# Program Analysis

Lecture 04: *Machine Language III* Winter term 2011/2012

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### Announcements

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- Feedback for tool intro and first exercise?
  - Next exercise will be published next week
  - Subroutines, code analysis, CrackMe, ...
- Next Wednesday: talk by @vxradius and @matrosov
  - See <a href="http://www.nds.rub.de/teaching/lectures/471/">http://www.nds.rub.de/teaching/lectures/471/</a>



### Last Week

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- x86 registers
- x86 instruction set
- Intel vs.AT&T syntax
- x86 memory access / endianness
- Privileges
- Interrupts / exceptions



### Outline

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- x86 subroutines
  - Overview
  - Calling conventions
- Higher-level structures
  - Control-flow structures
  - Loops



### x86 Subroutines





### Stack

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- Memory area dedicated to local variables and calling information for subroutines
  - Meta data when calling functions
  - Synchronization (threads)
- Stack pointer esp indicates current top of stack
- Control stack with push and pop instructions



### Base/Frame Pointer

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- In addition to stack pointer there is the so called base pointer/frame pointer ebp
- Before modifying the stack pointer to allocate space for local variables during the prolog, the content of this register is saved in base pointer ebp
- Base pointer is used to adress local variables and parameters
- Not always used, so called frame pointer omission (FPO)



### Subroutines

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- Parameters are put on stack before function is called
  - Use push instruction
  - Last parameter is pushed first!

```
f(1,2,3)

push 3
push 2
push 1
call f
```



### Subroutines

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- Parameters are put on stack before function is called
  - Use push instruction
  - Last parameter is pushed first!

```
f(l, 2, 3)

push 3
push 2
push 1
call f
```

Typical prolog / epilog

```
push ebp ; save old ebp
mov ebp, esp ; load ebp with esp
sub esp, 10h ; reserve space for
; local variables
...
mov esp, ebp ; load esp with ebp
pop ebp ; restore ebp
```

; return




ret

### Stack Frames

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- Each function call has a so called stack frame
  - Input and output parameters (stack parameters)
  - Return address
  - Saved register contents (old ebp)
  - Local variables
- Base/frame pointer to address stack parameters and local variables (FPO disabled)





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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
  int z;
  z = a * b;
  return z;
}
```

Assembler is executed step by step in the next few slides

```
push 4
  push [var y]
  call func1
  mov [var x], eax ;RET
func1:
  push ebp
                         Prolog
  mov ebp, esp
  sub esp, 4
  mov ecx, [ebp+0x8]
  mul ecx, [ebp+0xC]
  mov [ebp-4], ecx
  mov eax, [ebp-4]
  mov esp, ebp
  pop ebp
                          Epilog
  ret 8
```



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```
High-level language
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b )
{
  int z;
  z = a * b;
  return z;
ebp/esp
 Stack
 frame
```






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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```



#### Assembler


push 4



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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```




```
push 4
push [var_y]
```



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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```




```
push 4
push [var_y]
call func1
```



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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```



```
push 4
push [var_y]
call func1

func1:
  push ebp
```



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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```

```
y
return address
old ebp
```

#### Assembler

```
push [var_y]
call func1

func1:
   push ebp
   mov ebp, esp
```

push 4





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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```

```
y
return address

ebp
old ebp
```

```
push 4
push [var_y]
call func1

func1:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  sub esp, 4
```



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### High-level language


```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```

ebp + 0xC	4
ebp + 0x8	y
ebp + 0x4	return addr.
ebp	<b>old</b> ebp
ebp - 0x4	z = y * 4

#### Assembler

```
push 4
push [var_y]
call func1

func1:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  sub esp, 4
  mov ecx, [ebp+0x8]
  mul ecx, [ebp+0xC]
  mov [ebp-4], ecx
```



ebp

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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```

ebp + 0xC	4
ebp + 0x8	y
ebp + 0x4	return addr.
ebp	<b>old</b> ebp
ebp - 0x4	z = y * 4

( isecLAB)

ebp

esp

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#### Assembler

