

KAROLINA KRZYŻANOWSKA

academic appointments

October 2016 — Present

Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the [Scientific Reasoning and Argumentation Project](#), Center for Advanced Studies, LMU Munich.

Principal Investigator: Prof. Dr. Stephan Hartmann

October 2014 — September 2016

Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich, Germany.

June 2014 — September 2014

Visiting researcher at the Department of Information Science and Media Studies, University of Bergen, Norway.

February 2014 — July 2014

Predocotrinal researcher in the Project PF 740/2-1 “Rational reasoning with conditionals and probabilities. Logical foundations and empirical evaluations” within the DFG Priority Program SPP 1516 “New Frameworks of Rationality.” Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich, Germany.

Principal Investigator: Dr. Dr. Niki Pfeifer

November 2010 — October 2013

PhD student at the Department of Theoretical Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, The Netherlands.

Supervisor: Prof. Igor Douven

November 2009 — October 2010

Predocotrinal research fellow at the [Formal Epistemology Project](#), Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Belgium.

Supervisor: Prof. Igor Douven

education

Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Groningen, the Netherlands, February 2015.

Thesis: *Between “If” and “Then.” Towards an Empirically Informed Philosophy of Conditionals.*

Advisor: Prof. Igor Douven

Committee: Prof. David Over, Prof. Hans Rott, Prof. Rineke Verbrugge.

M.A., Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Poland, September 2009.

Thesis (in Polish): *Belief Reports in Linguistic and Cognitive Perspective.*

Advisor: Dr. Justyna Grudzińska.

Erasmus Exchange Programme, University of Leuven, 2008 — 2009.

Courses: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, Artificial Intelligence.

Summer schools: [IRSI 2016](#), [ESSLLI 2012](#), [ESSLLI 2011](#), [ESSLLI 2010](#), [Warsztaty Logiczne 2007](#) “Logika i Kognitywistyka.”

research profile

AOS: philosophy of language, psychology of reasoning, philosophy of psychology.

AOC: philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophical logic.

publications

Karolina Krzyżanowska, “Deliberationally Useless Conditionals,” accepted (with minor revisions) in *Episteme*, 2017.

Karolina Krzyżanowska, Sylvia Wenmackers and Igor Douven, “[Rethinking Gibbard’s Riverboat Argument](#)”, *Studia Logica*, Vol. 102, No. 4, pp. 771-792, 2014.

Karolina Krzyżanowska, Sylvia Wenmackers and Igor Douven, “[Inferential Conditionals and Evidentiality](#)”, *Journal of Logic, Language and Information*, Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 315–334, 2013.

Karolina Krzyżanowska, “[Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test](#)”, *Synthese* Vol. 190, No. 1, pp. 21-36, 2013.

Karolina Krzyżanowska, Sylvia Wenmackers, Igor Douven and Sara Verbrugge “[Conditionals, Inference, and Evidentiality](#)” in: Jakub Szymanik and Rineke Verbrugge (eds.): ‘[Proceedings of the Logic & Cognition Workshop at ESSLLI 2012, Opole, Poland, 13-17 August, 2012](#)’, vol. 883 of CEUR Workshop Proceedings, CEUR-WS.org, pp. 38-47, 2012.

Karolina Krzyżanowska “Ambiguous Conditionals” in: Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.): *Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis*, Ontos Verlag, pp. 315-332, 2012.

Karolina Krzyżanowska “Sprawozdania z przekonań w perspektywie filozofii języka i kognitywistyki” (“Belief Reports in the perspective of philosophy of language and cognitive science”), *Przegląd Filozoficzny* No. 3 (75), pp. 297-319, 2010.

under review

Karolina Krzyżanowska, Peter Collins, and Ulrike Hahn, “Between a conditional’s antecedent and its consequent: discourse coherence vs. probabilistic relevance.”

Abstract: Reasoning with conditionals is central to everyday life, yet there is long-standing disagreement about their meaning. One example is the puzzle of so-called missing-link conditionals such as “if raccoons have no wings, they cannot breathe under water.” Their oddity may be taken to show that conditionals require a connection between antecedent (“raccoons have no wings”) and consequent (“they cannot breathe under water”), yet most accounts of conditionals attribute the oddity

to natural-language pragmatics. We present an experimental study disentangling the pragmatic requirement of discourse coherence from a stronger notion of connection: probabilistic relevance. Results indicate that mere discourse coherence is not enough to make conditionals assertable.

