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Testimony of

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on the

Situation of *Hmong Refugees*

and Asylum Seekers in Thailand

before the

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

April 26, 1994

Mr. Chairman, I am Hiram A. Ruiz, Asia policy analyst for the <u>U.S.</u> Committee for <u>Refugees</u> (USCR). Thank you for extending me the opportunity to present the views of USCR concerning the situation of *Hmong* Laotian *refugees*.

The <u>U.S.</u> Committee for <u>Refugees</u> is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization that regularly monitors and assesses the situation of <u>refugees</u> and displaced people around the world. We have monitored developments affecting <u>Hmong refugees</u> in <u>Thailand</u> specifically for many years. I personally traveled to <u>Thailand</u> last year to document the situation of the <u>Hmong</u>, and, more recently, a USCR consultant conducted on-site documentation for USCR on the screening process being used to determine **refugee** status.

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, the <u>U.S.</u> Committee for <u>Refugees</u> is grateful that you have convened a hearing regarding <u>refugees</u> and asylum seekers in Southeast Asia at this critical juncture. The long saga of Vietnamese boat people appears to be drawing towards a close. The screening of most Vietnamese asylum seekers has been completed, and the UN High Commissioner for <u>Refugees</u> (UNHCR) and the governments concerned have agreed that those who have been screened out (determined not to be <u>refugees</u>) must return to Vietnam by the end of 1995.

As recent events in Hong Kong indicate, however, if this "end- game" is not approached sensitively and responsibly, there is potential for violence and tragedy. Although USCR is not testifying regarding the Vietnamese today, I would like to add our voice to those who urge that the <u>U.S.</u> government work to ensure that the return home of screened-out Vietnamese asylum seekers takes place with dignity and respect for the basic human rights of all individuals.

The situation of the <u>Hmong</u> is often regarded as parallel to that of the Vietnamese, and there appears to be widespread belief that solutions decided upon for the Vietnamese can and should apply to the <u>Hmong</u> as well. But that is not the case.

There are significant differences between political, social, and economic conditions in Vietnam and Laos, and between the Vietnamese and Laotian governments. Also, the <u>Hmong</u> are an ethnic minority within Laos, which, combined with the fact that some <u>Hmong</u> continue to engage in an armed insurgency against the present Laotian government, results in their remaining a marginalized, suspect group upon returning to Laos.

The situation of the <u>Hmong</u> should be analyzed in its own right, and the <u>U.S.</u> government should formulate policy toward the <u>Hmong</u> based on that group's particular needs and situation. That policy should take into account the fact that the <u>Hmong</u>, including many of those currently living as <u>refugees</u> in <u>Thailand</u>, risked their lives to assist the <u>United States</u>. Indeed, it is because of that support for die <u>United States</u> that the <u>Hmong</u> are in this situation today. While we may now wish to put that period in our history behind us, it would be wrong to turn our backs on the <u>Hmong</u> in the process.

Having said that, we can not ignore political realities on the ground in Southeast Asia, particularly <u>Thailand's</u> unwillingness to continue hosting <u>refugee</u> populations. What is needed is a <u>U.S.</u> policy that is sensitive to the situation and needs of the <u>Hmong</u>, that honors our responsibility toward them, that maximizes safeguards for the <u>Hmong</u>, and that takes into account political realities. Achieving such a balance will not be an easy task.

BACKGROUND

For many years following the end of the <u>United States'</u> military involvement in Southeast Asia, the <u>U.S.</u> government responded admirably to the plight of the <u>refugees</u> who fled Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia beginning in the mid- 1970s in the wake of communist takeovers in those countries. The <u>United States</u> opened its doors to more than a million such *refugees*.

The asylum countries of Southeast Asia, including <u>Thailand</u>, also did their part. Although there were serious problems, eventually, through the adoption in 1989 of the Comprehensive Plan of Action on Indochinese <u>Refugees</u>, the so-called CPA, an accommodation was found that guaranteed first asylum in the region for those who fled, and left the door open for overseas resettlement of those determined to meet the criteria for <u>refugee</u> status.

