial number as a SecureVector
byte> called serial. There are two additional (optional) values, an enumeration called CRL_Code which specifies the reason for revocation (reason), and an object which represents the time that the certificate became invalid (if this information is known).

If you wish to remove an old entry from the CRL, insert a new entry for the same cert, with a *reason* code of <code>DELETE_CRL_ENTRY</code>. For example, if a revoked certificate has expired 'normally', there is no reason to continue to explicitly revoke it, since clients will reject the cert as expired in any case.

7.4.2 Self-Signed Certificates

Generating a new self-signed certificate can often be useful, for example when setting up a new root CA, or for use in email applications. In this case, the solution is summed up simply as:

Where key is obviously the private key you wish to use (the public key, used in the certificate itself, is extracted from the private key), and opts is an structure which has various bits of information which will be used in creating the certificate (this structure, and its use, is discussed below). This function is found in the header x509self.h. There is an example of using this function in the self_sig example.

7.4.3 Creating PKCS #10 Requests

Also in x509self.h, there is a function for generating new PKCS #10 certificate requests.

This function acts quite similarly to **create_self_signed_cert**, except it instead returns a PKCS #10 certificate request. After creating it, one would typically transmit it to a CA, who signs it and returns a freshly minted X.509 certificate. There is an example of using this function in the pkcs10 example.

7.4.4 Certificate Options

So what is this X509_Cert_Options thing we've been passing around? Basically, it's a bunch of information which will end up being stored into the certificate. This information comes in 3 major flavors: information about the subject (CA or end-user), the validity period of the certificate, and restrictions on the usage of the certificate.

First and foremost is a number of std::string members, which contains various bits of information about the user: common_name, serial_number, country, organization, org_unit, locality, state, email, dns_name, and uri. As many of these as possible should be filled it (especially an email address), though the only required ones are common_name and country.

There is another value which is only useful when creating a PKCS #10 request, which is called *challenge*. This is a challenge password, which you can later use to request certificate revocation (if the CA supports doing revocations in this manner).

Then there is the validity period; these are set with **not_before** and **not_after**. Both of these functions also take a **std::string**, which specifies when the certificate should start being valid, and when it should stop being valid. If you don't set the starting validity period, it will automatically choose the current time. If you don't set the ending time, it will choose the starting time plus a default time period. The arguments to these functions specify the time in the following format: "2002/11/27 1:50:14". The time is in 24 hour format, and the date is encoded as year/month/day. The date must be specified, but you can omit the time or trailing parts of it, for example "2002/11/27 1:50" or "2002/11/27".

Lastly, you can set constraints on a key. The one you're mostly likely to want to use is to create (or request) a CA certificate, which can be done by calling the member function **CA_key**. This should only be used when needed.

Other constraints can be set by calling the member functions add_constraints and add_ex_constraints. The first takes a Key_Constraints value, and replaces any previously set value. If no value is set, then the certificate key is marked as being valid for any usage. You can set it to any of the following (for more than one usage, OR them together): DIGITAL_SIGNATURE, NON_REPUDIATION, KEY_ENCIPHERMENT, DATA_ENCIPHERMENT, KEY_AGREEMENT, KEY_CERT_SIGN, CRL_SIGN, ENCIPHER_ONLY, DECIPHER_ONLY. Many of these have quite special semantics, so you should either consult the appropriate standards document (such as RFC 3280), or simply not call add_constraints, in which case the appropriate values will be chosen for you.

The second function, add_ex_constraints, allows you to specify an OID which has some meaning with regards to restricting the key to particular usages. You can, if you wish, specify any OID you like, but there are a set of standard ones which other applications will be able to understand. These are the ones specified by the PKIX standard, and are named "PKIX.ServerAuth" (for TLS server authentication), "PKIX.ClientAuth" (for TLS client authentication), "PKIX.CodeSigning", "PKIX.EmailProtection" (most likely for use with S/MIME), "PKIX.IPsecUser", "PKIX.IPsecTunnel", "PKIX.IPsecEndSystem", and "PKIX.TimeStamping". You can call add_ex_constraints any number of times – each new OID will be added to the list to include in the certificate.

8 CMS

The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is an IETF standardized format for message encryption and signatures. It is based on PKCS #7, but has been extended to allow compression, authentication, and password based encryption. Some simple uses of CMS will inter-operate with PKCS #7 implementations, but most uses will cause incompatibilities.

CMS is based on the idea of layering. At the lowest level is a data type (the actual message), which is encapsulated in another layer, for example one that provides encryption or adds a signature. This layer can in turn be encapsulated in another layer, and so on as often as you like.

Note that CMS is not available in the current distribution. You can download an alpha version separately from the website.

8.1 Encoding

The CMS encoder included in Botan does not allow you to use the full range of options available; for example, when signing, you can only sign with one key at a time (this particular restriction may be changed in later versions). However, you can do repeated signature operations, signing the previously signed data. Semantically, this is not quite the same (since the second and later signatures sign the signatures that came before it, as well as the data), but practically speaking it's the same thing.

WRITEME

8.2 Decoding

WRITEME

9 Random Number Generators

The random number generators provided in Botan are meant for creating keys, IVs, padding, nonces, and anything else which requires 'random' data. It is important to remember that the output of these classes will vary, even if they are supplied with exactly the same seed (*i.e.*, two Randpool objects with similar initial states will not produce the same output, because the value of high resolution timers is added to the state at various points).

To ensure good quality output, a PRNG needs to be seeded with truly random data (such as that produced by a hardware RNG). Typically, you will use an EntropySource (see below). To add entropy to a PRNG, you can use void add_entropy(const byte data[], u32bit length) or (better), use the EntropySource interface.

One a PRNG has been initialized, you can get a single byte of random data by calling byte random(), or get a large block by calling void randomize(byte data[], u32bit length), which will put random bytes into each member of the array from indexes $0 \dots length - 1$.

You can avoid all the problem inherent to seeding the PRNG by using the globally shared PRNG, described later in this section.

9.1 Entropy Estimation

The PRNG algorithms included in Botan have various sanity checks included. In particular, they try to make sure that a reasonable amount of entropy has been input into them before they will output any randomness. If this condition is not met, they will throw a PRNG_Unseeded exception. While generally a library shouldn't be making policy decisions for applications, it seems generally preferable for the application to fail than for it to generate insecure keys.

On Windows and Unix systems, the available entropy source modules can provide more than enough entropy to seed the PRNGs sufficiently. However, if these entropy sources aren't compiled into the library, the application will have to handle seeding on its own.

9.2 The Global PRNG

Botan maintains a global PRNG (actually, a pair of them) that is used internally for things like generating secret keys and salts. These PRNGs are automatically seeded by the LibraryInitializer. Most of the time, you won't need to access it directly because the library handles the common cases where randomness is needed for you, but you might want to for a complicated application (or when implementing things at a low level).

To use it, include rng.h. You can't get a pointer to the actual global PRNG object, because it is guarded with a mutex for thread safety, so the interface basically defines a set of entry points into the object. All of them are in the namespace Global_RNG, which is inside the Botan namespace. So you might call them as Botan::Global_RNG::function, or if you have a using declaration to include Botan objects into the global namespace, just Global_RNG::function.

