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# **Body**

#### INTRODUCTION

President Bill Clinton has promised to "end <u>welfare</u> as we know it," and his Administration is drawing up proposals for Congress which, the White House claims, will deliver on that promise. In making this bold commitment, the President acknowledges that the War on Poverty has failed. America today is spending seven times as much in constant dollars on means-tested <u>welfare</u> as it was when the War on Poverty started in 1965. Overall the U.S. taxpayers have spent \$ 5 trillion on <u>welfare</u> since Lyndon Johnson launched his "war," an amount greater than the <u>cost</u> of defeating Germany and Japan in World War II.

President Johnson declared his "war" would be a great investment which would return its <u>cost</u> to society manyfold, and the average American household has already "invested" around \$ 50,000 in taxes in fighting the War on Poverty. But in many respects the fate of lower-income Americans has become worse, not better, in the last quarter-century.

A key reason is that <u>welfare</u> has caused a collapse of the low-income family. Today, one child in eight is being raised on <u>welfare</u> through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. When the War on Poverty began, roughly one black child in four in the United States was born out of wedlock. Today two out of three black children are born out of wedlock. Rapid increases in illegitimacy are occurring among low-income whites as well; the illegitimate birth rate among low-income white high school drop outs is 48 percent. Overall 30 percent of children in the U.S. are now born to single mothers.

One reason why this trend is so destructive is that single-parent homes dependent on <u>welfare</u> are poor environments for raising children. Children brought up in such circumstances have <u>limited</u> prospects for succeeding in mainstream society. They are far more likely to fail in school. They are more likely to get caught up in crime. And they are more likely to end up on <u>welfare</u> themselves as adults. June O'Neill of Baruch College, in New York City, has even shown that long-term <u>welfare</u> dependence reduces a child's intellectual ability by one-third when compared with nearly identical low-income children not on <u>welfare</u>. n1

Single-parent families also impose staggering social <u>costs</u> on the communities around them. Young black men raised without fathers on average commit twice as much crime as young black men raised in similar low-income families with both a father and mother present. n2 The threat of violence that makes most Americans afraid to walk at night in major U.S. cities is a direct result of family disintegration engendered by the <u>welfare</u> state.

It is indeed, as the President maintains, vital to end <u>welfare</u> as we know it. The center-piece of President Clinton's reform proposal does give the appearance of changing the system, at least in part. The President proposes to require those parents in the AFDC program who have received <u>welfare</u> for over two years to perform community service work (workfare) in exchange for continued AFDC benefits. However, despite the conservative rhetoric, the

actions of the Clinton Administration during its first year in office have gone in exactly the opposite direction. The Clinton Administration has in fact sought to expand conventional <u>welfare</u> programs and to undermine existing work requirements for <u>welfare</u> recipients.

Specifically, the Clinton Administration thus far has:

Proposed a huge increase in conventional <u>welfare</u> spending. After promising to end <u>welfare</u>, the Clinton Administration in its first budget proposal asked for \$ 110 billion over five years in expanded spending for existing <u>welfare</u> programs, such as Food Stamps, the Women, Infants and Children Food Program (WIC), public housing, and energy assistance.

Ignored funding for workfare. Despite its pleas for an additional \$ 110 billion for conventional <u>welfare</u> spending, Clinton's proposed budget did not seek one extra dime for expanding workfare programs. But all experts agree that if the government is to require <u>welfare</u> recipients to work in exchange for benefits, extra funds must be provided to administer such work programs. n3

Postponed long-term work requirements. By avoiding any real commitment to expanding workfare up to the present time, the Clinton Administration has ensured that its efforts to "end <u>welfare</u> as we know it" cannot even commence until fiscal year 1995. This very late start makes it unlikely that more than four or five percent of all parents enrolled in the AFDC program actually will be required to work in exchange for <u>welfare</u> benefits by the time President Clinton seeks re-election in 1996.

Attempted to reduce current work requirements. Far from promoting workfare programs, the Clinton Administration has spent most of 1993 seeking to undermine the few work requirements in existing law. It has even gone so far as to advise states to violate the current law in order to reduce the amount of work that *welfare* recipients would be required to perform.

The history of <u>welfare</u> is littered with the rhetoric of politicians who have claimed they were overhauling the system while little or nothing was changed. The Clinton Administration is perfectly poised to join in this venerable tradition. Even worse, despite passing references in a few speeches, Clinton seems determined to avoid serious policies dealing with the core <u>welfare</u> problem: how to reduce illegitimacy and encourage marriage.

#### LESSONS FROM THE PAST: THE LEGACY OF BOGUS REFORM

The history of the U.S. <u>welfare</u> system is marked by a complete disconnect between political rhetoric and public policy reality. For instance, in launching the War on Poverty, President Lyndon Johnson confidently declared "the days of the dole are numbered." But then he greatly expanded the number of <u>welfare</u> programs and the number of Americans receiving <u>welfare</u>.

Just five years ago, Americans were told that the <u>welfare</u> system had been dramatically overhauled with the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988. The public was told that most <u>welfare</u> recipients would be required to work in exchange for benefits. Senator Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) declared of the reforms, which he championed, "For 50 years the <u>welfare</u> system has been a maintenance program. It has now become a jobs program." n4 <u>Welfare</u> spending, supporters said, would be dramatically trimmed as child support payments from absent fathers replaced government-funded <u>welfare</u> benefits for most single mothers. The claim was eerily similar to today's declarations.

