


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## Roadmap


- Introduction
- Traffic collection, characterization, and modeling
- Case study: Collection of BCNET traffic
- Internet topology and spectral analysis of Internet graphs
- Machine learning models for feature selection and classification of traffic anomalies
- Conclusions

### Ihr: 535,102 nodes and 601,678 links




http://www.caida.org/home/

### Ihr: 535,102 nodes and 601,678 links



http://www.caida.org/home/

#### Code Red infection



http://www.caida.org/home/

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#### Measurements of network traffic

- Traffic measurements:
  - help understand characteristics of network traffic
  - are basis for developing traffic models
  - are used to evaluate performance of protocols and applications
- Traffic analysis:
  - provides information about the network usage
  - helps understand the behavior of network users
- Traffic prediction:
  - important to assess future network capacity requirements
  - used to plan future network developments




### Traffic modeling: self-similarity


- Self-similarity implies a "fractal-like" behavior
- Data on various time scales have similar patterns
- Implications:
  - no natural length of bursts
  - bursts exist across many time scales
  - traffic does not become "smoother" when aggregated
  - it is unlike Poisson traffic used to model traffic in telephone networks
  - as the traffic volume increases, the traffic becomes more bursty and more self-similar




# Self-similarity: influence of time-scales

#### Genuine MPEG traffic trace









W. E. Leland, M. S. Taqqu, W. Willinger, and D. V. Wilso, "On the self-similar nature of Ethernet traffic (extended version)," *IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.*, vol. 2, no 1, pp. 1-15, Feb. 1994.




# Self-similarity: influence of time-scales

#### Synthetically generated Poisson model








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# BCNET packet capture: physical overview

 BCNET is the hub of advanced telecommunication network in British Columbia, Canada that offers services to research and higher education institutions






#### BCNET packet capture

- BCNET transits have two service providers with
   10 Gbps network links and one service provider with
   1 Gbps network link
- Optical Test Access Point (TAP) splits the signal into two distinct paths
- The signal splitting ratio from TAP may be modified
- The Data Capture Device (NinjaBox 5000) collects the real-time data (packets) from the traffic filtering device



- Net Optics Director 7400 is used for BCNET traffic filtering
- It directs traffic to monitoring tools such as NinjaBox 5000 and FlowMon





#### Network monitoring and analyzing: Endace card

- Endace Data Acquisition and Generation (DAG) 5.2X card resides inside the NinjaBox 5000
- It captures and transmits traffic and has time-stamping capability
- DAG 5.2X is a single port Peripheral Component Interconnect Extended (PCIx) card and is capable of capturing on average Ethernet traffic of 6.9 Gbps

XFP interface with pluggable transceivers FPGA with fan fitted RJ45 socket for time synchronization




### Real time network usage by BCNET members

 The BCNET network is high-speed fiber optic research network

 British Columbia's network extends to 1,400 km and connects Kamloops, Kelowna, Prince George, Vancouver,

and Victoria



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- Internet is a network of Autonomous Systems:
  - groups of networks sharing the same routing policy
  - identified with Autonomous System Numbers (ASN)
- Autonomous System Numbers: http://www.iana.org/ assignments/as-numbers
- Internet topology on AS-level:
  - the arrangement of ASes and their interconnections
- Analyzing the Internet topology and finding properties of associated graphs rely on mining data and capturing information about Autonomous Systems (ASes)



### Variety of graphs

- Random graphs:
  - nodes and edges are generated by a random process
  - Erdős and Rényi model
- Small world graphs:
  - nodes and edges are generated so that most of the nodes are connected by a small number of nodes in between
  - Watts and Strogatz model (1998)



#### Scale-free graphs

- Scale-free graphs:
  - graphs whose node degree distribution follow power-law
  - rich get richer
  - Barabási and Albert model (1999)
- Analysis of complex networks:
  - discovery of spectral properties of graphs
  - constructing matrices describing the network connectivity

# 4

#### Analyzed datasets

- Sample datasets:
  - Route Views:

```
TABLE_DUMP| 1050122432| B| 204.42.253.253| 267| 3.0.0.0/8| 267 2914 174 701| IGP| 204.42.253.253| 0| 0| 267:2914 2914:420 2914:2000 2914:3000| NAG| |
```


RIPE:

```
TABLE_DUMP| 1041811200| B| 212.20.151.234| 13129| 3.0.0.0/8| 13129 6461 7018 | IGP| 212.20.151.234| 0| 0| 6461:5997 13129:3010| NAG| |
```



