

COMPARISON OF MACHINE LEARNING MODELS FOR CLASSIFICATION OF BGP ANOMALIES

by

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Abstract

Worms such as Slammer, Nimda, and Code Red I are anomalies that affect performance of the global Internet Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP anomalies also include Internet Protocol (IP) prefix hijacks, miss-configurations, and electrical failures. In this Thesis, we analyzed the feature selection process to choose the most correlated features for an anomaly class. We compare the Fisher, minimum redundancy maximum relevance (mRMR), odds ratio (OR), extended/multi-class/weighted odds ratio (EOR/MOR/WOR), and class discriminating measure (CDM) feature selection algorithms. We extend the odds ratio algorithms to use both continuous and discrete features.

We also introduce new classification features and apply Support Vector Machine (SVM) models, Hidden Markov Models (HMMs), and naive Bayes (NB) models to design anomaly detection algorithms. We apply multi classification models to correctly classify test datasets and identify the correct anomaly types. The proposed models are tested with collected BGP traffic traces from RIPE and BCNET and are employed to successfully classify and detect various BGP anomalies.

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List of Acronyms

- AS: Autonomous System
- CIXP: CERN Internet exchange Point
- BGP: Border Gateway Protocol
- BGPAD: Border Gateway Protocol Anomaly Detection Tool
- CDM: Class Discriminating Measure
- DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service
- EGP: Exterior Gateway Protocol
- EOR: Extended Odds Ratio
- HMM: Hidden Markov Model
- IANA: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
- IETF: Internet Engineering Task Force
- IGP: Interior Gateway Protocol
- IP: Internet Protocol
- ISP: Internet Service Provider
- OR: Odds Ratio
- MRT: Multi-Threaded Routing Toolkit
- MOR: Multiclass Odds Ratio
- mRMR: Minimum Redundancy Maximum Relevance
- NB: Naive Bayes
- NLRI: Network Layer Reachability Information
- RBF: Radial Basis Function
- RIB: Routing Information Base
- thesis: Réseaux IP Européens
- ROC: Receiver Operating Characteristic
- SQL: Structured Query Language
- SVM: Support Vector Machine
- TCP: Transmission Control Protocol
- WOR: Weighted Odds Ratio

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routes the Internet traffic [1]. BGP is de facto Inter-Autonomous System (AS) routing protocol. An AS is a group of BGP peers that are administrated by a single administrator. The BGP peers are routers that use BGP as an exterior routing protocol and participate in BGP sessions to exchange BGP messages. An AS usually relies on an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) protocol to route the traffic within itself [2]. The AS numbers are assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [3]. Peer routers exchange four types of messages: open, update, notification, and keepalive. The main function of BGP is to exchange reachability information among BGP peers based on a set of metrics: policy decision, the shortest AS-path, and the nearest next-hop router. BGP operates over a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) using port 179.

BGP anomalies often occur and techniques for their detection have recently gained visible attention and importance. Recent research reports describe a number of anomaly detection techniques. One of the most common approaches is based on a statistical pattern recognition model that is implemented as an anomaly classifier [4]. Its main disadvantage is the difficulty in estimating distributions of higher dimensions. Other proposed techniques are rule-based and require a priori knowledge of network conditions. An example is the Internet Routing Forensics (IRF) that is applied to classify anomaly events [5]. However, rule-based techniques are not adaptable learning mechanisms, are slow, and have a high degree of computational complexity.

Various anomalies affect Internet servers and hosts and, consequently, slow down the Internet traffic. Three worms have been considered in this thesis: Slammer, Nimda, and Code Red I.

The Structured Query Language (SQL) Slammer worm attacked Microsoft SQL servers on January 25, 2003. The Slammer worm is a code that generates random IP addresses and replicates itself by sending 376 bytes of code to randomly generated IP addresses. If the IP address happens to be a Microsoft SQL server or a user PC with Microsoft SQL Server Data Engine (MSDE) installed, the server becomes infected and begins infecting other servers [6]. Microsoft released a patch to fix the vulnerability six months before the worm's attack. However, the infected servers were never patched. The slowdown of the Internet traffic was caused by the crashed BGP routers that could not handle the high volume of the worm traffic. The first flood of BGP update messages was sent to the neighbouring BGP routers so they could update entries of the crashed routers in the BGP routing tables. The Slammer worm performed a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The Internet Service Provider (ISP) network administrators restarted the routers thus causing a second flood of BGP update messages. As a result, the update messages consumed most of the routers' bandwidth, slowed down the routers, and in some cases caused the routers to crash. To resolve this issue, network administrators blocked port 1434 (the SQL Server Resolution Service port). Later on, network security companies such as Symantec released patches to detect the worm payload [7].

The Nimda worm is most known for its very fast spreading. It propagated through the Internet within 22 minutes. The worm was released on September 18, 2001. It propagated through email, web browsers, and file systems. In the email propagation, the worm took the advantage of the vulnerability in the Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.5 SP1 (or earlier versions) that automatically displayed an attachment included in the email message. The worm payload is triggered by viewing the email message. In the browsers propagation, the worm modified the content of the web document file (.htm, .html, or .asp) in the infected hosts. As a result, the browsed web content, whether it is accessed locally or via a web server, may download a copy of the worm. In the file system propagation, the worm copies itself (using the extensions .eml or .nws) in all local host directories including those residing in the network that the user may access [8].

The Code Red I worm attacked Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers on July 13, 2001. The worm took the advantage of a vulnerability in the indexing software

in IIS. By July 19th, the worm affected 359,000 hosts. The worm triggered a buffer overflow in the infected hosts by writing to the buffers without bounds checking. An infected host interprets the worms' message as a computer instruction, which causes the worm to propagate. The worm spreads by generating random IP addresses to get itself replicated and causes a DoS attack. The worm checks the system's time. If the date is beyond the 20th of the month, the worm sends 100 kB of data to port 80 of www.whitehouse.gov. Otherwise, the worm tries to find new web servers to infect [9]. The worm affected approximately half a million IP addresses a day.

Variety of behaviours and targets of the described worms increase the importance of classifying network traffic to detect anomalies [10]. Furthermore, identifying the exact type of the anomaly helps network administrators protect the company's data and services.

In this thesis, we employ machine learning techniques to develop models for detecting BGP anomalies. We extract various BGP features in order to achieve reliable classification results. We use Support Vector Machine (SVM) models to train and test various datasets. Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) and naive Bayes (NB) models are also employed to evaluate the effectiveness of the extracted traffic features. We then compare the classification performance of these three algorithms.

1.2 Defining the Problem

Anomaly detection has gained a high importance within the research community and industry development teams in terms of research projects and developed models. BGP worms frequently affect the economic growth of the Internet. Many application domains are concerned with anomaly detection. Intrusion, distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), and BGP anomaly detections have similar characteristics and use similar detection techniques. The consensus between researchers and industry on the harmful effects of anomalies is based on the following properties of the Internet [11]:

- The Internet openness allows attackers to have a cheap, difficult to trace, and easy way to attack other servers or machines.
- Rapid development of the Internet allows users to devise new ways and tools to attack and harm other services.

- Most Internet traffic is not encrypted, which permits intruders to attack and threaten the confidentiality and integrity of many web services.
- Due to the rapid growth of the Internet, many applications are designed without taking into consideration secure ways to access the Internet. This downside makes these applications vulnerable to frequent attacks and makes the availability of adequate detection models a crucial factor for the Internet usability.

Technical vulnerabilities that the attackers exploited are software or protocol designs (Slammer and Code Red I) or system/network configurations (Nimda).

1.3 Purpose of Research

In this thesis, we adapt machine learning algorithms to detect BGP anomalies. The following issues are addressed:

- We investigate the features and correlations among features in order to identify any test data point whether a test data point is an anomaly or regular traffic. We develop a tool to extract 37 BGP features from the BGP traffic. We also explore the effect of each feature on the classification results. Among the 37 extracted features, we use 21 new features that have not been introduced in the literature.
- We select the best combination of features to achieve the best classification accuracy by applying and extending some of the existing feature selection algorithms. We compare the feature selection methods for each classification algorithm and identify the best features combination for each case.
- We adapt machine learning techniques to classify and detect BGP anomalies. Each technique has multiple variants that work well for a particular anomaly. We adapt these variants to maximize the accuracy of detecting the targeted BGP anomalies.

1.4 Literature Review

Many classification techniques have been implemented to detect BGP anomalies. During the last decade, statistical techniques were dominating classification of BGP anomalies. Recently, a number of machine learning techniques have been investigated to enhance the

performance of anomaly detection techniques [12]. In this Section, we review some well-known mechanisms for anomaly detection. We group the anomaly detection approaches in order to compare machine learning techniques used for anomaly detection and evaluate their advantages and disadvantages.

1.4.1 Statistical techniques

The statistical techniques detect anomalies under the assumption that anomalous traffic occurs with small probability when tested using stochastic models built for regular traffic [13]. Various statistical techniques have been implemented, such as wavelet analysis, covariance matrix analysis, and principal component analysis. For any statistical techniques, three steps should be performed: data prepossessing and filtering, statistical analysis, and threshold determination and anomaly detection [12]. The main disadvantage of statistical techniques is that they assume that the regular traffic is generated from a certain distribution, which is generally not correct. However, if the assumption of the traffic distribution is valid, their performance is excellent [14].

1.4.2 Clustering techniques

Clustering belongs to the unsupervised detection techniques. The key principle is to cluster the regular traffic into one cluster and classify the remaining data points as anomalous traffic [13]. Clustering groups similar traffic data points into clusters. A strong assumption of the clustering techniques is that all regular traffic data points belong to one cluster while anomalous data points may belong to multiple clusters. The main disadvantage of the clustering techniques is that they are optimized to find the regular traffic rather than the anomalous traffic that is usually the goal of the detection techniques.

