

Program Analysis

Lecture 11: *SimplL and Dynamic Taint Analysis*
Winter term 2011/2012

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Announcements

- Today only 45 minutes lecture
 - I have a meeting at 10am...
- Solution for Christmas challenge and last exercise
 - Two solution attempts were handed in
 - Missing solution for last exercise

Outline

- *SimplL*
 - Definitions and examples
- Dynamic taint analysis (*next lecture*)
 - Intuition
 - Definitions and examples

SimplL

Motivation

- We now focus on two import techniques
 - Taint analysis
 - Symbolic execution
- To understand these concepts we do not use x86 assembler, but an *intermediate language (IL)*
 - Avoids complexity
 - Enables us to reason about code

SimplL

- **Simple Intermediate Language**
 - Useful to learn concepts
 - Presented in a paper by Schwartz et al. (“All You Ever Wanted to Know About Dynamic Taint Analysis and Forward Symbolic Execution (but might have been afraid to ask)” - IEEE S&P'10)
 - Today's lecture is mainly based on this paper, link is available in Moodle
- REIL is an intermediate language developed by zynamics

SimplL

<i>program</i>	$::=$	<i>stmt</i> *
<i>stmt s</i>	$::=$	<i>var</i> $:=$ <i>exp</i> store(<i>exp</i> , <i>exp</i>) goto <i>exp</i> assert <i>exp</i> if <i>exp</i> then goto <i>exp</i> else goto <i>exp</i>
<i>exp e</i>	$::=$	load(<i>exp</i>) <i>exp</i> \diamond_b <i>exp</i> \diamond_u <i>exp</i> <i>var</i> get_input(<i>src</i>) <i>v</i>
\diamond_b	$::=$	typical binary operators
\diamond_u	$::=$	typical unary operators
<i>value v</i>	$::=$	32-bit unsigned integer

Language definition

SimplL

- Expressions in SimplL are side-effect free (i.e., they do not change the program state)
- x86 has many side effects that complicate analysis
- Only expressions (constants, variables, etc.) that evaluate to 32-bit integer values
- No type-checking semantics in the language, we assume things are well-typed (i.e., operands have the correct type)

SimplL Examples

1: $x := 2 * \text{get_input}(\diamond)$

SimplL Examples

```
1: x := 2 * get_input(♦)
```

```
1: x := 2  
2: y := 5 + x
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```
1: a := get_input(♦)  
2: if a > 42 then goto 3 else goto 5  
3:   a := a - 5  
4:   b := a  
5:   c := 7  
6: assert(a < 23)
```

Operational Semantics

- Next we need to define how to operate on SimplL, we need to define how a program is actually executed
- This is done using specific operational semantics
 - We need to first define the execution context, i.e., some kind of abstract execution framework
 - And then we can define how to operate on this framework
- This looks complex at first, but is necessary to be precise and enables a comprehensive analysis

Definitions I

- Execution context is defined by five parameters
 - List of program statements Σ
 - Current memory state μ
 - Current value for variables Δ
 - Program counter **pc**
 - Current statement **l**

Definitions II

- Σ , μ , and Δ contexts are maps
 - $\Sigma[y]$ denotes the program statement y
 - $\mu[z]$ maps to value at memory address z
 - $\Delta[x]$ denotes the current value of variable x
- Updating a context variable \mathbf{x} with value \mathbf{v} is denoted as $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathbf{v}$
- $\Delta[x \leftarrow l0]$ denotes setting the value of variable x to the value $l0$ in context Δ

Definitions III

- $\mu, \Delta \vdash e \Downarrow v$ denotes evaluating an expression e to a value v in the current state given by memory state μ and variables Δ
- Based on these definitions, we can now define the actual operational semantics

computation
$\frac{}{\langle \text{current state} \rangle, \text{stmt} \rightsquigarrow \langle \text{end state} \rangle, \text{stmt}'}$

- Rules are read bottom to top, left to right

Operational Semantics I

Context	Meaning
Σ	Maps a statement number to a statement
μ	Maps a memory address to the current value at that address
Δ	Maps a variable name to its value
pc	The program counter
ι	The next instruction

$\mu, \Delta \vdash e \Downarrow v$ denotes evaluating an expression e to a value v in the current state given by memory state μ and variables Δ

Operational Semantics I

$$\frac{\mu, \Delta \vdash e \Downarrow v \quad \Delta' = \Delta[var \leftarrow v] \quad \iota = \Sigma[pc + 1]}{\Sigma, \mu, \Delta, pc, var := e \rightsquigarrow \Sigma, \mu, \Delta', pc + 1, \iota} \text{ ASSIGN}$$

Context	Meaning
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Operational Semantics II

$$\frac{\mu, \Delta \vdash e \Downarrow 1 \quad \Delta \vdash e_1 \Downarrow v_1 \quad \iota = \Sigma[v_1]}{\Sigma, \mu, \Delta, pc, \text{if } e \text{ then goto } e_1 \text{ else goto } e_2 \rightsquigarrow \Sigma, \mu, \Delta, v_1, \iota} \text{TCOND}$$
$$\frac{\mu, \Delta, \vdash e \Downarrow 0 \quad \Delta \vdash e_2 \Downarrow v_2 \quad \iota = \Sigma[v_2]}{\Sigma, \mu, \Delta, pc, \text{if } e \text{ then goto } e_1 \text{ else goto } e_2 \rightsquigarrow \Sigma, \mu, \Delta, v_2, \iota} \text{FCOND}$$

