Program Analysis

Lecture 03: *Machine Language II* Winter term 2011/2012

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Announcements

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- Moodle info
 - http://moodle.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/course/ view.php?id=689 - PA2011
- Introduction to MASM, OllyDbg and IDA Pro at 10:30am
- Open positions for student helpers (SHKs)
- Next Wednesday: talk by @vxradius and @matrosov
 - See http://www.nds.rub.de/teaching/lectures/471/



Topics of Last Week

- Machine language / assembler
- Hardware basics
 - Von Neumann vs. Harvard
 - RISC vs. CISC
 - Load-Store architectures
- Intel x86 architecture
 - Registers



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x86 Registers





Important x86 Registers

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General Purpose Register

Register	Purpose	
eax	Accumulator	
ebx	Base Address	
ecx	Counter	
edx	Data	
esi	Source	
edi	Destination	

Special Purpose Register

Register	Purpose
esp	Stack Pointer
ebp	Base Pointer
eip	Instruction Pointer
eflags	Status Flags



Important x86 Registers

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General Purpose Register

RegisterPurposeeaxAccumulatorebxBase AddressecxCounter

Special Purpose Register

Register	Purpose
esp	Stack Pointer
ebp	Base Pointer
eip	Instruction Pointer

This are just the basic registers, many more registers (e.g., FPU, MMX, and SSE) exist, but they are typically not interesting for us.



General Purpose Registers

Register	Typical purpose	
eax	Accumulator	
ebx	Base address for addressing	
ecx	Counter for loops, index	
edx	I/O data, double-precision operations	
esi	Memory address for string source	
edi	Memory address for string destination	



General Purpose Registers

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Register	Typical purpose	
eax	Accumulator	
ebx	Base address for addressing	

Note: This is just a convention, compilers and programmers can use the registers arbitrarily. However, several instructions expect the operand in specific registers, for example:

loopz _jumpdest




Special Purpose Registers

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Register	Typical purpose	
esp	Points to the next free stack element (decreases)	
ebp	Points to current stack frame	
eip	Points to current instruction	
eflags	Different flags, typically used for conditional jumps (see next slide)	


Note: eip and eflags registers can only be written and read indirectly





Register Addressing

- All registers are 32bit long
- Lower parts can be addressed explictly



- Same for ebx/ecx/edx registers
- Only 16 bit available for esi/edi/ebp/esp registers



Subregisters

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- Modification of subregisters does not influence higher-order registers
- Example:

 Subregister are available to enable backward compatibility to 8/16bit programs



Other Registers

- Floating points: Register stack with 8 elements (80bit)
- MMX: mmx0...mmx7 (64bit)
- SSE: xmm0 ... xmm7 (128bit)
- Diverse number of control register
 - MMU controls
 - Debugging
- ... (many more documented in Intel Manuals)



x86 Instruction Set





Instruction Set

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- Many different instructions (CISC)
- Commonly only a subset of the complete instruction set is used
 - Especially compiler often use only a small number of instructions
 - Enables us to identify artifacts of compilers or to detect that a specific shellcode was presumably written by hand



Instruction Set


- Coarse classification
 - Memory access (read/write operations)
 - Arithmetic, logical and bitwise instructions
 - Subroutine instructions (call, return, ...)
 - Control transfer instructions (static jumps, conditional jumps)
 - String instructions (string comparison, ...)
 - ...



Instruction Layout

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 Assembler instructions are displayed as mnemonics (German translation: Gedächtnisstütze, source is Greek mnēmoniká - memory/Gedächtnis)



For x86, one source operand is always the destination



Instruction Layout

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 Assembler instructions are displayed as mnemonics (German translation: Gedächtnisstütze, source is Greek mnēmoniká - memory/Gedächtnis)

```
CMP reg/mem32, imm8

Counter example (ARM):

add r0, r1, r2

(r0 = r1 + r2)

Second Source Operand
```

• For x86, one source operand is always the destination



Syntax

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- We use Intel Syntax in this class
 - Target operand always on the left
 - Example: sub eax, ecx means eax = eax ecx
 - Size of operand is not explicitly mentioned, if it is clear from context: mov eax, [1234] (32bit)
 - Numbers are decimal. Hexadecimal is explicit with "h" at the end (10h = 16)



Syntax

```
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```

- Caution: there is another convetion AT&T Syntax
 - For example used by GNU asssembler as default
 - Example subl %eax, %ecx

