

Responses to Reviewers' Comments

for paper titled
Formal verification and validation of run-to-completion style state-charts using Event-B
by
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Thanks We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and providing us with the chance to improve our paper. Below we summarise our major changes and address the problems and questions raised by the referees.

Reviewer #1:

Presentation

This paper presents an embedding of statecharts in Event-B. As such, it can be considered as a shallow embedding of statecharts in Event-B. A strong point of the paper is to address through refinements the derivation of a concrete application. The starting point being the basic semantics of the execution model of statecharts and the last refinement being the considered application at a given level of detail. Moreover, the paper goes beyond the usual safety properties usually addressed by such approaches : liveness properties are here considered.

From my point of view, the presented work is valuable. Actually, it can be considered as emerging from the synthesis of three conference papers [12,13,14].

Discussion

I would appreciate if the authors could elaborate their work along the following points:

- Semantics. Statecharts have a long history. By now, they can be considered as belonging to the family of synchronous languages. It would be interesting if the authors could give some comments on the choice of statecharts and especially on the relevance of the considered semantics of run-to-completion. Otherwise stated could the authors highlight the benefits of such a choice in general and of statecharts especially.

Response:

Son: We need to justified run-to-completion here.

“ ... ”

Reviewer #1:

- Proof of temporal properties. Different temporal properties are considered. Since the proof of such properties are outside (currently) the Event-B method they have considered other tools and methods. It would have been interesting to outline the frontier. As a matter of fact, it is not clear for me if the Event-B properties can be tackled in temporal logic, e.g., how sequences are embedded? Could you be precise, comment your embedding?

Response:

Karla: →**Son** We were working on adding some text related to TLA. I think this can also be addressed extending on the that text

The trace semantics for Event-B models have been presented in some existing work. Based on the semantics, proof obligations are generated from the Event-B models accordingly. For example, the invariant preservation proof obligations are generated per event to ensure that the invariant holds always, i.e., $G(I)$. Here, we “extend” the trace semantics with fairness assumption and reason about progress properties using the combination of deadlock-freeness and convergence event arguments (generated as proof obligations).

We added the following paragraph related to various proof obligations that we used to Section 3.2 (Event-B).

“Proof obligations are generated to ensure the consistency of Event-B models. An important proof obligation in Event-B is invariant preservation to prove that safety properties (encoded as invariants of the models) will not be violated for any reachable states. In this paper, we also make use of other proof obligations in Event-B such as (relative) deadlock-freeness and (conditional) event convergence to construct our proof of liveness properties under some fairness assumptions.”

Reviewer #1:

- Proof of fairness properties. In order to deal with fairness properties you advocate a strong fairness assumption. From my point a view, this is a strong operating assumption. May be you could comment on that? Last, but may be I am wrong, I have the intuition that weak fairness for the events handling dequeuing external triggers would be enough? Please could you comment?

Response:

Karla: →**Son** I need your input here

“ ... ”

Reviewer #1:

- p.2 The three rules are not at the same level. The first ones are expressed explicitly in terms of Event-B refinement features, while the third one addresses statecharts.

Response: To address other concerns we have added a “Statechart Refinement” section to the manuscript. Please refer to Section 5 in the revised manuscript. This section now states, and illustrates the refinement rules.

Reviewer #1:

- p. 10 typo? listing 3 l. 10 \emptyset

Response:

Karla: →**Colin** I am not sure of what typo the reviewer is talking about

It is not clear what \emptyset reference needs to be change. We have reviewed the listing and there seem to be no problem with it.

Reviewer #1:

- p.13 Could you illustrate the sentence all possible combinations of each set of transitions that can fire together are calculated and corresponding events are generated, at appropriate refinement levels.

Response: The paragraph has been revised to include an example based on the drone model.

“Secondly, all possible combinations of each set of transitions that can fire together are calculated and corresponding events are generated, at appropriate refinement levels (given by the refinement annotations embedded in the SCXML model), that refine the abstract basis events. The transitions that can fire together are those that are triggered by the same trigger (or are both untriggered) and are in different parallel (‘and’) sub-states. For example, the untriggered transitions shown in the parallel states FLYOP and BATTERYOP of figure 3 are combined into an event in the Event-B representation of the model, through a conjunction of the guards and actions of each of the transitions.”

Reviewer #1:

- p.15 Fig. 5 is too small. One cannot read its text.

Response: The figure has been enlarged to improve readability.

Reviewer #1:

- p.18 It would have been interesting to state the discussion of the first paragraph of section 7: Verification of Safety Properties within the context of the proof obligation generator you have at hand.