There are six functions, four for adding entropy and two for getting randomness out.

void Global_RNG::randomize(byte buf[], u32bit size)

Get size bytes of random bytes from the global PRNG and put it into buf.

byte Global_RNG::random():

Return a single random byte

void Global_RNG::add_entropy(const byte buf[], u32bit size):

Add the contents of *buf*, which is of size *size*, into the global PRNG's internal state. The contents of the buffer cannot be recovered from the PRNG output or internal state, and the PRNGs included in Botan are specifically designed to be safe even if fed large amounts of data chosen by an attacker trying to weaken the PRNG. So feel free to include things like data you received over a socket (if you're writing a network application), passwords, log data, etc.

void Global_RNG::add_entropy(EntropySource& es, bool slow_poll):

Poll es for entropy. If slow-poll is true, then do a slow poll, otherwise do a fast poll.

u32bit Global_RNG::seed (bool slow_poll = true, u32bit bits_to_get = 256)

Seed the global PRNG, either a fast or slow poll (default a slow), until it gets at least bits_to_get bits of entropy. However, if little entropy is available on the system, it's entirely possible it will retrieve less than that (particularly if a fast poll is being done). This function will return an estimate for how many bits were gathered by the seeding process.

If you pass 0 for bits_to_get, then a poll will be run from all available entropy sources. Usually if enough entropy is collected after a few sources, the function will exit early. This is especially useful if you don't trust /dev/urandom to be safe for some reason.

If you've got a long running server process, it's a good idea to create a thread that just calls this function every once in a while, sleeping the rest of the time. Make sure to cancel it before you shutdown the library, though; otherwise it will try to get memory from the now-nonexist allocators, fail, and throw an exception (or crash). An alternate method might be to call it after servicing a particular number of clients.

u32bit Global_RNG::add_es (EntropySource* source, bool last = true)

Normally the library generates a list of entropy sources for **Global_RNG::seed** to call at initialization time. With this function you can add new entropy sources which will be queried. If *last* is true, the the entropy source is put at the end of the list of currently used entropy sources. If you'd like to be sure that your source is always called, set *last* to *false*, in which case it will placed at the start of the list.

9.3 Randpool

Randpool is the primary PRNG within Botan. In recent versions all uses of it have been wrapped by an implementation of the X9.31 PRNG (see below). If for some reason you should have cause to create a PRNG instead of using the "global" one owned by the library, it would be wise to consider the same on the grounds of general caution; while Randpool is designed with known attacks and PRNG weaknesses in mind, it is not an standard/official PRNG. The remainer of this section is a (fairly technical, though high-level) description of the algorithms used in this PRNG. Unless you have a specific interest in this subject, the rest of this section might prove somewhat uninteresting.

Randpool has an internal state called pool, which is 512 bytes long. This is where entropy is mixed into and extracted from. There is also a small output buffer (called buffer), which holds the data which has already been generated but has just not been output yet.

It is based around a MAC and a block cipher (which are currently HMAC(SHA-256) and AES-256). Where a specific size is mentioned, it should be taken as a multiple of the cipher's block size. For example, if a 256-bit block cipher were used instead of AES, all of the sizes internally would double. Every time some new output is needed, we compute the MAC of a counter and a high resolution timer. The resulting MAC is XORed into the output buffer (wrapping as needed), and the output buffer is then encrypted with AES, producing 16 bytes of output.

After 8 blocks (or 128 bytes) have been produced, we mix the pool. To do this, we first rekey both the MAC and the cipher; the new MAC key is the MAC of the current pool under the old MAC key, while the new cipher key is the MAC of the current pool under the just-chosen MAC key. We then encrypt the entire pool in CBC mode, using the current (unused) output buffer as the IV. We then generate a new output buffer, using the mechanism described in the previous paragraph.

To add randomness to the PRNG, we compute the MAC of the input and XOR the output into the start of the pool. Then we remix the pool and produce a new output buffer. The initial MAC operation should make it very hard for chosen inputs to harm the security of Randpool, and as HMAC should be able to hold roughly 256 bits of state, it is unlikely that we are wasting much input entropy (or, if we are, it doesn't matter, because we have a very abundant supply).

9.4 ANSI X9.31

ANSI_X931_PRNG is the standard issue X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 PRNG, though using AES-256 instead of 3DES as the block cipher. This PRNG implementation has been checked against official X9.31 test vectors.

Internally, the PRNG holds a pointer to another PRNG (typically Randpool). This internal PRNG generates the key and seed used by the X9.31 algorithm, as well as the date/time vectors. Each time an X9.31 PRNG object receives entropy, it simply passes it along to the PRNG it is holdin, and then pulls out some random bits to generate a new key and seed. This PRNG considers itself seeded as soon as the internal PRNG is seeded.

As of version 1.4.7, the X9.31 PRNG is by default used for all random number generation.

9.5 Entropy Sources

An EntropySource is an abstract representation of some method of gather "real" entropy. This tends to be very system dependent. The *only* way you should use an EntropySource is to pass it to a PRNG that will extract entropy from it – never use the output directly for any kind of key or nonce generation!

EntropySource has a pair of functions for getting entropy from some external source, called fast_poll and slow_poll. These pass a buffer of bytes to be written; the functions then return how many bytes of entropy were actually gathered. EntropySources are usually used to seed the global PRNG using the functions found in the Global_RNG namespace.

Note for writers of EntropySources: it isn't necessary to use any kind of cryptographic hash on your output. The data produced by an EntropySource is only used by an application after it has been hashed by the RandomNumberGenerator which asked for the entropy, and thus any hashing you do will be wasteful of both CPU cycles and possibly entropy.

10 User Interfaces

Botan has recently changed some infrastructure to better accommodate more complex user interfaces, in particular ones which are based on event loops. Primary among these was the fact that when doing something like loading a PKCS #8 encoded private key, a passphrase might be needed, but then again it might not (a PKCS #8 key doesn't have to be encrypted). Asking for a passphrase to decrypt an unencrypted key is rather pointless. Not only that, but the way to handle the user typing the wrong passphrase was complicated, undocumented, and inefficient.

So now Botan has an object called UI, which provides a simple interface for the aspects of user interaction the library has to be concerned with. Currently, this means getting a passphrase from the user, and that's it (UI will probably be extended in the future to support other operations as they are needed). The base UI class is very stupid, because the library can't directly assume anything about the environment that it's running under (for example, if there will be someone sitting at the terminal, if the application is even attached to a terminal, and so on). But since you can subclass UI to use whatever method happens to be appropriate for your application, this isn't a big deal.

There is (currently) a single function that can be overridden by subclasses of UI (the std::string arguments are actually const std::string&, but shown as simply std::string to keep the line from wrapping):

std::string get_passphrase(std::string what, std::string source, UI_Result& result) const;

The what argument specifies what the passphrase is needed for (for example, PKCS #8 key loading passes what as "PKCS #8 private key"). This lets you provide the user with some indication of why your application is asking for a passphrase; feel free to pass the string through **gettext(3)** or moral equivalent for i18n purposes. Similarly, source specifies where the data in question came from, if available (for example, a file name). If the source is not available for whatever reason, then source will be an empty string; be sure to account for this possibility when writing a UI subclass.

The function returns the passphrase as the return value, and a status code in result (either OK or CANCEL_ACTION). If CANCEL_ACTION is returned in result, then the return value will be ignored, and the caller will take whatever action is necessary (typically, throwing an exception stating that the passphrase couldn't be determined). In the specific case of PKCS #8 key decryption, a Decoding_Error exception will be thrown; your UI should assume this can happen, and provide appropriate error handling (such as putting up a dialog box informing the user of the situation, and canceling the operation in progress).