#### Internet topology at AS level

 Datasets collected from Border Gateway Protocols (BGP) routing tables are used to infer the Internet topology at AS-level





- The Internet topology is characterized by the presence of various power-laws:
  - node degree vs. node rank
  - eigenvalues of the matrices describing Internet graphs (adjacency matrix and normalized Laplacian matrix)
- Power-laws exponents have not significantly changed over the years
- Spectral analysis reveals new historical trends and notable changes in the connectivity and clustering of AS nodes over the years

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#### Traffic anomalies

- Slammer, Nimda, and Code Red I anomalies affected performance of the Internet Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
- BGP anomalies also include: Internet Protocol (IP)
  prefix hijacks, miss-configurations, and electrical
  failures
- Techniques for detecting BGP anomalies have recently gained visible attention and importance



#### Anomaly detection techniques

- Classification problem:
  - assigning an "anomaly" or "regular" label to a data point
- Accuracy of a classifier depends on:
  - extracted features
  - combination of selected features
  - underlying model

#### Goal:

 Detect Internet routing anomalies using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) update messages



#### BGP features

#### Approach:

- Define a set of 37 features based on BGP update messages
- Extract the features from available BGP update messages that are collected during the time period when the Internet experienced anomalies:
  - Slammer
  - Nimda
  - Code Red I



#### Feature selection

- Select the most relevant features for classification using:
  - Fisher
  - Minimum Redundancy Maximum Relevance (mRMR)
  - Odds Ratio
  - Decision Tree
  - Fuzzy Rough Sets



#### Feature classification

- Train classifiers for BGP anomaly detection using:
  - Support Vector Machines
  - Hidden Markov Models
  - Naive Bayes
  - Decision Tree
  - Extreme Learning Machine (ELM)



#### BGP: update messages

- Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) enables exchange of routing information between gateway routers using update messages
- BGP update message collections:
  - Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE) under the Routing Information Service (RIS) project
  - Route Views
  - Available in multi-threaded routing toolkit (MRT) binary format

### BGP: anomalies

Anomaly	Date	Duration (h)
Slammer	January 25, 2003	16
Nimda	September 18, 2001	59
Code Red I	July 19, 2001	10

Training Data	Dataset	
Slammer + Nimda	Dataset 1	
Slammer + Code Red I	Dataset 2	
Code Red I + Nimda	Dataset 3	
Slammer	Dataset 4	
Nimda	Dataset 5	
Code Red I	Dataset 6	



#### Slammer worm

- Sends its replica to randomly generated IP addresses
- Destination IP address gets infected if:
  - it is a Microsoft SQL server or
  - a personal computer with the Microsoft SQL Server Data Engine (MSDE)

### Nimda worm

- Propagates through email messages, web browsers, and file systems
- Viewing the email message triggers the worm payload
- The worm modifies the content of the web document files in the infected hosts and copies itself in all local host directories



#### Code Red I worm

- Takes advantage of vulnerability in the Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) indexing software
- It triggers a buffer overflow in the infected hosts by writing to the buffers without checking their limit



#### BGP: features

- Define 37 features
- Sample every minute during a five-day period:
  - the peak day of an anomaly
  - two days prior and two days after the peak day
- 7,200 samples for each anomalous event:
  - 5,760 regular samples (non-anomalous)
  - 1,440 anomalous samples
  - Imbalanced dataset

### BGP features

Feature	Definition	Category
1	Number of announcements	Volume
2	Number of withdrawals	Volume
3	Number of announced NLRI prefixes	Volume
4	Number of withdrawn NLRI prefixes	Volume
5	Average AS-PATH length	AS-path
6	Maximum AS-PATH length	AS-path
7	Average unique AS-PATH length	AS-path
8	Number of duplicate announcements	Volume
9	Number of duplicate withdrawals	Volume
10	Number of implicit withdrawals	Volume

## BGP features

Feature	Definition	Category
11	Average edit distance	AS-path
12	Maximum edit distance	AS-path
13	Inter-arrival time	Volume
14-24	Maximum edit distance = n, where n = (7,, 17)	AS-path
25-33	Maximum AS-path length = n, where n = (7,, 15)	AS-path
34	Number of IGP packets	Volume
35	Number of EGP packets	Volume
36	Number of incomplete packets	Volume
37	Packet size (B)	Volume



## Feature selection algorithms

- May be employed to select the most relevant features:
  - Fisher
  - Minimum Redundancy Maximum Relevance (mRMR)
  - Odds Ratio
  - Decision Tree
  - Fuzzy Rough Sets



#### Feature selection: decision tree

- Commonly used algorithm in data mining
- Generates a model that predicts the value of a target variable based on several input variables
- A top-down approach is commonly used for constructing decision trees:
  - an appropriate variable is chosen to best split the set of items based on homogeneity of the target variable within subsets
- C5 software tool was used to generate decision trees

C5 [Online]. Available: http://www.rulequest.com/see5-info.html.

