# Program Analysis

Lecture 10: Control Flow Analysis II Winter term 2011/2012

Prof. Thorsten Holz





### Announcements


Systems Security
Ruhr-University Bochum

- Next week (December 22) we will have a lecture, but it is not relevant for the examination
  - Vulnerabilities on document formats
  - Heap spraying
  - We will have a "christmas challenge" with bonus points
- Second part of the exercise after this lecture



# Building Blocks

\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum



- Program consists of several procedures
  - f() calls h()
- Produce consists of several basic blocks
  - "Atomic" units of a program



### **Basic Blocks**

Systems Security	
Ruhr-University Bochum	

- Basic block is a sequence of instructions which will always be executed in the given order
- Properties:
  - Basic block has a single entry and single exit
  - Flow of control can only enter at the beginning and leave at the end
  - Only last instruction can be a branch instruction;
     only first instruction can be target of a branch



# Finding BBs

Systems Security
Ruhr-University Bochum

- Identify leader instructions, i.e., first instruction of BB:
  - 1. First instruction of a program is a leader
  - 2. Any instruction that is the target of a branch is a leader
  - 3. Any instruction that immediately follows a branch or return instruction is a leader



# Example: Finding Leaders

\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

#### High-Level Language

```
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{
    j=0;

    do
    {
       functionXYZ ( );
    } while (j++< i);
}</pre>
```

#### Assembler

```
00401139
                 [ebp-4], 0
           mov
00401140
                 loc 40114B
           jmp
00401142
                 eax, [ebp-4]
           mov
00401145
           add
                 eax, 1
00401148
           mov [ebp-4], eax
0040114B
          cmp [ebp-4], 0Ah
0040114F
           jge loc 401172
           mov [ebp-8], 0
00401151
00401158
           call functionXYZ
0040115D
           mov eax, [ebp-8]
00401160
                 ecx, [ebp-4]
           mov
                 edx, [ebp-8]
00401163
           mov
00401166
           add
                 edx, 1
00401169
                 [ebp-8], edx
           mov
0040116C
           cmp
                 eax, ecx
         jl loc 401158
0040116E
          jmp
00401170
               loc 401142
00401172
```



### Rule I

\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

#### High-Level Language

```
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{
    j=0;

    do
    {
       functionXYZ ( );
    } while (j++< i);
}</pre>
```

#### Assembler

```
00401139
                 [ebp-4], 0
           mov
                 loc 40114B
00401140
           jmp
00401142
                 eax, [ebp-4]
           mov
00401145
           add
                 eax, 1
           mov [ebp-4], eax
00401148
0040114B
          cmp [ebp-4], 0Ah
                 loc 401172
0040114F
           jge
00401151
           mov [ebp-8], 0
           call
00401158
                 functionXYZ
0040115D
           mov eax, [ebp-8]
00401160
                 ecx, [ebp-4]
           mov
                 edx, [ebp-8]
00401163
           mov
                 edx, 1
00401166
           add
00401169
               [ebp-8], edx
           mov
0040116C
           cmp
                 eax, ecx
           jl loc 401158
0040116E
          jmp loc 401142
00401170
00401172
```

Rule 1: First instruction of a program is a leader

\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

#### High-Level Language

```
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{
    j=0;

    do
    {
       functionXYZ ( );
    } while (j++< i);
}</pre>
```

#### Assembler

```
00401139
                 [ebp-4], 0
           mov
                 loc 40114B
00401140
           jmp
00401142
                 eax, [ebp-4]
           mov
00401145
           add
                 eax, 1
           mov [ebp-4], eax
00401148
0040114B
          cmp [ebp-4], 0Ah
0040114F
           jge
                 loc 401172
00401151
           mov [ebp-8], 0
           call
00401158
                 functionXYZ
0040115D
           mov eax, [ebp-8]
00401160
                 ecx, [ebp-4]
           mov
                 edx, [ebp-8]
00401163
           mov
                 edx, 1
00401166
           add
00401169
               [ebp-8], edx
           mov
0040116C
           cmp
                 eax, ecx
           jl loc 401158
0040116E
          jmp loc 401142
00401170
00401172
```

\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

#### High-Level Language

```
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{
    j=0;

    do
    {
       functionXYZ ( );
    } while (j++< i);
}</pre>
```