```
push 4
push [var_y]
call func1

func1:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  sub esp, 4
  mov ecx, [ebp+0x8]
  mul ecx, [ebp+0xC]
  mov [ebp-4], ecx
```

First stack argument can be found at [ebp+08], with local variables typically at a negative displacement from ebp.

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### High-level language


```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```

ebp + 0xC	4
ebp + 0x8	y
ebp + 0x4	return addr.
ebp	<b>old</b> ebp
ebp - 0x4	z = y * 4

#### Assembler

```
push 4
push [var_y]
call func1

func1:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  sub esp, 4
  mov ecx, [ebp+0x8]
  mul ecx, [ebp+0xC]
  mov [ebp-4], ecx
  mov eax, [ebp-4]
```



ebp

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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```

```
y
return address
old ebp
```

#### Assembler

```
push 4
  push [var y]
  call func1
func1:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  sub esp, 4
  mov ecx, [ebp+0x8]
  mul ecx, [ebp+0xC]
  mov [ebp-4], ecx
  mov eax, [ebp-4]
  mov esp, ebp
```




ebp/esp

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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```



#### Assembler

```
push [var y]
  call func1
func1:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  sub esp, 4
  mov ecx, [ebp+0x8]
  mul ecx, [ebp+0xC]
  mov [ebp-4], ecx
  mov eax, [ebp-4]
  mov esp, ebp
  pop ebp
```

push 4



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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```

ebp/esp

#### Assembler

push 4

```
push [var y]
  call func1
func1:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  sub esp, 4
  mov ecx, [ebp+0x8]
  mul ecx, [ebp+0xC]
  mov [ebp-4], ecx
  mov eax, [ebp-4]
  mov esp, ebp
  pop ebp
  ret 8
```




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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```

ebp + 0xC	4
ebp + 0x8	у
ebp + 0x4	return addr.
ebp	<b>old</b> ebp
ebp - 0x4	Z

```
push 4
  push [var y]
  call func1
  mov [var x], eax ;RET
func1:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  sub esp, 4
  mov ecx, [ebp+0x8]
  mul ecx, [ebp+0xC]
  mov [ebp-4], ecx
  mov eax, [ebp-4]
  mov esp, ebp
  pop ebp
  ret 8
```



# Example II

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### High-level language

```
void f(int param1, int param2) {
  int var1 = 0;
  int var2 = 1;
  param1 = var1;
  param2 = var2;
}
```

#### Stack frame

ebp

param2	ebp + 0xC	
param l	ebp + 0x8	
return addr.	ebp + 0x4	
<b>old</b> ebp	ebp	
varl	ebp - 0x4	
var2	ebp - 0x8	

```
push
      ebp
      ebp, esp
mov
sub
      esp, 8
      [ebp-4], 0
mov
      [ebp-8], 1
mov
      eax, [ebp-4]
mov
      [ebp+8], eax
mov
      ecx, [ebp-8]
MOV
       [ebp+12], ecx
mov
mov esp, ebp
      ebp
pop
retn
```



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- Three problems
  - How are parameters passed?
  - When is the stack pointer modified during a call to a subroutine?
  - Which registers need to be saved during a subroutine call?
- No problem within the same program, compiler decides which calling convention to use



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- What happens with external code?
  - For example: API in external library
- Calling and called function need to use same calling convention
- Needs to be known during compile time
- There are four relevant calling conventions: cdecl, stdcall, fastcall and thiscall



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cdecl	stdcall	fastcall
- All parameters are pushed to stack - <b>Calling</b> function cleans the stack after the function call returns - C semantic - Advantage: variable number of parameters (printf & co.)	- All parameters are pushed to stack - <b>Callee</b> is responsible to cleanup the stack (e.g., ret 12)	- First three parameters in eax, edx and ecx (Windows: first two parameters in ecx and edx) - All other parameters on stack - Callee is responsible to



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cdecl	stdcall	fastcall
<ul> <li>eax, ecx, and</li> <li>edx are available</li> <li>for use in the</li> <li>function</li> <li>Return value</li> <li>available in eax</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>eax, ecx, and edx are available for use in the function</li> <li>Return value available in eax</li> <li>Standard calling convention for Win32 API</li> </ul>	- Return value available in eax - Typically only used internally by OS