1.4.3 Rule-based techniques

Rule-based techniques build classifiers based on a set of rules. If a test data point is not matched by any rule, it is classified as an anomaly. A rule-based technique has been implemented [15] where the rules that maximize the classification error were discarded. The rule-based techniques require a priori knowledge of network conditions. Their main advantage is that they enable multiclass classification. However, the labels for various classes are not always available. Another advantage is their simplicity that enables them to be

visualized as decision trees and interpreted using the classification criteria. For example, if the number of BGP announcements exceeds certain threshold, it is easy to infer that the BGP traffic at that time is considered as an anomaly.

1.4.4 Neural network techniques

Many classification models have been implemented using neural networks [16], [17]. A neural network is a set of neurons that are connected by weighted links that pass signals between neurons [18]. Neural networks are mathematical models that adapt to the changes in the layer states by constantly changing structure of the neural model based on the connection flows in the training stage. Although neural networks have the ability to detect the complex relationship among features, they have many drawbacks. For example, the high computational complexity and the high probability of overfitting encouraged researches to use other classification mechanisms.

1.4.5 Support Vector Machines (SVM) techniques

SVM detects the anomaly patterns in data using nonlinear classification functions. SVM algorithm classifies each data point based on its value obtained by the classifier function. SVM builds a classification model that maximizes the margin between the data points that belong to each class. Figure 1.1 (left) illustrates the margin that SVM maximizes. The margin is the distance between the SVM classifier (dashed line) and data points (solid lines). Figure 1.1 (right) illustrates the SVM solution. The maximum margin is the perpendicular distance between the SVM classifier function (dashed line) and the closest support vectors (solid lines). The complexity of the SVM model depends on the number of the support vectors because they control the dimensionality of the classifier function. The complexity of the SVM model decreases as the numbers of the support vectors decreases. Several variants of SVM detection techniques are introduced and evaluated [18]. The SVM algorithm has a high computational complexity because of the quadratic optimization problem that needs to be solved. However, SVM usually exhibits the best performance in terms of accuracy and F-score performance indices [19].




Figure 1.1: The margin between the decision boundary and the closest data points (left). SVM maximises the margin to a particular choice of decision boundary (right).

1.4.6 Bayesian networks based approaches

Bayesian approaches are used in many real-time classification systems because of their low time complexity. Time complexity is a function of input length and measures the execution time of an algorithm. The Bayesian networks rely on two assumptions: the features are conditionally independent given a target class and the posterior probability is the classification criteria between any two data point. The posterior probability is calculated based on the Bayes theorem. Many anomaly detection schemas have implemented variants of Bayesian networks [20]. The main advantage of Bayesian networks is their low complexity that allows them to be implemented as online detection systems [21]. Another advantage is that the testing stage has a constant time computational complexity [22].

1.5 Research Contributions

During the process of investigating the best models for BGP anomaly detection, we address and solve several issues related to the development of the proposed models. The main contributions of this thesis are:

- We extract and process BGP traffic data from thesis [23] and BCNET [24] to define 37 BGP features. These features permit us to classify and determine whether a data point instance is an anomaly.

- We investigate the effect of applying feature selection algorithms along with the proposed classifiers. We extend the usage of several algorithms to fit the type of certain features. For example, we apply the Odds Ratio [25] selection algorithm for both binary and continuous sets of features. We also discuss a methodology for identifying the relationship between the category of the features and the classification results.
- We use several machine learning algorithms to classify BGP anomalies. For example, we use HMM classifiers to classify and detect a sequence of BGP data points. In order to adapt HMM to detect BGP anomalies, we choose a two-layer, fully connected, supervised, 10-fold, Baum-Welch trained HMM classifier to detect anomalies in two-way and four-way classes. We propose efficient models to classify and test sequence of BGP packets.
- We propose four-way classifiers where the classifier will classify whether the data point instance is an anomaly and will also classify it into the correct type: Slammer, Nimda, or Code Red I. This thesis introduces the first multi-classification of BGP anomalies.
- We build a graphical user interface (GUI) tool named BGPAD [26] to classify BGP anomalies for the extracted BGP datasets and for any user specific datasets. The tool permits the user to upload a dataset to be tested by the trained models.

1.6 Structure of this Thesis

This thesis is outlined as follows. In Chapter 2, a detailed methodology of features extraction is proposed. Furthermore, several feature selection algorithms are addressed. In Section 3.1, the supervised classification process of BGP anomalies is described. Proposed methodologies based on SVM, HMM, and NB are presented in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, respectively. A user guide for the BGPAD tool is given in Chapter 4. We discuss the results in Chapter 5. Conclusions are summarized in Chapter 6 along with suggestions for future research.

Chapter 2

Feature Processing

2.1 Extraction of Features

In 2001, Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE) [23] initiated the Routing Information Service (RIS) project to collect BGP update messages. Real-time BGP data are also collected by the Route Views project at the University of Oregon, USA [27]. The RIPE and Route Views BGP update messages are available to the research community in the multi-threaded routing toolkit (MRT) binary format [28], which was introduced by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to export routing protocol messages, state changes, and contents of the routing information base (RIB). RIPE and RouteViews projects enlist end-points (routers) to collect BGP traffic. We collect the BGP update messages that originated from AS 513 (RIPE RIS, rcc04, CIXP, Geneva) and include a sample of the BGP traffic during time periods when the Internet experienced BGP anomalies. Various ASes and end-points may be chosen from RIPE and Route Views to collect the BGP update messages. Due to the global effect of BGP worms, similar results are obtained. During a worm attack, routing tables of the entire Internet are affected and, hence, similar traffic trends are observed at different end-points. We use the Zebra tool [29] to convert MRT to ASCII format and then extract traffic features. Traffic traces of three BGP anomalies along with regular RIPE traffic are shown in Figure 2.1. A sample of the BGP update message format is shown in Table 2.1. It contains two Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) announcements, which share attributes such as the AS-PATH. The AS-PATH attribute in the BGP update message indicates the path that a BGP packet traverses among Autonomous System (AS) peers. The AS-PATH attribute enables BGP to route packets via the best path.




Figure 2.1: Number of BGP announcements in Slammer (top left), Nimda (top right), Code Red I (bottom left), and regular RIPE (bottom right).

Table 2.1: Sample of a BGP update packet.

Field	Value
TIME	2003 1 24 00:39:53
FROM	192.65.184.3
TO	193.0.4.28
BGP PACKET TYPE	UPDATE
ORIGIN	IGP
AS-PATH	513 3320 7176 15570 7246 7246 7246 7246 7246 7246 7246 7246 7246
NEXT-HOP	192.65.184.3
ANNOUNCED NLRI PREFIX	198.155.189.0/24
ANNOUNCED NLRI PREFIX	198.155.241.0/24

We collect the BGP update messages that originated from:

- RIPE: Routing Information Service (RIS) project
- Autonomous System (AS 513) for European Organization for Nuclear Research Checker number four
- CERN Internet Exchange Point (CIXP) distributed neutral Internet exchange point for the Geneva area
- Routing Registry Consistency Check (rcc04) or Routing Configuration.

We filter the collected traffic for BGP update messages during time periods when the Internet experienced BGP anomalies. Details of the three anomalies and two regular traffic events considered in this thesis are listed in Table 2.2. Shown are the time range in minutes of the training and testing datasets during a five-day interval of the anomaly. For example, traffic between 3,212 and 4,080 minutes of the Slammer worm dataset are considered as anomalous traffic. The regular BCNET dataset is collected at the BCNET network operation center (NOC) located in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada [2], [30].

Table 2.2: Details of BGP datasets.

	Class	Date	Duration (h)	Training set data points	Testing set data points
Slammer	Anomaly	January 25, 2003	16	3212:4080	1:3211, 4081:7200
Nimda	Anomaly	September 18, 2001	59	3680:7200	1:3679
Code Red I	Anomaly	July 19, 2001	10	3681:4280	1:3680, 4281:7200
RIPE	Regular	July 14, 2001	24	None	1:1440
BCNET	Regular	December 20, 2011	24	None	1:1440

We develop a tool written in C# to parse the ASCII files and to extract statistics of the desired features. These features are sampled every minute during a five-day interval, producing 7,200 samples for each anomaly event. They are used as inputs for classification models. Samples from two days before and after each event are considered to be regular test datasets. The third day is the peak of activity for each anomaly. The features are normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. This normalization reduces the effect of the Internet growth between 2003 and 2011. The motivation for normalization is that most of machine learning classifiers depend on the distances between data points and the discriminant function. If a feature has high range of values, these distances are governed

by this specific feature. Extracted features, shown in Table 2.3, are categorized as *volume* (number of BGP announcements) and *AS-path* (maximum edit distance) features. Listed are the three types of features: continuous, categorical, and binary. The feature types are defined in Section 3.1. The effect of Slammer worm on *volume* and *AS-path* features is illustrated in Figure 2.2.

Table 2.3: Extracted features.

Feature	Definition	Type	Category
1	Number of announcements	continuous	<i>volume</i>
2	Number of withdrawals	continuous	<i>volume</i>
3	Number of announced NLRI prefixes	continuous	<i>volume</i>
4	Number of withdrawn NLRI prefixes	continuous	<i>volume</i>
5	Average AS-PATH length	categorical	<i>AS-path</i>
6	Maximum AS-PATH length	categorical	<i>AS-path</i>
7	Average unique AS-PATH length	continuous	<i>volume</i>
8	Number of duplicate announcements	continuous	<i>volume</i>
9	Number of duplicate withdrawals	continuous	<i>volume</i>
10	Number of implicit withdrawals	continuous	<i>volume</i>
11	Average edit distance	categorical	<i>AS-path</i>
12	Maximum edit distance	categorical	<i>AS-path</i>
13	Inter-arrival time	continuous	<i>volume</i>
14-24	Maximum edit distance = n , where $n = (7, \dots, 17)$	binary	<i>AS-path</i>
25-33	Maximum AS-path length = n , where $n = (7, \dots, 15)$	binary	<i>AS-path</i>
34	Number of Interior Gateway Protocol packets	continuous	<i>volume</i>
35	Number of Exterior Gateway Protocol packets	continuous	<i>volume</i>
36	Number of incomplete packets	continuous	<i>volume</i>
37	Packet size (B)	continuous	<i>volume</i>

The BGP generates four types of messages: open, update, keepalive, and notification. We only consider BGP update messages because they contain all information about the BGP status and configuration that is needed to extract the features defined in this thesis. The BGP update messages are either announcement or withdrawal messages for the NLRI prefixes.