The CPA plan called for asylum countries to institute a screening process to determine if any given individual met the criteria for being granted <u>refugee</u> status. Most of the <u>Hmong</u> in <u>Thailand</u> either arrived before the screening process began and thus have automatic <u>refugee</u> status, or were "screened in," that is, determined to be <u>refugees</u>.

The <u>United States</u> extended the possibility of resettlement here to <u>Hmong</u> with <u>refugee</u> status who also met <u>U.S.</u> Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) criteria for admission to the <u>United States</u> as <u>refugees</u>.

More than 64,000 <u>Hmong</u> have resettled in the <u>United States</u>. For many, lacking formal education, English language skills, or transferable work skills, life in the <u>United States</u> proved difficult. Consequently, many other <u>Hmong refugees</u> in <u>Thailand</u> decided against resettlement in the <u>United States</u>. Many of the <u>Hmong</u> in <u>Thailand</u> who did not opt for resettlement did so in part because of fears about life in the <u>United States</u>, in part because they hoped to be able to someday return to their homes, and in part because they believed they would be able to remain in <u>Thailand</u> until such time as they believed it to be safe to return home. In <u>Thailand</u>, they lived in fenced-in **refugee** camps that offered them little more than the possibility of survival.

For years that situation remained static. It appeared to more or less suit all concerned. But that has changed. For the past several years, the government of <u>Thailand</u>, which once supported the <u>Hmong</u> resistance group that continues to fight the Laotian government, now shuns the <u>Hmong</u> resistance and cultivates economic ties with the Lao government. It no longer welcomes <u>Hmong refugees</u>, and in fact would like to see all the <u>refugees</u> on Thai soil (including those from Laos and Burma) <u>leave Thailand</u>. It has said that the <u>Hmong</u> must <u>leave</u> by the end of 1995 (a target date of end- 1994 had earlier been set, but this has been eased). The Thai authorities have already closed two of the three main camps that housed <u>Hmong refugees</u>.

The Thai Military's forcible repatriation of the 500 or so Cambodians who refused to join the UNHCR-organized voluntary repatriation last year, and its recent forcible repatriation of some 20,000 Cambodians, mostly women, children, and elderly people, who fled fighting between Cambodian government forces and the Khmer Rouge, underscore the Thai government's hardened line toward refugees.

Laotians, both <u>Hmong</u> and lowland Lao, have been repatriating since 1980. Between 1980 and late 1993, more than 8,600 lowland Lao and some 7,600 highland Lao (mostly <u>Hmong</u>) repatriated. A majority of these were people with <u>refugee</u> status, but more than 2,700 were persons who had been screened out. In 1993, the number of highland Lao, mostly **Hmong**, who repatriated was the highest of any year since 1980.

<u>Thailand</u> presses the <u>Hmong</u> to repatriate. Thousands of <u>Hmong</u>, afraid to do so and also reluctant to resettle to the <u>United States</u> or elsewhere overseas, have left the <u>refugee</u> camps and sought shelter at a Buddhist temple some 100 kilometers from Bangkok. Their future remains particularly uncertain.

SUMMARY OF MAIN ISSUES

Although for many years relatively little public or official attention has been focused on <u>Hmong refugees</u>, discussions that have taken place have been polarized and highly charged. Perceptions about the current situation of the <u>Hmong</u>, about their future, and about what <u>U.S.</u> policy towards the <u>Hmong</u> should be vary widely. No doubt that polarization will be reflected in the testimonies presented during this hearing.

In my statement, I will identify the specific concerns that the <u>U.S.</u> Committee for <u>Refugees</u> has regarding the current situation and future status of <u>Hmong refugees</u> in <u>Thailand</u>, and will make recommendations that could, if acted upon, ameliorate these concerns. I have appended to this testimony copies of two articles published by USCR in August 1992 and January 1994 that provide detailed background information on the situation of the **Hmong** and that supplement the information contained in this testimony.