Response: We added the following paragraph related to various proof obligations that we used to Section 3.2 (Event-B), in particular stating that safety properties are modelled as invariants in Event-B.

“Proof obligations are generated to ensure the consistency of Event-B models. An important proof obligation in Event-B is invariant preservation to prove that safety properties (encoded as invariants of the models) will not be violated for any reachable states. In this paper, we also make use of other proof obligations in Event-B such as (relative) deadlock-freeness and (conditional) event convergence to construct our proof of liveness properties under some fairness assumptions.”

Reviewer #1:

- p.19 Could you precise your notion of run.

Response: Run here refers to different simulation paths that can be generated to explore systems behaviors. We have revised the text as shown below

“System events: Events other than external events are called system events. They are the events by which the system responds to the external triggers (by creating different runs or simulation paths).”

Reviewer #1:

- p. 20 typo. We are now present

Response: The text has been revised as follow:

“We now present a theorem and a corollary related to (relative) deadlock-freeness properties for a different set of events.”

Reviewer #1:

- p. 21 Could you give a formal definition or at least a reference of your strong fairness.

Response: We added the following paragraph to Section 3.2 (Event-B).

“ For the trace semantics corresponding to Event-B machines and the intepreation of LTL properties over traces, we refer the readers to [?]. Here, we recall the notation for fairness assumptions underlying event-based formalisms such as Event-B [?, ?]. Given an event e , a weak-fairness assumption $WF(e)$ states that if e is enabled continually, then it must occur infinitely often. Similarly, a strong-fairness assumption $SF(e)$ states that if e is enabled infinitely often, then it must occur infinitely often. Formally,

$$WF(a) \Leftrightarrow (FG \text{ enabled}(e) \Rightarrow GF [e]) , \text{ and} \\ SF(a) \Leftrightarrow (GF \text{ enabled}(e) \Rightarrow GF [e]) ,$$

where G and F are the temporal operators denoting *globally* and *finally*, respectively; and $\text{enabled}(e)$ denotes that event e is enabled and $[e]$ denotes an occurance of event e . ”

Reviewer #1:

- p.22 Could you comment on your definition of anticipated events. Why the set of convergent events is necessary to recall just before?

Response:

Karla: →Son Add explanation of why the variant is needed for anticipation

“ ... ”

Reviewer #1:

- p.22 Proof of Convergence an Anticipation I wonder if this paragraph should not be before because you use such arguments before just after stating Theorem 2.

Response:

Karla: →Son Highlight the the subproof will be done later

“ ... ”

Reviewer #1:

- p.23 typo. it will be dequeued.

Response: The text has been revised as follow:

“ If an external trigger is raised, then eventually, it will be dequeued.”

Reviewer #1:

- p. 23 could you explain the square bracket notation, e.g. `[externalTrigger.t]`

Response: We explain the `[]` notation as part of the explanation about fairness assumptions (newly added). The explanation of the “dot” notation is in Theorem 3, that is `[e.t]` indicates an occurrence of event `e` with parameter value `t`.

“where `G` and `F` are the temporal operators denoting *globally* and *finally*, respectively; and `enabled(e)` denotes that event `e` is enabled and `[e]` denotes an occurrence of event `e` .”

Reviewer #1:

- typo. they do not hold a priori.

Response: The text has been revised as follow:

“These proof will need to be done for each individual SCXML state-chart as they do not hold a priori.”

Reviewer #1:

- typo. relying on lexicographic order . . .

Response: The text has been revised as follow:

“We present a generic approach to reason about the proof of convergence and anticipation relying on lexicographic order as follow.”

Reviewer #1:

- The paragraph Proof of Convergence and Anticipation needs to be written again. There are many typos: this event removes, discards, decreases, accroding, . . .

Moreover the sentence

The external events are anticipated accroding to the above variants trivially since they only modify the external queue `eQ`. Note that we do not attempt to prove the convergence of any future events here. Instead, we assume that these future events will be prove to be convergence later. seems to me problematic. In your definition of anticipated you did not say that these events should be proven convergent later?

Response:

Karla: →**Son** Could you please take a look just to make sure I did not introduced mistakes with my changes

The entire Proof of Convergence and Anticipation subsection has been revised. Please refer to the provided manuscript.

Reviewer #1:

- p.25 could you state explicitly your strong fairness property and the interplay with the temporal properties you are concerned with.

Response: The definition of fairness assumptions is now added in the new paragraph in Section 3.2 (Event-B). The specific (strong) fairness assumption that we made is in Assumption 1 (Strongly Fair System Events). This fairness assumption is used in the proof for Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 to prove the termination of responses for external triggers.

