



# Classical Cryptography

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
Sungkyunkwan University

# Cryptography

“secret”

“writing”

# Crypto as black box




A generic view of **key** crypto


Tools for confidentiality and Integrity

# Types of crypto systems

- Symmetric



- Public or Asymmetric



# A framework for crypto

- Cryptography (making), cryptanalysis (breaking), cryptology (both)
- Traditional cryptanalysis – what goes wrong with the design of the algorithms
- Then – what goes wrong with their implementation (power analysis, timing attacks)
- Then – what goes wrong with their use

# Things to remember



- Cryptography is:
  - a tremendous tool
  - the basis for many security mechanisms
- Cryptography is **not**:
  - the solution to all security problems
  - reliable unless implemented and used properly
  - something you should try to invent yourself
    - » too many examples of broken ad-hoc designs

“If you think cryptography is the answer to your problem, you don’t know what your problem is.”

Peter G. Neumann



# The three steps in cryptography

1. Precisely specify a threat (or attack) model
2. Propose a construction
3. Prove that breaking construction under threat mode will solve an underlying hard problem (**Security Proof**)



# Attack models

- Ciphertext only
- Known plaintext
- Chosen plaintext (CPA)
- Chosen ciphertext (CCA1, CCA2)
- Exhaustive key search (in honey encryption)

# Ciphertext only attack

- Attacker has access to a set of ciphertexts
- Guess-and-check
- Frequency analysis

# Known plaintext attack

- Attacker has the ciphertext and some samples of plaintext
- Apply the known plaintext to the ciphertext to help decryption
- Preferred over ciphertext-only

# Chosen plaintext attack

- Chooses a plaintext and receives corresponding ciphertext
- Two variations
  - Batch Chosen-Plaintext
    - Attacker chooses a “batch” of plaintexts before any encrypted ciphertext is received
  - Adaptive chosen-plaintext
    - Attacker makes n-amounts of interactive queries and alters their plaintext based on the previous queries

# Chosen ciphertext attack

- Tries to discover the key
- Uses a ciphertext chosen by attacker
- Relies on being able to obtain decrypted plaintext
- Two variations
  - Lunchtime attack (CCA1)
  - Adaptive chosen-ciphertext (CCA2)

# Lunchtime attack (CCA1)


- Attacker can make queries but only up until a certain point
- Attacker cannot adapt queries
  - Results given after the ability to make queries expires

# Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext (CCA2)


- Similar to normal chosen-ciphertext
- Ciphertext is chosen based on the result of the previous queries

# CCA1 vs CCA2

- CCA1 (Lunchtime Attack)



- CCA2 (Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack)





# History


- Egyptians 4000 years ago
- World war 1&2



Enigma machine

- As a tool to protect national secrets and strategies

# The Imitation game (movie)




<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYfCvBDVSQY>

# Ceasar cipher (no key)

Shift by 3

a → d
b → e
c → f
...
z → c



$$c = E_k(\text{"abbc"})$$
$$= \text{"deef"}$$

# Basic assumptions

- The system is completely known to the attacker
- Only the key is secret
- That is, crypto algorithms are not secret
- This is known as **Kerckhoff's Principle**
- Why do we make this assumption?
  - Experience has shown that secret algorithms are weak when exposed
  - Secret algorithms never remain secret
  - Better to find weaknesses beforehand

# Substitution cipher with shift

Shift by  $k$

$a \rightarrow c$
$b \rightarrow d$
$c \rightarrow e$
...
$z \rightarrow b$

Key  $k$

$$c = E_k(\text{"abbc"}), k = 2 \\ = \text{"cdde"}$$

# How to break this cipher?

## Try them all

- A simple substitution (shift by  $n$ ) is used
  - But the key is unknown
- Given ciphertext: **cdde**
- How to find the key?
- Only 26 possible keys — try them all!
- **Exhaustive key search**
- Solution: key is  $k = 2$

# Substitution cipher with permutation

Use any permutation  
of letters

a → e
b → c
c → q
...
z → a


**Key permutation**

$$c = E_k(\text{"abbc"}) \\ = \text{"eccq"}$$

Then  $26! > 2^{88}$  possible keys!