The *U.S.* Committee for *Refugees* is concerned about several issues:

a sense that the <u>U.S.</u> government, and particularly <u>U.S.</u> Embassy officials in <u>Thailand</u>, have become impatient with the <u>Hmong refugees</u> and asylum seekers in <u>Thailand</u> and lack concern for them;

reports of ill-treatment of repatriated *Hmong* in Laos;

reports of involuntary repatriation of *Hmong refugees* and asylum seekers;

the disparity in the perceptions of concerned parties regarding the voluntariness of the repatriation program and the safety of returnees;

calls for an end to *U.S.* support for programs to assist *Hmong* who repatriate to Laos;

the fairness and competence of the screening (*refugee* determination) process in *Thailand*;

the limited access of screened-out <u>Hmong</u> to the appeals process and the fairness and thoroughness of that process;

restrictions already in place or anticipated that limit the ability of <u>Hmong</u> with <u>refugee</u> status to apply for resettlement in the <u>United States</u>;

the Thai government's insistence that all Laotian Hmong must leave Thailand by the end of 1995;

the disappearance of repatriated *Hmong* leader Vue Mai and the implications of his disappearance for the repatriation process; and

the fears of members of the <u>Hmong</u> community in the <u>United States</u> for their friends and relatives in <u>Thailand</u> and Laos.

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. Chairman, I would like to expand on these concerns and offer USCR's recommendations about what Congress could do to ameliorate them.

1. Regarding our sense that the <u>U.S.</u> government, and particularly <u>U.S.</u> Embassy officials in <u>Thailand</u>, have become impatient with the <u>Hmong refugees</u> and asylum seekers in

Thailand and lack concern for them:

I raise this issue first because it underlies many of the concerns USCR has regarding <u>U.S.</u> policy towards the <u>Hmong</u> and underscores why we believe that it is so important that Congress take a pro-active approach to the situation of the <u>Hmong</u>.

For many years, the <u>U.S.</u> government has kept its door open to <u>Hmong refugees</u> seeking resettlement in the <u>United States</u>. Through contributions to the UN High Commissioner for <u>Refugees</u> (UNHCR), the <u>United States</u> has also helped fund the stay in <u>Thailand</u> of <u>Hmong refugees</u> who did not wish to resettle and who continued to fear repatriation, and it has helped provide assistance to those <u>Hmong</u> who have repatriated.

More recently, however, there appears to be an attitude at the <u>U.S.</u> Embassy in Bangkok and the <u>U.S.</u> Department of State that the <u>Hmong</u> have had long enough to make up their minds about resettling in the <u>United States</u>, that those who can't or don't want to resettle can and should return to Laos, and that those who don't are simply being obstinate or opportunistic. In an excellent, in-depth report on the situation of the <u>Hmong</u> in the February 27, 1994 Philadelphia Inquirer, a <u>U.S.</u> Embassy official in Bangkok was quoted as saying that the <u>Hmong</u> who remain in the camps do so in order to enjoy "the good life."

That attitude is unfair and illogical. Many <u>Hmong</u> genuinely fear repatriation to Laos. The extent to which their fears are warranted is subject to debate, but the reality is that the fear is there. Based on the experience of <u>Hmong</u> who have resettled in the <u>United States</u>, many <u>Hmong refugees</u> in <u>Thailand</u> are also, sensibly, wary of the difficulties of adjusting to life in the <u>United States</u>. It is therefore not surprising that many <u>Hmong</u> would prefer to remain in *Thailand*.

Yet, rather that pressing the Thai government to allow the <u>Hmong</u> to remain while working to convince the <u>Hmong</u> that they truly can safely repatriate (if that is the case), some <u>U.S.</u> government officials dismiss the concerns of the <u>Hmong</u> about repatriation. There also appears to be little <u>U.S.</u> government concern over continuing reports that at least some of the <u>Hmong</u> who have been denied <u>refugee</u> status do, in fact, have genuine claims to such status. In the past, independent observers have criticized the <u>refugee</u> determination process as unfair and corrupt. Yet State Department and Bangkok embassy officials do not press the Thai government and UNHCR to remedy this by further review of such cases.