Igor Douven and Karolina Krzyżanowska, “The Semantics-Pragmatics Interface: An Empirical Investigation” with Igor Douven.

Abstract: Linguists and philosophers commonly distinguish between semantics and pragmatics, where the former concerns the truth or falsity of linguistic items and the latter concerns aspects of the usage of such items that may make them unassertable even when true. Common though the distinction is, there is an ongoing controversy about where exactly the line between semantics and pragmatics is to be drawn. We report two experiments meant to investigate empirically whether there is any pre-theoretic distinction that might help settle the debate. The same experiments are meant to shed light on a related question, namely, whether pragmatic aspects of language use pertain only at the level of assertability and not at that of believability. Our results suggest that ordinary people do not reliably distinguish between truth, assertability, or believability. We argue that this has consequences for the methodology of experimental semantics and pragmatics.

Karolina Krzyżanowska, Peter Collins, and Ulrike Hahn, “The Puzzle of Conditionals with True Clauses: Against the Gricean Account.”

Abstract: Indicative conditionals, that is sentences of the form “If p, then q,” belong to the most puzzling phenomena of language. On the majority of accounts of indicative conditionals, the truth of p and q suffices for “If p, then q” to be true or highly acceptable. Yet, many conditionals with true clauses, even if there is a meaningful connection between them, sound odd. The most common reaction to this phenomenon is to attribute the oddity of conditionals with true clauses to natural language pragmatics. We present an experimental study investigating how the presence or absence of a connection between the clauses affects the assertability of conditionals and conjunction expressing generic and specific kind of content. The results refute the standard pragmatic explanation.

working
papers

Peter Collins, Karolina Krzyżanowska, Stephan Hartmann, Gregory Wheeler, and Ulrike Hahn, “Conditionals and Testimony.”

Abstract: In this paper, we present some basic phenomena involved in responding to conditional utterances. In particular, we provide a brief summary of a number of experiments examining belief change in response to hearing a conditional. We then examine the implications of these phenomena for theories of the conditional and conditional reasoning. Finally, we present a model against which these phenomena might be understood.

Karolina Krzyżanowska and Paula Quinon “Assertions about Numbers.”

Abstract: It is a well known fact that expressions like “5 million” or “two hundreds” tend to be interpreted as approximations. Although the pragmatics of rounding up has been widely discussed in linguistic literature, semantic consequences of this phenomenon have not attracted that much attention. Drawing from the recent developments in cognitive science, and from research on the

approximate number sense in particular, we discuss possible truth conditions for sentences involving rounded up numerals.

“The Limits of a Pragmatic Explanation: the Case of Indicative Conditionals.”

Abstract: It is a common intuition that the antecedent of an indicative conditional should have something to do with its consequent, that they should be somehow connected. However, only very few semantic theories of conditionals do justice to this intuition and the majority tends to relegate it to the realm of pragmatics. Yet no one has offered a full-fledged pragmatic account of the oddness of missing-link conditionals. The aim of this paper is to discuss possible pragmatic explanations of the phenomenon and, consequently, to show how they all fail.

**conferences
and workshops**

“Pragmatics of the Missing Link Conditionals” at the Annual Meeting of the Priority Program *New Frameworks of Rationality* (SPP1516), Etelsen, Germany, March 2017.

“What Do We Learn When We Learn a Conditional?” [Learning Conditionals](#) Workshop, Munich, February 2017.

Invited talk: “Indicative Conditionals: From Language to Reasoning and Back,” [The Relevance of Logic to Human Reasoning](#) Workshop, Munich, Germany, November 2016.

“Researching Missing-Link Conditionals: Methodological Obstacles and How (We Could at Least Try) to Avoid Them,” Young Scientist’s Forum of the [International Rationality Summer Institute](#), Aurich, Germany, September 2016.

“Indicative Conditionals and the Search for the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction” [International Conference on Thinking \(ICT2016\)](#), Providence, RI, United States, August 2016.