# How to break this cipher?

- Use letter frequencies; most common letters in English are e, t, a, l, o, n, s, h, r, d, l, u





# An example of cryptanalysis

- Ciphertext:

PBFPVYFBQXZTYFPBFEQJHDXXQVAPTPQJKTOYQWIPBVWLXTOXBTFXQWAXBVCXQWAXFQJVVWLE  
QNTQZQGGQLFXQWAKVWLXQWAEBIPBFXFQVXGTVJVVWLBTPQWAEBFPBFHCVLXBQUFEVWLXG  
DPEQVPQGVPPBFTIXPFHXZHVFAGFOTHFEFBQUFTDHzBQPOTHXTYFTODXQHFTDPTOGHFQPBQ  
WAQJJTODXQHFOQPWTBDHHIXQVAPBFZQHCFWPFHPBFIPBQWKFABVYYDZBOTHBPBQPQJTQOT  
OGHFQAPBFEQJHDXXQVAVXEBQPEFZBVFOJIWFFACFCFHQWAUVWFLQHGXVAFXQHUFHILTT  
AVWAFFAWTEVOITDHFHFQAITIXPFHXAFQHEFZQWGFLVWPTOFFA

Analyze this message using statistics below

## Ciphertext frequency counts:

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
21	26	6	10	12	51	10	25	10	9	3	10	0	1	15	28	42	0	0	27	4	24	22	28	6	8

This might be 'e'.

# Vigenère cipher

- 16th century – the Vigenère

plaintext    tobeornottobethatistheques ...

key            runrunrunrunrunrunrunrunru ...

ciphertext   KIOVIEEIGKIOVNURNVJNUVKHVM ...

- Use repeated patterns at multiples of key length (Kasiski, 1883) – here, 'KIOV'
- Size of key space?
  - If keys are 14-character strings; then key space has size  $26^{14} \approx 2^{66}$
- Modern cryptanalysis (1915): Using index of coincidence to guess the key length

# Variant Vigenère cipher

- Easier to work with ASCII plaintext and hex ciphertext
  - Easier to implement
  - Easier to use (plaintext not limited to lowercase characters)
- Easier to work with byte-wise XOR rather than modular addition

# Variant Vigenère cipher

- The key is a string of bytes
- The plaintext is a string of ASCII characters
- To encrypt, XOR each character in the plaintext with the next character of the key
- Decryption just reverses the process

# Example

- Say plaintext is “Hello!” and key is 0xA1 2F
- “Hello!” = 0x48 65 6C 6C 6F 21
- XOR with 0xA1 2F A1 2F A1 2F
- $0x48 \oplus 0xA1$ 
  - $0100\ 1000 \oplus 1010\ 0001 = 1110\ 1001 = 0xE9$
- Ciphertext: 0xE9 4A CD 43 CE 0E

# Attacking the Vigenère cipher

- Two steps:
  - Determine the key length
  - Determine each character of the key

# Determining the key length

- Let  $p_i$  (for  $0 \leq i \leq 255$ ) be the frequency of byte  $i$  in plaintext (assuming English text)
  - I.e.,  $p_i = 0$  for  $i < 0$  or  $i > 127$
  - I.e.,  $p_{97}$  = frequency of 'a'
  - The distribution is far from uniform
- If the key length is  $N$ , then every  $N^{\text{th}}$  character of the plaintext is encrypted using the same “shift”
  - If we take every  $N^{\text{th}}$  character and calculate frequencies, we should get the  $p_i$ 's in permuted order
  - If we take every  $M^{\text{th}}$  character ( $M$  not a multiple of  $N$ ) and calculate frequencies, we should get something close to uniform