The 1988 reforms, it was alleged, would require millions of <u>welfare</u> mothers with young children to work. This claim had ramifications in other areas of public policy; over the next two years, it gave a major impetus to efforts to fund a national government day care system through the Act for Better Childcare. Proponents of this legislation argued that the 1988 <u>welfare</u> reforms demonstrated that the idea of mothers in general caring for children in the home was passe. Thus, a new government day care infrastructure would be required not only for the children of <u>welfare</u> mothers who would allegedly be sent to work, but also for children of the general population.

But in the five years since the 1988 "<u>welfare</u> overhaul," the only noticeable change in the <u>welfare</u> system has been a dramatic surge in spending. <u>Welfare</u> spending by federal, state, and local governments in 1988 was \$ 217 billion -- by 1992, spending had surged to \$ 305 billion (both figures are in constant 1992 dollars).

While Americans were told that the 1988 reforms required most <u>welfare</u> recipients to work for benefits, by 1992 only one percent of all AFDC parents were actually required to perform community service work (workfare) in exchange for <u>welfare</u> assistance. n5 A slightly greater number were required to search for a job or undertake training. Overall, as table 1 shows, during the average month in 1992, only 6.9 percent of AFDC parents were required to work, search for a job, or participate in education and training for more than 20 hours per week. Table

Percentage of Adult AFDC Recipients Participating in Mandatory Job Search, Community Service Work, or Training: FY1992

Alabama	7.2%
Alaska	3.8%
Arizona	2.8%
Arkansas	9.6%
California*	4.8%
Colorado	11.1%
Connecticut	14.6%
Delaware	8.0%
District of Columbia	6.0%
Florida	3.8%
Georgia	4.7%
Hawaii	0.7%
Idaho	8.4%
Illinois	6.6%
Indiana*	1.2%
Iowa	3.8%
Kansas	9.2%
Kentucky	5.1%
Louisiana	4.0%
Maine	5.2%
Maryland	4.6%
Massachusetts	16.5%
Michigan*	6.9%
Minnesota	5.1%
Mississippi	2.5%
Missouri	3.8%
Montana	15.1%
Nebraska	31.5%
Nevada	9.0%
New Hampshire	9.8%
New Jersey	8.9%
New Mexico	7.6%
New York	6.8%
North Carolina	5.1%
North Dakota	13.0%

<sup>\*--</sup> data represent participants as percentage of full AFDC caseload for 1991.

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Ohio	9.6%
Oklahoma	24.6%
Oregon	10.4%
Pennsylvania	5.9%
Rhode Island	10.9%
South Carolina	5.4%
South Dakota	8.6%
Tennessee	4.2%
Texas	5.2%
Utah	30.0%
Vermont	7.4%
Virginia	6.7%
Washington	11.2%
West Virginia	6.9%
Wisconsin	18.1%
Wyoming	11.7%
Nationwide Average	6.9%

Source: Office of Family Assistance, Department of Health and Human Services. All data are monthly averages of recipients who participated in programs more than 20 hours per week.

When pressed to explain the dismal results of the 1988 legislation, the conventional excuse is a shortage of funding for the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) program contained in the Act. Under the provisions of the legislation, this program operates workfare, job search, and training activities for <u>welfare</u> recipients. This convenient explanation is misleading, however. The real problem of the 1988 reforms was that very few AFDC recipients were in fact required to participate in any JOBS activity. Since the Act required only six percent of the AFDC caseload to participate in job search, training, or community service work, most states met these requirements using only part of the allocated federal JOBS funds. n6 There was a shortage of requirements, not a shortage of money.

Significantly, Congress poured billions of dollars into expanding the coverage of conventional <u>welfare</u> programs after passing the Family Support Act. n7 Since 1988, expansions in Medicaid and housing programs alone would have been far more than sufficient to fund work programs for all AFDC parents. The simple fact is that Congress, after telling the American public that it was going to require <u>welfare</u> recipients to work for their benefits, did everything but that. What Congress actually did was to <u>limit</u> workfare programs while expanding conventional welfare dramatically.

Congress has followed the traditional pattern in <u>welfare</u> policy over the last five years. Lawmakers talk tough about workfare, but Congress keeps the actual number of recipients who are required to work as low as possible, and expands spending on conventional <u>welfare</u> programs. Unfortunately, during its first year in office, the Clinton Administration has shown every indication that it intends to follow this well-worn path.

#### Clinton's Reform Rhetoric

As candidate and as President, Bill Clinton has spoken often about the <u>need</u> to reform <u>welfare</u>. At times his rhetoric has been stirring; in *Putting People First: How We Can All Change America*, Clinton pledged to "honor and reward people who work hard and play by the rules." <u>Welfare</u> reform, and more specifically his pledge to "end <u>welfare</u> as we know it" was invoked often and with great effect during the campaign, and played a key role in Clinton's strategy of portraying himself as a "New Democrat."

The centerpiece of President Clinton's reform proposal is to end <u>welfare</u> as a long-term one-way hand-out. Adult <u>welfare</u> recipients in the AFDC program would receive normal <u>welfare</u> for only two years. If they remained on <u>welfare</u> for over two years they would be required to perform community service work in exchange for benefits. In *Putting People First*, which laid the foundation for recent policy pronouncements, Clinton states the government should:

After two years, require those who can work to go to work, either in the private sector or in community service: [the government should] provide placement assistance to help everyone find a job, and give the people who can't find one a dignified and meaningful community service job. n8

With this statement, Clinton adopted rhetorically the workfare policy advocated by Ronald Reagan and other conservatives for over twenty years, but opposed by liberal majorities in Congress.