There is an example UI which uses GTK+ available on the web site. The GTK_UI code is cleanly separated from the rest of the example, so if you happen to be using GTK+, you can copy (and/or adapt) that code for your application. If you write a UI object for another windowing system (Win32, Qt, wxWindows, FOX, etc), and would like to make it available to users in general (ideally under a permissive license such as public domain or MIT/BSD), feel free to send in a copy.

10.1 Pulses

If you call a function in the library that turns out to take a long time (such as generating a 4096-bit prime), your pretty GUI will block up while the library does something, because the event loop is not being run. Not only does this look bad, it prevents the user from doing something else while the library works. The way around this is to register a pulse function.

By creating a class that inherits from Library_State::UI and passing it to **global_function**().set_ui, you can cause a pulse to be sent to your object occasionally (generally when performing long running operations like prime generation; eventually this will be extended for all operations that might take longer than a few milliseconds).

You can recieve a pulse by implementing the member function pulse(Pulse_Type) within your UI class. The Pulse_Type enum provides mildly useful information about the operation in progress (for a full list of the defined Pulse_Type values, see enums.h). The type code allows you do simple feedback such as that

GnuPG does during key generation (printing various characters as the prime generation process proceeds, such as '-' for prime test failed, '+' for prime test worked, and so on).

Generally the thing to do inside the pulse function is to run the GUI's event loop, for example with GTK+:

```
while(gtk_events_pending())
   gtk_main_iteration();
```

which will flush out the event queue and make your GUI seem nice and responsive. For a particularly long-running operation (one that takes more than a second or two), you will probably want to put up a progress bar. While you can update it directly from the pulse function, be warned that the pulse function is called at irregular intervals, so your progress bar's movement might seem choppy if you update it directly from the pulse. It may be a better move to instead set up a timer (preferably through the GUI framework) that runs every fixed timeslice, and updates the bar when the timer goes off. As long as the pulse function is called often enough (which is should), simply running the event loop and letting the timer function do the updates will work fine.

11 Policy Configuration

While Botan is performing operations on behalf on an application, there are times where there needs to be a policy decision. For example, when generating an X.509v3 certificate, should we include the key usage extension? Should it be marked as a critical extension, or is non-critical OK? And so on and so forth. It is not proper for a library to make these kinds of decisions for an application; after all, different applications might have different needs (not to mention the same application running at different sites). So, whenever it is sane to do so, the library will read from an internal table to find out what it should do when a policy decision is needed.

Right now, the option table is populated by some fixed, reasonable values at startup. These options can then be changed by the application, either hard-coded into the source code as an application policy, or reading them from a file (or options screen or whatever) and setting them as the user desires (possibly placing application-policy limits on the range they can take).

The library natively supports a simple format which is easy to parse and easy for humans to read and write. If you're at all familiar with Windows .INI files or OpenSSL's configs, it should be pretty easy to use. It's entirely possible that you want to instead use an XML config (or whatever), but you'll have to write you own parser for this (src/inifile.cpp will provide some ideas on what it is supposed to do).

There are basically four different things stored in the options table: strings, numbers, booleans, and times (not dates; times are things like "1 hour", "15 minutes", etc), though they are all represented by strings when they are provided to the library.

11.1 Option Types

Strings are simply strings – no strings attached (sorry). A list is a collection of strings, separated by a ':' character (no escaping is available, so you can't actually have a ':' character in a list item).

A number (more precisely, a non-negative integer less than 2^{32}) is specified as a string of decimal digits – no special formatters (such as a "0x" prefix) are supported. However, you can do simply arithmetic ('+' and '*'), and they do commute correctly. There is no explicit grouping (*i.e.*, with parenthesis), but generally a simple expression is all thats needed for this sort of thing.

A boolean can take on the values true and false, which can be represented by "true" (and "1") or "false" (and "0") respectively. Unlike C, a value of (say) "7" is not a boolean; it will be flagged as an error at runtime when the library attempts to read it. Finally, a time is essentially "<integer>[s|m|h|d|y]", where integer is the magnitude and the suffix (if present) provides a scaling value. For example "5d" represents 5 days, and "60", "60s", and "1m" all represent 60 seconds. If no suffix is provided, the scale defaults to seconds.

11.2 Setting and Getting Options

The header botan/config.h has the interface for setting policy options. All the actual configuration options are stored in a global object (of type Config); you can get a reference to this object by calling global_config.

```
To add (or set) an option, call global_config().set_option (std::string name, std::string value)
To get the value of an option, there are number of member
std::string option(std::string option)
std::vector<std::string> option_as_list(std::string option)
u32bit option_as_u32bit(std::string option)
u32bit option_as_time(std::string option)
bool option_as_bool(std::string option)
```

The only one that might be confusing is **option_as_time**, which returns the time in seconds.

As to defaults: strings default to the empty string, lists to an empty list, integers default to 0, times default to no time (0 seconds), and booleans will throw an exception if no value has been set.

11.3 Available Options

Generally, the defaults are chosen to provide a good level of security and sense for typical applications. Currently, most of the options are for the X.509 handling, since that's the place where most freedom is given to implementations. Options are organized in a hierarchal fashion, with a separating character of '/'. All options beginning with "app/" are reserved for use by applications.

- · "base/memory_chunk", (integer, default "64*1024"): how large a block of memory to allocate at once.
 - "base/default_pbe", (string, default "PBE-PKCS5v20(SHA-1,TripleDES/CBC)"): The default algorithm for encrypting PKCS #8 private keys.
- · "base/pkcs8_tries", (integer, default 3): how many times PKCS8::load_key will ask a UI object for a passphrase to decrypt the key before it gives up. If set to 0, it will continue to query the UI object until the object indicates to cancel the action..
- · "pk/blinder_size", (integer, default 64): how long (in bits) the blinding factor will be when doing private-key PK operations; if set to zero then blinding is not performed.
- · "pk/test/public", (string, default "basic"): How much testing to perform on imported public keys; can be "basic" or "all".
- · "pk/test/private", (string, default "basic"): How much testing to perform on imported private keys; can be "basic" or "all".
- · "pk/test/private_gen", (string, default "all"): How much testing to perform on generated private keys; can be "basic" or "all".
- · "pem/search", (integer, default "4*1024"): how large an area (in bytes) to search for PEM signatures in the heuristic that decides if data is PEM encoded, or raw BER data.
- · "pem/forgive", (integer, default "8"): how many characters that 'look like' a PEM header will be forgiven, *i.e.* how characters match before we decide it really is the PEM header, and any bad characters imply a malformed header.
- · "pem/width", (integer, default "64"): how long each PEM line will be encoded as; it should not be smaller than 50 or greater than 80.
- · "rng/min_entropy", (integer, default 384): how many bits of entropy must be collected before the PRNG is considered seeded.
- · "rng/es_files", (list, default "/dev/urandom:/dev/random"): what paths to attempt reads from for entropy, typically in-kernel devices.
- · "rng/egd_path", (list, default "/var/run/egd-pool:/dev/egd-pool"): what paths to attempt to use as an EGD socket.
- · "rng/ms_capi_prov_type", (list, default "INTEL_SEC:RSA_FULL"): what providers the CAPI entropy source should attempt to use, in order.
- · "rng/unix_path", (list, default "/usr/ucb:/usr/etc:/etc"): extra path fields to use when executing programs to gather entropy.