## Feature selection: decision tree

Dataset	Training data	Selected Features
Dataset 1	Slammer + Nimda	1-21, 23-29, 34-37
Dataset 2	Slammer + Code Red I	1-22, 24-29, 34-37
Dataset 3	Code Red I + Nimda	1-29, 34-37

- Either four (30, 31, 32, 33) or five (22, 30, 31, 32, 33) features are removed in the constructed trees mainly because:
  - features are numerical and some are used repeatedly



## Feature selection: fuzzy rough sets

- Deal with the approximation of fuzzy sets in a fuzzy approximation space defined by a fuzzy similarity relation or by a fuzzy partition
- The fuzzy similarity relation Sim(C) is:
  - an nxn matrix that describes similarities between any two samples
  - computed by the min operator
- Computational complexity: O(n²m)
  - n is the number of samples
  - m is the number of features

## Feature selection: fuzzy rough sets

Dataset	Training data	Selected Features
Dataset 4	Slammer	1, 3-6, 9, 10, 13-32, 35
Dataset 5	Nimda	1, 3-4, 8-10, 12, 14-32, 35, 36
Dataset 6	Code Red I	3-4, 8-10, 12, 14-32, 35, 36

- Using combination of datasets, for example
   Slammer + Nimda for training leads to higher computational load
- Each dataset was used individually



## Anomaly classifiers: decision tree

Dataset	Testing data	Acctrain	Acctest	Training time (s)
Dataset 1	Code Red I	90.7	78.8	1.8
Dataset 2	Nimda	92.3	72.8	2.1
Dataset 3	Slammer	87.1	23.8	2.3

- Each path from the root node to a leaf node may be transformed into a decision rule
- A set of rules that are obtained from a trained decision tree may be used for classifying unseen samples



## Anomaly classifier: ELM

- Used for learning with a single hidden layer feed forward neural network
- Weights connecting the input and hidden layers with the bias terms are initialized randomly
- Weights connecting the hidden and output layers are analytically determined
- Learns faster than SVMs by a factor of thousands
- Suitable for online applications
- We use all features (37), all continuous features (17), features selected by fuzzy rough sets (28 or 27), and continuous features selected by fuzzy rough sets (9 or 8)

## Anomaly classifiers: ELM

No. of features	Dataset	Acctrain	Acctest	Training time (s)
37	Dataset 1	83.57 ± 0.11	80.01 ± 0.07	2.3043
	Dataset 2	83.53 ± 0.12	79.75 ± 0.08	2.2756
	Dataset 3	80.82 ± 0.09	21.65 ± 1.93	2.2747
17	Dataset 1	84.50 ± 0.07	79.91 ± 0.01	1.9268
	Dataset 2	84.43 ± 0.12	79.53 ± 0.10	1.5928
	Dataset 3	83.06 ± 0.07	51.56 ± 16.38	1.8882

- 195 hidden units
- The binary features 14-33 are removed to form a set of 17 features



## Anomaly classifiers: ELM

No. of features	Dataset	Acc <sub>train</sub>	Acctest
28	Dataset 4	83.08 ± 0.11	80.03 ± 0.06
28 (from 37)	Dataset 5	83.08 ± 0.09	79.78 ± 0.07
27	Dataset 6	80.05 ± 0.00	81.00 ± 1.41
9	Dataset 4	84.59 ± 0.07	80.00 ± 0.05
9 (from 17)	Dataset 5	84.25 ± 0.11	79.79 ± 0.12
8	Dataset 6	83.38 ± 0.04	49.24 ± 12.90

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## Conclusions

- Data collected from deployed networks are used to:
  - evaluate network performance
  - characterize and model traffic (inter-arrival and call holding times)
  - identify trends in the evolution of the Internet topology
  - classify traffic and network anomalies

# Conclusions

- Machine learning algorithms (feature selection and classification algorithms) are used for detecting BGP anomalies
- Performance of classifiers greatly depended on the employed datasets
- Feature selection algorithms were used to improve the performance of classifiers
- For smaller datasets, performance of the ELM classifier was improved by using fuzzy rough sets
- Both decision tree and ELM are relatively fast classifiers with satisfactory accuracy



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