```
means ecx = ecx - eax
```

We always use Intel syntax in this class



Syntax

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	Intel Syntax	AT&T Syntax
Parameter order	Destination before source	Source before destination
Parameter size	Derived from register used (e.g., eax, al)	Mnemonics have size as suffix (e.g., I = dword)
Prefixes	Automatically detected	Constants with \$, registers with %
Effective address	<pre>In [square brackets] mov eax, dword [ebx + ecx*4 + mem_location]</pre>	DISP(Base, Index, Scale) movl mem_location(%ebx, %ecx,4), %eax

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_syntax#Syntax



Intel Syntax AT&T Syntax push loop: push loop: movl %ecx, -4(%ebp) mov [ebp - 4], ecx mov edx, [ebp + 8]movl 8(%ebp), %edx xorl %eax, %eax xor eax, eax movb (%ebx, %esi, 1), %al mov al, byte [ebx + esi] pushl %eax push eax push edx pushl %edx call printf call printf addl \$8, %esp add esp, 8 movl -4(%ebp), %ecx mov ecx, [ebp - 4]incl %esi inc esi loop push loop loop push loop push newline pushl \$newline call printf call printf addl \$4, %esp add esp, 4 movl %ebp, %esp mov esp, ebp popl %ebp pop ebp ret ret

Data transfer: mov		
mov eax, ecx	eax = ecx	
mov edx, [1234]	edx = content of memory address 1234	

Stack operations: push, pop		
push ecx	push value of ecx to stack and substract 4 from esp	
pop esi	add 4 to esp and copy top of stack to esi	



Arithmetic operations: add, sub, mul, rol, shl,		
add eax, ecx	eax = eax + ecx	
sub edx, ebx	edx = edx - ebx	
mul ecx	eax = eax * ecx	
div ebx	eax = eax / ebx, edx = eax % ebx	
rol eax, 12	Rotate eax 12 bit to left	
shl eax, 1	Shift left (= multiply eax by 2)	



Comparison/jumps: cmp, jmp, jXX		
jmp 2342	Set eip to 2342	
cmp eax, ecx	Compare content of eax and ecx and set eflags accordingly	
jz 1234	Set eip to 1234 if ZF (Zero Flag) is set (jump zero)	
jae 5678	Set eip to 5678 if CF (Carry Flag) is not set (jump above or equal)	



Instruction Mnemonic	Condition (Flag States)	Description
Unsigned Conditional Jumps		
JA/JNBE	(CF or ZF) = 0	Above/not below or equal
JAE/JNB	CF = 0	Above or equal/not below
JB/JNAE	CF = 1	Below/not above or equal
JBE/JNA	(CF or ZF) = 1	Below or equal/not above
JC	CF = 1	Carry
JE/JZ	ZF = 1	Equal/zero
JNC	CF = 0	Not carry
JNE/JNZ	ZF = 0	Not equal/not zero
JNP/JP0	PF = 0	Not parity/parity odd
JP/JPE	PF = 1	Parity/parity even
JCXZ	CX = 0	Register CX is zero
JECXZ	ECX = 0	Register ECX is zero
Signed Conditional Jumps		
JG/JNLE	((SF xor OF) or ZF) = 0	Greater/not less or equal
JGE/JNL	(SF xor OF) = 0	Greater or equal/not less
JL/JNGE	(SF xor OF) = 1	Less/not greater or equal
JLE/JNG	((SF xor OF) or ZF) = 1	Less or equal/not greater
JNO	0F = 0	Not overflow
JNS	SF = 0	Not sign (non-negative)
JO	OF = 1	Overflow
JS	SF = 1	Sign (negative)

```
If (v >= 13) { ... } else { ... }
                             for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++)
                               mov ecx, 0
  cmp [v], 13
  jb else
                              loop:
  ... ; if clause
                               cmp ecx, 10
  jmp _end
                               jae _end
 else:
    ; else clause
                               add ecx, 1
 end:
                               jmp loop
                              end:
```



Subroutines: call, ret (next lecture)		
call 2342	Call function at address 2342, push address of next instruction to stack	
ret	Return from subroutine, use the instruction pushed previously onto the stack (pop it from stack)	



```
mov eax, [x]
mul 5682
shr eax, 16
add eax, 120948
mov [var], eax
```



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```
var = (x * 5682) >> 16 + 120948
```

```
mov eax, [x]
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```



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```
var = (x * 5682) >> 16 + 120948
```

```
mov eax, [x]
mul 5682
shr eax, 16
add eax, 120948
mov [var], eax
```

```
mov eax, 12345678 ; pointer to string
mov ecx, 0
loop:
  cmp byte ptr[eax+ecx], 0
  jz end
  inc ecx
  jmp loop
end:
```



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```
var = (x * 5682) >> 16 + 120948
```

```
mov eax, [x]
mul 5682
shr eax, 16
add eax, 120948
mov [var], eax
```

strlen()