#### Assembler

```
00401139
                 [ebp-4], 0
           mov
00401140
           -jmp
                 loc 40114B
00401142
                 eax, [ebp-4]
           mov
00401145
           add
                 eax, 1
           mov [ebp-4], eax
00401148
0040114B
          -cmp [ebp-4], 0Ah
0040114F
           jge
                 loc 401172
           mov [ebp-8], 0
00401151
           call
00401158
                 functionXYZ
0040115D
           mov eax, [ebp-8]
00401160
                 ecx, [ebp-4]
           mov
                 edx, [ebp-8]
00401163
           mov
                 edx, 1
00401166
           add
00401169
               [ebp-8], edx
           mov
0040116C
           cmp
                 eax, ecx
           jl loc 401158
0040116E
           jmp loc 401142
00401170
00401172
```

\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

#### High-Level Language

```
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{
   j=0;

   do
   {
     functionXYZ ( );
   } while (j++< i);
}</pre>
```

#### Assembler

```
00401139
                 [ebp-4], 0
           mov
00401140
           -jmp
                 loc 40114B
00401142
                 eax, [ebp-4]
           mov
00401145
           add
                 eax, 1
           mov [ebp-4], eax
00401148
0040114B
          -cmp [ebp-4], 0Ah
0040114F
           jge
                 loc 401172
00401151
           mov [ebp-8], 0
          -call
00401158
                 functionXYZ
0040115D
           mov eax, [ebp-8]
00401160
                 ecx, [ebp-4]
           mov
                 edx, [ebp-8]
00401163
           mov
                 edx, 1
00401166
           add
00401169
               [ebp-8], edx
           mov
0040116C
                 eax, ecx
           cmp
          -jl loc 401158
0040116E
           jmp loc 401142
00401170
00401172
```

\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

#### High-Level Language

```
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{
    j=0;

    do
    {
       functionXYZ ( );
    } while (j++< i);
}</pre>
```

#### Assembler

```
00401139
                 [ebp-4], 0
           mov
00401140
          -jmp
                 loc 40114B
00401142
                 eax, [ebp-4]
          - mov
00401145
           add
                 eax, 1
           mov [ebp-4], eax
00401148
0040114B
          - cmp [ebp-4], 0Ah
0040114F
           jge
                 loc 401172
00401151
                 [ebp-8], 0
           mov
          -call
00401158
                 functionXYZ
0040115D
           mov eax, [ebp-8]
00401160
                 ecx, [ebp-4]
           mov
                 edx, [ebp-8]
00401163
           mov
00401166
                 edx, 1
           add
00401169
               [ebp-8], edx
           mov
0040116C
           cmp
                 eax, ecx
          —jl loc 401158
0040116E
          -jmp loc 401142
00401170
00401172
```

\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

#### High-Level Language

```
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{
    j=0;

    do
    {
       functionXYZ ( );
    } while (j++< i);
}</pre>
```

#### Assembler

```
00401139
                 [ebp-4], 0
           mov
00401140
                 loc 40114B
           jmp
00401142
                 eax, [ebp-4]
           mov
00401145
           add
                 eax, 1
           mov [ebp-4], eax
00401148
0040114B
          cmp [ebp-4], 0Ah
0040114F
           jge
                 loc 401172
           mov [ebp-8], 0
00401151
           call
00401158
                 functionXYZ
0040115D
                 eax, [ebp-8]
           mov
00401160
                 ecx, [ebp-4]
           mov
                 edx, [ebp-8]
00401163
           mov
                 edx, 1
00401166
           add
00401169
               [ebp-8], edx
           mov
0040116C
           cmp
                 eax, ecx
           jl loc 401158
0040116E
          jmp loc 401142
00401170
00401172
```

Rule 3: Any instruction that immediately follows a branch or return instruction is a leader

## **CFGs**

Systems Security	
Ruhr-University Bochum	

- A control flow graph (CFG) is a graph representation of the different paths that a program might traverse
  - CFG is directed multigraph
  - Nodes are basic blocks
  - Edges represent flow of control (either branches or fall-through execution)
- No information about data is available in CFG
  - An edge means that a program may take the path



## **Dominators**

Systems Security
Ruhr-University Bochum

- A node **a** in a CFG dominates a node **b** if every path from the start node to node **b** goes through **a**
- We say that node a is a dominator of node b
- The dominator set of node **b**, dom(b), is formed by all nodes that dominate **b**
- By definition, each node dominates itself, therefore,
   b ∈ dom(b)



