Windows Attack Lab - Step 11 - Abusing Domain Admin

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Methodology

With a Domain Admin's credentials it's possible to sync the whole Acitve Directory to get all user (at least their NTLM hashes).



Answers

- What can we do with the hash retrieved from the domain controller using DCSync?
  - Use those hashes to login as other users (again with pass-the-hash)
- What otherwise legitimate activity are we abusing when we perform a DCSync attack?
  - This sync is usually used between multiple Domain Controller and is a legit task
- What kind of privileges are required to perform this attack?
  - A Domain Admin is required
- How can Mimikatz make the RDP client use Ffast's credentials, without knowing the plaintext password?
  - Mimikatz injects the NTLM hash into memory
  - RDP client can then directly use the hash without prompting for a password (keyword "using windows credentials")
- Why was it still not possible to log in to the domain controller using RDP and the NTLM hash of Ffast?
  - Restricted Admin was not activated. Because of this only cleartext passwords are accepted.

    - Restricted Admin is security feature to prevent a interactive logon and therefore no NTLM hashes will be stored on the remote client
    - But activating this allows then pass-the-hash
- How did we bypass this RDP security feature?
    - Executing a Powershell command via `atexec` to activate Restricted Admin