# Determining the key length

- How to distinguish these two?
- For some candidate distribution  $q_0, \dots, q_{255}$ , compute  $\sum q_i^2$ 
  - If close to uniform,  $\sum q_i^2 \approx 256 \cdot (1/256)^2 = 1/256$
  - If a permutation of  $p_i$ , then  $\sum q_i^2 \approx \sum p_i^2$ 
    - Could compute  $\sum p_i^2$  (but somewhat difficult)
    - Key point: will be much larger than  $1/256$
- Try all possibilities for the key length, compute  $\sum q_i^2$ , and look for **maximum** value



# Index of Coincidence - Plaintext

Letter	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m
Frequency	.082	.015	.028	.043	.127	.022	.020	.061	.070	.002	.008	.040	.024
Letter	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z
Frequency	.067	.075	.019	.001	.060	.063	.091	.028	.010	.023	.001	.020	.001

Beker and Piper, *Cipher Systems: The Protection of Communications*, Wiley.

$$\begin{array}{ccccccccccc}
 \text{aa} & \text{or} & \text{bb} & \text{or} & \text{cc} & \text{or} & \dots & \text{or} & \text{zz} \\
 .082 \times .082 & + & .015 \times .015 & + & .028 \times .028 & + & \dots & + & .001 \times .001
 \end{array}$$

$$I \approx 0.0656010$$

# Index of Coincidence - Uniform

$$I \approx \left(\frac{1}{26} \times \frac{1}{26}\right) + \left(\frac{1}{26} \times \frac{1}{26}\right) + \left(\frac{1}{26} \times \frac{1}{26}\right) + \dots + \left(\frac{1}{26} \times \frac{1}{26}\right) = \frac{1}{26} \approx 0.038$$

26 terms

# Determining the $i^{\text{th}}$ byte of the key

- Assume the key length  $N$  is known
- Look at every  $N^{\text{th}}$  character of the ciphertext, starting with the  $i^{\text{th}}$  character
  - Call this the  $i^{\text{th}}$  ciphertext “stream”
  - Note that all bytes in this stream were generated by XORing plaintext with the same byte of the key
- Try decrypting the stream using every possible byte value  $B$ 
  - Get a candidate plaintext stream for each value

# Determining the $i^{\text{th}}$ byte of the key

- When the guess  $B$  is correct:
  - All bytes in the plaintext stream will be between 0 and 127
  - Frequencies of lowercase letters (as a fraction of all lowercase letters) should be close to known English-letter frequencies
    - Tabulate  $q_a, \dots, q_z$
    - Should find  $\sum q_i p_i \approx \sum p_i^2 \approx 0.065$
    - In practice, take  $B$  that maximizes  $\sum q_i p_i$ , subject to caveat above (and possibly others)

# Attack time?

- The key length is between 1 and  $L$
- Determining the key length:  $\approx 256 L$
- Determining all bytes of the key:
  - Guessing  $B$  at  $i$ th character: 256
  - Calculating  $\sum q_i p_i$  at  $i$ th character: 256
  - Total:  $256^2 L$
- Brute-force key search:  $\approx 256^L$

# The attack in practice

- Attacks get more reliable as the ciphertext length grows larger
- Attacks still work for short(er) ciphertexts, but more “tweaking” and manual involvement is needed

# One Time Pad (OTP)

First example of a “secure” cipher

*Choose key  $k$  as random  
bit string as long the  
message!*

$$\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} = \{0, 1\}^n$$

$$\mathcal{K} = \{0, 1\}^n$$

$$\text{Encryption: } c = k \oplus m$$

Very fast enc/dec !!

... but long keys (as long as plaintext)

# Quiz

You are given a message ( $m$ ) and its OTP encryption ( $c$ ).

Q. Can you compute the OTP key from  $m$  and  $c$ ?

Yes, the key is  $k = m \oplus c$ .



