

# KlayBank Audit Report - Zap,Bondsale

## Audit Info

- **delivered at** : 2022-01-25
- **auditor** : Creative Carrot 🥕
- **target**
  - **github** : <https://github.com/klaybank/klaybank-audit-shared>
  - **commit hash** :
    - **klaybank-bondsale** : `fa6fbd12e71cae34fa5423022c3b8cac2ea65f35`
    - **zap** : `89181150b9054432c97872da899b7c52f17c9b36`
  - **files** : `klaybank-bondsale/**/*.sol` & `zap/**/*.sol`

IssueId	Description	Severity
KBB-00	BondDepository.adjust() does not update <code>adjustment.rate</code> to 0 when <code>adjustment.target</code> has been reached.	Minor
KBZ-00	<code>ClaimSwapLPZap.estimatePoolTokensInverse()/estimatePoolTokens()</code> should not be used in other contracts	Tips

## Issues

### [KBB-00] - BondDepository.adjust() does not update `adjustment.rate` to 0 when `adjustment.target` has been reached.

**Severity** : Minor

**Status** : Fixed

### Description

because of the changes made in `BondDepository.adjust()` (compared to OlympusDAO BondDepository), `adjustment.rate` will remain non-zero when `adjustment.target` has been reached. It does not change any logics but will be displaying the wrong values

### Recommendation

Rollback the changed made in the `BondDepository.adjust()`

**[KBZ-00] - `ClaimSwapLPZap.estimatePoolTokensInverse()`  
`,estimatePoolTokens()` should not be used in other contracts**

**Severity :** Tips

**Status :** Ack

## **Description**

`ClaimswapLPZap.estimatePoolTokensInverse()/estimatePoolTokens()` functions are prone to flashloan attacks and sandwich attacks.

It is not being used in any parts of the contracts and seems it is used for calculating values off-chain so this issue is marked as 'tips' but if anyone uses these functions.

**DO NOT USE THESE FUNCTIONS IN ANY OTHER CONTRACTS**