- · "x509/validity_slack", (time, default "24h"): how much slack to allow when checking time validity on X.509 certificates.
- · "x509/v1_assume_ca", (boolean, default false): if true, then v1/v2 X.509 certificates are considered CA certificates by default. If not true, then no v1/v2 certificate is considered valid for CA use.
- · "x509/cache_verify_results", (time, default "30m"): how long to cache certificate verification results in a X509_Store. Set it to 0 if you don't want to cache the results, though this will cause a lot of unnecessary overhead.
- · "x509/ca/allow_ca", (boolean, default "false"): whether a CA will allow new certificates to be marked for CA usage.
- · "x509/ca/basic_constraints", (string, default "always"): can be either "always" or "ca_only"; if "always" then the basic constraints extension is included in new user certs as well as new CA certs.
- · "x509/ca/default_expire", (time, default "1y"): how long, by default, a newly generated certificate is valid for.
- · "x509/ca/signing_offset", (time, default "30s"): when generating a PKCS #10 certificate request, it will be marked as becoming valid this much time before the current time; helps protect against slightly off clocks.
- · "x509/ca/rsa_hash", (string, default "SHA-1"): what hash to use with an RSA key (SHA-1 is always used with DSA).
- · "x509/ca/str_type", (string, default "latin1"): what encoding to use by default (can be "latin1" or "utf8").
- · "x509/crl/unknown_critical", (string, default "ignore"): what to do when a CRL with an unknown critical extension is processed. Options are "ignore" and "throw". For X.509v4 compliance, use "ignore", for PKIX compliance, use "throw".
- · "x509/crl/next_update", (time, default "7d"): new CRLs are marked as expiring in this much time.

Here, in a separate list, are the options which control which extension are included in a newly generated X.509v3 certificate, and if they should be marked as critical extensions or not. Each one begins with "x509/exts/" (i.e., what is referred to as "basic_constraints" below is actually "x509/exts/basic_constraints"), and can take on a value of "yes", "no", "noncritical", or "critical". A value of "no" means the extension is not included under any circumstances. A value of "yes" or "noncritical" (they have the same meaning), means that the extension is included in the certificate if there is some data to populate it with, and that the extension should be marked as non-critical. Finally, "critical" means that the extension should be marked as a critical extension. Unless otherwise noted, the option will default to "yes": including the extension if data is available to fill it in, and mark it as a non-critical extension.

A word about X.509v3 extensions: each extension can be marked either critical or non-critical. A non-critical extension may be ignored by a compliant X.509v3 implementation (though for the common extensions, it is fairly rare for an implementation to actually do so). On the other hand, a critical extension forces an all-or-nothing situation: if an implementation can't handle an extension marked critical, it is required to reject the certificate outright.

For the full meaning of the extensions, it will probably be helpful to read an authoritative X.509 reference, such as RFC 2459 or ISO's X.509 v3/v4 documents. The default options here were chosen to comply with the IETF PKIX X.509v3 profile, which is probably the most commonly supported X.509 profile, at least in the United States.

· "basic_constraints" (default "critical"): Control the use of the Basic Constraints extension, which marks if a certificate is a CA or not. Changing this is *not* recommended, as this should always be a critical extension (doing otherwise violates most if not all X.509v3 profiles).

- · "subject_key_id": Controls the use of the subject key identifier. Not many implementations make use of this extension, but it is not harmful, and it is recommended it be included in all new certificates.
- \cdot "authority_key_id": See comments on "subject_key_id"
- · "subject_alternative_name": Contains various pieces of information that don't fit into the standard certificate name, like email addresses and URIs. Very commonly used.
- · "issuer_alternative_name": Like "subject_alternative_name", but not used nearly as often.
- · "key_usage" (default "critical"): Marks what uses this certificate is valid for.
- \cdot "extended_key_usage": Similar to "key_usage", but more general and much less commonly used.

11.4 Configuration Files

Botan has a number of options, which can be configured by calling the appropriate functions, documented earlier in this section. But this is somewhat inconvenient for the users of applications which use Botan. So Botan also supports reading options from a file which looks rather like Windows .INI files or OpenSSL configurations. You can find an example config (which simply matches the compiled-in defaults) in doc/botan.rc

Each set of options is part of a 'section', for example, "base", "rng", or "x509". These names are essentially arbitrary, and are (in theory) chosen on the basis of what the options pertain to. To set the option "x509/ca/default_expire" (which tells X509_CA how long newly minted X.509 certificates should be valid for), you could use either of the following methods:

```
[x509/ca] # section is x509/ca
default_expire = 1y # x509/ca + default_expire -> x509/ca/default_expire
# same as above
[x509] # section is x509
# other x509/ options in here...
ca/default_expire = 1y # x509 + ca/default_expire -> x509/ca/default_expire
```

There are also two special sections, "oids" and "aliases". The aliases section is easier to understand, and probably more useful for the average user. By adding a new line in an alias section, alias = officialname, you can create a new way to reference a particular algorithm (in those cases when you ask for an algorithm object with a string specifying its type). For example, if the line MyAlgo = Blowfish was included in an aliases section, then one could do this:

```
Pipe pipe(get_cipher(''MyAlgo/CBC/PKCS7'', key, iv, ENCRYPTION));
```

and get a Blowfish CBC encryptor. Initially this was implemented due to the number of algorithms with multiple names (such as "SHA1", "SHA-1", and "SHA-160"), but might also be useful in other, more interesting, contexts.

The OIDs section gives a mapping between ASN.1 OIDs and the algorithm or object it represents, in the form name = oid, where oid is the usual decimal-dotted representation. For readability and easy of extension in configuration files, a simple variable interpolation scheme is also available. Consider the following:

```
[oids]
ISO_MEMBER = 1.2
US_BODY = ISO_MEMBER.840 # US_BODY = 1.2.840
RSA_DSI = US_BODY.113549 # RSA_DSI = 1.2.840.113549
```

This only works when the variable name is at the start of the string; since the primary reason for its inclusion is for with OIDs, this is acceptable. In some cases, adding a new OID in is sufficient for code to work with new algorithms (though not always). For example, by setting the proper OIDs, you can make it possible to import, export, create, and process X.509 certificates that use Rabin-Williams.

11.4.1 Syntax

Each line is either a comment, blank, a section name, or a name/value pair separated by a '='. Comments start with the '#' character and continue to the end of line. The reader allows escaping, so if you wanted to include an actual # sign you could use \#, or include it in a string ('#' or "#"). A section name is specified by [somename]; a section name must have at least one character, and a section must appear before any name/value pairs. A name must be alphanumeric, but a value can contain spaces or other strange things (you must either enclose the argument in quotes or escape each space with a backslash). An example showing

some of the trickier parts of how input is interpreted follows (but the reader is cautioned that relying on this behavior is not a good idea):

```
[examples]
foo1 = a b c
                             # stored as abc (not quoted, ws removed)
foo2 = 'a b c'
                             # stored as a b c (quoted, keep ws)
foo3 = "a b c"
                             # stored as a b c (quoted, keep ws)
tricky = "Jack \"I like pie\" Lloyd" # stored as Jack "I like pie" Lloyd
simpler = "Jack 'I like pie' Lloyd" # no escapes needed
hashmark = "#"
                       # set to a hash
hashmark2 = \#
                       # also set to a hash
[oids]
RW = 1.2.3.4.5.6 # Now RW keys can be imported/exported!
NR = 1.2.3.4.5.7 # Now NR can be imported/exported too.
  # Note these OIDs are *not* allocated for RW/NR, in fact I have no idea who
  # owns that section of the OID space, but it's certainly not me. Someone will
  # have to allocate OIDs for RW/NR before this is 'legal'
some\_thing = 1.2.3
                                # some OID
another_thing = some_thing.4.5 # another_thing = 1.2.3.4.5
```

12 Miscellaneous

This section has documentation for anything that just didn't fit into any of the major categories. Many of them (Timers, Allocators) will rarely be used in actual application code, but others, like the S2K algorithms, have a wide degree of applicability.