## Domination Relation

\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

- Definition: Let G = (N, E, s) denote a flowgraph with set of vertices N, set of edges E, starting node S, and let  $A \in N$ ,  $B \in N$
- 1. **a** dominates **b**, written  $\mathbf{a} \leq \mathbf{b}$ , if every path from **s** to **b** contains **a**
- a properly dominates b, written a < b, if a ≤ b and a ≠ b</li>



## Domination Relation


\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

- Definition: Let G = (N, E, s) denote a flowgraph with set of vertices N, set of edges E, starting node S, and let  $A \in N$ ,  $B \in N$
- 3. **a** directly (immediately) dominates **b**, written  $\mathbf{a} <_d \mathbf{b}$  if:
  - a < b and</li>
  - there is no  $c \in N$  such that a < c < b



Systems Security \_\_\_\_
Ruhr-University Bochum


- Imagine a source of light at the start node, and that the edges are optical fibers
- To find which nodes are dominated by a given node a, place an opaque barrier at a and observe which nodes became dark





\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum


 The start node dominates all nodes in the flowgraph.





\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum


 Which nodes are dominated by node 3?





\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum


- Which nodes are dominated by node 3?
- Node 3 dominates nodes 3, 4, 5,
  6, 7, 8, and 9





\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum


 Which nodes are dominated by node 7?





\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

- Which nodes are dominated by node 7?
- Node 7 only dominates itself





## Loop Detection

Systems Security
Ruhr-University Bochum

- Loops are defined as repeated execution of the same instructions, typically with different data
- How do we identify loops in a flow graph?
- The goal is to create an uniform treatment for program loops written using different loop structures (e.g. while, for) and loops constructed out of goto
- Basic idea: Use a general approach based on analyzing graph-theoretical properties of the CFG



## Definitions


Systems Security
Ruhr-University Bochum

- A strongly-connected component (SCC) of a flowgraph
   G = (N, E, s) is a subgraph G' = (N', E', s') in which there is a path from each node in N' to every node in N'
- A strongly-connected component G' = (N', E', s') of a flowgraph G = (N, E, s) is a loop with entry s' if s' dominates all nodes in N'



\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum


In the flow graph below, do nodes 2 and 3 form a loop?





Systems Security
Ruhr-University Bochum

In the flow graph below, do nodes 2 and 3 form a loop?




 Nodes 2 and 3 form a strongly connected component, but they are not a loop. Why?



Systems Security
Ruhr-University Bochum

In the flow graph below, do nodes 2 and 3 form a loop?




- Nodes 2 and 3 form a strongly connected component, but they are not a loop. Why?
- No node in the subgraph dominates all the other nodes, therefore this subgraph is not a loop



# How to Find Loops?

Systems Security \_\_\_\_
Ruhr-University Bochum

- Look for "back edges"
- An edge (b, a) of a flowgraph G is a back edge if a dominates b, a < b</li>






## Natural Loops

Systems Security \_\_\_\_
Ruhr-University Bochum

Given a back edge (**b**, **a**), a natural loop associated with (**b**, **a**) with entry in node **a** is the subgraph formed by **a** plus all nodes that can reach **b** without going through **a** 






## Natural Loops

\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_


One way to find natural loops is:

- I. find a back edge (**b**, **a**)
- 2. find the nodes that are dominated by **a**
- 3. look for nodes that can reach **b** among the nodes dominated by **a**





\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum




Find all back edges in this graph and the natural loop associated with each back edge

(9, 1)

- (I) find a back edge (**b**, **a**)
- (2) find the nodes that are dominated by **a**
- (3) look for nodes that can reach **b** among the nodes dominated by **a**



\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum




Find all back edges in this graph and the natural loop associated with each back edge

(9, I) Entire graph




\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum



Find all back edges in this graph and the natural loop associated with each back edge




\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum




Find all bacand the nativity

(9, I) (10, 7)






Systems Security \_\_\_\_\_
Ruhr-University Bochum



Find all back edges in this graph and the natural loop associated with each back edge




\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum



Find all back edges in this graph and the natural loop associated with each back edge


```
(9, I) Entire graph (10, 7) {7, 8, 10} (7, 4)
```

\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum




Find all bacand the nawith

(9, I) (10, 7) (7, 4)






\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum



Find all back edges in this graph and the natural loop associated with each back edge

```
(9, I) Entire graph
(10, 7) {7, 8, 10}
(7, 4) {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10}
```

Systems Security \_\_\_\_
Ruhr-University Bochum



Find all back edges in this graph and the natural loop associated with each back edge