Yet Clinton's proposal was not <u>limited</u> to creating new responsibilities for <u>welfare</u> recipients. In addition to the "stick" of required work, he proposed new "carrots" or incentives to "honor and reward those who work hard and play by the rules." These incentives include an expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and government-funded health care for low-income working parents.

Earlier this year, in an address to the National Governors Association, Clinton repeated his "carrots and sticks" theme of <u>welfare</u> reform. "We must provide people on <u>welfare</u> with more opportunities for job training," he declared, "with the assurance that they will receive the health care and child care they <u>need</u> when they go to work, and with all the opportunities they <u>need</u> to become self-sufficient. But then we have to ask them to make the most of these opportunities and to take a job." n9

While Clinton's rhetorical commitment to requiring <u>welfare</u> recipients to work and to rewarding families who strive to be self-sufficient is commendable, it is also strangely <u>limited</u>. Despite having an entire chapter devoted to children and another to the family, <u>Putting People First</u> never mentions illegitimacy or marriage. n10 By ignoring the <u>need</u> to reduce illegitimacy and to promote marriage Clinton evades the core problem of the <u>welfare</u> state and the root of many of America's social problems. n11 Insisting that <u>welfare</u> mothers work at community service jobs will do little to reduce <u>welfare costs</u> or to improve society as long as the illegitimate birth rate remains at 30 percent and rising. THE CLINTON RECORD TO DATE

As disturbing as the lack of commitment to tackling illegitimacy is the widening chasm between Clinton's <u>welfare</u> reform rhetoric and his actions. The record thus far suggests that Bill Clinton intends to deliver on all of the "carrots" of <u>welfare</u> reform, such as expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, and providing government-funded health care to millions of Americans, but deliver on few or none of the "sticks," such as work and personal accountability.

#### A Disturbing Appointment

In his first concrete action on the <u>welfare</u> reform front, President Clinton appointed Donna Shalala as head of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The choice was odd because Shalala had served for years on the Board of Directors of the Children's Defense Fund, a Washington-based organization which has taken the lead in opposing work requirements for <u>welfare</u> recipients. Shalala actually served at the Children's Defense Fund during a period when the organization opposed the minuscule work and job search requirements in the 1988 Family Support Act. In her lengthy confirmation testimony Shalala mentioned <u>welfare</u> reform in only one vague sentence. Upbraided by Senator Moynihan for her lack of interest in reform, Shalalala promised merely to create yet another task force to look into reform.

#### Revealing Budget Proposals

An even greater disappointment to those who trusted in Clinton's promise to "end <u>welfare</u>" was the President's proposed budget submitted in the spring of 1993. The President's budget asked for \$ 110 billion in expanded <u>welfare</u> spending over the next five years. <u>Welfare</u> spending was already projected to grow at a baseline rate of roughly 50 percent over five years, before the proposed spending increases. Thus Clinton was proposing \$ 110 billion in new spending above an already rapidly expanding baseline.

True, some \$ 26 billion of this new <u>welfare</u> spending was to expand the Earned Income Tax Credit. By supplementing the earnings of low-wage working parents, the EITC does help to "make work pay" relative to <u>welfare</u>. It is one of Clinton's "carrots" to reward constructive behavior and should be considered part of his

<u>welfare</u> reform package. But the other spending increases sought by Clinton were largely for conventional <u>welfare</u> programs invented in the earlier years of the War on Poverty: Food Stamps, public housing, energy aid, community development grants, and Head Start, among others. A complete list of Clinton's proposed <u>welfare</u> spending increases is included in the Appendix.

Some might attempt to justify this expansion of conventional <u>welfare</u> programs on the grounds that <u>welfare</u> was cut back during the Reagan and Bush years. In reality, federal, state, and local <u>welfare</u> spending (measured in constant 1992 dollars) grew by more than 50 percent in the Reagan-Bush period, rising from \$ 195 billion in 1980 to \$ 305 billion in 1992. And as a percentage of GNP, <u>welfare</u> spending climbed from 4.2 percent when Ronald Reagan took office to 5.2 percent when George Bush left. So the claimed "reduction" of funding during this period cannot justify Clinton's proposed increases.

#### No Workfare Funding

Still, the dramatic spending increases for conventional <u>welfare</u> proposed by Clinton are only part of the picture. The most devastating fact about Clinton's budget is that the \$ 110 billion in proposed new <u>welfare</u> spending did not contain one thin dime for expanding workfare. If large numbers of <u>welfare</u> recipients are to be required to work, total <u>welfare costs</u> may fall as recipients leave the rolls, but the amount of money specifically devoted to operating work programs must be greatly increased. The funds for administering workfare for <u>welfare</u> recipients are currently included under the JOBS program created by the Family Support Act of 1988. In his address to the National Governors Association in February, Clinton said that the JOBS program had been highly successful but had been hampered by a lack of funds. However, his budget released a few weeks later contained no increase in JOBS/workfare funding.