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cdecl	stdcall	fastcall
Call:	Call:	Call:
push 3	push 3	mov ecx, 3
push 2	push 2	mov edx, 2
push 1	push 1	mov eax, 1
call F	call F	call F
add esp, 12	cmp eax, 0	cmp eax, 0
cmp eax, 0	jz error	jz error
jz error		
Subroutine F:	Subroutine F:	Subroutine F:
push ebp	push ebp	push ebp
mov ebp, esp	mov ebp, esp	mov ebp, esp
•••	•••	•••
pop ebp	pop ebp	pop ebp
ret	ret 12	ret



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- Content of registers need to be saved when entering the function...
- ... and restored when leaving the function again
- First push to stack, then pop in reverse order

```
push ebx
push esi
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
...
mov ebx, 0
...
mov esi, DEADBEEFh
...
pop ebp
pop esi
pop ebx
ret
```



### cdecl

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- Advantage of cdecl if number of parameter is not fixed
  - Called subroutine does not need to know the number of parameters
  - Supports semantic required by C

```
printf(,,Integer: %d", i, someothervar);
```

```
push [someothervar]
push [i]
push offset IntegerStr
call printf
add esp, 12
ret
```



# Summary: Calling function

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- Push parameter to stack (or pass in registers)
- Return value in eax
- Optionally: remove parameters from stack



# Summary: Callee

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- Prolog
  - Save old ebp, esp is new ebp
  - Reserve memory space for local variables on stack
- Epilog
  - Restore old ebp
  - Jump to return address
  - Optionally: remove parameters from stack



# Higher-level Structures






## Higher-level Languages

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
- Programming in assembler is cumbersome
  - Hard to understand and maintain
  - Code is not portable
  - Nowadays commonly used in performance-critical applications, malware/shellcode, and similar areas
- Typically programmers implement in higher-level languages like C/C++, Java, Python, ...



## Compiler Overview







## Reverse Engineering

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- Typical goal: reconstruct code information and data structures from a given binary program
  - Assembler ⇒ Higher-level language
  - Several exercises deal with this topic
- To understand this, we take a look at examples
  - Higher-level language ⇒ Assembler
  - Getting a feeling of how compilers transform code




## Example

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### High-level language

```
x = func1(y, 4);
stdcall int func1(int a, int b)
{
   int z;
   z = a * b;
   return z;
}
```

### Stack frame



4	ebp + 0xC
y	ebp + 0x8
return addr.	ebp + 0x4
<b>old</b> ebp	ebp
Z	ebp - 0x4

```
push 4
  push [var y]
  call func1
  mov [var x], eax ;RET
func1:
  push ebp
  mov ebp, esp
  sub esp, 4
  mov ecx, [ebp+0x8]
  mul ecx, [ebp+0xC]
  mov [ebp-4], ecx
  mov eax, [ebp-4]
  mov esp, ebp
  pop ebp
  ret 8
```



## Control-flow Structures

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- Conditional expressions
  - IF ...THEN ...
- Branches
  - IF ... THEN ... ELSE ...
  - SWITCH ... CASE ...
- Loops (WHILE ... DO, DO ... WHILE, FOR ... DO ...)
- Function calls



## Conditional Expressions

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### High-level language

```
IF( SomeVar == 0 ) THEN
  function1()
```

```
mov eax, [SomeVar]
  test eax, eax
  jnz lab_end
  call function1
lab_end:
...
```



### Branches

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### High-level language

```
IF( Var1 == 1 )
   THEN function1()
ELSE IF( Var1 == 2 )
   THEN function2()
   ELSE function3()
```

```
cmp [Var1],1
  jne lab_else1
  call function1
  jmp lab_end
lab_else1:
  cmp [Var1],2
  jne lab_else2
  call function2
  jmp lab_end
lab_else2:
  call function3
lab_end:
  ...
```