The State Department is also said to be considering a cut-off date for the *Hmong* to apply for resettlement. This adds pressure and limitations to those already exerted by the Thai government, which has told *Hmong* in Ban Na Pho camp, the so-called "repatriation camp," that since they did not apply for resettlement before, they cannot do so now.

RECOMMENDATION: We urge Congress to ask senior level State Department officials to review <u>U.S.</u> policy toward the <u>Hmong</u>, and to urge <u>U.S.</u> <u>refugee</u> officials in both Washington and Bangkok to pursue policies that do not further limit <u>Hmong refugees</u>' options.

2. Regarding reports of ill-treatment of repatriated <u>Hmong</u>, reports of involuntary repatriation of <u>Hmong refugees</u> and asylum seekers, and the disparity in the perceptions of concerned parties regarding the voluntariness of the repatriation program and the safety of returnees:

Some <u>Hmong</u> organizations and leaders argue that <u>Hmong refugees</u> who return to Laos are persecuted and abused, if not outright killed. These groups' claims are alarming, and understandably cause fear and consternation among <u>Hmong</u> in die <u>United States</u> and <u>Thailand</u>. But the organizations making these assertions do not provide specific details or concrete evidence.

UNHCR, Lao, Thai, and <u>U.S</u> government officials argue that the <u>Hmong</u> are safe upon return. But the Thai and Lao governments are not the most reliable sources on this issue, and the monitoring capacities of the <u>United States</u> and UNHCR in Laos are limited. Nevertheless, we understand from UNHCR that they have received several specific complaints of returnees experiencing security problems and that the agency has established that all but one, the disappearance of Vue Mai, were unfounded.

Some <u>Hmong</u> leaders also say that the Thai authorities routinely force <u>Hmong</u> <u>refugees</u> back to Laos, while UNHCR, Thai, and <u>U.S</u> government officials say that the <u>Hmong</u> who have repatriated have done so voluntarily.

While we do not have evidence that the Thai authorities use actual force to repatriate the <u>Hmong</u>, we can say with certainty that they subject the <u>Hmong</u> to considerable pressure to repatriate. The Thai authorities tell the <u>Hmong</u> that if they do not repatriate they might wind up in a prison camp, or that their families' food rations will be cut off. That may not be what UNHCR classifies as refoulement (forcible return of <u>refugees</u>), but it is also a far cry from the fully informed, unpressured decision carried out in safety and dignity that the UN and most governments say are the essentials of a truly voluntary repatriation.

RECOMMENDATION: One of the most pressing needs regarding <u>Hmong</u> repatriation is an unbiased, independent investigation of the safety of <u>Hmong</u> who return to Laos and of whether <u>Thailand</u> is using force or coercion to repatriate the <u>Hmong</u>. Such an investigation could be carried out by a special rapporteur appointed by the UN Human Rights Commission, or by an international delegation. We urge Congress to press for such an investigation, and the Laotian government to permit it.

3. Regarding calls for an end to <u>U.S.</u> support for programs to assist <u>Hmong</u> who repatriate to Laos:

There has been criticism from some quarters of Congress's financial support for programs aimed at protecting and aiding the reintegration of *Hmong* who repatriate to Laos. Such criticism is misguided.

Like the repatriation of Vietnamese who have been determined not to be <u>refugees</u>, the repatriation of screened-out <u>Hmong</u>, and of <u>Hmong refugees</u> who do not wish to, or are ineligible to resettle abroad, is a reality. Upon return, they urgently need international assistance in order to make a new start. <u>U.S.</u> funds not only help make that new start possible, but, by channeling <u>U.S.</u> aid through UNHCR and international nongovernmental organizations, the <u>United States</u> helps ensure that international staff will be present alongside the returnees in Laos, which helps enhance their security.

RECOMMENDATION: Congress should continue to support programs that help <u>Hmong</u> who return to Laos to reintegrate and that enhance their safety.