(9, 1)	Entire graph
(10, 7)	{7, 8, 10}
(7, 4)	{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10}
(8, 3)	{3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10}
(4, 3)	$\{3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10\}$


#### Dominator Tree

\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

- A dominator tree is a useful way to represent the dominance relation
- In a dominator tree the start node s is the root, and each node d dominates only its descendents in the tree
- Efficient construction with the help of the Lengauer
   Tarjan algorithm (see Moodle for link to paper)




\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum




In a dominator tree the start node **s** is the root, and each node **d** dominates only its descendents in the tree



\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum







### Regions

Systems Security	
Ruhr-University Bochum	

- A region is a set of nodes N that include a header with the following properties:
  - I. header must dominate all the nodes in the region
  - 2. all the edges between nodes in N are in the region (except for some edges that enter the header)
- A loop is a special region with additional properties:
  - 1. it is strongly connected
  - 2. all back edges to the header are included in loop



## Regions


Systems Security	
Ruhr-University Bochum	

- A region is a set of nodes N that include a header with the following properties:
  - I. header must dominate all the nodes in the region
  - 2. all the edges between nodes in N are in the region (except for some edges that enter the header)
- A loop is a special region with additional properties:

Typically we are interested on studying the data flow into and out of regions. For instance, which definitions reach a region



\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum




#### Points in a basic block:

- between statements
- before the first statement
- after the last statement

In the example, how many points do basic blocks B1, B2, B3, and B5 have?



\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum




#### Points in a basic block:

- between statements
- before the first statement
- after the last statement

BI has four, B2, B3, and B5 have two points each




\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum



A path is a sequence of points  $p_1$ ,  $p_2$ , ...,  $p_n$  such that either:

- 1. if p<sub>i</sub> immediately precedes S, then p<sub>i+1</sub> immediately follows S
- 2. or  $p_i$  is the end of a basic block and  $p_{i+1}$  is the beginning of a successor block

\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum




A path is a sequence of points  $p_1$ ,  $p_2$ , ...,  $p_n$  such that either:

- I. if p<sub>i</sub> immediately precedes S, then p<sub>i+1</sub> immediately follows S
- 2. or  $p_i$  is the end of a basic block and  $p_{i+1}$  is the beginning of a successor block

In the example, is there a path from the beginning of block B5 to the beginning of block B6?



\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum



A path is a sequence of points  $p_1$ ,  $p_2$ , ...,  $p_n$  such that either:

- 1. if p<sub>i</sub> immediately precedes S, then p<sub>i+1</sub> immediately follows S
- 2. or  $p_i$  is the end of a basic block and  $p_{i+1}$  is the beginning of a successor block

There is a path through the end point of B5 and then through all the points in B2, B3, and B4



### Global Dataflow Analysis

Systems Security	
Ruhr-University Bochum	

- We need to know variable def and use information between basic blocks for:
  - constant folding
  - dead-code elimination
  - redundant computation elimination
  - code motion
  - induction variable elimination
  - build data dependence graph (DDG)



### Definition and Use

\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

$$S_k: V_1 = V_2 + V_3$$

 $S_k$  is a definition of  $V_1$  $S_k$  is an use of  $V_2$  and  $V_3$ 

- We often need to study def-use chains to track how data propagates within a program
- Useful for other purposes as well



#### DU and UD Chains


	Syste	ms Se	curity	
Rul	nr-Uni	versity	y Boch	num

- Many dataflow analyses need to find the use-sites of each defined variable or the definition-sites of each variable used in an expression
- Def-Use (D-U) and Use-Def (U-D) chains are efficient data structures that keep this information
  - An UD chain is a list of all definitions that can reach a given use of a variable
  - A DU chain is a list of all uses that can be reached by a given definition of a variable



Systems Security

Ruhr-University Bochum





### Questions?

\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

# Contact: Prof. Thorsten Holz

thorsten.holz@rub.de @thorstenholz on Twitter

More information: <a href="http://syssec.rub.de">http://syssec.rub.de</a><a href="http://moodle.rub.de">http://moodle.rub.de</a>





### Sources

Systems Security	
Ruhr-University Bochum	

- Lecture Software Reverse Engineering at University of Mannheim, spring term 2010 (Ralf Hund, Carsten Willems and Felix Freiling)
- Lecture Compiler Design and Optimization at University of Alberta by José Nelson Amaral
  - http://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~amaral/courses/680/ index.html