Some might argue that Clinton could not increase workfare funding until all the details of his <u>welfare</u> reform could be worked out. But when Clinton ultimately unveils his reform, it will contain work programs similar to the workfare program (Community Work Experience program) which exists in current law and is already operated on a small scale as part of JOBS. If the intent is to "end <u>welfare</u> as we know it" the Clinton Administration should have begun by vastly increasing as soon as possible the number of recipients required to participate in existing workfare programs. It was not necessary to wait until every detail of its final workfare plan had been developed. It is also worth noting that the Clinton budget contained emergency funding requests for other initiatives such as National Service, even though the details of those programs had not been worked out.

If the Clinton Administration was serious in its plan to require workfare, it would have asked for supplemental appropriations for workfare in 1993 and, say, a quadrupling of JOBS funding for 1994. Instead Clinton sought aggressively to expand conventional *welfare* not workfare. The money for the proposed expansion of the Food Stamp program alone could have quadrupled future funding for JOBS/workfare. n12 By procrastinating on its commitment to workfare, the Clinton Administration ensured that its campaign to end *welfare* would not even begin until Fiscal Year 1995.

While not all the President's spending initiatives were approved by Congress, the proposed budget presents a dramatic statement of presidential priorities. The message is clear. The President has promised a <u>welfare</u> reform of both carrots (positive incentives for constructive behavior) and sticks (sanctions or <u>limits</u> on negative behavior). Following the pattern which has become almost habitual, the carrots have appeared promptly but the stick is nowhere in sight.

The Administration's budget story has a final hypocritical twist. A few months after Clinton proposed \$ 110 billion in increased spending, mainly for conventional <u>welfare</u> programs, Clinton political appointees at HHS began suggesting that it might be necessary to scale back Clinton's <u>welfare</u> reform plan because the government lacked funds to pay for it. n13 Thus Clinton appointees sought to build a case for reneging on Clinton's workfare policy by citing a lack of funds at the same time the Administration was proposing vast increases in conventional <u>welfare</u> spending.

The War Against Workfare

The Clinton Administration has not merely ignored its commitment to workfare; it has actually spent most of 1993 attempting to roll back existing work requirements.

Under the 1988 Family Support Act, only one group of <u>welfare</u> recipients was actually required to work in exchange for benefits. That group was fathers in two-parent families receiving benefits from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) program. According to the Family Support Act, fathers in AFDC-UP families would be required to work in community service programs for sixteen hours per week. Congress <u>limited</u> this requirement to only 40 percent of AFDC-UP fathers and postponed the effective date of the work requirement until FY 1994. Note the minimal nature of this requirement: two-parent AFDC-UP families are 9 percent of the AFDC caseload, so 40 percent of 9 percent means only 3.6 percent of the total AFDC caseload faced a real work requirement. Even that requirement to work for a few hours per week was delayed until FY 1994, six years after the Act's passage.

The Clinton Administration's actions with regard to this minimal work requirement have been unequivocal -- it has repeatedly attacked it. During the debate on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, the Clinton Administration sought to postpone the AFDC-UP work requirement effective date from FY 1994 to FY 1996. n14 Since all the work provisions of the AFDC program undoubtedly will be completely rewritten before 1996, the Clinton Administration effectively was proposing to kill the only real work provision in existing law. n15 The Administration claimed lamely that it was trying to postpone work requirements on AFDC-UP fathers because there were no funds to operate such workfare programs. Even assuming this dubious argument is correct, there were no funds to implement these workfare programs in FY 1994 precisely because the Clinton Administration requested none.

While the House of Representatives went along with Clinton's plan to roll back the AFDC-UP work requirements during the congressional debate on the budget, the Senate rebelled at this effort to gut the only work requirement in existing law. Led by Senator Moynihan, the Senate rejected the Clinton plan. The Senate then prevailed over the House in conference and the modest AFDC-UP work requirements were maintained unchanged.

After the Clinton Administration failed in its legislative efforts to eliminate work requirements for AFDC-UP fathers, it adopted a back-door strategy: If it could not wipe out the law, the Administration proposed to neuter it by permitting and encouraging an open violation of the law by state governments. This September, a few days before the AFDC work requirements were to take effect, Clinton's HHS issued a new regulation which greatly weakened the requirements. n16 Whereas the law requires participating AFDC-UP fathers to perform community service work at least sixteen hours per week, the Clinton regulations cut this to only eight hours per week. n17

Since these proposed regulations deliberately and clearly violated the law, they drew a firestorm of protest. Among the critics, Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) declared, "Now that they can't delay any longer, the Administration is trying to water down these requirements. It is clear that this Administration is evading <u>welfare</u> reform." n18 Faced with vocal opposition in the Senate and press articles calling attention to the contradiction between Clinton's rhetoric and policy, HHS quickly rescinded its regulations.