12.1 S2K Algorithms

There are various procedures (usually fairly ad-hoc) for turning a passphrase into a (mostly) arbitrary length key for a symmetric cipher. A general interface for such algorithms is presented in s2k.h. The main function is **derive_key**, which takes a passphrase, and the desired length of the output key, and returns a key of that length, deterministically produced from the passphrase. If an algorithm can't produce a key of that size, it will throw an exception (most notably, PKCS #5's PBKDF1 can only produce strings between 1 and n bytes, where n is the output size of the underlying hash function).

Most such algorithms allow the use of a "salt", which provides some extra randomness and helps against dictionary attacks on the passphrase. Simply call **change_salt** (there are variations of it for most of the ways you might wish to specify a salt, check the header for details) with a block of random data. You can also have the class generate a new salt for you with **new_random_salt**; the salt that was generated can be retrieved with **current_salt**.

Additionally some algorithms allow you to set some sort of iteration count, which will make the algorithm take longer to compute the final key (reducing the speed of brute-force attacks of various kinds). This can be changed with the **set_iterations** function. Most standards recommend an iteration count of at least 1000. "PBKDF2(SHA-1)", with an 8-byte salt and an iteration count of 2048, is recommend for new applications. Currently defined S2K algorithms are "PBKDF1(digest)", "PBKDF2(digest)", and "OpenPGP-S2K(digest)"; you can retrieve any of these using the **get_s2k**, found in lookup.h. As of this writing, "PBKDF2(SHA-1)" with 10000 iterations and an 8 byte salt is recommend for new applications.

12.1.1 OpenPGP S2K

There are some oddities about OpenPGP's S2K algorithms which are documented here. For one thing, it uses the iteration count in a strange manner; instead of specifying how many times to iterate the hash, it tells how many *bytes* should be hashed in total (including the salt). So the exact iteration count will depend on the size of the salt (which is fixed at 8 bytes by the OpenPGP standard, though the implementation will allow any salt size) and the size of the passphrase.

To get what OpenPGP calls "Simple S2K", set iterations to 0 (the default for OpenPGP S2K), and do not specify a salt. To get "Salted S2K", again leave the iteration count at 0, but give an 8-byte salt. "Salted and Iterated S2K" requires an 8-byte salt and some iteration count (this should be significantly larger than the size of the longest passphrase that might reasonably be used; somewhere from 1024 to 65536 would probably be about right). Using both a reasonably sized salt and a large iteration count is highly recommended to prevent password guessing attempts.

12.2 Checksums

Checksums are very similar to hash functions, and in fact share the same interface. But there are some significant differences, the major ones being that the output size is very small (usually in the range of 2 to 4 bytes), and is not cryptographically secure. But for their intended purpose (error checking), they perform very well. Some examples of checksums included in Botan are the Adler32 and CRC32 checksums.

12.3 Exceptions

Sooner or later, something is going to go wrong. Botan's behavior when something unusual occurs, like most C++ software, is to throw an exception. Exceptions in Botan are derived from the Exception class. You can see most of the major varieties of exceptions used in Botan by looking at exceptn.h. The only function you really need to concern yourself with is const char* what(). This will return an error message relevant to the error that occurred. For example:

```
try {
    // various Botan operations
}
catch(Botan::Exception& e)
    {
    cout << "Botan exception caught: " << e.what() << endl;
    // error handling, or just abort
}</pre>
```

Botan's exceptions are derived from std::exception, so you don't need to explicitly check for Botan exceptions if you're already catching the ISO standard ones.

12.4 Threads and Mutexes

Botan includes a mutex system, which is used internally to lock some shared data structures which must be kept shared for efficiency reasons (mostly, these are in the allocation systems – handing out 1000 separate allocators hurts performance and makes caching memory blocks useless). This system is supported by the mux_pthr module, implementing the Mutex interface for systems that have POSIX threads.

If your application is using threads, you *must* add the option "thread_safe" to the options string when you create the LibraryInitializer object. If you specify this option and no mutex type is available, an exception is thrown, since otherwise you would probably be facing a nasty crash.

There are a few functions that shouldn't be called from threads. If you want to use them, you'll have to either do locking in your own code, or only call them from a single thread (presumably the main thread, which initialized the library, but that isn't required). It is assumed that most of them are called at most once, and then the application runs. Thread-unsafe functions in Botan include:

```
add_engine(Engine*)
startup_engines()
shutdown_engines()
set_mutex_type(Mutex*)
set_timer_type(Timer*)
setup_global_rng(RandomNumberGenerator*, RandomNumberGenerator*)
destroy_global_rng()
```

This list is *not* complete. As you can see, most of them are used only at startup/shutdown; the functions/objects you would tend to use regularly in an application should be thread safe at the object level.

12.5 Secure Memory

A major concern with mixing modern multiuser OSes and cryptographic code is that at any time the code (including secret keys) could be swapped to disk, where it can later be read by an attacker. Botan stores almost everything (and especially anything sensitive) in memory buffers which a) clear out their contents when their destructors are called, and b) have easy plugins for various memory locking functions, such as the **mlock**(2) call on many Unix systems.

Two of the allocation method used ("malloc" and "mmap") don't require any extra privileges on Unix, but locking memory does. At startup, each allocator type will attempt to allocate a few blocks (typically totaling 128k), so if you want, you can run your application setuid root, and then drop privileges immediately after creating your LibraryInitializer. If you end up using more than what's been allocated, some of your sensitive data might end up being swappable, but that beats running as root all the time. BTW, I would note that, at least on Linux, you can use a kernel module to give your process extra privileges (such as the ability to call mlock) without being root. For example, check out my Capability Override LSM (http://www.randombit.net/projects/cap_over/), which makes this pretty easy to do.

These classes should also be used within your own code for storing sensitive data. They are only meant for primitive data types (int, long, etc): if you want a container of higher level Botan objects, you can just use a std::vector, since these objects know how to clear themselves when they are destroyed. You cannot, however, have a std::vector (or any other container) of Pipes or Filters, because these types have pointers to other Filters, and implementing copy constructors for these types would be both hard and quite expensive (vectors of pointers to such objects is fine, though).

These types are not described in any great detail: for more information, consult the definitive sources – the header files secmem.h and allocate.h.

SecureBuffer is a simple array type, whose size is specified at compile time. It will automatically convert to a pointer of the appropriate type, and has a number of useful functions, including clear(), and u32bit size(), which returns the length of the array. It is a template that takes as parameters a type, and a constant integer which is how long the array is (for example: SecureBuffer

byte, 8> key;).

SecureVector is a variable length array. Its size can be increased or decreased as need be, and it has a wide variety of functions useful for copying data into it's buffer. Like SecureBuffer, it implements clear and size.

12.6 Allocators

The containers described above get their memory from allocators. As a user of the library, you can add new allocator methods at run time for containers, including the ones used internally by the library, to use. The interface to this is in allocate.h. Basically how it works is that code needing an allocator uses get_allocator, which returns a pointer to an allocator. This pointer should not be freed: the caller does not own the allocator (it is shared among multiple users, and locks itself as needed). It is possible to call get_allocator with a specific name to request a particular type of allocator, otherwise, a default allocator type is returned.