Figure 2.2: Samples of extracted BGP features during the Slammer worm attack. Shown are the samples of (a) number of announcements, (b) number of announcements prefixes, (c) number of withdrawal, (d) number of withdrawals prefixes, (e) average unique AS-PATH, (f) average AS-PATH, (g) average edit distance AS-PATH, (h) duplicate announcements, (i) duplicate withdrawal, (j) implicit withdrawals, (k) inter-arrival time, (l) maximum AS-PATH, (m) maximum edit distance, (n) number of EGP packets, (o) number of IGP packets, and (p) number of incomplete packets features.

Feature statistics are computed over one-minute time interval. The NLRI prefixes that have identical BGP attributes are encapsulated and sent in one BGP packet [31]. Hence, a BGP packet may contain more than one announced or withdrawal NLRI prefix. While feature 5 and feature 6 are the average and the maximum number of AS peers in the AS-PATH BGP attribute, respectively, feature 7 only considers the unique AS-PATH attributes. Duplicate announcements are the BGP update packets that have identical NLRI prefixes and AS-PATH attributes. Implicit withdrawals are the BGP announcements with different AS-PATHs for already announced NLRI prefixes [32]. An example is shown in Table 2.4. The edit distance between two AS-PATH attributes is the minimum number of insertions, deletions, or substitutions that need to be executed in order to match the two attributes. The value of the edit distance feature is extracted by computing the edit distance between the AS-PATH attributes in each one-minute time interval [4]. For example, the edit distance between AS-PATH 513 940 and AS-PATH 513 4567 1318 is two because one insertion and one substitution are sufficient to match the two AS-PATHs. The most frequent values of the maximum AS-PATH length and the maximum edit distance are used to calculate features 14 to 33. Maximum AS-PATH length and maximum edit distance distributions for the Slammer worm are shown in Figure 2.3.

Table 2.4: Sample of BGP features definition.

Time	Definition	BGP update type	NLRI	AS-PATH
t_0	Announcement	announcement	199.60.12.130	13455 614
t_1	Withdrawal	withdrawal	199.60.12.130	13455 614
t_2	Duplicate announcement	announcement	199.60.12.130	13455 614
t_3	Implicit withdrawal	announcement	199.60.12.130	16180 614
t_4	Duplicate withdrawal	withdrawal	199.60.12.130	13455 614

We introduce three new features (34, 35, and 36) shown in Table 2.3, which are based on distinct values of the ORIGIN attribute that specifies the origin of a BGP update packet and may assume three values: IGP (generated by an Interior Gateway Protocol), EGP (generated by the Exterior Gateway Protocol), and incomplete. The EGP is the BGP predecessor not currently used by the Internet Service Providers (ISPs). However, EGP packets still appear in traffic traces containing BGP update messages. Under a worm attack,

BGP traces contain a large number of EGP packets [32]. The incomplete update messages imply that the announced NLRI prefixes are generated from unknown sources. They usually originate from BGP redistribution configurations [31].




Figure 2.3: Distributions of the maximum AS-PATH length (left) and the maximum edit distance (right).

Description of the extracted features:

1. Feature 1: The number of BGP update messages with the *Type* field set to announcement during a one minute interval.
2. Feature 2: The number of BGP update messages with the *Type* field set to withdrawal during a one minute interval.
3. Feature 3: The number of announced NLRI prefixes inside BGP update messages with the *Type* field set to announcement during a one minute interval.
4. Feature 4: The number of withdrawn NLRI prefixes inside BGP update messages with the *Type* field set to withdrawal during a one minute interval.
5. Feature 5: The average length of AS-PATHs of all messages during a one minute interval.
6. Feature 6: The maximum length of AS-PATHs of all messages during a one minute interval.
7. Feature 7: The average of unique length of AS-PATHs of all messages during a one minute interval. The maximum unique AS-PATH is not computed because it is identical to the maximum AS-PATH.

8. Feature 8: The number of duplicate BGP update messages with the *Type* field set to announcement during a one minute interval. The message that is counted more than one time is counted as one duplication.
9. Feature 9: The number of duplicate BGP update messages with the *Type* field set to withdrawal during a one minute interval. The message that is duplicated more than one time is counted as one duplication.
10. Feature 10: The number of BGP update messages during a one minute interval that have an announcement type and then a withdrawal for the same prefix has been received. If another announcement is received after the implicit withdrawal, the message is considered as a new announcement (feature 1).
11. Feature 11: The average of edit distances among all the messages during a one minute interval. Listed is the implementation of the edit distance algorithm:

```

1   Function EditDistance ([] a, [] b)
2   {
3       [,] EditDistanceArray = new [a.Length + 1, b.Length + 1]
4       for i = 0 to a.Length
5           EditDistanceArray [i, 0] = i
6       for j = 0 to b.Length
7           EditDistanceArray [0, j] = j
8
9       for i = 1 to a.Length
10      {
11          for j = 1 to b.Length
12          {
13              if (a[i - 1]) = (b[j - 1])
14                  EditDistanceArray [i, j] = EditDistanceArray [i - 1, j -
15                  1]
16              else
17                  EditDistanceArray [i, j] = Math.Min(
18                      EditDistanceArray [i - 1, j] + 1,
19                      Math.Min(
20                          EditDistanceArray [i, j - 1] + 1,
21                          EditDistanceArray [i - 1, j - 1] + 1)
22                  )
23          }
24      }
25      return EditDistanceArray [a.Length, b.Length]
26  }
27
28  Function AVG_and_MAX_EditDistance (List a)

```

```

29         {
30             max = 0
31             min = 1000
32             sum = 0
33             //break AS-PATH to a list of strings
34             foreach x in a
35             {
36                 AsPathList.Add(x.Split(','))
37             }
38
39             for i = 0 to a.Count
40             {
41                 for j = 0 to i
42                 {
43                     current = EditDistance(AsPathList[i], AsPathList[j])
44                     sum += current
45                     if current > max
46                         max = current
47                     if (current < min) and (i != j)//Avoid distnaces with zero
48                         values
49                         min = current
50                 }
51             }
52
53             [] temp = new [3]
54             temp[0] = max
55             temp[1] = Math.Ceiling((sum * 1.0) / (a.Count * a.Count))
56             temp[2] = min
57
58             return temp
59         }

```

12. Feature 12: The maximum edit distance of all messages during a one minute time interval.
13. Feature 13: The average inter-arrival time of all messages during a one minute time interval.
14. Feature 34: The number of BGP update messages that are generated by an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) such as OSPF.
15. Feature 35: The number of BGP update messages that are generated by EGP, which is the BGP predecessor. Since the value of the BGP update message type is one of

the BGP policies, network administrators may configure the attribute value so that they may reroute the BGP packets based on BGP policies.

16. Feature 36: The incomplete update messages imply that the announced NLRI prefixes are generated from unknown sources. They usually originate from BGP redistribution configurations [31].
17. Feature 37: The average of all BGP update messages in bytes.

2.2 Selection of Features

To highlight the importance of feature selection algorithms, we first define *dimensionality* as the number of features for each data sample. As shown in Table 2.3, 37 features are extracted. High dimensionality of the design matrix is considered undesirable because it increases the computational complexity and memory usage [11]. It also leads to poor classification results. To reduce the dimensionality, a subset of the original set of features should be selected or a transformation of a subset of features to new features is needed. Hence, before applying machine learning algorithms, we address the dimensionality of the design matrix and try to reduce the number of extracted features. We use the Fisher [34], [35] and minimum Redundancy Maximum Relevance (mRMR) [36] feature selection algorithms to select the most relevant features. These algorithms measure the correlation and relevancy among features and, hence, help improve the classification accuracy. We select the top ten features for the Fisher feature selection and, thus, neglect the weak and distorted features in the classification models [4].

Each training datasets is represented as a real matrix $\mathbf{X}_{7200 \times 37}$. Each column vector $\mathbf{x}_k, k = 1, \dots, 37$, corresponds to one feature. The Fisher score for \mathbf{x}_k is computed as:

$$\text{Fisher score} = \frac{m_a^2 - m_r^2}{s_a^2 + s_r^2}$$

$$m_a = \frac{1}{N_a} \sum_{i \in \text{anomaly}} x_{ik}$$

$$m_r = \frac{1}{N_r} \sum_{i \in \text{regular}} x_{ik}$$

$$\begin{aligned}s_a^2 &= \frac{1}{N_a} \sum_{i \in \text{anomaly}} (x_{ik} - m_a)^2 \\ s_r^2 &= \frac{1}{N_r} \sum_{i \in \text{regular}} (x_{ik} - m_r)^2,\end{aligned}\quad (2.1)$$

where N_a and N_r are the number of anomaly and regular data points, respectively; and m_a and s_a^2 (m_r and s_r^2) are the mean and the variance for the anomaly (regular) class, respectively. The Fisher algorithm maximizes the inter-class separation $m_a^2 - m_r^2$ and minimizes the intra-class variances s_a^2 and s_r^2 .