Reviewer #1:

- p.25 A reference to the seminal Unless of UNITY could be in order.

Response: We have added a reference to “Chandy, M., Misra, J.: Parallel program design - a foundation. Addison-Wesley (1989)” when discussing Unless property.

Reviewer #1:

- p. 26 (Theorem 5) I think that the indexes in eQ should be first stated as legal in both quantifications.

Response: We added the condition that both indexes i, j must be in the domain of eQ , i.e., $i \in \text{dom}(eQ)$ and $j \in \text{dom}(eQ)$.

Reviewer #1:

- p. 27 All the temporal proofs have been done in an adhoc way without any tool support. It would be interesting to have a feedback about this? To be provocative, if you are interested in temporal proofs why did you choose this tool? Have you considered TLA which does support temporal proofs (as well as refinements in a certain way)?

Response:

Karla: →**Son** Add some comments of the complexity of the models and and translating them to TLA

As explained above, the Event-B approaches to proving temporal properties is implicit via proof obligations. In TLA, the proving of temporal properties is more explicit compared to Event-B. The last time we checked the TLA+ Proof System, it does not support reasoning about many temporal operators (http://tla.msr-inria.inria.fr/tlaps/content/Documentation/Unsupported_features.html).

Karla: →**Son** Add to manuscript in the related work section TLA

“ ... ”

Reviewer #1:

- It would be interesting to analyze if the proofs are specific to the example or to the underlying semantics?
PS Could you put another zip version on the repository: I have had some strange problems (missing characters) with some machine files? For such files, I was not able to play again the proofs.

Response:

Karla: →**Son** Rephrase in page 23 second bullet point the fact that the variant is model specific. Add a couple of sentences on the semantic nature of the other variants

“ ... ”

Reviewer #2:

The paper introduces a technique for the refinement of ‘run to completion’ statechart modelling notation (using SCXML language) while preserving safety properties. The statechart specification is translated to event-B formalism, allowing for formal verification using a theorem prover. The proposed approach is demonstrated using a statechart specification of a drone.

Positive points:

- + Interesting topic
- + Technique well motivated
- + The paper is well written and easy to read.

Negative points:

- One single case study is not enough to validate the proposed approach. The statechart specification of the drone is rather small. More elaborated models are required to validate the proposed approach.

Response: Although we agree with the reviewers point of view that a single case study is not enough for a full evaluation of the approach. We want to emphasize the fact we have describe other model in previous publication. We have clearly added references to this other models in the example section. The case studies have grown in complexity and the drone in particular makes use of all the features for model construction and refinement.

Reviewer #2:

General comments:

- The three refinement rules listed in the introduction have not been described explicitly in the rest of the paper. Please describe them (using minimal examples) in section 3.

Response: A new section has been added to state and discuss the refinement rules. Please refer to section 5 in the revised manuscript.

Reviewer #2:

- In the introduction, the paragraph before last "Page 3: lines 7 to 17" that compares the proposed approach to the work presented in [4] may be pushed to Section 3 or 4 since such comparison is meaningless before presenting the details of the approach and the example.

Response: As suggested by the reviewer the paragraph has been moved to section 4.

Reviewer #2:

- The paper lacks a related work section. Please add one.

Response: A related work section has been added to the manuscript. Please see section 2

Reviewer #2:

Minor points:

- After an introductory word or phrase, use a comma (this is a recurrent in the paper). For example, e.g. --> e.g., i.e. --> i.e., "To verify liveness we outline" --> "To verify liveness, we outline", etc.

Response: The requested changes have been completed.

Reviewer #2:

- Abstract: "We introduce" --> "In this paper, we introduce".

Response: The text has been revised as follow:

“ In this paper, we introduce a notion of refinement into a ‘run to completion’ state-chart modelling notation, and leverage Event-B’s tool support for theorem proving.
”

Reviewer #2:

- Add "Even-B" to the list of keywords.

Response: The requested change has been completed.

Reviewer #2:

- Page 2: line 5: "Particularly attractive is providing" --> "Particularly attractive in providing"

Response: The text has been revised as follow:

“It is particularly attractive, to provide accessibility to abstraction/refinement via Rodin/Event-B which has an intuitive metaphor in the Statechart semantics [12,14,13].
”

Reviewer #2:

- Page 2: line 10: "safety preservation" --> "safety properties preservation"

Response: The requested change has been completed.

Reviewer #2:

- Page 2: line 20: "Preservation of safety" --> "Preservation of safety properties"

Response: The requested change has been completed.

Reviewer #2:

- Page 2: line 45: "in the sense of [9]" --> "in the sense adopted by Lamport [9]"

Response: The requested change has been completed.