# OTP has perfect secrecy

Q. What is the perfect secrecy?

# Information Theoretic Security

(Shannon 1949)

Def: A cipher  $(E, D)$  over  $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C})$  has **perfect secrecy** if

$$\forall m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M} \quad (|m_0| = |m_1|) \quad \text{and} \quad \forall c \in \mathcal{C}$$

$$Pr[E(k, m_0) = c] = Pr[E(k, m_1) = c] \quad \text{where} \quad k \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{K}$$

- Given  $c$ , we can't tell if  $m$  is  $m_0$  or  $m_1$
- Any adversary can't learn any information about  $m$  from  $c$
- In other words,  $m$  and  $c$  are independent
- No ciphertext only attack!! (but other attacks might be possible)



# Claude Shannon



Claude Shannon



Scholar

About 60,400 results (0.03 sec)

Articles

Case law

My library

## A mathematical theory of communication

CE **Shannon** - ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and ..., 2001 - dl.acm.org

THE recent development of various methods of modulation such as PCM and PPM which exchange band-width for signal-to-noise ratio has intensified the interest in a general theory of communication. A basis for such a theory is contained in the important papers of Nyquist 1

Cited by 93703 Related articles All 677 versions Cite Saved

# OTP has perfect secrecy

(Shannon 1949)

**Proof:**

$\forall m, c :$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[E(k, m) = c] &= |\{ k \in \mathcal{K} : E(k, m) = c \}| / |\mathcal{K}| \\ &= 1 / |\mathcal{K}| \end{aligned}$$

# Unfortunately ...

(Shannon's theorem)

**Thm: If a shared-key encryption has perfect secrecy**

$$\Rightarrow |\mathcal{K}| \geq |\mathcal{M}|$$

- That is, key length should be greater than message length to achieve perfect secrecy.
- It is hard to use in practice!!!

# Using the same key twice?

- $c_1 = k \oplus m_1$

$$c_2 = k \oplus m_2$$


- Attacker can compute

$$c_1 \oplus c_2 = (k \oplus m_1) \oplus (k \oplus m_2) = m_1 \oplus m_2$$

- This leaks information about  $m_1, m_2$ !
  - No longer perfectly secret! (e.g.,  $m_1 \oplus m_2$  reveals where  $m_1, m_2$  differ)
  - Frequency analysis

# OTP in practice: The Moscow-Washington hotline

- A device called *Electronic Teleprinter Cryptographic Regenerative Repeater Mixer II* (ETCRRM II) encrypted the teletype messages.
- ETCRRM II used OTP.
- Each country delivered **keying tapes** used to encode its messages via its **embassy** abroad.




# Codebook Cipher

- Literally, a book filled with “codewords”
- Zimmerman Telegram encrypted via codebook

Februar	13605
fest	13732
finanzielle	13850
folgender	13918
Frieden	17142
Friedensschluss	17149
:	:

- Modern block ciphers are codebooks!





# One more thing!

- Fundamental concepts
  - **Confusion** — obscure relationship between plaintext and ciphertext
  - **Diffusion** — spread plaintext statistics through the ciphertext
- One-time pad is confusion-only

# Double transposition

Plaintext: **attackxatxdawn**

	col 1	col 2	col 3
row 1	a	t	t
row 2	a	c	k
row 3	x	a	t
row 4	x	d	a
row 5	w	n	x

Permute rows  
and columns



	col 1	col 3	col 2
row 3	x	t	a
row 5	w	x	n
row 1	a	t	t
row 4	x	a	d
row 2	a	k	c

- Ciphertext: **xtawxnatxadakc**
- What is the key?
- Key is matrix size and permutations: (3,5,1,4,2) and (1,3,2)
- Double transposition is **diffusion-only**

# Modern Cipher Systems

- Many systems from the last century use stream ciphers for speed / low gate count
- Bank systems use a 1970s block cipher, the data encryption standard or DES; recently moving to triple-DES for longer keys
- New systems mostly use the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), regardless of whether a block cipher or stream cipher is needed

# Questions?