The mRMR algorithm minimizes the redundancy among features while maximizing the relevance of features with respect to the target class. We use three variants of the mRMR algorithm: Mutual Information Difference (MID), Mutual Information Quotient (MIQ), and Mutual Information Base (MIBASE). The mRMR relevance of a feature set $S = \{\mathbf{X}_1, \dots, \mathbf{X}_k, \mathbf{X}_l, \dots, \mathbf{X}_{37}\}$ for a class vector \mathbf{Y} is based on the mutual information function \mathcal{I} :

$$\mathcal{I}(\mathbf{X}_k, \mathbf{X}_l) = \sum_{k,l} p(\mathbf{X}_k, \mathbf{X}_l) \log \frac{p(\mathbf{X}_k, \mathbf{X}_l)}{p(\mathbf{X}_k)p(\mathbf{X}_l)}. \quad (2.2)$$

The mRMR variants are defined by the criteria:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{MID: } &\max [V(\mathcal{I}) - W(\mathcal{I})] \\ \text{MIQ: } &\max [V(\mathcal{I})/W(\mathcal{I})],\end{aligned}\quad (2.3)$$

where:

$$\begin{aligned}V(\mathcal{I}) &= \frac{1}{|S|} \sum_{\mathbf{X}_k \in S} \mathcal{I}(\mathbf{X}_k, \mathbf{Y}) \\ W(\mathcal{I}) &= \frac{1}{|S|^2} \sum_{\mathbf{X}_k, \mathbf{X}_l \in S} \mathcal{I}(\mathbf{X}_k, \mathbf{X}_l)\end{aligned}$$

and constant $|S|$ is the length of the set S . The MIBASE feature scores are ordered based on their values (2.2). The Fisher and mRMR scores are obtained for a set of features of arbitrary captured BGP messages during a one-day interval on January 25, 2003. The set contains 1,440 samples, where 869 samples are labeled as anomalies. The top ten features using the Fisher and mRMR algorithms are listed in Table 2.5. They are evaluated in Section 3.2 by using the SVM classification.

Table 2.5: Top ten features used for selection algorithms.

mRMR								
Fisher		MID		MIQ		MIBASE		
Feature	Score	Feature	Score	Feature	Score	Feature	Score	Feature
11	0.39	34	0.94	34	0.94	34	0.94	
6	0.35	32	0.02	2	0.33	36	0.63	
25	0.29	33	0.02	8	0.34	2	0.47	
9	0.27	2	0.01	24	0.31	8	0.34	
2	0.18	31	0.02	9	0.33	9	0.27	
36	0.12	24	0.01	14	0.30	3	0.13	
37	0.12	8	0.01	1	0.35	1	0.13	
24	0.12	14	0.02	36	0.36	6	0.10	
8	0.11	30	0.02	3	0.30	12	0.08	
14	0.08	22	0.02	25	0.27	11	0.06	

The scatterings of anomalous and regular classes for feature 6 (*AS-path*) vs. feature 1 (*volume*) and feature 6 (*AS-path*) vs. feature 2 (*volume*) in two-way classifications are shown in Figure 2.4 (left) and Figure 2.4 (right), respectively. The graphs indicate spatial separation of features. While selecting feature 1 and feature 6 may lead to a feasible classification based on visible clusters (\circ and $*$), using only feature 2 and feature 6 would lead to poor classification. Hence, selecting an appropriate combination of features is essential for an accurate classification. The scatterings of anomalous and regular classes for all features vs. feature 1 (*volume*) and vs. feature 2 (*volume*) are shown in Figure 2.5.




Figure 2.4: Scattered graph of feature 6 vs. feature 1 (left) and vs. feature 2 (right) extracted from the BCNET traffic. Feature values are normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. Shown are two traffic classes: regular (\circ) and anomaly ($*$).




Figure 2.5: Scattered graph of all features vs. feature 1 (left) and vs. feature 2 (right) extracted from the BCNET traffic. Feature values are normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. Shown are two traffic classes: regular (\circ) and anomaly (*).

Performance of anomaly classifiers depends on the feature selection algorithms [33]. We calculate the top ten features listed in Table 2.5 to be used in SVM, HMM, and NB classifiers. In case of SVM, we use the top ten features from each method listed in Table 2.5 as input for each classifier. In case of HMM, we arbitrarily select four features from the top ten features (two *volume* features and two *AS-path*) features to investigate the effect of feature categories on the detection performance. These four features are mapped to sequences and are then used as input to HMM classifiers. Other features could have been also used. For NB classification, we ignore binary features 14 through 33 because we use continuous and categorical features. The combination of the continuous and categorical features shows better performance than the combination of all feature types. We illustrate the difference among continuous, categorical, and binary features in Section 3.1. The extracted features for NB are listed in Table 2.6. The extracted features are considered as a feature design matrix for NB models in Section 3.4. We apply the same top ten features shown in Table 2.5. We also introduce a set of features selection algorithms that work well only with Bayesian classifiers. The applied algorithms are: odds ratio (OR), extended/multiclass/weighted odds ratio (EOR/MOR/WOR), and the class discriminating measure (CDM) [25].

Table 2.6: List of features extracted for naive Bayes.

Feature (\mathcal{F})	Definition	Category
1	Number of announcements	<i>volume</i>
2	Number of withdrawals	<i>volume</i>
3	Number of announced NLRI prefixes	<i>volume</i>
4	Number of withdrawn NLRI prefixes	<i>volume</i>
5	Average AS-PATH length	<i>AS-path</i>
6	Maximum AS-PATH length	<i>AS-path</i>
7	Average unique AS-PATH length	<i>AS-path</i>
8	Number of duplicate announcements	<i>volume</i>
9	Number of duplicate withdrawals	<i>volume</i>
10	Number of implicit withdrawals	<i>volume</i>
11	Average edit distance	<i>AS-path</i>
12	Maximum edit distance	<i>AS-path</i>
13	Inter-arrival time	<i>volume</i>
14	Number of Interior Gateway Protocol packets	<i>volume</i>
15	Number of Exterior Gateway Protocol packets	<i>volume</i>
16	Number of incomplete packets	<i>volume</i>
17	Packet size	<i>volume</i>

The OR algorithm and its variants perform well for selecting features to be used in binary classification with NB models. In binary classification with two target classes c and \bar{c} , the odds ratio of feature \mathbf{X}_k is calculated as:

$$OR(\mathbf{X}_k) = \log \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c)(1 - \Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|\bar{c}))}{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|\bar{c})(1 - \Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c))}, \quad (2.4)$$

where $\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c)$ and $\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|\bar{c})$ are the probabilities of feature \mathbf{X}_k being in classes c and \bar{c} , respectively.

The EOR, WOR, MOR, and CDM are variants that enable multiclass feature selection. In case of a classification problem with $\gamma = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_J\}$ classes:

$$\begin{aligned} EOR(\mathbf{X}_k) &= \sum_{j=1}^J \log \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c_j)(1 - \Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|\bar{c}_j))}{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|\bar{c}_j)(1 - \Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c_j))} \\ WOR(\mathbf{X}_k) &= \sum_{j=1}^J \Pr(c_j) \times \log \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c_j)(1 - \Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|\bar{c}_j))}{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|\bar{c}_j)(1 - \Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c_j))} \\ MOR(\mathbf{X}_k) &= \sum_{j=1}^J \left| \log \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c_j)(1 - \Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|\bar{c}_j))}{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|\bar{c}_j)(1 - \Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c_j))} \right| \\ CDM(\mathbf{X}_k) &= \sum_{j=1}^J \left| \log \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c_j)}{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|\bar{c}_j)} \right|, \end{aligned} \quad (2.5)$$

where $\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c_j)$ is the conditional probability of \mathbf{X}_k given the class c_j and $\Pr(c_j)$ is the probability of occurrence of the j^{th} class. The OR algorithm may be extended by computing $\Pr(\mathbf{X}_k|c_j)$ for continuous features. If the sample points are independent and identically distributed, (2.4) may be written as:

$$OR(\mathbf{X}_k) = \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathbf{X}_k|} \log \frac{\Pr(X_{ik} = x_{ik}|c)(1 - \Pr(X_{ik} = x_{ik}|\bar{c}))}{\Pr(X_{ik} = x_{ik}|\bar{c})(1 - \Pr(X_{ik} = x_{ik}|c))},$$

where $|\mathbf{X}_k|$ and X_{ik} denote the size and the i^{th} element of the k^{th} feature vector, respectively. A realization of the random variable X_{ik} is denoted by x_{ik} . Other variants of the OR algorithm may be extended to continuous cases in a similar manner. The top ten selected features are listed in Table 2.7.

Table 2.7: The top ten selected features \mathcal{F} based on the scores calculated by various feature selection algorithms.

Fisher		mRMR						Odds Ratio variants									
		MID		MIQ		MIBASE		OR		EOR		WOR		MOR		CMD	
\mathcal{F}	Score	\mathcal{F}	Score	\mathcal{F}	Score	\mathcal{F}	Score	\mathcal{F}	Score	\mathcal{F}	Score	\mathcal{F}	Score	\mathcal{F}	Score		
11	0.397758	15	0.94	15	0.94	15	0.94	10	1.3602	5	2.1645	5	1.3963	6	2.3588	5	8.5959
6	0.354740	5	0.12	12	0.36	17	0.63	4	1.3085	7	2.1512	7	1.3762	5	2.3486	11	6.9743
9	0.271961	12	0.11	3	0.35	2	0.47	1	1.1088	6	2.1438	6	1.3648	11	2.3465	9	3.0844
2	0.185844	7	0.10	8	0.34	8	0.34	14	1.1080	11	2.1340	11	1.3495	17	2.3350	2	2.3485
16	0.123742	4	0.07	1	0.32	6	0.27	12	1.0973	10	2.0954	13	1.1963	16	2.3247	8	2.2402
17	0.121633	10	0.07	6	0.30	3	0.13	3	1.0797	4	2.0954	9	1.0921	14	2.1228	16	2.0985
8	0.116092	8	0.04	4	0.27	1	0.13	15	1.0465	13	2.0502	2	1.0198	1	2.1109	3	2.0606
3	0.086124	13	0.04	17	0.26	9	0.10	8	1.0342	9	2.0127	16	0.9850	2	2.1017	14	2.0506
1	0.081760	2	0.03	9	0.25	12	0.08	17	1.0304	1	2.0107	17	0.9778	7	2.0968	1	2.0417
14	0.081751	14	0.03	2	0.24	11	0.06	16	1.0202	14	2.0105	8	0.9751	3	2.0897	17	2.0213

Chapter 3

Classification

3.1 BGP Anomaly Detection

3.1.1 Definitions

BGP anomalies are the BGP packets that exhibit unusual patterns. They are also referred to as outliers. The BGP anomaly detection classifier is a machine learning model that learns how to change its internal structure based on external feedback [38]. Machine learning models learn to classify data points using a feature matrix. The matrix rows correspond to data points while the columns correspond to the feature values. A feature is a measurable property of the system that may be observed. Even though machine learning may provide general models to classify anomalies, it may easily misclassify test data points. By providing a sufficient and related set of features, machine learning models may overcome this deficiency and may help built a generalized model to classify data with the least error rate.