At start time, the only allocator known is a Default_Allocator, which just allocates memory using malloc, and memsets it to 0 when the memory is released. It is known by the name "malloc". If you ask for another type of allocator ("locking" and "mmap" are currently used), and it is not available, some other allocator will be returned.

You can add in a new allocator type using add_allocator_type. This function takes a string and a pointer to an allocator. The string gives this allocator type a name to which it can be referred when one is requesting it with get_allocator. If an error occurs (such as the name being already registered), this function returns false. It will return true if the allocator was successfully registered. If you ask it to, LibraryInitializer will do this for you.

Finally, you can set the default allocator type that will be returned using the policy setting "default_alloc" to the name of any previously registered allocator.

12.7 Timers

Botan includes a pair of functions, **system_time** and **system_clock**, which are used extensively in some areas of the code (especially in the random number generators). These functions by default use **std::time** and **std::clock**, but often you can do better with system-dependent functions, especially for the system

clock (for example, returning the microseconds value from **gettimeofday**, or the nanoseconds value from the POSIX.1b **clock_gettime**, is far superior). Modules for this exist for several systems.

You can register a new timer method with **set_timer_type**. For example, if the **timer_unix** module is available, one could call **set_timer_type**(new Unix_Timer), in which case **system_clock** will return a more "interesting" value based on the return of the **gettimeofday** function call. This is done automatically by the LibraryInitializer object.

13 Botan's Modules

Botan comes with a variety of modules which can be compiled into the system. These will not be available on all installations of the library, but you can check for their availability based on whether or not certain macros are defined.

13.1 Pipe I/O for Unix File Descriptors

This is a fairly minor feature, but it comes in handy sometimes. In all installations of the library, Botan's Pipe object overloads the << and >> operators for C++ iostream objects, which is usually more than sufficient for doing I/O.

However, there are cases where the iostream hierarchy does not map well to local 'file types', so there is also the ability to do I/O directly with Unix file descriptors. This is most useful when you want to read from or write to something like a TCP or Unix-domain socket, or a pipe, since for simple file access it's usually easier to just use C++'s file streams.

If BOTAN_EXT_PIPE_UNIXFD_IO is defined, then you can use the overloaded I/O operators with Unix file descriptors. For an example of this, check out the hash_fd example, included in the Botan distribution.

13.2 Entropy Sources

All of these are used by the **Global_RNG::seed** function if they are available. Since this function is called by the **LibraryInitializer** class when it is created, it is fairly rare that you will need to deal with any of these classes directly. Even in the case of a long-running server that needs to renew its entropy poll, it is easier to simply call **Global_RNG::seed** (see the section entitled "The Global PRNG" for more details).

EGD_EntropySource: Query an EGD socket. If the macro BOTAN_EXT_ENTROPY_SRC_EGD is defined, it can be found in es_egd.h. The constructor takes a std::vector<std::string> that specifies the paths to look for an EGD socket.

Unix_EntropySource: This entropy source executes programs common on Unix systems (such as uptime, vmstat, and df) and adds it to a buffer. It's quite slow due to process overhead, and (roughly) 1 bit of real entropy is in each byte that is output. It is declared in es_unix.h, if BOTAN_EXT_ENTROPY_SRC_UNIX is defined. If you don't have /dev/urandom or EGD, this is probably the thing to use. For a long-running process on Unix, keep on object of this type around and run fast polls ever few minutes.

FTW_EntropySource: Walk through a filesystem (the root to start searching is passed as a string to the constructor), reading files. This tends to only be useful on things like /proc which have a great deal of variability over time, and even then there is only a small amount of entropy gathered: about 1 bit of entropy for every 16 bits of output (and many hundreds of bits are read in order to get that 16 bits). It is declared in es_ftw.h, if BOTAN_EXT_ENTROPY_SRC_FTW is defined. Only use this as a last resort. I don't really trust it, and neither should you.

Win32_CAPI_EntropySource: This routines gathers entropy from a Win32 CAPI module. It takes an optional std::string which will specify what type of CAPI provider to use. Generally the CAPI RNG is always the same software-based PRNG, but there are a few which may use a hardware RNG. By default it will use the first provider listed in the option "rng/ms_capi_prov_type" which is available on the machine (currently the providers "RSA_FULL", "INTEL_SEC", "FORTEZZA", and "RNG" are recognized).

BeOS_EntropySource: Query system statistics using various BeOS-specific APIs.

Pthread EntropySource: Attempt to gather entropy based on jitter between a number of threads competing for a single mutex. This entropy source is *very* slow, and highly questionable in terms of security. However, it provides a worst-case fallback on systems which don't have Unix-like features, but do support POSIX threads. This module is currently unavailable due to problems on some systems.

13.3 Compressors

There are two compression algorithms supported by Botan, Zlib and Bzip2 (Gzip and Zip encoding will be supported in future releases). Only lossless compression algorithms are currently supported by Botan, because they tend to be the most useful for cryptography. However, it is very reasonable to consider supporting something like GSM speech encoding (which is lossy), for use in encrypted voice applications.

You should always compress before you encrypt, because encryption seeks to hide the redundancy that compression is supposed to try to find and remove.

13.3.1 Bzip2

To test for Bzip2, check to see if BOTAN_EXT_COMPRESSOR_BZIP2 is defined. If so, you can include bzip2.h, which will declare a pair of Filter objects: Bzip2_Compression and Bzip2_Decompression.

You should be prepared to take an exception when using the decompressing filter, for if the input is not valid Bzip2 data, that is what you will receive. You can specify the desired level of compression to Bzip2_Compression's constructor as an integer between 1 and 9, 1 meaning worst compression, and 9 meaning the best. The default is to use 9, since small values take the same amount of time, just use a little less memory.

The Bzip2 module was contributed by Peter J. Jones.

13.3.2 Zlib

Zlib compression works pretty much like Bzip2 compression. The only differences in this case are that the macro is BOTAN_EXT_COMPRESSOR_ZLIB, the header you need to include is called botan/zlib.h (remember that you shouldn't just #include <zlib.h>, or you'll get the regular zlib API, which is not what you want). The Botan classes for Zlib compression/decompression are called Zlib_Compression and Zlib_Decompression.

Like Bzip2, a Zlib_Decompression object will throw an exception if invalid (in the sense of not being in the Zlib format) data is passed into it.

In the case of zlib's algorithm, a worse compression level will be faster than a very high compression ratio. For this reason, the Zlib compressor will default to using a compression level of 6. This tends to give a good trade off in terms of time spent to compression achieved. There are several factors you need to consider in order to decide if you should use a higher compression level:

- · Better security: the less redundancy in the source text, the harder it is to attack your ciphertext. This is not too much of a concern, because with decent algorithms using sufficiently long keys, it doesn't really matter that much (but it certainly can't hurt).
- Decreasing returns. Some simple experiments by the author showed minimal decreases in the size between level 6 and level 9 compression with large (1 to 3 megabyte) files. There was some difference, but it wasn't that much.
- \cdot CPU time. Level 9 zlib compression is often two to four times as slow as level 6 compression. This can make a substantial difference in the overall runtime of a program.

While the zlib compression library uses the same compression algorithm as the gzip and zip programs, the format is different. The zlib format is defined in RFC 1950.

14 BigInt

BigInt is Botan's implementation of a multiple-precision integer. Thanks to C++'s operator overloading features, using BigInt is often quite similar to using a native integer type. The number of functions related to BigInt is quite large. You can find most of them in bigint.h and numthry.h.

