

# Protocols

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## Questions and answers

1. Explain the two major concepts of authentication and its purpose in basic words?
  - Data origin authentication: ensure integrity
  - Entity authentication: identify involved parties
2. If you are presented a protocol what are the criteria you would judge it with?
  - Integrity (Authenticity of data origin)
  - Freshness (eg. nonce)
  - Liveness (not old, eg. time-stamp)
  - Protocol must embed identities (e.g.: message is for Bob.. so no other package is not valid for other receivers )
3. Referring to the following agreement. Does it fulfil all of the above criteria
  - Alice => Bob: {Session-Key}Public-KeyBob
  - KeyMAC = HMAC(Session-Key || 'MAC')
  - KeyENC = HMAC(Session-Key || 'ENC')
  - Answer
    - Authenticity of data origin: yes via KeyMAC
    - Freshness: I believe no as Alice is not bound to generate a new Session-Key everytime, at least in this example (in reality some kind of nonce would be involved and then "Freshness" would be ok)
    - Liveness: not fulfilled
    - Protocol: yes halfway, the message is for Bob as only he can decipher session key. However, Alice identity is not secured.
4. Referring to the Needham-Schroeder protocol. How can Bob tell the first message he receives of Alice {Session-Key, Alice}KeyBob is a fresh one?
  - He cannot. It could be from a previously established connection. However, Bob will try to ensure that this is a first time message by sending an encrypted Nonce to Alice and as only Alice can decipher it, only she could respond correctly.

## Notes and varia

*mainly from video (a bit redundant with answers to questions)*

### Authentication

- Data origin authentication: integrity (usually via MACS)
- Entity authentication (identify parties)
  - Unilateral (only one party)
  - Mutual

### Authentication requirements

- Authenticity of data origin
- Freshness (eg. nonce)
- Liveness (not old, eg. time-stamp)

- Protocol must embed identities (e.g.: message is for Bob.. so no other package is not valid for other receivers )

**key agreement** -> how to get both parties to have the same session key (also see diagrams in video)

- public/private key agreement
  - Alice will generate a session key and encrypt it with public key from Bob (from bobs certificate).
    - Attention: session key is not directly used. (as this would provide an attacker with info)
    - for integrity: HMAC(Session-Key || MAC)
    - for encryption: HMAC(Session-Key || ENC)
- Diffi-Hellmann -> secret is calculated on each side...
- Needham-Schroeder Protocol
  - based on trusted third party
  - vulnerable to replay attacks
  - <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Needham-Schroeder-Protokoll>
- Kerberos
  - based on trusted third party