“Persuading with Conditionals”, invited contribution to a Symposium: *Dynamic Inference and Belief Revision* organised by Mike Oaksford, [International Conference on Thinking \(ICT2016\)](#), Providence, RI, United States, August 2016.

Comment on Ben Schwan and Reuben Stern’s paper: “A Causal Understanding of When and When Not to Jeffrey Conditionalize,” [Formal Epistemology Workshop 2016](#), Groningen, June 2016.

Invited talk: “What Psychology of Reasoning can Teach us about the Meaning of Indicative Conditionals: The Case of a Metalinguistic Theory,” [2nd Belgrade Conference on Conditionals](#), Belgrade, Serbia, May 2016.

Invited keynote talk: “What Psychology of Reasoning Can Tell Us About the Meaning of Indicative Conditionals,” [Warsaw Workshop in Philosophy of Language: Logic and Meaning](#), Warsaw, Poland, May 2016.

Invited talk: “What are Indicative Conditionals About?” at EuNoC Workshop, Leeds, UK, January 2016.

Invited talk: “A New Kind of a Metalinguistic Theory of Conditionals” at the workshop *Do Conditionals have Truth Conditions? Dynamic and Pragmatic Aspects of Conditionals*, GAP.9 congress, Osnabrück, Germany, September 2015.

“Between *If* and *Then*. What Do We Learn When We Learn a Conditional?” at the Symposium *If, Then, Otherwise: A Symposium on Conditionals*. 23rd Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP2015), Tartu, Estonia, July 2015.

“The Ramsey Test and Conditionals of a Bad Advice” at the Annual Meeting of the Priority Program *New Frameworks of Rationality* (SPP1516), Etelsen, Germany, March 2015.

“Exact Numerals as Vague Quantifiers” at the 16th Szklarska Poręba Workshop on the Roots of Pragmasemantics, Szrenica, Szklarska Poręba, Poland, February 2015.

Comment on Matteo Colombo’s project: “Explanatory Reasoning, Moral Value, and Economic Incentive. Or...How much is your moral judgment?” *Operationalization: An Interdisciplinary Workshop at the Edge of Experimental Psychology and Analytical Philosophy*, Freiburg, October 2013.

“The Variety of Conditionals and the Evidential Function of Epistemic Modals” at The 7th London Reasoning Workshop (LRW), Birkbeck College London, United Kingdom, July 2013.

“Deliberationally Useless Conditionals” at the 21st Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP2013), Granada, Spain, July 2013.

“Rethinking Gibbard’s Riverboat Argument” at the 8th Barcelona Workshop on Conditionals (BW8), Universitat de Barcelona, Spain, June 2013.

Poster: “Inferential Conditionals and the Meaning of Some Epistemic Modals,” Sixth Semantics and Philosophy in Europe Colloquium (SPE6), Saint-Petersburg State University, June 2013.

“What *Must* and *Should* Can Mean” at the Graduate Conference in Theoretical Philosophy (GCTP2013), Groningen, The Netherlands, April 2013.

Invited talk: “Inferential Conditionals” at *Conditionals Workshop*, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, The Netherlands, November 2012.

Poster: “What Inferential Conditionals Can Reveal About Epistemic Modals: An Experimental Study Of Evidentiality,” 3rd Workshop of Experimental Philosophy

Group UK: [Intuitions, Experiments, and Philosophy](#), Nottingham, September 2012.

“Conditionals, Inference, and Evidentiality” at the [Logic & Cognition Workshop](#), European Summer School for Logic, Language, and Information ([ESSLLI](#)), Opole, Poland, August 2012.

“Ambiguity and Gibbard’s Argument Against Propositional Theories of Conditionals” at the Second International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics ([PhiLang2011](#)), Department of English and General Linguistics, Łódź, Poland, May 2011.

“Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test” at the 9th National Conference of the Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy ([SIFA](#)) “Truth, Knowledge and Science”, Padua, Italy, September 2010.

“Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test” at the International Congress of Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science ([SILFS](#)), Bergamo, Italy, December 2010.

Poster: “What Is Going On In the Nearset Possible World...” Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology ([ESPP2010](#)), Bochum and Essen, August 2010.