Due to the sheer number of functions involved, only a few, which a regular user of the library might have to deal with, are mentioned here. Fully documenting the MPI library would take a significant while, so if you need to use it now, the best way to learn is to look at the headers.

Probably the most important are the encoding/decoding functions, which transform the normal representation of a BigInt into some other form, such as a decimal string. The most useful of these functions are

```
{\tt SecureVector < byte > BigInt::encode} ({\tt BigInt}, \, {\tt Encoding}) \\ {\tt and} \\
```

```
BigInt BigInt::decode(SecureVector<byte>, Encoding)
```

Encoding is an enum which has values Binary, Octal, Decimal, and Hexadecimal. The parameter will default to Binary. These functions are static member functions, so they would be called like this:

```
BigInt n1; // some number
SecureVector<byte> n1_encoded = BigInt::encode(n1);
BigInt n2 = BigInt::decode(n1_encoded);
// now n1 == n2
```

There are also C++-style I/O operators defined for use with BigInt. The input operator understands negative numbers, hexadecimal numbers (marked with a leading "0x"), and octal numbers (marked with a leading '0'). The '-' must come before the "0x" or '0' marker. The output operator will never adorn the output; for example, when printing a hexadecimal number, there will not be a leading "0x" (though a leading '-' will be printed if the number is negative). If you want such things, you'll have to do them yourself.

BigInt has constructors that can create a BigInt from an unsigned integer or a string. You can also decode a byte[] / length pair into a BigInt. There are several other BigInt constructors, which I would seriously recommend you avoid, as they are only intended for use internally by the library, and may arbitrarily change, or be removed, in a future release.

An essentially random sampling of BigInt related functions:

```
u32bit BigInt::bytes(): Return the size of this BigInt in bytes.
```

BigInt random_prime(u32bit b): Return a prime number b bits long.

BigInt gcd(BigInt x, BigInt y): Returns the greatest common divisor of x and y. Uses the binary GCD algorithm.

bool is_prime(BigInt x): Returns true if x is a (possible) prime number. Uses the Miller-Rabin probabilistic primality test with fixed bases. For higher assurance, use **verify_prime**, which uses more rounds and randomized 48-bit bases.

14.1 Efficiency Hints

If you can, always use expressions of the form a += b over a = a + b. The difference can be *very* substantial, because the first form prevents at least one needless memory allocation, and possibly as many as three.

If you're doing repeated modular exponentiations with the same modulus, create a BarrettReducer ahead of time. If the exponent or base is a constant, use the classes in mod_exp.h. This stuff is all handled for you by the normal high-level interfaces, of course.

Never use the low-level MPI functions (those that begin with bigint_). These are completely internal to the library, and may make arbitrarily strange and undocumented assumptions about their inputs, and don't check to see if they are actually true, on the assumption that only the library itself calls them, and that the library knows what the assumptions are. The interfaces for these functions can change completely without notice.

15 Removing Algorithms

You may well want to remove some of Botan's algorithms in order to fit it into a memory-constrained system, where you're counting the kilobytes. For the most part, this is trivial to do, and Botan's interface makes it easy for applications to test for the presence of an algorithm at runtime, so a well-behaved application can work without any need for porting on such an version of Botan.

In some versions of 1.3.x, you can use the 'minimal' module, which removes large amount of Botan, including most ciphers and hashes (except AES, DES/3DES, SHA-1, HMAC, RSA, DSA, and Diffie-Hellman), DLIES, EAX and CTS modes, and a few other odds and ends. You can check for this being the case by seeing if BOTAN_EXT_MINIMAL is defined, though for the most part it's better to use the lookup interface (since you have no way of knowing what exactly the minimal module might remove from release to release, and certainly not if the shared object you're linking to has a particular algorithm). This module was removed just before 1.4.0, as there is a better way to handle all of this in the new engine code, which is aware of things outside public key algorithms.

Removing things like the PK signature encoding schemes (EMSA2, EMSA3...) is somewhat more complicated and not documented here (thought it is actually quite simple if you know how to do it – the minimal module shows how). This tutorial (of sorts) will go through the steps required to compile a version of Botan without the Blowfish block cipher (which has been included since the first release of Botan, in the spring of 2001).

The first step is to remove the files include/blowfish.h, src/blowfish.cpp, and src/blfs_tab.cpp, which actually implement the algorithm. Then minor editing of src/algolist.cpp is required. First, remove the line that includes the Blowfish header botan/blowfish.h. Then look in get_block_cipher for the code that adds a Blowfish block cipher object to the internal lookup table, and remove it. Run the configure script, and then make the library. Tada! Done.

So how does an application test for such a situation? The first is to simply try to pass the name "Blowfish" to constructor of CBC_Encryption or other Botan Filter, and catch the resulting exception. This is not particularly flexible, though. If an application wants to check on the status of Botan's support for a particular algorithm, it can call some status functions found in lookup.h, called have_block_cipher, have_stream_cipher, have_hash, and have_mac, passing in the name of the desired algorithm. If Botan knows about it, the function will return true.

There are a handful of algorithms which are considered "sacred", in that an application can always expect that they exist, and a distributor or other end-user should not remove them without considering the possibly serious consequences. At this time, these are: AES, DES, TripleDES, SHA-1, and HMAC. This allows a workable fallback strategy for applications.

One other useful application of this is to remove patented algorithms, for example if Botan were to be included as part of a commercial Linux distribution.

For the most part, applications don't have to really worry about this, simply because the cases this will be required are fairly rare. Checking for the availability of patented algorithms like RC5 and IDEA before using them might be a good idea, though.

Another advantage of this is that an application can be written to take advantage of an algorithm which is not currently part of Botan. If it's not available, one can simply fall back on another algorithm, and when/if it is added to Botan, the application will start using it automagically.

16 Writing Modules

It's a lot simpler to write modules for Botan that it is to write code in the core library, for several reasons. First, a module can rely on external libraries and services beyond the base ISO C++ libraries, and also machine dependent features. Also, the code can be added at configuration time on the user's end with very little effort (*i.e.* the code can be distributed separately, and included by the user without needing to patch any existing source files).

Each module lives in a subdirectory of the modules directory, which exists at the top-level of the Botan source tree. The "short name" of the module is the same as the name of this directory. The only required file in this directory is modinfo.txt, which contains directives that specify what a particular module does, what systems it runs on, and so on. Comments in modinfo.txt start with a # character and continue to end of line.

Recognized directives include:

realname <name>: Specify that the 'real world' name of this module is <name>.

note <note>: Add a note that will be seen by the end-user at configure time if the module is included into the library.

require_version <version>: Require at configure time that the version of Botan in use be at least <version>.

define <macro>[,<macro>[,...]]: Cause the macro BOTAN_EXT_<macro> (for each instance of <macro> in the directive) to be defined in build.h. This should only be used if the module creates user-visible changes. There is a set of conventions that should be followed in deciding what to call this macro (where xxx denotes some descriptive and distinguishing characteristic of the thing implemented, such as ALLOC_MLOCK or MUTEX_PTHREAD):

• Allocator: ALLOC_xxx

Compressors: COMPRESSOR_xxxEntropySource: ENTROPY_SRC_xxx

Engines: ENGINE_xxxMutex: MUTEX_xxxTimer: TIMER_xxx

/ > / : This specifies any extra libraries to be linked in. It is a mapping from OS to library
name, for example linux -> rt, which means that on Linux librt should be linked in. You can also use
"all" to force the library to be linked in on all systems.