4. Regarding the fairness and competence of the screening (<u>refugee</u> determination) process, the limited access of screened-out <u>Hmong</u> to the appeals process, and the fairness and thoroughness of that process:

The system that <u>Thailand</u> devised to differentiate between <u>Hmong</u> with valid claims to <u>refugee</u> status and those whose claims are less valid has been criticized for years. In 1989, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights detailed concerns about the system, including charges of corruption.

In 1993, an official involved in <u>refugee</u> assistance programs in <u>Thailand</u> made a careful study of 31 screened-out <u>Hmong</u> cases and concluded that 8 of the cases appeared to be potentially eligible for recognition as <u>refugees</u> and for admission to die <u>United States</u> as <u>refugees</u> based on <u>U.S.</u> Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) criteria. Another six cases appeared to have a "50-50 chance" to qualify for such recognition and <u>U.S.</u> admission.

An appeal and review system exists, but it is difficult to access, and the appeals are often rejected. For example, of the above 14 cases that an independent reviewer found to have a reasonable-to- strong claim for <u>refugee</u> status, UNHCR officials in <u>Thailand</u> only supported the appeal of one case, and the Thai authorities rejected that appeal.

Although obvious flaws exist in both the screening and appeals processes, the <u>U.S.</u> Embassy in Bangkok and the State Department in Washington have shown little interest in supporting a review of screened-out cases. Recently, for example, 300 <u>Hmong</u>, most of whom were screened out, paid thousands of dollars to Thai officials who promised to include them on the list of screened-in <u>Hmong</u> eligible to apply for resettlement. Rather than view the 300 individuals involved as people fearful of being returned to Laos and willing to take desperate measures to avoid that fate, a State Department official, in a letter to various members of Congress who expressed concern about the group, described the group as having "attempted to bribe their way into the resettlement process."

Given that there are only about 1,600 screened-out *Hmong*, reviewing the cases of those who claim that they were unfairly denied *refugee* status should not be an impossibly cumbersome task.

RECOMMENDATION: Congress should urge the State Department to press UNHCR and the Thai government to undertake a review of the cases of screened out <u>Hmong</u> who dispute the decision in their <u>refugee</u> status determination hearing. The State Department could facilitate this process by accepting information regarding these cases that may be available from relatives in the <u>United States</u>.

5. Regarding restrictions already in place or anticipated that limit the ability of *Hmong* with *refugee* status to apply for resettlement in the *United States*:

For many years, the <u>Hmong</u> have been under the impression that they could remain in <u>Thailand</u>. For that reason, some decided not to apply for resettlement. Now that it is becoming clear to them that their only alternatives may be repatriation or resettlement, some of those who did not choose resettlement earlier may now wish to do so. The Thai government has said that those who previously signed voluntary repatriation forms or who agreed to move to Ban Na Pho camp can no longer choose resettlement The <u>United States</u> is reportedly considering setting a date by which eligible **Hmong refugees** who wish to apply for resettlement must apply.

All of these restrictions and roadblocks are unnecessary. They limit options and accomplish nothing.

RECOMMENDATION: Both the Thai and <u>U.S.</u> government should allow <u>Hmong</u> who did not previously opt for resettlement but who now wish to pursue it to apply for it without unnecessary hindrances. Imposing a cut-off date at this time is unnecessary, and a decision on this matter should be postponed.

Regarding the Thai government's insistence that all Laotian Hmong must leave Thailand by the end of 1995:

<u>Thailand</u> has allowed the <u>Hmong</u> to remain on Thai soil for 19 years. Although it has confined them to closed <u>refugee</u> camps, it has allowed the international community to assist them. For its own reasons, <u>Thailand</u> has decided to pull up the welcome mat. Given the severity of <u>refugee</u> emergencies in other areas of the world, the international community, the <u>U.S.</u> government included, is reluctant to continue funding the <u>Hmong's</u> continued stay in <u>Thailand</u>, or to resist <u>Thailand</u> s decision.