3.1.2 Type of Anomalies

Anomaly detection techniques consider these three types of anomalies:

- Point anomalies: If each data point of the training dataset may be considered as anomaly.
- Contextual anomalies: The term contextual anomaly [40] refers to an anomaly as the behaviour of a data instance in a specific context. For example, a large number of BGP packets may be considered as regular traffic during the peak activity hours of

the working days. However, the same pattern may be classified as an anomaly in the off-peak hours.

- Collective anomalies: A sequence of data points is considered anomalous relative to the entire set. One data point may be considered as regular traffic. However, it is considered as anomaly with a collection of neighbouring data points. This type of anomaly is the most difficult to capture because the classifier should recognize the temporal relationship among the data points [42].

BGP anomalies in this thesis are treated as point anomalies. The BGP packets are grouped for each one minute interval. Each training data point may be classified as anomaly or regular class.

3.1.3 Type of Features

The type of the features determines the applicable classification technique. For example, the NB classifier works very well with categorical features while statistical models work well with continuous and categorical features. The features represented in this thesis belong to three types:

- Binary: Feature may have two values.
- Categorical: Feature may have finite number of values.
- Continuous: Feature may have infinite number of values. Sampling techniques discretize the continuous features into the categorical type.

The proposed BGP features listed in Table 2.3 belong to all the three types.

3.1.4 Supervised Classification

Supervised classification is one aspect of learning that has supervised (observed) measurements that are labeled with a pre-defined class. During the test stage, the data points are classified as one of the predefined classes. In unsupervised classification, the task is to establish the existence of classes or clusters in the training data. Classification is one of the machine learning categories. Other categories include regression and reinforcement. Learning implies that given a training dataset, a task is performed after learning the system's performance. The performance is measured by a performance index. The efficiency of the

proposed machine learning models is discussed in Section 3.1.5. The task in classification is to categorize the test labels into pre-defined classes. We define two-way and four-way classifications. In the two-way classification, two classes are defined: anomalous and regular. In the four-way classification, four classes are defined: Slammer, Nimda, Code Red I, and Regular. General steps of a classification process are shown in Figure 3.1. In the training stage, the training set consists of the sample data points and the associated labels. A sample data point consists of a set of predefined features. Next, the training dataset is fed into a machine learning model to build a classifier model that is used later to examine the test datasets. The classifier model is the criteria set by a machine learning model. In the testing stage, a testing dataset is processed to extract the design matrix. Next, a classifier model is applied to the design matrix to generate labels. The last step in the supervised classification process is to compare this generated set of labels from the testing step with the training set of labels to evaluate the performance of the model. For example, if the training datasets are the collected BGP update messages, the task is to classify each data point to anomaly or regular and the performance measure is F-score (3.5).




Figure 3.1: Supervised classification process.

In the training stage, a common procedure named cross-validation is usually performed

to remedy the drawback of overfitting the classifier function. Overfitting phenomenon implies the fact that the testing classification accuracy may not be as good as the training accuracy. Overfitting is undesired behaviour in machine learning and it is usually caused by rather complex trained models. For example, in curve fitting problems, if a 9th degree polynomial is used to fit 3 points, then it is highly probable that poor fitting will result in the testing stage because test data points will be scattered on a linear, 2nd, or 3rd polynomial function while the fitting polynomial function has a the degree 9. A cross-validation process is usually used to reduce the overfitting effect. The concept of cross-validation is to choose the best parameters of the machine learning model parameters that reduce the training error. A 4-fold cross-validation process is shown in Figure 3.2. To choose the best value of a parameter, four runs are needed to cover the case of using each fold as a testing set and the other three as training sets.




Figure 3.2: 4-fold cross-validation process.

The training dataset portion should be larger than the test dataset in order to capture the anomalous trends. In 2-fold cross-validation, the training dataset portion is equal to the testing dataset. A 10-fold cross-validation is commonly used as a compromise [39]. Parameters used in this thesis are given in Appendix A.

3.1.5 Performance Evaluation

We measure the performance of the models based on statistical indices. We consider accuracy, balanced accuracy, and F-score as performance indices to compare the proposed models. They are calculated based on the following definitions:

- True positive (TP): The number of anomalous training data points that are classified as anomaly.
- True negative (TN): The number of regular training data points that are classified as regular.

- False positive (FP): The number of regular training data points that are classified as anomaly.
- False negative (FN): The number of anomalous training data points that are classified as regular.

These definitions are shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Confusion matrix.

		Actual class	
		True (anomaly)	False (regular)
Anomaly test outcome	Positive	TP	FP
	Negative	FN	TN

We aim to classify a single class (anomaly), which usually has a smaller portion of the training dataset. Hence, we aim to find the proper performance indices that reflect the accuracy and precision of the classifier for anomaly training data points. These performance measures are calculated as:

$$\text{sensitivity} = \frac{TP}{TP + FN} \quad (3.1)$$

$$\text{precision} = \frac{TP}{TP + FP}. \quad (3.2)$$

The performance indices are calculated as:

$$\text{accuracy} = \frac{TP + TN}{TP + TN + FP + FN} \quad (3.3)$$

$$\text{balanced accuracy} = \frac{\text{sensitivity} + \text{precision}}{2}. \quad (3.4)$$

Sensitivity, also known as recall, measures the ability of the model to identify the anomalies (TP) among all labeled anomalies (true). Precision is the ability of the model to identify the

anomalies (TP) among all data points that are identified as anomalous (positive). Specificity reflects the ability of the model to identify the regular traffic (true negative) among all regular traffic (false). Accuracy treats the regular data points as important as anomalous training data. Hence, it is not a good measure to compare performance of classifiers performance. For example, if a dataset contains 900 regular and 100 anomalous data points and the NB model classifies the 1,000 training data points as regular, then the accuracy is 90%. At the first glance, this accuracy seems high. However, no anomalous data point is correctly classified. F-score is often used as a performance index to compare performance of classification models. It is the harmonic mean of the sensitivity and the precision:

$$\text{F-score} = 2 \times \frac{\text{precision} \times \text{sensitivity}}{\text{precision} + \text{sensitivity}}. \quad (3.5)$$

The harmonic mean tends to be closer to the smaller of the two. Hence, to obtain a large score value, both precision and sensitivity should be large.

The balanced accuracy is an alternative performance index that is equal to the average of *sensitivity* and *specificity*. F-score reflects the success of detecting anomalies rather than detecting both anomalies and regular data points. While accuracy and balanced accuracy give equal importance to the regular and the anomaly traffic, F-score emphasizes the anomaly classification rate. Hence, we used F-score to measure the performance of SVM, HMM, and NB models.

3.2 Classification with Support Vector Machine Models

Support vector machines were introduced by V. Vapnik in the 1970s [41]. SVMs are linear classifiers that find a hyperplane to separate two classes of data: positive and negative. SVM are extended for non linear separation using kernels. In real world classification problems, SVM performs more accurately than most other machine learning models, especially for datasets with very high dimensional complexity.

We use the SVM classification as a supervised deterministic model to classify BGP anomalies. MATLAB libsvm-3.1 toolbox [43] is used to train and test the SVM classifiers. The dimensions of the feature matrix is $7,200 \times 10$, which corresponds to a five-day interval. Each matrix row corresponds to the top ten selected features during the one-minute interval.

For each training dataset $\mathbf{X}_{7200 \times 37}$, we target two classes: anomaly (true) and regular (false). The SVM algorithms solves an optimization problem [44] with the constraints:

$$\begin{aligned} \min C \sum_{m=1}^M \xi_m + \frac{1}{2} \|w\|^2 \\ t_m y(\mathbf{X}_m) \geq 1 - \xi_m. \end{aligned} \quad (3.6)$$

Constant $C > 0$ controls the importance of the margin while slack variable ξ_m solves the non-separable data points classification problem. A regularization parameter $\frac{1}{2}\|w\|^2$ is used to avoid the overfitting. SVM classifies each data point \mathbf{X}_m with a training target class t_m either as anomaly $y = 1$ or regular traffic y equal -1 . \mathbf{X}_m corresponds to a row vector where $m = 1, \dots, 7200$. The SVM solution maximizes the margin between the data points and the decision boundary. Data points that are closest to the decision boundary are called support vectors. The Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel is used to avoid the using of the feature matrix of high dimension by mapping the feature space into a linear space:

$$\mathcal{K}(\mathbf{X}_k, \mathbf{X}_l) = \exp(-\gamma * \|\mathbf{X}_k - \mathbf{X}_l\|^2). \quad (3.7)$$

The RBF kernel \mathcal{K} depends on the Euclidean distance between \mathbf{X}_k and \mathbf{X}_l features [45]. Constant γ influences the number of support vectors. The datasets are trained using 10-fold cross validation to select parameters (C, γ) that provide the best accuracy. We apply SVM on sets listed in Table 3.2 to classify BGP anomalies. The SVM classification process is shown in Figure 3.3.

First, a batch of BGP update messages is processed to generate the feature matrix as discussed in Chapter 2. Next, the training process takes the design matrix as an input and cross-validates C and γ to generate the best classifier model. In the testing stage, the classifier model is used to evaluate the testing datasets and to generate its labels that are later used to calculate the performance indices.

Table 3.2: The SVM training datasets for two-way classifiers.

NB	Training dataset	Test dataset
SVM ₁	Slammer and Nimda	Code Red I
SVM ₂	Slammer and Code Red I	Nimda
SVM ₃	Nimda and Code Red I	Slammer




Figure 3.3: The SVM classification process.

