




The Impact of Network Topology on Banking Default Dynamics

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Financial crisis of 2008



- Drastic financial losses
- Decrease in the GDP growth rate
- Bankruptcy of the 4th largest investment bank in USA
Lehman brothers



Networks matter

- **Networks matter.** The network structure is crucial to estimate systemic risk
- **Data scarce.** This is one of the main challenges for empirical studies of financial networks
- **Systemic risk can be estimated.** One measure of systemic risk is the DebtRank

Network matters



Debt rank

Bank at the beginning (a) and at the peak of the financial crisis (b).

Project scope

- Nier E., Yang J., Yorulmazer T., Alentorn A. «Network Models and Financial Stability» (2008)
 - Simulation of default contagion
- Kashirin V. «Evolutionary Simulation of Complex Networks Structures with Specific Topological Properties» (2014)
 - Generation of complex networks
- Our project:
 - Implementation of simulation model
 - Implementation of network generation
 - **Observing the impact of network topology on default dynamics**

Generation of networks **G(n,p)**

- Network models
 - G(n, p) model
 - Stochastic Block Model (SBM)
 - Complex network structure simulation
- **G(n,p) Model.**
 - **n**: The number of nodes $|V|$
 - **p**: probability of connecting two nodes

Degree distribution of a node is given by:


$$P(k) = \binom{n-1}{k} p^k (1-p)^{n-1-k}$$

The mean degree is given by:

$$\langle k \rangle = np$$

Generation of networks **SBM**

- Generate Community like structure



- Parameters
 - Number of communities C
 - Block assignment vector \vec{z} with values in $\{0, \dots, C - 1\}$
 - Stochastic block matrix
 - An example for 3 community stochastic block matrix

$$M_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 0.8 & 0.1 & 0.05 \\ 0.1 & 0.9 & 0.1 \\ 0.05 & 0.1 & 0.65 \end{pmatrix}$$

Complex network structure simulation

- Real-world complex networks are usually characterized by a set of specific topological characteristics:
 - High clustering coefficient
 - Short average path lengths
 - Communities
 - etc.

Simulated annealing

$$G^* = \operatorname{argmin}_{G \subseteq R} 1 - \psi(G)$$

Let G be the initial graph

Let $\psi(G)$ be the weighted sum of objective functions for graph G

$T \leftarrow T_0$

$t \leftarrow 0$

while $T > T_{min}$ **do**

$E_{cur} \leftarrow 1 - \psi(G)$

 Mutate G to obtain G'

$E_{new} \leftarrow 1 - \psi(G')$

$G \leftarrow G'$ with probability $Pr = [-\frac{1}{T} * \max\{0; E_{new} - E_{cur}\}]$

$T \leftarrow T(t)$

$t \leftarrow t + 1$

end while


Graph mutation

- Connection of random pair of nodes
 - Rewiring a pair of randomly selected edges
- Global modifications
- Removal of random edge
- Connecting local nodes
 - Local rewiring a pair of random edges
- Local modifications


Compute-intensive task

- Graph generation could run up to 6 hours on ETH Euler's 48 cores
- 5 days of CPU time (for 10`000 graphs)
- **Must be parallelized!**

Example graphs



$C = 0.52$, $apl = 3.55$



3 communities, 0.6 modularity

Shock and assets simulation model

Model parameters (p, n, γ, β, E)

- I, E Total internal/external aggregate assets $A = E + I$
- γ net worth percentage to total assets
- β, θ percentage of external/internal assets $\beta = \frac{E}{A}$
- a_i, e_i, i_i are total, external and internal assets for each bank
- Z is number of links

Algorithm 1: Algorithm distributing assets according to the aggregated values

```

 $w \leftarrow \frac{I}{Z}$ 
for  $i \in [1, n]$  do
   $i_i \leftarrow w \sum_{j=1}^n A_{ij}$ 
   $b_i \leftarrow w \sum_{j=1}^n A_{ji}$ 
   $\tilde{e}_i \leftarrow \max(b_i - i_i, 0)$ 
end for
for  $i \in [1, n]$  do
   $e_i \leftarrow \tilde{e}_i + [(E - \sum_{l=1}^n \tilde{e}_l)/n]$ 
   $a_i \leftarrow e_i + i_i$ 
   $c_i \leftarrow \gamma a_i$ 
   $d_i \leftarrow a_i - c_i - b_i$ 
end for

```


Shocks simulations


Model parameters (p, n, γ, β, E)


- c_i bank net worth $c_i = \gamma a_i$
(damping shocks)
- b_i inter-bank borrowing
- $a_i = e_i + i_i$


Algorithm 2: Algorithm of shocks and shock transmission


Let s_i be the size of initial shock
if $s_i > c_i$ **then**
 the bank i defaults
end if
if $s_i - c_i - b_i \leq 0$ **then**
 creditor banks lose $(s_i - c_i)$
 distributed equally
else
 Depositor banks lose $s_i - c_i - b_i$
end if































G(n, p) model results

- We scan parameters p and θ .




(a)



(b)


G(n, p) model results

- We scan the parameter γ (damping factor).




Recall : $\langle k \rangle = np = 25 \times 0.2 = 5$.


Impact of the clustering coefficient




Results obtained from SBM



(a)
SBM with M_1



(b)
 $G(n = 75, p = 0.2)$



(c)
SBM with M_2

$$M_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 0.4 & 0.1 & 0.1 \\ 0.1 & 0.4 & 0.1 \\ 0.1 & 0.1 & 0.4 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$M_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 0.65 & 0.1 & 0.1 \\ 0.1 & 0.65 & 0.1 \\ 0.1 & 0.1 & 0.65 \end{pmatrix}$$

Summary

- Implemented crisis simulation and network generation models
- Models applied to observe the impact of different topological parameters on banking default dynamics
- Propose regulations for the minimum percentage net worth
- Full graph topology matters in real world banking networks
- International banking networks require higher percentage net worth

Improvements

- Use our framework to generate networks and observe the impact of varying other properties
- Use different distributions of assets:
 - Observe the impact of distribution
 - Evaluate existing network to get the distribution
- Introduce the temporal characteristic of networks

Thank you for your attention!