State Experimentation and Waivers

The only area of the Clinton record that suggests even the slightest momentum toward genuine reform has been waivers granted to state governments. In keeping with his "New Democrat" theme, President Clinton has acknowledged that all wisdom may not reside in Washington, D.C. He has thus proposed to foster state experimentation in <u>welfare</u> policy by granting state governments waivers from federal law in operating some <u>welfare</u> programs. n19

In addressing the National Governors Association, President Clinton repeated his campaign pledge to promote state experimentation:

We <u>need</u> to encourage experimentation in the states . . . I do not want the Federal Government, in pushing <u>welfare</u> reforms based on [my] general principles, to rob [state governors] of the ability to do more, to do different things. . . . My view is that we ought to give you more elbow room to experiment. n20

Clinton explained that serious support for experimentation must permit the states to undertake initiatives which go beyond federal reform policies and do things which he, the President, might not personally approve of. In order to foster experimentation, he pledged to "approve waivers of experiments that I did not necessarily agree with. . . . If we didn't disagree on anything, what would be the <u>need</u> for experiments? That is the nature of the experiment, is that one person has an idea different from another person." n21

However, to date, few of the waiver requests submitted to the Clinton Administration have proposed significant reforms. The key exception was the waiver request submitted by Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson for an experiment in two counties. In those counties, the Governor planned to convert the AFDC program into a program of temporary aid. AFDC recipients could receive benefits for two years, after which their AFDC benefits would be terminated. In contrast to President Clinton's national reform proposal, Thompson's experimental plan did not guarantee community service jobs to those who stayed on <u>welfare</u> over two years.

The response of Clinton's HHS was predictable. Despite the President's explicit pledge to grant waivers for policies he did not fully agree with, HHS attempted to crush the Wisconsin waiver request. HHS demanded that the Governor eviscerate his proposal by guaranteeing all AFDC recipients who remained on AFDC over two years the right to community service jobs. This would have converted the Thompson proposal from a unique experiment into a mere clone of what Clinton was proposing to do nationally.

Governor Thompson refused to yield to HHS pressure. HHS then sought to cripple the proposal by requiring the Wisconsin government to entangle itself in thousands of dollars of "due process" litigation each time an AFDC case was actually terminated. Despite months of resistance, it was HHS rather than Thompson that finally buckled, and the waiver request was granted without crippling modifications.

The Wisconsin waiver will initiate a bold experiment, but its scope is <u>limited</u>. The experiment is restricted to only two counties and does not begin until January 1995. <u>Welfare</u> benefits will not be terminated for any recipients until two years later, in January 1997.

Reviewing the overall record of the Administration, the lesson is plain. The Clinton record on workfare has been a disaster. After campaigning on the theme of "ending <u>welfare</u>" and requiring <u>welfare</u> recipients to work, Clinton has expanded conventional <u>welfare</u> spending, requested no funds for workfare, and sought to abolish the only real work requirement in existing law. This is scarcely an auspicious start for "ending <u>welfare</u> as we know it."

#### PRINCIPLES OF REAL REFORM

The <u>welfare</u> system desperately <u>needs</u> reform. Real reform would convert <u>welfare</u> from a one way hand-out into a system of mutual responsibility in which <u>welfare</u> recipients would be given aid but would be expected to contribute something back to society for assistance given. A reformed system also must strongly discourage dependency and irresponsible behavior and encourage constructive behavior. It must firmly control soaring <u>welfare costs</u>, which are slowly bankrupting the nation. Finally, and most important, <u>welfare</u> reform must seek to reduce the illegitimate birth rate in the U.S. and promote the formation of stable two-parent families. Any "reform" which does not dramatically reduce the illegitimate birth rate will not save money and will fail to truly help America's children and society.

With these objectives in mind, real reform must be based on the following eight principles:

#### 1) Establish serious workfare requirements.

The key to successful workfare is the number of <u>welfare</u> recipients who are required to participate. Following the pattern of the 1988 reforms, it is likely that the Clinton plan will be quite complex, appearing to require large numbers of recipients to perform community service work when in reality few are. Real reform would require all fathers in the AFDC-UP program to perform community service work forty hours per week in 1994. It would also require able-bodied single persons in the Food Stamp program to work. And it should require half of all single mothers on AFDC to perform community work service for benefits by 1996.

#### 2) Establish sensible workfare priorities.

Workfare programs should be efficient and low-<u>cost</u>. Workfare should be established first for those persons who have the least justification for being out of the labor force. Therefore workfare requirements should be imposed initially on able-bodied, non-elderly single persons on <u>welfare</u>, followed by fathers in two-parent families on <u>welfare</u> and absent fathers who fail to pay child support. After workfare has been put in operation for these groups, those single mothers on AFDC who do *not* have preschool children should be required to work. n22

High day care expenses mean that putting a single mother with a young child to work in a community service work program <u>costs</u> roughly two to three times as much as requiring a mother with older child to work. Because work programs inevitably operate within fixed budgets, an emphasis on workfare participation by mothers with younger children leads to a sharp reduction in the total number of persons who will be required to work. One little-understood aspect of the workfare debate is that liberals often attempt to focus workfare programs on mothers with very young children precisely because they understand this will quickly soak up available funds and thereby <u>limit</u> the number of recipients required to participate. Liberal <u>welfare</u> advocates also would like to undermine the general concept of workfare by showing that all workfare programs <u>cost</u> more than they save -- so they promote the least <u>cost</u>-effective workfare programs (namely, those with a heavy emphasis on mothers with young children).

About half of AFDC single mothers do not have any pre-school children under age five. Workfare should be imposed on single mothers with younger children under five only after most mothers with older children have been required to work. However, if an AFDC mother gave birth to an additional child after her initial enrollment in AFDC, that child should not exempt her from work requirements. (This rule is <u>needed</u> to prevent mothers from having additional children to escape the work requirement.)