3.2.1 Two-Way Classification

In a two-way classification, all anomalies are treated as one class. Their performance is shown in Table 3.3. SVM_3 model achieves the best F-score (86.1%) using features selected by the MIQ feature selection algorithm. We check the validity of the proposed models by applying the two-way SVM classification on the BGP traffic trace that was collected from the BCNET [24] on December 20, 2011. All data points in the BCNET traffic trace are labeled as regular traffic. Hence, parameter $y = -1$. The classification accuracy of 79.2% indicates the number of data points that are classified as regular traffic. The best two-way classification result is achieved by using SVM_2 . Since all data points in BCNET and RIPE test datasets contain no anomalies, they have low sensitivities and, hence, low F-scores. Therefore, we calculate instead accuracy as the performance measure. Data points that are classified as anomalies (false positive) are shown in Figure 3.4.

Table 3.3: Performance of the two-way SVM classification.

SVM	Feature	Performance index			
		Accuracy (%)		F-score (%)	
		Test dataset	RIPE (regular)	BCNET (regular)	Test dataset (anomaly)
SVM_1	All features	64.1	55.0	62.0	63.2
SVM_1	Fisher	72.6	63.2	58.5	73.4
SVM_1	MID	63.1	52.2	59.4	61.2
SVM_1	MIQ	60.7	47.9	61.7	57.8
SVM_1	MIBASE	79.1	74.3	60.9	80.1
SVM_2	All features	68.6	97.7	79.2	22.2
SVM_2	Fisher	67.4	96.6	74.8	16.3
SVM_2	MID	67.9	97.4	72.5	19.3
SVM_2	MIQ	67.7	97.5	76.2	15.3
SVM_2	MIBASE	67.5	96.8	78.8	17.8
SVM_3	All features	81.5	92.0	69.2	84.6
SVM_3	Fisher	89.3	93.8	68.4	75.2
SVM_3	MID	75.4	92.8	71.7	79.2
SVM_3	MIQ	85.1	92.2	73.2	86.1
SVM_3	MIBASE	89.3	89.7	69.7	80.1

Test data points from various worms that are incorrectly classified in the two-way classification (false positives and false negatives) are shown in Figure 3.5 (left column). Correctly classified as anomalies (true positives) are shown in Figure 3.5 (right column).




Figure 3.4: Shown in red is incorrectly classified (anomaly) traffic.




Figure 3.5: Shown in red are incorrectly classified regular and anomaly traffic for Slammer (top left), Nimda (middle left), and Code Red I (bottom left) and correctly classified anomaly traffic for Slammer (top right), Nimda (middle right), and Code Red I (bottom right).

3.2.2 Four-Way Classification

We extend the proposed classifier to implement multiclass SVMs and used one-versus-one multiclass classification [46] on four training datasets: Slammer, Nimda, Code Red I, and RIPE. A multiclass classification combines a number of two-class classifications. To cover all classification combinations, data points are classified by $n(n - 1)/2$ classifiers, where n is the number of classes. Each data point is classified according to the maximum value of the classifier function [44]. The four-way classification detects and classifies the specific type of traffic: Slammer, Nimda, Code Red I, or Regular. Classification performance is shown in Table 3.4. The BCNET dataset is also tested using the multiclass SVM. The average accuracy achieved by using BCNET dataset is 91.4%. This is an example of how the proposed multiclass models perform a recently collected BGP datasets. It shows that the proposed model has 91.4% probability to classify data points to the correct class type. The miss-classified data points show that the proposed model may be improved. Possible solutions are discussed in Chapter 5.

Table 3.4: Accuracy of the four-way SVM classification.

Feature	Average accuracy (%)	
	RIPE	(3 anomalies concatenated with 1 regular)
All features	77.1	91.4
Fisher	82.8	85.7
MID	67.8	78.7
MIQ	71.3	89.1
MIBASE	72.8	90.2

3.3 Classification with Hidden Markov Models

The second model for classification is based on the first order Hidden Markov Models (HMMs). HMMs are statistical tools that are used to model stochastic processes that consist of two embedded processes: the observable process that maps BGP features and the unobserved hidden process that has the Markovian property. We assume that the observations are independent and identically distributed. Even though HMMs belong to non-parametric

supervised classification methods, we use 10-fold cross validation to select number of hidden states as a parameter in order to improve the accuracy of the model. We implement the HMMs using the MATLAB statistical toolbox. A first order HMM processes is shown in Figure 3.6. Each HMM model is specified by a tuple $\lambda = (N, M, \alpha, \beta, \pi)$, where:




Figure 3.6: The first order HMM with two processes.

N = number of hidden states (cross-validated)

M = number of observations (11)

α = transition probability distribution $N \times N$ matrix

β = emission probability distribution $N \times M$ matrix

π = initial state probability distribution matrix.

The proposed detection model consists of three stages:

- *Sequence extractor and mapping:* All features are mapped to 1-D observation vector.
- *Training:* Two HMMs for two-way classification and four HMMs for four-way classification are trained to identify the best α and β for each class. HMMs are trained and validated for various number of hidden states N .
- *Classification:* The maximum likelihood probability $p(x|\lambda)$ is used to classify the test

observation sequences.

The HMM classification algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3.7.




Figure 3.7: The HMM classification process.

In the sequence extraction stage, the BGP feature matrix is mapped to a sequence of observations by adding the BGP announcements (feature 1) and the BGP withdrawals (feature 2) for each data point. We also add the maximum AS-PATH length (feature 6) and the maximum edit distance (feature 12). In both cases, we divide the result arbitrary to eleven observations using a logarithmic scale. This transformation solves the high skew problem of heavy tailed probability distribution of the BGP *volume* features in the training datasets. We evaluate 10, 11, and 12 observations for the mapping function. HMMs provides best results with 11 observations [47]. After the transformation, instead of having an infinite number of observations, each HMM model is trained with 11 distinct values. The mapping

function for features X_k and X_l is:

$$\frac{\log(X_k + X_l)}{11}. \quad (3.8)$$

The distribution for BGP announcements during the Code Red I worm attack is shown in Figure 3.8.




Figure 3.8: Distribution of the number of BGP announcements (left) and withdrawals (right) for the Code Red I worm.

HMMs are trained and validated for a various number of hidden states. A 10-fold cross-validation with the Baum-Welch algorithm [44] is used for training to find the best α and β for each HMM. The best transition and emission matrices are validated by obtaining the largest maximum likelihood probability $p(x|\lambda_{\text{HMM}_x})$. We construct 6 and 12 HMM models for two-way and four-way classifications, respectively. Various HMMs are listed in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6. We evaluate the test observation sequences and calculate maximum likelihood probability for each HMM.

In the classification stage, each test observation sequence is classified based on the largest maximum likelihood probability for HMMs with the same number of hidden states. For example, HMM_1 , HMM_4 , HMM_7 , and HMM_{10} shown in Table 3.6 correspond to HMMs with two hidden states for various training datasets.

Table 3.5: Hidden Markov Models: two-way classification.

Training dataset	Number of hidden states		
	2	4	6
Slammer, Nimda, and Code Red I	HMM ₁	HMM ₂	HMM ₃
RIPE/BCNET	HMM ₄	HMM ₅	HMM ₆

Table 3.6: Hidden Markov Models: four-way classification.

Training dataset	Number of hidden states		
	2	4	6
Slammer	HMM ₁	HMM ₂	HMM ₃
Nimda	HMM ₄	HMM ₅	HMM ₆
Code Red I	HMM ₇	HMM ₈	HMM ₉
RIPE/BCNET	HMM ₁₀	HMM ₁₁	HMM ₁₂

The accuracy of each HMM is defined as:

$$\frac{\text{Number of correctly classified observation sequences}}{\text{Total number of observation sequences}}. \quad (3.9)$$

The numerator is calculated using the highest maximum likelihood probability $p(x|\lambda_{\text{HMM}_x})$. Sequences in the denominator share the same number of hidden states. The correctly classified observation sequence is generated by a model that has the highest probability when tested with itself.

We use RIPE and BCNET datasets to test the three anomalies. Two sets of features (*volume*) and (*AS-path*) are mapped to create one observation sequence for each HMM. We map *volume* feature set (1, 2) and *AS-path* feature set (6, 12) to two observation sequences. HMMs achieve better F-scores using set (1, 2) than set (6, 12), as shown in Table 3.7. The RIPE and BCNET datasets have the highest F-scores when tested using HMMs with two hidden states.

The performance indices for regular RIPE and BCNET are shown in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9, respectively.

Table 3.7: Accuracy of the two-way HMM classification.

N	Feature set	Performance index			
		Accuracy (%)		F-score (%)	
		3 anomalies concatenated with one	regular	3 anomalies concatenated with one	regular
2	(1,2)	86.0	94.0	84.4	93.8
2	(6,12)	79.0	71.0	76.2	60.7
4	(1,2)	78.0	87.0	72.2	85.0
4	(6,12)	64.0	60.0	48.0	35.9
6	(1,2)	85.0	91.0	84.3	90.1
6	(6,12)	81.0	65.0	80.1	50.2

Table 3.8: Performance of the two-way HMM classification: regular RIPE dataset.

N	Feature set	Performance index					
		Accuracy	Precision	Sensitivity	Specificity	Balanced accuracy	F-score
2	(1,2)	86.0	97.3	74.0	98.0	86.0	84.4
2	(6,12)	79.0	93.9	62.0	96.0	79.0	76.2
4	(1,2)	78.0	96.6	58.0	98.0	78.0	72.2
4	(6,12)	64.0	91.1	62.0	94.0	78.0	48.0
6	(1,2)	85.0	90.0	78.0	92.0	85.0	84.3
6	(6,12)	81.0	88.5	62.0	90.0	77.0	80.1

Table 3.9: Performance of the two-way HMM classification: BCNET dataset.

N	Feature set	Performance index					
		Accuracy	Precision	Sensitivity	Specificity	Balanced accuracy	F-score
2	(1,2)	94.0	97.8	90.0	98.0	94.0	93.8
2	(6,12)	71.0	100	62.0	100	81.0	60.7
4	(1,2)	87.0	100	74.0	100	87.8	85.0
4	(6,12)	60.0	94.0	66.0	96.0	81.0	35.9
6	(1,2)	91.0	100	82.0	100	91.0	90.1
6	(6,12)	65.0	77.7	14.0	96.0	55.0	50.2

Each test is applied using RIPE and BCNET datasets with the four-way HMM classification. The classification accuracies are averaged over four HMMs for each dataset and are listed in Table. 3.10.