Operational Semantics II

$$\frac{\mu, \Delta \vdash e \Downarrow 1 \quad \Delta \vdash e_1 \Downarrow v_1 \quad \iota = \Sigma[v_1]}{\Sigma, \mu, \Delta, pc, \text{if } e \text{ then goto } e_1 \text{ else goto } e_2 \rightsquigarrow \Sigma, \mu, \Delta, v_1, \iota} \text{ TCOND}$$

$$\frac{\mu, \Delta, \vdash e \Downarrow 0 \quad \Delta \vdash e_2 \Downarrow v_2 \quad \iota = \Sigma[v_2]}{\Sigma, \mu, \Delta, pc, \text{if } e \text{ then goto } e_1 \text{ else goto } e_2 \rightsquigarrow \Sigma, \mu, \Delta, v_2, \iota} \text{ FCOND}$$

$$\frac{\mu, \Delta \vdash e \Downarrow v_1 \quad \iota = \Sigma[v_1]}{\Sigma, \mu, \Delta, pc, \text{goto } e \rightsquigarrow \Sigma, \mu, \Delta, v_1, \iota} \text{ GOTO}$$

Operational Semantics II

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$$\frac{\mu, \Delta \vdash e \Downarrow v \quad v' = \Diamond_u v}{\mu, \Delta \vdash \Diamond_u e \Downarrow v'} \text{ UNOP}$$

$$\frac{\mu, \Delta \vdash e_1 \Downarrow v_1 \quad \mu, \Delta \vdash e_2 \Downarrow v_2 \quad v' = v_1 \Diamond_b v_2}{\mu, \Delta \vdash e_1 \Diamond_b e_2 \Downarrow v'} \text{ BINOP}$$

Operational Semantics II

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$$\frac{\mu, \Delta \vdash e \Downarrow v_1 \quad v = \mu[v_1]}{\mu, \Delta \vdash \text{load } e \Downarrow v} \text{ LOAD}$$

$$\frac{\mu, \Delta \vdash e_1 \Downarrow v_1 \quad \mu, \Delta \vdash e_2 \Downarrow v_2 \quad \iota = \Sigma[pc + 1] \quad \mu' = \mu[v_1 \leftarrow v_2]}{\Sigma, \mu, \Delta, pc, \text{store}(e_1, e_2) \rightsquigarrow \Sigma, \mu', \Delta, pc + 1, \iota} \text{ STORE}$$

Operational Semantics IV

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$$\frac{v \text{ is input from } src}{\mu, \Delta \vdash \text{get_input}(src) \Downarrow v} \text{ INPUT}$$

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$$\frac{}{\mu, \Delta \vdash var \Downarrow \Delta[var]} \text{ VAR}$$

$$\frac{}{\mu, \Delta \vdash v \Downarrow v} \text{ CONST}$$

Operational Semantics IV

$$\frac{v \text{ is input from } src}{\mu, \Delta \vdash \text{get_input}(src) \Downarrow v} \text{ INPUT}$$

$$\frac{}{\mu, \Delta \vdash var \Downarrow \Delta[var]} \text{ VAR}$$

$$\frac{}{\mu, \Delta \vdash v \Downarrow v} \text{ CONST}$$

$$\frac{\mu, \Delta \vdash e \Downarrow 1 \quad \iota = \Sigma[pc + 1]}{\Sigma, \mu, \Delta, pc, \text{assert}(e) \rightsquigarrow \Sigma, \mu, \Delta, pc + 1, \iota} \text{ ASSERT}$$

Rule Evaluation

Rules are quite complex at first,
evaluating rules is also complex:

`1: x := 2 * get_input(♦)`

is evaluated for the input 20 to:

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1: $x := 2 * \text{get_input}(\cdot)$

is evaluated for the input 20 to:

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{}{\mu, \Delta \vdash 2 \Downarrow 2} \text{CONST} \quad \frac{20 \text{ is input}}{\mu, \Delta \vdash \text{get_input}(\cdot) \Downarrow 20} \text{INPUT} \quad v' = 2 * 20 \\
 \hline
 \mu, \Delta \vdash 2 * \text{get_input}(\cdot) \Downarrow 40 \quad \text{BINOP} \quad \Delta' = \Delta[x \leftarrow 40] \quad \iota = \Sigma[pc + 1] \\
 \hline
 \Sigma, \mu, \Delta, pc, x := 2 * \text{get_input}(\cdot) \rightsquigarrow \Sigma, \mu, \Delta', pc + 1, \iota \quad \text{ASSIGN}
 \end{array}$$

Since the ASSIGN rule requires the expression e in $\text{var} := e$ to be evaluated, we have to recurse to other rules (BINOP, INPUT, CONST) to evaluate the complete expression

Discussion

- SimplL looks complex at first glance
 - ... also at second glance
- But we need to be precise to *reason* about programs
 - We need to define operational semantics such that we can actually work with the language
 - Transitions need to be clear and unambiguous

Tools

- BAP (<http://bap.ece.cmu.edu/>) and BitBlaze (<http://bitblaze.cs.berkeley.edu/>) implement a variant of SimplIL to perform analysis
- Source code is available, feel free to play with it
- REIL by zynamics is very similar and there is also an analysis framework to work on top of REIL
- Can be a topic for a master's thesis 😊

Questions?

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More information:

<http://syssec.rub.de>

<http://moodle.rub.de>



Sources

- Paper by Schwartz et al.: “All You Ever Wanted to Know About Dynamic Taint Analysis and Forward Symbolic Execution (but might have been afraid to ask)” - IEEE S&P'10
- <http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~ejschwar/papers/oakland10.pdf>