#### 3) *Limit welfare* given to unwed teen mothers.

By paying young women to have children out of wedlock, the current <u>welfare</u> system encourages them in a course of action that, in the long term, proves self-defeating to the mothers and harmful to both the children and society. Placing millions of single mothers in work and training programs will have little positive effect for society as long as the illegitimate birth rate remains over 30 percent.

Congress must go to the heart of the dependency problem by seeking to reduce the number of illegitimate births. It has been a tragic mistake for the government to pay money to fourteen-year-old girls on the condition that they have children out of wedlock. The government should begin to address the illegitimacy problem by ending the disastrous present policy of giving AFDC cash payments to unmarried teen mothers.

As Washington Post journalist Leon Dash has shown in his book When Children Want Children, most unmarried teen mothers both conceive and deliver their babies deliberately rather than accidentally. n23 While young women do not bear unwanted children in order to gain a <u>welfare</u> income, they are very much aware of the role which <u>welfare</u> will play in supporting them once a child is born. Thus, the availability of <u>welfare</u> bolsters the decision to become pregnant. Refusing to pay young unwed mothers direct cash benefits would certainly result in a sharp and substantial drop in teen illegitimacy. n24

Those federal AFDC funds, which currently are given directly to unwed mothers under age 21 should be converted into block grants to the states. State governments could use the funds to develop innovative new policies for assisting those teenagers who continue to have children out of wedlock. Such polices could include supporting the mothers in tightly supervised group homes or promoting adoption. But federal funds could no longer be used to simply give cash <u>welfare</u> to teen mothers.

4) Do not provide increased AFDC and Food Stamp benefits to mothers who bear additional children while already enrolled in the AFDC program.

Under the current system, if a mother enrolled in AFDC bears additional children she receives an automatic increase in her AFDC and Food Stamp benefits. No other family in U.S. society receives an automatic increase in its family income if it has more children. There is no reason to provide expanded <u>welfare</u> benefits to single mothers who have additional illegitimate children after they are already dependent on <u>welfare</u>.

A <u>limitation</u> of this sort has already been put in effect in the state of New Jersey by black Democratic Assemblyman Wayne Bryant. Although available evidence is <u>limited</u>, early data suggest that the policy will significantly reduce the number of out-of-wedlock births. State officials call attention to a 16 percent drop in births among <u>welfare</u> recipients in the first two months following the change in policy. n25

5) Require paternity establishment for children receiving AFDC.

Current law requires that an AFDC mother must make a "good faith" effort to identify the father of the child in order to receive AFDC. This law is routinely ignored.

The government should require, for children born after January 1994, that the mother identify the father of the child in order to receive AFDC, public housing, or Food Stamps. n26 Exceptions to this rule in a few hardship cases could be given but the exceptions should not exceed 10 percent.

Modern DNA testing permits government officials to determine the child's real father with absolute confidence. Once the mother has identified the father and paternity has been established, the father can be required to pay child support to offset <u>welfare costs</u>. If the child support paid does not equal half the <u>cost</u> of the AFDC and Food Stamps received by the mother and child, the remainder should become a debt which the father must repay at a future point.

If the father claims he cannot pay any child support because he cannot find a job, the government should require community service work from him to fulfill his obligation. Experiments with this approach in Wisconsin have led to surprising improvements in the ability of absent fathers to locate private sector employment and pay child support. Moreover, the definite expectation among young men that they will be identified as fathers and required to pay child support for their children may put an end to the ethos in some communities where young men assert their masculinity by lathering children they have no intention to support.

## 6) Reduce welfare's marriage penalty.

The current <u>welfare</u> system heavily penalizes marriage between a mother and a working man. This marriage penalty should be reduced by creating a tax credit for lower-income parents who are married and who are working rather than living on <u>welfare</u>.

7) Provide increased funding for abstinence education.

Scientific experiments have shown that strong sexual abstinence curricula substantially change teenagers' attitudes toward early sexual activity. Among girls taking abstinence courses, pregnancy rates have been reduced by over 40 percent when compared with girls who have not taken the sex abstinence classes. n27 By contrast, programs promoting contraception may increase pregnancy rates.

8) Cap the growth of welfare spending.

No matter how frequently official Washington proposes to "end <u>welfare</u>," the <u>costs</u> of <u>welfare</u> continue to rise. <u>Welfare</u> absorbed about 1.5 percent of GNP when Lyndon Johnson launched the War on Poverty in 1965; it had risen to over 5 percent by 1992. With a \$ 305 billion price tag, <u>welfare</u> spending now amounts to \$ 8,300 for each poor person in the U.S. Worse still, Congressional Budget Office figures project total <u>welfare costs</u> to rise to half a trillion dollars, or about 6 percent of GNP, by 1998. n28 Predictably, the Clinton Administration maintains that half a trillion dollars is not enough; "ending <u>welfare</u>" for the Clinton Administration means adding on even more spending.

The long history of bogus <u>welfare</u> reforms, all of which were promised to save money but did not, leads to one obvious conclusion. The only way to <u>limit</u> the growth of <u>welfare</u> spending is to do just that: <u>limit</u> the growth of

welfare spending. The welfare system must be put on a diet. The future growth of federal means-tested welfare spending should be capped at, say, 3.5 percent per annum. n29 Individual programs would be permitted to grow at greater than or less than 3.5 percent according to congressional priorities, provided aggregate spending fell within the 3.5 percent ceiling. By slowing the outpour from the federal welfare spigot, the cap gradually would reduce the subsidization of dysfunctional behavior: dependency, non-work, and illegitimacy. The cap also would send a warning signal to state welfare bureaucracies. Cushioned by a steady and increasing flow of federal funds in the past, most bureaucracies have found no need to grapple with the tough and controversial policies needed to really reduce illegitimacy and dependency. With a cap on future federal funds, state governments would, for the first time, be forced to adopt innovative and aggressive policies which would reduce the welfare rolls.