Table 3.10: Accuracy of the four-way HMM classification.

N	Feature set	Average accuracy (%)	
		RIPE	BCNET
2	(1,2)	72.50	77.50
2	(6,12)	38.75	41.25
4	(1,2)	66.25	76.25
4	(6,12)	26.25	33.75
6	(1,2)	70.00	76.25
6	(6,12)	43.75	42.50

3.4 Classification with naive Bayes Models

The Bayesian classifiers are among the most efficient machine learning classification tools. These classifiers assume conditional independence among features. Hence:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\mathbf{X}_k = \mathbf{x}_k, \mathbf{X}_l = \mathbf{x}_l | c_j) &= \\ \Pr(\mathbf{X}_k = \mathbf{x}_k | c_j) \Pr(\mathbf{X}_l = \mathbf{x}_l | c_j), \end{aligned} \quad (3.10)$$

where \mathbf{x}_k and \mathbf{x}_l are realizations of feature vectors \mathbf{X}_k and \mathbf{X}_l , respectively. In a two-way classification, classes c_1 and c_2 denote anomalous and regular data points, respectively. We arbitrarily assign labels $c_1 = 1$ and $c_2 = -1$. For a four-way classification, we define four classes $c_1 = 1$, $c_2 = 2$, $c_3 = 3$, and $c_4 = 4$ that correspond to Slammer, Nimda, Code Red I, and Regular data points, respectively. Even though it is *naive* to assume that features are conditionally independent on a given class (3.10), NB classifiers perform better for some applications compared to other classifiers. They also have low complexity and may be trained effectively using smaller datasets.

We train generative Bayesian models that may be used as classifiers using labeled datasets. In such models, the probability distributions of the priors $\Pr(c_j)$ and the likelihoods $\Pr(\mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}_i | c_j)$ are estimated using the training datasets. Posterior probability of a

data point, represented as a row vector \mathbf{x}_i , is calculated using the Bayes rule:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(c_j | \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}_i) &= \frac{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}_i | c_j) \Pr(c_j)}{\Pr(\mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}_i)} \\ &\propto \Pr(\mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}_i | c_j) \Pr(c_j). \end{aligned} \quad (3.11)$$

The naive assumption of independence among features helps calculate the likelihood of a data point as:

$$\Pr(\mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}_i | c_j) = \prod_{k=1}^K \Pr(X_{ik} = x_{ik} | c_j), \quad (3.12)$$

where K denotes the number of features. The probabilities on the right-hand side (3.12) are calculated using the Gaussian distribution:

$$\Pr(X_{ik} = x_{ik} | c_j, \mu_k, \sigma_k) = \mathcal{N}(X_{ik} = x_{ik} | c_j, \mu_k, \sigma_k), \quad (3.13)$$

where μ_k and σ_k are the mean and standard deviation of the k^{th} feature, respectively. We assume that priors are equal to the relative frequencies of the training data points for each class c_j . Hence:

$$\Pr(c_j) = \frac{N_j}{N}, \quad (3.14)$$

where N_j is the number of training data points that belong to the j^{th} class and N is the total number of training points.

The parameters of two-way and four-way classifiers are estimated and validated by a 10-fold cross-validation. In a two-way classification, an arbitrary training data point \mathbf{x}_i is classified as anomalous if the posterior $\Pr(c_1 | \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}_i)$ is larger than $\Pr(c_2 | \mathbf{X}_i = \mathbf{x}_i)$.

We use the MATLAB statistical toolbox to develop NB classifiers. The feature matrix consists of 7,200 rows for each dataset corresponding to the number of training data points and 17 columns representing features for each data point. Two classes are targeted: anomalous (true) and regular (false). In a two-way classification, all anomalies are treated to be of one type while in a four-way classification each training data point is classified as Slammer, Nimda, Code Red I, or Regular. We use three datasets listed in Table 3.11 to train the two-way classifiers. Performances of two-way and four-way classifiers are evaluated using various datasets. The results are verified by using regular RIPE and regular BCNET [24] datasets. Classifiers are trained using the top selected features listed in Table 2.7. We compare the proposed models using the accuracy and F-score as performance measures.

Table 3.11: The NB training datasets for the two-way classifiers.

NB	Training dataset	Test dataset
NB1	Slammer and Nimda	Code Red I
NB2	Slammer and Code Red I	Nimda
NB3	Nimda and Code Red I	Slammer

3.4.1 Two-Way Classification

The results of the two-way classification are shown in Table 3.12. The combination of Nimda and Code Red I training data points (NB3) achieves the best classification results. The NB models classify the training data points of regular RIPE and regular BCNET datasets with 95.8% and 95.5% accuracies, respectively. There are no anomalous data points in these datasets and, thus, both TP and FN values are zero. Hence, the sensitivity (3.1) is not defined and precision (3.2) is equal to zero. Consequently, the F-score (3.5) is not defined for these cases and the accuracy (3.3) reduces to:

$$\text{accuracy} = \frac{TN}{TN + FP}. \quad (3.15)$$

Classifiers trained based on features selected by the OR algorithms often achieve higher accuracies and F-scores for training and test datasets listed in Table 3.11. The OR selection algorithms perform well when used with the NB classifiers because the feature score (2.4) is calculated using the probability distribution that the NB classifiers use for posterior calculations (3.11). Hence, the features selected by the OR variants are expected to have a stronger influence on the posteriors calculated by the NB classifiers [48]. The WOR feature selection algorithm achieves the best F-score for all NB classifiers.

The test data points generated by various worms that are incorrectly classified in the two-way classification (false positive and false negative) are shown in Figure 3.9 (left column). The correctly classified traffic data points as anomaly (true positive) are shown in Figure 3.9 (right column).

Table 3.12: Performance of the two-way naive Bayes classification.

No.	NB	Feature	Performance index			
			Test dataset	Accuracy (%)		F-score (%)
				(regular)	(anomaly)	
1	NB1	All features	87.6	91.1	77.3	2.31
2	NB1	Fisher	62.5	97.0	76.3	12.5
3	NB1	MID	72.3	93.1	82.3	26.9
4	NB1	MIQ	70.8	92.3	75.4	46.9
5	NB1	MIBASE	83.0	90.6	74.0	47.8
6	NB1	OR	52.0	80.4	85.3	43.9
7	NB1	EOR	53.1	81.1	77.7	39.2
8	NB1	WOR	97.5	87.1	77.1	48.0
9	NB1	MOR	62.6	80.9	79.8	34.3
10	NB1	CDM	55.1	94.0	82.6	16.4
11	NB2	All features	85.8	92.2	87.1	23.5
12	NB2	Fisher	64.2	97.5	89.0	4.87
13	NB2	MID	70.3	94.3	95.0	10.7
14	NB2	MIQ	85.7	94.0	90.0	22.9
15	NB2	MIBASE	87.9	92.1	87.2	23.1
16	NB2	OR	69.4	81.2	90.4	23.2
17	NB2	EOR	67.1	81.8	89.8	18.4
18	NB2	WOR	70.7	88.3	86.9	35.8
19	NB2	MOR	73.9	81.9	90.6	25.2
20	NB2	CDM	77.5	94.3	93.0	21.5
21	NB3	All features	89.1	91.8	85.9	53.2
22	NB3	Fisher	77.1	92.5	85.9	19.8
23	NB3	MID	76.6	45.2	92.5	46.1
24	NB3	MIQ	90.4	91.8	87.2	63.5
25	NB3	MIBASE	82.9	91.3	86.1	57.6
26	NB3	OR	45.9	76.3	88.1	55.6
27	NB3	EOR	63.3	78.8	88.9	61.3
28	NB3	WOR	83.1	88.1	86.3	60.3
29	NB3	MOR	58.6	81.6	89.2	59.8
30	NB3	CDM	46.3	95.6	91.9	32.5




Figure 3.9: Shown in red are incorrectly classified regular and anomaly traffic for Slammer (top left), Nimda (middle left), and Code Red I (bottom left); and correctly classified anomaly traffic for Slammer (top right), Nimda (middle right), and Code Red I (bottom right)

3.4.2 Four-Way Classification

The four-way classification results are shown in Table 3.13. The four-way NB model classifies data points as Slammer, Nimda, Code Red I, or Regular. Both regular RIPE and regular BCNET datasets are tested. The regular BCNET dataset classification results are also

listed in order to verify the performance of the proposed classifiers. Although it is difficult to classify four distinct classes. The classifier trained based on the features selected by the MOR algorithm achieves 68.7% accuracy.

Table 3.13: Accuracy of the four-way naive Bayes classification.

No.	Feature set	Average accuracy (%)	
		3 anomalies concatenated with 1 <i>regular</i>	
		RIPE	BCNET
1	All features	74.3	67.6
2	Fisher	24.7	34.3
3	MID	74.9	33.1
4	MIQ	24.6	34.8
5	MIBASE	75.4	33.1
6	OR	25.5	36.7
7	EOR	75.3	68.1
8	WOR	75.8	53.2
9	MOR	77.7	68.7
10	CDM	24.8	34.5

Performance of the NB classifiers is often inferior to the SVM and HMM classifiers [49], [50]. However, the NB2 classifier trained on the Slammer and Code Red I datasets (F-score = 32.1%) performs better than the SVM classifier (F-score = 22.2%).

Chapter 4

BGPAD Tool

We develop a graphical user interface for the MATLAB code to allow the users to inspect BGP packets for anomalies. It supports both PCAP and MRT formats. A complete code for the tool is available [26]. BGPAD tool provides the following functionalities:

- An option to convert a MRT ASCII format to feature set file.
- An option to convert a PCAP ASCII format to feature set file.
- Generated statistics of various features for any BGP trace.
- Test performance indices and displays anomalous traffic.
- An option to select classification two-way or four-way classification algorithms (SVM, HMM, and NB).
- An option to parametrize each algorithm and to achieve the best performance.
- An option to upload PCAP files to be tested on the trained models [49].
- An option to save the results as tables and graphs.