Comment on Benjamin Hoffmann’s paper: “Belief Revision for Dynamic Reliability Ranks,” [The Bi-Annual Konstanz–Leuven Workshop in Formal Epistemology](#), Leuven, January 2010.

seminars and colloquia **Invited talk:** “The puzzle of missing-link conditionals,” at the [TiLPS Colloquium](#), Tilburg University, The Netherlands, January 2017.

Invited talk: “What is wrong with the Ramsey Test and why we should care,” at the [MCMP Colloquium in Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Science](#), LMU Munich, Germany, May 2015.

Invited talk: “Between *if* and *then*. On what is wrong with the Ramsey Test and how to fix it,” Reasoning and Argumentation Lab ([ReAL](#)) Seminar, Birkbeck College London, UK, March 2015.

“Indicatives and a Problem of a Bad Advice,” WiP Seminar, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, March 2013.

Invited talk: “Conditionals and inferences” at Logic and Interactive Rationality ([LIRa](#)) Seminar at the Institute of Logic, Language, and Computation, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, March 2013.

“Truth Conditions for Conditional Sentences, Allan Gibbard and Ambiguity,” PCCP Seminar, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, September 2011.

teaching

LMU Munich:

Philosophy of Language, advanced seminar, Summer 2017.

History of the Analytic Philosophy, advanced seminar, Summer 2016.

Philosophy of Mind, advanced seminar, Winter 2015/2016.

Conditionals and Psychology of Reasoning, advanced seminar, Summer 2015.

University of Groningen:

Philosophy of Logic: Conditionals, master's level seminar, Summer 2013 (together with Igor Douven).

Summer Schools:

Learning That If P Then Q, a lecture at the MCMP Fellows' session of the Third Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students, July 2016, LMU Munich.

Conditionals and Cognitive Science a lecture at the PostDoc's session of the Second Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students, July 2015, LMU Munich.

service to the profession

(Co)organised events:

[Reasoning and Argumentation in Science Conference](#) (with Ben Evan and Stephan Hartmann; CAS, LMU Munich, 31 May – 2 June 2017).

[Learning Conditionals Workshop](#) (with Stephan Hartmann; CAS, LMU Munich, 2-3 February 2017)

[Third Summer School on Mathematical Philosophy for Female Students](#) (with Samuel Fletcher and Milena Ivanova; MCMP, LMU Munich, 24-30 July 2016).

Contributed Symposium *If, Then, Otherwise: A Symposium on Conditionals*, the 23rd Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology ([ESPP2015](#)), Tartu, Estonia, 14-17 July 2015.

[Causal and Probabilistic Reasoning Workshop](#) (with Stephan Hartmann, Gregory Wheeler and Michael Waldmann; MCMP, LMU Munich, 18-20 June 2015)

[Graduate Conference in Theoretical Philosophy](#) (with PhD students in Theoretical Philosophy; University of Groningen, 18-20 April 2013).

Refereeing:

Analysis, Cognition, Journal of Cognitive Psychology, Journal of Cognitive Science, Episteme, Minds & Machines, CogSci2015, CogSci2016, CogSci2017, Studia Semiotyczne, National Science Center (Polish Research Funding Agency).

Program Committee Memberships:

Formal Epistemology Workshop 2017 (University of Washington), Formal Epistemology Workshop 2016 (Groningen), Semantics of Theories Conference (MCMP, LMU Munich), 2nd Munich Graduate Workshop in Mathematical Philosophy: Formal Epistemology (MCMP, LMU Munich), Graduate Conference in Theoretical Philosophy 2013 (Groningen).

Service to the University:

Selection committees for PhD/postdoctoral fellowships and visiting fellowships at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich.

Second reader of the M.A. Thesis by Yunhao Zhang “On considering Psychology Scientific: How a Discipline with 54 Subfields Operates as Science.”

other

Languages: Polish (mother tongue), English (full professional proficiency), Dutch (basic speaking, intermediate reading), German (intermediate speaking, advanced reading, Zentrale Mittelstufe Prüfung 2006).

Technical skills: $\text{\LaTeX}_{2\epsilon}$, basics of (X)HTML/CSS, basics of the R environment for statistical computing.

Hobbies: playing cello, sport climbing, painting.