```
mov eax, 12345678 ; pointer to string
mov ecx, 0
loop:
  cmp byte ptr[eax+ecx], 0
  jz end
  inc ecx
  jmp loop
end:
```



x86 Memory Access






Memory

- Linear, continuous address space
- Smallest addressable unit: I byte
- Divided in physical, linear and virtual address space
 - Not covered in detail in this class
- 32bit ⇒ at most 4 GB can be addressed
- Typically not the whole address space is allocated



Physical Memory

- Initialized by BIOS
- Interrupt Vector Table (IVT) at address 0 (see later slides)
- In real mode only access to first 640 KB






Endianness

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- There are two different ways to address memory, little-endian and big-endian
- Basically it describes the way memory is read/written
- Example: Store value DEADBEEF (4 byte)






little-endian



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
little-endian




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
little-endian




Endianness

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
little-endian

Byte ordering on x86 is little-endian!




Example: mov var, 12345678h

Before



After



Addressing

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- Four different types of memory access
 - Immediate, register, memory, and offset
- Convention is to depict memory access in [square brackets]
- One instruction can perform at most one memory access
 - Remember what load-store architecture means



Examples

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Instruction	Туре	Explanation
mov eax, 1337	Immediate	Load constant into eax
mov eax, ebx	Register	Load ebx into eax
mov eax, [2342]	Memory	Load content from static memory address
mov esi, [edi]	Offset	Load content from memory address via pointer in register
mov eax, [ebx + ecx] mov eax, [ebx + 1234] mov eax, [ebx + ecx*4 - 1337]	Offset	Other variants of the same construct



Examples

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
Instruction	Туре	Explanation
mov eax, 1337	Immediate	Load constant into eax
mov eax, ebx	Register	Load ebx into eax
mov eax, [2342] No	t possib	from static memory
mov esi, [edi] MOV [[esi], [e	from memory address register
mov eax, [ebx + ecx] mov eax, [ebx + 1234] mov eax, [ebx + ecx*4 - 1337]	Offset	Other variants of the same construct



Addressing

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- Actual memory destination when using offsets is called effective address
- Computed based on base (reg), index * scale (reg
 * 1, 2, 3, 4), and displacement (32bit)





Offset = Base + (Index * Scale) + Displacement

Slide #34

Example I

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Addition of two variables

```
mov eax, [1337]
mov ecx, [1234]
add eax, ecx
mov [1337], eax
```

Alternative implementation

```
mov eax, 1337
mov ecx, [1234]
add [eax], ecx
```



Example I

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Addition of two variables

```
mov eax, [1337]
mov ecx, [1234]
add eax, ecx
mov [1337], eax
```

Alternative implementation

```
mov eax, 1337
mov ecx, [1234]
add [eax], ecx
```

Memory access is possible in each instruction, not only for mov (no load-store architecture!)



Example II

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int a[256]; return a[i];

```
mov ebx, offset a
mov ecx, [i]
mov eax, [ebx+ecx*4]
```



Example II

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int a[256]; return a[i];

```
mov ebx, offset a
mov ecx, [i]
mov eax, [ebx+ecx*4]
```

Complex example

mov eax, [eax+ecx*4+12345678h]



Example II

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int a[256]; return a[i];

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Complex example

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
Load effective address

lea eax, [ecx+edx]



Data Sizes


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Data Sizes

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Byte, Word, Doubleword (DWORD), Quadword (QWORD), and Double Quadword



Negativ numbers are displayed in 2's complement

 127
 64 63
 0

 High Quadword
 Low Quadword
 Double Quadword

 N+8
 N

High Doubleword

63

Privileges

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- There are several privilege levels, so called rings
- Each instruction is executed in a specific ring
- Some instructions are only valid in certain rings
- Memory access can be based on privilege system
 - Access to certain memory areas only possible in certain rings



Privileges

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
- There are four rings
 - But effectively only ring 0 and 3 are used
- Ring 0: Kernel and drivers (kernel space)
- Ring 3:Applications (user space)
- Current ring is saved in cs register (lower two bits)
- Transfer in other rings via system calls, interrupts and exceptions



Privileges

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- There are four rings
 - But effectively only ring 0
- Ring 0: Kernel and drivers
- Ring 3: Applications (user s



- Current ring is saved in cs register (lower two bits)
- Transfer in other rings via system calls, interrupts and exceptions



Interrupts

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- Exceptions are often simply called interrupts, handling of both is identical
- Interrupts and exceptions are handled by specific handlers that take care of appropriate actions
- Central data structure: Interrupt Vector Table (IVT)
- The IVT keeps a pointer to the specific handler for each type of interrupt



Interrupt Vector Table

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Vector	Description
0	Integer Divide-by-Zero exception
1	Debug exception
2	Non-maskable interrupt
3	breakpoint exception (INT 3)
4	overflow exception (INTO instruction)
5	Bound-range exception (BOUND instruction)
6	Invalid opcode exception
7	Device not available exception
•••	•••
13	General protection exception
14	Page fault exception
•••	•••
20 - 255	Not specified, can be used by OS



Questions?

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Contact:
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More information: http://syssec.rub.de
http://moodle.rub.de





Sources

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 Lecture Software Reverse Engineering at University of Mannheim, spring term 2010 (Ralf Hund, Carsten Willems and Felix Freiling)