The feature set file is an input file that is formatted so that rows correspond to traffic data points and columns correspond to values of the extracted features.

The extracted feature values along with their distribution for various datasets are shown in Figure 4.1. BGPAD provides the functionality to change the number of the bins of the distribution and to save the graphs to the user local machine.




Figure 4.1: Inspection of BGP PCAPs and MRT files statistics.

The SVM two-way classification's GUI is shown in Figure 4.2. It provides full control of SVM parameters including C , γ , and the number of folds for cross-validation. It also provides an option to choose the feature selection algorithm. Various test datasets are available including the test datasets listed in Table 2.2. BGPAD permits to upload a test dataset to evaluate the proposed SVM models. Various performance indices are shown after the testing is completed. The GUI also allows the user to generate and save the graphs of false negatives/false positives and the true positives. The *Test* button provides an option to evaluate a test dataset based on the best trained SVM model [49].




Figure 4.2: GUI for two-way SVM models.

The generated graphs of Slammer, Nimda, and Code Red I test datasets used along with training datasets (Table 3.2) are shown in Figure 4.3. Shown in red are incorrectly classified regular and anomaly traffic for Slammer (top left), Nimda (top right), and Code Red I (top middle) and correctly classified anomaly traffic for Slammer (bottom left), Nimda (bottom right), and Code Red I (bottom middle).




Figure 4.3: Two-way SVM graphs.

The GUI for four-way SVM classification is shown in Figure 4.4. It provides an option to choose one test dataset along with the three SVM training datasets listed in Table 3.2. The *Test* button provides the option to evaluate a test dataset based on the best trained four-way SVM model [49].




Figure 4.4: GUI for four-way SVM models.

HMM two-way classification GUI is shown in Figure 4.5. In two-way classification, a five training datasets are provided. The user has an option to choose three anomalous training datasets and one regular. The regular dataset options are BCNET or RIPE. The test datasets should also contain three anomalies and one regular dataset. The GUI also provides an option to choose one of the feature selection algorithms and the number of hidden states. The *Test* button evaluates a test dataset on the best trained HMM model [49].




Figure 4.5: GUI for two-way HMM models.

The HMM four-way classification GUI is shown in Figure 4.6. In four-way classification, a five training datasets are provided from which four datasets should be selected. The GUI provides an option to choose one of the three anomalous datasets and one regular testing dataset (BCNET, RIPE, or user specific dataset).




Figure 4.6: GUI for four-way HMM models.

Two-way and four-way NB classification GUIs are shown in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, respectively. The available options are similar to those in SVM classification GUI.




Figure 4.7: GUI for two-way NB models.




Figure 4.8: GUI for four-way NB models.

Chapter 5

Analysis of Classification Results and Discussion

Performance of the BGP is based on trust among BGP peers because they assume that the interchanged announcements are accurate and reliable. This trust relationship is vulnerable during BGP anomalies. For example, during BGP hijacks, a BGP peer may announce unauthorized prefixes that indicate to other peers that it is the originating peer. These false announcements propagate across the Internet to other BGP peers and, hence, affect the number of BGP announcements (updates and withdrawals) worldwide. This storm of BGP announcements affects the quantity of *volume* features. As shown in Table 2.5, 65% of the selected features are *volume* features. Hence, *volume* features are more relevant to the anomaly class than the *AS-path* features, which confirms the known effect of BGP anomalies on the volume of the BGP announcements. To illustrate the effect of *volume* features and *AS-path* features, we apply two-way SVM classification separately with *volume* and with *AS-path* features. The results are shown in Table 5.1.

The top selected *AS-path* features that appear on the boundaries of the distributions are shown in Figure 2.3. For example, *AS-path* features 24, 25, and 32 have the highest MIQ, Fisher, and MID scores, respectively. This indicates that during BGP anomalies, the edit distance and AS-PATH length of the BGP announcements tend to have a very high or a very low value and, hence, large variance. This implies that during an anomaly attack, *AS-path* features are the distribution outliers.

Table 5.1: Comparison of feature categories in two-way SVM classification.

SVM	Category	Performance index					
		Accuracy	Precision	Sensitivity	Specificity	Balanced accuracy	F-score
SVM1	<i>volume</i>	68.5	53.6	16.6	73.2	44.9	27.1
SVM1	<i>AS-path</i>	56.4	6.12	29.5	58.8	44.1	3.93
SVM2	<i>volume</i>	87.0	69.6	12.5	99.1	55.8	22.3
SVM2	<i>AS-path</i>	86.0	38.7	1.19	99.6	50.4	2.36
SVM3	<i>volume</i>	94.8	79.7	76.4	97.3	86.8	85.0
SVM3	<i>AS-path</i>	56.9	19.1	79.4	53.8	66.6	64.1

Approximately 58% of the *AS-path* features shown in Table 2.5 are larger than the distribution mean. For example, large length of the AS-PATH BGP attribute implies that the packet is routed via a longer path to its destination, which causes large routing delays during BGP anomalies [32]. In a similar case, very short lengths of AS-PATH attributes occur during BGP hijacks when the new (false) originator usually gains a preferred or shorter path to the destination [51]. The SVM models exhibit better performance than the HMMs in two-way and four-way classifications. The SVM models based on Nimda and Code Red I datasets and the HMMs with two hidden states have the highest accuracies. HMMs based on the number of announcements and number of withdrawals (feature 1 and feature 2) achieve better accuracy in two-way and four-way classifications than models based on the maximum number of AS-PATH length (feature 6) and the maximum edit distance (feature 12). Both SVM and HMM two-way classifications produced better results than four-way classifications because of the common semantics among BGP anomalies. For example, Slammer worm is more correlated to Nimda than to regular RIPE mapped sequence.

We compare the proposed results to rule-based and behavioural techniques by comparing the proposed models with models proposed in the research literature. Table 5.2 illustrates that using rule-based technique [52], the classifier performs worse than the proposed models in two datasets (Nimda and Code Red I) out of three datasets. However, the proposed models achieve better accuracy compared to behavioural techniques [53]. The shaded columns show that the model does not consider the difference among the three anomalies. Instead, it takes into account that the dataset is anomaly rather than specifying the type of anomaly (Slammer, Nimda, and Code Red I). Although it is difficult to make fair comparison because of the differences between the datasets class ranges, feature selection algorithms, and

dataset sources, models proposed in this thesis show better overall results than the two models reported in the literature. It is also important to mention that, to the best of our knowledge, there are no proposed multi-classification models of BGP worms reported in the literature.

Table 5.2: Performance comparison of anomaly detection models.

Dataset	Proposed models							
	SVM	SVM	HMM	HMM	NB	NB	Rule-based	Behavioural
	two-way	four-way	two-way	four-way	two-way	four-way	techniques	techniques
Slammer	89.3	82.8	86.0	70.0	87.4	77.7	94.4	74.0
Nimda	68.6	82.8	86.0	70.0	70.1	77.7	84.1	74.0
Code Red I	79.1	82.8	86.0	70.0	74.1	77.7	74.9	74.0

The development of the proposed models greatly depends on several factors:

- Domain experts involvement: Most labeling assumptions for the BGP worms datasets are based on the technical reports that were released after the worm attacks. There are no agreed time limits to label the data points. In this thesis, we rely on the literature reviews [4] and the visual effect of worms on *volume* features to decide the limits for each dataset.
- Confidentiality of data: Most Internet service providers restrict the access to the collected BGP traffic. Most application layer protocols contain confidential user information. These application layer packets are confidential because they contain private information about the Internet users. Anonymization tools may remove these privacy concerns.
- The Internet rapid development: Due to the fast development of the Internet services, many legitimate traffic data points are captured by the proposed models as anomalous traffic. Hence, a periodic training may be necessary to adapt the proposed models to these new services [11].

Chapter 6

Conclusions

In this thesis, we have analysed BGP anomalies such as Slammer, Nimda, and Code Red I. We compare feature selection algorithms to choose the most correlated features for anomaly class. We introduce new classification features and apply various machine learning algorithms. The proposed models show better performance compared to models proposed in the literature.

We have investigated BGP anomalies and proposed detection models based on the SVM, HMM, and NB classifiers. Classification results show that the best achieved F-scores of the SVM, HMM, and NB models are 86.1%, 84.4%, and 69.7%, respectively. Furthermore, *volume* mapped sequences generate models with better accuracy than *AS-path* mapped sequences. Hence, using the BGP *volume* features is a viable approach for detecting possible worm attacks. The extracted features share similar statistical semantics and, hence, are grouped into two categories. Since BGP anomalies have similar properties and effect on BGP features, the proposed models may be used as online mechanisms to predict new BGP anomalies and detect the onset of worm attacks.

Further investigation of the effect of anomalies and worms on BGP may lead to a better feature extraction process. Furthermore, applying better feature selection algorithms may generate more correlated features of the anomaly class and, hence, may improve the performance of the detection models. Further analysis on the results may lead to better understanding of the performance indices. For example, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis may generate better performance measure than the F-score index. ROC curve shows the relationship between false positive and true positive ratios for various parameters of the machine learning model. An online version of BGPAD tool is developed to

provide a web interface for the end users [26]. Spatio-temporal network anomaly detection is one of the proposed models to build the online system because it takes in consideration the dependency of the data points among each other [54]. Spatio-temporal statistical approach may discover new anomalies that are not present in the training dataset.

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Appendix A

Parameter Assumptions

Table A.1 shows the parameters used in this Thesis.

Table A.1: Sample of a BGP update packet.

Parameter	Value	Explanation
Number of portions in HMM mapping function	11	Heuristic
Number of HMMs	6, 12	All combinations of three values of hidden states and four datasets in two-way and four-way classifications
Number of folds in cross-validation	10	Heuristic
Number of SVM features	37	The total number of defined features
Number of features per HMM observation sequence	2	Arbitrary chosen. More accurate results may be achieved by performing cross-validations
Number of NB features	17	Using continuous and categorical features gives better results than using the combination of continuous, categorical, and binary features
Number of the top selected features	10	Heuristic