CONCLUSION: THE COMING BOGUS REFORM

Clinton's promise to "end <u>welfare</u> as we know it" was a focal point of his 1992 election campaign. Clinton aides admit that <u>welfare</u> reform is pivotal to Clinton's effort to define himself as a "New Democrat." By claiming that he will require <u>welfare</u> recipients to work for the benefits they get, Clinton has seized a very popular issue; nearly 90 percent of the public believe that able-bodied <u>welfare</u> recipients should be required to "do work for their <u>welfare</u> checks." n30

But Clinton's actions in his first year in office indicate strongly that he intends to expand rather than end <u>welfare</u>. While Clinton no doubt will boldly embrace the symbols of reform, there is very little indication that he will actually seek substantial changes in the current system. All the evidence suggests that Clinton will duplicate the meaningless <u>welfare</u> reform debate of 1988. As in 1988, the public again will be told that America has achieved a revolutionary change in <u>welfare</u> when in fact little or nothing has been altered.

Using the 1988 reform and the first year Clinton record as prognosticators, it seems likely that President Clinton will propose a new round of bogus reform which will have the following features:

checkmark Any proposed legislation will have tough language about requiring work, but the actual work provisions will be technical and complex. Few on Capitol Hill will read and understand them.

checkmark While the Administration will claim that vast numbers of <u>welfare</u> recipients will be required to perform community service work under its proposed legislation, few will actually be required to work. The percentage of AFDC recipients who are actually required to perform community work service work will probably be under 10 percent in 1996.

checkmark The workfare programs established will be inefficient and unnecessarily expensive. The <u>costs</u> of operating these programs will exceed any savings they achieve by encouraging <u>welfare</u> recipients to leave the rolls. The Clinton Administration will claim vaguely that the programs will save money "in the long run."

checkmark The Clinton Administration will call for a heavy new investment in education and training programs for <u>welfare</u> recipients despite the compelling evidence that such programs are ineffective in raising the wage rates of <u>welfare</u> recipients.

checkmark The false notion that huge numbers of <u>welfare</u> mothers have been required to work will be used to justify creating a federal day care system for middle class families.

checkmark The central problem of high illegitimacy rates will rarely be mentioned; no effective policies to reduce illegitimacy and promote marriage will be adopted.

checkmark Means-tested <u>welfare</u> spending will continue to soar after the "reforms" and will almost certainly top \$ 500 billion by 1998.

checkmark The entire Clinton reform will be swaddled in tough, conservative rhetoric.

The bogus <u>welfare</u> reform of 1988 simply perpetuated a social disaster. By creating a facade of illusory change, the 1988 Family Support Act stalled serious reform efforts for a half decade. Accumulating evidence indicates the 1988 process is about to be repeated.

But American society cannot afford another round of bogus <u>welfare</u> reform. The <u>welfare</u> state is out of control and growing rapidly. Insidiously, <u>welfare</u> creates its own clientele; by undermining work ethic and family structure, the <u>welfare</u> state generates a growing population in "<u>need</u> of aid." This is why <u>welfare</u> spending has risen from 1.5 percent of GNP when Lyndon Johnson launched the War on Poverty in 1965 to 5 percent today. Spending will rise to 6 percent of GNP within few years, and there is no end in sight. Moreover, by promoting illegitimacy and family disintegration, <u>welfare</u> is a leading cause of crime and other social problems.

The only way to end this expensive and destructive pattern is to enact true reform -- reform that controls <u>costs</u>, reduces dependency, and above all, reduces illegitimacy.

#### **APPENDIX**

Proposed Expansions for <u>Welfare</u> Programs from "A Vision for Change for America" The Clinton Administration Budget Proposal, FY 1994

The following is a list of spending increases in means-tested <u>welfare</u> programs and related programs for low-income persons and communities proposed by the Clinton Administration in its initial budget submitted to Congress on February 17th of this year. While not all of these spending increases were enacted by Congress, the list does give a clear indication of the priorities of the Clinton Administration.

All figures are taken directly from the Appendix to the President's budget summary, *A Vision of Change for America*. n31 Most figures represent proposed spending increases over a five-year period from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 1998. However, "Summer of Opportunity" figures generally represent short-term spending initiatives of one or two years. Some programs are listed more than once in the budget, receiving multiple increases from separate initiatives. For example, the Clinton Administration proposed to increase WIC funding as part of the "Summer of Opportunity" and again as part of "Lifelong Learning." In these cases, the total proposed increase for the program is the sum of all the increases listed separately in the budget.

Proposed Increases in the FY 1994 Budget Request

"Summer of Opportunity"

WIC Supplemental Feeding Program:

Expand food benefits to women and children.

Cost: \$ 75 million

Emergency Food Assistance Program:

Provide added federal money to purchase food for food banks.

**Cost**: \$ 23 million

Chapter 1, Summer School Program:

Expand funding for summer school programs for children in poor neighborhoods.