But the fact that <u>Hmong</u> who cannot or do not wish to resettle abroad may have little choice but to repatriate does not mean that repatriation is right for them. The State Department's own 1993 report on human rights in Laos,

while noting improvements in some spheres, noted, "Restrictions on basic freedoms in Laos have eased only a little in recent years."

That the Laotian government limits the areas in which repatriating <u>Hmong</u> may settle, and the number who can settle together, is an indication of its continued suspicion of <u>Hmong</u> returnees. The government is also slow to approve the applications for repatriation of those <u>Hmong</u> who do volunteer to repatriate. Some informed observers have told USCR that they believe that Vientiane does not want the <u>Hmong</u> back, and that the government only cooperates with the repatriation program to ease its relations with the outside world.

RECOMMENDATION: The <u>United States</u> should urge the Thai government to allow <u>Hmong refugees</u> and asylum seekers to remain in <u>Thailand</u>, at least while the safety of returnees is investigated and while cases that may have been wrongly denied <u>refugee</u> status are reviewed, and to remove any roadblocks to <u>Hmong</u> with <u>refugee</u> status applying for resettlement.

7. Regarding the disappearance of repatriated <u>Hmong</u> leader Vue Mai, the implications of his disappearance for the repatriation process, and the fears of members of the <u>Hmong</u> community in the <u>United States</u> for their friends and relatives in **Thailand** and Laos:

Vue Mai, a prominent <u>Hmong refugee</u> leader who repatriated to Laos in November 1992, disappeared in September 1993, an incident that fueled concern about <u>Hmong</u> repatriation to Laos.

The <u>U.S.</u> and Thai governments and UNHCR encouraged Vue Mai, who had formerly been active in the <u>Hmong</u> resistance, to repatriate in order to be a role model for screened-out <u>Hmong</u> who would have to accept repatriation to Laos. Vue Mai was assured that he would be safe in Laos.

Nearly seven months after Vue Mai's disappearance, nothing concrete is known about who was responsible for his disappearance or what their motives were. There is much speculation, however, and two explanations are most often heard. One is that Vue Mai was abducted by Lao government security forces for unknown reasons (though some speculate that it may have been an attempt by Vientiane to undermine the repatriation process, which the Lao government is said not really to want). The other is that he was abducted by members of the *Hmong* resistance, which opposes repatriation because it undermines the resistance politically, financially, and logistically. (The resistance is said to receive its support primarily from *Hmong refugees* in *Thailand* and the *United States*.)

If putting a damper on the repatriation was the intent of those responsible, they certainly had some effect. The disappearance confirmed the fears of many in the <u>U.S. Hmong</u> community that repatriation is not safe, and some **Hmong** leaders and organizations have used the disappearance to argue that repatriation should be halted.

RECOMMENDATION: The disappearance of Vue Mai should be investigated as part of any assessment of the safety of returned *refugees* in Laos.

Mr. Chairman, it will be difficult to find solutions for the *Hmong* that all will welcome.

The wishes and attitudes of many of the concerned parties are deeply at odds. Many <u>Hmong</u> still fear returning home. 'Me Thai government wants the <u>Hmong</u> to <u>leave</u>. Some <u>Hmong</u> leaders in the <u>United States</u> claim that repatriation is unsafe. The international community tires of financing the <u>Hmong's</u> continued exile. The <u>United States</u> appears anxious to wind down <u>Hmong</u> resettlement.

It seems clear that many <u>Hmong</u>, particularly those denied <u>refugee</u> status, are going to repatriate, whether voluntarily or not so voluntarily. What the <u>United States</u> government can do to ease the concern of <u>Hmong</u> both here and in <u>Thailand</u> is to ensure that all those with valid claims to <u>refugee</u> status have a full and fair hearing, to make it possible for those with <u>refugee</u> status who are eligible and wish to apply for resettlement in the <u>United States</u> to do so, and to provide as many safeguards for those who return as possible. That is the objective of the recommendations I have made today. The State Department does not appear, at present, to see a need for these

actions. I strongly urge you to impress upon the Department that acting upon these recommendations could make a positive difference.

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