<add> / </add>: Tell the configuration script to add the files named between these two tags into the source tree. All these files must exist in the current module directory.

<ignore> / </ignore>: Tell the configuration script to ignore the files named in the main source tree. This is useful, for example, when replacing a C++ implementation with a pure assembly version.

<replace> / </replace>: Tell the configuration script to ignore the file given in the main source tree, and
instead use the one in the module's directory.

Additionally, the module file can contain blocks, delimited by the following pairs:

```
<os> / </os>, <arch> / </arch>, <cc> / </cc>
```

For example, putting "alpha" and "ia64" in a <arch> block will make the configuration script only allow the module to be compiled on those architectures. Not having a block means any value is acceptable.

17 Compliance with Standards

Botan is/should be compatible with many cryptographic standards, including the following:

- * RSA: PKCS #1 v2.1, ANSI X9.31
- * DSA: **ANSI X9.30**, **FIPS 186-2**
- * Diffie-Hellman: ANSI X9.42, PKCS #3
- * Certificates: ITU X.509, RFC 3280/3281 (PKIX), PKCS #9 v2.0, PKCS #10
- * Private Key Formats: PKCS #5 v2.0, PKCS #8
- * DES/DES-EDE: FIPS 46-3, ANSI X3.92, ANSI X3.106
- * SHA-1: **FIPS 180-2**
- * HMAC: **ANSI X9.71**, **FIPS 198**
- * ANSI X9.19 MAC: **ANSI X9.9, ANSI X9.19**

There is also support for the very general standards of **IEEE 1363-2000** and **1363a**. Most of the contents of such are included in the standards mentioned above, in various forms (usually with extra restrictions which 1363 does not impose).

18 Recommended Algorithms

This section is by no means the last word on selecting which algorithms to use. However, Botan includes a sometimes bewildering array of possible algorithms, and unless you're familiar with the latest developments in the field, it can be hard to know what is secure and what is not. The following attributes of the algorithms were evaluated when making this list: security, standardization, patent status, support by other implementations, and efficiency (in roughly that order).

It is intended as a set of simple guidelines for developers, and nothing more. It's entirely possible that there are algorithms in Botan that will turn out to be more secure than the ones listed, but the algorithms listed here are (currently) thought to be safe.

- \cdot Block ciphers: TripleDES or AES in CBC mode with "PKCS7" padding.
- · Stream Ciphers: Use any of the recommended block ciphers in CTR mode.
- · Hash functions: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512
- · MACs: HMAC with any recommended hash function
- · Public Key Encryption: RSA with "EME1(SHA-1)"
- · Public Key Signatures: RSA with EMSA4 and any recommended hash, or DSA with "EMSA1(SHA-1)"
- · Key Agreement: Diffie-Hellman, with "KDF2(SHA-1)"

19 Algorithms Listing

Botan includes a very sizable number of cryptographic algorithms. In nearly all cases, you never need to know the header file or type name to use them. However, you do need to know what string (or strings) are used to identify that algorithm. Generally, these names conform to those set out by SCAN (Standard Cryptographic Algorithm Naming), which is a document which specifies how strings are mapped onto algorithm objects, which is useful for a wide variety of crypto APIs (SCAN is oriented towards Java, but Botan and several other non-Java libraries also make at least some use of it). For full details, read the SCAN document, which can be found at http://www.users.zetnet.co.uk/hopwood/crypto/scan/

Many of these algorithms can take options (such as the number of rounds in a block cipher, the output size of a hash function, etc). These are shown in the following list; all of them default to reasonable values (unless otherwise marked). There are algorithm-specific limits on most of them. When you see something like "HASH" or "BLOCK", that means you should insert the name of some algorithm of that type. There are no defaults for those options.

A few very obscure algorithms are skipped; if you need one of them, you'll know it, and you can look in the appropriate header to see what that classes' **name** function returns (the names tend to match that in SCAN, if it's defined there).

- · ROUNDS: The number of rounds in a block cipher.
- · OUTSZ: The output size of a hash function or MAC
- · PASS: The number of passes in a hash function (more passes generally means more security).

Block Ciphers: "AES", "Blowfish", "CAST-128", "CAST-256", "DES", "DESX", "TripleDES", "GOST", "IDEA", "MARS", "MISTY1(ROUNDS)", "RC2", "RC5(ROUNDS)", "RC6", "SAFER-SK(ROUNDS)", "SEED", "Serpent", "Skipjack", "Square", "TEA", "Twofish", "XTEA"

Stream Ciphers: "ARC4", "MARK4", "Turing", "WiderWake4+1-BE"

Hash Functions: "FORK-256", "HAS-160", "MD2", "MD4", "MD5", "RIPEMD-128", "RIPEMD-160", "SHA-160", "SHA-256", "SHA-384", "SHA-512", "Tiger(OUTSZ,PASS)", "Whirlpool"

MACs: "HMAC(HASH)", "CMAC(BLOCK)", "X9.19-MAC"

20 Support and Further Information

20.1 Compatibility

Generally, cryptographic algorithms are well standardized, and thus compatibility between implementations is relatively simple (of course, not all algorithms are supported by all implementations). But there are a few algorithms which are poorly specified, and these should be avoided if you wish your data to be processed in the same way by another implementation (including future versions of Botan).

The block cipher GOST has a particularly poor specification: there are no standard Sboxes, and the specification does not give test vectors even for sample boxes, which leads to issues of endian conventions, etc.

If you wish maximum portability between different implementations of an algorithm, it's best to stick to strongly defined and well standardized algorithms, TripleDES, AES, HMAC, and SHA-1 all being good examples.

20.2 Patents

Some of the algorithms implemented by Botan may be covered by patents in some locations. Algorithms known to have patent claims on them in the United States and which are not available in a license-free/royalty-free manner include: IDEA, MISTY1, RC5, RC6, and Nyberg-Rueppel.

You must not assume that, just because an algorithm is not listed here, it is not encumbered by patents. If you have any concerns about the patent status of any algorithm you are considering using in an application, please discuss it with your attorney.

20.3 Recommended Reading

It's a very good idea if you have some knowledge of cryptography prior to trying to use this stuff. You really should read one or more of these books before seriously using the library (note that the Handbook of Applied Cryptography is available for free online):

Handbook of Applied Cryptography, Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. Van Oorschot, and Scott A. Vanstone; CRC Press

Security Engineering - A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems, Ross Anderson; Wiley

Cryptography: Theory and Practice, Douglas R. Stinson; CRC Press

Applied Cryptography, 2nd Ed., Bruce Schneier; Wiley

Once you've got the basics down, these are good things to at least take a look at: IEEE 1363 and 1363a, SCAN, NESSIE, PKCS #1 v2.1, the security related FIPS documents, and the CFRG RFCs.

20.4 Support

Questions or problems you have with Botan can be directed to the development mailing list. Joining this list is highly recommended if you're going to be using Botan, since often advance notice of upcoming changes is sent there. "Philosophical" bug reports, announcements of programs using Botan, and basically anything else having to do with Botan are also welcome.

The lists can be found at http://www.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/.

20.5 Contact Information

A PGP key with a fingerprint of 621D AF64 11E1 851C 4CF9 A2E1 6211 EBF1 EFBA DFBC is used to sign all Botan releases. This key can be found in the file doc/pgpkeys.asc; PGP keys for the developers are also stored there.

Web Site: http://botan.randombit.net

Mailing lists: http://www.randombit.net/mailman/

20.6 License

Copyright ©2000-2006, The Botan Project

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.