## Expressions: OR

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### High-level language

```
IF( Var1 == 1 ||
    Var1 == 2 ||
    Var2 >= 5 )
    THEN function1()
```

```
cmp [Var1], 1
  je lab_then
  cmp [Var1], 2
  je lab_then
  cmp [Var2], 5
  jae lab_then
  jmp lab_end
lab_then:
  call function1
lab_end:
  ...
```



## Switch Statements

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Switch statements are common

```
switch( condition ) {
  case value1: ...; break;
  case value2: ...; break;
  case value3: ...; break;
  default: ...; break }
```

- Often implemented as
  - Table: if values are near each other, complexity O(1)
  - Tree: if values are far away, complexity O(log(n))



## Example: Table Lookup I

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### High-level language

```
switch( Var1 )
{
    case 0: RC = 0; break;
    case 1: RC = 1; break;
    case 2: RC = 2; break;
    case 3: RC = 3; break;
    default: RC = 0; break;
}
```

```
switch_table:
0x00: dd offset lab_case0
0x04: dd offset lab_case1
0x08: dd offset lab_case2
0x0C: dd offset lab_case3
```

```
cmp [Var1], 3
  ja lab default
  mov ecx, [Var1]
  jmp switch table[ecx*4]
lab case0:
  mov [RC], 0
  jmp lab end
lab case1:
  mov [RC], 1
  jmp lab_end
lab default
  mov [RC], 0
  jmp lab end
lab end:
```



## Example: Table Lookup II

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### High-level language

```
switch( Var1 )
{
   case 0: RC = 0; break;
   case 1: RC = 1; break;
   case 2: RC = 2; break;
   case 4: RC = 4; break;
   default: RC = 0; break;
}
```

```
switch_table:
0x00: dd offset lab_case0
0x04: dd offset lab_case1
0x08: dd offset lab_case2
0x0C: dd offset lab_default
0x10: dd offset lab_case4
```

```
cmp [Var1], 4
  ja lab default
  mov ecx, [Var1]
  jmp switch table[ecx*4]
lab case0:
  mov [RC], 0
  jmp lab end
lab case4:
  mov [RC], 4
  jmp lab end
lab default
  mov [RC], 0
  jmp lab end
lab end:
```



## Example: Table Lookup II

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### High-level language

```
switch( Var1 )
  case 0: RC = 0; break;
  case 1: RC = 1; break;
  case 2: RC = 2: break:
  case 4: F
  default:
```

```
If there are "holes": use default
     value in lookup table
```

```
switch table:
0x00: dd offset lab case0
0x04: dd offset lab case1
0x08: dd offset lab case2
0x0C: dd offset lab default
0x10: dd offset lab case4
```

```
Assembler
```

```
cmp [Var1], 4
  ja lab_default
  mov ecx, [Var1]
  jmp switch table[ecx*4]
lab case0:
```

```
jmp lab end
lab default
  mov [RC], 0
  jmp lab end
lab end:
```



## Example: Tree Lookup

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
### High-level language

```
switch( Var1 )
{
    case 0x0: ...
    case 0x100: ...
    case 0x150: ...
    case 0x210: ...
    case 0x210: ...
    case 0x230: ...
    case 0x2A0: ...
    default: ...
}
```

```
cmp [Var1], 0x172
  jg lab above 0x172
  cmp [Var1], 0x172
  je lab 0x172
  cmp [Var1], 0x100
  jg lab above 0x100
  cmp [Var1], 0x100
  je lab 0x100
  cmp [Var1], 0x0
  je lab 0x0
  jmp lab default
lab above 0x100:
  cmp [Var1], 0x150
  je lab 0x150
  jmp lab default
lab above 0172:
```



## Example: Tree Lookup





## Questions?

\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

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More information: <a href="http://syssec.rub.de">http://syssec.rub.de</a>
<a href="http://moodle.rub.de">http://moodle.rub.de</a>





### Sources

\_\_\_\_ Systems Security \_\_\_\_\_ Ruhr-University Bochum

 Lecture Software Reverse Engineering at University of Mannheim, spring term 2010 (Ralf Hund, Carsten Willems and Felix Freiling)