**Cost**: \$ 500 million

Chapter 1, Census Supplemental:

Expand education funding for schools in

Cost: \$ 235 million

disadvantaged areas.

Head Start Summer Program:

Expand Head Start through <u>Cost</u>: \$ 500 million

the summer months.

HHS/Head Start Childcare Feeding:

Pay for meals of children attending <u>Cost</u>: \$ 56 million

the expanded

Head Start summer program.

Immunization:

Buy vaccines for low-income children. <u>Cost</u>: \$ 300 million

Summer Youth Employment:

Finance more than 700,000 summer jobs <u>Cost.</u> \$ 1,000 million

for low-income youths.

Worker Profiling:

Provide funds to identify workers that <u>need</u> <u>Cost</u>: \$ 29 million

job placement help.

Community Service Employment

for Older Americans:

Provide added funds to expand <u>Cost</u>: \$ 26 million

participation of senior citizens in community service projects.

Extend Unemployment Compensation: <u>Cost</u>: \$ 4,000 million

National Service Program:

Pay "volunteers" to perform <u>Cost</u>: \$ 15 million

community service.

Urban Development and Housing Initiative

Accelerate Public Housing Modernization:

Accelerate a "backlog" of funding for 5-year <u>cost</u>: \$ 1,035 million

improving public housing.

Community Development Block Grants:

Funding for previously unfunded 5-year **cost**: \$ 2,536 million

projects like street and bridge

work, building rehabilitation, painting

and resurfacing, and other "public

service projects" in disadvantaged areas.

Supportive Housing:

Expand funding for homeless shelters. 5-year <u>cost</u>: \$ 423 million

Environment/Energy

Increase Weatherization Grants:

Expand grants to encourage state 5-year <u>cost</u>: \$ 47 million

weatherization programs for low-income people.

Rebuild America -Infrastructure

Business and Community Initiative:

Provide federal assistance 5-year <u>cost</u>: \$ 1699 million

to low-income rural

residents to raise their standard of living.

Increase Weatherization Grants:

Provide more federal money for low-income

people to insulate their homes. 5-year **cost**: \$ 375 million

Community Development Block Grant:

Provide more funds for low- and 5-year <u>cost</u>: \$ 430 million

moderate-income

residents to improve their communities.

Enterprise Zones (tax incentive):

Invest in "enterprise zones" in poor areas. 5-year <u>cost</u>: \$ 4,119 million

Community Development Banks:

Create banks that would provide 5-year cost. \$ 468 million

government loans

for business and housing purposes in low- and

moderate-income areas.

Housing Vouchers:

Expand housing subsidies to more Americans. 5-year <u>cost</u>: \$ 1,370 million

Preservation and Restoration

of Assisted Housing:

Provide funds to upgrade government 5-year <u>cost</u>: \$ 1,377 million

rental housing.

Supportive Housing Program:	
Increase funds for homeless.	5-year <u>cost</u> : \$ 424 million
Distressed Public Housing:	
Increase funds to repair and	5-year <i>cost</i> : \$ 373 million
restore public housing.	
HOPE Youthbuild:	
Provide added spending on young people.	5-year <u>cost</u> : \$ 106 million
Lifelong Learning	
WIC (Special supplemental	
food program for women,	
infants, and children):	
Expand food aid to families with young children.	5-year <u>cost</u> : \$ 3,634 million
Parenting and Family Support:	
Provide funds to government	5-year <u>cost</u> : \$ 1,450 million
programs to teach low-	
and moderate-income parents	
how to raise children.	
Head Start:	
Increase Head Start funding.	5-year <u>cost</u> : \$ 13,846 million
National Service:	
Employ "volunteers" for community service.	5-year <i>cost</i> : \$ 9,430 million
Worker Training Initiatives:	
Add to funding for training	5-year <i>cost</i> : \$ 14,910 million
low-income workers.	
Rewarding Work	
EITC:	
Expand refundable tax credits to	5-year <i>cost</i> : \$ 26,787 million
low-income working families with children.	
Unemployment Extension:	5-year <u>cost</u> : \$ 2,400 million
Health Care	
Food Stamps:	

Provide funds to expand

5-year *cost*: \$ 12,000 million

the Food Stamp program.

Low-income Home Energy Assistance Program:

Increase funding to pay utilities bills for low- and moderate-income families.

5-year *cost*: \$ 2,945 million

Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

# **Graphic**

Graph, U.S. <u>Welfare</u> Spending: 1929-1992, Source: Heritage calculations based on U.S. government data. Heritage DataChart

## Classification

Language: ENGLISH

**Subject:** POVERTY & HOMELESSNESS (89%); *WELFARE* BENEFITS (89%); CHILDREN (89%); LOW INCOME PERSONS (89%); PREGNANCY & CHILDBIRTH (88%); FAMILY (88%); POOR POPULATION (73%); INCOME ASSISTANCE (73%); PERSONAL & FAMILY INCOME (68%); WORLD WAR II (67%); SINGLE PARENTS (65%); BIRTHS & BIRTH RATES (65%); PARENTS (65%); SCHOOL DROP OUTS (60%)

**Company:** XIAMEN ANNE CORP LTD (51%); CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (90%)

Organization: CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (90%)

Ticker: 002235 (SZSE) (51%)

Person: BILL CLINTON (56%)

Geographic: UNITED STATES (95%); JAPAN (79%); GERMANY (54%)